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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 1/17/2017

File Folder ROMANIA - CORRESPONDENCE (1)

FOIA

F1640/3

Box Number 5

HERSHBERG

46

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
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187293	LETTER	RR TO CEAUSESCU	2	5/11/1981	B1
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187312	LETTER	RR TO CEAUSESCU	1	ND	B1
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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

April 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu

Attached is a letter from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to the President presented by the Romanian Ambassador on April 2. The letter sets forth Romania's views on the CSCE Conference in Madrid and reiterates Romania's request for U.S. support for Bucharest as the site of the next CSCE Review Conference. We will prepare a suggested reply for the President's signature.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive SecretaryAttachment:
As stated.**UNCLASSIFIED**

HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. RONALD REAGAN
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

In the spirit of the relations of cooperation established between our countries and starting from the responsibility of the States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, for the peace and security of the European peoples, I address myself to You in matters related to the development of the present Madrid meeting wishing for its conclusion with positive results.

In the present international situation it is necessary to do everything possible for the resumption and continuation of the policy of peace, detente, respect for national independence and cooperation, to ensure a world of peace and equality to the present and the future generations, so that each people could develop freely, without any aggression or interference from outside, according to its own interests and aspirations.

I consider that the central issue of the Madrid meeting should be the adoption of agreements meant to open the way for the strengthening of confidence, stopping the arms race and the adoption of concrete measures towards military disengagement and disarmament. That is why the Madrid meeting should establish the convening of a Conference for confidence building measures and disarmament in Europe, as part of the process initiated by the Helsinki Conference, at a date allowing its thorough preparation.

To this end, I believe that a reunion of experts should be decided upon in Madrid, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, ensuring the proper preparation of the Conference.

I consider that a basis of negotiations likely to lead to the achievement of a consensus within the framework of the Madrid meeting regarding the convening of the Conference on confidence building and disarmament is offered by the recent proposals submitted by Leonid Ilyitch Brezhnev, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, regarding the expansion of the zone of implementation of the confidence building measures on the whole European territory of the U.S.S.R. and the quantitative and qualitative freezing of the nuclear medium range missiles in Europe, simultaneously with starting immediate negotiations for their reduction.

I would also consider that the Madrid meeting should adopt decisions leading to the development of the political, economic, technical, scientific, cultural and other relations among the participating States, it should agree upon measures for the assuring the democratic rights and liberties, the elimination of any manifestations of neo-nazism, chauvinism and irredentism, of terrorist actions, for the extension of human contacts aiming at better mutual knowledge and rapprochement among peoples.

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act, the meeting must ensure the continuation of the process initiated by the Helsinki Conference and therefore it should establish the place and date of the next meeting. As You know, Romania offered to host this meeting in Bucharest, ensuring the proper conditions for good progress of its works. We express our confidence that this proposal will receive the support of your country's Government and will reach the consensus of the participating States at the meeting.

As far as Romania is concerned, she is determined to make steady efforts to ensure the success of the Madrid meeting and will further cooperate with Your country, with the other participating States, to agree upon measures able to give a new impulse to the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.

In conclusion, I convey my greetings to You and I express my desire to further develop the relations between our countries, their cooperation on the international arena, for a policy of peace, detente, national independence and security in Europe and throughout the world.

With the highest regards,

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

PRESIDENT

OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

EXCELENTEI SALE
DOMNULUI RONALD REAGAN
PRESEDINTELE STATELOR UNITE ALE AMERICII

În spiritul relațiilor de colaborare statornicite între țările noastre și pornind de la răspunderea statelor semnatare ale Actului Final de la Helsinki față de pacea și securitatea popoarelor europene, mă adresez Dumneavoastră în probleme legate de desfășurarea actualei reuniuni de la Madrid, în dorința ca aceasta să se încheie cu rezultate pozitive.

În actualele împrejurări internaționale este necesar să se facă totul pentru reluarea și continuarea politicii de pace, destindere, respect al independenței naționale și colaborării, pentru a asigura generațiilor de azi și de mâine o lume a păcii și egalității în care fiecare popor să se dezvolte în mod liber, la adăpost de orice agresiune și ingerință, în conformitate cu interesele și aspirațiile sale.

Consider că pe primul plan al reuniunii de la Madrid trebuie să fie adoptarea de înțelegeri care să deschidă calea întăririi încrederii, opririi cursei înarmărilor și trecerii la măsuri concrete în direcția dezangajării militare și a dezarmării. De aceea reuniunea de la Madrid

ar trebui să stabilească convocarea, în cadrul procesului inițiat de Conferința de la Helsinki, a unei conferințe pentru măsuri de încredere și dezarmare în Europa, la o dată care să permită o pregătire temeinică. În acest scop, cred că ar trebui ca la Madrid să se convină ținerea unei reuniuni de experți, cu participarea tuturor statelor semnatare ale Actului Final, care să asigure pregătirea corespunzătoare a conferinței.

Apreciez că o bază de negocieri de natură să conducă la realizarea unui consens în cadrul reuniunii de la Madrid privind convocarea conferinței pentru încredere și dezarmare oferă și recente propuneri prezentate de președintele Prezidiului Sovietului Suprem al Uniunii Sovietice, Leonid Ilici Brejnev, privind extinderea zonei de aplicare a măsurilor de încredere asupra întregii părți europene a U.R.S.S. și înghețarea cantitativă și calitativă a mijloacelor racheto-nucleare cu raza medie de acțiune în Europa, concomitent cu începerea imediată de negocieri pentru reducerea acestora.

Consider, de asemenea, că reuniunea de la Madrid ar trebui să adopte hotărâri care să ducă la dezvoltarea relațiilor politice, economice, tehnico-științifice, culturale și în alte domenii între statele participante, să convină măsuri pentru apărarea drepturilor și libertăților democratice, eliminarea oricăror manifestări de neonazism, sovism și iredentism, a acțiunilor teroriste, pentru lărgirea contactelor între oameni, în scopul unei mai bune cunoașteri reciproce și apropierii între popoare.

În conformitate cu prevederile Actului Final, reuniunea trebuie să asigure continuitatea procesului inițiat de Conferința de la Helsinki și, ca atare, să stabilească locul și data următoarei reuniuni. După cum cunoașteți, România s-a oferit să găzduiască la București această reuniune, pentru care va asigura condiții corespunzătoare

unei bune desfășurări a lucrărilor. Ne exprimăm încrederea că această propunere se va bucura de sprijinul guvernului țării Dumneavoastră și va întruni consensul statelor participante la reuniune.

În ceea ce o privește, România este hotărâtă să depună în continuare eforturi pentru asigurarea succesului reuniunii de la Madrid și va conlucra și de acum încolo cu țara Dumneavoastră, cu celelalte state participante, pentru convenirea măsurilor care să dea un nou impuls aplicării Actului Final de la Helsinki.

În încheiere, vă adresez salutul meu și îmi exprim dorința de a dezvolta în viitor relațiile dintre țările noastre, conlucrarea dintre ele pe arena internațională pentru o politică de pace, destindere, independență națională și securitate în Europa și în lume.

Cu cele mai alese sentimente,

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

PRESEDINTELE
REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE ROMANIA

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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REFERRAL

DATE: 11 MAY 81 10

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: CEAUSESCU, NICOLAE

FROM: PRES

DATE: 11 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: ROMANIA

HS

CSCE

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO CEAUSESCU ^{for} OF APR 2

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:

Cathy Millison
FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO FARRAR

RENTSCHLER

LORD

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PIPES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


11

May 11, 1981

MR. PREISIDENT:

Attached for your signature is a letter to President Ceausescu of Romania which was drafted by State, and approved by Dick Allen and Ed Meese.

Secretary Baldrige would like to hand carry the letter, and is leaving tonight for Romania.



Richard G. Darman

Mr. Muse approved
text of letter by phone
5/11/89

Secretary Baldridge
leaves for E. Europe
tonight (5/11) ^{En}
would like to
hand carry letter.

JL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Response to President Ceausescu of Romania

The attached letter from you to Romanian President Ceausescu drafted by the Department of State (Tab A) refers to Ambassador Kampelman's visit to Romania on April 30, to Secretary Baldrige's planned visit to Romania May 13-15 and to Secretary Haig's forthcoming meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei in Washington, May 15.

This proposed reply would maintain a valuable and regular channel of communication with Romania established during the previous Administration. President Carter and President Ceausescu were known to have corresponded frequently. Upon your election, President Ceausescu indicated he would like to maintain this practice of exchanging letters. Specifically, in February 1981, Ceausescu instructed the Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei to convey to our Ambassador to Romania O. Rudolph Aggrey his desire to continue this correspondence. Subsequently, the State Department tasked Ambassador Aggrey to inform the Romanian government that this Administration would value the continuation of these confidential exchanges on bilateral and broader issues which proved so useful in the past.

I recommend that you sign and forward this letter to President Ceausescu. The NSC Staff and the speechwriters concur on the text.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

SIGNED
5/11/81



S/S 8113042

1689

14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Response to Letter from
President Ceausescu

Attached are the signed original of a letter from President Ceausescu to President Reagan and a proposed draft reply. A translation of the text of President Ceausescu's letter was transmitted to you April 2.

Our proposed reply refers to the visit to Romania on April 30 by Ambassador Kampelman, who will be consulting on CSCE matters, to Secretary Baldrige's planned visit to Romania May 13-15, and to Secretary Haig's forthcoming meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei in Washington May 15.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. RONALD REAGAN
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Esteemed Mr. President,

In the spirit of the relations of cooperation established between our countries and starting from the responsibility of the States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, for the peace and security of the European peoples, I address myself to You in matters related to the development of the present Madrid meeting wishing for its conclusion with positive results.

In the present international situation it is necessary to do everything possible for the resumption and continuation of the policy of peace, detente, respect for national independence and cooperation, to ensure a world of peace and equality to the present and the future generations, so that each people could develop freely, without any aggression or interference from outside, according to its own interests and aspirations.

I consider that the central issue of the Madrid meeting should be the adoption of agreements meant to open the way for the strengthening of confidence, stopping the arms race and the adoption of concrete measures towards

military disengagement and disarmament. That is why the Madrid meeting should establish the convening of a Conference for confidence building measures and disarmament in Europe, as part of the process initiated by the Helsinki Conference, at a date allowing its thorough preparation. To this end, I believe that a reunion of experts should be decided upon in Madrid, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, ensuring the proper preparation of the Conference.

I consider that a basis of negotiations likely to lead to the achievement of a consensus within the framework of the Madrid meeting regarding the convening of the Conference on confidence building and disarmament is offered by the recent proposals submitted by Leonid Ilyitch Brezhnev, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, regarding the expansion of the zone of implementation of the confidence building measures on the whole European territory of the U.S.S.R. and the quantitative and qualitative freezing of the nuclear medium range missiles in Europe, simultaneously with starting immediate negotiations for their reduction.

I would also consider that the Madrid meeting should adopt decisions leading to the development of the political, economic, technical, scientific, cultural and other relations among the participating States, it should agree upon measures for the assuring the democratic rights and liberties, the elimination of any manifestations of neo-nazism, chauvinism and irredentism, of terrorist actions, for the extension of human contacts aiming at better mutual knowledge and rapprochement among peoples.

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act, the meeting must ensure the continuation of the process initiated by the Helsinki Conference and therefore it should establish the place and date of the next meeting. As You

- 3 -

know, Romania offered to host this meeting in Bucharest, ensuring the proper conditions for good progress of its works. We express our confidence that this proposal will receive the support of Your country's Government and will reach the consensus of the participating States at the meeting.

As far as Romania is concerned, she is determined to make steady efforts to ensure the success of the Madrid meeting and will further cooperate with Your country, with the other participating States, to agree upon measures able to give a new impulse to the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.

In conclusion, I convey my greetings to You and I express my desire to further develop the relations between our countries; their cooperation on the international arena, for a policy of peace, detente, national independence and security in Europe and throughout the world.

With the highest regards,



București, 30 martie 1981

18

*Președintele
Republicii Socialiste România*

Stimate domnule președinte,

În spiritul relațiilor de colaborare statornicite între țările noastre și pornind de la răspunderea statelor semnatare ale Actului Final de la Helsinki față de pacea și securitatea popoarelor europene, mă adresez Dumneavoastră în probleme legate de desfășurarea actualei Reuniuni de la Madrid, în dorința ca aceasta să se încheie cu rezultate pozitive.

În actualele împrejurări internaționale este necesar să se facă totul pentru reluarea și continuarea politicii de pace, destindere, respect al independenței naționale și colaborării, pentru a asigura generațiilor de azi și de mâine o lume a păcii și egalității în care fiecare popor să se dezvolte în mod liber la adăpost de orice agresiune și ingerință, în conformitate cu interesele și aspirațiile sale.

Consider că pe primul plan al Reuniunii de la Madrid trebuie să fie adoptarea de înțelegeri care să deschidă calea întăririi încrederii, opririi cursei înarmărilor și trecerii la măsuri concrete în direcția dezangajării militare și a dezarmării. De aceea, Reuniunea de la Madrid ar trebui să stabilească convocarea, în cadrul procesului inițiat de Conferința de la Helsinki, a unei conferințe pentru măsuri de încredere și dezarmare în Europa, la o dată care să permită o pregătire temeinică. În acest scop, cred că ar trebui ca la Madrid să se convină ținerea unei reuniuni de experți, cu participarea

./.

Excelenței Sale
Domnului RONALD REAGAN,
Președintele Statelor Unite ale Americii



tuturor statelor semnatare ale Actului Final, care să asigure pregătirea corespunzătoare a Conferinței.

Apreciez că o bază de negocieri de natură să conducă la realizarea unui consens în cadrul Reuniunii de la Madrid privind convocarea conferinței pentru încredere și dezarmare oferă și recente propuneri prezentate de președintele Prezidiului Sovietului Suprem al Uniunii Sovietice, Leonid Ilici Brejnev, privind extinderea zonei de aplicare a măsurilor de încredere asupra întregii părți europene a U.R.S.S. și înghețarea cantitativă și calitativă a mijloacelor racheto-nucleare cu rază medie de acțiune în Europa, concomitent cu începerea imediată de negocieri pentru reducerea acestora.

Consider, de asemenea, că Reuniunea de la Madrid ar trebui să adopte hotărâri care să ducă la dezvoltarea relațiilor politice, economice, tehnico-științifice, culturale și în alte domenii între statele participante, să convină măsuri pentru apărarea drepturilor și libertăților democratice, eliminarea oricăror manifestări de neonazism, șovinism și iredentism, a acțiunilor teroriste, pentru lărgirea contactelor între oameni, în scopul unei mai bune cunoașteri reciproce și apropierii între popoare.

În conformitate cu prevederile Actului Final, Reuniunea trebuie să asigure continuitatea procesului inițiat de Conferința de la Helsinki și ca atare să stabilească locul și data următoarei reuniuni. După cum cunoașteți, România s-a oferit să găzduiască la București această reuniune, pentru care va asigura condiții corespunzătoare unei bune desfășurări a lucrărilor. Ne exprimăm încrederea că această propunere se va bucura de sprijinul guvernului țării Dumneavoastră și va întruni consensul statelor participante la reuniune.

În ceea ce o privește, România este hotărâtă să depună în continuare eforturi pentru asigurarea succesului Reuniunii de la Madrid și va conlucra și de acum încolo cu țara Dumneavoastră, cu



celelalte state participante, pentru convenirea măsurilor care să dea un nou impuls aplicării Actului Final de la Helsinki.

În încheiere, vă adresez salutul meu și îmi exprim dorința de a dezvolta în viitor relațiile dintre țările noastre, conlucrarea dintre ele pe arena internațională pentru o politică de pace, destindere, independență națională și securitate în Europa și în lume.

Cu cele mai alese sentimente,



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

April 3, 1981

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L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

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- 2 -

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With the highest regards,

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

PRESIDENT

OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

EXCELENTEI SALE
DOMNULUI RONALD REAGAN
PRESEDINTELE STATELOR UNITE ALE AMERICII

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ar trebui să stabilească convocarea, în cadrul procesului inițiat de Conferința de la Helsinki, a unei conferințe pentru măsuri de încredere și dezarmare în Europa, la o dată care să permită o pregătire temeinică. În acest scop, cred că ar trebui ca la Madrid să se convină ținerea unei reuniuni de experți, cu participarea tuturor statelor semnatare ale Actului Final, care să asigure pregătirea corespunzătoare a conferinței.

Apreciez că o bază de negocieri de natură să conducă la realizarea unui consens în cadrul reuniunii de la Madrid privind convocarea conferinței pentru încredere și dezarmare oferă și recente propuneri prezentate de președintele Prezidiului Sovietului Suprem al Uniunii Sovietice, Leonid Ilici Brejnev, privind extinderea zonei de aplicare a măsurilor de încredere asupra întregii părți europene a U.R.S.S. și înghețarea cantitativă și calitativă a mijloacelor racheto-nucleare cu raza medie de acțiune în Europa, concomitent cu începerea imediată de negocieri pentru reducerea acestora.

Consider, de asemenea, că reuniunea de la Madrid ar trebui să adopte hotărâri care să ducă la dezvoltarea relațiilor politice, economice, tehnico-științifice, culturale și în alte domenii între statele participante, să convină măsuri pentru apărarea drepturilor și libertăților democratice, eliminarea oricăror manifestări de neonazism, șovinism și iredentism, a acțiunilor teroriste, pentru lărgirea contactelor între oameni, în scopul unei mai bune cunoașteri reciproce și apropierii între popoare.

În conformitate cu prevederile Actului Final, reuniunea trebuie să asigure continuitatea procesului inițiat de Conferința de la Helsinki și, ca atare, să stabilească locul și data următoarei reuniuni. După cum cunoașteți, România s-a oferit să găzduiască la București această reuniune, pentru care va asigura condiții corespunzătoare

- 3 -

unei bune desfășurări a lucrărilor. Ne exprimăm încrederea că această propunere se va bucura de sprijinul guvernului țării Dumneavoastră și va întruni consensul statelor participante la reuniune.

În ceea ce o privește, România este hotărâtă să depună în continuare eforturi pentru asigurarea succesului reuniunii de la Madrid și va conlucra și de acum încolo cu țara Dumneavoastră, cu celelalte state participante, pentru convenirea măsurilor care să dea un nou impuls aplicării Actului Final de la Helsinki.

În încheiere, vă adresez salutul meu și îmi exprim dorința de a dezvolta în viitor relațiile dintre țările noastre, conlucrarea dintre ele pe arena internațională pentru o politică de pace, destindere, independență națională și securitate în Europa și în lume.

Cu cele mai alese sentimente,

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

PRESEDINTELE
REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE ROMANIA

2896

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1981


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation
with Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei

Attached for your files is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's May 15 meeting with
Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei.


Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

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9/17/17

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~~SECRET~~

2896

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen
Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (European Affairs)
Harry Barnes, former U.S. Ambassador to Romania (interpreter)
Paula Dobriansky, NSC Staff Member

Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei
Romanian Ambassador to U.S. Nicolae Ionescu
Corneliu Bogdan, Director for the Americas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME: Friday, May 15, 1981; 11:30 - 11:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President opened the meeting by welcoming Foreign Minister Andrei. (C)

Foreign Minister Andrei responded by expressing his thanks and gratitude for having the opportunity to meet with the President and by conveying President Ceausescu's best wishes and warm regards to the President. He went on to stress the great importance Romania attaches to its relations with the United States -- particularly in the political and economic realm. Specifically, he referred to the importance of MFN being extended to Romania and the fact that the United States constitutes Romania's third largest trading partner. Both developments have significantly broadened their overall relations. Lastly, he mentioned that Romania is seeking to strengthen cooperation in the international field and hopes the U.S. will join in this effort. (S)

The President replied that he respected Romania's independent and special position within the Warsaw Pact and hoped that it will continue to pursue such an autonomous course. (S)

In response, the Foreign Minister assured the President that Romania will continue to support this policy and added it would be of great assistance if the U.S. would join Romania in its efforts to lessen international tensions. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on May 15, 2001
Classified and Extended by RValley
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

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BY RW

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2

The President then reaffirmed his wholehearted approval of Romania's independent course and the need to maintain good bilateral relations. (S)

Foreign Minister Andrei went on to say that he would be meeting with Secretary of State Haig in the afternoon, at which time he would continue to discuss and explain the Romanian position on some very pressing issues. That very morning President Ceausescu had given him instructions regarding Lebanon, and he wanted to discuss this issue with the Secretary of State. (S)

The Foreign Minister again expressed and emphasized the importance of good U.S.-Romanian relations and specifically made reference to Secretary of Commerce Baldrige's May 14-15 trip to Bucharest. He maintained that Baldrige's trip signified an expression of U.S. goodwill. He then conveyed President Ceausescu's invitation to the President to visit Romania and said he sincerely hoped the President will accept this invitation. (S)

The President replied that he looked forward to the invitation. (S)

The Foreign Minister added that a Presidential visit to Bucharest would be a clear manifestation of the special relationship between the U.S. and Romania. (S)

At this point the meeting concluded to enable Foreign Minister Andrei to attend a luncheon at the State Department and to meet with Secretary of State Haig. (C)

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation
with Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei

Attached for your files is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's May 15 meeting with
Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei.


Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

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~~SECRET~~

2896

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen
Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (European Affairs)
Harry Barnes, former U.S. Ambassador to Romania (interpreter)
Paula Dobriansky, NSC Staff Member

Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei
Romanian Ambassador to U.S. Nicolae Ionescu
Corneliu Bogdan, Director for the Americas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME: Friday, May 15, 1981; 11:30 - 11:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

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In response, the Foreign Minister assured the President that Romania will continue to support this policy and added it would be of great assistance if the U.S. would join Romania in its efforts to lessen international tensions. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on May 15, 2001
Classified and Extended by RValley
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

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BY RW DATE 11/17/07

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2

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Foreign Minister Andrei went on to say that he would be meeting with Secretary of State Haig in the afternoon, at which time he would continue to discuss and explain the Romanian position on some very pressing issues. That very morning President Ceausescu had given him instructions regarding Lebanon, and he wanted to discuss this issue with the Secretary of State. (S)

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The President replied that he looked forward to the invitation. (S)

The Foreign Minister added that a Presidential visit to Bucharest would be a clear manifestation of the special relationship between the U.S. and Romania. (S)

At this point the meeting concluded to enable Foreign Minister Andrei to attend a luncheon at the State Department and to meet with Secretary of State Haig. (C)

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2896

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen
Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (European Affairs)
Harry Barnes, former U.S. Ambassador to Romania (interpreter)
Paula Dobriansky, NSC Staff Member

Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei
Romanian Ambassador to U.S. Nicolae Ionescu
Corneliu Bogdan, Director for the Americas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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AND PLACE: Oval Office

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~~SECRET~~

Review on May 15, 2001
Classified and Extended by RVALlen
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

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HLRR M37111 #60818

BY FW DATE 11/17/87

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2

The President then reaffirmed his wholehearted approval of Romania's independent course and the need to maintain good bilateral relations. (S)

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At this point the meeting concluded to enable Foreign Minister Andrei to attend a luncheon at the State Department and to meet with Secretary of State Haig. (C)

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

JANET COLSON

Jan 21/1322

BUD NANCE

Jan 21/1600

DICK ALLEN

Jan 25/1721

IRENE DERUS

Jan 26/1720

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

Jan 26/0125

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

2896
GH

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL with
SECRET Attachment

May 19, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation
with Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei

Attached (Tab I) for your approval is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei held on May 15, 1981. Your approval is also requested so that distribution can be made to Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Commerce Baldrige. A transmitting memorandum for your signature is included at Tab II. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation (Tab I) for the record.

Approve *lva* Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum at Tab II to Secretaries Haig and Baldrige, which would transmit copies of the Memorandum of Conversation.

Approve *Rva* Disapprove _____

SIGNED

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation for the record.
Tab II Memorandum to Secretaries Haig and Baldrige
transmitting Memcon

pu
1/17/87
CONFIDENTIAL with
SECRET Attachment
Review May 19, 1987.

*Paper, file
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2743
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 22, 1981

Dear Mr. President:


Thank you for your warm letter, which Foreign Minister Andrei delivered to me when we met on May 15. I very much appreciate your kind invitation to visit Romania, and I hope it will be possible for us to agree on a visit at a mutually convenient future date.

It was a pleasure for me to meet Foreign Minister Andrei and to have an opportunity to discuss the state of our relations. I view the Foreign Minister's visit to Washington and Secretary Baldrige's visit to Bucharest as having been particularly beneficial. Continued contacts of this kind will lead us to a deepening of our understanding for each other's positions on major international issues and will contribute to greater cooperation between us as we deal with them.

Let me take this occasion to also respond to your May 15 message on Lebanon. I can assure you we are continuing intensive efforts to defuse the crisis and to find ways of resolving this situation by peaceful means, supportive of Lebanon's independence, national unity and territorial integrity.

I look forward to our future correspondence.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Nicolae Ceausescu
President of the Socialist
Republic of Romania
Bucharest

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 20, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Reply to President Ceausescu's Message of May 15

On May 15, in your meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei, the Foreign Minister handed you a message from Romanian President Ceausescu (Tab B) which reaffirms Romania's intention to seek better relations with the United States and invites you and Mrs. Reagan to make an official visit to Romania at a mutually convenient date. The President also telephoned a message (Tab C), to be conveyed to you by Foreign Minister Andrei, seeking U.S. support for peaceful resolution of the Lebanese crisis. (C)

At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Ceausescu indicating your desire to visit Romania but not committing you to a specific timeframe, asserting your interest in continued U.S.-Romanian exchanges and assuring Ceausescu we are working toward a political solution of the Lebanese crisis. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Ceausescu at Tab A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review June 16, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED
ON 3/10/01 BY 1000000000 amended
WHICH HAD
BY NARA RAL E 1/17/17
Sept 11, 2006

Bucharest, May 5, 1981

Dear Mr. President,

First of all, I should like to convey to You a warm greeting and to renew my best wishes for Your good health and happiness, for the success of Your high mission as well as my wishes of progress and prosperity for the friendly American people.

Using this opportunity I desire to reaffirm once again Romania's decision as well as mine that the relations between our countries know a continuous development on the basis of principles of international justice and of joint American-Romanian documents.

It is our profound conviction, continually strengthened by the experience of the last years, that the permanent deepening of relations and dialogue on multiple plans between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the United States of America is serving the national interests of our peoples and is affirming itself as a constructive factor in international relations, supporting the cause of peace, international cooperation and national independance of peoples.

I have no doubt, Mr. President, that You are sharing the same thoughts, that Your Administration and You, personally, will continue and develop the tradition of fruitful American-Romanian cooperation established in the last years granting all attention to the solution of problems arising in our mutual relations.

./.

His Excellency
Mr. RONALD REAGAN
President of the
United States of America

In this respect, I am confident that the visit of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Washington as well as the visit of the U.S. Secretary of Trade to Bucharest will be concluded with fruitful results both on the plan of bilateral exchanges and of American-Romanian collaboration in the sphere of international life.

As You are aware of, in the positive evolution of the American-Romanian relationship a decisive role was played by the high level dialogue and I want to express my desire to continue and deepen this dialogue with You.

In this spirit, it is a great pleasure for me that on my own behalf and on behalf of my wife, to address to You and Mrs. Reagan the invitation to pay an official visit to Romania, at a mutually convenient date.

You may be sure, Mr. President, that You will be received in Romania with best feelings of esteem and friendship the Romanian people have for your people and country. I am convinced that the meetings and talks we shall have will range as a memorable moment in the upward evolution of American-Romanian relations.

With friendly feelings,

N.Ceaușescu

MEMORANDUM

2743

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
June 16, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*
SUBJECT: President's Reply to Romanian President
Ceaurescu's May 15 Message

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President summarizing a proposed reply from the President to President Ceaurescu's two messages -- his message (Tab B) which was delivered to the President by Foreign Minister Andrei on May 15 and his May 15 "telephoned" message (Tab C) eliciting U.S. support for peaceful resolution of the Lebanese crisis. The proposed reply (Tab A) expresses the President's desire to visit Romania but does not commit him to a specific timeframe, reaffirms the President's interest in continued U.S.-Romanian exchanges, and assures Ceaurescu that the U.S. is working toward a political solution of the Lebanese crisis. (C)

The proposed reply has been cleared with Speechwriters.

RP Pipes and *JA* Stearman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum from you to the President
Tab A	The President's proposed letter to President Ceaurescu
Tab B	President Ceaurescu's letter of May 15.
Tab C	President Ceaurescu's "telephoned" message of May 15 on Lebanon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by RPipes
Review June 16, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NAC Waiver 8/6/10*
BY *hw* DATE *11/7/17*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS-30

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EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY HAIG FROM SECRETARY BALDRIGE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

E. O. 12065: RDS- 5/15/01 (AGGREY, O. RUDOLPH) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, RO, US, LE, SY, IS, XF

SUBJECT: PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM
ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONVEYING TO THE PRESIDENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU. CEAUSESCU TELEPHONED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BURTIKA AT THE AIRPORT JUST BEFORE MY DEPARTURE AND ASKED HIM TO GIVE ME TWO FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGES FOR THE PRESIDENT.

3. SITUATION IN LEBANON. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU HAS RECIEVED A MESSAGE FROM FORMER LEBANESE PRESIDENT FRANJA REQUESTING HIM TO INTERVENE WITH THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES TO URGE US TO DO OUR UTMOST SO THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT PUSH FOR A DIVISION OF THE STATE OF LEBANON. FRANJA SAID THE CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON WANT A UNITARY STATE AND IT IS ALSO IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO HAVE LEBANON DIVIDED. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU JOINS FORMER PRESIDENT FRANJA IN STRONGLY APPEALING TO THE UNITED STATES TO DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO PREVENT A DIVISION OF LEBANON. THE SETTLEMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS OF THE PROBLEMS IN THAT AREA IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE.

4. INVITATION TO PRESIDENT TO VISIT ROMANIA. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU WISHES TO INFORM PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT HE IS AWAITED WITH GREAT PLEASURE IN ROMANIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HE HAS AUTHORIZED FOREIGN MINISTER ANOREI TO CONVEY THIS INVITATION. AGGREY

P/C
Log
adv to R
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EK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: State Waiver 11/6/05
BY: hw NARA DATE 11/17/17



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to President Ceausescu of Romania
from the President

Enclosed is a suggested draft reply for signature by the President of a letter to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. The letter is in response to a message from President Ceausescu which was delivered to the President personally by Foreign Minister Andrei May 15. Ceausescu's letter reaffirms Romania's intention to seek better relations with the United States and invites the President and Mrs. Reagan to make an official visit to Romania at a mutually convenient date. In the proposed reply the President would express his desire in principle to visit Romania without committing himself to a specific timeframe.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft Presidential Response to
Romanian President Ceausescu's
May 5 Letter.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AW 11/17/17

AIRGRAM

100-110-2181

ROMANIA

45

HANDLING ROUTINE	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	MESSAGE REFERENCE NO. A-27
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT PASS: BELGRADE, BERLIN, BRUSSELS, BUDAPEST, MOSCOW, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW, USDOC WASHDC, USMISSION USNATO, USCINCEUR VAHINGEN

FROM: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

DATE: July 20, 1981

E.O. 11652: GDS 7/14/87 (JOHNSON, Stephen T.) OR-P

TAGS: PINT, RO

SUBJECT: THE CEAUSESCU SUCCESSION: What Might Be Involved

67 REF:

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION			
ORIGIN/ACTION			
AF	ARA	CU	EA
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FRB	HEW	INT	LAB
NAVY	NSA	NSC	OPIC
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I. C - Entire Text.

II. SUMMARY: Though Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, is only 63 years old and in apparent good health, it may not be too early to examine the question of his successor. Any answer is complicated, however, by the fact that Ceausescu has thus far avoided designating anyone as a successor and has made every effort to prevent any other high Romanian official from establishing a power base or gaining the status which might be a challenge to his own position. The one exception is his wife, Elena, who is the acknowledged second "personality" in the nation. Mrs. Ceausescu would be in a strong position to try to replace her husband, though important factors, including her unpopularity and the fact that she is a woman in a male-oriented society, would work against her success.

Others who will be contending to replace Ceausescu are likely to be found in today's Party Political Executive Committee, particularly in its Permanent Bureau.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTED BY: POL:STJohnson mk	DRAFTING DATE 7/14/81	PHONE NO. 214	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: POL:STJohnson
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CLEARANCES: Charge: HKaiser

DAO: BHayward

OPTIONAL FORM 247
(FORMERLY FS-DS-323)
MARCH 1975
DEPT. OF STATE

50247-101

GPO : 1975 O - 579-100

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: State Waiver 11/17/85
BY: [Signature] DATE: 11/17/85

AUG 10 PM 5 51

For the most part these are men and women who have made their careers as faithful servants of the present Secretary General. How they would behave without him or which ones among them have higher ambitions or hidden leadership abilities is impossible to say. It is likely that at least at first some sort of collective leadership would be formed, but the history of the Romanian Communist Party would indicate that over time one person would probably emerge at the new "conducator". Whoever that person is, he or she is unlikely at first to be able to play the large and relatively independent role on the world stage enjoyed by the present Secretary General. Nevertheless, Ceausescu's successful example is likely to cause his successor to attempt to do so. We should encourage this effort as a relatively independent, internationally active Romania will continue to be, as it is today, in America's interest.
END SUMMARY.

III. INTRODUCTION

Nicolae Ceausescu has been the head of the Romanian Communist Party since 1965. During that time he has achieved almost complete power within Romania, reducing other once powerful figures to mere acolytes or removing them completely. Today, when photographs of Ceausescu with other high Romanian officials are published in the newspapers, the latter are not even identified. Only the President and his wife, Elena, matter. It has become very difficult to discover what these other officials' personal attitudes towards various policies may be or what their relations to each other are. All have been subsumed into the cult of Ceausescu.

Nevertheless, Ceausescu was 63 on January 26, 1981. That is not very old as Communist dictators go. His health appears to be good (despite occasional rumors to the contrary), but his birthday reminds us that he is mortal.

Ceausescu himself has avoided designating an heir (as he himself was singled out by his predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej). In fact, being mentioned today as a possible dauphin is to ruin one's political prospects. This attitude of Ceausescu, and his policy of rotating high officials, has created a situation where he has no obvious successor.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Naturally, just who or what replaces Ceausescu will depend a great deal on the manner of his going. Were he to die suddenly political relationships would, at least initially, be similar to those prevailing today. Were he to have a lingering illness, however, there would likely be considerable pre-mortality jockeying for position with an effort, on the part of some at least, to have him designate a successor. The person so designated would, no doubt, have a great advantage in the ensuing struggle for power.

Though Ceausescu's present dominance of the Party and state makes it appear unlikely today, it is also possible that circumstances other than death may cause a succession struggle. If Romania's economic situation worsens significantly, Ceausescu, like other Communist dictators before him, might find his position weakened. Many Romanians already see their standards of living as declining and describe the consumer supply situation as the worst in many years. If this trend continues they may start blaming Ceausescu personally.

There is also the position of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have no reason to criticize Ceausescu as far as internal Communist orthodoxy is concerned. There are no significant challengers to the Party's monopoly of power in Romania, and within the Party there is not the slightest hint of liberalism or a breakdown in "democratic centralism". On the other hand, Ceausescu's foreign policy independence has apparently often annoyed Moscow, though thus far at least not enough to cause the Soviets to do anything about it. The Soviets might at some future time, however, decide that it would be expedient if Ceausescu were replaced with someone else who was more compliant on foreign policy issues important to them. Were they so to decide it is difficult to envisage just how they could proceed unless there were other factors, such as economic decline and internal Party infighting which had already significantly weakened Ceausescu's position. The Soviets obviously shrink from military intervention except in the most extreme circumstances when the continuance of their hegemony is put in peril. Ceausescu is most unlikely to take actions (withdrawing Romania from the Warsaw Pact might be one) which would evoke such a response. Less direct methods, however, such as publicly criticizing the Romanian leader or working to form anti-Ceausescu groups within the Romanian Party might be self-defeating -- only reinforcing his most popular avatar, that of the man who stands up to the Russians.

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Ceausescu seems to have unchallenged control within the Party today. Those who might have been regarded as his rivals have for the most part been retired, others have been rusticated or placed in positions of little potential power. The inner circle is increasingly made up of people who have gained their positions as loyal lieutenants to Ceausescu. Some of them are quite able and energetic. Others have no other apparent qualification than their loyalty.

In any case, no one is allowed to set up his own satrapy. Promotions, demotions and transfers are frequent and apparently designed to prevent any potential rival to Ceausescu's power from building a base of political strength. Party secretaries change frequently. (Dumitru Popescu, who is concerned with culture and propaganda is an exception. He has been in the Secretariat since 1968.) The Ministers of Interior and Defense have been in place only three years and one year respectively. The only exceptions to short term ministerial rotation are Ion Avram, Minister of Machine Building, and Neculai Agachi, Minister of the Metallurgical Industry, who have held their portfolios since March of 1969. Even in their ministries, however, major subordinates come and go with great rapidity. Thus no one in the Party or state structure seems well placed to start a movement to try to push Ceausescu aside.

The short answer regarding who will replace a transcendent Communist dictator when he leaves the scene is usually "nobody." No one person, at least in the short run, will enjoy the power of the departed chieftan. Whoever is selected for the top Party post will find himself having to share supreme power with some of his colleagues. He may even be dominated by them. Nevertheless, given Romanian Communist experience, it seems likely that over time someone will emerge who will clearly be seen to be the leader of the Party, even if he or she does not have Ceausescu's absolute authority.

IV. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES

A. Mrs. Elena Ceausescu: One possible place to look for Ceausescu's heir would be within the Ceausescu clan. As a good Balkan chieftan, he has rewarded many of his numerous siblings, inlaws, and other relatives with comfortable positions within the state and Party structure.

Nevertheless, only one of them would appear to be a possible candidate at present for supreme power, the President's wife, Mrs. Elena Ceausescu.

Mrs. Ceausescu is an unusual figure for a Communist regime. The wives of Communist leaders are usually kept behind the scenes and are of no political significance. The only parallel to Romania's situation is the career of Mrs. Mao Tse Tung. (This parallel may not be wasted on Mrs. Ceausescu. Some believe the almost total absence of any reporting in the Romanian press of the trial of the "gang of four" in China was because of Mrs. Ceausescu's sensitivities.) Mrs. Ceausescu, however, unlike Mrs. Mao, is not operating in the vacuum created by a senile leader, but as the right hand of a leader who is very much in charge of things. Her rise in formal Party and state power has been rapid. Today she is a member of the Party's Political Executive Committee and of its Permanent Bureau, head of the Party's Cadre Commission, a First Deputy Prime Minister, Chairman of the National Council of Science and Technology, and the director of a chemical institute. She is very much the second person in the country, even maintaining her own relatively modest personality cult in the shadow of her husband's.

Were her husband to die suddenly or be incapacitated, she would appear to be well placed to take over. There are negative factors, however, which would probably prevent her from doing so. The first is the fact that she is a woman. Though there have been women in high positions in Romanian Communist politics for some time, e.g., Ana Pauker, it would take a considerable change in attitude on the part of most of the middle-aged men who make up the higher levels of the Party to accept a woman as Secretary General. Second, she seems to be genuinely disliked by the population at large as well as within the Party. Leadership in a Communist system is not based on popularity, but popularity can certainly help when the situation is in flux. Third, Mrs. Ceausescu basically has a constituency of one, her husband; without him she is likely to find very few rallying behind her banner. It might be assumed that, given her key role in the Party's apparatus, she would have built up a large group of officials beholden to her and ready to back her in an intra-Party struggle. This does not appear to be the case. Her interventions in personnel decisions have broken a lot of careers, but have not made very many. Thus there are probably relatively few high officials who feel they owe

their careers to her or would be hurt by her not achieving power.

Nevertheless, if she were to act quickly, she might be able to consolidate her position and take over at least for a time if her husband were suddenly removed from the scene. If she hesitates or enters into a coalition with others, given the fundamental weakness of her position, her power is likely to diminish rapidly.

B. Political Executive Committee: High Party position is a more traditional path to power in a Communist system than conjugality or consanguinity. In Romania, however, it is difficult to mark out just who holds such rank and how much personal power he or she may have built up because of it. The Party's highest body, the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee, has 27 full members and 22 candidates. When mentioned publicly the members of each group are listed alphabetically rather than by any rank order, except that Nicolae Ceausescu, Elena Ceausescu, and Prime Minister Elie Verdet come first. There is also a Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee. It is almost never mentioned publically, but apparently meets frequently and forms a true inner cabinet. Thirteen of its fifteen members are full members of the Political Executive Committee. The exceptions, Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei, and Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Emilian Dobrescu, are candidate members. Ceausescu's deliberate policy of "rotation of cadres" has meant most of those now occupying high Party positions were previously in the state apparatus and vice versa. They also "rotate" between Bucharest and the provinces. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to look at those who are now members of the Permanent Bureau and also the other members of the Political Executive Committee as being in the best position to succeed Ceausescu.

1. Leading Candidates: Below is an outline of the leading candidates to succeed the Secretary General, in descending order of our estimate as to the probability of their being successful.

a) Ilie Verdet: If any figure in Romanian public life could be described as number three, after the President and his wife, it would be Verdet. He is a close protege of Ceausescu's and, indeed, appears to owe his present position to his consistent support of the leader. Verdet has displayed no desire to change his image as a faithful aide, ready to carry out his chief's bidding. Necessarily, he has shown no ambition to climb higher. One can assume that the ambition is there, but in Ceausescu's Romania any indication of it would be a ticket to obscurity.

Verdet has been in the Political Executive Committee and its predecessor body since 1966 and in its Permanent Bureau since 1977. From 1974 to his selection as Prime Minister in 1979, he served as a Party Secretary, first for economic affairs and later for organization and cadres. In the Ceausescu scheme of things a Prime Minister's duties seem to consist basically of coordinating economic activities. The foreign affairs, internal security and defense portfolios are in the special domain of the President. In the last few years the apparent independent activity of the Prime Minister has been even more eroded in favor of the Secretary General/President.

Cabinet meetings are almost never held and Verdet rarely goes on independent provincial or factory visits. Verdet does, however, make trips abroad. He has recently been to the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. These visits have, however, been almost totally devoted to economic subjects. Verdet has made his way thus far as a faithful aide to Ceausescu and, necessarily, has never displayed the attributed of an independent political leader. Were Ceausescu to disappear, however, Verdet's central governmental position as Prime Minister and his long tenure in key Party posts could serve him in good stead in any succession struggle. As long as he holds the Prime Ministry, we would have to regard him as the best placed individual to replace the present Secretary General.

b) Constantin Dascalescu: Dascalescu, as Party Secretary for Organizational Affairs, is in a particularly favorable position to exploit the possibilities for personal advancement which would be offered by Ceausescu's absence. Like almost all high officials of the Secretariat, he had held both State and Party jobs. He has been at the Secretariat since 1974 and was appointed a Secretary in June of 1976. Dascalescu is in his 60s and has had wide experience throughout both the state and Party structures.

When we recently asked a Chinese Embassy officer, "who would be likely successor to Ceausescu", he replied that Dascalescu, as the key official in the organizational sector, was a logical pick. He may be right.

c) Emil Bobu: Bobu is a very close associate of the Ceausescus. He previously served as Party Secretary for Personnel, working closely under Mrs. Ceausescu's supervision. For the last few years, however, he has filled the less exacting posts of Minister of Labor and President of the Federation of Trade Unions. In February of 1981 he returned to the Secretariat and was given responsibility for Agriculture. At the Second Agricultural Congress, which was held soon after his transfer back to the Party Secretariat, he was appointed Chairman of a newly-created Council which is charged with overseeing all aspects of agricultural activity.

It is too early to say what the effect will be on Bobu's career of these new responsibilities. In the short run it looks very good. He has returned to the Secretariat, apparently to head the effort in one of the two areas of the economy which are to be given particular emphasis (the other is raw materials). In the longer run, however, since emphasis on agriculture seems not to include any willingness on the part of the Romanian Government to devote significantly increased resources, Bobu may find himself to be the man held responsible for results which almost inevitably will fall short of expectations. Nevertheless, at the moment, he is in a very powerful position.

d) Ion Coman: Colonel General Coman is one of two Party Secretaries who, though members of the Political Executive Committee, are not also in its Permanent Bureau. The other is Ludovic Fazekas, an ethnic Hungarian and thus not a candidate for Party leadership. Just as most of the other candidates could be described as having mixed Party/State careers, Coman's might best be characterized as mixed Party/military. Since March of last year he has been Party Secretary for Military and Internal Security Affairs. From 1976 until he was transferred to the Secretariat, he was Minister of Defense. Previously he had been First Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff, and before that a Section Chief in

the Party Secretariat for Military and Security Affairs. Communists have tended to shy away from placing basically military men in high civil positions, but recent experience in Poland indicates that such appointments are not entirely unthinkable. In any case, Coman's present strategic position and his prestige as, for all practical purposes, Romania's senior soldier, could serve him well in any succession struggle, particularly if the Party felt it necessary to emphasize the role of the Army and Romania's willingness to resist foreign intervention. At present, however, Coman seems to be suffering from health difficulties which may reduce his future political role.

e) Virgil Trofin: Trofin, a member of the Political Executive Committee since 1968, is at present a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Mines, Oil and Geology. At one time he was regarded by many observers as the number-two man in Romania. Today, although he heads an important ministry, he is no longer in the inner circle. One reason for his decline may have been his tendency in the past to act as an independent political figure rather than just as a shadow of Ceausescu. He is an impressive man. His relative youth, at 54, indicates he will be around for some time. Many observers regard him as the most pro-Soviet of the Romanian leadership. We have never seen any evidence to substantiate this view. Should it be true, however, Trofin might be a logical candidate for the Secretary Generalship if, at the time of the succession struggle, the Romanian leadership felt the necessity of placating the Soviets.

f) Cornel Burtica: Burtica is at present a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade. He has been a member of the Political Executive Committee since 1974 and of the Permanent Bureau since 1977. Burtica, like Verdet, was once a Party Secretary, from 1972 until he was appointed Minister of Foreign Trade in 1978. While in the Secretariat, Burtica's responsibilities were mainly ideological and cultural. Now he has the vital job of trying to increase Romania's exports and to minimize its imports in the face of very difficult circumstances. He has had mixed success but has impressed observers as a vigorous and intelligent politician. His present job would give him little leverage in a power struggle at this time but his relative youth (he will be 50 this year) and his personal qualities noted above, as well as the fact that he is married to a niece of Mrs. Ceausescu, equip him well for the long haul.

g) Dumitru Popescu: Popescu is the Party Secretary for Propaganda and Culture. He has had a meteoric rise through the ranks, becoming a Party Secretary in 1969. He is apparently a vigorous and capable man, but unlike the more catholic experience of his colleagues in the Secretariat, his career has been almost totally concentrated in the educational/propaganda/ideological/cultural area. This important, but narrow specialization would probably be a detriment in an eventual struggle for power. We have also heard he has sometimes clashed with Mrs. Ceausescu. He is only 52 years old, however, and may, over time, broaden his base.

h) Stefan Andrei: Andrei, unlike those discussed above, is only a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee, though anomalously he is a member of the Permanent Bureau. He is an impressive and intelligent international statesman with apparent boundless energy, and at 50 should be in the leadership for many years. He was once a Party Secretary so is not without connections in the Secretariat. The Foreign Ministry provides a weak base for a power struggle, but should the Party feel it needs someone with high international stature it might turn to Andrei.

i) Virgil Cazacu: Cazacu, the Party Secretary for Foreign Affairs, is often pictured as a rival to Foreign Minister Andrei for influence on foreign affairs questions with President Ceausescu. He certainly is one of Ceausescu's major advisors. He has been described by a Yugoslav diplomat (Cazacu was once Ambassador at Belgrade) as intelligent, direct and forceful. As a full member of the Political Executive Committee Cazacu enjoys slightly higher Party rank than Andrei, but in tough situations, e.g., crucial contacts with the Soviet Union, of late at least, it seems to be Andrei who gets the nod. In any case, Cazacu's foreign affairs responsibilities do not provide an opportunity to build up a significant following while were the Party leadership to feel the need to pick someone with a high international standing in a post Ceausescu situation, they are more likely to discern that quality in Andrei than in Cazacu. In addition, Cazacu is apparently suffering from serious health problems which might limit his ability to play a larger role in Party activities.

2. Others With A Chance: Other members of the Political Executive Committee who might have a chance either because of their personal qualities or the positions they fill are:

a) Lieutenant General Ion Dinca: Dinca is one of the three First Deputy Prime Ministers with undefined responsibilities. The others are Mrs. Ceausescu and Gheorghe Oprea. Dinca has been First Secretary of Bucharest City and a Party Secretary. Earlier he was in the Army.

b) Gheorghe Oprea: Oprea, like Dinca and Mrs. Ceausescu, is a First Deputy Prime Minister but his duties are not so undefined as he is known to oversee the industrial production ministries. He is only 54 and has been in high position since 1973. Oprea is a member of the Permanent Bureau.

c) Ion Patan: Patan is a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Technical Material Supplies and Control of Fixed Assets. He is 55 years old and has been in the Permanent Bureau since 1974.

3. Those With Little Chance: The remaining 14 members of the Political Executive Committee, for one reason or another, appear to have little chance to succeed Ceausescu. Some are women, some are from minority ethnic groups, and others either occupy positions which give them no bases for political action or have personalities which appear ill suited for such action. Some of them may, however, play significant roles in a succession struggle. This is particularly true of Iosif Banc and Ludovic Fazekas, both Party Secretaries, but as Hungarians having no chance of becoming Secretary General.

4. Dark Horses

a) Ion Iliescu: Iliescu at present occupies the relatively obscure post of Chairman of the National Water Council and, though a member of the Party's Central Committee, is not a member of the Political Executive Committee. He has seen

better days. From 1969 to 1979 he was a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee. He was First Secretary of Iasi Judet from 1974 to 1979. Previously he had served as a Secretary, for propaganda, in Timis Judet and, for a brief period in 1971, as the Party Central Committee Secretary for Propaganda and Youth. He really built up his political base, however, during the period from 1967 to 1971 when he served as First Secretary of the Union of Communist Youth (UTC). Iliescu is very intelligent, articulate and personable, and many observers have regarded him as a candidate for much higher position. It may in fact have been such observations, as well as Iliescu's popularity, which caused his present political decline. He is only 51 and we can expect that he will be an active political figure well into the future. He will, however, have to lever himself into some position more strategically located than the Water Council if he is to have any chance in any eventual succession struggle.

b) Nicu Ceausescu: Nicu Ceausescu would have to be regarded as a candidate for the distant future. Now about 30 years old, he is the only one of the Ceausescus' three children (there is an older son, Valentin, and a daughter, Zoia) who has shown great interest in a political career. He has been a Secretary of the Union of Communist Youth (UTC) for several years and more recently has been appointed a candidate member of the Party Central Committee and a member of the Grand National Assembly. Now whenever a new board or council is formed, Nicu's name figures on the list of those appointed to it. In the international arena, at the Romanian Government's proposal, he has been named Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the United Nations' Year of Youth.

It is apparent that Nicu's parents (especially his mother) have made a decision to promote his career and we can assume that, as the years go by, he will progress to even higher positions. Thus far, however, all of his jobs, except perhaps the UTC one, are largely honorific or part time. He has had no real executive experience. There was talk that he might be named to be First Secretary of the newly-created Giurgiu Judet (county) but someone else was appointed instead. For the most part, he has not impressed Western observers who have come in contact with him. He has the reputation of acting like a spoiled princeling and, while

not stupid, of not being very interested in work. These attitudes may change as he grows older, however, and it is possible that, were his father to carry on for another fifteen years, a Nicu Ceausescu in his mid-40's with the backing of his mother and with years of experience in high positions, might be a considerable political figure. Nevertheless, he is not now, and were the elder Ceausescu to disappear in the next five years, Nicu is unlikely to play any significant role in the succession struggle.

V. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

There are many others, such as Major General Constantin Olteanu, the Minister of Defense; or George Homostean, the Interior Minister who, though not candidates themselves, might be able to use the resources at their disposal to influence the outcome of a power struggle. Within the military structure, Lieutenant General Ion Hortopan, Commander of Land Forces; First Army Commander, Major General Lucian Ionescu; and Bucharest Garrison Commander, Major General Alexandru Turcu, are all in the capital charged with direct command of troops, including an armored division. Farther afield, Major General Ion Dindareanu at Buzau commands the three divisions of the 2nd Army and Lieutenant General Iulian Toplicieanu, at Cluj, has four divisions under him as Commander of the 4th Army. Major General Dumitru Rosu of the 3rd Army at Craiova would have to be considered a lesser factor as his command includes only one division. The key man at the Interior Ministry appears to be Major General Constantin Vasile Nuta, a Deputy Minister and head of Securitate troops. Military action has not played a major role in most Communist succession struggles, but having the troops behind you at a crucial moment can be a crucial factor in determining which way the political balance may tip.

There is also the complicating factor of the Party statutes governing the election of the Secretary General. In the Romanian Party, unlike other Communist Parties, the Secretary General is not formally elected by the Central Committee but instead by the Party Congress. The statutes make no provision for filling a vacancy in the Secretary Generalship which occurs between Party Congresses, even on a temporary basis. Communists are normally not sticklers for legality, but in the event of a struggle, this particular anomaly in the Party's rules may play a part. We assume that what in practice will happen is that the Political Executive Committee will meet and those in contention will attempt to resolve the succession question

within it. If they are not able to do so, however, the struggle may spill out into the Central Committee. Otherwise, the Central Committee will perform its traditional rubber-stamp role and elect whomever is recommended to it by the Political Executive Committee. If forms are observed, the new Secretary General would only be provisional until a Congress was organized but, unless things get completely out of hand, election by the Congress would be automatic.

A plausible scenario would be Mrs. Ceausescu, Prime Minister Verdet and perhaps one of the Party Secretaries (such as Constantin Dascalescu) forming an informal triumverate with one of the triumvers being selected as Secretary General. Nothing about the Party organization is sacred, however, and such a group could formalize a more collegial leadership by creating one or more Deputy Secretaries General. There is also the office of President of the Republic. Nicolae Ceausescu occupies both top positions, but they could be split. Mrs. Ceausescu, if denied the Secretary Generalship, might settle for being President. In any case, whoever is selected as Secretary General would have a head start over the others in trying to aggrandize power and assume a dominant role. Today all the lines of power, and the habits of the Party, lead to the Secretary General. We can assume that anyone occupying that position; unless he or she was a complete nonentity, selected to keep the seat warm while the struggle went on, would use these tools to try to consolidate power.

VI. INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS

We cannot, of course, assume that a succession struggle would take place in an international vacuum. Romanian officials have long contended that one reason for the great centralization of power in the person of the Secretary General was to avoid presenting the Soviets with an opportunity to exploit internal Romanian differences to reestablish their own influence in Bucharest. A prolonged interregnum would, of course, present such an opportunity.

The Soviets would have to proceed carefully, however. Ceausescu's stand against them in 1968 probably helped to establish his legitimacy in the eyes of most Romanians more than any other act of his 15 years in power. This phenomenon cannot have been wasted on those who now surround him. Being known as Moscow's man, therefore, might be the kiss of death to any contender's aspirations.

What will the effect be on American interests? A long interregnum in which the Soviet Union might be able to play off the factions which would develop within the leadership against each other and thus increase its own influence in Romania would, of course, not be in our interest. At the same time, such a contest for succession, since it is likely to be confined to court politics and not spill over into the general public, is unlikely to result, at least in the short-run, in any significant liberalization of the internal regime.

Even if the change is swift and relatively painless, however, whoever emerges as the new "conducator" (except perhaps Andrei) will for many years lack Ceausescu's international prestige and range of contacts. This will naturally diminish Romania's role on the world stage which today is larger than the intrinsic strength of the nation would call for. It might never recover, the new man or woman in charge might decide that mending one's fences with the Soviets and tending one's own garden was more important for Romania than high international politics. It is more likely, however, that a new leader would try to emulate the most successful attributes of his predecessor and attempt to play a similar international role. When the time comes, and it may be many years from now, we should, as we do today, encourage these efforts. A relatively independent, internationally active Romania can only be in our interest even though on many issues we will find ourselves on differing sides. As long as it exists it will be an example to the other minor members of the Warsaw Pact that there is an alternative to their present international posture.

KAISER 5)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: RICHARD PIPES/SVEN KRAEMER

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to the President of
Romania

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding a proposed response to President Ceausescu's letter of November 30 on INF. We have edited the text, which was prepared by the Department of State and cleared by the speechwriters, in order to have it conform with the President's INF proposal of November 18.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
 A Proposed Response to President Ceausescu
 B Incoming Letter of November 30

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from President Ceausescu
of Romania

Attached for your signature at Tab A is a response to President Ceausescu's letter to you of November 30. The letter, based upon a Department of State draft and cleared with the speechwriters, responds to Ceausescu's proposals for a moratorium and for a nuclear free zone in Europe by drawing heavily on your speech of November 18.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Ceausescu at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response to President Ceausescu
Tab B Incoming Letter of November 30

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~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 8602

E.O. 12065: NA
 TAGS: PPDC, PARM, RO
 SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CEASESCU TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

REF: A. BUCHAREST 8395; B. BUCHAREST 8537

1. ON DECEMBER 1, FOREIGN MINISTER STEFAN ANDREI CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ASKED HIM TO TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN; 1) A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRESIDENT CEASESCU (IN ROMANIAN WITH AN MFA SUPPLIED ENGLISH TEXT) AND 2) AN APPEAL FROM THE ROMANIAN GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (GNA) OF NOVEMBER 28 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA; CALLING FOR THE ELIMINATION FROM EUROPE OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND ALL OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI SAID THAT THIS LETTER WAS TRANSMITTED "IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION" AND IN AN EFFORT "TO MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE TALKS" NOW BEGINNING IN GENEVA BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR. ANDREI SAID THE MFA WOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR ON DECEMBER 2 REGARDING A ROMANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE TRANSMISSION OF THE LETTER AND APPEAL, WHICH HE ADDED IS NOT SECRET AND WAS PRESSAGED BY THE GNA ACTION LAST WEEK (BUCHAREST 8537). THE AMBASSADOR THANKED ANDREI FOR THE PACKAGE AND SAID THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT THE ENGLISH TEXT OF PRESIDENT CEASESCU'S LETTER IMMEDIATELY. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ENGLISH TEXT, PREPARED BY THE MFA, OF THE NOVEMBER 30, 1981 LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CEASESCU TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

3. BEGIN TEXT: DATE NOVEMBER 30, 1981. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON BEHALF OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA AND ON MY OWN BEHALF I AM SENDING TO YOU, AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THIS MESSAGE IN CONNECTION WITH THE BEGINNING IN GENEVA OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE STOPPING OF THE DEPLOYMENT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES FROM EUROPE.

THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, AS WELL AS THE OTHER EUROPEAN PEOPLES ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION CREATED IN EUROPE, WHERE THE GREATEST MILITARY ARSENAL EVER KNOWN IN HISTORY INCLUDING BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HAS BEEN ACCUMULATED.

THE PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW INTER-MEDIATE RANGE MISSILES CANNOT BUT FURTHER AMPLIFY THE DANGER OF WAR AND TENSION ON THE CONTINENT THUS MAGNIFYING THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES CONCERN AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR DETERMINATION TO INTERVENE WITH ALL THEIR STRENGTH, IN ORDER TO CHECK THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR ARMA-

MENT ON THIS CONTINENT, FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING POTENTIAL AND FOR FREEING EUROPE OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE HUGE DEMONSTRATIONS AND ACTIONS BRINGING TOGETHER HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS PARTICIPANTS FROM THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING ROMANIA, DEMONSTRATE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLES ON OUR CONTINENT, CONSCIOUS THAT THEY WILL BE THE VICTIMS OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE, TO ACT WITH ALL THEIR FORCES TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF WAR, TO STOP THE ARMS RACE AND, FIRST OF ALL, THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONE, TO ELIMINATE THE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF ANY KIND FROM THIS REGION OF THE WORLD.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN GENEVA ACQUIRE A PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. DEBATING THESE ISSUES, THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA IN ITS SESSION OF NOVEMBER 28, THIS YEAR, HAS ENTRUSTED UPON ME THE TASK TO SEND THIS PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YOU, DEAR PRESIDENT REAGAN, CALLING UPON YOU TO DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER, IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT, AS A RESULT OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS REGARDING THE CEASATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES FROM EUROPE.

I HAVE ALSO BEEN EMPOWERED BY THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO SEND A MESSAGE ON THE SAME ISSUE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, LEONID BREZHNEV. EQUALLY I HAVE BEEN EMPOWERED TO SEND MESSAGES TO THE HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES SIGNATORIES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT CALLING UPON THEM TO DO THEIR UTMOST FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, FOR A HALT TO NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS RACE IN EUROPE, FOR FREEING THE CONTINENT OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-09 PA-01 INRE-00 SMS-01 OES-09
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AT THE SAME TIME, THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA ADOPTED A SIMILAR APPEAL ADDRESSED TO ALL PARLIAMENTS, GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, OF THE USA AND CANADA.

WE WELCOME THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, AS WELL AS THE OTHER PEOPLES ARE EXPECTING THE NEGOCIATIONS TO AGREE, FROM THEIR VERY BEGINNING, ON A HALT, FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO DECISION TO DEPLOY IN EUROPE NEW INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES, IN THE INCREASING, BY BOTH SIDES, OF THE EXISTING ONES AND, THE SOVIET UNION, AS PRESIDENT L. I. BREZHNEV HAS STATED, TO UNILATERALLY REDUCE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THE SAME KIND OF THEIR MISSILES DEPLOYED ON THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR TERRITORY.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ENDING WITH AN AGREEMENT CONDUCTIVE TO THE REDUCTION AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, AS WELL AS TO MEASURES TO REMOVE ALL NUCLEAR ARMS, BE EITHER INTERMEDIATE-RANGE OR TACTICAL, SO THAT EUROPE WOULD BECOME A CONTINENT FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE I WOULD LIKE, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, TO APPEAL TO YOU, ON BEHALF OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, TO USE ALL YOUR AUTHORITY AS THE LEADER OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, TO THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE AND FRUITFUL COURSE, WITH THE VIEW OF THEIR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, SO THAT THEY MEET THE PEOPLES EXPECTATIONS AND BE REGISTERED AS A MAJOR EVENT WITH PROFOUND, POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LIFE.

I THINK YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, THAT NOW, BEFORE THE MISSILES ENTER INTO ACTION, BEFORE NUCLEAR BOMBS ARE BEGINNING TO BE DROPPED ON THIS CONTINENT, NOW BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE, WHEN WE ARE STILL ALIVE AND WE CAN ACT, WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING IN ORDER TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, IN ORDER TO DEFEND THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT TO LIFE, FREEDOM AND PEACE.

THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, AS WELL AS THE OTHER PEOPLES, HOPE THAT THE HEADS OF STATES AND, FIRST OF ALL, YOU AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, WILL ACT IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE TWO GREAT NUCLEAR POWERS WILL NEVER USE THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, WILL RENOUNCE THEM, AND THE ATOM WILL BE USED ONLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, IN THE INTEREST OF THE PROGRESS, THE WELFARE AND THE CIVILISATION OF MANKIND.

I AM AWARE OF THE NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES, OF MANY EXISTING COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO BE SOVED IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIFE, I KNOW THAT MANY WEAPONS AND MUCH DISTRUST HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATED, BUT THE CAUSE OF STOPPING THE ARMS RACE, OF REDUCING TENSION AND ARMAMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE NUCLEAR ONES, SHOULD PREVAIL ON EVERYTHING ELSE. IN THIS SPIRIT I CONSIDER THAT ALL THE EUROPEAN STATES SHOULD EXPRESS A

CUPATION AND INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, AND SHOULD PARTICIPATE, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, ROMANIA WILL FURTHER CO-OPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WITH THE OTHER STATES, FOR THE SUCCESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND IS READY TO TAKE PART, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, TO THE QUEST FOR THE MOST JUDICIOUS WAYS LEADING TO UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN THE SERVICE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF PEOPLES ON OUR CONTINENT.

STARTING FROM THE MAJOR IMPORTANCE, THE CREATION IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF EUROPE OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, OF COOPERATION AND GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD, HAS FOR THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT, SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING ON THE CONTINENT, ROMANIA IS DETERMINED TO FURTHER DO EVERYTHING IN HER POWER TO DEVELOP HER GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL THE BALKAN STATES, TO TRANSFORM THE BALKANS INTO AN AREA OF PEACE AND COOPERATION, WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD WELCOME THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE FULFILMENT OF THIS DESIDERATUM OF THE BALKAN PEOPLES.

MAY I, IN CONCLUSION, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, CONVEY TO YOU CORDIAL GREETINGS AND MY BEST WISHES, AS WELL AS MY DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS OF COOPERATION, IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST, TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CAUSE OF PEACE, COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL DETENTE.

SINCERELY,

(S) NICOLAE CEAUDESCU

END TEXT.

4. THE EMBASSY IS POUCHING TO EUR/EE ON DECEMBER 3, VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH A) THE ORIGINAL OF THE CEAUDESCU LETTER IN ROMANIAN, B) THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION, C) THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPEAL IN ROMANIAN, AND D) THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE APPEAL PREPARED BY THE GOR. THE REGISTRY NUMBER IS 2395188.
FUNDORBURK

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ROMANIA
(views on INF)
66

EUR/RPM:SKPIFER
12/28/81 EXT. 22057 2753M
EUR:DCGOMPERT

EUR/RPM:ABOHLN
PM/TMP:GSANFORD
S/S:

EUR/EE:RBECKER
NSC:

IMMEDIATE USNATO

PRIORITY BUCHAREST, ANATO PRIORITY, MOSCOW PRIORITY,
USDEL MBFR VIENNA,

GENEVA FOR USINF

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/06/92 (GOMPERT, DAVID C)

TAGS: NATO, PARM, MNUC, RO

SUBJECT: CEAUSESCU LETTER ON INF

REF: (A) 81 USNATO 7850
(B) 81 USNATO 7933

CCG
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1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU SENT LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DECEMBER IN CONNECTION WITH THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. TEXT IS SIMILAR TO THOSE LETTERS RECEIVED BY OTHER ALLIED LEADERS AS REPORTED AT NATO. SYNOPSIS OF CEAUSESCU LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PROVIDED PARA 3 AND SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE IS PROVIDED PARA 4. MISSION MAY DRAW UPON PARAS 3 AND 4 AS APPROPRIATE IN BRIEFING ALLIES.

3. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF CEAUSESCU LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN:

-- THE PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES CAN ONLY INCREASE THE DANGER OF WAR, AND IS A SOURCE OF INCREASING CONCERN TO

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BY RW DATE 11/7/71

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THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE.

-- THE PRESIDENT IS ASKED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS RESULT IN SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS PROVIDING FOR AN END TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES FROM EUROPE.

-- INDICATES THAT SIMILAR MESSAGES HAVE BEEN SENT TO BREZHNEV AND TO OTHER HEADS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF SIGNATORIES TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

-- CALLS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TO AGREE TO A HALT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO DECISION TO DEPLOY IN EUROPE NEW INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND A HALT ON BOTH SIDES INCREASING THE NUMBERS OF EXISTING MISSILES.

-- IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE, INDICATES THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL -- AS BREZHNEV STATED -- UNILATERALLY REDUCE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF ITS MISSILES DEPLOYED ON THE EUROPEAN TERRITORY OF THE USSR.

-- EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESULT IN AN AGREEMENT CONDUCTIVE TO REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF ALL INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARMS AND LEAVING EUROPE A CONTINENT FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- NOTES THAT ALL EUROPEAN STATES SHOULD EXPRESS AN INTEREST IN THE GENEVA TALKS AND SHOULD PARTICIPATE "IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER" IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. ROMANIA IS PREPARED TO TAKE PART IN THE TALKS.

-- ROMANIA SUPPORTS CREATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES THROUGHOUT EUROPE, IS DETERMINED TO TRANSFORM THE BALKANS INTO SUCH A ZONE, AND ASKS US SUPPORT TOWARDS THIS GOAL.

4. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RESPONSE:

-- AS THE PRESIDENT STATED NOVEMBER 18, THE US IS WILLING TO FOREGO PERSHING II AND GLCM PROGRAMS IF SOVIETS DISMANTLE THEIR SS-20, SS-4 AND SS-5 MISSILES.

-- NATO'S DECEMBER 1979 DECISION WAS TAKEN TO CORRECT A MAJOR IMBALANCE IN INF, AN IMBALANCE WHICH WAS CREATED BY THE SOVIETS AND IS THE PRIMARY THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

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-- NATO'S MODERNIZATION PROGRAM CAN ONLY BE RESCINDED OR MODIFIED AS A RESULT OF A CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT RESTORING A SATISFACTORY BALANCE IN INF.

-- ACCEPTANCE OF THE MORATORIUM WOULD ONLY PERPETUATE THE PRESENT IMPBALANCE. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET EFFORT TO LIMIT NEGOTIATIONS TO SYSTEMS IN EUROPE IGNORES THE THREAT POSED TO EUROPE BY SOVIET MISSILES BASED IN ASIAN PORTIONS OF THE USSR.

-- THE ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO GENUINE AND SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS INTERMEDIATE-RANGE FORCES.

NOTE: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY PURPOSELY DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF A NUCLEAR-FREE EUROPE OR A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN THE BALKANS, SO AS TO AVOID DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM THE MAIN POINT, WHICH WAS TO EXPRESS OUR SERIOUSNESS IN CONDUCTING THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

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