

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:

Green, Max: Files, 1985-1988

Folder Title:

South Africa I (4 of 7)

Box: 23

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

60
750 limit of lease
a 47.~ just in 25th

institutions of private enterprise & prop -
govt built house - sold

new villages - given plots - enclosure passed
Mug. & said Israel all should be sold

have to be held OSU - non-dictator

winning info. on photo - Israel friendship com.

Office (Shanah) - use committee - one secret &
disagree after decision has been made.

(Don't understand it important experience)

after various to public & private - 26

Nkomo of funeral - joining in gov't

as minister of info at Raising challenge
about how well Israel is doing, Israeli
land to upped hood -

Don't understand why could get more private
investments -

also becoming something fierce - time out
of our factors for us -

Still different distance with the neg.

Israeli perspective views accepted -

2

Zimbabwe

can be some apples by gov.

Mass Mch Gp. ~~can be~~ - linked to gov

gov. has to call "concord" growing but not required
20 what sects till 87.

CZ - Benshang, CZI - Mr John Konde, CZI - PPP Tony Reed

John - ch. who for Smith, left after in 7 applied dep min of
commerce & now ch. of commerce, public acct; ~~not serious~~ may not serve again
in parliament, which is future with new to turn up w black.

Recently gov. gov. - exports, imports - Exports mostly

new materials: tobacco, chrome, gold -

~~all in private hands~~

Gov. Reed - future for which politicians have future up & at least

1400 depending on alignment - will have to get closer to gov.

15 w Smith, 5 w ind.

after 1990 while it stood for ZANU

10,000,000 white now - used to be double that

movable - socialist, not a communist, accepts London who is

100% cap; ~~at one~~ lot of gov. ministers; London referred to
as "concord";

for black is as entrepreneur industrialists

firm in formal sector employment - ^{subsidized} not inflated

2/3 of pop under 18 -

90 000 school leavers

generating no new net jobs -

2 tribes

muta bel's: To - disorganised & Zulus,

Shona - 80%;

Nkomo coming together w musoke.

African doesn't believe there is any role for opposition & w. heads

4

502 is too dist support Zou's on enemy

lot of people in gear, left over from SA. loads of

bandits in village 2100 get better women do

left ~~down~~

more British military training now; Cubans NK gone home

French w Gas by train intend security

Judith Stalen ind. - minister of — find 50000

cult. & personality

lot of rhetoric ideology poetry

can sense style goz

1. disengaged in Poland - win outside party

2. Jewish communists -

as before
perhaps - smaller.

Israel sent military advisors to Smith ~~was~~ in late 200

Muzikera - is US ~~version~~ Smith's report, (last) PM over

basically Mugabe's NK -

PHO has embassy here.

Editorial Herald will accept ~~and~~ to visit Zou's predictions.

Verification Zimbabwe will rehabilitate relations to Israel.

no racial friction

1st class of ambassador here. but give more info
than anywhere else.

President - J. M. Mkwinda

private sector views on largely manufacturing

CZ1 - J. M. Mkwinda has members, ~~the~~ businessmen not ind.

X

8.5m is Zimbabwe

manufacturing & value added is 2nd only to Nigeria
contribute +25% of

four sectors based mainly on farming & mining

11 gold 21 minerals

—, cotton

manufacturing slowed mostly last yr - 74 during isolation but
falling stock, buses.

put about
needed
prices.

Depressed world in;

— SA needs

Zimbabwe is too diversified.

exports to SA till last yr & major export & import 20%
manufacture
in 86 - marginally higher than 85

tight foreign exchange here -

Zimbabwe land locked.

manufacturing has been ~~inverted~~, inward looking & manufacturing
it has been responsive to farmers

Socialism means redistribution of wealth has taken
from 1st sector eg education, health,

GDP marginally up since 80

the other African countries not too bad - esp given
2 yr drought. had to import corn.

* govt - wants to control & determine what happens in

clothing - not really own. It

Don't have clear cut policy re foreign investment

State has to approve big investment decisions, foreign
exchange controlled by govt.

W

govt acquired the commercial farm land
for redistribution since ...
farm with wealth? - OK but w/ privileges

Minister

ZAPU & rest to Matabeleland.

govt has tried military solution which worked, have to win
hearts & people.

- discuss w/ Nkomo.

will not ignore the reason for dance & schools, etc
why are people state?

look at Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania - can we
disagree w/ gov.

people in control & power in US are gov.

Rhodesia supports Jews "Israel"

historical reason for policy

don't want to make & some make mistakes ideologically
as the African countries -

Don't need to report on Tanzania.

here socialize & T - not too much, debate about
this in capital

Tanzania - mistake in idealizing now allowing
private econ. back -

just farms - now invited Zambian farmers to
visit -

one state farms have - inherited from Rhodesia -

no resident control.

start back - "American imperialism" -

4

supposed in ANCO PAC -

Metabolic like stuff encouraged by Smith regime - ~~we~~ encouraged

General solution -

[Bou + Qzi - creation of S. - ~~to~~ the backtracking,

5

~~time~~
~~long~~ 5

doesn't calls think reactions with -

Lab. Porter -

did accept the concept as finality - but as beginning

2 principles: for 1st time

1) is other than whites being part of decision making process

1835 - vote 1848 - not elected - 1870 w act
Union British accepted loss of 2nd vote for whites)

3 chambers, 1 parliament, each house a vote at

2 is cabinet - 1 Indian & 1 colored -

acceptance as colleagues -

Colored & Indian ministers did have substantial

participation in govt -

did not vote apart, they became advisory on the books -

is vote budget but not bring down govt -

in House a minister of housing & civil service
EGGS

1948 - v minister parties, a non political conference
since repealed -

after conflict

v PLO, p, & Israel -

colored to low (1st) white left over -

colored vote not. ed. 30%

participating in Enda ba,

1 man, 1 vote, is federal structure, & way white from based on
no. ; white - white ; black - black,

20 jail - 2nd is solitary confinement, now occurring
after a man responsible for jailing

Race Classified as: by area as,

Tues 11 Jan 1

Cape Town Times

oldest daily - 110 yrs

50% Coloured 50% + white -

65 000 circulation -

liberal newspaper; 1.5c news re Jewish immigrants during 300'

1 country; = citizenship for all

still segregation on beaches, cinemas, trains - not all

Heinrich, losing legitimacy, accepting blandishments

hasn't delivered re black power

some influence over

total parliament power weakened, 50 state

security - white

Don't want 50%
unemployment in Cape
to 70%.

Sanctions counterproductive; govt that prides itself
on biblical Christianity - these guys are much tougher
than Ben Smith.

occupational pressure mounts - sports,

a couple of correspondents being kicked out

8 changes to the papers

to career.

to more disruption & more govt in streets than in
parliament

8 cannot - educational needs.

provide 1/2 of Africa's electricity,

trade union good thing & govt attitude fairly liberal.

Tobacco - moderate, views found in 300' - for returning to
Commonwealth

Stim. Col. KGB

try to win moderate views from CP's

Buttleg. & more to part 7 and will be part of
problem.

→

Tony B

(2)

Tambo

~~For~~ - doing criticism Inkota,

hawk is ANC in ascendancy.

the glass is half full of the armed wing of ANC.

no military victory for ANC for next 20 yrs

violent equilibrium for long time.

for way thru Tuto, Matlana, Boesak,

Street committee in township run by kids - direct & indirect criticism of ANC - force parents to eat powder etc from white shops - Tony B...
said to have got to see what it could do
good coverage in colored & Indian township; some

colored & Indian esp in colored townships -
not too good coverage in black townships - lack of history of
deprivation

his
solution

for one man, one vote = 1/2 vote v. 1/2
outlawing apartheid

Return to Commonwealth

is a SB - black ID voted x Karim & Hitler

SB

exported wasteful - huge bureaucracy to impose

own affairs - e.g. museum, schools, hospital

and led to more apartheid

German was.

(Lobby was -

more conservative

Jafta - closed hearts

should go for
decentralized
federal
system

Soc. Sci.

Math Shad - Jewish

Jish - Economics

Car - Communist

He - Ed

Index - Yell -

Fun - low

Practical - Just studies

the 1st only center for anti-semitic Jewish students

2000 Jews living 7800 students

15% Black non white

mean sp. 300 - 400 - 500

Cults in the world

60° 4th Jewish D. 1000

Ethnic Jewish -

Jews of Justice - captured Jew -

J. Office studies being Marxist & 95 influence - 3000

Class not new, Z. 1000 - Exploitation, Pleasure & 1000
t. 1000 1000 1000 Communist

Organization here - new different New Left in 1967

LMC Council - control re words for new

to Communist in Ed dept but ~~the~~ new feel

[unclear as left.

political leaning ~~from~~ the new new

who scholar - new placed color

students in white sp. 1000 many 1000

many white 1000 1000 1000

Jish

protesters for left are communist -

protesters protest 2000 1000 1000 1000 1000

clear up 1000

5000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000

1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000

an acc. n.d. - white students at ex-elite w
 whites. - ex w/in deals resources
 to help, places (CNE+E). f. directed -
 (black)

was s. m. & H. school

Chr. nat al ed CNE :: public school ^{later} ^{nationales} ^{pl}
 v. school w.?
 parents failing public school + pass - Jewish values

(?)(?) 900 change been split so Jews - 1) (CNE), 2) p.
 English business - i. blacks didn't use it b
 not sent to - increase, when being Muslim
 London, etc.
 f. school, policy time o some research w
 Jewish p. Jews

Univ. Western (ex - CNE) - 15 K. White

Jews don't become academics here to & some
 serious for w. but Jews

very QH2 study, 1/10 Jewish community

HW van der Meer - Century 20th students

cont. to J. school w. BNC in 84

f. regular, APC, to help in (CNE) but national government
 he once w. w. African college students w. BNC

Future - planned violence v. UDF v. J. House v. violence
 v. physically stopping kids for boycotting

history of UDF v. Botswana & Botswana

unreliable - ~~was~~ presented

Botswana. In speaking at U. of Cape Town

Berlin - d. to 7 anti-Semitism is true

if you confuse race w class (social) were
finished -

Bartlett - m. d. l. a. , c + h ,
+ with reds ~~then~~ not sympathetic to ind. b. .

Learn over Kennedy -

①

250 lost in all, job

this 72. s. for 600 for all, job.

Young people talking about where to go to
Australia.

problems.

in accession
in 1971 sent to in 1971

part 1 white community - want get things for

being liberal in 1971

concern about freedom under law.

ANC

UNR

1971

all anti Zionism.

tried to get Tutu to visit Israel, also Motlana.

to - P.L.C. - BN world -

pld bases in Mozambique & Zimbabwe - distributing
stuff here.

COSATU - tried to get Ransome to visit
Israel & Histadrut.

Zionism is racism - Tutu - is all forms of discrimination
Israel policy & area discrimination
spilling into anti semitism.

entire pt - new focus

contrasts Jews make contribution but like
not to flee ship

Def.

lots of black computers -

Muslims & Hitler, hadn't completed yet

letting black for blacks - Jews exploited

SA using Jewish students -

②

Jews critical of Depp - not involved
Jewish life.

Jew State - v establishment of Israel - got line
for East

mass exodus of Arab refugees, & Capital limit -
324,000

facts are that most Jews staying -
firmly as internal enemy today is Ellizah.

Jews in Zimbabwe - for 7000 & 1200 -
are aged 65 - Zimbabwe anti
Zionists, Jewish day school prohibited
for flying Israeli flag -

Boutlezi visits Israel - positive response.
his unit been in town w Zimbabwe to house
Exchanges w Hebrew U.

UDF -

AZAPO - word - include Biko people
r class struggle - Jews in wrong class -
Boutlezi - could be a warning influence.

Christian Zion church - intimidated from UDF & BPC

no moral obligation for communist to
commit suicide.

③

SA fine 2nd grade

Br 1 Jewell Ed.

King David School - d. 7 school

3 is Johannesburg - 37

Day school - 9000

5, 9, 7 Jewish school studies

14000 to now from 3 Jewish Ed.
(Cine Khavens?)

gave grant to private schools.

process is non-violent ^{only} is one in which Jews co-
thrive

Scholar-

apartment going, going gone-

red issues

1) who exercises power & structure of power
(minority etc?)

2) is a struggle for redistribution of income in
America

few - Empirical Jewish from 1981 -
250000 now in sector rate 70

5 reasons for Jewish

a) individuals

4 children - (now liberation

b) agitators

before educ.)

c) unemployed

5 criminal elements living in

Net.

then you feel coming vs here -

refers to the fact that it is just
community, feels increasingly isolated
the fact is that in America, ^{in the process of} Jewish
community - knows there is a strong Jewish
community here & is concerned about its future
the trip is in fact one of the main purposes of
the trip - is to learn more
about you - in order to strengthen our

relationship w/ you.
impressed by success is remarkable ^{you self-initiated}
 ^{Jewish values}

& understand that you want to learn more about
the Jewish community

It's fortunate that the delegation have many
serious students of Jewish history & community
& 3 rabbis,

MS - disinterested but for Jews, good for rest.

So Africa

HOUSE OF COMMONS -
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE

Session 1985-86

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

Monday 20 January 1986

Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi

*Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed
20 January 1986*

LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
£4.90 net

MONDAY 20 JANUARY 1986

Members present:

Sir Anthony Kershaw, in the Chair

Mr Robert Harvey
Mr Ivan Lawrence
Mr Jim Lester
Mr Ian MikardoMr Nigel Spearing
Mr Peter Thomas
Mr Michael Welsh

**MEMORANDUM TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE BY CHIEF
MANGOSUTHU GATSHA BUTHELEZI CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU,
PRESIDENT OF INKATHA AND CHAIRMAN THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK
ALLIANCE (SA/19)**

PREFACE

I see the relationship between Great Britain and South Africa as certainly fundamentally important to South Africa and also as not inconsequential to Great Britain.

The Foreign Affairs Committee is now reassessing British attitudes to South Africa. This is a formidable task and because of the significance which I attach to its work, I have compiled somewhat comprehensive notes about Inkatha's position and my leadership in South Africa.

I find all too frequently that decision-makers in the West pause too seldom to delve into the underlying realities which make Black South African politics so very complex.

It is my sincere hope that the Foreign Affairs Committee will find the time to read this document prior to hearing my verbal evidence on South Africa. It is true to say that the fate of not only South Africa but also of the whole of Southern Africa, will be profoundly affected by what will be taking place in South Africa in the foreseeable future. What Great Britain and her allies do during this crucial period of our history, could well be of cardinal significance.

Black South African politics has never been institutionalised in South Africa in such a way that parliamentary norms and traditions mould political action. In countries with parliamentary democracies, a wide range of restraints and directing influences are constantly at play establishing not only the who's who of politics, but what is and what is not acceptable as political behaviour.

In South Africa this is not the case. Not only have Blacks been excluded from the parliamentary process since the inception of modern South Africa, but for many generations, they were excluded from participating in the decision-making process in the country's economic, religious and social institutions. Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary restraints on political excessiveness have been absent in Black South Africa, and as Black politics has become increasingly radicalised, it has become increasingly characterised by ever-wilder excessiveness on the part of some.

British Parliamentarians should therefore approach the need to make their own assessments of the who's who of Black South Africa with a great deal of circumspection. Foreign observers have again and again been misled into making false assessments of what the real mood of Black South Africa is and who is and who is not accepted by Black South Africa as national leaders. Self-appointed leaders, celebrity leaders, media-created

The cost of printing and publishing these Minutes of Evidence is estimated by Her Majesty's Stationery Office at £4,212.

*20 January 1986]**[Continued]*

leaders and vociferous but transient protest leaders have always abounded in Black South Africa. There has always been an indulgence by some in political excesses unchecked by parliamentary restraints and by traditional values and norms. This indulgence in excesses unchecked by institutionalised politics has led to Black South Africans being drawn into one hare-brained political scheme after another. The broad masses, however, have kept remarkably constant in their commitment to time-honoured and centrally valued political traditions. They have always denied that they are faced with the stark alternatives of accepting subjugation by Whites on the one hand, and killing Whites to liberate themselves on the other hand. They have always opposed apartheid in the country's day to day life and step by step have participated in the country's social, economic and political life in such a way that apartheid has become ever increasingly unworkable. It is not the exiles which have brought South African society to the point where everybody now accepts that there must be a radical break with past National Party politics. The Government has accepted the need for reform not because they have been frightened by the ANC Mission in Exile but because Black South Africans and harsh realities in the economic sphere have made it imperative that they do so.

It is important for British Parliamentarians to understand that if the ANC Mission in Exile ceased to exist tomorrow the demand for reform inside South Africa would assume an ever increasing urgency. Apartheid society simply cannot work because 72 per cent of all South Africans are Black and all Blacks reject apartheid. The waves of violent anger which have swept the country for the past 18 months have not been inspired by the ANC Mission in Exile's or the United Democratic Front's political programme. These organisations are attempting to capitalise on Black anger which they did not produce. It is the hideousness of apartheid and the deep suffering of a disenfranchised and economically deprived people which have produced anger. It is joblessness, hopelessness and above all, the South African Government's talk of reform without backing the words up with meaningful action, which has pushed Black anger beyond the boiling point.

The vast majority of Black South Africans demand the normalisation of South Africa in which there is equality of opportunity in a free enterprise system and a parliamentary democracy which is a heritage that the British presence in South Africa bequeathed to us. Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee will be aware of opposing Black views about South Africa and what needs to be done to eradicate apartheid for the scourge that it is. I would appeal to them not to fall into the trap some foreign observers fall into, of tracing differences of opinion between Blacks to differences between leaders and to conflicts of interests which arise out of personal idiosyncracies amongst Black leaders. An understanding of the South African political process and an awareness of the real issues which the Black struggle for liberation has always focused on are lost when media representations of the South African scene are used as guidelines. Britain has always played a historically significant role in South and Southern Africa and I perceive the need for the British Parliament to play a very significant role in the emerging circumstances we face. I take this Committee's work very seriously and intend to make in-depth representations to it in the hope that Britain will yet again show herself to be the kind of honest broker which brought an end to violence in Zimbabwe.

I would like to stress that what I say goes beyond airing personal views on crucial matters. I cannot afford the luxury of making personal choices in politics. I was born to occupy a leadership position in South Africa which has very defined parameters. The role that I play has been determined by history itself and it is with a deep sense of historical awareness that I respond to demands on my leadership. I am a leader by hereditary right and follow in the footsteps of my father, grandfather and great-grandfather, who in turn followed in the footsteps of their forebears to the time of the founding father of KwaZulu, King Shaka. I and my forebears have always occupied influential positions as prime ministers, advisers and generals to successive Zulu Kings. Whatever Whites did or could have done, I would have had to play one or another political role.

My great-grandfather was Prime Minister to King Cetshwayo who was only finally defeated by the full might of the British army at the Battle of Ulundi in 1879 after he had won a decisive victory over the British at the Battle of Isandlwana. Not only does

20 January 1986[Continued]

my line of descent go back to the founding father of KwaZulu, King Shaka, but the transitional period for South Africa towards the end of the last century from which modern South Africa emerged, saw my forebears both on my father's side and on my mother's side, as prime actors. King Cetshwayo was defeated and was the last reigning monarch of a sovereign and free KwaZulu. He was my mother's grandfather. My mother's father who succeeded him was, like his father before him, sent into enforced exile to the Island of St. Helena by the British. He was later implicated in the Zulu Rebellion in 1906. As a result, he was charged with treason and was imprisoned for life. After the Act of Union in 1910 the first Prime Minister of South Africa removed him from jail and permitted him to live in exile on the farm "Uitkyk" in the Transvaal where he died in 1913. These were living memories for my mother and among my older relatives.

From my mother's knee onwards I was surrounded by political thought and discussion. the founding father of the African National Congress, which was established in 1912, was my uncle, Dr Pixley ka Isaka Seme. Throughout my youth I was brought into contact with leading Black political figures. I knew people like Chief Albert Lutuli, Nelson Mandela, Zami Conco, Walter Sisulu, Robert Sobukwe, J K Ngubane, and M B Yengwa, personally, as colleagues in the liberation struggle.

After school and university education, I was keen to pursue a legal career, but pressure was mounted on me to return to my home district to take up the chieftainship of the Buthelezi people. I consulted many prominent Black leaders then active in the African National Congress, about the options before me. I was eventually persuaded, against my personal desires, not to delay entering into politics until after I had been in law for some time. Chief Albert Lutuli was particularly insistent that I took up my hereditary position without delay. It was a consensus view of the African National Congress leadership that it was in the interests of the liberation struggle itself that I should take up my Chieftainship.

These discussions took place in the ascendancy of political prominence of the old ANC as it responded to increasing Black anger at the developments which followed the National Party's electoral victory in 1948. Deepening Black concern demanded a national Black effort to oppose the radicalisation of right-wing politics and the ANC responded to the call of the people. At that stage of my political career, as a member of the ANC, I was torn between desires to serve my organisation, and the need to devote my energies to my hereditary leadership role. It was Chief Albert Lutuli who did more than anyone else to persuade me that I had no option but to combine the two roles. This I set about doing.

The South African Government was totally opposed to me and for five years refused to recognise my chieftainship of the Buthelezi people. It was only after five years of ever increasing insistent demands by my people that I should lead them that the Government was forced to accept my position. After a trip to the United States in 1963, the South African Government confiscated my passport, and for nine years I was not allowed to leave South Africa. Most opposition political parties in the South African Parliament appealed unsuccessfully to the Government to return my passport until the Government gave in.

Once having accepted the need to combine a party political role with my traditional political role, I set about opposing apartheid at the local, regional, provincial and national levels. I campaigned vigorously against apartheid and for the rejection of the so-called homeland policy—a policy of dividing Black South Africa into ethnic groups with their own political identities and each with their own political machinery—which separated them not only from White politics but from each other as well. As a Black leader I rejected this policy from the outset, just as I continue to do so vigorously today.

For me South Africa is one country with one people which history is thrusting into a single destiny. I reject all notions of political structures based on race divisions. The multiplicity of the ethnic origins of White South Africa did not deter Whites from uniting politically. The diversity of Black ethnic origins in South Africa demands in fact Black political unity rather than deters it.

20 January 1986][Continued

I campaigned so vigorously against separate political institutions for KwaZulu that the complete rejection of these institutions by the Zulu people followed. In typical dictatorial fashion the Government then bluntly told us that we had no say in the matter and that they would be forced on us willy nilly, whether we liked it or not.

This they proceeded to do and it was in these circumstances that the people turned to me to lead them through the difficulties which lay ahead. I accepted the challenge to do so and assumed the role of Chief Executive Officer in the KwaZulu Territorial Authority, and later Chief Executive Councillor, which was imposed on us. I vowed to lead my people in the tactics and strategies which would ensure that they would retain their South African citizenship and would continue to be entitled to exercise their democratic rights to oppose apartheid and any form of politics based on racial differentiation.

The African National Congress never made my position in KwaZulu, and I had dealings with Mr Oliver Tambo until 1980. Those in the ANC Mission in Exile who now belatedly criticise me, and who complain all of a sudden because they say I occupy the position of Chief Minister of KwaZulu, conveniently forget that the enabling legislation which was enacted to enable the National Party to pursue its homeland policy, the Bantu Authorities Act (68) of 1951, was passed before I assumed my chieftainship. That same Act abolished the old Native Representative Council and even then it was quite clear that it was the intention of the National Party to separate Black and White politics. It was in these circumstances that Chief Albert Lutuli encouraged me to take up my position and it was during the years of his presidency of the ANC that he continued to support me as I campaigned amongst my people for the rejection of this legislation. He clearly saw the threatened balkanisation of South Africa as an impending catastrophe. Had those now in prominent roles in the ANC Mission in Exile paid more attention to the dangers which Chief Albert Lutuli and I so clearly saw, and set about mobilising Blacks in other areas as I mobilised them in KwaZulu, the South African Government would never have gone as far along the road as they did go to implement their homeland policy. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei today would not be quasi so-called independent States.

The question of non-participation was then discussed as a strategy in Black politics and had not yet been falsely elevated to be a sacrosanct political principle. Chief Albert Lutuli himself saw no clash of interest in being a Chief and the President of the African National Congress. Nelson Mandela shared his view. It is interesting to see what Mr Nelson Mandela, the best known of the ANC leaders, had written on participatory opposition as long ago as February 1958. An extract from his article "The struggle has many tactics" reads as follows:

"In the opinion of some people, participation in the system of separate racial representation in any shape or form, and irrespective of any reasons advanced for doing so, is impermissible on principle and harmful in practice. According to them such participation can only serve to confuse the people and to foster the illusion that they can win their demands through a parliamentary form of struggle. In their view people have now become so politically conscious and developed that they cannot accept any form of representation which in any way fetters their progress. They maintain that people are demanding direct representation in parliament, in the provincial and city councils, and that nothing short of this will satisfy them. They say that leaders who talk of the practical advantages to be gained by participation in separate racial representation do not have the true interests of the people at heart. The basic error in this argument lies in the fact that it regards the boycott not as a tactical weapon to be employed if and when objective conditions permit but as an inflexible principle which must under no circumstances be varied."

Those now in the ANC Mission in Exile who reject me, pretending that they do so because I occupy the position of Chief Minister of KwaZulu, do so as part of their propaganda campaign. They know the truth. My only sin is that I refused to make Inkatha a surrogate organisation of the External Mission of ANC. They are also politically naive. Had I not accepted the challenge to lead in the way the people demanded, KwaZulu may well by now have been manipulated into the same positions as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

The blunt truth of the matter is that those who reject the free enterprise system, reject Western forms of democracy and reject the politics of non-violence and the politics of negotiation which Western democratic principles demand of Black South Africans now.

I provide this detail about my own background because it is a detail known to Black South Africa and accepted by them as establishing my bona fides. Black South Africa gave me massive support as a tried and trusted leader when I brought Inkatha into being in 1975. By then the ANC Mission in Exile had been abroad for 15 years. During this period the harshness of apartheid, and the growth of Draconian laws on South African Statute Books bore testimony to the ineffectiveness of the leadership in the ANC Mission in Exile. They so conducted their affairs, and became so preoccupied with their own unilateral choice to make the armed struggle the primary means of bringing about change in South Africa, that a very debilitating political vacuum emerged in Black South Africa.

Faced with the growth of horrendous legislation and faced with growing social and economic deprivation, Black South Africa resented the ANC Mission in Exile's behaviour. We realised that it is we inside the country who have to do something. The political ferment inside South Africa which was produced by the ANC Mission in Exile's failure emerged to inspire two different political fronts. One was Inkatha and the other was the Black Consciousness Movement. The Black Consciousness Movement contained in it the young Black dissenting voice. They were, if anything, dominantly pro-PAC. The Pan Africanism and the militant action-orientated mood which characterised the PAC before it was banned in South Africa had been produced by dissatisfaction with the old leadership of the ANC. The PAC break-away from the ANC started political divisions which re-emerged in the early to mid-seventies, when the Black Consciousness Movement was formed. The late Mr Steve Biko, having emerged from the South African Students' Organisation which rejected the multi-racialism in the External Mission of the ANC, sought to establish the Black People's Convention as an independent Black Consciousness Movement. The ANC Mission in Exile at the time regarded the BPC as a possibly evolving third force.

I established Inkatha as a Black liberation movement in the sincere hope that the dangerous divisions in Black politics could be breached. I could not side with the Black Consciousness rejection of the ANC Mission in Exile. I understood the grave difficulties which the ANC Mission in Exile had been facing in the outside world. Both in South Africa and abroad I then argued in public that the ANC had been driven underground by South African police brutality and that it was understandable that in an exiled position where they were rejected by the West, the Mission in Exile should seek recourse in violence. I accepted that the ANC Mission in Exile, having been rejected by the West, would naturally tend to seek alliances elsewhere. It was for me understandable that they should start thinking in terms of the application of force against apartheid. I, however, never accepted the unilateral decision which the ANC Mission in Exile made to commit Black South Africa to the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change. They had no mandate to do it. They only adopted the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change once they were in exile. They never consulted Black South Africa about this very fundamental step. They made the decision unilaterally only after they had been in exile for some years. Mr Joe Slovo, a member of the ANC Mission in Exile's National Executive and head of Umkhonto weSizwe, its military wing, confirms this. I quote him:

"The attempts, particularly in the West, to question this policy and to influence the ANC to consider the adoption of a 'peaceful road to change' is nothing less than a recipe for submission and surrender of national liberation aims. We must bear in mind that the ANC was declared illegal long before it adopted a policy of armed struggle."

The old ANC sent a Mission into exile to mobilise international opinion to aid the struggle at home. I rejected the argument by prominent members of the ANC Mission in Exile that any involvement they may have in democratic opposition in South Africa would detract from their main purpose which was to pursue the armed struggle.

20 January 1986]

[Continued

I rejected this because it was patently clear to me that it would be foolish for Black South Africans to model their liberation struggle on struggles elsewhere, where circumstances were entirely different. Anyone with even a modicum of military sense realises that the nature of the South African terrain is such that no liberated zones can be established and that the transportation of men and weapons on a scale sufficient to mount a serious armed onslaught against apartheid, presents formidable logistic problems. The armed struggle against apartheid has failed for a quarter of a century, and again anybody with a modicum of military sense would know that the employment of violence in South Africa would necessarily have to take the form of a bloody civil war. The ANC Mission in Exile has failed to mount a viable armed struggle for a quarter of a century. This the ANC Mission in Exile has now itself recognised and has had to change tactics and is now attempting to make South Africa ungovernable by establishing the conditions for a bloody civil war. I have attached transcripts of ANC Mission in Exile broadcasts from Radio Freedom¹ obtained from the British Broadcasting Corporation's monitoring service. A perusal of these documents containing the actual broadcast words of the ANC Mission in Exile shows that they are intent upon:

1. Generalising Black violence which has broken out in our townships.
2. Going beyond threatening the South African economy to actually destroying it.
3. Spreading a reign of terror in which targets are civilians and they are particularly intent now on trying to get Black violence to be directed against White suburbia.
4. Ordering the elimination of all Blacks who do not agree with their tactics and strategies and are particularly bent upon the murder of any Black who could play a meaningful role in the politics of negotiation and reconciliation.
5. Undermining the evolution of Black democratic forces working for change within the institutionalised life of South Africa.
6. Engaging in a battle of minds in which their point of view is that it is the nature of the free enterprise system and the nature of the Western industrial world's commitment to non-violent change in South Africa which constitutes the real threat against liberation.

I stress that this is not anti-ANC Mission in Exile propaganda and the recognition of the fact that I am actually presenting their own views in their own words is substantiated by the BBC transcripts. This ANC Mission in Exile attempt to reduce South Africa to chaos must be seen in the context of their declared intention to escalate the use of violence in South Africa and to do so regardless of whether or not civilians are maimed and killed. Quite clearly the elimination of their operational bases in Mozambique and in other neighbouring territories has spelt the end of any illusions that a classical armed struggle could be waged against apartheid. They are now not waging a struggle against apartheid and the South African Government. They are pitting themselves against South African society.

Ever since the so-called consultative conference of the ANC Mission in Exile last year, it has committed itself to the intensification of the armed struggle, and it is doing so by giving directives now no longer to be sensitive about civilians dying in any attacks they may make. At a press conference given in Lusaka on 9 January this year, Mr Oliver Tambo served notice on South Africa and the world that there would be increased civilian casualties because he said they were unavoidable in a situation of escalating warfare. I include as an Appendix a report of that press conference.¹

I know of no society in the world where the kind of violence now employed by the ANC Mission in Exile has produced an open, democratic society. I have again and again said bluntly that if the ANC Mission in Exile is allowed to continue much further along the road they have chosen to walk, White South Africa will adopt a scorched earth policy and unleash the kind of state violence which we have not even yet begun to see.

¹ Not printed.

20 January 1986][Continued

It is a central argument in my whole political position now that forces working for change in South Africa are being terribly detrimentally affected by the levels of violence we are experiencing. There is now in South Africa a yearning for a normalised society amongst all population groups. Whatever the National Party says and does, White South Africa recognises that apartheid has failed and that South Africa must move towards meaningful reform in which Black South Africans are integrated into a central political system. The South African Government is now floundering around not knowing how to go about normalising South Africa. It still contains White right-wing elements, but it is doing so in the face of a recognised inevitability that power-sharing must come about. There is a very wide-spread recognition that there will be no recovery from the country's economic dire circumstances unless Blacks are accommodated politically. When one goes beyond sentiments as determinants of political action in the White group, the harsh driving realities in the economic field must be seen to be producing an escalating impetus towards real change. There are no illusions left in White South Africa that there can be an economic separation of White and Black interests. Big business in South Africa, in all its organised forums, and across both White language groups, want meaningful reform, and big business has now declared its intention to participate fully in the process of bringing about real change regardless of Government action. The National Party is under siege by the forces of economic reality and the prime actors in the economic field now want the very kind of change which the British Parliament wants, which the Western world wants, and which the general Black population of South Africa has always struggled for.

The South African economy has gone past the take-off point where there is now a functional interdependence between Black and White. The task that faces South Africa is the task that faces any industrialised society and that is to harmonise political institutions with economic institutions and social institutions. There is a process at work in South Africa which will translate economic interdependence into political interdependence. It is unstoppable and it is truly and deeply tragic that as South Africa emerges into an era of necessary reformation, there are forces in the world seeking to strengthen Black political groups in the country which want to use violence to bring about the downfall of the Government.

Thus in 1974 when I set about gathering leaders together to establish Inkatha in 1975, I set about doing so with the clear intention not of subverting the ANC Mission in Exile but of proving to them that democratic opposition to apartheid and non-violent tactics and strategies were still possible and could be highly productive in the process of bringing about change. If the ANC Mission in Exile had understandably opted for violence, then it was incumbent on Black South Africans to prove that democratic opposition could be productive and avoid the prospects of the military failure of the ANC Mission in Exile turning them towards bloody destructive civil war. This could only be done if the democratic forces emerging in Black South Africa accepted a multi-strategy approach and offered to work in harmony with the ANC Mission in Exile. This intention was deep in my motivation when I established Inkatha. Unlike the Black Consciousness Movement, I publicly identified with the ANC Mission in Exile. I defied all laws prohibiting the quotation of banned organisations and persons, and prohibiting furthering their aims and objectives. I quoted whenever the need was there from ANC Mission in Exile spokesmen and banned old ANC leadership. I rallied Black South Africa under the national colours of Black South Africa—black, green and gold. I brought together a very considerable constituency which had provided the old ANC with grass-root support while it was in the country. We sang old freedom songs and in every possible way identified with the ANC Mission in Exile. I told my people that we had sent them there; that they were our brothers and sisters and that we should wage a struggle in harmony with them.

On every possible occasion I kept in contact with the ANC Mission in Exile. I liaised with their offices in Swaziland and my emissaries had frequent meetings there with ANC Mission in Exile personnel. I sent emissaries abroad charging them to argue the merits of a multi-strategy approach with them, and to offer co-operation in those projects where Inkatha's aims and objectives coincided with the ANC Mission in Exile aims and objectives, and where tactics and strategies were not mutually hostile. After four years

20 January 1986][Continued

of sending emissaries abroad, the time seemed ripe for a top level meeting. The first such meeting was arranged and took place in Stockholm in the early part of 1979. I would have attended that meeting myself had Mr Oliver Tambo been able to be there. He was not able to be there and that meeting was then used as a consultative meeting to establish a summit conference between Inkatha and the ANC Mission in Exile which did in fact finally take place here in London in October 1979. Mr Oliver Tambo chaired the meeting and I had to spend over R30,000 of Inkatha's money obtained from workers and peasants to make sure that the Inkatha contingent was top level and representative of the Movement. I took that meeting very seriously. I have a Memorandum which I presented for discussion at that meeting but do not make it available to the Parliamentary Select Committee because Mr Tambo and I agreed to make it confidential until he came back with a response to me. I went to London determined to seek reconciliation and determined to bring about a working relationship between the ANC Mission in Exile and Inkatha.

I was right in maintaining that this was a real possibility. I myself had had many discussions with Mr Oliver Tambo in person ever since 1963. From what he told me himself and from what he himself told my emissaries, I was aware of the fact that he was having difficulties with some elements in his organisation. Those with a single, bloody-minded commitment to violence did not want any evidence that non-violent tactics and strategies were viable in South Africa. Their propaganda was that nothing could be done other than through violence and they were threatened by the steadily increasing evidence that Inkatha's tactics and strategies were moving ever more closer to the South African political centre of gravity.

There was a tragic misassessment by the ANC Mission in Exile about the mood of Black South Africa in the mid-seventies. They were taken totally by surprise when violence broke out on the scale that it did in 1976 and 1977. The militants in the ANC Mission in Exile realised that Black groups in South Africa were stealing their violent thunder. They knew that they did not produce the violence which erupted. They knew that they had under-estimated the drive of Black South Africa to do something for itself in the vacuum which the ANC Mission in Exile's failure abroad had produced. They did what they could to undermine the Black Consciousness Movement and sought to establish every possible stranglehold over support for Black Consciousness groups from abroad. Then the South African Government did the ANC Mission in Exile's dirty work for it. In a massive crackdown in October 1977, 19 Black organisations were banned, thousands were arrested and hundreds of individuals were detained or served with banning orders. The violent militants in the ANC Mission in Exile were given a breathing space and they became adamantly determined to undermine all Black groups in South Africa who were not under their direct control and were there to do their bidding.

On the 19 September 1977, I was summoned to Pretoria by the then Minister of Justice and of Police, Mr Jimmy Kruger. He wanted to see me because he was concerned about the growth of Inkatha only two years after it had been established. He threatened to take action against me and Inkatha because he stated that I had no right to recruit Blacks into Inkatha who were not Zulus. I told him bluntly that as long as the ruling National Party recruited Whites of ethnic groups, other than Afrikaaners, that I had the same right to recruit any Black into Inkatha, regardless of ethnic affiliation. I totally refused to make Inkatha an ethnic organisation. I wish to submit to Members of this Parliamentary Committee, copies of a verbatim report of the discussion I had with Mr Kruger on that day.² It is a matter of record that I defied the South African Government at that time when they suggested that Inkatha should be built up as a Zulu ethnic organisation. The stories therefore that are carried in various media reports, and references to Inkatha as Zulu or ethnic, are deliberate distortions by the media, which they disseminate to make propaganda for the External Mission of ANC. I also hand in a copy of Inkatha's constitution which is printed in South Africa in Zulu, Sotho and English. That Inkatha was not ethnic was confirmed later in 1977 by empirical surveys done by the Bergstrasser Institute at Freiburg University in Germany, which showed that two years after its founding, Inkatha had 40 per cent non-Zulu membership.

² Not printed.

20 January 1986][Continued

In all my discussions with the ANC Mission in Exile I was adamant that Inkatha should remain Inkatha and that it should remain committed to the Black popular will which expressed itself in Inkatha's massive membership and was articulated through its democratic machinery. Inkatha had emerged at the same time as the Black Consciousness Movements in South Africa. During those troubled years of 1976, 1977 and 1978, Inkatha grew phenomenally. In the first year of its existence, Inkatha's membership exceeded the membership of the old ANC even in its heyday. When violence erupted, a wide range of friends and self-appointed advisers urged me to abandon Inkatha's aims and objectives, and to participate in the growth of violence. I resisted these efforts and persisted in what I was doing. The fact that Inkatha's membership doubled in 1977 and again doubled in 1978, is in itself indisputable proof that those in the mainstream of Black politics in South Africa, rejected violence as the primary means of bringing about change. It was Inkatha's growing prominence even in the very early years of its existence, and the evidence of its mass support which was frightening to the militants in the ANC Mission in Exile. They wanted Inkatha crushed if it could not be subdued into being subservient to the Mission in Exile.

Any group in exile which commits itself to the armed struggle resists sharing power. Revolutionary organisations throughout the world, operating from exiled positions, seek to become a totally dominant force and this is what the ANC Mission in Exile had been doing during the 1970s. They were saddled with the fact that the OAU had accepted both themselves and the PAC as liberation forces in South Africa, but they continued doing everything they could to undermine the PAC. The history of hostile relationships between the ANC Mission in Exile and the PAC in exile is widely known in Africa and in the West. The ANC Mission in Exile styled themselves as the vanguard movement, and sought recognition as the only true authentic representatives of Black South Africa. They did everything they could to block my access to Africa and to the international community. The Foreign Affairs Committee should ponder upon the nature of exiled revolutionary groups. If it did so it would come to the conclusion that the ANC Mission in Exile sees itself as a government in exile and wants to return as a revolutionary government to take over South Africa. The ANC Mission in Exile is not working to establish democratic rights for the people of South Africa to choose whom they will to form a government. It regiments its members ideologically and inculcates in them the view that only the ANC Mission in Exile can be allowed to make decisions and to direct the affairs of the struggle for liberation. It wants to take over and control and it is ruthless in its dealings with those who do not act as fetch and carry boys for it.

When we met the ANC Mission in Exile in London in October 1979 under the chairmanship of Dr A H Zulu, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Speaker, we did so against this background of forces in the Mission in Exile which subsequent history proved Mr Tambo could not control. After the London meeting, in 1980 Mr Tambo for the first time in his career began criticising me publicly. He did not have the courage of his convictions and he could not control his own organisation, and had perforce to side with those who saw Inkatha as a threat and wanted no evidence that Black democratic opposition and Black non-violent tactics and strategies were powerful forces for bringing about change.

The ANC Mission in Exile was extremely worried about the rapid progress Inkatha made after its establishment in 1975. They anticipated its early demise and thought that it would not survive the turbulent years of 1976, 1977 and 1978. I am shocked now to learn that Mr Oliver Tambo is claiming that Inkatha was formed on the advice of the ANC Mission in Exile. This statement is entirely devoid of all truth. Inkatha was formed by me and other Black South Africans who saw the need to rally Blacks because of the ANC Mission in Exile's inactivity in South Africa. The formation of Inkatha was never discussed with Mr Tambo by me, and to my certain knowledge, neither was it discussed with him by anybody else.

Part of the hideousness of apartheid is that it has precipitated internecine Black conflict. As I said in my opening remarks, democratic politics requires democratic institutions in which values and norms are upheld and in which decent behaviour is distinguished from indecent behaviour. Black South Africa has been denied the right to

20 January 1986][Continued

evolve its own democratic machinery and forces. State brutality has crushed Black organisations, and it has denied to the people of South Africa, the circumstances in which decency can be preserved at all costs. At a public meeting in Soweto, Johannesburg, I said:

“The Government has harmed the process by which Black people will sort out their own priorities. I know that there is widespread anger. I know that there is sympathy amongst rank and file people for possible courses of effective action, but when leadership goes wild to kill and maim people and to destroy the means of life around people, then the people will react. The detention of some so-called leaders has interfered in the process by which the people themselves would have rejected the tactics and strategies employed and they would have exposed the sleight-of-hand politics which was involved. Let me say this to the South African Government: I say to them that Blacks form the majority in whatever part of the country Whites live. Blacks and Whites are irrevocably drawn together and whether they like it or not, they will have to face the future together. White authorities must stop interfering in the Black political process.

Arrests and detentions so often only make false heroes who left on their own, would be seen to fail by the people. Ordinary trade union members can now not censure their executives who are being detained. The swoop against Black leaders in recent weeks is ill-considered and detrimental to the politics of negotiation. I tell the Government bluntly that unless they leave Black society to sort out its own priorities and to elect its own leaders, they will be faced with situations in which South Africa step-by-step will be taken further and further towards an ultimate Police State. Detentions have interfered with the delicate balance between employers and unions. The process of maturation in Black trade unionism has been interfered with. Is it not about time that the Government recognised that democracy is the only thing we can rely on in this country? They must not interfere in the democratic process in Black society.”

At every opportunity I campaign for the release of political prisoners and for the un-banning of organisations and people. I have made numerous personal representations to the State President, Mr P W Botha, to release Mr Nelson Mandela and other Black political leaders who are incarcerated with him, and I also did so to his predecessor, Mr J B Vorster. Even if I am not now negotiating with Mr Botha, and I have adamantly refused to co-operate in the South African Government's attempts to legitimise the new constitution, I put the release of Mr Mandela and other leaders beyond party political interests. The democratic process in South Africa is deeply impaired because Blacks cannot demonstrate their political choices by electing the leaders whom they think ought to be in the forefront of politics. It is in the circumstances of jailing, bannings and detention without trial, that Black politics becomes confounded by celebrity leaders and self-appointed spokesmen. There is an urgent need to found Black politics as constituency politics in which there are the normal safeguards and checks to ensure that leaders represent their people truthfully. The outside world has an urgent task to perform and that is to mount every endeavour to persuade the South African Government to normalise Black South African politics. State interference in the Black democratic process favours the development of violence in politics.

There are some who now call for a Lancaster House-type conference and there are others calling for a National Convention now. Such endeavours must one day be made but unless we now prepare for them by normalising politics, there will not be dialogue between Black and White and between Black and Black. I am aware of the fact that you cannot schedule politics in logical sequences, but it would be illogical to bring the ANC Mission in Exile to the conference table while they have not yet had the opportunity of putting their case to the South African people and then going to that conference with a mandate from the people. I call for the immediate un-banning of the ANC and for the release of Nelson Mandela so that the South African population can judge for themselves the who's who of their politics. Myths which are woven around heroes and martyrs created by the South African State could be misleading. I have the deepest respect for Mr Nelson Mandela and I regard him as a brother in the struggle for liberation. I urgently plea for his release from jail so that he may have the opportunity of moving amongst his

20 January 1986][Continued

people and putting alternatives to them as he sees them best formulated. A political settlement in South Africa is not a settlement between political parties. It must necessarily be a settlement between race groups. It must be a people's settlement and not a rigged settlement behind closed doors, out of sight of the people.

The ANC Mission in Exile's dealing with Black opposition in South Africa is gross: it is indecent and offensive to every democratic norm in the Western civilised world. If they disagree with a Black man or woman who thinks that he or she can contribute to bringing about change by working within Black Local Authorities, the ANC Mission in Exile encourages their murder. It encourages its followers to seek them out and to batter them to death and it is historical fact, not propaganda, to say that it encourages Blacks in South Africa to burn them alive as demonstrations of what happens to those who do not toe their line. A victory obtained by intimidating opposition through putting tries around people's necks, dousing them with petrol and letting them run until they burn to death—what is hideously termed “the necklace”—would be a hideous victory. Sheer terror in internecine Black violence is encouraged by the ANC Mission in Exile.

As a Black leader, a democrat and a committed Christian, I cannot tolerate such behaviour. Black South Africans themselves are revolted by it. It is in situations of desperate hunger and poverty and a sense of despair that people can easily be driven into mob behaviour. To make political capital out of human failure in terribly adverse circumstances, is despicable. This the ANC Mission in Exile does. Inkatha buries its dead and its members are maimed and made homeless in the reign of terror which the ANC Mission in Exile has ordered against us.

The businessmen and members of the Progressive Federal Party who met the ANC Mission in Exile in Lusaka last year will bear testimony to the vehemence with which the ANC Mission in Exile talk against me. I quote from notes of a meeting at Mfuwe Game Lodge on 3 September 1985 which summarises the perceptions of the businessmen who went there:

“Thabo Mbeki said that the ANC was in contact with the UDF, the trade unions, the churches, and so on, and that's why they react as they do. Tony Bloom was right in saying that they had sent a message out. However, there were major problems associated with Gatsha Buthelezi. In fact, there was a school of thought who felt that the ANC was already being too generous to Gatsha. He pointed out that this related to the man himself and that in relation to Mangope, the ANC had never denounced him despite his working within the system.

Oliver Tambo asked why Gatsha was so bitter against the UDF, Boesak, etc. He said that the ANC had had many meetings with Buthelezi, but that Buthelezi had destroyed those meetings. Bishop Zulu had presided over them in a sane manner, but Gatsha turned the meeting against the ANC.

Tambo (speaking with passion) said that he had never felt so betrayed—Buthelezi only wanted to gain ascendancy, publicity and push himself up. He attempted to sow confusion in the ranks of the ANC by capitalising on the fact that he could be quoted in South Africa but the ANC could not. He (Gatsha) deeply resents support for Nelson Mandela.”

This is the kind of character assassination which they indulge in when they are at their most polite, but even this is indicative of their vehement opposition to me because I do not support their self-defeating tactics and strategies. The references to me make me sound as though I am avaricious for power, and that I resent the prominence of Nelson Mandela in the media in recent times. That this is blatantly untrue is shown by this letter I have recently received from Mr Mandela himself. It reads as follows:

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

Certified mail

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi
PO Ulundi, KwaZulu 3838
II 220/82: Nelson Mandela

10.12.85

Dear Shenge, Mndlunkulu and family

Your warm message of goodwill and support contributed tremendously to my speedy and complete recovery, and gave me much strength and joy. I shake your hand and very warmly!

Very sincerely

Madiba

Pollsmoor Maximum Prison
Private Bag XX, Tokai 7966

The ANC Mission in Exile has declared war on Inkatha. Very senior members of its National Executive are vitriolic in their condemnation of Inkatha. One has said that when the ANC Mission in Exile comes to power, it will ban Inkatha. Businessmen and PFP members who have gone to Lusaka to talk with the ANC Mission in Exile speak of the vehement hatred of myself and Inkatha which they experienced while there. Having done everything that a Black leader could possibly do to avoid a failed armed struggle degenerating into a brutal bloody civil war, and having at every opportunity sought reconciliation and a division of labour approach, one has either to be intimidated out of political existence or to defend people in the face of the kind of tactics and strategies which the ANC Mission in Exile is now employing against their fellow Black South Africans.

I attach as Appendices Inkatha's aims and objectives and its Statement of Belief. They reflect noble ideals to which I and Inkatha are deeply committed. They are ideals we will defend with our life if necessary, and I reserve my right as a Black leader to defend what I am doing with all the means at my disposal because what I am doing I regard as fundamentally important for the whole of South and Southern Africa. I will not be intimidated out of the political arena. I will not abandon the noble cause of the struggle. I will not step aside and see deep and hallowed values which have always been there in the struggle for liberation being corrupted and discarded. Millions of Black South Africans support me, and if the ANC Mission in Exile fails to recognise the depth of our commitment, and continues on its present course of action, it will only have itself to blame when Black South Africans reject it for what it is doing.

I do not speak academically or theoretically about violence. I lead Inkatha as its President in the midst of violence. Inkatha is surviving in violence. It is surviving in circumstances in which violent onslaughts are being made against it and attempt after attempt is being made to establish no-go areas for it. The guts of Black South African politics needs to be exposed to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The Black rejection of apartheid is very vehement in South Africa and Black anger runs very deep about the way we are treated in the land of our birth. Party political differences between Blacks give rise to a very heated debate. We are involved in life and death issues and pursue political aims and objectives among stark realities of a truly oppressive society where the Government uses Draconian laws to curb opposition. It can be anticipated therefore that exchanges of views between those in Black groups will be strident, but in recent times the stridency of Black political debate has assumed very nasty under- and overtones. Inkatha's Black political opponents denigrate it in such a way that they invite all those who oppose me and Inkatha with them to use violence against us. In Black South Africa there is nothing so hideous as a Black who aids and abets apartheid and participates in the subjugation of his or her people. When Blacks call me a "government stooge", a "sell-out", the "lackey of Pretoria", a "Bantustan leader", a "tribal leader in the pay of Pretoria", their intention is to raise hatred against me and Inkatha and the effect of these accusations is to declare me and Inkatha open game for violence. In the political context of Black South Africa, these accusations are

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

made by groups which do in fact use violence for political purposes. There is a brand of what observers call "protest politics" in South Africa which seeks continuity by violent intimidation.

At the University of Zululand a concerted attempt has been made for many years now to make it a no-go area for me and Inkatha. The student body as such is not hostile to us. In fact it is dominated by students with pro-Inkatha sentiments. Activists groups, however, mobilised by Azanian Students Organisation, and the Congress of South African Students, which originated in the Black Consciousness philosophy, and which have always opposed Inkatha, stage violent protests and demonstrations at the University, not only against me but against the University authorities. I have particularly come under fire because I am Chancellor of the University. It was activist cliques long associated with violent behaviour on the Campus which set themselves the task of disrupting a King Cetshwayo commemoration function held on the 29 October, 1983 at the University, at which both the King of the Zulus, King Goodwill Zwelithini ka Bhhekuzulu and I were guest speakers. This was a cultural function but every possible attempt was made to turn it into one in which I and Inkatha would be confronted and driven from the Campus by force. Speaking of me, student pamphlets said such things as: "He killed and divided the African nation through his policy of tribalism . . .", "This puppet Gatsha Buthelezi . . .", "We do not want a puppet to further the aims of the Pretoria regime. Let us fight before it is too late", "We . . . shall demonstrate against the coming activity engineered by traitors." In the same pamphlet, speaking about one of the lecturers at the University who is a member of the Central Committee of Inkatha, it said: "Maphalala who is propagating this nuisance must be stoned to death". In another pamphlet, it was said, speaking of me: "This University will be in flames because of him. We shall make our stand against his warriors and the SAP." "If Nkabinde [the Rector] does not stop the massacre that will happen, he will die with him. This is a serious warning." Speaking of me, a pamphlet says: "He is a puppet of the South African racist and oppressive regime."

These are the kind of insults which preceded the meeting held at the University of Zululand in October, 1983. A clique of activist students who were attempting to make the University a no-go area for me and Inkatha, tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Rector of the University to prohibit the meeting, and sought a Supreme Court injunction prohibiting it. There were no grounds for doing so, and the public began arriving on Saturday, 29 October to take part in the commemorative meeting. Inkatha youth gathered and began singing Inkatha songs. They were abused verbally and my name was abused in their presence. They were a little while later attacked and had to rally in their self-defence. In the ensuing clash five young people died, including an Inkatha member, and many were injured. The tragic events were widely reported and a great deal of political capital was made against me on the basis of entirely malicious and erroneous reporting that I organised the massacre of students and the violence which took place. In the City Press of 6 November 1983, it was stated: "As President of Inkatha he must either accept responsibility for the actions of the blood-thirsty militants that ran wild at Ngoye and weed them out immediately, or he must admit that Inkatha militants are out of his control." In the Rand Daily Mail dated the 4 November 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) and its student wing, the Azanian African Student Organisation (AZASO), joined together to condemn me and Inkatha for the deaths at the University. They said I was: "siding with the oppressor." And the Reverend Frank Chikane, the Vice-President of the Transvaal UDF said: "Inkatha will not use violence against the oppressor, but they will kill our people." The AZASO President said that I was a "Traitor to the cause of our people and a collaborator." In the Daily News dated 3 November 1983, the UDF is reported issuing a statement criticising me for the violence at the University of Zululand: "And the massacre of defenceless students." In The Sowetan of 1 November 1983 AZAPO is quoted as saying: "We lack words to condemn this brutal and insensitive murder of Black children. Political violence from any group poses a threat of serious and dire consequences among the exploited and oppressed."

The tragic events were orchestrated by those who wanted to drive me and Inkatha from the Campus. When they could not do so verbally, they attempted to do so physically,

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

and yet I was widely reported as being responsible for the death of the students. A Commission of Inquiry into the violence which occurred subsequently investigated the events, and exonerated Inkatha of responsibility for them. I quote from the Commission's Report:

- “ (a) The Commission found no evidence supporting the allegation, made in the Sunday Times of 1983-10-30 that the Inkatha Women's Brigade surrounded the Women's Hostel on 29 October 1983 and assaulted female students who would not chant “Buthelezi is our leader.” . . .
- (c) The Commission found no evidence in support of the allegation, made in a number of newspapers, that the attack on the hostels was led by a lecturer and two (Zulu) chiefs.
- (d) The allegation was made in a number of newspapers that the “impis” were assisted in their attack upon the hostels by members of the KwaZulu Police. The Commission finds this allegation to be completely unfounded. According to the evidence, the only recognisable members of the KwaZulu Police who were on the campus on 29 October 1983 arrived together with the Chief Minister of KwaZulu long after the attack on the hostels had ceased . . .
- (g) The allegation was made in the Rand Daily Mail of 1983-11-01 that two attacks against the hostels were carried out on 29 October 1983. The second attack allegedly took place at 16h00 on 29 October 1983. According to the evidence of one student, a group of persons, who were allegedly Inkatha supporters, were escorted to the Men's hostels during the afternoon of 29 October 1983. There was, however, no further clash between these people and the students, though some of the students, understandably, were apprehensive that there might be an attack and some of them fled. It was suggested to the Commission, though no evidence in this regard was led, that the persons escorted by the police were pro-Inkatha students who were afraid of returning to the hostels alone . . .
- (k) A report in the City Press of 1983-10-30 alleges that there was an unconfirmed report that an Inkatha member was “later” attacked by about 50 avenging students “when he left the rally to buy a soft drink.” The Commission was unable to find any direct evidence confirming this report, but there is a tuck-shop in the Student Centre where Mr Eric Ngcobo who later died was found unconscious by the Security Officer, Mr Mbatha.”

The Commission found that:

“There was no evidence that the clash was between forces of the Inkatha Movement and student supporters of the United Democratic Front or that it was a planned attack launched by Inkatha supporters.”

Because the Government has fragmented the Black political scene, by banning people and organisations and by jailing Black leaders, Black politics is now characteristically in many respects incoherent. We lack the disciplining of small group activity which would normally be the function of dominant political groups. The effect of this fragmentation is to create numerous small platforms for small group activists who present themselves to the people in the light of acting on behalf of banned leaders and organisations. The effect of this can be quite disastrous in terms of dividing the Black body politic and I would like to give the Committee on Foreign Affairs an indication of how disruptive Black unity is by providing it with some brief details about the Lamontville situation in Natal.

Lamontville is a Black township like most Black townships on the periphery of a “White” city. Black urbanised people can only find housing in these townships and the Group Areas Act forces them to remain housed there.

When White settlers arrived in South Africa, they drove the Black inhabitants of the country off their land and treated them only as a labour force. Their rights were generally

20 January 1986][Continued

disregarded and it was only the British liberal tradition in the Cape which afforded some Africans very limited rights. Even in the British-ruled Natal Province, Africans were totally without rights. When in 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed, Black people were excluded from the constitutional rights that Whites enjoyed, with the exception of very limited rights in the Cape. However, over time industrialisation increased and White industry demanded a large Black labour force within reasonable reach of their places of employment. This industrial need resulted in an inflow of Blacks to the cities from rural areas and led to the Land Act of 1936, which set aside the areas in which Blacks could live. The drift to the cities continued during the thirties and after the Second World War because it was in the cities that opportunities for work were available. In practice, Black people had to take to living around cities in areas which were not officially set aside for them because there was no accommodation for them in authorised areas.

When the National Party came into power in 1948, they vowed to clear what Whites called "Black spots" and set about repatriating Blacks to the "Reserves" set aside for them. Economic realities however forced the National Party Government to proclaim some of these areas as Black townships. Other areas were turned into squatter areas by Blacks who occupied them illegally. The more rural areas in which Black people lived were later to be proclaimed "homelands."

A Black township either falls into a so-called homeland or falls into a White area and would therefore be administered by a white-controlled Board. With this set-up, the apartheid policy separated population groups geographically for political reasons.

White industrial areas see a constant inflow of newcomers seeking work. At present the access of Black South Africans to the White prescribed areas under White administration is regulated through a system of influx control. Illegal workseekers always stand the risk of being deported back to rural areas.

It is only so-called Section 10 rights which protect people from deportation. To qualify for Section 10 rights a person has to be born in the relevant area of parents who have Section 10 rights (Section 10.1 a) or by, before 1968, having worked continuously for 15 years or longer within the area or for 10 years for one employer (10.1 b). Generally speaking, these criteria are so unattainable that in practice it is the employed skilled workers, the urban elite, who tend to qualify under Section 10. New workseekers have to be in possession of a workseeker's permit, obtainable through a Labour Bureau.

The Greater Durban Area is inhabited by almost two million people. White people are administered by Local authorities whilst Indian and Coloured people are administered by the Central Government. The administration of Black people in the Province of Natal is very complicated. Some townships, like KwaMashu and Umlazi, are administered by KwaZulu. Others like Lamontville, Chesterville and Clermont are administered by the Government-controlled Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB).

The recent drift to the cities in Natal has been increased by economic recession and prolonged droughts, resulting in chaos in the administration of Black people around Durban. Because of the acute shortage of houses a large number of people have to live in squatter areas. These squatters are always underenumerated in all census work, and according to Professor L. Schlemmer their number now exceeds 1,440,000. He says that more Blacks are living in the "squatter belt" of shacks and camps around Durban's borders than in the townships, and in the hostels and servants' quarters in Durban. Dr Errol Haarhoff of the University of Natal estimates that the Durban squatter population grew at a rate of 10 per cent a year between 1966 and 1977 and there seems no reason to believe that this rate will decline. The continued growth of the squatter population is the result of people leaving rural areas to find work, and the fact that KwaZulu and Natal are inseparable economically means that the migration to the city is a migration from KwaZulu to Natal. They form a single economic unit and the rigid application of influx control regulations would cripple Natal industry. Hence the recent message of the Durban Chamber of Commerce to its members stating that influx control cannot work in the Durban area because the borders of KwaZulu criss-cross the metropolitan area. The

20 January 1986][Continued

Chamber is of the opinion that Section 10 rights should be extended to all township Blacks to enable them to seek work directly without first reporting to a Labour Bureau.

The rigid application of influx control to everyone except those with Section 10 rights is not undertaken in the Durban area. When the townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi became part of KwaZulu in 1981, the residents legally ceased to qualify under Section 10 but in practice they have continued to enjoy the same rights as those who do qualify. They are allowed to seek work themselves and are for the sake of convenience regarded as "commuters". Again economic laws proved to be stronger than apartheid laws and in practice no distinctions are made between people in KwaZulu townships such as KwaMashu and Umlazi and people in townships under PNAB control, such as Lamontville.

Lamontville is situated on the Southern outskirts of the White city of Durban. The official population figure of the township is given by the PNAB as 27,778. However many thousands more live in the township unofficially. There is a desperate shortage of housing as the PNAB has not built a single new house for the past 18 years. Just over the hills of Lamontville, therefore, a large squatter area has developed

Lamontville was built as a township following the Urban Act of 1932 and it is one of the oldest of its kind in the Greater Durban area. It was built by the City Council, funded by government money. The township initially fell under the jurisdiction of the Durban City Council but it was later taken over by the PNAB.

The houses are now more than 40 years old and naturally require ongoing maintenance. Most of the complaints about maintenance revolve around the ingress of water into houses caused by poor drainage, as well as in some cases about severe cracking of the walls.

There are several primary schools in Lamontville, one high school and a secondary school. Since these are insufficient to serve the youth of Lamontville, pupils have to use schools outside the township in KwaZulu and schools elsewhere in the country. Lamontville is served by only one clinic and the three referral hospitals serving the township are outside it. The impression is gained that the PNAB is not interested in the welfare of the people and only provides services which are unavoidable.

A high proportion of the residents of Lamontville do not possess Section 10 rights and unemployment is on the increase. Income is relatively low. Recent research by the University of Cape Town showed that in Lamontville 66.67 per cent of the households had incomes below the minimum living level, which sets the true basic minimum standard of living. The conditions of the people of Lamontville are not different from the conditions of residents in other townships in the Durban area. Income is relatively low, emotions are readily aroused and people are easily exploited.

Recently there have been reports in the press of violence in Lamontville, and even of killings. What has happened in this township that makes it different from other townships such as KwaMashu and Umlazi? All the issues which are important in Lamontville are also important in the other two townships. . . . Rent and bus fare increases, prolonged drought, unemployment and economic recession have affected all townships equally. But in Lamontville, the reaction has been different to the reaction in other townships.

Over the decades, rent and bus fare increases have given rise to protests all over the country. Community groups and political organisations always came together to join forces in opposition to the increases in the costs of daily living. The Alexandra bus boycott in the fifties was a clear example of successful protest.

In the townships around Durban administered by the PNAB transport is provided by the White-owned Durban Transport Management Board. In December 1982, the DTMB increased its fares by 12 per cent. This resulted in the successful bus boycott which followed. Several community organisations in Lamontville, among which there was Inkatha, joined hands to fight the increase. While the bus boycott was still in full swing,

20 January 1986][Continued

the PNAB announced an increase in rents of between 26 and 72 per cent. Rents in townships are made up of three components:

- House rent, which averages around R5 monthly depending on the age and cost of the house's construction,
- site rent, which pays the township administration, infrastructure, maintenance and contributes to schools and clinic costs, and
- service charges which cover the costs of water, street cleaning, refuse removal, sewerage and electricity.

According to the Administration Board, particularly the latter two components were accountable for the increase. They refused to discuss the question of value for money for the poor services rendered to the community.

Several organisations, among which there was Inkatha, vehemently opposed such extraordinary increases. As these organisations had already come together to organise the bus boycott, the decision to increase rents was a very convenient new issue about which to protest. Then, instead of joining the combined protest, some people decided to form a new organisation and to go it alone. Town Councillor Msizi Dube, the Rev Xundu and Mr Richard Gumede formed the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC). JORAC joined the UDF and received support from other UDF member organisations, such as the church organisation in Durban Diakonia. This "going it alone" by JORAC in Lamontville created divisions which were to have tragic consequences.

In the circumstances which prevailed, Councillor Dube was murdered by the Chairman of the Town Council who was later sentenced to 12 years in jail. Then several times after JORAC held meetings, some participants went on the rampage. They set fire to cars and buildings and attacked people. Inkatha members were particularly victimised. A packed Inkatha meeting where the rent issue was being discussed was broken up, cars and houses of Inkatha members were burned, windows smashed and people were injured. During all this violence and looting, five people were killed.

The aggressiveness of JORAC failed to achieve tangible successes in the rent issue. It was only when I called on the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, that the first discussion took place between the authorities and representatives of the people. It was decided to shelve the rent increases for six months because of the devastating effects which the drought had had on income in KwaZulu and Natal. In addition to discussions with Dr Koornhof, Inkatha decided to fight the rent issue in court at a cost of R15,000 (about 12,000 US dollars) which was gathered nationwide from Inkatha's members. Together with the Community Council, the Movement challenged the right of the Minister of Co-operation and Development to increase the rents unilaterally in townships without consulting the constituted Black local authorities.

JORAC, empty-handed because of its failure in the action for which it had been created, directed a new offensive against fellow Blacks: me and Inkatha. The decision of the South African Government to incorporate Lamontville into KwaZulu was the pretext on which I and Inkatha were attacked. The JORAC argument was that people would lose their Section 10 rights if Lamontville were to be incorporated into KwaZulu.

JORAC ignored the fact that if the people of Lamontville were to be included in KwaZulu they would in practice retain the benefits of Section 10 rights. Dr Koornhof's statement made under pressure from Natal Industry was clear: "I wish to give the assurance that any rights acquired by residents of the area in the past terms of Section 10 of the Black Urban Consolidation Act to work in a prescribed area will not be jeopardised in any fashion as a result of the new status". JORAC's leadership conveniently ignored the fact that in practice the application of regulations affecting Section 10 rights is different in Durban than it is elsewhere in the country. JORAC leaders also seem to have forgotten history. In 1978 a meeting was called by the residents of Lamontville at which more than 1,000 participants passed a motion expressing the wish that Lamontville be incorporated in KwaZulu. Thereupon in June 1978 the following

20 January 1986][Continued

motion was moved in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by Mrs Willel Yengwa then a local Inkatha leader in Lamontville:

“Mr Speaker, I move—

That in the opinion of this Legislative Assembly the advisability be considered that negotiations with the Republican Government be initiated by the KwaZulu Government for the transfer of certain places presently under the control of Bantu Administration Boards, such as Lamontville and others, to KwaZulu, in order to facilitate uniform rendering of services to KwaZulu citizens, for example education.”

The facts of the matter were that before this motion was tabled, the South African Government had already decided that Lamontville should be incorporated in KwaZulu. It is therefore beyond understanding why JORAC leaders, helped by other UDF member organisations, took this up as an issue which could be used against myself and Inkatha, and not as an issue to be taken up against the South African Government. By doing this they created distinctions between sections of their own people, namely a distinction between Black people inside and outside KwaZulu, and what is worse by doing this, they have followed in the footsteps of Pretoria which employs a divide and rule policy.

In a meeting with JORAC leaders and others, I made my position very clear. I said at that meeting that “I have never worked for the incorporation of Lamontville into KwaZulu, but I also see nothing wrong with its inclusion into KwaZulu. Blacks inside and outside KwaZulu share the same destiny. We suffer the same oppression and we have to work for Black unity across the political chasms which Pretoria tries to create to divide Black and Black. I refuse to be curtailed by the boundaries erected by Pretoria. I have defied National Party Government after National Party Government to keep KwaZulu unfettered by the political barriers created by Pretoria between Black and Black. Inkatha knows no ethnic barriers. It knows no regional barriers, and it is at one with all those who truly struggle for the liberation of this country in whatever destitute areas they may be. It is God-forsaken to distinguish between the oppression of Blacks in KwaZulu, and the oppression of Blacks in Lamontville, and it is God-forsaken to create Black/Black conflicts over the boundaries that Pretoria has drawn to divide us”.

The insults which have been directed against me and Inkatha have provoked deep resentment among many people. As the membership of Inkatha has reached over one million, it is not possible to go anywhere in Natal or on the Reef without encountering Inkatha members, and they take strong exception to insults against their leaders.

At a mass meeting in Durban, held to honour those who died in Lamontville, Mr Gideon Sibiyi who leads the 10,000 residents of the S J Smith Hostel outside Durban stated that one day on his return to the hostel, he found his men ready to go and “teach the people of Lamontville a lesson”. Only with extreme tact and persuasion was he able to persuade several thousand men not to apply the dictum of “eye for an eye.” According to Mr. Sibiyi “There could be more trouble” if the leadership of JORAC allowed looting and the insulting of myself to continue.

The events at the unveiling of the tombstone of the late Councillor Msizi Dube on 22 July 1984 were tragic. At the function in the church and in the graveyard some people carried placards which read: “Gatsha stay out of Lamontville”. When some Inkatha members present took exception to these placards and demanded that they be removed, they were attacked. The mob killed two Inkatha members and several were injured.

The Secretary-General of Inkatha, Dr O D Dhlomo, expressed his deep concern about the pattern of violence in Lamontville. He said: “It is amazing that each time there is a semi-political gathering in Lamontville, Inkatha or its leaders are denigrated. When we try to defend ourselves against such denigrations, we are accused of being a violent Movement. Yet these groups apparently have a right to kill indiscriminately without anybody raising a murmur”.

One cannot escape the impression that the first objective of UDF member organisations in Lamontville is to try to destroy Inkatha, instead of fighting the apartheid régime.

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

Leaders of some UDF member organisations attempt to mislead the people by distorting truths to convince them that the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha have nothing to offer them. They try to sow Black/Black discord so that they can prosper politically out of the plight of the people. In order to further their own interests, they do not hesitate to use undemocratic tactics under the guise of having the wellbeing of the people at heart. They tried to make Lamontville a no-go area for me when I announced that I was going to Lamontville on 1 September. JORAC leaders wanted to prevent me from showing my strength in Lamontville and therefore the Rev Xundu and some members of JORAC and Diakonia requested a meeting with me. Beforehand they were informed that the question of my visit to Lamontville was not negotiable. I pointed out to them that I had a democratic right to go and speak to the people of Lamontville. Like Blacks elsewhere, the residents of Lamontville had a democratic right to support whom they wanted to and to formulate community responses to the circumstances of their oppression.

After the meeting, which lasted six hours, the representatives of JORAC and Diakonia refused to issue a joint statement with Inkatha calling for the cessation of Black/Black violence. They however were not successful in prohibiting me from going to Lamontville. The Rev Xundu tried to have the Court serve an interdict on me to stop me, but without success. JORAC's attempts to make Lamontville a no-go area for me have failed and the meeting took place as planned.

Prayers were conducted by representatives of IDAMASA and over 30,000 people attended. Some news reporters hostile to me who had in the week before built up the impression of imminent violence, must have been disappointed. Not a single act of violence occurred. People met, prayed, sang and listened, and many new members joined Inkatha during the Lamontville meeting. In my speech I said:

"Inkatha and KwaZulu did not create Lamontville. Inkatha and KwaZulu did not stop building houses here. Inkatha and KwaZulu did not create the Group Areas Act, influx control regulations and all the other acts which confine you to the terrible circumstances in which you live. The KwaZulu Government did not tell the PNAB to raise your rents, to raise your bus fares. The KwaZulu Government did not tell Pretoria to deprive your children of the kind of education they need by starving your schools of money. One South African Government after another did these things. Those who argue against incorporation are telling you to serve your masters in Pretoria. They are actually saying that you should yourselves elect to be administered by the White-controlled PNAB. They are telling you to give this Board your confidence, and to say to this Board that you trust your future to them."

There are more issues on which JORAC and other UDF member organisations seem to apply double standards. JORAC and UDF spokesmen have attacked me for "working within the system" and UDF representatives are on record as saying that they do not want to co-operate with people "working within the system". Furthermore the UDF tried to prevent people from working within the system by calling for a boycott of the elections for Community Councils.

However, the same organisations had worked closely with the late Councillor Dube who, according to them would be "working within the system". They hailed him as a great leader. Apparently the same standards are not always applied to everybody.

Inkatha has used participation as a very successful tactic. By taking part in the elections for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and in winning all its seats, it guaranteed that the people of KwaZulu would never be forced to become foreigners in their country of birth. Inkatha has blocked all moves by Pretoria to manipulate KwaZulu into accepting the so-called independence being offered to it. In addition to its important political stand Inkatha has control over the KwaZulu Assembly and is able to utilise available resources where people need them most.

I talked about this very issue in my Policy Speech in 1983: "I think our role can be summed up in the concept participatory democratic opposition to apartheid. There is no safe way of opposing apartheid. You cannot oppose apartheid by sniping at its victims.

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

If the real struggle is taking place here in this country and if victory is to be won by waging a struggle for liberation here where it matters, then we have got to participate in the society which is changing. We have to continue our role here in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and we have to continue in the programmes which emanate from this house. We have had the courage to stand with the people in attempts to do whatever can be done together with them in their circumstances and that makes us vulnerable. The path that we have chosen to walk, the role that we have involved ourselves in in real politics, is a difficult and demanding role, and we have to pursue our objectives knowing full well that as we oppose apartheid and strive for real changes, we will be belittled, we will be sniped at and what we do will be undermined. We must see all this as part of the challenge we face”.

The circumstances of Lamontville are not different from those of Umlazi and Kwa-Mashu. The people of Lamontville will not be worse off should the South African Government include their township in KwaZulu. The people of KwaMashu and Umlazi who are incorporated in KwaZulu do not resist this incorporation and they find themselves no worse off than people in other townships.

In Lamontville UDF member organisations have taken up the incorporation issue in an offensive against Inkatha instead of laying the blame where it belongs—with the South African régime. The inevitable result is unnecessary division, and the futile prolonging of the suffering of the people of Lamontville. The only thing Black/Black opposition does is to play right into the hands of Pretoria.

Apartheid is so abhorrent that just simply any measure against it is seen as justified by some in the West. I have no doubt that there are many members in the Conservative and Labour Parties who are genuinely indignant about apartheid and in whom that indignation gives rise to irresponsible action in supporting the forces of destruction in South Africa.

This has become very apparent in the disinvestment debate in the United States, and it is very apparent in much of the activity of pressure groups in Great Britain and Western Europe. There is too much at stake, not only for millions in South Africa, but for the whole sub-continent of Southern Africa for Western indignation to give rise to indiscriminate action against apartheid.

I am pursuing a path of non-violent, democratic opposition to the Government precisely because I see this as the only way of preserving the future. Vast backlogs in Black housing, health services and welfare, and in such things as education, can only be wiped out some time in the future if the South African economy grows at its maximum possible rate. Any move against South Africa which damages its economy now, is a move which will damage the prospects of a worthwhile future. I am pursuing the politics of negotiation because I do not want to reduce South Africa to ungovernability, and this is what mass poverty will do some time in the future if the country's economic growth base is damaged now.

Inkatha holds an Annual General Conference every year and at every one of these Conferences I inform delegates what I have said on their behalf on the question of disinvestment. I inform them that I tell the world:

- that ordinary Black South Africans still seek a negotiated settlement and seek to pursue non-violent tactics and strategies;
- they know the meaning of poverty and are aware of the fact that if they do not have work they suffer terrible deprivation and that therefore any strategy which results in a decrease in the number of jobs available to Blacks is rejected by Blacks;
- Blacks in South Africa who have jobs with foreign companies would never be persuaded to relinquish their jobs to further the aims and objectives of those who pursue the disinvestment lobby;
- that no membership-based Black organisation in South Africa has an executive with a mandate from its members to call for disinvestment;

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

- that Black protest politicians who are not involved in constituency politics, but who are involved in voicing Black grievances in a manner calculated to gain media acclaim, are more prone to call for disinvestment than other leaders;
- that every leader of an organisation working to make this country ungovernable and who is prepared to use violence, whether it be mob violence or armed violence, to bring about political change, argues for disinvestment;
- that there is no prospect of the armed struggle succeeding within the foreseeable future and that we therefore will have to rely on the politics of negotiation; and that the politics of negotiation are favoured by what has now become a total dependence by White South Africa on Black South Africa;
- that Black bargaining power is increased by Black economic advancement and vertical mobility which accompanies it;
- that it is the responsibility of Black South Africans to liberate South Africa from apartheid oppression in such a way that we do not force on neighbouring Black States, and States further afield in Southern and Central Africa, to pay the costs of our struggle;
- I tell them that we respect the national choices of Black States in Southern Africa and that we have no quarrel with those who have opted for a socialist future under a one-Party state, but that is not a viable option for us; and that the benefits we will derive from working within a race-free, democratic state in which there will be equality for all, and in which the principles of the free enterprise system will dominate in government planning, will have a very significant spill-over benefit for other States in Southern Africa.

Western industrialised countries which are moving towards banning future investment in South Africa, or even worse to withdrawing existing investment, and which regard Black opinion among rank and file workers and peasants as irrelevant, stand in the very real danger of pursuing aims and objectives which conflict with what is beneficial in our struggle for liberation. And in this vein, I would like to make an additional point. I am beginning to hear more and more arguments in favour of selective disinvestment because many of the points I have made above are taken and it is naïvely believed that, for example, prohibition of further investment in capital intensive industries, is warranted. Every Western Government knows that economies are not malleable things and cannot be turned on or off at will, and can only be directed towards political ends with very limited success. The naïvety of some who think they can damage one part of the economy without it having repercussions for another part of the economy is to me alarming. I am most certainly open to persuasion that one or another form of disinvestment may put pressure on Pretoria without damaging the economy, or causing greater Black suffering. I argue against disinvestment because it has these negative effects. Any sanctions against South Africa which would not harm the growth of the economy, but which would exert pressure on Pretoria, would be welcome by every Black South African. I have always spoken against irresponsible exploitative capitalism, but that to me is another debate entirely.

There is also a ripeness of time in which blunders would lead to irrecoverable losses. The West should realise that the threat of violence, and the threat of economic sanctions has more utility than the employment of violence and the implementation of damaging sanctions. The West should also realise that as sanctions do begin to bite, it is Black South Africa which will bear the brunt of the burden. The West should also realise that the South African Government is quite capable of taking retaliatory measures of the most despicable kind. If sanctions began to bite, and Blacks began to suffer the burden of those sanctions, Pretoria would have no scruples about repatriating more than a million workers in South Africa who come from neighbouring States.

I am not saying that pressures should not be brought to bear on South Africa. All I am saying is that all of us who work for the destruction of apartheid should not be blinded by anger to the extent that we fail to examine carefully the consequences of every act we take in the process of doing so. I have become very sceptical on the issue of whether the West would come to the rescue of more than a million citizens of these independent

20 January 1986][Continued

States when the crunch comes, and South Africa decides to expel them as a retaliatory act. I have become sceptical because I have not seen a single Western country do anything to the rogue elephant, which the South African Defence Force has been, when they have killed our brothers and sisters in countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana.

I am fully aware of the fact that even the maximum possible growth rate of the South African economy will leave a great many Black South Africans jobless for a very considerable time into the future. The Black birth rate in South Africa is approaching 3 per cent per annum, and already more than half of all Black South Africans are 15 years old and younger. This huge population bulge of millions of young people moving towards the market place is going to create almost insoluble problems for whatever government rules South Africa. I am therefore aware that the development of an informal economy, and the development of self-help schemes is vital for our future. I am also aware that the growth rate of the informal economy rises and falls as the growth rate of the formal economy rises and falls. Western governments should understand that the cause for which we all struggle in South Africa demands the maximisation of the West's input into the South African economy. Millions of people now, and future generations, will benefit from a vast inflow of capital into South Africa, and the inflow of new technology and managerial skills which will come with it.

My attitude to the disinvestment question has to be tempered by the realities of the South African situation. The ANC Mission in Exile and the United Democratic Front have been joined by a number of protest politicians and by a number of clerics, in a veritable clamour for the West to embark on a programme of disinvestment against South Africa. Glib claims are made about the willingness of Black South Africans to suffer the consequences of a shattered economy and what measure of support there is in Black South Africa for disinvestment rests on the false hope that economic threats will be effective as a means of bringing the Government to its knees. This unrealism is dangerous and when unrealism about economic affairs is accompanied by unrealism about the threat of violence in South Africa, a very dangerous situation could be in the making. Western parliamentarians know that it would be foolhardy for any Western government to ignore the voice of the Church. There are times when the Church's voice and the pressure it mounts in support of specific lobbies has considerable political significance. The British Parliament, however, would not put itself in a position where it is dictated to by the Church of England, or by any other Church. Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee are well aware of the fact that the Church does not have the expertise to run a government and the Church is not sufficiently acquainted with the realities which the British Government has to take into account in developing a domestic and foreign policy. I clearly see this to be the case in Western societies and I see it just as clearly to be the case in South Africa. It is therefore with considerable amazement that I perceive the extent to which some of our political clerics hold sway on crucial issues about South Africa as far as the West is concerned.

I have known Bishop Desmond Tutu for a great many years. I am well aware of the fact that he and the South African Council of Churches is critical of me and Inkatha. His indignation about apartheid and the suffering of Black South Africa has led him to identify with protest politics. In the past he has played a very valuable role at times when he so eloquently denounced apartheid to the world. The extent to which he attempts to participate in Black politics on the ground, however, frequently estranges the two of us. Every parliamentarian will know the importance of having a constituency to support him or her, and what the curbs and restraints of accountability to that constituency involve. I have a massive constituency to which I am accountable. A Bishop's role in one sense is to pontificate to people in his Church, to teach them what to think and how to behave and political clerics in South Africa wrongly extend that role into the political arena. There is in South Africa a great deal of concern about the fact that Bishop Tutu has estranged himself from me. People see this as undesirable. I think it would add to the Foreign Affairs Committee if I gave it details of my relationship with Bishop Tutu. In September last year, a number of very senior churchmen persuaded me to respond positively to Bishop Tutu's request for a meeting with me. I therefore met Bishop Tutu

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

in Durban at a meeting chaired by the Anglican Bishop of Natal, Bishop Nuttall in the presence of a number of other Bishops. The following is the paper I tabled for discussion.

[MEMORANDUM FOR PRESENTATION BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER KWAZULU, PRESIDENT OF INKATHA AND CHAIRMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ALLIANCE AT A MEETING AT BISHOP'S HOUSE, DURBAN, 30 SEPTEMBER 1985, WITH:

The Rt Revd Michael Nuttall	Bishop of Natal
The Rt Revd Desmond Tutu	Bishop of Johannesburg
The Rt Revd Lawrence Zulu	Bishop of Zululand
The Rt Revd A H Zulu	Former Bishop of Zululand
The Rt Revd A A Mkhize	Suffragan Bishop of Natal
Father Makhaye	Venerable E Mkhize
Reverend Vundla	Venerable Xulu
Dr O D Dhlomo	Dr F T Mdlalose
Revd E Z Sikakane	Retired Minister of the Methodist Church
Mr A Z Mlotshwa	KwaZulu Government representative in Durban

We have come here, I hope, to explore unity and reconciliation. I certainly came here to do so. I came here with an earnest desire to leave this meeting with a deepened understanding of what estranges important people, and I yearn to leave here in circumstances in which the whole world could be witness to the Bishop of Johannesburg and myself embraced in common purpose, even if we are divided by our Lord to do different things to achieve that common purpose.

It is now I hope patently clear that as a political leader I need no props, and no allies who can fight my battles for me. I have established Inkatha against all odds and it is now an entrenched political power which is self-sufficient as far as its own survival goes. My yearning for Black South African unity is a yearning born out of a deep love for my country and a recognition that justice, peace and equality for all can only be brought about by eradicating apartheid. Apartheid is not merely a political philosophy; it is not merely an ideology; it is a South African White way of life which has been institutionalised and which must therefore be fought on a wide range of fronts. We can be united in purpose but we can only be united in strategy if we all accept the need for a multi-strategy approach.

Outside a multi-strategy approach, the only unity there can be between different Black organisations is unity based on uniformity and this will in hard practice only be found in a disciplined joint commitment in the armed struggle. I make the point that if any single strategy can win, it is the strategy of war. The African National Congress Mission in Exile places the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change. They demand that we all recognise that fact. In an armed struggle one does not need to fight across a broad spectrum of democratic opposition to apartheid. The armed struggle must necessarily negate any step towards reform. They must negate the concept of reform, and they must negate even such steps as the elimination of the pass laws and influx control. This they have done. In the armed struggle, every step of real progress towards negotiated reform must be viewed as a threat.

As a Christian I must welcome the scrapping of pass laws and influx control, if and when that actually does take place. I must welcome the prospect of it taking place. I must encourage Mr P W Botha and all members of Government who are thinking in this direction. Would you, Bishop Tutu, join me in a joint public encouragement of Mr Botha to scrap influx control and the pass laws?

Bishop Tutu is a patron of the United Democratic Front. I am President of Inkatha. We stand in camps which are now in fact hostile to each other. From my point of view, that hostility was authorised by the United Democratic Front which publicly rejected Inkatha and stated it would not accept Inkatha as an affiliate member, when the thought had not even crossed my mind. It is common cause that the UDF formally rejects Inkatha and it is common cause that elements in the UDF reject Inkatha in acts of violence against it.

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

Inkatha has buried people in Black/Black confrontations in which the UDF were involved against us. It is simply true that the UDF and AZAPO have buried their dead who were casualties of UDF/AZAPO conflicts. It is simply true that AZAPO and UDF have buried those who were killed in Inkatha action. At today's discussion, I hope we do not have to lay blame. I am simply recording the fact that people are dying because Black leaders cannot get together. I believe that Inkatha only takes up a stick or a stone to defend that which is threatened with death and destruction. And I believe that elements in the United Democratic Front encourage the growth of violence in our townships in a commitment to making our country ungovernable. Let us say even that you, Sir, and I have got irreconcilable analyses of why people are dying. We must accept that people are dying as a result of Black/Black internecine strife. Will you, Sir, stand on a platform with me to condemn Black killing Black? Will you stand on a platform to condemn acts of violence by Blacks? Will you stand on a platform to condemn those statements by the ANC's Mission in Exile which exhort Black South Africans and our youth in particular to kill Black Councillors and Black policemen? Will you publicly condemn with me the ANC's Mission in Exile recent broadcasts over Radio Freedom exhorting Blacks to take violence into White areas and to forcibly remove arms from White houses to be used in killing people, whether or not the number of civilians who die increases dramatically?

I find it difficult to conceive of reconciliation in private behind closed doors if the horrors of brutality perpetrated by Blacks on Blacks and on Whites because they are Whites, cannot be condemned in public in joint statements.

I have, Bishop Tutu, I think shown the hand of friendship to you. You will remember that I even invited you once to lead devotions at the opening of a South African Black Alliance Prayer Meeting in Soweto, but you declined to come even though you were asked to come simply as a clergyman. When you took the initiative to reconcile Black/Black confrontations when AZAPO and UDF were at each other's throats, I responded very positively and sent Inkatha representatives to the meeting. I would any day of the week be prepared to stand with you in public and for us to tell the world that we have major differences of opinion about strategy, but that we both as Christians seek to play a role to bring our country to its senses. I am not denying you, Sir, your democratic right to have political opinions which bear your judgment. Christ may be directing your steps in one direction and mine in another. My problem does not come because of your political leanings. My problems come when you do not attack Inkatha's tactics and strategies, but attack me as a person.

If I am wrong in some of my perceptions please correct me. I am informed, for example, that you work very closely with Mr Randall Robinson when you are in the United States, and you praise him for his support of the Black South African struggle for liberation in this country. I am informed that he has taken your view when he makes outrageous statements to the effect that I am an agent of the South African Government and that I am "doing the bidding of the South African Government" and that I am "on their pay roll" and that I was an apologist for the system in South Africa. You are aware that I have had a running battle with the system. You are aware that the South African Government did everything in its power to avoid confirmation of my appointment as Chief of the Buthelezi clan. You are aware that they took away my passport. You are aware that my telephone is tapped and that my mail has been intercepted. You are aware that the National Intelligence Service, then BOSS, actually funded opposition parties to Inkatha in KwaZulu in an attempt to get rid of me. Is it really too much to have expected that you would have informed Mr Robinson of this history of constant opposition to apartheid and the extent to which the Government time and again attempted to undermine the influence I was exerting? In the totality of things one sees more than could perhaps be justified in bickerings about specific texts. For example, *The Star* carried a news item under the heading: "Thatcher will meet Tutu next week". The sting in the news item in the last two paragraphs may have escaped those who are not fully informed. They read:

"Mrs Thatcher's failure to see Bishop Tutu when he was in London a year ago reportedly caused offence to many South African Blacks.

It was noted that Mrs Thatcher had found time during the same year to see Mr P W Botha and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi."

20 January 1986][Continued

Because you, Bishop Tutu, were involved in the events being reported, is it unreasonable for me to have expected you to have disassociated yourself from the conjoining of my name and Mr Botha's name in this kind of way? The implications of this news item is that Black South Africa took umbrage at Mrs Thatcher seeing Mr Botha and myself and not seeing you. Could you not have said that this is an unfair insinuation and that you welcomed me seeing Mrs Thatcher as a Black South African?

As an African in South Africa, you would know how deeply insulting these kind of statements are. You know I have been hurt by them and that they are calculated to be damaging to my role and to Inkatha. Would you, Bishop Tutu, be prepared to inform Mr Randall Robinson in a joint statement with me that my leadership in KwaZulu was not a creation of the homeland policy? It was in fact Chief Lutuli and such people as Bishop A H Zulu, Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Joe Matthews and a number of other people in leadership roles in the old ANC who urged me to take up my hereditary leadership position in KwaZulu. This involved me in taking up my chieftainship of the Buthelezi clan. I do not know if you, Sir, are aware that the Buthelezi clan traditionally provided advisers, generals and prime ministers to Zulu monarchs. In other words if there was no homeland policy, my position in KwaZulu leadership would be exactly the same as it is today. It was the same before the homeland framework was imposed on the Zulu nation.

For many years there were no problems between Mr Tambo and myself. Problems only emerged after a full Inkatha delegation met with Mr Tambo and the ANC Mission in Exile delegation in London in 1979. It then became clear for the first time that unless I was prepared to become a surrogate of the ANC Mission in Exile, there would be problems. I was prepared to be an ally on those levels of political action in which common objectives permitted joint interests. I could not undertake those things which amounted to support for the armed struggle, the use of violence in politics and the economic isolation of South Africa which would starve Black South Africans into a deeper misery than they had ever known before. You, Bishop Tutu, are aware of the points of difference between the ANC Mission in Exile and Inkatha. They revolve around tactics and strategy and our unwillingness to support violence. As a Bishop of the Anglican Church, is it really too much to ask you to support Inkatha's non-violent tactics and strategies as preferable to the ANC Mission in Exile's commitment to war.

Whether or not you agree with the tactics and strategies of Inkatha, Sir, you would agree that it has a million members and that I am elected to be the President of Inkatha. I find it very disquieting when I am insulted in public by people who I really do believe to be under your influence in the United States, and that you do not raise your voice to object on my behalf. Few Whites would understand the depth of feeling which calling a Black leader a homeland stooge or a sell-out solicits in Black hearts. You, Sir, would be aware of that depth. I am not asking you to publicly approve of my politics, or that I play a role in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. All I am asking is that you help correct the very divisive politics which follow on people calling me a stooge, a sell-out and an apologist for apartheid. If you want to do something practical about reconciliation, that is one of the places you could start.

The ANC Mission in Exile has not openly declared war on Inkatha and the United Democratic Front stands side by side with them in doing so. Do you, Sir, believe that Inkatha should be destroyed? You may believe we will fail. You may believe we are doing the wrong things but do you believe that Inkatha is a threat to the struggle for liberation? Do you think it is wrong for Inkatha to have seized control of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to block the South African Government in its attempt to manipulate KwaZulu into accepting so-called independence? KwaZulu is the only region which has nothing to do with the Special Cabinet Committee. It is the only one which has had nothing to do with the non-statutory negotiating forum. KwaZulu was the only so-called homeland which refused to have anything to do with the Black Advisory Council which President Botha attempted to establish in his then role as Prime Minister. I have refused even to discuss the consolidation of KwaZulu with the Commission for Co-operation and Development, and I refused to have anything to do with a committee which the late Mr J B Vorster set up to look at ways and means of making the pass laws more acceptable

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

to Blacks. I am the only leader of any region in South Africa who has had not one single discussion with the State President about the future of our country. I am now further estranged from the State President than I have ever been in my life before. At the outset of his then premiership, I simply pleaded with the world to give him a chance to prove his own leadership merits. Was this un-Christian? When he disappointed Black South Africa in the way he was leading Whites and in the way in which he was leading our country into ever greater turmoil, is it not true that I criticised him in ever more strident terms? Whenever he has shown any signs of moving in the right direction, I have encouraged him. Is this un-Christian? During the last four and a half years I have only met him once formally, and then it was to tell him that I can only talk to him outside the four corners of apartheid. Is this a crime? Can I really be called a stooge of the South African Government?

I find it difficult to think about reconciliation on a personal level with anyone who condemns these stances and actions as stances and actions of a government stooge and Black sell-out. Have you, Sir, in the United States and elsewhere criticised me on the grounds that I am, you claim, paid by Pretoria? Have you ever criticised John Kane-Berman because he is too closely associated with me? Do you recognise that the language which is used in denigrating Inkatha incites Blacks to kill Blacks? These are the kind of questions which must be tabled.

What I have been saying could be read to be provocative. I am making no statements with that intention. I am pointing to difficulties and I am pointing to the kind of things which should be looked at if we really are talking about reconciliation. I am not a theologian and I have not been called to high office in the Church. My understanding of Christ is a sinner's understanding and in this company of Bishops and priests who have been called to high office in the Church, let me state some of my perceptions, and let me be corrected if I am un-Christian in these statements. I would like to make the following statements:

- 1 Christ is to be found everywhere. He is seeking obedience from those who are in guerilla camps. He is seeking obedience from those who are in the South African army. He is seeking obedience from those who are in the United Democratic Front. He is seeking obedience from those who are in Inkatha. He is seeking obedience from those in the PFP and the National Party, in COSAS, AZAPO and all other political organisations. In all these organisations Christ has directed one or more of His servants to be there. The Church of the Province has not condemned any political group in this country to be unholy, beyond redemption, with no possible role to play in normalising South Africa and bringing about a just and fair society.
- 2 The Anglican Church has no formal stance which declares the need to rely on violence as the essential element in bringing about a just state. It has retained a commitment to furthering non-violence in politics and it is still deeply committed to bringing about change through non-violent means. Our Church does not believe that mass violence is either essential or even inevitable. As a Church we express deep faith in the reconciling powers of our Lord, and it has not condemned Inkatha for its commitment to the politics of negotiation. As the Bishop of Johannesburg, Sir, these must be your views.
- 3 The Church has a duty to confront the State when the State acts unjustly and does not meet the demands of the Gospel, but the Anglican Church has appointed no political organisation to be its spearhead in tackling that which has to be done to confront the State with the inequities of apartheid. It must applaud all who work for the liberation of our country from racial fear and hatred which gives rise to constitutionalised injustice. It should applaud everything which can be applauded in all the country's political organisations.
- 4 Christendom has never finally pronounced on the question of violence. Whether or not there is such a thing as a just war is not decided upon. The Church does not bind all its members to one or another answer to the question of violence. I believe, however, that I am right in saying that there can be no just war if all non-violent means have not yet been properly employed. There is theologically no justification for the armed struggle which the ANC Mission in Exile has

20 January 1986][Continued

declared. Their position may be theologically understandable, but the Church as the Church must applaud those who work to bring about change through non-violent means. Are you, Sir, prepared to tell the ANC Mission in Exile publicly with me that its commitment to the armed struggle as a primary means of bringing about change in our country is not theologically justified?

When one reaches out to reconcile, or when one adopts a stance seeking reconciliation, difficulties and perceptions must be tabled whether the perceptions are correct or incorrect. I perceive you, Bishop Tutu, as one who denigrates my person, as one who denigrates my leadership, and as one who identifies with those who vilify me in the vilest of terms. I am not talking here about disagreements which as Christians we are entitled to. I am not denying you the democratic right to hold contrary views to those I hold. I am not denying you the right to tell the people that you think I am wrong. When I talk about denigration, I am talking about an un-Christian attack on the integrity of a person. I have already asked the question whether you have ever criticised me for taking a salary from Pretoria, as it was put. That is talking about me as a sell-out and a stooge doing apartheid's dirty work for it. That is criticism but it is also denigration.

You, Sir, were with me at Robert Sobukwe's funeral. You saw what was happening and you advised me to leave. When I subsequently deplored the behaviour of those who desecrated that funeral and correctly talked about the youngsters involved as thugs, you responded publicly by saying that they were "a new breed of young people with iron in their souls". I necessarily had to respond to this in public when I held a mass meeting in Soweto. You, Sir, have travelled across the length and breadth of America and Europe without ever once finding anybody to authenticate a public attack by me on you. What others regard as attacks by me on you in certain statements I have made in South Africa were no more than necessary comments in a very volatile political situation which demanded them. The move against me at Robert Sobukwe's funeral was politically inspired; it was politically orchestrated and after the event my enemies made a great deal of political capital out of that event. This I regard as deeply shameful to African morality and African perceptions, and I simply must raise the question in public about your participation in that which I so deeply regretted.

In speaking recently to a White I heard that you had told him that I was nobody of consequence and was rejected to the extent of not being able to attend Black funerals. This statement opened up old wounds inflicted on me at Graaff Reinett. You, Sir, were witness to my near murder. Was the press report at the time headed "Tutu Saves Buthelezi" a correct interpretation of what transpired there? I regarded what happened there as a hideous desecration of a funeral. For me you condoned it by staying there and in effect presiding over a desecration. I am appalled at the use which Black political leaders make of funerals when they turn them into important political platforms. I am appalled at what I regard as the hypocrisy of your words when you appealed passionately to the South African Government to allow Blacks to bury their dead in peace without directing that same appeal to the United Democratic Front. They have taken over funerals in this volatile political atmosphere and converted them into horrible spectacles where people have been burnt without anyone raising a finger to protect the victims.

You, Sir, approached me early in 1984, unasked for out of the blue, seeking a meeting with me when you were still General-Secretary of the SACC. But during the whole year you found no time to actually meet with me. You even described my response to your letter as gracious. I am offended by a Bishop who criticises me publicly and then privately asks me to meet with him in reconciliation, but then takes no step to do so. I feel disdained.

I stress again that I do not regard this meeting as a political meeting. We are not here to discuss the merits of one or another political approach. We are looking at what divides you, Bishop Tutu, and myself as Christian brothers. You know, Sir, that it is now simply a fact that the ANC's Mission in Exile are encouraging every possible United Democratic Front move which is directed against Inkatha. The Mission in Exile is attempting to turn me into an enemy of the people in the eyes of the people. If you, Sir, believe the UDF's tactics and strategies are the correct ones, then you are entitled to hold those beliefs, but

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

if those beliefs make you take up sides against me as a person and as a leader and if you, Sir, support those who denigrate my person, whether you do so privately or publicly, then I really do have a problem. I believe that if there are differences between the United Democratic Front and Inkatha, both sides should take their point of view to the people and leave the people to judge on the merits of tactics and strategies who should be supported and who should not be supported. It is dirty politics which goes into character assassination, and I do not believe the Church is right to stand in the company of character assassins to express views about justice and reconciliation.

If having said these things you no longer want to be reconciled with me as a Christian brother engaged in the struggle for liberation as Christians, then I will go away from this meeting in sadness. That I have said what I have said is the measure of my earnest Christian desire to embrace you in forgiveness and in being forgiven. I hope that you on your side will leave this place with no feelings unsaid.

We meet in the embracing strength of Christian fellowship. We meet in a spirit of prayer, and I believe that our Lord is here with us and I have spoken in that awareness.]

I cannot afford the luxury of being personal in my politics or being idiosyncratic. My political life is filled with the hard, grinding work of serving a number of very large and demanding constituencies. It is filled on a day-to-day basis with the real issues which the poorest of the poor in South Africa face, and it is filled with very stringent demands which I have to meet as I work on the interface between Black and White politics. There will be no Utopia brought about overnight in South Africa. There will be no overnight victory by the radicals, and the world will not be presented with a new and wholesome South Africa in any short space of time. In my political life I strive to bring Black and White together and in our circumstances, the only way to do so, is to address bread and butter issues where consensus can be obtained and where joint Black/White action can be generated to bring about a new South Africa.

While the State President was busy with planning and establishing the new constitution, I was busy charting a course which Blacks and Whites could follow together to bring about radical change. In 1980 I called for the establishment of the Buthelezi Commission and gave it the following major terms of reference:

- 1(a) In terms of the requirements of peace, stability, prosperity and equity, to consider fully and appreciate the present position of KwaZulu and Natal within a constitutional and political structure of South Africa, taking into account possible or likely future developments, and with due cognisance of alternative constitutional forms and modes of political organisation and development.
- 1(b) To assist and evaluate the rationality, desirability and viability of the present constitutional, social and economic situation of KwaZulu and Natal in the light of historical development, and the current and emerging political reality of South and Southern Africa.
- 2 To enquire into and report and make recommendations on the constitutional future of the areas of KwaZulu and Natal within the context of South Africa and Southern Africa.

I also charged it with looking at the vexing political issues we face in what can be done in the context of solving local and regional problems in KwaZulu/Natal within the South African context.

Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, who was full-time Secretary to the Commission while it sat, has summarised the work of the Commission in an article published in *Clarion Call*, Vol 2, 1985. I attach a copy of this article as an Appendix.³ Here I want to mention that Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government accepted the Commission's recommendations in principle and we have been using these recommendations to assist us in charting a course of action. Individual members of the Foreign Affairs Committee will know how important it is to relate politics to local and regional issues.

³ Not printed.

20 January 1986][Continued

In KwaZulu and Natal, Blacks and Whites are faced with the gross inefficiency of apartheid. Since the Buthelezi Commission recommendations have been published, we in Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government paid a great deal of attention to the need to bridge the gap between Black and White political and administrative machinery at the local and regional level. There have been ongoing negotiations between KwaZulu and the Natal Provincial Council, and I am glad to say that there is now consensus between ourselves and the White administrators of Natal about the necessity of multi-racial local and regional government. Negotiations have reached an advanced stage and we are now in a position where we can make a concrete joint Black/White proposal to the Government. If the South African Government accepts the proposals we are making, it would represent a major breakthrough in South African politics.

My approach in South African politics is that solutions cannot be imposed by the Central Government. The very deep-rooted problems we face as a society have to be solved by the people and the Government has to reflect the people's will in their situations. While it is foolhardy to make predictions in South Africa, I am relatively optimistic that sooner or later the realities which underline the present problems of South Africa, will demand that the Central Government decentralise the problem-solving procedures, so to speak, and permit regional experimentation in the evolution of the kind of local and regional political machinery which will de-escalate race conflicts and violence. What we are doing in KwaZulu/Natal is "realpolitik".

A new democratic and free South Africa will not be authorised by street corner violence. It will be authorised by men and women in Black and White society who accept that apartheid has to go and it has to be replaced with a social and political system which give both Black and White a meaningful stake in the government of their country. What we are doing in the KwaZulu/Natal region amounts to taking effective and realistic steps towards normalising South Africa as an industrialised democracy. There is vast support for the kind of things we are doing. South Africa is not a society beyond the pale. Black and White are prepared to work together to find new solutions. The National Party, however, continues to have a stranglehold in politics which stifles the goodwill which exists in all population groups. Very considerable groundswell pressures are building up in White society demanding that the Government face our problems realistically and abandon a narrow Afrikaaner-orientated ideology in favour of a broad South Africanism.

If there is no hope of succeeding, I would not be doing what I am doing. The very substantial constituency support I enjoy could make me a very prominent leader amongst those who have opted for violence. I do what I do because the politics of negotiation are in all reality far more potent as a force of change than the politics of violence. I do what I do because it can succeed.

Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi

20 January 1986

Memorandum submitted by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi (SA/W)

I have provided members of the Foreign Affairs Committee with a relatively in-depth document which lays bare some of the nitty gritty events in South African Black politics because I believe that the British will one day be called upon to play the role of honest broker in South Africa. This Committee now needs to delve into underlying Black political realities. I have prepared and distributed this document in advance to free time today for questions and answers. I would like very briefly now only to summarise Inkatha's position in Black politics.

South African elements are ever-increasingly demanding that Inkatha plays a mediating and reconciling role because it is not only central to the South African political scene, and at the South African political centre of gravity, but is a true mass Movement. As President of Inkatha I have the advantage of also having constituencies in all the country's race groups. Inkatha is also advantageously placed by the fact that the South African

20 January 1986][Continued

Government will not succeed in any reform programmes without us, and nor will, for example, the ANC Mission in Exile succeed in mounting a classical armed struggle without us, or succeed in destabilising the country to produce a state of chaos without us.

Inkatha's just over 1.2 million members are dominated by workers and peasants and Inkatha's membership is distributed across South Africa and is as well represented in urban areas as it is in rural areas. Inkatha occupies a strategic position in South African politics and it wields real Black power.

Inkatha is committed to the politics of negotiation and national reconciliation and is committed to the ideal of Black national unity on the basis of a multi-strategy approach.

Inkatha sees a desperate need in South Africa to pursue the struggle for liberation in such a way that national reconciliation is brought about in the process of destroying apartheid. We are convinced that the country will require a truly national effort after liberation if political victories against apartheid are going to be made meaningful to ordinary people.

Inkatha sees South Africa locked into a global north/south axis and it accepts the fact that the free enterprise system is the most efficient system mankind has devised to translate the kind of mineral wealth which South Africa has into human wealth, and to develop an industrialised society.

Inkatha believes that a free enterprise-based economic system needs to go hand in hand with a Western type parliamentary democracy. It also believes that such democracies cannot be produced through the barrel of a gun, and in our circumstances most certainly can only be produced through the politics of negotiation.

Great Britain needs to recognise more fully that it is Inkatha's accumulating strength and its strategic position in South African politics which the ANC Mission in Exile fears. Success in Inkatha's tactics and strategies will downgrade the importance of the politics of violence. For violence to succeed, Inkatha must be made to fail. The vehemence with which the ANC Mission in Exile attacks Inkatha must be traced to this truth.

Inkatha applauds the strength and character and the statesmanship that Mrs Margaret Thatcher is displaying in handling South African issues, whether it be at a Commonwealth Conference or in her own Parliament. We really do plead that the South African apartheid question be placed above all party political interests in Great Britain.

Chief M G Buthelezi

20 January 1985

20 January 1986]

[Continued]

Examination of witness

CHIEF MANGOSUTHU GATSHA BUTHELEZI, Chief Minister KwaZulu, President of Inkatha and Chairman, South African Black Alliance, called in and examined.

Chairman

178. Chief Minister, we are very grateful to you for having come to our Committee to give us your profound knowledge about your country. We have had the opportunity to see others, and we will have others coming to us as well, so we are very grateful to you for giving us this opportunity to fill our knowledge about your country. If I may, I will ask some questions, and my colleagues will also ask questions, but perhaps before doing that I should first thank you for the papers you have sent us, which have been a great help, and secondly ask you if you would like to make a statement to start with to get us on the way?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Thank you, Sir. I also wish to thank you for the opportunity you have given me to come here to share my perspectives with yourself and your Committee. As you have just said, I tried to provide Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee with a relatively in-depth document which I thought laid bare some of the nitty-gritty events in South African Black politics, because I believe that the British will one day be called upon to play the role of honest broker in South Africa. The document I prepared has unfortunately only reached the Members shortly before the session, but in it I tried, for instance, to share my perspective, which is that Black South Africa is determined to destroy apartheid, and this is an on-going process which has gained its own momentum in South Africa. The joblessness amongst our people and the feeling of hopelessness in general, and also the Government's talk of reform, which it has not implemented, has pushed Blacks beyond boiling point. There is a strong desire amongst various sections of the population to normalise the country. Of course, there are opposing views on how this should be done. My own position, in the context of the Black struggle for liberation, is set out in the document: the involvement of my family on both sides, my paternal and maternal lines, in the struggle in South Africa and the founding of ANC by my uncle, and my own position in the context of ANC, under the leadership of Chief Albert Luthuli, as it began in South Africa and before it was banned by the South African Government. I have also

tried to set out my relationship with the External Mission of ANC, as represented by Mr Tambo, and with Mr Tambo himself personally between 1963 and 1980, and I set out my trip to London in 1979 at the request and insistence of Mr Tambo. I have also tried to set out my role in the leadership of KwaZulu, which was not created by the Government of South Africa—my position, which was never really the issue—in the way it is made out to be by some of the Black organisations which are opposed to me. I have also tried to set out in the document the differences which I have with the External Mission of ANC on violence and what I consider to be the impossibility of accomplishing that mission because of the logistical problems at present. I have also made available the broadcasts of the External Mission of ANC from Radio Freedom in Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam and Ethiopia, because they are important, insofar as they are a mirror of the kind of views they express about me personally and about Inkatha. I explain in the document my establishment of Inkatha in 1975 and the fact that it is structured on the ideals of ANC as propounded by the Founding Fathers in 1912. I see that in the report of Mr Tambo's own evidence he says he advised me to found Inkatha. This surprised me. He said that I acted on the advice. Whereas we had had this relationship and had met in Europe and in an independent state in Africa, I do not remember it; he is the one who says I founded Inkatha. If it was true it would be a compliment, but I am still surprised there is not one word of praise for Inkatha, if we accept it is the brainchild of Mr Tambo or the External Mission of ANC, because he does not shower any praise on us as much as he does on the UDF. I set out the conflicts which arise between the leadership of the External Mission and myself. The External Mission of ANC is ruthless in dealing with those who do not allow themselves to be their fetch-and-carry boys. I have quoted in the document as well the accusations which were made that we are jealous of Mr Mandela's popularity, Mr Tambo saying our people feel that ANC has already been too generous to me, implying that they should have killed me long ago. I quote in that document the recent communication from Mr Nelson

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Chairman *Contd.*]

Mandela in gaol—a very warm message from a brother to a brother—which contradicts what Mr Tambo says. I have told you also of the various things which have happened in South Africa which might not come out as distinctly as these things should come out in the media here: the efforts made by UDF, prompted by the External Mission of ANC in creating no-go areas for me, like the University of KwaZulu at one time and the Lamontville Township in Durban. I have set out my own ideas of the world's indignation of apartheid which have resulted in my being here this afternoon, and my continued involvement in non-violent democratic opposition. I have also thought it important to set out in the document my own relationship with Bishop Tutu, because we often give different points of view. I find everywhere I go people often ask what are the relationships between us. I have made available a memorandum which I used in a discussion with him on 30 September when some prominent churchmen in South Africa drew us together because they thought as Anglicans that it was scandalous we should be perceived as being at daggers drawn. I have set out in the document my own proposals for constitutional development in South Africa, as set out by the Commission set up in 1980 for the region of KwaZulu/Natal. This Committee now needs to delve into underlying Black political realities. For this reason, I have prepared and distributed this document. I had hoped it would be available in advance. Nevertheless, I would briefly like to summarise what I have said concerning Inkatha's position in Black politics. South African elements are ever-increasingly demanding that Inkatha plays a mediating and reconciling role because it is not only central to the South African political scene and at the South African political centre of gravity, but it is also a true mass movement. As President of Inkatha I have the advantage of also having constituencies in all the country's race groups. Inkatha is also advantageously placed by the fact that the South African Government will not succeed in any reform programme without us, nor will, for example, my brothers in the External Mission of ANC in Exile succeed in mounting a classical armed struggle without us, or succeed in destabilising the country to produce a state of chaos without us. Inkatha's just over 1.2 million members are dominated by workers and peasants, and Inkatha's membership is distributed across South Africa

and is as well represented in urban areas as it is in rural areas, except for the Eastern Cape. Inkatha occupies a strategic position in South African politics and it wields real Black power. I have also made available the record of a conversation I had with the Minister of Justice, Mr Kruger, where he tried to force me to make Inkatha into an ethnic organisation,¹ because the ghost of Inkatha being an ethnic organisation has not been laid to rest, despite the fact I defied the Government in not making Inkatha an ethnic organisation, as they wanted me to do. Inkatha is committed to the politics of negotiation and national reconciliation, and is committed to the ideal of Black national unity on the basis of a multi-strategy approach. We have never pretended, even if we are the largest membership-based organisation, that only what we do is important or only what we do will bring about change in South Africa. We recognise that there are other organisations inside and outside South Africa, and that their role is as important as our own role. Inkatha sees a desperate need in South Africa to pursue the struggle for liberation in such a way that national reconciliation is brought about in the process of destroying apartheid. Inkatha is concerned very much about how we conduct our struggle, because we do not want to conduct our struggle for liberation in such a way that we destroy the foundations for the future. We are convinced that the country will require a truly national effort after liberation of South Africa, if political victories can be made meaningful to ordinary people. Inkatha sees South Africa locked into a global north/south axis, and it accepts the fact that the free enterprise system is the most efficient system mankind has devised to translate the kind of mineral wealth which South Africa has into human wealth, and to develop an industrialised society. Inkatha believes that a free enterprise-based economic system needs to go hand in hand with a Western-type parliamentary democracy. It also believes that such democracies cannot be produced through the barrel of a gun, and our circumstances most certainly can only be produced through the politics of negotiation. Great Britain needs, therefore, to recognise more fully that it is Inkatha's accumulating strength and its strategic position in South African politics which the ANC Mission in Exile fears in stepping up an offensive against me and against

¹ Not printed with this Evidence.

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Chairman *Contd.*]

Inkatha. Success in Inkatha's tactics and strategies will downgrade the importance of the politics of violence which they espouse. For violence to succeed, Inkatha must be made to fail or to be seen to be a sell-out organisation. The vehemence with which my brothers in the ANC Mission in Exile attack Inkatha must be traced, therefore, to this truth. Inkatha applauds the strength, character and also the statesmanship that Mrs Margaret Thatcher is displaying in handling the South African issue or issues, whether it be at the Commonwealth Conference or in her own Parliament. We really do plead that the South African apartheid question be placed above all party-political interests in Great Britain. That is just a short statement I wished to make before I answer questions.

Chairman: Chief Minister, thank you very much for that; it will have answered many of our questions in advance.

Mr Mikardo

179. You spoke of Inkatha fulfilling a reconciliation role. Reconciliation between whom and whom?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Between the disparate forces in South Africa; because the fact of the matter is that the population groups in South Africa are alienated, particularly those who are in power and those of us who are not in power. That is why, for instance, I set up the Commission to make an experiment in the Natal/KwaZulu region where the interdependence of Black and White is of such a nature that I felt that setting up such an experiment would succeed. If it did succeed there, I had a hope that it would then become a pilot project for the whole of South Africa. That is why Inkatha endorsed the recommendations of the Commission which proposed to set up for this region a legislature for all race groups: the Whites of this region, the Indians (who number 800,000, the largest settlement of Indians in South Africa), and Coloureds and Africans.

180. Does not that mean reconciliation between those who oppose apartheid and those who operate apartheid?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Correct.

181. Do you find that possible? Is that attempt consistent with your own opposition to apartheid?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I say that, whether we like it or not, if we are committed to peaceful change and to negotiation—as we

are in Inkatha—then it means that we have ultimately to achieve reconciliation between those in power and those who are powerless at the moment. I do not think this is inconsistent with that commitment.

Chairman

182. Chief Minister, could we return to one or two points arising from your statement? Could you make it clear to me when Inkatha was founded?

(Chief Buthelezi.) It was founded in 1975, so last year we had our tenth anniversary.

183. Do you have a formal membership of Inkatha? If so, how many members do you have?

(Chief Buthelezi.) We have card-carrying members who number today 1,200,000 plus.

184. I think you make clear in your statement that you do not regard Inkatha as a Zulu movement but as a national movement?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes. I have made available to Members a verbatim report of a meeting with Mr Kruger. He is that notorious minister who said that Steven Biko's death leaves him cold. He tried to intimidate us and to drag us into making Inkatha ethnic. I have made available to Members copies of this verbatim report, because many of our detractors always try to say that we are divisive or that we are what they call tribal or ethnic—and that document lays that ghost to rest.

185. From what you said, Chief Minister, the relations between yourself and ANC are obviously not good. Would you say that it has gone so far that you are now under personal threat from ANC or from some other organisations in South Africa?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes. In fact, there have been threats to my life. Some of them have already sentenced me to death, because of my growing power in South Africa, in so far as some of them see me as an obstacle, since they perceive themselves as a government in exile who must seize power from the régime of South Africa and install themselves in Pretoria and they find the growing power and relevance of Inkatha in the struggle an obstacle to themselves. I have no feelings of hostility, and I have never had any feelings of hostility, towards my brothers in the Mission in Exile in ANC. I have never acquiesced that they

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Chairman *Contd.*]

adopt violence, although I said from the point when they were in exile that probably, if I were in their shoes, I would have done the same. However, I have always disagreed openly with them that it is the instrument which can be used at this point in time to bring about change in South Africa, because purely on the basis of logistics, apart from the philosophical considerations, it is not possible to bring about change in that country, facing as we do the most powerful military force in the continent of Africa.

186. Would you say that the clashes between the Zulus and other elements, which have recently, in the last few days, been reported in the papers, have really nothing to do with Inkatha or with ANC as such?

(Chief Buthelezi.) No, definitely not. I know, of course, judging by some things that some of my brothers in ANC have said, that they always try to attribute any uprising to Zulus. Zulus are the most militant language group in Southern Africa. The Zulus were a sovereign nation and the most powerful nation; they dominated the whole of Southern Africa before they were conquered by the British in 1879. Zulus are a problem, even amongst themselves: all of a sudden they kill each other, they fight and so on. These days, to vilify me and to discredit me, often when there are clashes they try to pin them onto Inkatha, since Zulus as such are known, for instance, as the most militant language group in Southern Africa. Concerning the outbreak, for instance, that took place between the Pondos and the Zulus around Durban, that was not an ethnic clash, really speaking. What has happened is that as a result of the independence of the Transkei a lot of the people in the Transkei have migrated to the area of Durban, and some Zulus from the rural areas, who need jobs, have also moved to the area round Durban and have become squatters there. They are the people who have not got much to live on, who have just a piece of cardboard and zinc over their heads. Naturally, there is a scramble for resources, even water, in this area. Therefore, the people who were originally there are beginning to resent having to compete for resources with those who have just come in. As a matter of history, it happens that they have come in from the Transkei and they are Pondos, but there is no hostility to them because they are Pondos. After the clash took place, with more than 60 lives lost, they came up to

Ulundi. Most were members of Inkatha themselves. Therefore, we regard them as full South Africans, because we rejected independence and made our people South African citizens. And they continue to be South African citizens, because the aims of the homelands policy is to de-nationalise Black people and make them foreigners.

Chairman: The records of a number of British regiments will confirm what you say about the Zulus.

Mr Lester

187. Chief Minister, a lot of the violence we see has been apparently committed by young people in the youth brigades—the comrades—against people they feel are collaborators. How many members of your organisation would you say are also members of the youth brigades? Have you any control over them, and would they regard you as a collaborator?

(Chief Buthelezi.) The largest segment of Inkatha is the Youth Brigade, as distinct from other youth generally in the rest of South Africa. In terms of our constitution, we have a Women's Brigade and a Youth Brigade. The largest segment is the Youth Brigade which consists of more than 400,000 members. They are committed to non-violent change, as I am myself. What happened was that in August there was an outbreak of violence from outside, initiated by people outside, because they wanted to challenge my leadership. The fact was that the townships in Natal did not have any incident of violence and therefore they wanted to show there could be violence there. Many of the Zulu buildings, like offices, schools and clinics, were destroyed by Xhosas who are affiliated to UDF. They were carrying out the instructions of ANC as given in their broadcast that the country must be made ungovernable, and UDF is also committed to making it ungovernable. Our losses amounted to more than two million Rand, apart from the people who were killed. On 9 August I called a meeting of the Assembly Caucus of KwaZulu, because most of the members are either office-bearers in their regions or members of the Central Committee. I asked them to go to Durban to help the people of Durban to exercise their leadership, and we managed to defuse it in the Natal region. There has been a feeling that, because I have a warrior's blood coursing through my veins, it is a disgrace that a descendant of King Shaka and other Zulu warriors of my family espouse non-violence, but the fact is

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Lester *Contd.*]

that this is the the policy of Inkatha. As far as defending what we are doing is concerned, we are prepared to lay down our lives. As I said, we have never interfered with any organisation doing what it wants to do, but we are prepared to defend with our lives our democratic right to pursue a non-violent struggle. Therefore, when some of the Inkatha people retaliated there was a big outcry, for which the media blamed the UDF, in that the media reported that Inkatha had stopped the violence and murder in the Durban area—which was true. But some members of Inkatha, not instructed by myself or the Central Committee, retaliated. And some parts of the organisation of Inkatha were rejected as organisations which espoused non-violence and in the next breath, which defused violence, insofar as it was accused of being involved in violence which has been unleashed against other organisations. The use of violence has been only in the area of defence where we have been attacked. We have always said it is our inalienable right to defend ourselves. The violence which has happened in the townships is sponsored mainly by the UDF, and it has happened at funerals, sometimes in the presence of clergymen like Bishop Tutu. If anybody feels he has a grudge against you and says you have sold out, you are killed instantly in a barbaric way, like hanging and being doused in petrol and set on fire. Black people have been incinerated by Black people in their cars, and there has been looting and maiming of people. That is another level of violence which the media has not projected as strongly as the state violence by the police against Black people.

Mr Mikardo

188. You said in a speech a few minutes ago that Inkatha was intensely democratic. It is not easy to organise democratically a large body like 1.2 million members, so I would like to ask you one or two questions about the organisation. How does a man or woman become a member of Inkatha? Does he or she join a local branch?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes; any person can join. The joining fee is three Rand and the annual fee is two Rand. We have branches. In some areas we have regions. We have an East and West Rand region in the Transvaal. In some places we do not have regions, but they are all formed by various branches.

189. Each branch will have a list of members?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes. Any 30 people can form a branch.

190. Each branch has a list of its members?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes.

191. Does it show from what ethnic group a member comes?

(Chief Buthelezi.) No, we never do that.

192. How do you know what proportion of your members are Zulu or non-Zulu?

(Chief Buthelezi.) We never do that, but, as I stated in the document, a survey was carried out in 1977¹ when we were two years old and from empirical findings it was discovered that 40 per cent of membership was non-Zulu.

193. What sort of regional or national governing body do you have? How are people elected? How are the officers of Inkatha, including the leader, elected?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Leaders are elected every five years by the General Conference, and the Annual General Conference is the final decision-making body. I have a Central Committee of 100 members, and in terms of our constitution some are elected by delegates and some by the President.

194. How many are elected and how many are nominated?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think more than half are elected by ordinary members at the Annual Conference every five years.

195. If it came about—and nobody can see it as a great probability at the moment—that there was a situation in which there was a one-man-one-vote electoral system in South Africa, would Inkatha put itself forward as a political party?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Correct, yes.

196. Can you tell us about the South African Black Alliance? What is it and what is Inkatha's relationship with it?

(Chief Buthelezi.) In 1976 when the Government set up the President's Council it co-opted Coloureds and Indians and excluded Africans (72 per cent of the population). Mr Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party—I am sorry, not Mr Hendrickse, but Mr Leon—came to Ulundi

¹ Note by witness: By the Bergstrassen Institute, Freiburg.

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Mikardo *Contd.*]

with Mr Chinsamy who is of the Reform Party. They came to me as the leader of the African Council and requested me, on the basis of Inkatha's statement of belief, to set up the Alliance—because at that time the Political Interference Act was still the governing law on racial groups interfering with the politics of other racial groups. So we formed the Alliance on the basis of Inkatha's statement of beliefs. I was then elected. So it was a kind of federal organisation consisting of Inkatha, the Labour Party (which was Coloured) the Reform Party, and Dikwenkwetla, which came from the Free State. I was elected then as chairman of this Alliance. However, when the Labour Party decided to participate in the tricameral Parliament, which again excluded Africans, then they were expelled from the Alliance. So we had remaining in the Alliance Inkatha and the Reform Party (which is Indian), and we were also joined by Inyandza which was an African political organisation in the eastern Transvaal.

197. How much power has the Alliance got? To what extent have the member bodies given up some of their autonomy (if at all) to the Alliance to act on their behalf?

(Chief Buthelezi.) We always assume that we share the chairmanship with leaders of these organisations. Whenever we have meetings (which we have from time to time), the position of the chairman—myself—is that of principal *inter pares*.

198. That does not, with respect, quite answer my question. Does the Black Alliance actually speak with a single voice for all its members *vis-à-vis* the Government?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Of course. Yes, we do. We pass resolutions and so on, on various issues of the day.

Mr Thomas

199. What is the total membership of the Black Alliance? You mentioned that your body has 1,200,000 card-carrying members. What is the total membership of the Black Alliance?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I know of my members of Inkatha because, as I say, it is a federal structure. I do not keep the numbers of individual constituent members myself at Ulundi, because the various other parties are joined to us on a kind of federal basis.

200. Are you satisfied that the 1,200,000

members subscribe to the aims that you have mentioned: namely, the abolition of apartheid through negotiation, the proscription of violence, and the promotion of the free-enterprise economic system? That is right, is it not?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes, I think so, because we operate democratically. Regularly, I have meetings of the Central Committee in between the Annual General Conference, because you cannot wait for the Annual General Conference which meets in about June. Therefore, in between the Central Committee speaks for the Movement. Very often these issues are very, very thoroughly debated, and then resolutions are passed. There are various resolutions that have been passed on the issue of, for instance, sanctions, on the issue of disinvestment, on the issue of violence very often—on all those issues. These are the issues which confront Black people at this time. Invariably, whenever we have meetings, some resolutions are passed on them, to make sure that we still carry our members with us.

201. I have read the major speech you made in September, in which you referred to your attempts to get on terms with the ANC, but you found that they had been taken over by the Communist Party—is that right?—and that they were therefore preaching a new form of violence, having known that they had to abandon their attempts to build up an army, and they were going for “soft targets”?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Correct.

202. You found that it was going to be an aggression of Black against Black, and people who were in any way thought to be supporting the system in South Africa would be considered to be enemies?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Quite correct.

203. You yourself, I believe, were threatened with assassination, is that right? (Chief Buthelezi.) That is correct.

204. In what way do you think Mr Oliver Tambo is in control of the ANC?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I have known him for many years. I know he is a Christian, and I would almost vouch that Mr Tambo is not a Marxist or a Communist. However, at the same time I see as far as the members of his executive are concerned, 19 of them are members of the South African Communist Party. It is not a secret that they operate together with the South African Commu-

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Thomas *Contd.*]

nist Party. It is not a secret that the military wing is led by Mr Joe Slovo who is a Communist, who is alleged by some people to be a Colonel in the KGB.

Chairman: You mentioned the matter of violence. I will ask Mr Ivan Lawrence to continue with that theme.

Mr Lawrence

205. Are you able to give us any assessment at all about the number of the Black African population which is on your side, for non-violence, and is against violence in any circumstances?

(Chief Buthelezi.) That is a very difficult thing to say, because surveys have been made, and it depends on the methodology that is used. As you know, it depends on the samples. There is no question about the fact that Black people in South Africa are very angry, because they have been dehumanised so much by apartheid. The anger is right through the population. Inkatha is just as angry as any other sector of the population, but the question of whether the time is now to take up arms is an issue which I would dispute. After all, no one is debarred from crossing the borders and joining our brothers in the External Mission of ANC. I would say that the External Mission of ANC is not even a military force in the sense in which ZAPU was a military force, for example. I myself was once questioned by Dr Koornof who was then Minister of Black Affairs, because in Soweto, in a rally attended by more than 30,000 people, I said that it was not problematic to cross the borders to join the ANC; because I have never appealed to youths or to anybody not to join the ANC, nor even join the armed struggle, so called. I told them that the fence was actually not guarded right through, and that they could easily go through the fence, only being careful not to get their shirts torn! I said this could be done through Lesotho too, through Botswana and through Swaziland. Dr Koornof then said they were dismayed in the Cabinet when they read this in the press. So I said this. In fact, I did say so, and I said it very often, that I am not against anyone who feels that they would like to lay down their lives now for liberation. So I say that I have not seen tens of thousands of Black people cross the borders; it is not problematic to cross the borders to join the ANC. That would be different now from the mob violence that is happening in the townships; again, that is a different thing, because that is not initiated by ANC either.

The violence that you see in the townships, which you have seen on your television screens here in the last 18 months, is not initiated by them, although, as I have said earlier, they do take advantage of it and fan the flames of it as well.

206. You seem to be blurring the lines between ANC supporters and Inkatha supporters; saying that the Inkatha supporters can go across the line into the ANC?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes.

207. However, you did say, in your speech of September 1985—and I quote—"The fundamental difference in approach between Inkatha and the ANC revolves around the use of violence", did you not?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Of course.

208. How do you reconcile the fundamental difference and the blurred practical effect of what is happening?

(Chief Buthelezi.) No, there is no blurring of lines there. What I am saying is that I have never questioned the right of any Black patriot to join them. So I have said that while I disagree that violence is the answer to our problems at this moment, I have never said to anyone, who wants to join them, that they should not.

209. You did say that you were against violence in defence of yourselves or your members and I think we would all understand that. Is there any sense in which you would support violence in order to secure fundamental change in South Africa?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I suppose throughout the history of man a very important theological question has been the question, when does war take place, when is violence justified on the basis that there is nothing else left to do? Quite apart from philosophical commitments to non-violence, I do not myself believe it is true that in South Africa there is nothing else left to do as far as change in South Africa is concerned. I do not think that point has been reached and I say that my experience of mankind is that violence is something that human beings resort to when there is nothing else left to do. I do not think we have reached the point in South Africa where there is nothing else left to do and I have said in South Africa insofar as I am a democratic leader "My people's options are my options": that if my people feel we should now take up arms, I have said, despite my

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Lawrence *Contd.*]

own commitment to non-violence, I will be prepared to lead them through those dark waters. I have said to young people, some of whom are itching to do something dramatic, they can trust me, that if I feel the time has come to pick up a gun I will give them guns. But I just do not believe that that time has come or that within the foreseeable future we are facing such a time.

210. You said in answer to an earlier question that the media had been giving too much prominence, or more prominence, to the violence exercised by the South African authorities against Blacks and not enough prominence to the violence within the Black communities themselves. Why do you think there is so much violence within the non-White community rather than between Whites and non-Whites?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think it is again the question of people saying that the violence in South Africa shows that the liberation struggle is going on. I have often been very sad about that because I have heard in London in the last couple of days how many Whites have been killed. Those are the people who oppress but who really have not been touched, even in 1976-77 when there were problems in Soweto. So they are the people who reflect the picture that the régime is just about to be toppled. And even now the impression is created that the Government is on the run or that Mr P W Botha has lost the will to rule. There is nothing of the kind, so the Whites are still quite secure. As far as the lethal power that is at the command of the White régime in South Africa is concerned, we have not even seen a fraction of the lethal power they can unleash if it comes to the push. So the other day when General Malan said, "You ain't seen nothin' yet" those who are in South Africa know exactly what he means by that, because not a fraction of that has been used; and if the Whites are pushed to the wall they will scorch the earth. It seems to me, therefore, that Black people are very good targets which can be used by others who feel sure that they are doing something about liberation and who have to let off steam or frustration against them. No one has ever tried to bomb Libertas where Mr P W Botha lives, but Black houses have been destroyed by bombs and grenades and so on, AK rifles have been used to shoot at houses of members of Inkatha in the Durban area, and limpet mines have been exploded in,

for instance, our hotel—which is run by a member of my Central Committee—because they think we are a softer option than the Government.

Mr Mikardo

211. Is it really all that surprising that in the struggle for the liberation of the Black people there are Blacks killing Blacks? In the struggle of the Indian people for liberation Indians killed more Indians than British; in the struggle of the Cypriots for liberation Cypriots killed more Cypriots than British; in the struggle in Northern Ireland for liberation Irish men killed, and are still killing, more Irish men than British. Is that not one of the inescapable facts of history?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think it is tragic, whether you call it an inescapable fact of history or whatever, when we have a common enemy that, purely on the basis of strategy—it is all strategy and tactics, it has nothing to do with principle—Blacks are annihilating each other.

212. Of course it is tragic, but is it really nothing at all to do with principle? Do not some of these historical parallels that I have just given illustrate that the struggle is between people of the same group seeking liberation, who believe that others of the group who appear to be seeking liberation are seeking it only rhetorically and not in practice?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I do not know about that.

213. I am not applying that to you. I am talking about historical precepts.

(Chief Buthelezi.) I do not think the analogy applies to us.

Mr Lawrence

214. It is very important as far as South Africa is concerned because if the reason why Blacks are fighting Blacks is that Blacks cannot get on together, they cannot live together, they dislike each other more than they dislike the Whites, then the White apartheid system will always be stronger and will remain, will it not, as long as you are divided?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I agree.

215. The question is, is there any chance of there being such a degree of unity amongst the Black tribes, who are now warring in various parts between themselves, that your doctrine of non-violence will

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued

[Mr Lawrence *Contd.*]

become the major accepted doctrine amongst Blacks in South Africa?

(Chief Buthelesi.) I really would say that the divisions are not even what you call tribal. I personally do not accept that they are at all tribal. I would say, for instance, that the ANC Mission in Exile and PAC left South Africa 25 years ago and they are not on speaking terms even now. The leaders of the front-line states have tried to get them together, to get their act together, but with no success. If you make a survey of the whole sub-continent of Southern Africa within the post-liberation era, if you look at Mozambique, Angola and even to some extent Zimbabwe, you will find even after liberation has been achieved this Black-on-Black confrontation is still going on today. It is something that distresses me. I have often said, as you rightly said, the racists in South Africa can laugh all the way to the bank because we Black people are still destroying each other.

216. Is there any hope, or are you still banging your head against the wall in trying to get unity amongst the Blacks?

(Chief Buthelesi.) If I had abandoned hope I would not be doing what I am doing. I do not think you can abandon hope. I do not think I have abandoned hope when no one has done more in South Africa than I to unite more than one million people (even if I sound immodest). That is the thing which inspires me to go on.

Mr Thomas

217. Chief Minister, can I follow up one of the questions you were asked by Mr Mikardo about people being united in their desire for liberation frequently falling out amongst themselves and possibly killing each other. I am again looking at the speech you made last September. In that speech you referred to what you described as the "vitriolic and cowardly attacks" the ANC were making on Inkatha and in particular on yourself. You have told this Committee that Inkatha stands for the end of apartheid by peaceful negotiation, if you can, and you also mentioned that the purpose of Inkatha was to achieve a South Africa with a free enterprise economic system to go hand in hand with a Western type of parliamentary democracy. What does the ANC stand for? Do you think it stands for any democratic solution in South Africa once apartheid has gone and the system has changed? Could you give us your view?

(Chief Buthelesi.) Well, even when we

are speaking in terms that some of them like, for instance, the late Robert Resha, he used to say to me that, while I was still concerned about negotiations, they were not interested in negotiations, they were just going to seize power in South Africa. They are committed to seizing power, to using the gun, to marching into Pretoria and installing themselves in Pretoria. Once you establish that system, of course, it becomes a way of life in your country. You know in the experience of Africa, any other person who would like to remove any government installed like that would have used the gun too. At the same time, as far as the economic system is concerned, I think Mr Tambo stated to those businessmen who went to see him that ANC would like to nationalise some of the big conglomerates like Anglo-American and Barlow and so on in South Africa; that therefore they see a socialist future for us. Now, I would say that that is an issue, of course, which they have already decided, that is the kind of pattern they would like to see emerge. So if they are going to install themselves by the gun, I do not see that people have any democratic choice to choose whether they go along with them on that or not.

Mr Lester

218. Chief Minister, in 1979 in a meeting with the ANC in London you were ready to put your name to a declaration which included the phrase "the banned ANC and Inkatha who between them represent the Blacks". Clearly from what you have been saying things have changed since then. Yet it has been repeatedly suggested that, if there was an opportunity for all the people in South Africa to vote openly for a political leader, Nelson Mandela would be elected. Now, do you agree with that proposition and, if so, do you think it reflects his personal popularity or the strength of the ANC?

(Chief Buthelesi.) I do not quite understand. Is that your opinion at the end, Mr Lester? You seem to be quoting.

219. The ANC frequently suggested that if there was one man one vote for a leader in South Africa, Nelson Mandela would be elected.

(Chief Buthelesi.) It may well be so.

220. Do you agree with that? If you do not agree—

(Chief Buthelesi.) It may well be so, but

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Lester *Contd.*]

I do not know how they reached that conclusion. I assume when South Africa is liberated all population groups will have to participate in a democratic election, and at this point in time I cannot see how anyone can be so categorical about who will be elected. I would not mind if the Black and White people of South Africa, in a democratic election, wanted Mr Mandela to be our leader. I personally would not mind serving under him as Head of State. But I definitely reject the fact, much as I have such warmth for him and though I feel for him as a brother, that he should be imposed, by anyone, on the rest of us without an election. I made it clear that I would not mind myself if he was the Head of State, but to impose him like that is something I reject.

221. Do you think it is right then for Western governments to press for his release?

(Chief Buthelezi.) In fact, I started pressing for it long before anyone ever thought of it. In October I exchanged correspondence with Mr P W Botha, although I am alienated from him. In October I wrote a long letter when Mr Mandela went to hospital and said, since I knew as a politician he might lose face by insisting on the renunciation of violence, that now that Mr Mandela was ill he had a very good excuse for releasing him. Because I feel personally that, even if we did not have the state of emergency, even if we did not have the outbreaks of violence, even if the statement of intent I am asking Mr P W Botha to declare was declared as long as people like Mr Mandela, Mr Sisulu, Mr Kathrada, Mr Mbeki and others—Mr Zeph Mothopeng of the PAC—are in jail, whatever comes out of the wash cannot be the final solution, because there is going to be a segment of people who are going to say they would have preferred a solution in which Mr Mandela had an input.

Mr Harvey

222. Do you think there are any differences between Mr Mandela and the external leaders? Do you think Mr Mandela is perhaps more moderate than Mr Tambo and other leaders?

(Chief Buthelezi.) It depends what "moderate" means. But I would think that I have always respected Mr Mandela because of his patriotism and because his politics have always been realistic and he has never despised ordinary people. We

know Inkatha is supported by ordinary Black workers and peasants, and very often many people look down on them and think they are just the scum who must be dictated to. So I would think that one good example which shows the difference between the External Mission leaders and Mr Mandela, is the fact that Mr Mandela does not consider me to be political dirt to the extent that in the past we have exchanged very warm letters—even recently. In the *Sunday Times* yesterday they published a letter he wrote to me from Pollsmoor Jail which was very warm, quite contrary to the attitude of those in Lusaka with Mr Tambo. The attitude is completely different from that.

223. Are you satisfied that the rioting in the townships is co-ordinated by the external leadership?

(Chief Buthelezi.) No, I think I should not be forced to say they co-ordinate it. I said earlier they do try to take advantage of the existing discontent, because there has been a down-swing in the economy. And when this Government tried to impose this tricameral system on the people of South Africa, I warned then there would be violence, in fact it led to Mr Botha waving a finger in my face and saying "Buthelezi, don't try it!" as if I had said I was going to try it, when in fact I was warning, because I knew what would happen. It resulted in outbreaks of violence, exactly as I predicted. That has happened. Now I would say, therefore, just as in 1976 when Mr Tambo claimed when the Soweto riots broke out that it was ANC and it was not them—we knew how the whole thing started, when he is claiming this at the moment. Of course, it is true that, as I stated earlier, there have been broadcasts which they have beamed at South Africa urging young people to band themselves together to kill town councillors, to kill all those whom they call collaborators and so on. But Mr Tambo's press statements in the last week or so were very, very clear also on this; that there are people that must be killed amongst Black people, the error of the Black people has been caused by apartheid itself. Secondly, the down-swing in the economy has caused this. One must take this fact into account, that half the population of South Africa—half the Black population, 50 per cent of that population—consists of people of 15 years of age and younger. Then you can see the problems there. We have young people who need education and who need jobs

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Harvey *Contd.*]

soon and, therefore in the present current down-swing of the economy, these people can easily be used by anybody for whatever purpose.

Mr Lawrence

224. Chief, since you are so strongly opposed to violence, except in the very last resort, do you think it is unreasonable of the South African Government not to release Nelson Mandela until he says that he will not resort to violence?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Sir, I think it is unreasonable myself because the continued incarceration of Mr Mandela in itself would generate more violence from my point of view and I do not see, with the security they have, what Mr Mandela can do in fact if he comes out.

225. He can inspire the ANC to further acts of violence.

(Chief Buthelezi.) But that violence by the ANC has not got a snowball's chance in hell against the régime and the army and so on. They have not even used a fraction of what they can use.

Mr Spearing

226. Chief, we have heard of your relations with the ANC and PAC and the SABA, but could you tell us a little more of your relations with the UDF? In your speech on 29 September you suggested that they were in ivory towers, but you also said just now in your introduction that you thought they had the aim of making the state ungovernable?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I am not speaking for them—this is what they say themselves. They do want to make the country ungovernable. When there were strikes last year many spokesmen of the UDF did say they were not concerned about using the labour to settle problems between labour and management, but they aimed to use the labour in strikes to make the country ungovernable. That was stated by the leadership of UDF themselves.

227. But would you not make a distinction between that sort of action, which may be putting internal pressure, if you like, on an internal sanction, on an unjust government, and violence? After all, was it not in South Africa that Mr Gandhi started his techniques against the local people, and later in India, of non-violence?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I agree totally. In fact, in South Africa I was the first Black leader

on record as saying it is not true that there is nothing else left to do in the area of non-violent strategy. I have said so. That is why I do not support violence because I have said Black people have not used their worker power effectively, nor their consumer power. You quoted Mr Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi did not use duress. He did not, in fact, use force against other people. He did not intimidate them. I am a democrat. I believe once you have a philosophy you offer it to people—just as you gentlemen are elected on the basis of what you offer to your electorate. I do not believe people must be intimidated, killed and annihilated, in other words, the use of force, as has happened so far. The strategy of “stay away” is a strategy which I believe myself, if we were more unified, we could use effectively to force the Whites to come to the conference table, but I do not believe you can use that in conjunction with violence. Black people have been dehumanised by the violence of the State and of the Whites for generations. I think it is a tragedy that Black people should then do exactly the same to other Black people, not persuading them to follow a strategy but forcing it on people and killing them. Concerning consumer power that I referred to, in certain parts of the country some people tried to impose consumer power without persuasion, and many pensioners and other people were killed because they made them drink detergents and eat soap. Whatever they had bought they rammed it down their throats. That is not how I believe those strategies should be used. I think they should be used as democratic strategies.

228. But looking from the outside it would seem that some of the methods which may have been used in America by Martin Luther King are not so far from those of the UDF. We might think there was some possible linkage but you are telling us there is not, I assume?

(Chief Buthelezi.) No, because the civil rights movement in America never used violence against other Black people.

229. But are you saying the UDF, as distinct from making the place ungovernable through passive resistance, also advocates violence?

(Chief Buthelezi.) No, I am all for passive resistance, but so far they have not used it as it should be used. They have only used force against other people and they have actually had people killed if they did not

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Spearing *Contd.*]

fall in line. That is the only difference I have with them.

230. Can you tell us about the relationships between Inkatha and the trade unions. Do you have any linkage formally?

(Chief Buthelezi.) In the constitution of Inkatha, as supplied to members of this Committee¹ we have a provision for affiliation for trade unions but have never insisted that trade unions affiliate to us. There is only one trade union that is affiliated to us, but even then we did not encourage that because of the experience with ANC, because SACTU as the trade union was affiliated to the ANC and when the Government took action against ANC, SACTU was also affected. At the moment we have many members of Inkatha who are members of various trade unions. But recently, when COSATU was launched in Durban Mr Barayi, who is the President, was at a rally when it was launched and went out of his way to attack me for my stance on sanctions and things like that, and a lot of members of Inkatha came to see me. He also said the new trade union was going to align itself with ANC and members of Inkatha were outraged by this and they told me in a closed meeting that in the speech he made he had no mandate from members to talk like that. As a result of their actions in the movement, especially in the Natal region where there are many trade unions, to which members of Inkatha belong, they want to leave COSATU because they say they are being hijacked. I realise as a Black man that trade unions also have to be used for political problems and issues, but I do believe their primary function at present is to act as the mouthpiece for solving our problems of labour and management. At the same time, there are some members and political organisations who eschew the back-breaking job of organising people or poaching the membership of trade unions.

Mr Mikardo

231. You were telling us earlier about the enormous power of the State which has not yet been used. You can do anything with tanks and guns except dig gold and dig coal. Is it not possible that COSATU may be a more powerful force in ending apartheid than either ANC or Inkatha?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I do not know of any single country in Southern Africa that was ever liberated by trade unions—not one. It

is true that the role of trade unions is very important and crucial, but I do not know of any single state that was liberated by trade unions all by themselves without political organisations working in conjunction with them.

232. That was true in the past without a doubt, but is there not a possibility that COSATU may carry weight that none of its predecessor trade unions could, to the extent, for example, of bringing more sectors of the economy to a halt?

(Chief Buthelezi.) We are in the area of prophecy. I think your view is as good as mine. I am not prepared to argue with you because we are prophesying what is without any precedent.

Mr Mikardo: I was not prophesying but asking a question.

Mr Lester

233. Many of us apart from all the argument about sanctions believe the most positive thing that could happen within South Africa is if, through the trade union movement, there was a massive spontaneous withdrawal of labour in the way there was from Soweto to Johannesburg in 1976, and this is a tremendous internal sanction that can be applied, as when the three-day strike in Soweto stopped anyone going to Johannesburg. Does one understand from what you say about the coercion people try to apply to the workers, that there is not this spontaneous withdrawal which can have a substantial effect?

(Chief Buthelezi.) This is the fact.

234. So there is the coercion, but there is not this general feeling amongst the people of South Africa that they can use this weapon which is available?

(Chief Buthelezi.) In fact, it is the only weapon they have.

235. Why are they not using it?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Because of these divisions and this political faction fighting.

Chairman

236. Chief Minister, could you tell us about your relations with the Progressive Federal Party? This Committee heard Dr van Zyl Slabbert. How close are you to his views?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I have always respected the leadership of the Progressive Federal Party because I regard them as the conscience of White South Africa, so I

¹ Not printed with this Evidence.

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Chairman *Contd.*]

always believe they have a very important role as far as White South Africa is concerned, and because I believe in a Black/White future for the country. I also believe alignments must be made now, so I have always taken a stance. For instance, when I opposed the tricameral parliamentary system during the referendum I addressed various White audiences throughout the country, sometimes with Dr van Zyl Slabbert, sometimes alone. We have a committee of three people who meet regularly with the Progressive Federal Party. In August Dr van Zyl Slabbert was my guest at an Inkatha Youth Conference at Ulundi where he announced his intention of initiating a Convention Alliance, which I supported immediately. Dr van Zyl Slabbert was trying to initiate a Convention Alliance, because we have to try and initiate a commitment. We have to create a groundswell of people who are committed to sitting around the conference table to resolve the problems of our country. That was destroyed by ANC partly and also the UDF because the ANC condemned it and the UDF condemned it and, therefore, both Dr van Zyl Slabbert and myself withdrew as primary actors in it because we wanted it to have a chance and did not want to handicap it, as the UDF have done with Inkatha and its relationship with the Progressive Federal Party. So I do believe that they have a role to play, particularly amongst the Whites.

237. Could you clarify a little more, because you have mentioned the subject already, your relations with the Coloured and Indian parties?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Sir, as I have said, in Natal it is very strong. I would say that I have a Coloured and an Indian constituency as I have my White constituents. There are many Whites who want to join Inkatha. I said they would be welcome except that the Government has not yet repealed the Population Registration Act. Even as far as the Coloureds and Indians are concerned, there are many who want to join Inkatha. As far as my relations with the Indians are concerned, when in August there were some problems around the Inanda area and also at the Gandhi settlement where UDF-sponsored violence had done the havoc it did in the Greater Durban area in Black townships, there were a lot of attacks on Indian homes and shops in the Inada area. What happened then was that some people tried to project this as Inkatha violence, as a Zulu-Indo

riot, a repeat performance of the Indo-Zulu riots of 1949. In fact, they were nothing of the kind. So a day before I went to Israel, on 9 August, I set up a meeting before I left with the Indian leaders—Mr Chinsamy, a colleague of mine in the Black Alliance—and asked my righthand man Dr Dhlomo to hold a meeting of Indians and Africans in the Inanda area, which was very successful. In fact, there were people even abroad here—some people in the media—who tried to project this as an Indo-Zulu thing and it was not a thing of that kind. In November, when I was in the United States, on 16 November, the South African Indian Academy honoured me with a very prestigious award called the Nadaraja Award, for what they called my contribution towards better race relations in South Africa.

238. You will agree that the South African Government has a problem with the parties on its right. To what extent do you think that the HNP and the Conservative parties in South Africa inhibit action by the present South African Government?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think, Mr Botha in the first place disappoints me because he was the man who came out and said he was for reform, and I even went out of my way to say to our people when he delivered his famous "adapt or die" speech: "There has never been a leading South African who spoke in this language—let's give this man a chance." I said we must be patient, he could not undo the damage of so many centuries with the stroke of a pen. I was very disappointed when he went to the half-measures of the present stance with Africans and the tricameral parliament, because in fact he had an opportunity, which no other White leader in South Africa has had. The referendum showed he enjoyed the broad support of Whites of all the language groups, Afrikaans and English, more than any other leader before him. In my own region, the Natal region, Whites gave 70 per cent support, so he was the man who could have moved boldly forward to get us out of the problem and out of the violence. He is the man who could go down in history as a statesman, the biggest statesman of all the Heads of State in South Africa, but he just has not got that boldness which will make him go down in history as a statesman. You know, in some of the utterances he made in some of the congresses last year he said some good things, which many people have dismissed as cosmetic but which I did not

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Chairman *Contd.*]

myself dismiss as cosmetic. He talked about abolishing the pass laws, influx control—although he did not state how. He stated Black people were not permanent in 87 per cent of the country, where all along they had been regarded as temporary sojourners. Frankly, I do not think Mr Botha is threatened by the right wing, not at all. I think that even the by-elections we had last year proved it, when only Sassolburg was won by the lunatic fringe in the Herstigte Nasionale Party. Even if he lost 50 seats he could still go forward; he could still move boldly. He could not be toppled even if he lost 50 seats, he has such massive support in the Parliament. It is a shame he cannot take his courage in both hands and get the country out of the problem.

239. You think he should not be frightened of his right wing but you think he is frightened?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think he tends to look over his shoulder. You and I, Sir Anthony, are politicians, and of course also turn to look over one's shoulder now and then, but I do not think one should overdo it—and I think he is overdoing it.

Mr Thomas

240. Chief Buthelezi, could I ask you something about KwaZulu? You are the Chief Minister. Could you tell us briefly something about your powers as Chief Minister of what is described as a non-independent homeland?

(Chief Buthelezi.) The authority I have is limited in the sense that, because I reject independence and fragmentation of the country and of South African people, I do not have foreign affairs, for instance, and I do not have an army, for instance. But I have departments such as the Department of Education and Culture, over which we have absolute jurisdiction. Our schools, in fact, are attended by children from all over South Africa. I have got a Department of Agriculture and Forestry and a Department of Economic Affairs, which I run myself. I have a Department of Finance, a Department of the Interior, a Department of Justice, a Department of Health and Welfare and a Department of Works.

241. What factors have led you to reject the South African Government's offer of moving towards what they describe as full independence?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Because I believe I am

entitled to the wealth of South Africa. I believe South Africa has become the wonder of Africa and of the Third World countries today because the economy of South Africa in fact has been developed on the backs of Blacks and I believe, therefore, that we must have a share in the wealth of the country and that our people, just like Whites, have developed the country to what it is. I will not be fobbed off with the crumbs of the undeveloped part of South Africa by accepting so-called independence.

242. Do you, for instance, think that there is a possibility of a final solution to the political problems of South Africa involving a federal arrangement so long as it is principally on geographical rather than racial grounds?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes. I am very pleased, sir, that you have asked that question because, you know, being former subjects of Britain we have tended to be brainwashed into thinking everything made in Britain, especially in Westminster Palace, is ordained by God, so as South Africans—

Mr Mikardo

243. You should have been here last week!

(Chief Buthelezi.) So we have always striven for democracy *à la* Westminster and in 1973 when I was asked to deliver a memorial lecture—the Hoernle Memorial Lecture—at the Cape Town Institute of Race Relations, I publicly said it was high time that we looked at a solution other than democracy *à la* Westminster, for instance, as a further formula for the country. And some people said even by daring to say so I was already abandoning the struggle by saying so, because they had grown to think nothing else was good enough except that. It is true, of course, the constitution, as worked out in 1910, was good—all that needed to be done was our inclusion—whereas this abomination of a constitution which we have now in fact makes race the very cornerstone of the constitution. I believe that a further formula should be looked at by South Africa. In fact, the Buthelezi Commission itself makes the recommendation because when it comments on the KwaZulu/Natal situation I think it is in the context of a Western solution for South Africa.

244. Could I go back to the question of the homeland and whether it be

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Mikardo *Contd.*]

independent as described by the South African Government. Take, for instance, Bophuthatswana. Is it right that in Bophuthatswana there is no apartheid?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes, among the people, yes.

245. What about KwaZulu?

(Chief Buthelezi.) There is none there either. We do not have separate lavatories, and so on.

246. You have a legislative assembly but you do not make your own laws, is that right?

(Chief Buthelezi.) We are limited, of course, but as a matter of fact we did have a commission to look at all the—

247. If you were independent you would be able to pass the same laws as are passed in Bophuthatswana and abolish apartheid.

(Chief Buthelezi.) Of course we would, but the point is that we are still South Africans.

248. Do you not think it might be a move forward to greater participation in a federal system later?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think that whatever good comes out of it is like a child born in sin. A child born in sin is just as beautiful as any other child, but it is still born in sin.

249. There have been suggestions, in which you have been involved, that there could be a joint KwaZulu and Natal administration. What are the prospects of that, and how might it fit into the prospect of a settlement for the rest of South Africa?

(Chief Buthelezi.) In 1980 I set up the Commission, and in 1982 when the report was published the Central Government, through Senator Horwood, leader of the National Party in Natal, rejected the recommendations of the Commission. However, this attitude has now changed, because in May, which was the first formal meeting I had had with Mr Botha in four and a half years, I was surprised to hear him question one of his Ministers in these terms: "How far have you and the Chief Minister got in discussing the Buthelezi Commission?" I could not believe it. There are on-going discussions between my Cabinet, as distinct from myself, and members of the Provincial Administration, who are White, in Natal which have gone very far, to the extent that they are now working on a consensus document, which will be presented to the Central Government, to

allow us in KwaZulu to have, first, a joint statutory administrative body. Therefore, we believe that in the spirit of the Buthelezi Commission we should move towards the recommendations of the Commission, but we must do it in phases. At present Mr Heunis seems not to be hostile to the idea; he is waiting to hear what is to be done. There is a sense of urgency about it, because what has happened is that the Government of South Africa wants to abolish the provincial system, which was part and parcel of the constitution of the Union of South Africa, and set up what they call regional councils consisting of nominated members. We reject it and say we are elected as a legislature in KwaZulu and we will not do business with nominees of Mr Botha. We are trying to appeal to him to have a moratorium as far as Natal is concerned; we do not want abolition of the system until we have got some consensus on the issues. It has gone very far.

Mr Welsh

250. I am very interested to hear your comments about the lack of work for people in South Africa. To what extent do you consider that the unrest and discontent in South Africa is caused by economic deprivation rather than political deprivation?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think, as I stated earlier, the downturn in the economy was partly responsible for the rapid degeneration of the situation in South Africa. There was unrest at the time of the election for the Indians to the tricameral Parliament; there were outbreaks of violence amongst Coloureds, but then came the down-swing in the economy which compounded the problem. The down-swing in the economy has made a very, very large contribution to what is happening.

251. As big a contribution as the political situation?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Apartheid is in the centre of everything in South Africa, and the problems of deprivation, have just drawn the attention of the Black population to their deprivation, economic and political.

252. The economic one has increased the political one?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes.

253. With regard to the violence in South Africa, do you think the South

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Welsh *Contd.*]

African Government will be able to contain the on-going violence, or will it get worse in the coming months?

(Chief Buthelezi.) It depends on what Mr Botha does next week, because I had a meeting with the mediator, Dr Leutwiler of Switzerland, last Sunday. He came to Ulundi last Sunday. He had seen Mr Botha and he was informed that Mr Botha was going to make a very important statement when opening Parliament. One can hope against hope that there will be no such a statement, but I find it helps my heart not to be optimistic.

254. In place of violence, do you think a significant political change can come about peacefully in South Africa?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Yes. What makes me believe there will be non-violent change in South Africa is that in my 57 years of life I have realised that Black people have acquired a lot of bargaining power from economic prosperity. Whereas in the past the Government did not allow Blacks to perform certain jobs—you know there were job reservations—economic reality has caused it to fall away to the extent that participation by Blacks in the trade union movement has come about and has increased buying power, and mobility of Blacks in the political field has increased interdependence between Blacks and Whites. If this is allowed to happen more and more it will not be difficult to extend it to political interdependence. That is why I say we need massive and sustained economic growth in South Africa for the purpose of change; that is why I say sanctions cannot solve the problem for us. There is a big weapon in our hands the moment you create more jobs for people. Economists say that at the present rate the country's economic growth is only 3 per cent; we need something like 5 per cent economic growth. To create that, economists say we need to generate capital, 90 per cent of which comes from South Africa and 10 per cent of which must come from outside.

255. The Progressive Federal Party leader has proposed a national convention to draw up a new constitution. Taking your comments earlier, you would be totally in favour of such a convention to draw up a constitution for South Africa?

(Chief Buthelezi.) Quite; I have been committed to it for many, many years.

Mr Spearing

256. But that would depend on a majority, and it would depend on Mr Botha saying, "Yes, I will do it" (which might or might not be likely). Is there not another possibility? I have noticed that most of the legislation introduced under the apartheid policy—not all—is disappearing, or is on the way, and the principle of apartheid appears to have become very heavily eroded. Is there no possibility of Mr Botha being bold enough to go one stage further in acknowledging that fact by proposing in some suitable form, even under the constitution, the trial of universal franchise with one man one vote in a non-discriminatory government in one part of the country? I know it would not mean getting rid of apartheid by smashing it up entirely, but would it not be a bold step his majority would go with him for, as you mentioned earlier?

(Chief Buthelezi.) If he allowed KwaZulu/Natal to get on with it, it would give him a breathing space, and also it would be a pilot project which could be shown to the conservative members demonstrating that the heavens will not cave in when he shares power.

Mr Harvey

257. You have reiterated your opposition to sanctions. Is this because you think sanctions will not work, or because you do not think they are necessary, or because you think they are positively harmful to the cause of Black South Africans?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I do myself believe that it would compound the problem of poverty, because there is massive poverty amongst Blacks in South Africa. I have learnt a lesson in some parts of South Africa. In the past, you remember, as a student at the university we created martyrs of some of the great South African patriots like Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Dr Kwame Nkrumah. Often we used with exuberance to quote "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all these other things will be added on to you". But we have learnt from the experience of South Africa—for instance, if you look at Mozambique—that that dictum does not really work. Therefore, for liberation to have a meaning for the ordinary people, you must improve their quality of life. You cannot have a situation where you destroy the economy of the country, because whoever runs the country will have problems

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Harvey *Contd.*]

if the country's economy is destroyed. If you look at the population growth amongst Black people, at three per cent, then that is already very high, as you can see it. It seems to me that the more poor they are, the more—as you see in every poverty situation—they produce more and more kids to compound poverty. So for the first reason I think that in Inkatha we believe that we should not conduct our strategy in such a way that we destroy the foundations for the future. That is why I am opposed to sanctions, for that reason. Secondly, I do not even think that sanctions will work myself, because I notice that, during the Rhodesian problem, there was such cheating by the West that even if someone assures me that human nature has changed, then maybe I can consider it. However, with the cheating that took place then, even by Russia as the big champion of human rights from the point of view of Africa, I am satisfied that the international community would not do it. At the same time, of course, I do accept that the threat of sanctions and the threat of violence do have a role in change, but when this is overplayed, then I think it is destructive.

258. So you are not ruling out the eventual use of sanctions, if progress is not made by the South African government?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I am sorry?

259. You are not ruling out the eventual possible use of sanctions?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I say that you have already played your part. I think the pressure of EEC partial sanctions and President Reagan's partial sanctions are as far as you can go. I think that the threat is already there. I do not think that you should overplay your hand in it, because then it would be destructive. I believe that it would be completely destructive. At the same time, though, I must make it clear for the record that I do realise that in many countries this is a domestic political issue. I do also accept that if the British people, or if the Europeans, or if the Americans want to be purer than pure, by distancing themselves from South Africa through sanctions, it is not for me to tell them not to do that, if it will salve their consciences. However, if they are doing it because they are concerned about us as victims of apartheid, then they must take seriously what I am saying.

260. Would you agree that recent economic pressure has been one of the forces

that has made Mr Botha make such moves towards political progress as he has already?

(Chief Buthelezi.) That is why I said I applauded what President Reagan did, and also the EEC partial sanctions; I applauded them publicly in South Africa—that they should send some signals to him. However, I do not think that you should overplay your hand there, because if you do then you destroy the whole thing again.

261. So in the same context you presumably support the Commonwealth's decision to send its Eminent Persons Group?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I do support that 100 per cent. I have already said—even when I talked to the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, here last year, I said this—that Britain, because of her past history, if I may say so, needs to act at some point as the honest broker in that situation.

262. Have you met, or are you expecting to meet, members of the Commonwealth Group?

(Chief Buthelezi.) One Ambassador has already advised me that he has spoken to some of them about meeting with me too, yes.

Mr Mikardo

263. Are you optimistic that they may be able to achieve something worth while?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I think so, in the sense of more flies being caught with honey than with vinegar!

Mr Lawrence

264. About two years ago, when I was in South Africa, practically no grouping thought that economic sanctions were a good idea, except the ANC. Now nearly everybody seems to think that economic sanctions would be a good idea in South Africa. Is that view likely to be permanent, or is there some activity, short of the immediate repeal of apartheid, which the South African Government can engage in, which would bring people round to thinking along your lines (that economic sanctions would not be a good idea for the benefit of the poorer Black South Africans)?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I want to say for the record that it is just not true that Black people in their tens of thousands have ever called for economic sanctions. That is just not true. However, I do know why you say

20 January 1986]

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI

[Continued]

[Mr Lawrence *Contd.*]

so, because there have been more voices like those from the SACC. Some trade unions have also spoken in favour of it, because some of them come to Europe, they go to Brussels and the ICFTU and they are promised funding, provided they espouse the sanctions view. This is what has happened in the South African Council of Churches. More than 90 per cent of this comes from churches in Europe who have always been in favour of sanctions, and they are told that they must toe the line if they are going to get money from there. It is just not true that the people call for sanctions. I have addressed meetings attended by tens of thousands of people in Soweto, in the heartland of industrialised South Africa, and not once, when I addressed the issue, have people massively said they call for sanctions. I would challenge anyone who said that Black people want sanctions, to go to the pass office in Johannesburg, to go to the pass office in Cape Town, in Durban and other cities, and see how many hundreds of Black people are queuing up for jobs there. I think that when Black people queue up for jobs in these pass offices they are voting with their feet for more investment and for jobs.

Mr Mikardo

265. Did I mishear you? I thought you said that the World Council of Churches tells recipient organisations that their getting assistance is conditional upon their supporting sanctions. Is that what you said?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I am saying so. I am saying so, because I know this area very well, because as a Christian over the years I have met church agencies and church-related organisations in Europe and America, and I know that this is their song. I know that the World Council of Churches, for example, at the insistence of the South African Council of Churches, at this meeting which produced the Harare

Declaration in November, supported sanctions and wanted stay-aways. The South African Council of Churches is an amalgam of various churches that are affiliated to it, but those various churches still govern through their synods; it is not a legislature for churches. Therefore, they have no right really to speak for churches and for individual members, even at parish level or at synod level, because the legislative bodies of churches—various churches affiliated—are still synods of those churches, and not a single one of those synods has ever said that it wants sanctions.

Chairman

266. Chief Buthelezi, you told us that you thought that the role of the British Government might be to act as an honest broker. Do you think the time is now for that, or under what circumstances should it best arise?

(Chief Buthelezi.) When I spoke to the Prime Minister I thought the time was now. I mean that for all of us who would like the situation resolved without bloodshed, or with as little bloodshed as possible, I think the time is now, because I believe that the cumulative effect of various things is the thing that will break the camel's back.

267. Perhaps we had better wait for the Eminent Persons Group to report first, do you think?

(Chief Buthelezi.) I accept that as well.

268. Chief Minister, thank you very much for coming. It has been a very interesting time. We realise what a large amount of effort and time you have spent with us. We are very grateful for the information you have given us. Thank you very much indeed.

(Chief Buthelezi.) Thank you, sir, and your Committee, for the privilege of sharing this with you.

HMSO publications are available from:

HMSO Publications Centre
(Mail and telephone orders only)
PO Box 276, London SW8 5DT
Telephone orders (01) 622 3316
General enquiries (01) 211 5656

HMSO Bookshops

49 High Holborn, London WC1V 6HB (01) 211 5656 (Counter service only)
258 Broad Street, Birmingham B1 2HE (021) 643 3757
Southey House, 33 Wine Street, Bristol BS1 2BQ (0272) 24306/24307
9-21 Princess Street, Manchester M60 8AS (061) 834 7201
80 Chichester Street, Belfast BT1 4JY (0232) 234488
13a Castle Street, Edinburgh EH2 3AR (031) 225 6333

HMSO's Accredited Agents
(see Yellow Pages)

And through good booksellers

ISBN 0 10 280686 1

NJC Bulletin

NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION

INSIDE

SAUDI ARMS STALLED 4

CAMPAIGN '86 5

JEWISH APOLOGISTS FOR ANTI-SEMITISM 6

MAY 1986

Striking A Blow for U.S. Power

After the defeat of Hitler's forces in the battle of El Alemein, British prime minister, Winston S. Churchill, reflected on the implications of the allied victory. "This is not the end," he said of the war against Nazi Germany, "it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

President Reagan's election in 1980 marked "the end of the beginning" of the debilitating effects of the Vietnam syndrome, the paralysis that overcame U.S. defense and foreign policy after the Vietnam War. The American people had elected in President Reagan a man whom they believed would restore American pride, American strength and the primacy of America among the world's democracies.

But Ronald Reagan's election did not bring with it the reckless use of military force anticipated by his opponents on the left. For five years, his administration went to great lengths to avoid using force when U.S. interests could be protected by other means. The President tried numerous peaceful means to combat the increasingly frequent terrorist attacks against American citizens, fearing perhaps that military action might provoke a public outcry that would undermine his support in the nation.

But these approaches repeatedly failed to bear fruit, as our allies refused to join the effort to curtail the growing scourge of state-sponsored terror. As Colonel Qaddafi continued to call America's bluff over the President's threats of a military response, and continued to direct terrorist attacks against Americans, Mr. Reagan recognized that the United States had to respond, and had to respond with force.

For years, the fear of public opposition restrained the use of military force even in the most testing of circumstances. When attacked, the Marines withdrew from Lebanon; when the TWA 847 and

the Achille Lauro were hijacked, America's response was limited. By ordering a carefully-planned and -executed strike against terrorist training and support facilities in Libya, President Reagan has helped change the perception of America from that of a power whose hands are tied to that of one willing and able to use force when provoked.

However, President Reagan's measured and skillful use of force against Libya did more than show that the U.S. government is willing to exercise power.

Continued, page 4



Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, and Nicaraguan president, Daniel Ortega, watch military maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra.

Bringing Change to South Africa

Max Green

Editor's note: Max Green is associate director of the White House Office of Public Liaison. He has recently returned from a fact-finding trip to South Africa which he organized for a number of non-governmental public-policy experts.

The features of apartheid are so well known that they do not need repeating.

Suffice it to say that the racial segregation and discrimination that define apartheid are politically and morally indefensible.

About that, the Reagan administration and its critics agree. About the rest—both means and ends—we disagree profoundly. For those committed to the democratic reform of South Africa, only a policy of "constructive engagement" makes sense. But those who despair of reform (or for whom reform is anathema) want us to sever our ties to South Africa.

Continued, page 3

CAPITAL *Wire*

LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

Contra Aid Setback

President Reagan's policy in Central America suffered another setback on April 31 when supporters of the policy failed to gather enough support to force a new House vote on military aid to the contras. Supporters of the aid package needed to gather 218 signatures on a "discharge petition" to force the contra aid issue back to the House floor on May 12—but failed to do so. The House will not now have an opportunity to vote on the issue until June.

The House first rejected the President's request on March 20. The Senate then passed a modified version of the aid package which was returned to the House floor on April 16, where it was considered as an amendment to an appropriations bill that President Reagan had threatened to veto. Supporters of the package also feared that opponents such as Reps. Dave McCurdy (D-OK) and Michael Barnes (D-MD) would succeed in passing amendments that would dilute the aid request or even bar any aid from reaching the anti-Sandinista resistance. Supporters, wishing to avoid such amendments and seeking to vote on the aid package as a separate piece of legislation, attempted to secure a discharge petition. This would have by-passed efforts by the Democratic leadership of the House to block the package and bring the issue to the House floor. With the failure of that petition, some advocates of the proposal now acknowledge that the prospects for passage of the aid request appear increasingly poor.

Defense Funds, Foreign Aid, Cut

House Budget Committee Democrats are proposing deep cuts in the administration's defense and foreign aid requests as part of a strategy to achieve a budget deficit of \$144 billion for 1987, the target specified by the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction legislation.

The Democrats' plan would set defense appropriations for 1987 at an estimated \$282 billion—\$38 billion less than President Reagan's request. This means that by 1989, new defense budget authority would be \$303.4 billion, or just \$2.5 bil-

lion more than the Senate-proposed level for 1987.

The cuts made in foreign-aid requests, though smaller in dollar terms, are still significant. Budget Committee Democrats reportedly rejected an amendment backed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to restore \$400 million included in the Senate budget resolution. Currently, the House Democratic proposal would provide an estimated \$13.8 billion in foreign aid during 1987—\$2.7 billion less than the President's request and \$1.3 billion less than current spending as estimated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION CONTROVERSY

On April 23rd, U.S. Civil Rights Commission vice chairman, Morris B. Abram, criticized a General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of the Commission which he called "part of a larger effort to discredit the Commission because our ideas are unacceptable".

The GAO's audit, requested by Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA), chairman of the House Judiciary subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights, charged the Commission with mismanagement and improper political hiring.

Supported by Commission Chairman, Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., Abram responded that the GAO had relied on "innuendo" in its report. Abram said that the real reason for the audit and the harassment was the Commission's opposition to racial quotas. "The real subject of this dispute is over equality of opportunity versus equality of results. The real issue here . . . is the struggle between the fair shakers, who started the civil rights movement, and the social engineers who presume to speak for it." The GAO reports were triggered, he maintained, because "the social engineers have lost their ideological monopoly of the Commission."

Citing accusations that Pendleton had made inflammatory remarks, Abram asked why these accusations were not raised when Commissioner Mary Berry characterized Chairman Pendleton, At-

torney General Edwin Meese, and Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds as having "bigotry dripping from their lips." "Where are these sanctimonious guardians of public discourse when Congressman Parren Mitchell or others call Chairman Pendleton 'a low-level kind of houseboy' or 'Uncle Tom?'" Abram asked.

They look the other way, he suggested, because these speakers, no matter how inflammatory their rhetoric, have "the correct social engineering ideas." The GAO report, he claimed, was simply another example "of heavy-handed attempts at legislative interference with an independent commission because of its ideas."

ANTI-TERRORISM BILL PROPOSED

On April 17th, Reps. Joe Barton (R-TX), Bob Livingston (R-LA), and Duncan Hunter (R-CA) introduced a bill which clarifies presidential authority and strengthens the President's hand in dealing with terrorism. Identical legislation is being introduced in the Senate by Senators Robert Dole (R-KS) and Jeremiah Denton (R-AL).

The sponsors of the bill state that terrorism is the number-one threat to the safety and well-being of American citizens. While diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions must be part of an overall anti-terrorism policy, the sponsors assert that these avenues are not sufficient in themselves. "Terrorism can be discouraged" they say, "only if terrorists believe that the President has a full range of anti-terrorism options and the ability to act promptly with the backing of Congress."

Although the legislation gives the President no new authority, it seeks to clarify—particularly to terrorists—that he has the power to act "with all appropriate means, including deadly force." The resolution defines as terrorists not only those who pull the trigger or detonate the bomb, but also those who "organize, lead, fund and support terrorists." In other words, all those involved in the terrorist network, including governments that openly and actively promote and support terrorism as an instrument of policy, will be held accountable.

South Africa

continued from page 1

The record of the past ten years shows that South Africa is changing. So far, that change has been due in large part to the capitalist development of its economy. As South Africa's private sector has grown, it has required the labor of more and more blacks, at first for unskilled jobs only, but later for skilled jobs too. As a result, one of the mainstays of apartheid—the "job bar"—fell.

Influx control another of apartheid's distinguishing characteristics, has also given way for similar reasons. The apartheid ideology of 1976 dictated that the flow of blacks into urban areas be slowed and ultimately reversed. Instead, in response to new economic opportunities in the cities, it increased. As it did, enforcement of the hated pass laws began to break down and the laws ceased serving a purpose. Their recent repeal was thus a radical, but nonetheless logical, next step.

With blacks required to fill many skilled and professional jobs, the government has been forced to increase the quantity and improve the quality of education provided to blacks. Spending for black education is on the rise—up 300% since 1980. Black college students are no longer a rare breed. In 1960, there were only 2200 black college graduates in all of South Africa. This year more than ten times that number will attend college, many of them at formerly "white-only" colleges that are now integrated.

Although reforms are underway, the process is far from complete. Public schools, hospitals, and other institutions remain segregated and grossly unequal. The Group Areas Act still prohibits blacks from living in white neighborhoods. And most importantly, blacks, 70% of the population, are still denied participation in the governance of their country.

Continued progress is essential if chaos and tyranny are not to prevail. For most purposes, the government has already lost control of black townships to "street committees" of kids armed with gasoline-drenched tires with which they "necklace" black "collaborators."

This is a far cry, though, from a truly revolutionary situation. Gangs of wild teenagers wielding tires are no match for South Africa's well-disciplined and well-armed security forces. Neither is the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's underground revolutionary organization. By all accounts, it is woefully short of everything an army needs. This is not a fact to bemoan. Whatever its

past, the ANC of 1986 is not fighting for democracy. Armed primarily by the Soviet Union and its allies, the ANC has come increasingly under the sway of the South African Communist Party, which holds between 12 and 18 out of 30 seats on its executive committee.

Revolution being both unattainable (at least in the short term), and undesirable (at least to the West), what can the United States do to promote faster

or of "The Bill Cosby Show", or their presence more likely to affect the way South Africans think about race?

American corporations can pull up their stakes in South Africa. But won't they do far more to undermine the social foundations of apartheid by hiring according to the non-discriminatory Sullivan principles? The United States can refuse to have anything further to do with South Africa unless and until apartheid is com-



Black demonstrators at a recent funeral in South Africa.

change? Disinvestment would slow down the economy, the most powerful engine of reform in South Africa. A serious recession caused by disinvestment would move affected blacks to the left, affected whites to the right, and bring to power white hardliners who would first stop the process of reform and then reverse it. A blood bath would soon follow.

This is not to suggest that economic growth is sufficient in and of itself. Protest against the outrages of apartheid from both within and outside of South Africa has always been and will continue to be important. But not all protest is effective. The South African government, for example, does not care about the condemnations of the Communist world which is its enemy. But, because it considers itself part of the West, it does care very much about American attitudes. Thus the following paradox: while advocates claim that Western disinvestment from and isolation of South Africa would provide incentive for further reform, in fact, either would be a disincentive.

Consider. The owners of the television series "Dallas" recently announced that, to protest apartheid, they would not allow the program to be shown on South African television. Is the absence of "Dallas"

pletely dismantled and replaced by one man, one vote. But in so doing, the United States would lose all its leverage, and no longer be able to fund training for black entrepreneurs and black trade unionists, black community-based self-help projects, or numerous other such programs.

We could hardly pick a worse time than now to give up on South Africa. At long last, black trade unions and black political parties are being allowed to organize freely. The ANC is still prohibited, but the United Democratic Front, which by all accounts is an ANC front, is legal and active in black communities throughout the country. Also, Chief Gatsho Buthelezi's Inkatha party which has more than a million members, has begun negotiating an agreement for a unitary legislature and executive in Natal province.

Blacks finally have a political voice: the question is whether they will be granted political power. If they are not, other reforms will have limited effect. But if they are, additional reforms will necessarily follow. For America to abandon the South African people at this, the most critical juncture of their history, would be an unforgivable act of political cowardice and moral irresponsibility.

Saudi Arms Stalled

On May 6th and 7th, Congress defeated the administration's proposal to sell \$354 million worth of Stinger, Side-winder and Harpoon missiles to Saudi Arabia. The Senate voted 73-22 and the House 356-62 to block the sale, more than the two-thirds needed to over-ride a presidential veto. The administration is seeking the sale in an effort to demonstrate American commitment to Saudi security and deter Iranian aggression against Saudi Arabia.

This effort to defeat the arms sale included some of the strongest supporters of the administration. Republican senators James Abdnor (SD), William Armstrong (CO), Jesse Helms (NC), Mack Mattingly (GA), Don Nickles (OK) and Steve Symms (ID), and 28 of 32 House Republican freshmen voted to defeat the package.

This unprecedented defeat of an arms sale to an Arab government came even though the Israeli government, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations were not actively opposing the sale. Having suc-

ceeded in convincing the administration to remove more threatening elements of the package, such as sophisticated fighter aircraft and tanks, the principal pro-Israel groups dropped further active involvement.

However, substantial opposition had already developed among pro-Israel members of Congress, and continued to gather strength under its own momentum. Those leading the effort against the sale, most notably Senators Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Bob Packwood (R-OR) and Alan Cranston (D-CA) continued to work for the sale's defeat even after Israel and the major pro-Israel organizations ceased their efforts to block congressional approval of the package.

A further reason for the strength of congressional opposition to a sale at this time is the recent increase in Arab terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. With Saudi Arabia maintaining close ties with both Libya and the PLO, sentiment on Capitol Hill was not favorable to the Saudis' request for U.S. arms.

Despite the Israeli government's view that the Saudi package "was not worth fighting," a number of pro-Israel political action committees (PACs), organizations such as the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, and some leading members of the Jewish community, lobbied against the sale.

Their efforts created a perception among legislators that, despite the lack of opposition on the part of the organized Jewish leadership, opposition to the sale was strong among American Jews. Concerned that they not alienate their Jewish constituents in an election year, 23 of 29 senators facing re-election in November voted against the sale.

While congressional opposition was growing, however, the administration did not mount a high-level effort to gain passage for the sale during the 30-day period leading up to the congressional vote. With the Tokyo economic summit, the battle for "contra" aid, and efforts to deal with Libya and international terrorism underway, the Saudi missile sale was, understandably, not at the top of the administration's agenda.

Nevertheless, President Reagan is now expected to veto the resolution disapproving the sale. The resolution will then be returned to Congress where a two-thirds majority in each house will be required to over-ride the presidential veto.

In an effort to ensure that his veto is sustained, the President has begun work to persuade some of the senators who voted against the sale that the package should, indeed, proceed. The administration needs to persuade only seven of the 73 senators who opposed the sale to change their votes for the veto to be sustained and the sale approved.

U.S. Power, *continued from page 1*

It also demonstrated that the American people will strongly support military action when their patience has been exhausted and alternatives yield no result.

Opinion polls taken since the strike show that an overwhelming majority of Americans—79 percent—approve of the President's action, 76 percent approve of the President's handling of foreign policy overall, while on Capitol Hill, leaders of both parties have hurried to support the strike. Such popular backing serves further to reinforce the perception that the U.S. armed forces are a credible tool of American foreign policy that can and will be used when necessary.

The air strike may not bring an immediate end to Qaddafi's sponsorship of terrorism. But by acting when talking no longer proved a reasonable alternative, the Reagan administration has put Qaddafi and his allies in Damascus, Teheran and even in Moscow, on notice that the United States will defend itself when attacked.

The Kremlin has recognized the implications of the American action. Unwilling to risk a confrontation with a U.S. administration committed to the defense of its citizens, the Soviet Union withdrew its ships from Libyan ports, and allowed the American strike to proceed unhindered by Soviet forces. In the face of American determination to fight the terrorism that the Kremlin had encouraged, the Soviet Union pulled back. The price of confrontation was simply too high.

It is instructive that Israel, the nation with the greatest experience in combating terrorism, was among the few U.S. allies to give unequivocal support the President. The Israelis recognize that appeasement and weakness serve only to embolden one's adversary.

Despite the reticence of most of our other allies, the strike against a declared enemy of "America, Great Britain and NATO," will engender the recognition by friend and foe alike, that America will not engage in appeasement, but can and will use her power in defense of freedom. This recognition will be particularly reas-

suring to friends of Israel. The demonstration of American willingness to use force in the Middle East will send a strong message to any adversary of Israel, that the Israeli people can look for, and receive, U.S. support in the event of a conflict in the region.

America has now reached, if not the end of the post-Vietnam era of paralysis, then at least the beginning of the end. April 14th, 1986, will be remembered as a glad day for democracy.

NJC Bulletin is published monthly by
the National Jewish Coalition

MAX FISHER <i>Honorary Chairman</i>	RICHARD J. FOX <i>National Chairman</i>
GEORGE KLEIN <i>Co-Chairman</i>	IVAN BOESKY <i>Finance Chairman</i>
	GORDON ZACKS <i>Co-Chairman</i>
CHRIS GERSTEN <i>Executive Director</i>	

The NJC Bulletin welcomes comments and letters to the editor. These, along with any address changes, should be sent to:

NJC Bulletin
415 Second Street, N.E.
Suite 100
Washington, D.C. 20002

ANTONY KORENSTEIN <i>Editor</i>	SUSAN HOFFINGER <i>Associate Editor</i>
------------------------------------	--

NJC Bulletin

NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION

SAUDI ARMS STALLED

4

CAMPAIGN '86

5

JEWISH APOLOGISTS FOR
ANTI-SEMITISM

6

MAY 1986

Striking A Blow for U.S. Power

After the defeat of Hitler's forces in the battle of El Alemein, British prime minister, Winston S. Churchill, reflected on the implications of the allied victory. "This is not the end," he said of the war against Nazi Germany, "it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

President Reagan's election in 1980 marked "the end of the beginning" of the debilitating effects of the Vietnam syndrome, the paralysis that overcame U.S. defense and foreign policy after the Vietnam War. The American people had elected in President Reagan a man whom they believed would restore American pride, American strength and the primacy of America among the world's democracies.

But Ronald Reagan's election did not bring with it the reckless use of military force anticipated by his opponents on the left. For five years, his administration went to great lengths to avoid using force when U.S. interests could be protected by other means. The President tried numerous peaceful means to combat the increasingly frequent terrorist attacks against American citizens, fearing perhaps that military action might provoke a public outcry that would undermine his support in the nation.

But these approaches repeatedly failed to bear fruit, as our allies refused to join the effort to curtail the growing scourge of state-sponsored terror. As Colonel Qaddafi continued to call America's bluff over the President's threats of a military response, and continued to direct terrorist attacks against Americans, Mr. Reagan recognized that the United States had to respond, and had to respond with force.

For years, the fear of public opposition restrained the use of military force even in the most testing of circumstances. When attacked, the Marines withdrew from Lebanon; when the TWA 847 and

the Achille Lauro were hijacked, America's response was limited. By ordering a carefully-planned and -executed strike against terrorist training and support facilities in Libya, President Reagan has helped change the perception of America from that of a power whose hands are tied to that of one willing and able to use force when provoked.

However, President Reagan's measured and skillful use of force against Libya did more than show that the U.S. government is willing to exercise power.

Continued, page 4



Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, and Nicaraguan president, Daniel Ortega, watch military maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra.

Bringing Change to South Africa

Max Green

Editor's note: Max Green is associate director of the White House Office of Public Liaison. He has recently returned from a fact-finding trip to South Africa which he organized for a number of non-governmental public-policy experts.

The features of apartheid are so well known that they do not need repeating.

Suffice it to say that the racial segregation and discrimination that define apartheid are politically and morally indefensible.

About that, the Reagan administration and its critics agree. About the rest—both means and ends—we disagree profoundly. For those committed to the democratic reform of South Africa, only a policy of "constructive engagement" makes sense. But those who despair of reform (or for whom reform is anathema) want us to sever our ties to South Africa.

Continued, page 3

CAPITAL *Wire*

LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

Contra Aid Setback

President Reagan's policy in Central America suffered another setback on April 31 when supporters of the policy failed to gather enough support to force a new House vote on military aid to the contras. Supporters of the aid package needed to gather 218 signatures on a "discharge petition" to force the contra aid issue back to the House floor on May 12—but failed to do so. The House will not now have an opportunity to vote on the issue until June.

The House first rejected the President's request on March 20. The Senate then passed a modified version of the aid package which was returned to the House floor on April 16, where it was considered as an amendment to an appropriations bill that President Reagan had threatened to veto. Supporters of the package also feared that opponents such as Reps. Dave McCurdy (D-OK) and Michael Barnes (D-MD) would succeed in passing amendments that would dilute the aid request or even bar any aid from reaching the anti-Sandinista resistance. Supporters, wishing to avoid such amendments and seeking to vote on the aid package as a separate piece of legislation, attempted to secure a discharge petition. This would have by-passed efforts by the Democratic leadership of the House to block the package and bring the issue to the House floor. With the failure of that petition, some advocates of the proposal now acknowledge that the prospects for passage of the aid request appear increasingly poor.

Defense Funds, Foreign Aid, Cut

House Budget Committee Democrats are proposing deep cuts in the administration's defense and foreign aid requests as part of a strategy to achieve a budget deficit of \$144 billion for 1987, the target specified by the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction legislation.

The Democrats' plan would set defense appropriations for 1987 at an estimated \$282 billion—\$38 billion less than President Reagan's request. This means that by 1989, new defense budget authority would be \$303.4 billion, or just \$2.5 bil-

lion more than the Senate-proposed level for 1987.

The cuts made in foreign-aid requests, though smaller in dollar terms, are still significant. Budget Committee Democrats reportedly rejected an amendment backed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to restore \$400 million included in the Senate budget resolution. Currently, the House Democratic proposal would provide an estimated \$13.8 billion in foreign aid during 1987—\$2.7 billion less than the President's request and \$1.3 billion less than current spending as estimated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION CONTROVERSY

On April 23rd, U.S. Civil Rights Commission vice chairman, Morris B. Abram, criticized a General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of the Commission which he called "part of a larger effort to discredit the Commission because our ideas are unacceptable".

The GAO's audit, requested by Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA), chairman of the House Judiciary subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights, charged the Commission with mismanagement and improper political hiring.

Supported by Commission Chairman, Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., Abram responded that the GAO had relied on "innuendo" in its report. Abram said that the real reason for the audit and the harassment was the Commission's opposition to racial quotas. "The real subject of this dispute is over equality of opportunity versus equality of results. The real issue here . . . is the struggle between the fair shakers, who started the civil rights movement, and the social engineers who presume to speak for it." The GAO reports were triggered, he maintained, because "the social engineers have lost their ideological monopoly of the Commission."

Citing accusations that Pendleton had made inflammatory remarks, Abram asked why these accusations were not raised when Commissioner Mary Berry characterized Chairman Pendleton, At-

torney General Edwin Meese, and Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds as having "bigotry dripping from their lips." "Where are these sanctimonious guardians of public discourse when Congressman Parren Mitchell or others call Chairman Pendleton 'a low-level kind of houseboy' or 'Uncle Tom?'" Abram asked.

They look the other way, he suggested, because these speakers, no matter how inflammatory their rhetoric, have "the correct social engineering ideas." The GAO report, he claimed, was simply another example "of heavy-handed attempts at legislative interference with an independent commission because of its ideas."

ANTI-TERRORISM BILL PROPOSED

On April 17th, Reps. Joe Barton (R-TX), Bob Livingston (R-LA), and Duncan Hunter (R-CA) introduced a bill which clarifies presidential authority and strengthens the President's hand in dealing with terrorism. Identical legislation is being introduced in the Senate by Senators Robert Dole (R-KS) and Jeremiah Denton (R-AL).

The sponsors of the bill state that terrorism is the number-one threat to the safety and well-being of American citizens. While diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions must be part of an overall anti-terrorism policy, the sponsors assert that these avenues are not sufficient in themselves. "Terrorism can be discouraged" they say, "only if terrorists believe that the President has a full range of anti-terrorism options and the ability to act promptly with the backing of Congress."

Although the legislation gives the President no new authority, it seeks to clarify—particularly to terrorists—that he has the power to act "with all appropriate means, including deadly force." The resolution defines as terrorists not only those who pull the trigger or detonate the bomb, but also those who "organize, lead, fund and support terrorists." In other words, all those involved in the terrorist network, including governments that openly and actively promote and support terrorism as an instrument of policy, will be held accountable.

South Africa

continued from page 1

The record of the past ten years shows that South Africa is changing. So far, that change has been due in large part to the capitalist development of its economy. As South Africa's private sector has grown, it has required the labor of more and more blacks, at first for unskilled jobs only, but later for skilled jobs too. As a result, one of the mainstays of apartheid—the "job bar"—fell.

Influx control another of apartheid's distinguishing characteristics, has also given way for similar reasons. The apartheid ideology of 1976 dictated that the flow of blacks into urban areas be slowed and ultimately reversed. Instead, in response to new economic opportunities in the cities, it increased. As it did, enforcement of the hated pass laws began to break down and the laws ceased serving a purpose. Their recent repeal was thus a radical, but nonetheless logical, next step.

With blacks required to fill many skilled and professional jobs, the government has been forced to increase the quantity and improve the quality of education provided to blacks. Spending for black education is on the rise—up 300% since 1980. Black college students are no longer a rare breed. In 1960, there were only 2200 black college graduates in all of South Africa. This year more than ten times that number will attend college, many of them at formerly "white-only" colleges that are now integrated.

Although reforms are underway, the process is far from complete. Public schools, hospitals, and other institutions remain segregated and grossly unequal. The Group Areas Act still prohibits blacks from living in white neighborhoods. And most importantly, blacks, 70% of the population, are still denied participation in the governance of their country.

Continued progress is essential if chaos and tyranny are not to prevail. For most purposes, the government has already lost control of black townships to "street committees" of kids armed with gasoline-drenched tires with which they "necklace" black "collaborators."

This is a far cry, though, from a truly revolutionary situation. Gangs of wild teenagers wielding tires are no match for South Africa's well-disciplined and well-armed security forces. Neither is the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's underground revolutionary organization. By all accounts, it is woefully short of everything an army needs. This is not a fact to bemoan. Whatever its

past, the ANC of 1986 is not fighting for democracy. Armed primarily by the Soviet Union and its allies, the ANC has come increasingly under the sway of the South African Communist Party, which holds between 12 and 18 out of 30 seats on its executive committee.

Revolution being both unattainable (at least in the short term), and undesirable (at least to the West), what can the United States do to promote faster

or of "The Bill Cosby Show", or their presence more likely to affect the way South Africans think about race?

American corporations can pull up their stakes in South Africa. But won't they do far more to undermine the social foundations of apartheid by hiring according to the non-discriminatory Sullivan principles? The United States can refuse to have anything further to do with South Africa unless and until apartheid is com-



Black demonstrators at a recent funeral in South Africa.

change? Disinvestment would slow down the economy, the most powerful engine of reform in South Africa. A serious recession caused by disinvestment would move affected blacks to the left, affected whites to the right, and bring to power white hardliners who would first stop the process of reform and then reverse it. A blood bath would soon follow.

This is not to suggest that economic growth is sufficient in and of itself. Protest against the outrages of apartheid from both within and outside of South Africa has always been and will continue to be important. But not all protest is effective. The South African government, for example, does not care about the condemnations of the Communist world which is its enemy. But, because it considers itself part of the West, it does care very much about American attitudes. Thus the following paradox: while advocates claim that Western disinvestment from and isolation of South Africa would provide incentive for further reform, in fact, either would be a disincentive.

Consider. The owners of the television series "Dallas" recently announced that, to protest apartheid, they would not allow the program to be shown on South African television. Is the absence of "Dallas"

pletely dismantled and replaced by one man, one vote. But in so doing, the United States would lose all its leverage, and no longer be able to fund training for black entrepreneurs and black trade unionists, black community-based self-help projects, or numerous other such programs.

We could hardly pick a worse time than now to give up on South Africa. At long last, black trade unions and black political parties are being allowed to organize freely. The ANC is still prohibited, but the United Democratic Front, which by all accounts is an ANC front, is legal and active in black communities throughout the country. Also, Chief Gatsho Buthelezi's Inkatha party which has more than a million members, has begun negotiating an agreement for a unitary legislature and executive in Natal province.

Blacks finally have a political voice: the question is whether they will be granted political power. If they are not, other reforms will have limited effect. But if they are, additional reforms will necessarily follow. For America to abandon the South African people at this, the most critical juncture of their history, would be an unforgivable act of political cowardice and moral irresponsibility.

Saudi Arms Stalled

On May 6th and 7th, Congress defeated the administration's proposal to sell \$354 million worth of Stinger, Sidewinder and Harpoon missiles to Saudi Arabia. The Senate voted 73-22 and the House 356-62 to block the sale, more than the two-thirds needed to over-ride a presidential veto. The administration is seeking the sale in an effort to demonstrate American commitment to Saudi security and deter Iranian aggression against Saudi Arabia.

This effort to defeat the arms sale included some of the strongest supporters of the administration. Republican senators James Abdnor (SD), William Armstrong (CO), Jesse Helms (NC), Mack Mattingly (GA), Don Nickles (OK) and Steve Symms (ID), and 28 of 32 House Republican freshmen voted to defeat the package.

This unprecedented defeat of an arms sale to an Arab government came even though the Israeli government, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations were not actively opposing the sale. Having suc-

ceeded in convincing the administration to remove more threatening elements of the package, such as sophisticated fighter aircraft and tanks, the principal pro-Israel groups dropped further active involvement.

However, substantial opposition had already developed among pro-Israel members of Congress, and continued to gather strength under its own momentum. Those leading the effort against the sale, most notably Senators Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Bob Packwood (R-OR) and Alan Cranston (D-CA) continued to work for the sale's defeat even after Israel and the major pro-Israel organizations ceased their efforts to block congressional approval of the package.

A further reason for the strength of congressional opposition to a sale at this time is the recent increase in Arab terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. With Saudi Arabia maintaining close ties with both Libya and the PLO, sentiment on Capitol Hill was not favorable to the Saudis' request for U.S. arms.

Despite the Israeli government's view that the Saudi package "was not worth fighting," a number of pro-Israel political action committees (PACs), organizations such as the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, and some leading members of the Jewish community, lobbied against the sale.

Their efforts created a perception among legislators that, despite the lack of opposition on the part of the organized Jewish leadership, opposition to the sale was strong among American Jews. Concerned that they not alienate their Jewish constituents in an election year, 23 of 29 senators facing re-election in November voted against the sale.

While congressional opposition was growing, however, the administration did not mount a high-level effort to gain passage for the sale during the 30-day period leading up to the congressional vote. With the Tokyo economic summit, the battle for "contra" aid, and efforts to deal with Libya and international terrorism underway, the Saudi missile sale was, understandably, not at the top of the administration's agenda.

Nevertheless, President Reagan is now expected to veto the resolution disapproving the sale. The resolution will then be returned to Congress where a two-thirds majority in each house will be required to over-ride the presidential veto.

In an effort to ensure that his veto is sustained, the President has begun work to persuade some of the senators who voted against the sale that the package should, indeed, proceed. The administration needs to persuade only seven of the 73 senators who opposed the sale to change their votes for the veto to be sustained and the sale approved.

U.S. Power, *continued from page 1*

It also demonstrated that the American people will strongly support military action when their patience has been exhausted and alternatives yield no result.

Opinion polls taken since the strike show that an overwhelming majority of Americans—79 percent—approve of the President's action, 76 percent approve of the President's handling of foreign policy overall, while on Capitol Hill, leaders of both parties have hurried to support the strike. Such popular backing serves further to reinforce the perception that the U.S. armed forces are a credible tool of American foreign policy that can and will be used when necessary.

The air strike may not bring an immediate end to Qaddafi's sponsorship of terrorism. But by acting when talking no longer proved a reasonable alternative, the Reagan administration has put Qaddafi and his allies in Damascus, Teheran and even in Moscow, on notice that the United States will defend itself when attacked.

The Kremlin has recognized the implications of the American action. Unwilling to risk a confrontation with a U.S. administration committed to the defense of its citizens, the Soviet Union withdrew its ships from Libyan ports, and allowed the American strike to proceed unhindered by Soviet forces. In the face of American determination to fight the terrorism that the Kremlin had encouraged, the Soviet Union pulled back. The price of confrontation was simply too high.

It is instructive that Israel, the nation with the greatest experience in combating terrorism, was among the few U.S. allies to give unequivocal support the President. The Israelis recognize that appeasement and weakness serve only to embolden one's adversary.

Despite the reticence of most of our other allies, the strike against a declared enemy of "America, Great Britain and NATO," will engender the recognition by friend and foe alike, that America will not engage in appeasement, but can and will use her power in defense of freedom. This recognition will be particularly reas-

suring to friends of Israel. The demonstration of American willingness to use force in the Middle East will send a strong message to any adversary of Israel, that the Israeli people can look for, and receive, U.S. support in the event of a conflict in the region.

America has now reached, if not the end of the post-Vietnam era of paralysis, then at least the beginning of the end. April 14th, 1986, will be remembered as a glad day for democracy.

NJC Bulletin is published monthly by
the National Jewish Coalition

MAX FISHER <i>Honorary Chairman</i>	RICHARD J. FOX <i>National Chairman</i>
GEORGE KLEIN <i>Co-Chairman</i>	IVAN BOESKY <i>Finance Chairman</i>
GORDON ZACKS <i>Co-Chairman</i>	CHRIS GERSTEN <i>Executive Director</i>

The NJC Bulletin welcomes comments and letters to the editor. These, along with any address changes, should be sent to:

NJC Bulletin
 415 Second Street, N.E.
 Suite 100
 Washington, D.C. 20002

ANTONY KORENSTEIN <i>Editor</i>	SUSAN HOFFINGER <i>Associate Editor</i>
---	---

Campaign '86: Missouri and Nevada

With eighteen Republican senators facing re-election in 1986, and another four retiring, the GOP is working hard to win open seats in order to retain their Senate majority, now 53 to 47, over the Democrats. In particular, Republican strategists are focusing on seats being vacated in Missouri and Nevada, which they believe offer their best chances for success. In both cases, the Republican candidate—former governor Kit Bond in Missouri and former congressman Jim Santini in Nevada—is well known in his state.

Missouri

In the race to fill the seat being vacated by retiring Democratic senator Thomas Eagleton, former Republican governor Kit Bond is running against Lieutenant-Governor Harriet Woods, leader of the liberal-wing of the state's Democratic party.

Bond is credited with improving Missouri's fiscal policy during his two terms as governor. Facing a budget deficit of \$270 million when he entered office, Bond claims to have instituted programs which produced a balanced budget each year, leaving the state with a \$300 million surplus when he stepped down in 1984.

Bond has maintained close ties with the Jewish community, and last summer travelled to Israel to learn more about Mideast foreign policy issues and to assess first hand the state of U.S.-Israeli relations. Bond has stated publicly that as a member of the Senate, he will sup-

port military and economic aid to Israel and will oppose sales of weapons to Israel's adversaries. It is imperative, he maintains, that the United States "continue to provide Israel with the military and economic aid it needs to maintain a qualitative military advantage over its neighbors."

Recent polls show Bond maintaining a lead over Woods, who was unsuccessful in a prior attempt to unseat GOP senator, John Danforth, in 1982. According to a May poll conducted by the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, Bond is carrying 43% of the voters' support, to Woods' 39%. Bond received an added boost to his candidacy recently when he was endorsed by the Missouri Farm Bureau.

Nevada

For nearly a decade, Jim Santini represented the entire state of Nevada in the U.S. Congress. Re-elected four times as Nevada's sole representative, Santini now faces a battle against Harry Reid, Democratic congressman representing the Las Vegas area.

As a U.S. representative, Jim Santini was a moderate-conservative Democrat who strongly supported President Reagan's tax and budget policies. Last August, Santini changed parties because, he maintains, to remain a Democrat would have "forced me to change my principles and abandon my convictions." Unlike Reid, who is a staunch critic of the administration's defense and foreign policies, Santini is known to agree with

most of the President's positions. As such, he is the candidate that Nevada's powerful senior senator, Paul Laxalt, has hand picked to take his place upon retirement this year.

As a member of the House, Jim Santini opposed arms sales to Arab states hostile to Israel—including the sale of F-15s and AWACs to Saudi Arabia—while supporting aid packages to Israel. He has



Nevada Republican, Jim Santini.

promised that as a senator, he will continue to oppose arms sales to Arab countries that refuse to enter peace talks with Israel, and he will consistently support adequate levels of U.S. aid to Israel as a cornerstone of effective U.S. foreign policy. "Strong U.S.-Israel relations are not only a moral imperative, they serve long-range U.S. strategic interests as well," he asserts.

Santini has also promised to keep the issue of Soviet Jewry prominently on the agenda of U.S.-Soviet relations. He has stated that he does not believe the U.S. can ease its demand for progress on this issue as a precondition for discussions concerning most-favored-nation status in the provision of trade credit.

Santini has been out of public life for four years (his term as representative ended in 1982), yet indications are that he is still widely remembered and respected. Currently, polls show Santini running dead even with Rep. Reid, who lost a former bid for the Senate to Laxalt in 1974.



Former Missouri governor, Kit Bond of Missouri, with President Reagan.

Jewish Apologists for Anti-Semitism

Nicaraguan Jews who fled their country when the Sandinistas came to power assert that the Sandinista regime is anti-Semitic and anti-Israel. Jewish leaders representing organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee and the National Jewish Coalition, have accepted their testimony. However, the New Jewish Agenda and New York rabbi, Balfour Brickner, deny accounts of these eyewitnesses, adopting the Sandinista line that Jews fled not because they were persecuted as Jews, but because they were supporters of ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza.

Nicaraguan Jews deny that they supported Somoza. Most were either neutral or supportive of efforts to move Nicaragua toward democracy. Sarita Kellerman, a native Nicaraguan, says that she felt safe returning to her country after the revolution because the Sandinista government had promised the people "true democracy, human rights, social justice."

Brickner, who visited Nicaragua after almost all of the small Jewish community had left, said of assertions that the community was non-political, "That's just a damn lie." His information is based on discussions with Sandinistas.

Fred Luft, former secretary of the Nicaraguan Jewish community, reports that most Jews fled out of fear for their personal safety—fear stimulated by the 1978 firebombing of the Managua synagogue, telephone threats, carbombings and anti-Semitic graffiti on homes and businesses.

Oscar Kellerman was worshipping inside the synagogue when it was firebombed. When he and others tried to escape the burning building, they were met by gunmen who identified themselves as Sandinistas. "If you don't go back we will kill you. What Hitler started, we will finish," he quoted one as saying.

According to Brickner, this incident represents, at worst, the actions "of a small gang of excited supporters of the revolution . . ." "When questioned about the event, Brickner snapped: "I don't

want to argue about that . . . nobody really knows what happened. I suggest to you that what happened is different than what they report."

Brickner is not concerned that the Sandinista-approved newspaper, *Nuevo Diario*, has referred to "synagogues of Satan" and denounced Jews "who . . . massacre the Palestinian people without

Brickner is dedicated to the radical left, not Judaism and the Jewish people.

mercy." He is not concerned that the PLO maintains an "embassy" in Managua, that the Sandinistas provide PLO members with Nicaraguan passports to facilitate terrorism, nor that Sandinistas participated in PLO attacks against Jews in Israel and Europe during the 1970s.

Brickner continues to believe Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, who claims that the regime is "neither anti-Semitic nor anti-Israel."

Sarita Kellerman is surprised that Nicaraguan Jews have not received more support from American Jews. "We are one people, and therefore we have one destiny . . . What happens to a Jew in any place in the world is bound to happen to every Jew any place in the world if you let it happen."

Unfortunately, Rabbi Brickner does not accept this view. He has cast off his Jewish mantle, donning that of an apologist for the overt anti-Semitism of a regime which he admires. Brickner has chosen to take the word of Sandinista officials, who understandably deny allegations of anti-Semitism, rather than that of the many Jewish victims of Sandinista persecution.

Brickner's willingness to ignore the human rights abuses of the Sandinistas is consistent with his world view. While he apologizes for Sandinista anti-Semitism, he also sympathizes with those who accuse Israel of persecuting the Palestinian people. According to a 1985 *New York Times* article, Brickner's synagogue invited Mohammed Milhem, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, to speak to its congregation.

Rabbi Brickner has dedicated himself to the causes of the radical left rather than to Judaism and the Jewish people. It is time that the Jewish community repudiate those, like Brickner, who are prepared to sacrifice Jewish security and welfare to advance their own political agendas.

C.G.

NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION

415 Second Street, NE., Suite 100
Washington, DC 20002

Non Profit
Organization
U.S. Postage
PAID
Wash., DC
Permit No. 1062

SOUTH AFRICA FACTS

Issued by: The Embassy of South Africa, Washington, D.C.

For further information: Call Pieter Swanepoel or Manus

Le Roux: (202) 232-4400 or the Consulate General

New York (212) 371-7997; Chicago (312) 828-9200;

Houston (713) 850-0150; Beverly Hills (213) 858-0380

NO. 2

May, 1986

THE PACE OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The abolition of the 73-year-old pass laws last month was a very important political development. It removed a serious impediment to the social and economic mobility of millions of black South African citizens.

Repeal of the pass laws should not be viewed as an isolated event. Rather, it must be understood for what it is: one important aspect of the social, economic and political program of change that has been ongoing in South Africa for several years.

The South African Government's goal for this program is simple and clear: to promote a social and political environment in the country conducive to a constitutional democracy in which all South Africans can share political power in a meaningful way.

Recent political and economic changes instituted by the Government include:

- * 1976 - Sports and athletic competition desegregated.
- * 1979 to 1984 - Desegregation of trade unions and workplaces. Black and multi-racial trade unions legalized. Right to strike and bargain collectively protected by statute.
- * ~~1983 - Legalized employment discrimination eliminated.~~
- * 1983 (November) - Blacks exercise vote in local elections.
- * 1983 (November 2) - National referendum conducted in which the then all-white electorate overwhelmingly approved a new South African Constitution that extended the national franchise to Indians and Coloreds.
- * 1983 - Universities desegregated.
- * 1984 (August) - Colored and Indian voters went to the polls for the first time to elect direct representatives to Parliament.

- * January 25, 1985 - Whites, Coloreds and Indians for the first time participated jointly in Parliament in the executive and legislative functions of the Government.
- * February 1, 1985 - Abolition of forced resettlement of black communities.
- * February 8, 1985 - Downtown commercial districts nationwide opened to all businessmen irrespective of race.
- * February 8, 1985 - Amnesty, conditioned only on a renunciation of political violence, offered to Nelson Mandela and members of the African National Congress (ANC).
- * April 15, 1985 - Laws prohibiting marriage and sexual relations between persons of different races (the "Mixed Marriages" and "Immorality" Acts) repealed.
- * December 1985 - The right to own land granted to all South Africans irrespective of race.
- * January 31, 1986 - President P.W. Botha committed the Government to repeal the pass laws, restoration of South African citizenship to blacks, equality of education for all, and the establishment of a National Council in which black and white leaders will sit together to plan for South Africa's future a constitutional democracy.
- * February 27, 1986 - The Government announced that the Separate Amenities Act - one of the original cornerstones of apartheid mandating racial segregation in public accommodations - will be repealed. Repeal legislation effective April 2, 1986.
- * March 17, 1986 - The Government announced that education once again forms the largest budget item of Government expenditure for 1986. Government expenditure for black education up 700 per cent since 1979.
- * April 23, 1986 - Legal restrictions on the movements of black South Africans -- the pass laws and influx control -- abolished. All South Africans now enjoy equal freedom of movement throughout South Africa, irrespective of race.

SOUTH AFRICA FACTS

Issued by: The Embassy of South Africa, Washington, D.C.
For further information: Call Pieter Swanepoel or
Chris Streeter: (202) 232-4400 or the Consulate General
New York (212) 371-7997; Chicago (312) 828-9200;
Houston (713) 850-0150; Beverly Hills (213) 858-0380

1 SA: For P.A.
2 Com. Purp. 5
URGENT
MAY 22 1986

NO.6

May 19, 1986

FACING UP TO TERRORISM

"Self-defense is not only our right
it is our duty."

President Ronald Reagan
April 14, 1986

A very specific series of recent terrorist bombings and land-mine explosions which killed women, children and other innocent bystanders in South Africa formed the basis for the actions against terrorist sanctuaries in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia carried out today by the South African Defense Force.

These terrorist incidents include the following:

1. In December of last year, four children and two women were killed by a land-mine on a farm near the Zimbabwe-South African border.
2. On December 9, eight people were severely injured when a bomb exploded at a post office in Durban.
3. On December 23, a bomb in the Sanlam Shopping Mall in Durban killed two children and three adults who were Christmas shopping.
4. On April 3, a land-mine explosion near Breyten crushed both legs of a passenger in a taxi, Mr Moshuloane, and lacerated the body of the taxi driver, Mr Ndluli. The same day another land-mine explosion destroyed a vehicle carrying black farm workers in the same area, causing numerous injuries.

In addition to these deaths and casualties from bombings and land-mines, two very recent incidents highlighted terrorists' use of sanctuaries in neighboring countries:

1. As reported in the New York Times of May 19, a large arms cache containing land-mines, assault rifles and explosives manufactured in the Soviet bloc was discovered near Johannesburg several days ago. These arms were smuggled into South Africa from neighboring states for use in terrorist actions.
2. Recently, twelve terrorists were apprehended at the Athens Airport attempting to board a flight to Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. Shortly before, this group had been in Libya where its members received specialized training in terror actions, and were directed to go to Zimbabwe to receive orders and equipment for terrorist missions inside South Africa.

Over the last several months, South Africa has communicated to Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia its deep concern over these incidents. South Africa attempted peaceful discussions to put an end to these terrorist incidents and the use of neighboring territory as a sanctuary for the terrorists. Specifically, South Africa proposed the formation of a Regional Security Council as a forum by which governments in Southern Africa could work out ways to halt terrorist activities. These efforts proved fruitless.

Having attempted peaceful alternatives and faced with the irrefutable fact that the territory of these countries was being used as a sanctuary to plan and execute terrorist actions inside South Africa, the South African Government was compelled to act. South Africa has the duty and the right to protect all its citizens, black and white, against terrorism and murder, and South Africa will carry out this responsibility.

A LETTER FROM SOUTH AFRICA

From:
HERBERT BEUKES
Ambassador

A monthly viewpoint on
South Africa

NO. 6:

JUNE 1, 1986

THE RIGHT CHOICE

A few days ago, my Government called for enactment by Parliament within the next four months of a bill designed to lead directly toward a new, post-apartheid South Africa.

The bill creates a forum in which blacks and whites together will begin work on a new constitution providing for black political participation and a government in which blacks will share power.

This task will not be easy. At both extremes of our political spectrum are radical forces that oppose my Government's program for peaceful negotiation of fundamental change. Extremist whites, who two weeks ago violently broke up a Government party meeting, vote to oust the Government and restore apartheid by force. Extremist blacks refuse the Government's offer to negotiate a new constitution and they conduct terror against blacks who support dialogue and negotiation. Both of these extremist groups favor violence and revolution.

In this situation, some in the United States say the right course is to impose more economic sanctions on South Africa -- a Government which itself has rejected apartheid and is fully engaged in the task of reconciliation and constitutional change through peaceful negotiation.

Sanctions will, in effect if not by intention, support the extremists in their attacks on the people who want peaceful negotiation and a new constitution providing for black political participation and the end of apartheid.

In my view, Americans who want to see violence end and black political participation begin in South Africa will have an important policy choice to make in the weeks ahead.

That choice is not between apartheid and democracy. My Government's abolition of the pass laws and the series of earlier fundamental changes -- granting of property rights and the opening of public accommodations to all, legalization of black and multiracial trade unions, acceptance of political participation by blacks through enfranchisement and power-sharing -- have accelerated the abolition of apartheid.

But just as the ending of Jim Crow in the U.S. did not by itself immediately create equal opportunity or full black political participation, we recognize that these changes in South Africa must now be followed by a further phase in which a new political framework and expansive social and educational programs must be put in place.

Statesmanship and great political skill are required if we are to achieve these goals. Public opinion must be inspired, deep differences between regions and groups bridged, political coalitions and, ultimately, a national consensus formed in support of the new political arrangement in which blacks will be fully included.

It is this creative political process, and not the mere ending of discrimination, on which South Africa is now embarked.

As my Government and the people move into this complex political effort to build a post-apartheid constitution, American sanctions will complicate the problem, not contribute to the solution.

If reconciliation is to be successful, if democracy is to be extended, if South African society is to be normalized, violence as a political instrument should be rejected unequivocally.

The right choice is to encourage peaceful negotiations and to extend understanding and support for the political task we have undertaken to bring about a new constitution in which all South Africans will participate.

Herbert Rumsfeld

Southern Africa

NOTES AND COMMENTS

A DIGEST OF NEWS FROM THE REGION

South Africa: Sanctions Hit Mother of Two

A black South African woman recently told the Johannesburg Sunday Times that sanctions have hurt her personally. Mrs Pauline Mbatha, 34, mother of two children aged 11 and 13, lost her job as an office clerk for Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) when the airline, responding to disinvestment calls, ceased operations in South Africa. "I just do not know what to do right now," Mrs Mbatha said, referring to her 150 Rand monthly grocery bill and a 64 Rand monthly mortgage payment. "I do not understand politics. I just want a job. What matters to me is the future of my children and keeping our home."

Zimbabwe: PLO Ambassador Attacks South Africa and Israel

"It is necessary for the PLO and the liberation movements in Southern Africa to work together and exchange information on their struggles and their plight because we are convinced that the collapse of the South African system

will lead to destruction of the Zionist state in the Middle East."

Ali Halimeh
PLO Ambassador to
Zimbabwe

South Africa: Black South Africans Oppose Sanctions

A recent survey by the Human Sciences Research Council showed that nearly 68 percent of blacks in South Africa's industrial heartland oppose economic sanctions against the country and believe that blacks would suffer most if sanctions are applied.

Swaziland: South African Company Invests

A South African company is investing 16 million Rand in Swaziland to build a factory to manufacture particle board. This project will provide 320 new jobs for Swazis.

The South African Government has also extended a low interest loan to Swaziland for road construction. This represents the latest project in the ongoing program of economic cooperation between the two African countries.

Lesotho: Government Condemns Sanctions Against South Africa

The Lesotho Government denounced sanctions against South Africa as being disastrous to the economies of Lesotho and other countries in the Southern African Region. The head of Lesotho's Government, Mr Metsing Lekhanya, said, "Sanctions would hit all countries in Southern Africa."

Zimbabwe: ANC Targets White Children

Freddie Mzimba the official representative of the African National Congress (ANC) in Zimbabwe told the Zimbabwe Herald last week that white civilians, including children, would be targeted in the ANC's war against the South African Government.

Another ANC spokesman later denied that it was ANC policy to kill white children.

South Africa: Multiracial Day of Prayer

The first multiracial religious mass gathering ever convened by the Dutch

Reformed Church took place in Pretoria in April. A crowd of 10,000 people gathered to pray in three languages for "justice, peace and reconciliation" in the country.

South Africa: Landmines Take More Lives

A Soviet-made landmine killed 2 black South Africans and critically injured 8 others on May 25. The 10 people were travelling from Johannesburg to a farm in the Eastern-Transvaal in a minibus to visit ancestral graves.

South Africa: Mandela Called Stooze by U.S. Editorial

The Richmond News-Leader, May 2, 1986 carried the following editorial:

"The story goes that South Africa's jailed Nelson Mandela and his wife Winnie are just your standard garden-variety moderates who want freedom for their country. But consider this. Moscow's Communist Party newspaper PRAVDA recently carried a story about Winnie Mandela, quoting her as saying:
'The Soviet Union is the

torch-bearer for all our hopes and aspirations. We have learned and are continuing to learn resilience and bravery from the Soviet people, who are an example to us in our struggle for freedom, a model of loyalty to internationalist duty. In Soviet Russia, genuine power of the people has been transformed from dreams into reality. The Land of the Soviets is the genuine friend and ally of all peoples fighting against the dark forces of world reaction.' That is not the swoony stuff of a dizzy moderate, but the disciplined ideological (sic) of a Soviet stooge.'

South Africa: Natal Town Votes for Multiracial Government

The Town Council of Stanger, in Natal Province, recently voted unanimously to adopt a multiracial government for the town of

20,000. One of the plan's architects, Mr Yunus Moolla, the Indian Member of Parliament for Stanger said after the vote: "It is my firm belief that no central government reform will succeed unless an acceptable solution is found at local government level."

Zimbabwe: Amnesty International Condemned

Zimbabwe's Home Affairs Minister recently condemned Amnesty International as "a very dirty organization."

The Government Minister's comments came in reaction to an Amnesty International report that accused the Zimbabwean Government of torturing several hundred of its opponents being held without trial.

Mozambique: Famine Continues

The greatest food shortage in Mozambique's history will continue this year. The

country will be able to produce only 15 percent of its food for 1986. The balance will have to come from foreign donors.

South Africa: Blacks Oppose Violence

The majority of black South Africans oppose unrest and believe more can be gained through negotiation, according to a recent opinion poll conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, a prestigious research organization. The poll indicates that 75.4 percent of black South Africans believe nothing is gained from the current unrest situation.

Africa: Urgent Need for Economic Aid

The U.N. General Assembly held a special 5 day session in May aimed at finding ways to solve the urgent economic problems of African countries. A report by the Organization of African

Unity (OAU) asked for \$45.6 billion more in aid and an additional \$55 billion in debt relief from Western donor nations. The special session was the first General Assembly meeting on regional economics ever held in the 40 year history of the United Nations.

According to the OAU report, African nations' debt burdens (estimated at \$175 billion), far exceed their export revenues. At the end of 1984, almost half of Africa's countries were behind in their debt payments.

The OAU predicts that debt payments, amounting to \$24.5 billion annually from 1986-1990, will hinder development and further contribute to the economic decline of Africa.

Commenting on the OAU aid request, an African economist George Ayitteh said: "Until economic and political freedoms are restored, no amount of aid can rescue Africa, and the next drought will produce a holocaust the world has never seen before."

S. A

The basic features of apartheid are so well known that they do not need repeating. Suffice it to say that the racial segregation and discrimination that define apartheid are politically and morally indefensible. About that, the Administration and its critics agree.

That unfortunately is the full extent of our agreement. About the rest-both means and ends-we disagree, profoundly. For those of us who are committed to the democratic reform of South Africa, only a policy of "constructive engagement" makes sense. On the other hand, those who despair of reform (or for whom reform is an anathema) want us to sever our ties to South Africa.

In fact, the record of the past ten years shows clearly that South Africa can and is changing. So far, that change has been due in greatest measure to the capitalist development of its economy. As South African's private sector grew, it required the labor of more and more blacks, at first for unskilled jobs only, but later for skilled jobs as well. In consequence, one apartheid mainstay, the "job bar," has fallen.

Influx control of blacks, another of apartheid's distinguishing characteristics, has also given way.

The apartheid ideology of 1976 dictated that the flow of blacks from their "home lands" to urban areas be slowed down and ultimately reversed. Instead, in response to new economic opportunities in the cities, it increased. As it did, enforcement of the much hated pass laws began to break down. In 1973 over 700,000 blacks were arrested from violating the pass laws. Last year, more blacks than ever violated the laws, yet less than 200,000 were arrested. Being flouted as there were, the laws ceased serving a purpose. Their recent outright appeal was thus a radical, but nonetheless logical next step.

All of which has virtually forced the government to increase the quantity and improve the quality of education provided to blacks, to prepare them for the skilled and professional jobs that they must now fill. Thus spending for black education is on the rise-up 300% since 1980. As a direct result, the number of educated blacks has also risen dramatically. The number of black high school graduates is now roughly equal to that of whites. And, black college students are no longer a rare breed. In 1960, there were a total of 2200 black college graduates black college graduates in all of South Africa. This year more than ten times that number will attend college, many of them at formerly "white" college that are now intergated.

Other government concessions (announced as " initiatives" of course) have followed in the train of the economic and racial developments. For example, as blacks have become more integral to the economy, the government has had to grant them the same right to join labor unions as whites have always had.

Reforms, then, are obviously underway, but none is anywhere near complete. Public schools, hospitals, and other important institutions remain segregated and grossly unequal. The Group Areas Act still prohibits blacks from moving and living in white neighborhoods. And perhaps most importantly, blacks, 70% of the population of South Africa, are still denied participation in the governance of their country.

Continued progress is essential or else chaos and tyranny will prevail. For most purposes, the government has already lost control of black townships to "street committees" of "kids" armed with gasoline drenched tires with which they "necklace" their unusually unarmed and black "collaborator" victims.

This is a far cry though from a truly revolutionary situation. Gangs of wild teenagers wielding tires are no match for South Africa's, well disciplined and well armed security forces. Neither is the African National Congress, South Africa's underground revolutionary organization. By all accounts it is woefully short of everything an army needs, from manpower to firepower.

This is not a fact to bemoan. Whatever its past, and whatever the reason, the ANC of 1986 is not fighting for democracy in any meaningful sense of the word. It is armed primarily by the Soviet Union and its allies-whose foreign policy(e.g. the continuing terrorist war against Israel) it fully supports. Moreover, it has come increasingly under the sway of the

South African Communist Party, which now holds somewhere between 12 and 18 out of 30 seats on its Executive Committee.

Revolution being both unattainable (in the short term, that is for the next twenty years or so) and undesirable, what can and should the United States do to promote faster change?

Disinvestment is counter productive for its purpose and effect is to slow down the economy, whereas, the most powerful and proven engine of reform in South Africa is economic growth. We know full well what the effect of a serious economic recession would be. It would move affected blacks to the left and affected whites to the right. Given the current balance of political forces this would bring the power to the far right, which would first put a quick stop to the process of reform and then put it in reverses. A blood bath would follow in short order.

This is not to suggest that economic growth is sufficient in and of itself. Protest against the outrages of apartheid from both within and outside of South Africa have always been and will become increasingly important. But not all protest is effective. The South African government , for example, does not give a hoot about condemnations issuing from the Communist world which is its enemy. It does though care very much about our government's attitude, because it considers itself part of the West. Thus the following paradox: the threat of Western disinvestment from and isolation of South Africa is an incentive for further reform, while the fact of either would be a disincentive. Put another way, our influence is dependent on our involvement. Consider:

The owners of the television series "Dalls" recently announced that as an act of plitical protest agaisnt apartheid, they would not let the program be shown on South African television. Is the absence of " Dallas" or the presence of " The Bill Cosby Show" (rated number one in South Africa) more likely to affect the way South Africans think about race?

American corporations can pull up their stakes in South Africa. But won't they do far more to undermine the economic and social foundations of apartheid by hiring and promoting according to the the non-discrimniatory Sulivain principles?

Finally , the United States can refuse to have anything further to do with South Africa unless and until Apratheid were completely dismantled and replaced by let us say one man, one vote. But in so doing it would give us all its leverage. For example, it could no longer fund training for black entrepaneurs and black trade unionists; black community based self help projects, human rights organizations that provide legal assistance to black detainess, exchange programs that benefit black South Africans; United States based programs for black South African lawyers...The list goes on and on.

Moreover, we could hardly pick a worse time than now. to give up on South Africa. At long last, black political parties are being allowed to organize freely. The revolutionary African National Congress is still prohibited. But the United Democratic Front, which by all accounts is an ANC front, is legal and active in black communities throughout the country. Also, Chief Gatsho Boutehlezi's Inkantha party which has upwards of a million members, has begun negotiating an agreement for a unitary legislature and executive in the province of Natal. Thus, Blacks finally have a political voice: the question is whether they will

be granted political power. If not, other reforms will have limited effect. But if so, additional effective reforms will necessarily follow. For American to abandon the South African people at this, the most critical juncture of their history, would be an unforgivable act of political cowardice and moreal irresponsibility.



SOUTH AFRICA FOUNDATION

SUITE 620 ■ 1225 19TH STREET, N.W. ■ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

TELEPHONE (202) 223-5486

February 12, 1986

Mr. Max Green
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison
Old Executive Office Bldg.
196 The White House House
Washington, DC 20500

Draft Letter of Invitation

It gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the private sectors of both South Africa and Zimbabwe, and in conjunction with the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, to invite you to visit South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique as our guest.

The organizations responsible for the invitation are the South Africa Foundation, the Association of Chambers of Commerce, the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Chamber of Mines and the Zimbabwean Chamber of Industries.

The Foundation will be coordinating the arrangements. It has the explicit aim of acting as a catalyst for change in South Africa, and we have among our trustees such stalwarts of the cause of racial justice in South Africa as the Roman Catholic Cardinal of Cape Town, the Chief Rabbi of Johannesburg, and the Black General Secretary of the Clothing Workers. We believe that our influence has been important. Indeed, the London Daily Telegraph recently noted that:

"Business is the only real and effective opposition in South Africa, the one of which the Nationalists are most afraid and to which they are gradually paying heed."

President: Dr. F. J. du Plessis

Deputy Presidents: P. Grobbelaar J. A. Stegmann

The Council: L. G. Abrahamse* R. J. N. Abrahamsen C. J. W. Ball J. L. J. Bezuidenhout Mrs. E. Bradley N. Cullinan
Prof. J. P. de Lange Adv. D. P. de Villiers* G. W. Dunningham Dr. P. G. Eggstein* R. J. Goss F. M. Hirsch* Dr. C. J. F. Human*
Dr. H. E. Joosub* P. J. Liebenberg* A. Louw* B. Lubner R. Lurie B. C. McCarthy* I. G. MacPherson* D. N. Marvin
Dr. P. R. Morkel R. A. Plumridge* J. C. Robbertze C. J. Saunders* A. J. van den Berg

*Vice-Presidents

Director General: J. de L. Sorour
Director for North and South America: John H. Chettle

Hon. Presidents: Dr. P. Etienne Rousseau Dr. Jan S. Marais
Basil E. Hersov W. F. de la Harpe Beck G. W. H. Bally E. Bant

I am pleased to know that you will add to the number of the distinguished guests the Foundation has invited over the years, including Sir Alec Douglas Home and Sir Geoffrey Howe from Britain, Dr. Walter Scheel, the former President, and Dr. Manfred Woerner, the Minister of Defense of West Germany, and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ambassador Anne Armstrong and Mr. David Packard from this country. I think that you will find our efforts to give you an opportunity to gain further insight into the situation scrupulously even-handed, as did the President and four members of the board of the NAACP who visited South Africa several years ago, and asked the Foundation to arrange their entire program.

The purpose of the invitation is to afford you an opportunity to see the impact of U.S. policy, and developments in the area. We hope to be able to arrange visits not only to Zimbabwe and South Africa, but also to Mozambique.

The group will leave New York on.....
and it will leave South Africa at.....
arriving at JFK airport at.....
Naturally, we will also be responsible for your connections with these flights.

We enclose copies of the itineraries we arranged as host to various congressional visits to South Africa in order to give some idea as to the type of itinerary you might find useful, and we would appreciate your comments in order to make the visit as worthwhile as possible.

With kind regards,

John H. Chettle
Director
North and South America

JHC/1er
enclosures