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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name CARLUCCI, FRANK: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 5/2/2006

File Folder THE PRESIDENT (04/29/1987-06/30/1987)

FOIA

F01-092

Box Number 92462

CAMERON, GRANT

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
24143	MEMCON	HORST TELTSCHIK, FRANK CARLUCCI, MAY 6, 1987 - TELEPHONE <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	2	5/6/1987	B1
24144	NOTES	THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, HOWARD BAKER, FRANK CARLUCCI, COLIN POWELL, MAY 6, 1987 <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	2	5/6/1987	B1
24145	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES FOR #24144 <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	2	5/6/1987	B1
24146	MEMCON	CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL/THE PRESIDENT - TELEPHONE, MAY 12, 1987 <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	4	5/12/1987	B1
24147	MEMO	RE: SAUDIS <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	1	5/14/1987	B1
24148	MEMO	CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE RELATING TO MOSCOW EMBASSY SITUATION <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	2	5/28/1987	B1
24149	NOTES	MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT ARIAS IN THE OVAL OFFICE - JUNE 17, 1987 - TYPED <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	3	6/17/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
24150	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES FOR #24149 <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	6	6/17/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

24143

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

3445

May 6, 1987

✓ R R

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Horst Teltschik, Special Advisor to
Chancellor Kohl
Frank Carlucci, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE OF CALL: May 6, 1987

Pursuant to instructions from the President and with the agreement of Secretary Shultz I phoned Horst Teltschik to discuss the FRG position on INF. I told him we had been following his activities with great interest and wanted to be as supportive as possible to the Chancellor. The President did not want in any way to seem to be putting pressure on the Chancellor. On the other hand I was sure that he would agree it was important for the Alliance to reach a decision as soon as possible.

I wondered if it would be helpful in this matter if the President and the Chancellor were to have a telephone conversation. If so I wanted the Chancellor to know that the President would be delighted to talk with him.

Teltschik responded that the Chancellor is eager to reach a common understanding but is still faced with problems in his own government. These problems related to the position of the Foreign Minister who favored the "second zero-zero" (SRINF). The Chancellor and his CDU party were in favor of common ceilings similar to the third option laid out by Secretary Shultz in Brussels. (By this I assume he was referring to the option of something between zero and current levels, and relating this to their 80-80 proposal.)

On the other side of the coin the Chancellor was anxious to reach agreement with the French and the British. At this point he could state with confidence that the French were with them. The British position was a little different.

In short the Chancellor was looking for a position that was acceptable to everybody. He needed more time to do this. Having a call between the Chancellor and the President this week might be "too early." Let's be in touch on this at the beginning of next week.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR.F01-072#24143

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I inquired whether an emissary from us might be helpful in this process. Teltschik responded that "our problem exists now because of statements from the State Department and the Pentagon that you are in favor of a second zero zero. We are looking for an alternative position." He added that the Chancellor is absolutely in favor of LR INF, but the "second zero zero" would create a lot of problems.

In concluding Teltschik urged that we not decide before having consultations on this matter. This would be disastrous since German interests would be most affected by such a proposal, and the Chancellor needed time to win necessary political support. I assured him we would not reach a decision before consulting with the Chancellor.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ
WITH HOWARD BAKER, FRANK CARLUCCI, & COLIN POWELL

1. ~~copy~~
2. file
24144

Wednesday, May 6, 1987 - 9:30 am

Calendar. Time for G. Visit - Late September or early October.
Deputy Foreign Minister will be here next week.

Tabled Start treaty. Need to push hard. Talks on nuclear
testing proceeding.

Toughest are regional issues. Soviets stepping up pressure in
Afghan. We the same. Nearing end game and both sides putting
more chips on table.

SRINF - I sent you memo.

P Where is SS 23? G.S. In SRINF.

Thatcher program is consistent with position in Moscow.
Third country system tricky. Describes P.Ia's. We are not
in strong posture on P. Ia warheads. This is why Germans
are resisting deal.

How I see state of play.

- a) We have satisfied Thatcher's basic conditions.
- b) We have to confront fact that no ally willingly
deploy US SRINF.
- c) Verification better at 0.

Now is time to make a decision. Drag on - we will lose
leverage. Important to take initiative. Let's not push
Germans around, but let's send somebody who can counsel
them.

I didn't want us to be seeming to lay down law or say we
want you to do this. Create resentment. But more weapons
can eliminate the better. I am alone in world (G.S. says
he agrees. H.B. says he agrees.)

G.S. This is an alliance problem, not military problem as such.
We can get along w/80-80, but we look stupid.

P We are trying to persuade 2 classes go to zero. This means
P. Ia useless.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F01-092#24144

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

G.S. Options.

- 1) Sit here, listen and let Europeans wallow. End up putting SRINF aside.
- 2) Go to Kohl and tell him make up mind. Here is what I think. You resist this. OK put in play somebody to help congeal around Thatchers program.

RR - GS - HB, FC. C.P. ^{5/6}

Start ~ 11 AM

24145

Calendar. Time for G. visit - Late Sept or early Oct. Dep FortMn will be here next week.

Tabled Start treaty. Need to push hard. Talks on nuclear testing proceeding.

Toughest are regional issue. Sours stepping up pressure in Afghan. We the same. Nearing end game & both sides putting more chips on table.

SRINF. I sent you memo.

P. Where is ^{SS} 23. G.S. In SRINF.

Thatcher program is consistent with position in Moscow. 3rd country system tricky. Describes P.I.a's. We not in strong posture on P.I.a warheads. This why Germans resisting deal.

How I see state of play.

a) we have satisfied Thatcher's basic conditions.

b) We have to confront fact that no ally willing deploy US SRINF.

c) Verification better at Q.

Now is time to make a decision. Drag

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NLRR FOL-D92 #24145

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

P. I didn't want us to be seeming lay down law or say we want you to do this. Create resentment? ~~But~~ But more weapons can eliminate the better. I am alone in world (G.S. says he agrees. H.B. says he agrees).

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- 1) Sit here, listen & let Europeans wallow. End up putting SRINF aside.
- 2) Go to Kohl & tell him make up mind. He is what I think. You resist this. OK put in play somebody to help conical around Thatchers program.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 May

FRANK,

✓

SUGGEST YOU
MENTION AT 0930
THAT THIS MEMO
WAS FIXED AND
SENT TO GPS &
CHW.

CP

Gen.,

5/14

Was this mentioned
@ 0930?

Yes-OBE.

Kes

~~SECRET~~

24146

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90457 ADD

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between the President
and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Federal Republic
of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

DATE, TIME May 12, 1987, 9:00 a.m. - 9:25 a.m.
AND PLACE Oval Office

After exchange of greetings, the President stated that he had a message he wished to convey to Chancellor Kohl. The Chancellor had displayed great courage in 1983 by the deploying Pershing II missiles in FRG. Our Alliance steadfastness in carrying out the 1979 NATO decision has nearly borne fruit. The Soviets have agreed to reduce their SS-20s by more than 90 percent --a major step toward LRINF elimination. (C)

The President emphasized that the US will keep at the LRINF negotiations until we get all the SS-20s eliminated. NATO can be proud of that, but now shorter range INF is getting the spotlight. He had a brief visit with Minister Genscher yesterday, but felt the Minister may have misunderstood part of what had been said. The President said he wished to underscore that we understand the FRG's special sensitivity on the SRINF issue. We have refrained from stating a preference on that issue to avoid putting pressure on you. We will continue to keep our options open. There is no pressure on you. Continuing, the President said that while he may have a personal preference for zero SRINF, the USG has not yet stated its position. Saying he was a strong believer in consultations, the President added we are awaiting your views as well as those of the rest of NATO before formulating our SRINF position. The President observed that he had talked long enough and I would be curious about the Chancellor's views. (S)

Chancellor Kohl thanked the President for his message and stated that he had two points he wanted to make at the outset. His first point was that he thought exactly along the lines the President had outlined. He believed two things brought Gorbachev back to the table: (1) NATO's 1983 deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs; and (2) the President's clear position on SDI. The Chancellor noted that the Soviets are people who do not want to engage in adventure where there is any risk; they want to win

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NLRR 24146
BY RW NARA DATE 11/31/11

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- 2 -

with no risk. Now, they have become aware of the risk and have returned to the table. This is our common success and we should be proud of it. (S)

His second point, said the Chancellor, was that he was absolutely in favor of agreement this year on LRINF. The agreement should be acceptable to NATO. He indicated that he wanted the President to finish a treaty -- he wanted the President to have that success. The President deserved such success because without the President's position and efforts in the US, it would have been impossible for Europe to take the position that has been taken. (S)

Turning to SRINF, the Chancellor stated that he did not want to delay this issue, but we (the FRG) could not negotiate on these issues -- either internally (within the FRG) or with the Soviets. The Chancellor expressed hope of concluding internal debate on SRINF in the course of the summer. He emphasized that Germany's special problem is that all the systems with less than 1000 kilometer range are targeted on German territory. The Soviet proposals on systems between 500-1000 kilometers which include the German Pershing I-A are not acceptable. (S)

Continuing, the Chancellor said the Europeans need to develop a common position that will be acceptable to the US. He said he wanted to continue German coordination in Europe, especially with London and Paris, and also with the other potential basing countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy). He had already had intensive conversations with Chirac and Mitterrand. Chirac is very clear -- he is full of skepticism on solutions in the 500-1000 kilometer range. With Mitterrand, the situation is different. He does not take such a direct interest in these matters, but has said he will not stand against the German position. Mrs. Thatcher has written both of us, but we should talk to her once more, said Kohl. (S)

The Chancellor pointed out that an emotional wave was being created in Europe that involved the same people who stirred up emotions in 1983 to try to prevent NATO LRINF deployments. We need, said the Chancellor, to give this aspect of the problem our common attention. The Soviets, the Chancellor said, will apply tactics to pressure NATO members. First, the Soviets have said that eliminating missiles over 1000 kilometer range is O.K. Now, they said that eliminating missiles between 500-1000 kilometer range is O.K. (S)

This will bring us, said the Chancellor, to a new discussion here in Germany: What is to happen in the range between 0-500

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- 3 -

kilometer? At that point we (NATO and FRG) are confronted with the argument that these remaining missiles (0-500 kilometers) are exactly the weapons that will hit only Germans, East or West. This problem needs our careful consideration and discussion before it becomes a reality. Also, the Chancellor argued, the enormous Soviet superiority of conventional and chemical weapons must be taken into consideration. (S)

The Chancellor then stated that for him one point was of crucial importance. These matters must result in a success for the US, because only a US success makes it impossible for a war to be fought in Europe. Disarmament is not an end in itself, it only serves our purpose if security is enhanced, not diminished. That is our common Western objective. (S)

The Chancellor stated that in Europe there was need to balance nuclear and conventional weapons. A central point was the US military and nuclear guarantee to NATO -- the Chancellor stressed that there was no alternative to that. (S)

Chancellor Kohl concluded by saying that for all of these reasons the FRG was still in the midst of its discussions about SRINF. On a personal basis, he said that Option III -- described by Secretary Shultz (80 systems of SRINF on each side) -- is worth consideration and discussion. Further, the US and the FRG must determine for sure what will be the future of the German Pershing I-As. The Chancellor then stated that he had all the confidence in the world in the President, and that based on their very friendly personal ties -- which have spurred great cooperation -- the President would find an acceptable solution. In addition, the Chancellor promised to do all he possibly could to help find such a solution. (S)

The President thanked the Chancellor for his views and stated that we cannot begin discussing shorter range (less than 500 kilometer) systems before making sure that conventional and chemical imbalances were redressed. (S)

Chancellor Kohl responded that he shared the President's view. He pointed out that his comments were an attempt to describe what he foresaw as possible defeat in the FRG. The Chancellor then offered his personal view that Gorbachev would agree to eliminate all LRINF and that the US should continue to press for such elimination and reach agreement on it. (S)

Continuing, The Chancellor emphasized that with respect to all other systems -- both shorter range nuclear, chemical, and conventional -- the West should be cautious and prudent and should consider each step carefully. The Chancellor then repeated his wish to see the President achieve an LRINF agreement this year that could be ratified before the US elections. (S)

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- 4 -

In reply, The President said he believed the US and the FRG agreed on many of these issues. He would welcome the Chancellor's further thinking after consultations were complete so the West could go forward with a unified position. This would make it impossible for the Soviets to separate the Allies. The President then indicated that he would like to move forward as soon as possible, but repeated that this was not an attempt to put pressure on the FRG. (S)

The Chancellor replied that that was exactly how he wished to assist the President. The President then reminded the Chancellor that if the Chancellor wished to try for an 80-80 SRINF solution, the US would need to know where Europeans wanted us to deploy the 80 systems that would be our part of that balance. (S)

The Chancellor stated that he understood the President's concern. (S)

Saying he appreciated the opportunity of this conversation, The President underscored that he looked forward to seeing the Chancellor in Venice. The two leaders then exchanged closings. (U)

*President reviewed
& approved 5/13
JC Carlin*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

24147

For files.
shown to
RR
5/14

[Signature]

May 14, 1987

**SUBJECT: Saudi Position on Conversations with the President
on Saudi Contributions to the Contras**

Up to now the Saudis have taken the position that the President and the King did not discuss Saudi aid to the Contras. Privately they have told me that McFarlane did solicit such aid.

In light of yesterday's flap the Saudis have been in touch with us. King Fahd still does not recall mentioning Contra aid to you when he was here. The Saudis will try to avoid any public comment on this subject. If they are unable to do so they will take the following line:

1. They don't discuss conversations between Heads of State.
2. They do cooperate in many areas with the US Government.
3. They have provided humanitarian aid to people fighting for freedom in various parts of the world.
4. The President has never asked the King for aid to the Contras nor did he raise it with His Majesty or Prince Bandar during the visit.

The Saudis still wonder how to get around the dilemma of your recalling the statement and Fahd being unable to recall it. I told them to simply state they don't recall the statement and do not have this in their records, but in any event the central point is clear. The President of the United States did not solicit funds for the Contras.

cy given to Culvahouse -5-28-87

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NLRR FOI-092#24147

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/17

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SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS-40321 add on

24148


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 

SUBJECT: Meeting Between the President and the Secretary
of State Relating to Moscow Embassy Situation

In his last meeting with you Secretary Shultz said he would discuss the Moscow Embassy Security situation with you at some future time. The following is an update in preparation for that meeting.

- Schlesinger returned from his trip to Moscow last night (5/27). He may indicate the construction of the Embassy building is not as bad as reported in the press.
- Secretary Shultz was recently briefed on the results of the joint State/CIA/FBI fly-away teams that visited 10 countries to look at the state of security. The teams have provided several recommendations about improving security at overseas missions. Among the recommendations is the need for a standardized non-fraternization policy which can be strictly enforced. The teams found this area a weak element in our security policy.
- The teams also found little or no counterintelligence operation being conducted to protect our missions. Presently what is done is divided among State, CIA and occasionally other agency personnel.
- The Naval Investigative Service continues to pursue the espionage investigation involving the Marines. To date, they have interviewed 155 Marine Security Guards (MSG) and polygraphed 104. Out of this group, two have admitted espionage and two are strongly suspected of espionage. Six more have shown deception on polygraph questions relating to espionage. In addition, between 45 and 50 Marines have admitted unauthorized contact with criteria country citizens or other infractions of regulations or illegal activities, some of which may involve KGB recruitment operations directed against MSG personnel.

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NLRR FDI-092 #24148

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

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- To date, investigators have discovered no physical evidence in Moscow to prove the Soviets made entry into our Embassy's secure spaces.
- Secretary Shultz may raise the issue of funding needs to address issues raised by the Moscow security situation and the problems we are finding at other posts.

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~~SECRET~~

UNPUB

6/11/5pm



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE
FOR

FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1987

7:00 a.m.	The VICE PRESIDENT departs Residence for OEOB	
7:20 a.m. (40 minutes)	The VICE PRESIDENT arrives OEOB and Personal Staff Time	
8:00 a.m. (15 minutes)	Meeting with Craig Fuller	(OEOB Office)
8:15 a.m. (15 minutes)	CIA Briefing (Gregg)	(OEOB Office)
8:30 a.m. (30 minutes)	Senior Staff Time (Fuller)	(OEOB Office)
9:00 a.m. (15 minutes)	Meeting with John McMullen (Bates)	(OEOB Office)
9:15 a.m. (30 minutes)	Personal Staff Time	(OEOB Office)
9:45 a.m. (10 minutes)	Drop-by Reception for "Future of America" (Greenleaf)	(Indian Treaty Room)
10:05 a.m.	The VICE PRESIDENT departs OEOB en route Andrews Air Force Base	

10:35 a.m. The VICE PRESIDENT arrives
 Andrews Air Force Base

- 10:45 a.m. The VICE PRESIDENT departs
 Andrews Air Force Base en route
 Sommersworth, New Hampshire

SEE SEPARATE SCHEDULE

RON KENNEBUNKPORT, MAINE

6/11/5pm

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cy. set to
Sorzano

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT ARIAS
IN THE OVAL OFFICE - JUNE 17, 1987

24149

P Welcome plan - defects
Looking forward to mtg w/dem. resisting

Laas
Express my concerns. May undercut your goals

A I know of your concerns. Have dealt with this for last
3 1/2 months

P Goal is worthy & has our support

A We decided postpone till beginning of August & hold FM mtg
before. FM never met before because Sand. didn't present
anything written. Sand. against, recently said in favor.
But awaiting reaction of other countries. Wanted Salv. to
present objections.

A Don't like our peace proposal. Wrote letter to
Contradoras saying wanted discuss letter of Contradoras, but
recognize my plan has teeth. Emphasize democracy. Puts
timetable.
Contradora has been used by Sandinistas.
All peace initiatives in past have been used by Nicaragua to
get time. My objective is to unmask Sand. I made trip to
Europe & got support for my plan; also Contradoras & Central
Americas.

Ambiguity of Sand. We have to unmask them. Have to show
they betrayed revolution. This is one of main objectives of
my peace proposal.

For 60 days we allow them to show sincerity. I know they
cannot fulfill it. They cannot open La Prensa in 60 days.
Won't let Obando y Bravo use press.

If we could take calculated risk for 60 days.
I don't believe they will open up. They won't accept
liberty because it is end. Only 15% would vote for them.
Hunger & misery. Believe me my only objective is expose
Nicaraguan government and to change it. My interest is
vital. I am neighbor w/o Army. They have used Contras as
excuse for everything, to abolish liberty and for poor state
of economy. Will collapse tomorrow. They are desperate
now. They are isolated. Will collapse.

I may be wrong, but believe in my sincerity. Washington has
been alone. Europe backed Contradoras thus they will back
me.

In 60 days we see if they sincere. If they lie, then whole
world will know.

Alfonsin, de la Madrid don't like Nicaragua, but not
supporting Contras. My country is 99% anti-Sandinistas.
We betrayed by them.

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NLR 501-092# 24149

BY PWS NARA DATE 1/31/11

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P You giving them a period in which they could cheat. Our concern is that cheating could succeed, but pressure would be gone because freedom fighters no longer viable. Why not close loopholes through which cheat?

Not case of saying don't make proposal. It is case of making sure they don't cheat. If they do then do we move in militarily. That is not the answer. They will cheat.

A There may be some loopholes. Discussed w/Habib who has done tremendous job. But they can't get away with it. But commission will control this.

I concerned about Duarte, who is our friend. Durate has doubts; they valid concerns. I want to be on offensive. If 4 dem. agree Nic will be isolated. Within 2 months they will be exposed. Against essence of Marist govt to do what we propose.

P Nic has had disinformation campaigns. Tells story of Bishop Schlaffer being attacked by Contras, but really attacked by Sandinistas.

Nothing being lost to you in this plan - you want to expose them in 60 days. If that is true they will have exposed themselves but strengthened for future in going ahead. Could loopholes be removed so they could be exposed by refusing? Then no way out. Have to go ahead w/democratization.

Let's look for ways to eliminate loopholes and then we will be very supportive.

A But S. wouldn't agree to what Durate wants.

P Then they expose themsleves.

A But if they refuse there is no agreement. If there is no agreement among 4 democracies, then I won't go on.

P You would be chief spokesman, not failure, joined by all of us. They don't want democracy. You would be the man who demonstrates it. Freedom fighters would be shown to be right.

A By perception this is a little different. If there is no agreement because S. propose changes, then that battle is won.

P Let's close loopholes in that way we are united. When S. see no loopholes & can't accept, then they are exposed for what they are.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A That is the best scenario. If we 4 democracies can agree. I don't think we can reach agreement because Sand. can't agree w/Salvador. The Sandinistas will win. If we sign an agreement w/loop-holes. We just want 60 days & then it is Sandinistas who will be exposed.

Baker - What happens after 60 days?

A There are no sanctions, but anything could happen.

P But in meantime what happens to Contras?

A This has to be negotiated. We wrote 2 lines about ceasefire. Commission of Natl. Reconciliation would have to deal with this.

P If Nicaragua becomes democracy no more support for guerillas in Salvador.

Habib - Not just El Savlador seeking improvements. Also Honduras and Guatemala. You can harmonize your views. Can harmonize & still retain essence of your proposals.

Madrigal - We are not saying take it or leave it.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P welcome plan - defects
Looking forward to meeting w/ dem. representatives

Laas -

Express my concerns. May
undercut your goals

~~know~~

A. I know of your concerns. Have
dealt with this for last 3
months

P. Goal is worthy & has our support

A. we decided postpone till beginning
of Aug. & hold FM mtg before
FM never met before because Sanel
didn't present anything written.
Said against, recently said
in favor. But awaiting reaction
of other countries. wanted Salv.
to present objections

-S: don't like our peace proposal.
Wrote letter to Contadora saying
wanted discuss letter of Contadora,
But recognize my plan has
depth. Emphasizes democracy.
Puts timetable

Contadora has been used by sandinistas

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF01-092#24150

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

~~When I presented~~

All peace initiatives in past have been used by Nic. to get time.

My objective is to unmask Sand.

I made trip to Europe & got support for my plan; also centadones & Central American.

~~the~~ Ambiguity of Sand. We have to unmask them. Have to show they betrayed revolution. This is one of main objectives of my peace proposal.

For 60 days we allow them to show sincerity. ~~the~~ I knew they cannot fulfill it. They cannot open la Prensa in 60 days. Won't let Obando & Bravo use press.

If we could take calculated risk for 60 days.

I don't believe they will open up. They won't accept liberty because it is end. Only 15% would vote for them. Hunger & many

Believe me my only objective is expose
Nic govt & to change it. My interest
is vital. I am neighbor w/ Army.
They have used contras as excuse for
everything, to abolish liberty & for
poor state of economy. Will collapse
tomorrow. They are desperate now.
They are isolated. Will collapse.

I may be wrong, but believe
in my sincerity. Washington has
been alone. Europe backed contras,
thus they will back me.

In 60 days we see if they sincere.
If they lie, then whole world will
know.

Alfonso, de la Madrid don't
like Nicaragua, but not supporting
contras. My country is 99%
anti Sandinista. We betrayed
by them

P. You giving them a period in
which they could cheat. Our
concern is that cheating could
succeed, but pressure would
be gone because freedom
fighters no longer viable. Why
not close loopholes through

which cheat.

Not case of saying don't make proposal.
It is case of making sure they don't
cheat. If they do then do we
move in militarily. That is not
the answer. They will cheat.

A. There may be some loopholes. Discussed
w/ Lab. 6 who has done tremendous
job. But they can't get away
with it. But Commission will
control this.

I concerned about Duarte, who
is our friend. Duarte has doubts;
they valid concerns. I want to
be on offense. If 4 dem. agree
Nic will be isolated. Within 2 months
they will be exposed. Against essence
of Marxist govt to do what we propose.

P. Nic has had disinformation campaigns.
Tells story of Bishop ^{Schlotten} ~~pre~~ said attached
by contras, but really attached by
Sandistas.

Nothing being lost to you in this
plan - you want to expose them
in 60 days. If that is true
they will have exposed themselves
but strengthened for future in going
ahead. Could loopholes be removed.

so they could be exposed by refusing,
then no way out, have to go ahead
w/ democratization.

Lets look for ways to eliminate
loopholes + then we will be very
suppressive.

A. But S. wouldn't agree to what
Duarte wants

P. Then they expose themselves.

A. But if they refuse there is no
agreement. If there no
agreement among 4 democracies,
then I won't go on.

P. You would be chief spokesman, not
failure; joined by all of us. ~~But~~
They don't want democracy. You
would be the man who demonstrates
it. Freedom fighters would be
shown to be right.

A. By perception this is a little different. If
there is no agreement because S.
propose changes, then that battle
is won.

P. Lets close loopholes in way that
we united. When S. see no
loopholes, & can't accept, then
they exposed for what they are.

A. That is the best scenario. If we
4 democracies can agree. I don't
think we can reach agreement because
Sand can't agree w/ Salvador.

~~But~~ The Sandinistas will win.
If we sign an agreement w/ loopholes.
We just wait 60 days & then
it is sandinistas who exposed.

Baker. What happens after 60 days.

A. There are no sanctions, but anything
could happen.

P. But in meantime what happens
to ~~press~~ contras.

A. This has to be negotiated. We
wrote 2 lines about ceasefire. ^{Commun} Communism
of ^{Madri} Madri. Reconciliation would have
to deal with this.

P. If Nicaragua becomes democracy no
more support for guerrillas in
Salvador.

Polak. Not just El Salo. seeking improvements.
also Hond. & Guat. You can
harmonize your views.
Can harmonize & still retain essence
of your proposals.

Madrigal. We not saying take it or
leave it.