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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name CARLUCCI, FRANK: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 5/2/2006

File Folder THE PRESIDENT (09/10/1987-10/31/1987)

FOIA

F01-092

Box Number 92462

CAMERON, GRANT

6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
24169	PAPER	ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	5	9/10/1987	B1
24170	MEMO	CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT	1	9/11/1987	B6
48937	MEMO	FRANK CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	9/25/1987	
24171	NOTES	PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DIRECTOR WEBSTER, KEN DUBERSTEIN AND FRANK CARLUCCI IN THE OVAL OFFICE SEPTEMBER 29, 1987 - TYPED <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	1	9/29/1987	B1
24172	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES FOR #24171 <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	1	9/29/1987	B1
24173	PAPER	RETURN TO NICARAGUA: NDR PLAN <i>R 1/31/2011 F2001-092/1</i>	3	ND	B1
24174	CABLE	#232307Z OCT 87 - MEMCON - GORBACHEV, SHEVARDNADZE, GEORGE SHULTZ, CARLUCCI, 10/23/1987 <i>R 6/24/2010 M133/1; UPHELD 1/31/2011 F01-092 #24174</i>	8	10/23/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

This is the arms control paper FCC wants -
the original is in the green arms control
folder in FCC's safe.

September 10, 1987

GK
RRARMS CONTROL DECISIONSSTART.

a. Mobiles. The US will consider permitting mobile ICBMs in a START agreement at/near end-game on the negotiations if needed to conclude an agreement that is otherwise in our interests and provided that the Soviets are prepared to work with us in good faith to agree on acceptable associated verification measures.

While the US should not signal flexibility on mobiles to the Soviet Union at this time, an internal assessment should be done to determine the best possible approaches for verifying limits on road and rail mobile ICBMs.

b. Sub-limits. The US will be prepared to respond to Soviet flexibility in START by showing some flexibility on sub-limits. There should be no flexibility shown on:

- 6000 warheads on ballistic missiles & ALCMs (+ compensation for bomber weapons under the Reykjavik bomber counting rule.)
- 1600 total ballistic missiles and heavy bombers
- 4800 warheads on ballistic missiles
- 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs

In showing flexibility, the initial move should be the relaxing of our current proposal of a sub-limit of 3300 on total warheads on ICBMs to 3600 warheads on ICBMs. (This sublimit should not be extended to apply to warheads on SLBMs as well).

c. SLCM. The best the US can do in this area is to offer to make unilateral statements about the existing and planned nuclear SLCM forces of both sides.

DEFENSE & SPACE

a. Bottom Line. Protect the promise of SDI at all costs. Regardless of whether the US forswears its pursuit of active defenses against ballistic missiles, none doubt that the Soviets are now and will continue to dig the massive, deep shelters that they are permitted to build under the terms of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union will defend those things it values most. The issue for the future is whether the US will be permitted to protect what it values. A future effective SDI deployment program (not merely the existence of an SDI research program) is the basis for a more secure future for the US and her Allies.

b. No Framework Agreements. We should avoid any "framework agreements" that cover the START and Defense and Space area since they will effectively put in place anticipated restrictions on SDI on us while not being sufficient to allow us to see START reductions begin.

c. 6 Month Notification Prior to Deployment. As needed, we can add to our current position a provision calling for a "6 month notification of either side's intent to deploy defenses not currently permitted" after 1 January 1995 when each side can choose to deploy such defenses.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD-092#24169
BY EW NARA DATE 1/31/11

~~TOP SECRET~~INF

a. Overall. The INF Treaty is a major accomplishment. We should resolve the remaining "minor" issues as quickly as possible so that we can get this Treaty ratified and implemented while you are still in office.

b. Status. We have resolved most of the critical issues associated with this Treaty. While a lot of details still need to be ironed out (e.g., the schedule of reductions, details of verification, status of flight testing, etc.), the only remaining major issue between the US and Soviet Union has to do with the US warheads provided under an existing program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany for their Pershing IA missiles.

c. US Warheads for German Pershing IA Missiles. We cannot undercut the basic principle that such existing programs of cooperation are not subject to bilateral negotiation. Provided that the Soviet Union can be satisfied by the statement made by Chancellor Kohl that the German PIAs will be eliminated, and the subsequent statements by US spokesmen that in such a circumstance, the US warheads would be withdrawn, we should be able to conclude a Treaty in this area this fall. This being the case, we should do what we can to conclude this treaty.

d. Reduction Schedule. We wanted to eliminate the missiles involved as quickly as possible. The current plan, proposed by the JCS and agreed by all agencies, would have the missiles destroyed within 3 years. We are about to discuss the details with our allies.

e. New Draft Treaty. We hope to be in a position to table a new treaty by next Monday. To do so, needed to make the following decisions:

1. To clarify that this treaty only covers SRINF/LRINF missiles designed to attack targets on the surface of the earth (and not ABM, ASAT or air defense missiles that could fly to similar ranges).

2. No flight testing after treaty is signed. This would include using the launching of these missiles (e.g., US Pershings) to "destroy" them. Therefore, we can't use Pershings for other testing, spacelaunch vehicles, or as targets for SDI experiments.

3. Permit research and development missiles for other purposes as long as they

- (1) are not existing types of SRINF/LRINF missiles;
- (2) are limited in number; and
- (3) are not used to develop new SRINF/LRINF missiles.

4. Ban all armed ground launched cruise missiles (including those which are conventionally armed) beyond 500 kilometers. This is needed for verification, but it does foreclose future US/NATO options for advanced conventionally armed cruise missiles at these longer ranges. (SecDef objects strongly to this decision and it may cause complaint from some conservatives.)

Nuclear Testing

View A -- Step Back. Any restrictions on nuclear testing are not in the US interest. We should do what is needed to avoid unilateral restrictions being imposed upon us by Congress, but go no further. We should make it clear that negotiations on limits on testing beyond the TBT/PNET could begin only after a START Treaty was completed and implemented (when we fully understand the impact of the START agreement and our security requirements under such a Treaty).

View B -- Move Further. We are committed to pursue the ratification of the TBT/PNET. We have told the Soviet Union and the Congress that, if the Soviets agree to work with us to satisfy our verification requirements associated with the TBT/PNET, once this is done we will immediately negotiate on further limitations on nuclear testing as part of a parallel program, parallel to nuclear force reductions. We have also agreed to an ultimate goal of a complete and comprehensive test ban, albeit in the context of a world where nuclear weapons are no longer needed for our security. We have laid out this course in good faith. We should seek to make progress along this course with full vigor. We should actively press the Soviets to agree to the agenda for negotiations so that we can make progress, and we should pursue the idea of "joint verification experiments" as suggested by Shevardnadze to the Secretary of State in Moscow last April. We can make progress here if we are prepared to show some creativity and flexibility.

View C -- Hold. Go no further than our current position. This is one of the most important areas for you to consider. Feelings among your advisors run exceptionally high about this subject. This is appropriate because if the Soviet Union were able to constrain our nuclear test program, it could undercut our ability to sustain our nuclear deterrent. The principle that guides our position on testing limitations is that "as long as we require nuclear weapons for our security and that of our allies, we require the ability to test those weapons." This is a sound principle.

Discussion. Those who would support View A would argue that it would be better to walk back the US position to some degree. They feel that we are leaning too far forward in commitments to negotiations on limitations beyond those of the TBT/PNET when we can identify no such limitation now that would be in the US interest. They are correct on this account. They fear that the US pursuit of our current position will carry us even further beyond that position.

Those who support View B argue that we can't walk the US back in this area without risking unilateral Congressional restrictions on our program. They are also correct.

Recommendation. The answer may lie in simply holding the US position, prepared to meet the commitments made if the Soviets accept the conditions which we have laid down, but not pursuing this area of our own accord.

Chemical Weapons

View A -- Step Back. The current US position in this area is a mistake because the US Treaty that was tabled in 1984 is totally unverifiable. In addition, other hostile nations are now actively involved in chemical weapons, like Libya and Iran. There is no security in such an agreement. Instead, the US needs to take those actions necessary to permit the production of a stockpile of modern binary chemical weapons which can serve as a deterrent. Since a worldwide ban on chemical weapons can not be verified, the US must reverse itself, and instead pursue reductions of existing stocks of such weapons down to lower levels (permitting the US to maintain such a stockpile).

View B -- Hold Firm. We knew the difficulties involved in verifying a chemical weapons ban before the Vice President traveled to Geneva and tabled the US Treaty. Without the current US position, we would have been unable to sustain support for the US binary program in the Congress. Any backing away from the current US commitment to the goal of treaty banning chemical weapons can only lead to the death of the US chemical weapon modernization effort. No matter what happens, the current unitary chemical weapon stockpile will have to be destroyed within the next 5-10 years because of its age and for safety reasons. Therefore, even in the absence of a treaty, the US will face a situation where it is unable to produce and maintain a modern chemical deterrent while the Soviet Union is free to do so. For these reasons, it is better to continue to pursue our treaty in the belief that some limits on Soviet chemical weapons are better than none since the US will likely not have a robust chemical weapon deterrent program in any event.

Recommendation. Harden the current US position. This is another very critical area for the United States. Chemical weapons are easy to produce and easy to hide. Any ban on the production of chemical weapons would be virtually impossible to verify. Relatively small amounts can make a big difference in combat. The treatment of this issue is a matter of great concern to your most conservative supporters. They would urge that the US revise its position in light of the unverifiability of a ban on chemical weapons, and that we pursue limits on chemical weapon stockpiles so that these limited stockpiles can provide a real basis for deterring the use of chemical weapons. This may be an area where, despite our desires to rid ourselves of the threat of these terrible weapons, the reality of the situation is that our current position is untenable.

Conventional Arms

View A -- Go Slow. Conventional arms reductions, even if larger for the Warsaw Pact than NATO, are not in US interest. Also, there is no way to engage in conventional reductions negotiations without the risk of having NATO nuclear forces of less than 500 kilometer range incorporated. Therefore, we must be prepared to "string out" the current procedural discussions, and block any substantive proposals in the intra-NATO phase of deliberations.

View B -- Move Faster. Although the multilateral nature of conventional reductions negotiations makes them more difficult to manage than bilateral US-USSR talks, there is opportunity for substantial benefit from conventional talks. The US can "take charge" of the NATO Alliance by being imaginative and forthcoming. We can keep the initiative in public diplomacy away from the Soviets by "getting there first" with substantive reductions proposals. We can forestall unilateral action by the US Congress and individual European Allies -- much the way MBFR blunted the Mansfield amendment. To do this we must show some flexibility on procedural issues (to assuage the French) and then start generating NATO support for substantive proposals.

Recommendation. Hold firm on our current approach. The complexity of conventional negotiations -- both in their multilateral construction and the variety of elements included in the negotiations -- makes it unlikely any agreement could be forged in the next 15 months. Therefore the issues here are ones of Alliance management and making sure our security interests are not foreclosed by the framework of the negotiation. Our best course would be to pursue internal work vigorously to determine what kind of substantive proposals fit within our security interests, while exerting pressure on NATO Allies to keep the terms of reference for the negotiations focused away from nuclear or dual-capable forces.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
24170	MEMO CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT	1	9/11/1987	B6

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~~SECRET~~


48937

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 25, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 
SUBJECT: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

Since Cap is in the Persian Gulf, I conveyed to him the general tenor of your meeting the other day with the Republican Leadership on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Cap asked that the following points be reaffirmed to you.

1. You have always been on the side of deficit reductions. It is the continual Congressional refusal to accept your recommendations for non-defense reductions that has created the problem.
2. Veto should be followed not by chaos, but by a quick debt extension bill.
3. The thing most likely to "destroy" the Republican Party would be our abandonment of any pretense of an adequate defense budget. How would signing a bill that requires a 38B, plus cut in defense "enable" them to do battle as a unified party.
4. They should help you on this by supporting vetos on spending bills as a matter of simple adherence to Republican doctrine, not as a favor to the President.
5. In any event, their support of vetos does not add one cent to defense.
6. All but one, or possible two of the Republican Congressional leaders who attended have supported tax increases. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is simply another means of trying to force you to ask for more taxes.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 5/1/06

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 25, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 

SUBJECT: Senator McCain Amendment

You asked this morning about the McCain amendment. McCain submitted an amendment to the DOD Authorization Bill which was adopted yesterday evening by the vote of 96 yeas 1 nay (Senator Simpson) - 3 not voting (Senators Biden, Gore and Simon). Sense of the Congress re Japan's contributions to global stability: It is the sense of Congress that the U.S. would welcome an initiative by Japan to assume a politically acceptable and significant global security role consistent with its economic status by taking the following actions:

1. Increase its official development assistance program funding so that by 1992 it will be spending approximately 3% of its gross national product on such program.
2. Devote increased official development assistance expenditures primarily to regions of importance to global stability outside of East Asia, particularly Oceania, Latin America, and the Caribbean and Mediterranean nations.
3. Devote any increase in its official development assistance program primarily to concessional, untied grants and increase the portion of total expenditures made for such program for those multilateral financial institutions of which Japan is a member.
4. Designate those nations that are to be recipients of its increased development assistance through consultation with its security partners.
5. Expand its official development assistance program without regard to its expenditures on Defense, particularly expenditures for completion of the 5-year defense program for FYs 1986 through 1990.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. ~~CCP~~
2. File
24171

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DIRECTOR WEBSTER, KEN
DUBERSTEIN AND FRANK CARLUCCI IN THE OVAL OFFICE
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1987

1. Zia's grandson going back. Story.
2. Trip. Hospitable. Forthcoming. Consensus. Now that we are there in Gulf we should stay. Take out of Iranian ships was indicator we mean business. They like international mode.

Afraid of Iranian victory. Great concern. Worried about fundamentalism. Mecca worked against Iran. Fahd said Shiites expressed their outrage.

Saudis coming along in their sense of responsibility.

Israelis happy to let Iran-Iraq war keep going. Arab countries restrained in their view of Israel. Want Palestinians at bargaining table.

Afghanistan better picture. We are winning that war. Stinger has done it. Hit average 85%.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR F01-092#24171

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

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NLRR FDI-092#24172

BY RW NARA DATE 11/31/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1987

Mr. President:

In case you missed this.
Ms. Suzman has been for 30 years
the leading South Africa foe
of apartheid.


Frank Carlucci

Sanctions Won't End Apartheid

By Helen Suzman

A year ago the European Economic Community, the Commonwealth countries and the United States introduced economic sanctions against South Africa. The effects of these sanctions are now under review.

The Reagan Administration, which tried unsuccessfully to veto the comprehensive anti-apartheid act approved by Congress a year ago, believes that the sanctions have been misguided and has rejected new penalties. Other leaders share these doubts.

The European and Commonwealth sanctions are less extensive than the American sanctions, in part because of the determined opposition of the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, both of whom repudiate apartheid but believe sanctions to be counter-productive and ineffective.

The experience of the past year bears out this belief, the most compelling evidence being the election last May for South Africa's white assembly. This election produced a distinct swing to the right, following a campaign that played heavily on the security concerns of the white minority while encouraging a burst of patriotic sentiment against "outside interference."

These and other factors — including a virtual boycott by the radical left — gave President P. W. Botha's National Party 123 seats out of 166 and strengthened the far-right Conservative Party. The Conservatives won the support of 27 percent of the white electorate, captured 22 seats and displaced the anti-apartheid Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition.

Helen Suzman, the longest serving member of Parliament in South Africa, is spokeswoman for the Progressive Federal Party.

Mr. Botha has since reimposed the state of emergency, renewing and extending the powers of detention without trial. Meanwhile, the army and police remain in force in the strife-ridden black and "coloured" townships, press censorship has been tightened and reform measures have been put on the back burner.

So much for the political value of economic sanctions. What of their economic effects? Here, sanctions have been effective. The question is whether they have been at all useful.

The loss of export markets, such as the North American and Scandinavian markets for fruit, will seriously jeopardize the labor market in the western Cape where fruit growers employ nearly a quarter of a million workers, all of whom are black or "coloured." Similarly, declining markets for coal will affect the livelihood of about 30,000 black migrants from neighboring black territories.

More broadly, the absence of foreign investment capital and the withdrawal of foreign companies (especially American firms fed up with the hassle factor and the threat of boycotts at home) have reduced the growth rate to less than the minimum required to keep job opportunities level with new job seekers.

It is estimated that some two million people are presently unemployed, mostly unskilled black workers, and that by the year 2000 the number will have risen to nearly eight million, without sanctions, and to almost 10 million with sanctions.

**There
cannot be
democracy
in a
wasteland.**

Economic expansion will promote change.

And this is a nation without much of a social security safety net.

Needless to say, whatever harm is done to South Africa's economy will certainly harm the economies of its neighbors, for southern Africa is one economic unit. All the neighboring black states depend on South Africa for jobs, markets, electricity and transport. And if South Africa's job-sustaining capacity is reduced, thousands of foreign workers will be repatriated to the neighboring black states.

One wonders, then, why leaders of the black states are so vociferous in their support of sanctions, and why, since South African blacks are least able to sustain the mass increase in joblessness, their leaders also advocate sanctions and other punitive measures.

The answer to the first question is that the frontline states, while continuing to trade briskly with South Africa, see international pressure as the only way in which to bring down the Pretoria regime. They also rely on the West to make good any economic losses they sustain as a result of sanctions. The answer to the second is usually: "South African blacks are suffering so much already that any additional suffering caused by sanctions will make little difference to their lives."

This contention is not borne out by the reality of joblessness in a country with no dole and no food stamps. There is, of course, a more sophisticated, if equally unrealistic, reply: Economic stress will bring on the revolution and the downfall of the capitalist system, which is closely identified with apartheid. Such a view

totally underestimates the strength, ferocity and determination of the armed forces in South Africa to maintain the status quo.

If there were any chance that sanctions would dismantle apartheid, I would be the first to support them. But reducing South Africa to a wasteland would lead not to a nonracial democracy but to more oppression, and misery. No one should be under the delusion that things are so bad in South Africa that they could not get worse.

A little over a year ago, Archbishop Desmond Tutu said, "The onus is on those who do not want sanctions to provide us with a viable, nonviolent strategy to force the dismantling of apartheid."

While I disagree with the underlying premise of this remark — that sanctions provide such a strategy — it is relevant to ask what alternative there is, and it is particularly relevant when the question comes from a man who cannot vote, despite the fact that he is South African-born, the head of the Anglican Church in South Africa and a Nobel laureate.

The sad truth of the matter is that there is no instant solution that will transform the South African scene. Despite all the pressures from within and without the republic, the fundamentals of apartheid remain. The most effective instrument for change is economic expansion within the country. This is the force that led in the first instance to those non-cosmetic changes that have taken place in the last 10 years — the opening of skilled jobs to blacks, improvements in education and training, recognition of black trade unions, acceptance of a permanent black urban population and the abolition of the pass laws.

The Western democracies, whose basic values are freedom and human rights, should continue to protest long and loud against all the miserable practices of apartheid and to use all positive measures to speed its demise. But moral indignation should not lead them to impose punitive measures that will wreck the economy of the country in which black South Africans will inevitably share.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 8, 1987

Mr. President:

For your leisure reading in case you missed it. You will not like the article but it expresses the point of view that is shared by a number of Europeans.

Frank Carlucci

Attachment

Newsweek Article by
Henry Kissinger:
The Challenge for NATO

Kissinger: A New Era for NATO

After an INF accord, creative diplomacy will be needed to save the alliance

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

I was born in Europe and became secretary of state of the country that gave me refuge—an inconceivable elevation anywhere else in the world. I have known both sides of the Atlantic intimately, and maintaining close ties between them has always been a priority especially close to my heart. And for a long period it was my good fortune to observe an American policy based on that same commitment. Americans have every reason to take pride in what their leaders have built in 40 years of bipartisan effort on Atlantic relations. America, the daughter of Europe, repaid its heritage by contributing idealism and resources to the old Continent in its darkest hour. And it added to the values of human dignity and freedom that it inherited from Europe an innocence and idealism that have made it a beacon to oppressed peoples everywhere.

To be sure, like many Americans I have often been exasperated by shortsighted European actions and by the tendency among some of our allies to shift the burden of difficult decisions onto the United States. With the passage of time, it has become increasingly evident that the alliance cannot live forever on the capital accumulated in the great decade of creativity that produced the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall plan and the Atlantic alliance. While in office in 1973, I appealed for a rededication of the two sides of the Atlantic. "The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada and America," I pointed out, "will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders... On both sides of the Atlantic, we are faced with the anomalous situation in which the public mind identifies foreign-policy success increasingly with relations with adversaries..."

That effort at renewal foundered on European fear of American domination and on tactical mistakes on my part. But the situation I foresaw a decade and a half ago is now upon us. A grave crisis of confidence has developed. Concern about America's intentions has always been inherent in the military inequality between the two sides of the Atlantic and their geographic separation. What is new about the current situation is that America is being doubted not by its traditional critics but by its oldest friends.



Pressure tactics: One of the German Pershing 1A missiles slated for removal

The crisis has been triggered by the imminent agreement to eliminate medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the arsenals of both superpowers. Its provisions will no doubt be fully debated when it comes up for ratification before the Senate. But the debate will miss a crucial point. Domestic political support for stationing American missiles on the Continent has disappeared in all the European countries. In that sense, the negotiations have already created a new reality. Hence, nonratification is not an option.

It will be the task of American foreign policy to find constructive ways of dealing with that new reality. At the moment, the groups that have most consistently supported close Atlantic cooperation are in disarray. For over a generation, they have accepted as an article of faith that American nuclear weapons were needed to counterbalance Soviet conventional superiority—and that deployment of American missiles on the Continent was an essential component of that strategy. They now find the most conservative U.S. administration

of the postwar era stigmatizing nuclear weapons with arguments all but indistinguishable from the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament.

They experienced the shock of Reykjavik, where the superpowers were on the verge of agreeing to scrap all missiles (including those of our allies). They have seen enormous pressure put on the Federal Republic of Germany to accept the withdrawal not only of the American medium-range missiles on its soil but also of Pershing 1A's, German-controlled missiles located there for a decade and a half. The fact that the last four NATO commanders are themselves deeply uneasy about the agreement compounds the Europeans' anxiety. The internal political debate within the alliance will never be the same again.

The administration justifies the pending agreement by pointing out that the Soviets will give up more warheads than the United States. But the Soviet Union is not in the habit of making unequal agreements. Its quid pro quo is a goal that the Soviets have sought for a generation: sepa-

rating America from its European allies.

This is a particular problem in the Federal Republic of Germany. No other country is in as precarious a geographic, political, and psychological position. West Germany is still a relatively new state with an artificial capital and essentially arbitrary frontiers that rose out of the shock and despair of a disastrous war. Across mine fields and barbed wire that divide it from East Germany, it faces at least 20 Soviet divisions in a high state of preparedness. No other country so desperately needs steadiness and sensitivity from its allies. Frequent shocks threaten its fragile self-confidence and hard-won new moorings. An eminent European leader said to me shortly after Reykjavik: "The [medium-range] missiles were a corset that ties Germany to the West. You are now destroying that corset and we will have to pay the price for it."

In addition, if the president persists in his assault on nuclear weapons and establishes denuclearization as a pre-eminent American objective, a crisis with the European nuclear powers, Britain and France, is certain. They do not accept his proposition that their security is enhanced by eliminating all nuclear weapons; nor do they believe it is possible to defend Europe entirely with conventional forces. Under the shock of Reykjavik, they are acquiescing in the withdrawal of American weapons stationed in Germany—but primarily as a means of staving off U.S. pressure to give up their own nuclear forces. If that calculation proves mistaken, they will fiercely resist any assault on their nuclear forces.

The NATO crisis can thus be summed up as follows:

- The apparent change in a military doctrine pursued by the past five administrations places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea. This is occurring at a time when congressional budgetary pressures have put in doubt plans to develop new weapons necessary for a more flexible strategy.

- In the process, many Europeans are convinced, a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic will be "decoupled."

- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet conventional superiority has not been reduced. Because of that imbalance, administration invocations of its horror of nuclear war send a shudder through the Europeans, who worry that America may recoil before its nuclear commitments.

All this makes it probable that Europe will seek new directions in the years ahead. Some countries will be tempted to maneuver between East and West and to extend

the administration's denuclearization rhetoric to battlefield weapons. Others will go in the opposite direction and seek to build up their own nuclear forces. In either case, the old pattern of American tutelage will end. While America can no longer prevent these trends, it should try to channel them in a constructive direction. It should endorse the existing European nuclear forces, support their coordination, and encourage a greater European identity in defense and arms-control matters. Where it is feasible, it can strengthen political cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic. Where it is not, it can at least limit the extent to which disagreements are pushed.

How Did the Crisis Arise?

From the beginning, NATO has faced a fundamental dilemma: it confronts a threat from a single country, while the alliance is composed of many (lately 16) sovereign states, the strongest of which is separated from most of the others by some 4,000 miles. A coalition, no matter how close, can never be—or appear to be—as cohesive as a single state. America has acted as if a legal commitment could make NATO a single unit. But Europeans, with their experience of fragile alliances, have always sought more tangible guarantees. Even in the early days of NATO, when the United States possessed clear nuclear superiority, the allies insisted on a substantial American military presence on the Continent. It made little sense in terms of the prevailing military doctrine of "mas-

sive nuclear retaliation"; but it provided reassurance because it was believed—at least subconsciously—that the United States would have no choice except to defend its own forces.

In the '60s, the Soviet Union began to edge toward parity, and in the '70s the United States and the Soviet Union entered into arms-control negotiations aimed at making nuclear attack militarily unproductive. To some extent, they have succeeded in that end. But a nuclear standoff puts the side that can escape defeat only by the use of nuclear weapons at a clear disadvantage. When nuclear war loses its military rationale, the inevitable question arises whether any nation would risk national suicide for an ally—no matter how close their ties.

The Europeans have never believed that conventional weapons, by themselves, are reliable deterrents; too many European wars have broken out when forces were roughly equal. NATO thus came to rely on American nuclear forces to offset a Soviet conventional threat beyond a certain threshold. But, insecure about relying entirely on a United States arsenal located so far away, our allies sought a claim on American decision making. For defense-minded Europeans, the issue has not been whether the United States had the technical ability to reach Soviet territory from America or from the sea. It was whether America would use that capability in defense of European interests and survival. Atlanticist Europeans reasoned that long-



Harsh memories: Waiting for a U.S. air drop during the 1948 Berlin crisis

range nuclear weapons in Europe would provide the indispensable link between American strategy and European defense.

To be sure, this point of view was never unanimous. A significant portion of European opinion always believed that Europe should rely less on the United States and instead mediate between East and West. The debate became virulent when America sought to deploy medium-range American missiles in Europe in the early '80s. In the end these missiles were introduced only after riots and demonstrations that shook the domestic tranquillity of many countries for months. It is impossible to understand the European reaction to the forthcoming INF agreement without considering what the current leaders went through when the missiles were installed. And the fact that the agreement is supported by some American hard-liners with arguments first advanced by the opponents of missile deployment has added to the psychological havoc.

Balance of power: The confusion and anger have been particularly acute in the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany was the last major European state to be unified. Its founding was not the result of a popular movement; it was a decision taken by the princes of the various German states, under the dominant influence of Prussia. Precisely because democracy and nationalism were at odds in Germany for the better part of a century, German populism has always had an abstract romantic quality and lacked a sense of proportion. This turned the strategic problems produced by Germany's geographic location into a permanent source of instability for Europe. Before unification, Germany had for centuries been the battleground on which its neighbors fought to maintain the European balance of power. After unification, Germany sought—understandably, if unwisely—to achieve security against all its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort paradoxically produced Germany's worst nightmare: a coalition of neighboring states. For if Germany was strong enough to defeat all its neighbors simultaneously, it was clearly strong enough to overwhelm them individually. Thus Germany's effort to escape its strategic predicament made the first world war all but inevitable. For centuries Germany has been either too weak or too strong to ensure peace in Europe.

It was the West's good fortune that in the period following World War II the new West German state was led by a truly great man, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer understood that Germany could find its emotional bearings and overcome the legacy of distrust only by resisting the temptations of geography and attaching itself firmly to the Western Alliance. He acted courageously and painfully, while the Soviet Union was turning the eastern

third of the country into a communist outpost—and while a passionate domestic opposition was accusing him of giving up the option of unification in favor of the Western Alliance and the American connection.

Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), was the chief

What is new about this crisis is that America is being doubted by its oldest friends

spokesman for that point of view. His party had heroically resisted the Nazis and included some of the most admirable men in German politics. But precisely because the SPD represented one of the few elements of historic continuity, it advocated a policy that amounted to dressing up traditional nationalism in neutralist garb—that is, trading Western ties for unification.

The opponents of NATO only gradually came to terms with German integration into the West. Adenauer's legacy proved so strong that in the '70s two distinguished Social Democratic chancellors, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, were able to make major contributions to Western policy (in part because a staunchly pro-Western core of German public opinion forged during the bitter debates of the '50s provided a hedge against adventurism).

Still, Schumacher's legacy proved almost as lasting as Adenauer's. His disciples never completely overcame their doubts, and when Chancellor Schmidt proposed the deployment of American medium-range missiles on German soil, the upheaval in his party helped bring him down. Since then, the SPD has pursued an agenda much closer to the spirit of its first leader than of its last chancellor—one that stresses national issues, antinuclear policies and German autonomy. And since the third German party—the Free Democrats—can survive only by maneuvering between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, any weakening of the Christian Democrats is bound to jeopardize the steady course of German policy.

I have known the Christian Democratic leaders who have responsibility for foreign policy and defense for decades. After a life-

time of unquestioning support for American policies, they find themselves adrift in an unfamiliar world in which American briefers parrot the slogans of their antinuclear adversaries. They resent the pressures that caused them to give up their own 450-mile-range missiles, the Pershing 1A's. (To be sure, Washington denied applying any pressure. However, its claim that it was on the verge of a historic agreement implicitly put the onus on Germany if the talks failed.) After the INF agreement goes into force, the nuclear missiles left in Germany will be unable to hit targets outside East or West Germany. No government in Bonn is likely to sustain support for a strategy under which only Germans are threatened by nuclear retaliation from German soil.

As they grow more and more disillusioned with America, heretofore pro-Atlantic Germans may seek an emotional outlet by promoting the so-called "German question." To be sure, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have no conceivable interest in actual unification. But they do not need to agree to unification to influence German policy. The notion that the fate of Germany under communist rule should be eased is gaining momentum. By manipulating that slogan, the communists could discourage the Federal Republic from making further pro-Western moves without paying the price of actual unification.

Most European leaders share this assessment of the German situation. And the leaders of Britain and France are bound to wonder whether if the START talks progress their own nuclear forces will eventually be subjected to the same pressures as the Pershing 1A's in Germany. The disarray in the alliance will then be complete.

What Should Be Done?

No one should pretend that there is a simple remedy to a crisis that has been building for a decade or more. Nor will the old standby of multiplying reassurances work. A NATO summit—now being discussed in Washington—would act as a brief tranquilizer, at best. Before the NATO heads of government meet, the United States must make up its mind about what it wishes to say and how it can elicit a reliable long-term consensus.

A few principles can be stated here:

- It is imperative for the United States to establish a relationship between its rhetoric and its strategy, and between its defense and arms-control policies. President Reagan cannot keep repeating the goal of denuclearizing the world without further eroding the American nuclear commitment to Europe. Moreover, somebody must face the fact that slogans of denuclearization are impossible to fulfill—and hence irresponsible. So many nuclear weapons have been produced and the territory of both super-

powers is so vast that it would be impossible to ensure that all these weapons have been eliminated. No arms agreement could do away with the knowledge of how to make these weapons. Any negotiation would have to take into account open as well as clandestine programs in new nuclear countries. In short, it cannot be in the interest of the democracies to keep avowing objectives more sentimental than realistic—and to stigmatize the weapons on which the defense of the West must for the foreseeable future be based.

■ *The popular sport of Europe-bashing must end.* This is not the time to settle old scores, however real. America's traditional friends need reassuring, not lecturing. In particular, a time of nuclear withdrawal is not the occasion to push for so-called "burden-sharing" by threatening to remove conventional forces. What is most lacking, after all, is an agreement on precisely what burden is supposed to be shared.

■ *It is urgent that allied strategic doctrine be reviewed.* The relationship between conventional and nuclear forces is in the process of being lost. I have argued for 30 years that the threshold at which nuclear weapons have to be used should be raised much higher. But a few realities must be faced: the United States will not restore the draft. And no Western nation will substantially increase its defense budget (indeed, the trend is in the opposite direction). The practical problem, therefore, is to define a realistic threshold for conventional forces—and for once to meet it.

At the moment, the potential for distrust between the two sides of the Atlantic is paralyzingly deep. An increasing number of Europeans, especially in Germany, want to remove battlefield nuclear weapons from their soil. The practical implication of that would be to shift the risks of nuclear deterrence from the most threatened country entirely to the most distant ally. By the same token, the administration's suggestion that battlefield weapons can substitute for medium-range missiles creates the reverse impression in many European minds—namely, that America seeks to confine nuclear devastation to European territory. The alliance can no longer avoid a precise definition of who, in times of crisis, has what nuclear responsibilities and in what time frame.

■ *The American nuclear forces assigned to the NATO commander should be more precisely defined.* Now that any major nuclear response to Soviet aggression against NATO will have to come from the seas or from America, some of the weapons earmarked for that purpose should be placed more immediately and visibly under NATO control. The American strategic weapons "assigned" to NATO now belong to the alliance in name only. A defined number of warheads fall into that category,

but no specific submarines—and the submarines on which the warheads are stationed are constantly being rotated. But as former NATO commander Bernard Rogers has pointed out, there will be no way for the Soviets to distinguish NATO-assigned forces from the overall U.S. strategic force.

The Soviets will not be stupidly impatient. The democracies need to save themselves

A flexible nuclear response is therefore becoming almost impossible. Some concrete measures that give the NATO commander a greater and continuing role in overseeing the weapons earmarked for European defense are essential, as well as some method of clarifying which part of the U.S. strategic forces serves the purpose of flexible response.

■ *Defense policy must be related to arms-control policy.* It is quite predictable that the Soviet Union will apply the Reykjavik model to conventional forces—and sooner rather than later. A numerical scheme seemingly advantageous to the United States will be put forward—say, to start with, the withdrawal of two Soviet divisions for one American division. But no such scheme can alter the geographic reality of Soviet proximity to Europe. And the inevitable corollary would be a freeze on NATO's remaining conventional forces. Unless carefully designed, such schemes could enhance the Soviet conventional advantage by forcing smaller NATO forces to be stretched thin against an aggressor with the option of concentrating its forces. Until there is an alliance agreement on a desirable conventional threshold, no criteria exist for assessing conventional reductions.

Similarly, it is certain that pressure for denuclearized zones within the alliance will mount. In my view, the denuclearization of central Europe would open the floodgates of neutralism, encouraging no-first-use doctrines that imply that the alliance prefers to be defeated by conventional forces than to use nuclear weapons. This is undoubtedly why Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has rejected any further nuclear reductions in Europe until

allied and Soviet-bloc conventional and chemical weapons are brought into balance. She has seen the alliance drifting perilously close to self-imposed military impotence in which START negotiations remove the rationale for retaliation with strategic weapons. INF negotiations prevent retaliation from European territory and conventional talks threaten to freeze an unfavorable conventional equation.

■ *The United States should encourage a greater European sense of identity in defense matters.* In the wake of Reykjavik and the tentative INF agreement, the Europeans are sure to seek greater self-reliance. The only open question is whether those efforts take the form of neutralism or of common European defense. The current governments in Britain and France will almost certainly accelerate their nuclear buildups, giving that priority over conventional reinforcement; the defense-minded element in the rest of Europe will strive to foster a specifically European conception of security. The United States should encourage these trends, for the alternative is neutralism.

European identity: Allowing Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defense will in the long run strengthen Atlantic ties and help Germany overcome its sense of isolation. Washington for a generation has supported the Common Market, which inherently involves competition with America. It should therefore abandon its historic reserve and welcome a European identity in defense, which in the end is bound to spur Atlantic cooperation. There is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which Europe will not be better off without American support. This is why, if the British and French can agree on coordinating their nuclear forces, the United States should encourage it as an important first step toward a greater European role in nuclear defense.

To symbolize its confidence in the new arrangement, America could allow the NATO military commander to be a European. Meanwhile, the secretary-general, the political representative of NATO, might be American—a reversal of traditional roles that would demonstrate that the alliance is adapting to new political conditions.

A few weeks ago, a European in a senior position of responsibility told me that though he agreed with my analysis, he had concluded that opposition to what was inevitable would reduce his effectiveness. "Remember," he said, "that even Churchill would have gone down in flames had Hitler not been stupidly impatient."

My wise European friend had a point. The Soviets will not be stupidly impatient. The democracies will have to save themselves. By dealing with the new realities creatively, they can yet revitalize their alliance.

Mr. President:

24173

SECRET/SENSITIVE

RETURN TO NICARAGUA: NDR PLAN

This is the plan George and I discussed with you, modified slightly by the NDR. We are trying to keep it on close hold until the NDR announces it.

Frank

The Nicaraguan Resistance has decided that they should try to return to Nicaragua to pressure the Sandinistas to negotiate a cease fire with them.

-- Three Resistance Director (most likely Calero, Ferrey, Chomorro) will travel to Managua accompanied by top aides of the other three members (Robelo, Cesar, Sanchez), representatives of the private sector and labor from the Resistance Assembly and members of the Resistance Cease-Fire Commission.

-- They will try to get US Congressmen and Latin and Central American and other prominent individuals to fly on the plane to Managua with them.

-- They will request that the Central American democracies provide protection for them when they are there.

-- The specific purposes of their trip would be:

-- To show their support for the Guatemala Agreements by taking a large risk on behalf of national reconciliation.

-- To demonstrate their seriousness about negotiating a cease fire.

-- To take the initiative away from the Sandinistas and pressure them.

The following will have to be consulted in order for the plan to be implemented successfully:

-- Central American Democracies: to offer protection

-- Internal Opposition: to support initiative.

(Cerezo's Christian Democratic Party is hosting a conference on internal oppositions early next week which will be attended by major internal opposition figures. Calero will be there to speak with them about this initiative)

-- Church: The Resistance would use Cardinal Obando y Bravo as mediator. He is currently in Rome and would have to be approached to secure his agreement to play this role.

-- Congress: To agree to accompany the Resistance and to agree to have the funding legislation sent formally to the Hill before they leave for Managua.

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NLRR FDI-DQJ#24173

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

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NEGOTIATIONS: In order to gain support for this initiative from the Congress and the Central American democracies, we would announce our willingness to enter into regional discussions, including the Sandinistas, on security issues.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TIMETABLE

October

9	PRG on date to introduce legislation
10-11	NDR sees Arias, briefs Bermudez
12	NDR sees Azcona
12-13	NDR approaches Internal Opposition in Guatemala NDR sees Cerezo
14	NDR sees Duarte in Washington; talks to Congressment
15-16	Busby travel to see Arias, Azcona, Cerezo to support initiative & discuss US role in regional security negotiations
17	Busby, Friers, Tillman meet with NDR in Miami
20 Guatemala)	NDR announces initiative (probably from
22-23	Administration send Funding Request to Hill
25	Return to Managua

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TIME STAMP

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED dlb 5/1/04

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM II

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 91172

87 OCT 26 AID: 57

ACTION OFFICER: ~~FOR RECORD PURPOSES~~ DUE: _____

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo Green to Peterson / Murr |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Carlucci / Powell | <input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

- | FYI | FYI | FYI |
|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Batjer | <input type="checkbox"/> Herbst | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bemis | <input type="checkbox"/> Howard | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rodman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, B. | <input type="checkbox"/> Rosenberg |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, J. | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Kimberling | <input type="checkbox"/> Rostow |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input type="checkbox"/> Sorzano |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dean, B. | <input type="checkbox"/> Major | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> Matthews | <input type="checkbox"/> Stevens |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> McNamara | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ermarth | <input type="checkbox"/> Michael | <input type="checkbox"/> Tice |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> Oakley | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flower | <input type="checkbox"/> Paal | <input type="checkbox"/> Tobey |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Perina | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Heiser | <input type="checkbox"/> Porter | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Henhoeffer | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliese | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

INFORMATION ☒ Green

☐ Carlucci (advance)

☒ Courtney

☐ Powell (advance)

☒ Secretariat

☐ _____

COMMENTS

Logged By SC

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Return to Secretariat

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SYSTEM II
91172

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

24174

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PRT: BAKER POWELL PRESIDENT, FCC, GG, WC

PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? TOP SECRET <DTG? 232307Z OCT 87

FM FRANK CARLUCCI ABOARD AIRCRAFT

TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFO WHITE HOUSE

T O P S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

OOOO

WHITE HOUSE INFO EYES ONLY FOR: SENATOR BAKER
COLIN POWELL

FOLLOWING IS MY INFORMAL MEMORANDUM ON TODAY'S CONVERSATION
WITH GORBACHEV:

OCTOBER 23, 1987

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE
GEORGE SHULTZ
FRANK CARLUCCI

ATTENDEES, BUT NOT PARTICIPANTS: AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN
MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV
AMBASSADOR DUBININ
MR. BESSMYRTNYKN, DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER
AMB. NITZE
AMB. MATLOCK
AMB. RIDGWAY
MR. PARRIS, DEPT OF STATE
(NOTETAKER)
MR. CHERNAYEV, AIDE TO
GORBACHEV

INTRODUCTION:

1. GORBACHEV ASKED SHEVARDNADZE AND SHULTZ TO CLARIFY WHERE
THEIR DISCUSSIONS STOOD. BOTH MADE A FACTUAL REPORT.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-133#24174

BY RW NARA DATE 6-24-10

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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GORBACHEV THEN COMMENTED THE THE IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS A RESULT OF THE POST-GENEVA PERIOD. THEY HAD MADE ONE MORE STEP THAN WE HAD. (IT WASN'T CLEAR WHAT HE WAS REFERRING TO.) THIS HAD GENERATED GREAT EXPECTATIONS. WE WERE NOW APPROACHING THE RESULTS STAGE. IF WE DO NOT COMPLETE AN ARMS CONTROL DEAL THERE WILL BE POLITICAL LOSSES FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R.

2. GORBACHEV STATED HIS IMPRESSION THAT WE CAN SOON COMPLETE INF. HE AGREED THAT THE FUNDAMENTALS SHOULD BE SOLVED THERE & THEN IN MOSCOW RATHER THAN IN GENEVA. IN THIS CONNECTION HE PROPOSED A JOINT MORATORIUM ON INF DEPLOYMENTS EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 1.
3. GORBACHEV CONSIDERED START THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION. "LET'S FIND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS." THE BASIC FORMULA OF 50 PERCENT AND 10 YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL WAS ESTABLISHED AT REYKJAVIK. WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THEN HAS BEEN "HORSE TRADING."
4. HE (GORBACHEV) HAD BEEN THINKING OF WHAT ELSE TO DO. PUTTING ASIDE THE DETAILS, THERE ARE TWO BIG PROBLEMS:
 - A) STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, AND
 - B) OPTIMAL FORMULATION OF THE TRIAD.
5. ON THE FIRST HE HAD PROPOSED THAT BOTH SIDES NOT WITHDRAW

FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR 10 YEARS. WE THEN CAN DISCUSS WHAT CAN AND CAN'T BE PUT IN SPACE. HE IS AWAITING OUR RESPONSE.

6. ON THE SECOND QUESTION, THE KEY IS TO HAVE AN OPTIMUM CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE TRIADS OF BOTH SIDES. ACCORDINGLY, HE IS PROPOSING A NEW FORMULA BASED ON DISTRIBUTION LEVELS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD. WITHIN A LEVEL OF 6,000 WARHEADS, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON ICBMS WOULD BE NO MORE THAN 3,000 TO 3,300. THE NUMBER FOR SLBMS WOULD BE 1,800 TO 2,000. THERE COULD BE 800 TO 900 ALCMS.
7. SUCH MOVEMENT COULD PROPEL US VERY SOON TO THE "KEY PROVISION," HE SAID. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. GORBACHEV PROPOSED A 12-MONTH "MORATORIUM" ON KRASNOYARSK CONSTRUCTION. HE EXPECTS A SIMILAR REACTION FROM US ON CONSTRUCTION AT THULE AND FLYINGDALES RADARS.

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8. SECRETARY SHULTZ WELCOMED HIS COMMENTS ON INF AND SAID WE WOULD PUSH THE NEGOTIATIONS RAPIDLY.
9. ON ABM AND RELATED QUESTIONS, THE SECRETARY WANTED TO CLARIFY WHAT GORBACHEV WAS PROPOSING. HE WOULD RESTATE IT WITHOUT IMPLYING THE PRESIDENT AGREED SINCE THIS WAS A SENSITIVE ISSUE:
 - 10 YEAR WITHDRAWAL, AND
 - COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, ACCORDING TO THE NARROW INTERPRETATION (THAT IS, AS DEFINED IN THE MARCH 1985 DOD REPORT).
10. GORBACHEV RESPONDED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT AT REYKJAVIK THAT HE WOULD HELP HIM DEAL WITH THE SDI PROBLEM. HE WOULD DO THIS BY DEFINING WHAT CAN AND CANNOT GO INTO SPACE, BUT ALL OF THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE 10 YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL PROVISION. RESEARCH COULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER THIS OPTION. THE IDEA, HOWEVER, IS THAT WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE IN SPACE.
11. SECRETARY SHULTZ ASKED AGAIN TO CLARIFY, WITHOUT INFERRING THAT HE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL: 10 YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL, INTERPRETATION AS TRADITIONALLY UNDERSTOOD. THIS WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY ACTIVITIES IN SPACE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF CERTAIN THRESHOLDS. NOTHING WOULD ALLOW DEPLOYMENT. GORBACHEV ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TESTING OF WEAPONS IN SPACE.
12. SECRETARY SHULTZ THEN TURNED TO HOW TO MAKE THE 50-PERCENT CUT OPERATIVE. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. HE PROPOSED AN ALTERNATIVE TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL, RECOGNIZING THAT SOME LIMITS ARE A PROBLEM. WE HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:
 - 6,000 WARHEADS;
 - 1,600 LAUNCHERS AND BOMBERS;
 - 1,540 WARHEADS ON HEAVY MISSILES;
 - BOMBER COUNTING RULE; AND
 - THROWWEIGHT REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT (WE ARE STILL SEEKING TO CODIFY THIS).
13. WE HAVE PROPOSED TO LIMIT ICBM WARHEADS TO 3,300. IN WASHINGTON THE SOVIETS MADE THIS 3,600 AND APPLIED IT TO ALL THREE LEGS. WE FEEL THE BIGGEST DISTINCTION IS BETWEEN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND AIR-DELIVERED WARHEADS -- BALLISTIC VERSUS NON-BALLISTIC.

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WE ARE WILLING TO DROP THE SUBLIMIT INVOLVING ICBMS AND SLBMS IN EXCHANGE FOR A 4.800 LIMIT ON ALL BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS. EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE A MIX SUITED TO ITS OWN FORCE STRUCTURE.

14. REGARDING MOBILES, THERE IS A QUESTION OF HAVING CONFIDENCE IN VERIFICATION. WE ARE WILLING TO LISTEN. "IF WE CAN FIND A SOLUTION ON THE ENTIRE PACKAGE, THEN MOBILES CAN BE RESOLVED."
15. GORBACHEV SAID THE U.S. HAS CONCERNS. "WE DO TOO. WE DO NOT WANT YOU TO FEEL LESS SECURE BY FORCING TOO MANY REDUCTIONS ON YOU. IF WE FORCE YOU TO RECONFIGURE YOUR FORCES, YOU WILL FIND A WAY OUT."
16. SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED THAT GORBACHEV HAD MADE THE SAME POINT IN GENEVA; THAT IS, ONE SIDE CAN'T MAKE THE OTHER CONFORM TO ITS IDEA OF FORCE STRUCTURE. LET'S PUT A CAP ON BALLISTIC MISSILES, BUT LEAVE THE OTHER SIDE TO STRUCTURE ITS MIX AS IT CHOOSES. WE WOULD HAVE PACKAGES THAT MAKE GAINS TOWARD STABILITY BUT DON'T TRY TO DO EVERYTHING.
17. GORBACHEV SAID WE HAVE A BASIS TO WORK TOWARD "KEY PROVISIONS." THIS WOULD BE THE CENTRAL THEME AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT, HE REPEATED, WOULD BE "KEY PROVISIONS." THEY WOULD THEN BE USED TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DELEGATES. WHEN THE PRESIDENT CAME TO MOSCOW NEXT SUMMER, HE COULD SIGN THE TREATY. GORBACHEV THEN SAID, "LET ME MAKE ONE POINT." GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO IT. I RECENTLY HEARD SOME REMARKS BY MAX KAMPELMAN SAYING THAT WE SHOULD COME TO GRIPS WITH START. THEN WE CAN DEAL WITH SPACE. NOT SO! WE HAVE TO RESOLVE START AND SPACE IN THE TOTALITY OF THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS.
18. SECRETARY SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT WE HAVE SHOWN FLEXIBILITY ON SOME OF THE START NUMBERS. PERHAPS GENEVA CAN'T DO MUCH, BUT IT CAN LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A FRUITFUL SUMMIT. HE HAD SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS:
 - 1) GENEVA COULD WORK ON VERIFICATION, PARTICULARLY MOBILES;

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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- 2) REGARDING THE POSITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN.
THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS CAN CLARIFY THEM.
AND
 - 3) THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO ELIMINATE BRACKETS
SO THAT A SUMMIT WOULD END UP WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO OUR NEGOTIATORS.
19. GORBACHEV SAW WEAKNESSES IN SHULTZ'S SUGGESTION. HE HAD NOT MENTIONED SPACE. IF THIS IS SET ASIDE THEN MOVEMENT IN OTHER MATTERS MAKES NO SENSE. "WHY HAVE YOU AVOIDED DISCUSSION ON SPACE, PARTICULARLY OUR LATEST PROPOSALS?" LET ME ALSO SAY, HE ADDED, THAT I SENSE AN EFFORT TO REJECT OUR IDEAS. THE KEY PROVISIONS MUST BE DEVELOPED IN TIME FOR THE SUMMIT. YOUR PURPOSE SEEMS TO BE VAGUE, AND NEGATES THE SOVIET EFFORT. SOME OF YOUR PEOPLE HAVE TO WORK ON THE KEY PROVISIONS OR IT WON'T MAKE SENSE. IF NOT, WE WILL HAVE TO POSTPONE ALL THIS UNTIL YOUR ADMINISTRATION IS OUT OF OFFICE.
20. SECRETARY SHULTZ RESPONDED BY REVIEWING POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE SUMMIT (1, 2, 5 DAY TRIPS) AND DISCUSSING VENUES. GORBACHEV WENT BACK TO THE THEME OF COMBINING START AND D&S, ARGUING FOR A PUSH TO COMPLETE WORK BY NEXT SPRING.
21. SECRETARY SHULTZ ASKED CARLUCCI FOR HIS COMMENTS. CARLUCCI SAID THAT HE FOUND LINKAGE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. GORBACHEV HAD DESCRIBED AN ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION THAT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S GOALS FOR SDI. AS LONG AS THIS TYPE OF LINKAGE WAS MAINTAINED, HE SAW LITTLE CHANCE FOR PROGRESS. "YOU ARE ON A COURSE THAT WILL CONSTRAIN SDI AND THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE." AFTER A SOMEWHAT STUNNED PAUSE, GORBACHEV RESPONDED, "WELL, IS IT ALL A WASTED EFFORT?"
22. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THAT, IF HE FELT THAT WAY, PERHAPS THE INF AGREEMENT COULD BE SIGNED BY THE NEGOTIATORS. YOU WANT AN AGREEMENT ON SDI AND SPACE. THAT IS THE ESSENCE OF YOUR POSITION. FRANK HAS DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW. YOU KNOW IT AS WELL. IS IT POSSIBLE TO FIND A FORMULATION THAT GIVES YOU THE ASSURANCES YOU WANT ON PREDICTABILITY WHILE ALLOWING THE PRESIDENT TO MAINTAIN THE THRUST OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAM

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23. GORBACHEV SAID HE WAS COMING BACK TO THE AGENDA NOT BECAUSE HE DIDN'T WANT TO VISIT THE U.S. HE DID. BUT, WE HAVE TO DECIDE. WE CAN'T HAVE A MEETING WITHOUT MOVEMENT. "I WANT SOME MOVEMENT IN AMERICA." I HOPE THAT IN THE NEXT MONTH SOME CONCLUSIVE PROPOSALS CAN BE PREPARED IN GENEVA. PERHAPS A SUMMIT COULD BE HELD LATE IN DECEMBER. SUCH A MEETING IS NECESSARY, BUT WE MUST THINK IN TERMS OF RESULTS. "I AM NOT MANEUVERING. I HAVE BOTH A HUMAN AND A POLITICAL INTEREST, BUT THE LATTER IS MORE IMPORTANT." THAT IS WHY I'M INSISTING ON "KEY PROVISIONS" FOR START AND SPACE. I BELIEVE WE HAVE AN ACCUMULATION OF QUANTITATIVE ASSETS THAT MAKES A QUALITATIVE RESULT POSSIBLE.
24. I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY, HE WENT ON, THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN QUESTIONS ONLY THE PRESIDENT AND I CAN RESOLVE. BUT, "KEY PROVISIONS" IS A WORTHWHILE APPROACH. ANY PROGRAM OF FURTHER CONTACTS PRESUPPOSES SUCH AN APPROACH.
25. SECRETARY SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT IT WASN'T THE FORMAT OF GORBACHEV'S SUGGESTIONS THAT MADE US CAUTIOUS, IT WAS THE CONTENT. IN TERMS OF TIMING, IF WE GO PAST EARLY DECEMBER A VISIT BECOMES DIFFICULT.
26. GORBACHEV RESPONDED THAT MANY THINGS HAD BECOME CLEARER AND HE NEEDED TO DO SOME THINKING. THE SECRETARY AND FRANK CARLUCCI HAD ONLY TO REPORT TO ONE MAN, BUT HE HAD TO REPORT "TO MANY." WE SHOULD REPORT AND HE WOULD REPORT.
27. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THE LEADERS OF THE U.S.S.R. AND U.S. COULD MEET IN A NORMAL WAY FOR A FULL ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS. GORBACHEV AGREED BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, A LOT OF EXPECTATIONS HAD BEEN AROUSED.
28. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD HAD QUITE A DISCUSSION ON STRATEGIC AND SPACE ISSUES, BUT HE DID NOT SEE AN IMMEDIATE PROSPECT FOR AN AGREEMENT ON SPACE. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE GENERAL SECRETARY WOULD NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE ESTABLISHING A TIME FOR THE VISIT. IN THE MEANTIME, HE WILL CONTINUE WORKING THESE AREAS.
29. GORBACHEV AGREED, WITH THE ADDED COMMENT THAT HE INTENDED TO

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WRITE THE PRESIDENT A LETTER ON ALL OF THIS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT HE NEEDED TO KEEP THE PROCESS MOVING. INF WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. IT REPRESENTED GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS BY SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE A GOOD EXPERIENCE BASE FOR START.

30. SECRETARY SHULTZ ASKED HOW THEN SHOULD WE SIGN THE INF AGREEMENT> GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT WE STILL HAVE TIME TO WEIGH EVERYTHING, AND EXPLORE WAYS TOWARD A COMPROMISE ON THE MAIN PROBLEM. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO THIS BY FALL OR THE END OF THE YEAR. "I WILL WRITE TO THE PRESIDENT. I STILL THINK THERE IS TIME TO WORK THIS OUT AND THEN WE COULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL AGENDA FOR A VISIT TO WASHINGTON."
31. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID, "I HOPE YOU ARE RIGHT, BUT I DOUBT IT." GORBACHEV RESPONDED, IF YOU, CARLUCCI AND NITZE GET YOUR HEADS TOGETHER, "I WILL WORK WITH THE PRESIDENT." IT CAN HAPPEN.
32. SECRETARY SHULTZ WARNED THAT GORBACHEV NEEDED TO WEIGH CAREFULLY WHAT HE MEANT BY SAYING THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON SDI, BECAUSE THIS COULD WELL FOREGO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS FAR AS THIS ADMINISTRATION IS CONCERNED.
33. SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED, "IF THERE IS NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT SPACE THEN TELL ME." SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AND CAREFULLY LAID OUT FOR SHEVARDNADZE THE AGREED-UPON AMERICAN POSITION: SEVEN-YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL UNTIL 1994.
34. GORBACHEV CONCLUDED THAT EVERYTHING WAS NOW CLEAR. HE WOULD CONSIDER IT AND EVALUATE IT. "OUR EXCHANGES ON START AND SPACE ARE NOT OVER AND I WILL WRITE THE PRESIDENT. I STILL HAVE A MONTH AND A HALF, AND I HAVE A DESIRE TO COME OVER TO THE U.S."
- NB: THE ABOVE SUMMARIZES A FOUR-AND-A-HALF HOUR CONVERSATION, BUT OMITS GORBACHEV'S POLEMICS ON A STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION WHICH HE PRODUCED AND COMPLAINED ABOUT. HIS DIATRIBE ON THIS SUBJECT TOOK APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF HOUR. NEITHER SHULTZ NOR I HAD SEEN THE PUBLICATION.

REGARDS. FRANK.

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