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
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**The South African Jewish Population  
At The Beginning Of The Eighties  
With  
Some Bibliographical and  
Methodological Notes**

## **The South African Jewish Population At The Beginning Of The Eighties**

**A preliminary analysis of the 1980 census**

By Allie A Dubb

Institute of Contemporary Jewry,  
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The final count of Jews according to the 1980 census of the South African population has confounded both professional and popular expectations. In the first place, the results of successive censuses, and of a series of social and demographic studies had led to the conclusion that the steadily declining growth rate of the community would eventually reach zero growth and that thereafter the size of the community would begin to decrease. Thus, projections based on the 1960 census indicated that 1968 would mark the turning point and that by 1970 the Jewish population — though still larger than it had been in 1960 — would have already been two years into its downward trend. The reasons for this trend were, essentially, twofold: firstly, the cessation of large-scale Jewish immigration prior to World War II and, secondly, as in other western diaspora communities, a falling birth rate in an aging population resulting in a negative balance between births and deaths. Research during the first half of the 1970s, sponsored by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, confirmed these findings while updated projec-

tions predicted a drop in the Jewish population to just over 60 000 souls by the end of the century under certain conditions.

The widespread rioting in Black townships during 1975 and their aftermath triggered a considerable emigration of Whites from the country — including many Jews. From a demographic point of view this development would be expected to exacerbate the decline of the community so that even the most conservative projection, taking the new situation into account, predicted that there would be no more than 109 000 Jews by 1980.

It was, therefore, with considerable scepticism that the 5% sample enumeration of Jews in the 1980 census was received: the estimate of 116-122 thousand, with a mid-point of 119 000, was simply too large and contrary to all indications. In the event, the final count of 117 963 Jews was only slightly less surprising! Where did the 'surplus' come from? The answer could, perhaps, lie in the second set of expectations about changes in the Jewish population which would be reflected in the 1980 census: the massive influx of Israelis

into South Africa.

During the seventies, and particularly after the Yom Kippur War, it was apparent that significant numbers of Israelis were coming to South Africa, finding employment and taking up residence. Israeli technologists and technicians were increasingly evident in research institutes, universities, public utilities, and industry.

Israeli restaurants were opening up, in Johannesburg Hebrew was heard increasingly — among the many other foreign languages — in the streets, shops and cafes of Hillbrow, while in Jewish day schools the special needs of Israeli pupils had to be considered. No authoritative statistics on the number of Israelis were available, but estimates as high as 30 000 were quoted publicly as fact. The expectation, then, was clear: whatever trends were exhibited by the local Jewish population, these would be offset by the growing Israeli population. If, then, the Jewish population according to the 1980 census appeared to be too large, this was probably due to the inclusion of the Israelis. But this expectation, too, was confounded: in the census some 2 000 Israelis by birth or citizenship were enumerated — marginally, if at all, more than in 1970. If indeed, there were more Israelis in South Africa when the enumera-

tors called, they were, for some reason, excluded or they disguised their Jewish and Israeli affiliations. At any rate, they were certainly not included in the enumeration of Jews.

There is probably insufficient information available ever to answer this question conclusively. Further analysis, presently in process, will undoubtedly throw some light on the issue. At this stage, however, we can do no more than to examine what we have and make some educated guesses.

### Growth and Decline

According to the census, the Jewish population of South Africa numbered 117 963 in 1980, a decrease of 0,2% since 1970 and the first such in a hundred years of Jewish settlement. Over the same period the total White population increased by 21% from 3,8- to 4,5-million. As a proportion of total Whites, therefore, the Jewish population dropped from 3,1% to 2,6%. As has already been pointed out, these figures represent the continuation of a trend in which growth has progressively declined from 4% per annum between 1904-1926, to 0,3% between 1960-1970 (actually reaching 0% in 1968) and to -0,02% per annum during the decade up to 1980.

TABLE 1 THE JEWISH POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1960-1980

Year	Total Population	Total Whites	Total Jews	Jews as % Whites	Jews as % Total
1960	15 994 000	3 080 159	114 762	3,7	0,7
1970	21 447 982	3 773 282	118 200	3,1	0,6
1980	25 016 525	4 551 068	117 963	2,6	0,5

TABLE 2 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF JEWISH POPULATION, 1904-1980

Population	Average Annual Percentage Growth				
	1904-1926	1926-1936	1936-1960	1960-1970	1970-1980
Total Whites	2,3	2,0	2,2	2,2	2,1
Jews	4,0	2,6	1,1	0,3	-0,02

Regarding the future development of the Jewish population, we have already seen that during the period 1970 to 1980 certain events — some known, some suspected and some as yet unknown — upset previous predictions of population size and structure. Until the contributory factors are identified and understood, therefore, it would be unprofitable to attempt further projections at this stage. Furthermore, current events in South Africa add to the fluidity, and unpredictability, of those trends which will shape the community over the ensuing ten to twenty years.

### Emigration, Immigration and Internal Migration

One consequence of the country-wide unrest among Blacks from 1975 on was the unprecedented exodus of Jews to a number of other countries, including Israel. The subjective impression of those living in the country during that period was of almost daily departure of relatives, friends, neighbours and colleagues. Organized Jewish community life suffered a perceptible loss of members and leaders

while, from the perspective of the population at large, the emigration of Jewish professionals — who made up a large proportion of the total — left significant gaps. Unfortunately, there are no authoritative statistics on the extent of this emigration except for those emigrants whose destination was Israel. While these figures, derived from records of the South African Zionist Federation Office in Tel Aviv (Telfed), give no clue as to the number of Jews who went to such places as England, the United States, Canada and Australia, they are probably not markedly atypical as regards the demographic characteristics of the emigrants. The only hint as to the relative magnitude of emigration to Israel comes from the results of the 1974 socio-demographic survey of South African Jews. In the survey it was found that one-third of all family members living abroad were in Israel: certainly an estimate of the total emigration during the 1970s as being twice the net emigration to Israel (ie those still in Israel at the end of 1979) could be regarded as conservative.

TABLE 3 JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO ISRAEL, 1970-1979

Emigrants	Year of Emigration											
	Total	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	
Total at time of emigration	8 179	583	575	559	617	524	496	666	1 511	1 507	1 141	
Still in Israel at end 1979	6 158	334	284	321	366	382	358	546	1 297	1 310	960	



Between 1970-1975 the *net* annual average of immigrants to Israel was under 350. In 1976 there was a 50% increase over the previous year to 546, in 1977 to 1 297, in 1978 to 1 310 and in 1979 it declined somewhat to 960: a total of 6 158 South African Jews who had emigrated since 1970 and were still in Israel at the end of the decade. Even if it is assumed that emigration to Israel constituted no more than 50% of total Jewish emigration during the ten years — as suggested above — this would mean that over 12 000 — or more than 10% of the total 1970 Jewish population — had left the country. It was this estimate, together with prevailing fertility and mortality rates which led to the expectation that the Jewish population in 1980 was not likely to exceed 109 000.

As was mentioned, one of the reasons for the decline in the growth rate of the Jewish population was the cessation of mass immigration since the end of the 1930s. After the war, there was no resumption of large-scale Jewish immigration nor did it appear that significant numbers of Jews were included in the general immigration of western Europeans.

During the sixties and early seventies, there was a trickle of Jews from newly independent African countries such as Zambia and Zaire, but the actual number was small and probably did not reach the thousand mark. During the latter part of the seventies,

however, a slightly larger immigration from Zimbabwe (then still Rhodesia) occurred as conditions in that country worsened. Again there are no records of the number of Rhodesian Jews who arrived in South Africa but of a total population of 5 000+ reported by the Central African Jewish Board of Deputies for 1971, around 2 000 are, apparently, still living in Zimbabwe. Nor did all or, necessarily, most of the Rhodesians emigrate to South Africa — many went to England and other English-speaking countries and at least 500 emigrated to Israel. But, while at this point in the analysis it is not possible to say where immigrants came from, there are strong indications that between 1970 and 1980 between 4-6 000 Jewish immigrants arrived in South Africa. Although this is considerably less than the estimated number of Israelis, an accretion of several thousand Jews, representing about 5% of the 1970 population, is unexpected at a time when many Whites were emigrating and in the face of the long-time belief that only very small numbers of individual Jews came to settle in the country. One of the issues which will have to be investigated — if data are available — is whether this immigration was exceptional or whether it had actually been going on over a much longer period. At any rate, it does supply part of the answer to the 'surplus' population in 1980.

**TABLE 4 ESTIMATE OF JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1970-1980**

Age	Foreign-born 1970	Still alive in 1979 I	Foreign-born 1980 II	Immigrants II-I
0-9	720	—	915	915
10-64	16 990	9 851	12 694	2 843
65+	10 460	10 153-8 565	10 981	828-2 416
Total	28 170	20 004-18 416	24 590	4 586-6 174

Although, as will be discussed in the section on geographical distribution, internal migration (ie movement from one area to another within the country) has been a continuous process, the patterns of emigration and immigration during the seventies may also have exerted some influence. In the first place, although Jews emigrated from every part of the country, the data on emigrants to Israel indicate that some of the smaller cities lost proportionately more people. There is, however, another more indirect effect that may have occurred: for many years the smaller cities have provided opportunities for young businessmen and, particularly, professionals to establish themselves where doing so in Cape Town or Johannesburg might have been extremely difficult. Emigration of a disproportionate number of Jews from the higher occupational groups may well have created new opportunities in the larger centres, thus attracting people away from the smaller cities. At the same time, as we shall see, the smaller centres were no longer receiving significant numbers of immigrants from

the towns and villages.

#### **Country of Birth and Citizenship**

As the Jewish population became established and as large-scale immigration came to an end, the proportion of native-born Jews increased. Thus, even between 1970 and 1980, there was an increase from 76% to 79%. Apart from those born in Rhodesia — who had increased by almost 900 persons to 1,7% of the total — foreign-born Jews from every other major region had decreased both in number and proportion. This was particularly true of those born in Eastern Europe (not reflected in the tabulation) who had made up the bulk of the large wave of immigration from the turn of the century until the thirties.

While 93% of Jews held South African citizenship, this represented a 2% drop compared with 1970, and is, perhaps, a reflection of the balance between emigration and immigration during that period. The increase in foreign citizens applies to all regions and this should, eventually provide an additional clue as to the origin of the recent immigration.

**TABLE 5 JEWS BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND CITIZENSHIP**

Country	Birthplace		Citizenship			
	1970 %	No	1980 %	1970 %	No	1980 %
South Africa	76,2	93 363	79,1	95,1	109 744	93,0
Zimbabwe	1,0	1 999	1,7	0,6	1 068	0,9
Other Africa	1,0	1 301	1,1	—	156	0,1
United Kingdom	4,3	4 693	4,0	2,2	2 827	2,4
Germany	2,6	2 450	2,1		225	0,2
Other Europe	11,4	11 034	9,3	0,6	1 305	1,1
Israel		1,999	1,7	inc in Other	1 856	1,6
Other Asia	2,2	314	0,3	inc in Other	83	0,1
Americas & Australasia	0,6	695	0,6	0,3	613	0,5
Other Unknown	0,7	115	0,1	1,2	86	0,1
Total %	100,0		100,0	100,0		100,0
No	118 200	117 963		118 200	117 963	

### Geographical Distribution

South African Jews have always been predominantly urban. In 1921, 92% were already living in urban areas and by 1970 the proportion had risen to just under 99% where it has remained. By contrast, 88% of the total White population lived in urban areas. Although the Jews tended to concentrate in the larger cities, there were in past years scores of small but viable Jewish communities scattered throughout the small towns of South Africa. Over the years, however, Jews have moved away from the smaller towns to settle in the larger centres and, by 1960, 84% lived in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and East London, and by 1970 the proportion had increased to 88%. Between 1970 and 1980, however, the smaller cities — Port Elizabeth, East London and Bloemfontein to the greatest extent, and Pretoria and Durban to a lesser extent — had

declined as a result of both internal and external migration, while Johannesburg and Cape Town not only increased proportionately, but in absolute numbers. Thus, whereas the smaller cities had decreased in size since 1970 (ranging from -1% in Durban, through -17% in Port Elizabeth to -42% in Bloemfontein); Johannesburg had gained over 4 000 Jews and Cape Town over 1 300. Furthermore, by 1980, 80% of all Jews lived in the two largest cities. This movement from town to city and from smaller to larger metropolitan areas is also reflected in changes in the distribution of Jews among the provinces. Thus the Orange Free State, with its single major metropolitan area and many small towns has declined dramatically, the Cape and Natal have remained relatively stable and the Transvaal has increased modestly but steadily over the past twenty years.

TABLE 6 JEWS IN URBAN AREAS, 1960-1980 (PERCENTAGES)

Population	1960	1970	1980
Total Whites	83,5	86,8	87,9
Jews	98,7	98,8	98,8

The social consequences of the exodus from the smaller towns have been felt over a period of many years:

communities have dwindled and eventually ceased to exist, and synagogues and other community property have been disposed of. During the past decade or so, Port Elizabeth, East London and Bloemfontein have been faced with a similar reality: out-migration of Jews leading to a significant decrease in the size of these communities and in their ability to maintain the amenities of Jewish life which for so many years they had taken for granted. They were also hav-

ing greater difficulty in attracting personnel to fill positions of rabbi, minister, chazan, shohet mohel and teacher — and were, increasingly, unsuccessful in doing so. Whether this is the beginning of a trend which will ultimately leave these cities virtually bereft of a Jewish community, we should hesitate to predict, but it is clear that, during the eighties, these communities must constantly monitor the nature and direction of demographic changes. One such set of changes, which affect the numbers of school-going children and older persons, is discussed in the section of age and sex.

TABLE 7 MAJOR CENTRES OF JEWISH POPULATION, 1960-1980

Location(a)	1960		1970		1980		% Change	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	1970-1980	1960-1980
Johannesburg Germiston	59 205	51,7	63 190	53,6	67 820	57,5	7,3	14,5
Cape Town								
Metropolitan Area	22 716	19,8	25 650	21,7	26 977	22,9	5,2	18,8
Durban Metropolitan Area	5 353	4,7	5 990	5,1	5 930	5,0	-1,0	10,8
Pretoria Metropolitan Area	3 553	3,1	3 750	3,2	3 487	3,0	-7,0	-1,9
Port Elizabeth Metro Area	2 972	2,6	2 820	2,4	2 348	2,0	-16,7	-21,0
East Rand	3 743	3,3	2 940	2,5	2 303	2,0	-21,7	-38,5
West Rand	1 951	1,7	2 240	1,9	1 362	1,1	-39,2	-30,2
East London	1 023	0,9	800	0,7	641	0,5	-19,9	-37,3
Bloemfontein Metro Area	1 219	1,1	1 200	1,0	690	0,6	-42,5	-43,4
Vereeniging								
Vanderbijl Park	731	0,6	720	0,6	510	0,4	-29,2	-30,2
Kimberley	551	0,5	400	0,3	330	0,3	-17,5	-40,1
Orange Free State Goldfields	524	0,4	400	0,3	266	0,2	-33,5	-49,2
Total - Major Locations	103 541	90,4	110 100	93,3	112 664	95,9	2,3	8,8
Rest Republic of SA	10 960	9,6	7 890	6,7	5 299	4,5	-32,8	-51,6
Total Republic of SA	114 501	100,0	118 200(b)	100,0	117 963	100,0	-0,2	3,0

(a) Boundaries of metropolitan areas vary to some extent between censuses. Some of the intercensal population changes are due to this factor.

(b) The figures for 1970 are based on the 10% sample census, as final figures for the Jewish population were not available for all centres. The total number of Jews in 1970 according to the 10% sample was 117 990 and is the actual total of the figures in this column. For the sake of a more accurate overall picture, however, the final total for the 1970 Jewish population is given, and the percentage change in the penultimate column is based upon this figure.

TABLE 8 JEWISH POPULATION ACCORDING TO PROVINCE, 1960-1980

Province	1960	1970	1980	Jews as % Whites 1980
Cape	28,0	27,1	27,4	2,5
Natal	5,4	5,7	5,5	1,2
Transvaal	63,8	65,3	66,0	3,3
Orange Free State	2,8	1,9	1,1	0,4
Total %	100,0	100,0	100,0	—
No	114,762	118,200	117,963	—



## Age and Sex

The Jewish population in South Africa, as in other countries of the diaspora, is an aging population. As the proportion of Jews in the older age-groups has increased and that of the younger age-groups has decreased, the median age has gradually risen from 26 years in 1926 to 34 in 1960, with a slight drop to 33 in 1970 and 1980. During the period of 1970 to 1980 the proportion of children and young adults under the age of 20 dropped from 33% of all Jews to 29%, while those aged 65 years and over increased from 11% in 1970 to 17% in 1980. The extent of this aging process becomes clearer when Jews are compared with the White population as a whole. Although the White population has also aged — from a median age of 23 in 1926 to 26 in 1970 — the rise has been more gradual so that the gap between Jews and all Whites has doubled. This reflects the fact that, compared with total Whites, 8% less Jews are under 20 and twice the proportion are 65 or over.

A noteworthy feature of the age distribution in 1980 is its unevenness as compared with the relatively 'flat' distribution of 1970. Whereas in the previous census, the size of age groups from 25 up ranged between 10,4% to 13,7%, the range in 1980 was between 9,9% and 17,1%. This drastic change in the age structure of the community is probably due largely to the effects of emigration and immigration. If we examine the ages in 1970 of those who emigrated to Israel between 1970 and 1979, we find that almost three-quarters had been under 35 years of age when they had been enumerated in the last census, while only 6% had been over the age of 55. This means that in 1980 there would be a 'deficit' in the 10-44 year-old group (ie age of

emigrants in 1970 plus 10 years), but hardly any among those who survived and passed into the oldest age level. The age distribution of immigrants, included for the first time in the 1980 census, also contributed to the overall pattern: the large proportion of elderly immigrants (18%) augmented further the older age-groups, while those aged between 25-34 and 35-44 appeared to have effectively offset the effects of emigration.

Another change, related largely to the increase of older people, is the masculinity rate. Whereas in 1970 there were 97 males to every 100 females, this had dropped to 95 per 100 in 1980. In particular, among the 65+ age-group masculinity had fallen from 88 to 83. While the overall decline could have been explained simply in terms of the increase in the proportion of older people (of whom the majority are always women because of their higher life expectancy), the change within the age group suggests that it was affected by differences in the migration patterns of men and women. Either more older women immigrated than men, or more older men had emigrated than women — or a combination of the two. It should be noted that there does not appear to be any significant change in masculinity rates in the younger age groups.

The implications for the community of the changes in its age structure become apparent when the absolute numbers are examined. In the country as a whole, the age-group 0-19 years has declined from over 38 000 in 1970 to less than 34 000 in 1980, while those aged 65 and over have increased from less than 14 000 to over 20 000. The impact of these changes is different in

the various centres of Jewish settlement. As has been shown in the section on geographical distribution, there has been a marked migration away from the smaller urban centres towards Johannesburg and Cape Town. This migration has been predominantly among younger working-age adults and their children. The result is a decline in the number of school-going children in certain areas and an increase of older people. In Port Elizabeth, for example, there were about 600 children up to the age of 14 in 1974; in 1980 this had fallen to 528. On the other hand, during the

same six-year period, the number of people aged 65 and over had increased from 423 to 492. Although these figures are quite small, they represent significant numbers in a small community which must plan and maintain facilities for the two most dependent sectors of the population. In Johannesburg, on the other hand, those under 15 increased from 13 000 in 1974 to 15 000 and those aged 65+ from 6 540 to 11 200. The current situation in the five major centres is presented in Table 10 in which the ages have been grouped in terms of the most significant social categories.

TABLE 9 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF JEWS AND TOTAL WHITES, 1970 AND 1980 (PERCENTAGES)

Age	1970		1980		Age in 1970	Age in 1980
	Jews	Whites	Jews	Whites	Emigrants to Israel	Immigrants to RSA
Up to 19	32,7	40,4	28,5	36,5	44	33
20-24	7,9	8,5	7,4	8,6	14	8
25-34	11,9	14,4	14,3	16,1	14	22
35-44	10,4	11,7	11,7	13,3	6	12
45-54	12,0	10,1	9,9	9,6	6	5
55-64	13,7	8,3	11,1	7,8	4	2
65+	11,4	6,6	17,1	8,1	2	18
Total %	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100	100
No	118 200	3 773 282	117 963	4 531 068	6 087	4 586

TABLE 10 JEWS BY AGE AND SEX, 1980

Age	Total		Males		Females		Males per 100 Females
	No	%	No	%	No	%	
Up to 19	33 600	28,5	17 327	30,1	16 273	26,9	106
20-34	25 511	21,6	12 892	22,4	12 619	20,9	102
35-54	25 492	21,6	12 046	21,0	13 446	22,2	90
55-64	13 201	11,2	6 047	10,5	7 154	11,8	84
65+	20 159	17,1	9 166	16,0	10 993	18,2	83
Total	117 963	100,0	57 478	100,0	60 485	100,0	95

**TABLE 11 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION IN FIVE MAJOR CENTRES ACCORDING TO SEX AND SOCIALLY SIGNIFICANT CATEGORIES, 1980**

Age	Cape Peninsula		Port Elizabeth Uitenhage		Durban		Pretoria		Johannesburg Germiston	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Preschool:										
0-2	490	408	43	34	93	87	51	62	1348	1262
3-5	505	469	58	58	95	81	70	60	1542	1459
School-going:										
6-12	1398	1219	129	128	315	333	186	184	3835	3620
13-17	961	958	94	97	198	180	132	135	2611	2494
Students/Working:										
18	210	201	7	18	34	23	62	19	536	520
19	221	265	10	7	41	34	75	18	508	508
20-24	1089	1007	52	38	185	153	215	77	2689	2666
Working:										
25-64	5874	6630	585	586	1389	1508	833	792	15118	17247
Senior Citizens:										
65-74	1501	1784	151	191	415	408	195	171	3433	3972
75+	699	1086	82	68	137	221	74	76	1524	2287
Total	12948	14027	1211	1225	2902	3028	1893	1594	33144	36035

### Education and Occupation

In comparing the educational levels of Jews with those of all Whites, it must be borne in mind that there are considerably more children in the total population than among the Jews and that this has the effect of inflating the lower educational levels in the total population. Nevertheless, when educational levels for those aged over 15 or over 20 are compared, Jews continue to be better-educated than Whites in general. In fact, if Jews are compared with Anglicans, who are generally regarded as a well-educated segment of the White community, we find that more Jews complete high school and more obtain university degrees. Thus Jews are over-represented at all educational levels from

matriculation up. On the other hand, it is clear that the general level of Whites as a whole has improved to a greater extent than that of Jews during the period 1970-1980, so that by 1980 the proportion of Jews in the higher levels had decreased perceptibly except, for whatever reason, at the Master's degree level. This may have been the effect of an exodus of the more highly educated Jews, but no data are available on this point. It should also be noted that the overall improvement in Jewish levels since 1970 may well be due to the further reduction in the proportion of school-going children and in the diminishing proportion of uneducated (in a formal sense) older Eastern European immigrants.

**TABLE 12 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF JEWS AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATION, 1970 AND 1980 AND ANGLICANS, 1980 (PERCENTAGES)**

Highest Educational Level	1970			1980			
	Jews	Whites	Jews as % Whites	Jews	Anglicans	Whites	Jews as % Whites
No Education							
Unknown	13,4	15,9	2,6	12,8	12,5	15,1	2,2
Up to Standard 9 (Grade 11)	43,3	60,3	2,2	35,3	43,5	52,6	1,7
Standard 10 (Grade 12)	28,6	15,5	5,8	30,0	24,8	19,5	4,0
Non-graduate							
Diploma	7,3	5,4	4,2	11,1	13,0	8,6	3,3
Bachelor's Degree	6,8	2,5	8,5	9,9	5,5	3,8	6,8
Master's Degree	0,4	0,3	4,2	0,6	0,5	0,3	5,0
Doctoral Degree	0,2	0,1	7,3	0,3	0,2	0,1	5,6

Both the Whites in general and the Jewish population in particular exhibited a somewhat 'higher' occupational profile in 1970 than in 1980 — with the greater degree of improvement in the White population as a whole. As already suggested in relation to education, one reason for the 'improved' profile, is the reduction in the number and proportion of older, uneducated, non-professional Eastern European immigrants. Thus, it is possible that educational and occupational distributions of locally-educated Jews may have become stabilized but that overall changes will still be apparent until the earlier immigrant generation has died out. It is also likely that the change between 1970 and 1980 might have been greater if not for the fact that a disproportionately large number of professionals emigrated while those in the 'lower' level occupations emigrated to a markedly lesser degree — with the exception of production workers.

Among women there was upward mobility into the professions — markedly so among Jewish women —

while among Jewish women there was also increased representation in managerial and administrative occupations. This upward mobility among women occurred despite the large proportion of professional emigrants.

### Concluding Remarks

The 1980 census results reflects significant changes in the demographic structure of the South Africa Jewish community. The Census has also raised a number of critical questions which necessitate further analysis, not only of the 1980 figures but also of other available data. These questions arise, primarily, out of the relatively stable size of the Jewish population as compared with 1970, when all the evidence pointed to a significant decline. Some tentative suggestions, based on data (not yet conclusive) on emigration and immigration, have been made and attention has been drawn to some of the immediate implications for the community. It is hoped that as the analysis continues, new insights and understandings will further illuminate the issues raised.



**TABLE 13 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF JEWS AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATION, 1970 AND 1980, AND NET JEWISH EMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL 1970-1979**

Occupation	1970			1980			Jewish
	Jews	Whites	Jews as % Whites	Jews	Whites	Jews as % Whites	Emigrants to Israel
<b>A MALES</b>							
Professional and Technical	24,0	14,4	5,5	29,8	18,9	4,1	40,3
Managerial & Administrative	23,1	7,1	10,6	23,5	10,0	6,2	24,6
Clerical	8,2	15,1	1,8	7,0	13,0	1,4	2,9
Sales	30,5	9,4	10,7	25,8	9,5	7,1	12,4
Services	4,2	7,3	1,9	4,5	8,8	1,3	1,2
Production	7,0	35,5	0,6	6,8	31,4	0,6	10,5
Agricultural	1,4	8,7	0,5	1,2	6,8	0,4	—
Not Classified							
Unknown	1,6	2,5	2,1	1,4	1,6	2,3	8,1
Total Economically Active %	100,0	100,0	—	100,0	100,0	—	100,0
No	34 842	1 060 919	3,3	33 360	1 276 260	2,6	1 544
Total	58 364	1 881 813	3,1	57 478	2 268 478	2,5	2 924
Economically Active as % of Total	59,7	56,4	—	58,0	56,3	—	52,8
<b>B FEMALES</b>							
Professional and Technical	19,8	17,9	3,8	26,7	21,7	3,5	36,6
Managerial & Administrative	4,8	1,1	15,0	5,6	1,9	8,6	2,5
Clerical	48,7	54,1	3,1	43,9	55,2	2,3	44,8
Sales	18,5	12,6	5,1	16,8	10,3	4,6	3,5
Services	3,6	5,7	2,2	3,9	6,0	1,8	4,3
Production	1,5	3,8	1,4	1,2	2,7	1,2	1,5
Agricultural	0,2	0,9	0,7	0,1	0,7	0,4	—
Not Classified							
Unknown	2,9	3,9	2,6	1,8	1,5	3,5	6,8
Total Economically Active %	100,0	100,0	—	100,0	100,0	—	100,0
No	15 380	447 983	3,4	18 062	631 948	2,9	1 300
Total	59,836	1 891 469	3,2	60 485	2 282 590	2,6	3 099
Economically Active as % of Total	26,0	23,7	—	29,9	27,7	—	42,0

## Some Bibliographical and Methodological Notes

It will be noted that this paper has not been footnoted nor have text or tables been referenced with regard to sources. Instead, a select bibliography of recent publications which have been consulted, is provided as well as a list of primary data sources.

In connection with tabulations, it should be noted that the 1980 figures are based either on tables published by the Central Statistical Services or on a tape containing partial information pertaining to 108 000 out of the total 117 963 Jews. In the tables, data from the tapes have been inflated so as to total 117 963.

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publications and handouts based on census and other data: unpublished tabulations based on 10% sample of Jews enumerated in the 1970 census; tape containing partial data from 1980 census on whole Jewish population of six statistical regions *South African Jewish Board of Deputies - Social Research Unit:* In addition to funding the purchase of the sample tabulations in 1970, the tapes in 1980 and various census publications the Board, through its Social Research Unit, carried out empirical studies of births, deaths and marriages, as well as the countrywide Socio-demographic Survey of the Jewish Population (upon which the *Advance Reports* cited in the bibliography are largely based).

*South African Zionist Federation Tel Aviv Office (Telfed):* Analysis by the author of *aliya* (immigration to Israel) records kept by the Federation for the years 1970-1979. Analysis of a random sample of detailed records to determine number and characteristics of immigrants who were still in Israel at the end of 1979.

### Acknowledgements

I should like to record my appreciation to the following people who have, in some or other way, contributed to this analysis: Mr Gus Saron, former General Secretary of the Board of Deputies who did so much to initiate and encourage demographic research in the community; Mr Aleck Goldberg, Executive Director of the Board of Deputies, without whose continued support we would not have had the data for analysis of the 1980 census; My colleagues at the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University — Professor U O Schmeltz and Dr Sergio DellaPergola for their interest and advice;

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# AIDL BULLETIN

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## The African National Congress A Closer Look

by Nathan Perlmutter  
and David Evanier

**D**iscussion of the political scene in South Africa properly begins with the self-evident stipulation that apartheid is racist and dehumanizing.

If you are a black citizen of South Africa, you cannot vote in national elections; you must generally use separate public facilities; you are not allowed to own real estate in 87 percent of your own country; you are told with whom you may socialize, and where you can look for a job. If the government wants to resettle you, it can do so at any time for any reason.

The "homelands" resettlement drive has forced half of South Africa's blacks into overcrowded, unproductive segregated *Bantustans*, areas with no industrial base that are so overpopulated hardly any viable agricultural land remains. Drinking water is unsafe and sanitation deplorable. Since the *Bantustans*

*Nathan Perlmutter is national director of the Anti-Defamation League and David Evanier is a member of the League's Civil Rights Division Research Department.*



*Oliver Tambo, African National Congress president*

are little more than detention camps, many Africans migrate to urban centers as "illegals" subject to arrest. Forty percent of black children are estimated to be malnourished and ten percent suffer from *kwashiorkor* (extreme protein deficiency).

In 1984, Pretoria's Constitution granted Parliament chambers to Asian and "colored" communities but not to blacks.

On the positive side, black, colored and Asian trade union membership has grown from 150,000 after legalization in 1979 to 750,000 today and blacks' real income has risen substantially in the last 25 years, higher than in any other African country. The U.S. State Department says that more positive changes have taken place in South Africa in the last five years than in the previous 300.

Hotels, parks and theaters are being integrated, and the pass laws controlling where blacks can live and work were recently revoked. Other reform commitments that are going to be translated into legislation include guaranteeing blacks freehold property rights.

Paul Johnson, British historian and former editor of the *New Statesman*, recently wrote

*Continued on page 12*

## COMMENT:

# What Else Is There To Say?



**B**elieve It or Not seems like a suitable title for this month's Comment. And so with a nod of thanks to Robert Ripley, here goes:

• Harry Belafonte, commenting on his suddenly aborted New York Senate candidacy, allowed as how he had been misquoted and misrepresented by "the white press" (hiss? boo?). The author of the report he was faulting was one Ron Howell.

Howell is a Black.

• Twenty-two percent of the polled population viewed Orthodox Jews as "opportunists, liars and charlatans" and another 22 percent think of them in terms of religious coercion.

The survey was conducted in Jerusalem.

• Recently local inhabitants "rose up in arms" against an Hassidic sect's attempt to buy property on which to build a religious center. Not very far away, a majority of residents demonstrated in the streets against a municipally-approved plan to build a synagogue and yeshiva. Where did this happen?

The former in Yavne'el in the Lower Galilee; the latter in Jerusalem.

• In Mayor Andrew Young's Atlanta, 35 percent of the contracts for design, construction and operation of a major development project has been set aside on a racial (racist?) basis. For minorities only. Recently a minority group member qualified for one of the architectural contracts. He soon lost it, however. Blacks had complained.

The poor fellow was a minority member alright enough, but alas, he's Chinese.

• A headline of a UPI story: "Jews in Nicaragua Reject U.S. Claim They Are Persecuted by Sandinistas." The headlines backup in the body of the story? "Social Welfare Minister Reynaldo Antonio Tefel, a practicing Roman Catholic whose Jewish predecessors lived in Nicaragua since 1860, denied the tiny community has been persecuted by the Sandinistas."

"A practicing Roman Catholic" is "Jews in Nicaragua"?

• The speaker compared Israel to the Nazi regime at its worst. More, he termed Israel itself to be a neo-Nazi state. He said Israel is copying Hitler's laws and methods, and that Jews helped Hitler into power and financed his war machine. Lyndon LaRouche? No. An Aryan Nations hoodlum? No. It was Dimitri Bykov. Dimitri Bykov? Who's he? A cultist? A professional anti-Semite?

He's the Soviet Union's delegate to—Believe It or Not—the United Nations' Human Rights Commission.

—Nathan Perlmutter

National Director, Anti-Defamation League

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"To stop defamation of the Jewish people . . .  
To secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike."

—ADL CHARTER 1913

# A Time To Remember

by Abraham H. Foxman

**I**t is that time of year again, the Days of Remembrance, a time to remember and to reflect. The single day is called *Yom Hashoa*, Holocaust Remembrance Day, and we remember the millions who were killed by a nation that used bureaucratic precision and skill to do what other nations had tried for centuries.

For the Holocaust, now two generations removed, was the culmination of a structure that began several dozens of generations ago. There can be no meaningful study of the Holocaust without at least a reminder of that Jewish experience of two millennia. It was an experience that too frequently exposed the Jews to a variety of appalling options in hostile anti-Semitic environments. They ranged, as Professor Raul Hilberg put it, from: "you are not allowed to live amongst us as Jews" (the Inquisitions), through "you are not allowed to live amongst us" (the Expulsions), to finally: "you are not allowed to live" (Nazism).

Dr. Joseph Mengele, in a calm, philosophical conversation with a colleague, expressed some thoughts on the necessity to implement the "you are not allowed to live" formula. He said that mankind had tried everything from forced conversions to Christianity, through expulsion, through limiting living space to ghettos, through pogroms, but nothing, he concluded, helped to rid the world of the Jews. Therefore, he rationalized, only a systematic, well-planned and executed extermination policy could bring about a "final solution to the Jewish question."

Last year was the 40th anniversary of the days when the gates to the concentration camps were opened and the world

glimpsed the heaps of bodies, living skeletons and indescribable horrors that became known as the Holocaust.

Some people asked why was there so much commemoration on the 40th anniversary? Why not wait for the 50th?

How many of those who remember firsthand will be here to tell the story? There will be records, books—more than 20,000 titles to date, but few eyewitnesses. Some 20,000 books on the Holocaust! That figure alone must give the ill-informed a hint of the magnitude of this tragedy.

Another figure also comes to mind. It is smaller but certainly frightening. There are 200 books written so far *denying* the Holocaust. Such tampering with history seems unbelievable with so many of the victims still alive. Yet a whole new band of falsifiers of history is busy at work.

How could the Holocaust happen? The question has a thousand variants: What did people know? What did they do? The search for answers is important. It is safe to say that they will not make us proud.

The year 1942 was not yet over when it became widely known that Hitler was liquidating European Jewry. The response was silence . . . silence in the name of the "larger picture"—the war effort against Germany. Perhaps Churchill and Roosevelt felt a need for silence, but what was the press doing, especially American journalists with their freedom from restraints?

Deborah Lipstadt has made a valuable contribution shedding light on this question. In her book "Beyond Belief," subtitled "The American Press and The Coming of the Holocaust—1933-1945," Professor Lipstadt puts forward an awesome thesis: If the American press had done its job, public opinion would have forced governments to action and hundreds of thousands of Jews might have been saved. There were exceptions, Ed Murrow and Bill Downs among them. Someone aptly called them the "Righteous Brothers of Broadcasting." But exceptions were not enough to make

Mr. Foxman, a survivor of the Holocaust, is associate national director of the Anti-Defamation League and head of its International Affairs Division.



Whitstone Photo

## Remembering the Holocaust

**T**elelevision cameras and news reporters recorded the Anti-Defamation League's special interfaith ceremony marking *Yom Hashoah*, the Day of Holocaust Remembrance. Several hundred New Yorkers attended the event at the Holocaust Memorial Wall on the Dag Hammarskjold Plaza side of ADL's national headquarters building. The Wall's series of seven bronze bas-reliefs by sculptor Ardit Blatas depicts the various phases of the Nazi massacre of six million Jews. Pictured at the podium during the ceremony is John Cardinal O'Connor, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York.

Others taking part are, l. to r., Nat Kameny, chairman of ADL's International Center for Holocaust Studies; Moshe Yegar, Israel Consul General in New York; Kenneth J. Bialkin, ADL's national chairman; Dr. Ronald B. Sobel, chairman of the League's Intergroup Relations Committee and senior rabbi at Temple Emanu-El, New York; Nathan Perlmutter, ADL's national director; Metropolitan Silas, spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox Diocese of New Jersey; and Abraham H. Foxman, ADL's associate national director and director of its International Affairs Division, a Holocaust survivor himself, who ended the service with the recitation of the Kaddish. □

the difference between rescue and death.

In December, 1942, Mr. Murrow told the world from London: "What is happening is this: Millions of human beings, most of them Jews, are being gathered up with ruthless efficiency and murdered. . . . The phrase 'concentration camps' is now obsolete. . . . It is now possible to speak of extermination camps." Why did the majority of the press fail to tell the story? Professor Lipstadt finds disbelief as one reason.

What about ordinary people? Were they shocked, outraged at the "final solution." Some were, but others, as historian Martin Gilbert shows in his book on the Holocaust, enjoyed torturing and killing. The Gilbert book describes murderers laughing as they were killing. (Pictures of the good citizens of Vienna come to mind, smiling as their fellow citizens, the Jews of Austria, scrubbed the sidewalks with toothbrushes.)

We have become dependent on the visual media for lasting impressions. Claude Lanzmann in his film "Shoah" offers some powerful lasting images. Simone de Beauvoir, in an introduction to the published text of Lanzmann's film, said: "Faces. They, most of them, seem indifferent, ironic and even satisfied. . . . The oddest are the German faces. Franz Suchomel, the former SS *Unterscharfuhrer* at Treblinka, remains impassive, except when he sings a song glorifying Treblinka and then his eyes light up. But the embarrassed, foxy expressions of the others give the lie to their protestations that they did not know and are innocent."

In 1942, Jan Karsky, a member of the Polish Home Army, was entrusted by Jewish underground leaders to carry their appeals for help to the leaders of the West-

*Continued on page 8*

# A Study in Democracy

by Jack J. Zurofsky

*"...When it comes to democracy, Jews really have no need to ask is it good for the Jews? We know that democracy is good for Jews but we worry about its well-being. . . . In our deliberations, we'll try to explore our people and our nation—what we want and how we stand with the world. . . . Some of the very best minds of our country are here to take a searching look at the confusions and alarms of the present, at the problems—and possibilities—of things to come. . . ."*

**S**o said Nathan Perlmutter, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, in his opening remarks at a unique two-day invitational colloquium cosponsored by ADL and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Castle on the Mall of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC. The theme was "Democratic Freedoms, Democratic Responsibility: The Delicate Balance Between Liberty and License." Nearly 80 leaders from diverse stratas of American life participated.

The keynote paper, written by Sidney Hook, professor emeritus of New York University and a fellow of the Hoover Institution, was on: "Defense of Democracy." Six concurrent workshop sessions explored the democratic roles of government and the political process; business and labor; education and academe; media; ethnic, racial and religious leadership, and science and technology.

According to Dr. Hook, "a crisis threatens the very survival of a free self-governing society in the United States." (Dr. Hook was not present because of illness. His paper was summarized by Jeffrey A. Ross, director of ADL's Higher Education and Campus Affairs Department, who was the principal organizer of the conference.)

*Jack J. Zurofsky is a writer on the staff of ADL's Communications Division.*

The Hook paper warned that allegiance to democratic ideals and practices is eroding, because of:

- The vehement assertion of rights and entitlements without the acceptance of concomitant duties and obligations;
- Increasing assertion of group rights overriding individual ones;
- The growth and tolerance of violence;
- Open defiance of laws and a lack of legal redress toward repeated violators;
- The continued invasions by the courts themselves into provinces not intended by the Constitution;

- The loss of faith in the electorate as the ultimate custodian of its own freedom.

These problems, he indicated, "raise the question of whether we possess the basic social cohesion and solidarity today to survive the challenge to our society from *without*, particularly that posed by the global expansion of Communism."

Professor Hook called for fundamental educational reforms, honest inquiry into the functioning of a democratic community and intensive study of the theory and practice of contemporary totalitarian societies. He urged a *domestic* National Endowment for Democracy, calling it more necessary than the one of the same name created by the Administration to encourage the spread of democratic forces abroad.

He deplored the widespread opposition to calls for a new Constitutional Convention "as a contradiction of the Jeffersonian faith" and said that, timed for the Constitution's bicentenary, such a convention "could become the occasion for a great historic debate. . . reviewing and interpreting the experience of two centuries."

In response, Lloyd Cutler, cochairman of the Commission on Constitutional Alternatives and former counsel to President Jimmy Carter, challenged the concept of a new Constitutional Convention as an idea whose time has passed. The original framers, he pointed out, were a small group



of men. Today, he said, "in our interest-group society, I can't conceive who would come or what its subject matter would be."

"It is far better to amend the Constitution in the time-honored way," he stated.

Pointing out that Professor Hook's six reasons for democratic erosion are conditions that have existed since the country's birth, Mr. Cutler said that the United States currently is "less violent, more law-abiding and has less hate" than ever before.

He also rejected the proposal for a domestic National Endowment for Democracy because, in addition to creating another federal bureaucracy, he feared the potential dangers of a government agency determining the nature of democracy.

Declaring that democracy is facing a fundamental test in its confrontation with terrorism, Mr. Cutler expressed concern that some forms of counteraction might lead to limitations of civil rights such as invasion of privacy.

Mr. Cutler cited a need to revive the strength of our political parties so that they can once again assume mediating roles in the political system. He also called for limits on campaign expenditures. This view was echoed by John Brademas, president of New York University and a former Congressman. He reported that his campaign costs had increased nearly 15-fold in 25 years.

Another participant, Ira Katznelson, a political scientist and dean of the graduate faculty of New York's New School for Social Research, pointed out that American political parties formerly served as "linkages between the people and the state." Histor-

ically, he noted, the party machine at the local level served to absorb and integrate new immigrants. The Democrats, he said, especially were the "party of ethnicity." Today, he observed, "the party is much less available as an entry vehicle."

Mass media was seen as a primary culprit in the decline of the political party system. Dr. Brademas asserted that television eliminates the need for mediating party mechanisms. Kenneth J. Bialkin, ADL's national chairman, observed that television oversimplifies issues and "diminishes political nuances."

Education was cited as a major source of concern. Dean Katznelson pinpointed what he termed "the remarkable decay of the values of republicanism in the public schools." Founded as common schools to mix people of different social classes and ethnicities, he said, today they are fragmented with private schools and the suburbanization of the middle class siphoning off the well-to-do. The result is a mass of poorer students in inner city schools.

A plenary session focused on reports from the six workshops. The "Government and Political Process" workshop was summarized by Stuart Eizenstadt, chief domestic advisor in the Carter Administration, and Hugh D. Graham, professor of history at the University of Maryland.

They said that the group explored the pendulum swing from greater to lesser government involvement and that concern was noted that the results are creating both paralysis and, paradoxically, excesses of government control.

Summarizing the workshop on "Business and Labor," Herbert Berman, chair-



From left, Herbert Berman, Father Healy, Prosser Gifford, Wilson Center deputy director, and Richard Ralston, a Wilson Center fellow. Dr. John Brademas with James Billington and Stuart Eizenstadt.



Smithsonian Institution

man of ADL's Higher Education and Campus Affairs Committee, said his panel was more successful in defining problems than in finding solutions. The group agreed that while organized labor is becoming destabilized, business becomes better organized and more influential. The group consensus was a need to develop methods to cope with the effects of federal deregulation of various industries and the pace of innovation and technological advances. While stressing the benefits of free enterprise, the panelists felt that they must not be at the expense of the public interest.

The Rev. Timothy Healy, president of Georgetown University, reporting on the "Education and Academe" workshop, voiced a growing concern over the potential effect of proposed federal budget cuts on the educational system.

He said there was acknowledgement of government support for higher education but on the level of primary and secondary schools, there are continuing problems such as who determines what should be taught, how schools are evaluated and the safety of schools in inner cities.

Wycliffe Bennett, former director general for the Jamaican Broadcasting System and a fellow of the Wilson Center, summarized the "Media" workshop discussion. He said there was some concern about journalists who act as though they are not accountable to the public. The group noted that new papers are proliferating in smaller communities, adding to pluralism and providing greater diversity of views.

He said that television, a mechanism for communal sorrow and joy, is replacing

moral criteria with concern for style. He added that while TV helps to centralize issues and homogenize society, it takes values for granted without confirming them and has little mechanism for public involvement such as "letters to the editor" in newspapers.

Michael Novak, a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute and author of "The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics," reported on the "Ethnic, Racial and Religious Leadership" workshop. He noted that the importance of ethnic groups in the American system is now an accepted fact, a remarkable change in the 15 years since he wrote his book.

How to make democracy work while respecting the differences and interests of these groups is a difficult matter, Mr. Novak observed. With Americans now coming from every corner of the globe, ethnic groups are identifying with many important issues of foreign policy, he said.

Nobel Laureate Rosalyn Yalow of the Albert Einstein School of Medicine, Yeshiva University, summarized the workshop on "Science and Technology." Noting that many children seem to be losing a desire to learn mathematics, she warned of the development of a "scientocracy" in which an exclusive scientific elite would dominate. She urged that essential education be developed to create a scientifically literate citizenry. "There must be interaction between science and technology for the common good," she said. Genetic research, she noted, is vital "not for the development of supermen but to take care of 3,000 genetic diseases."

At a panel discussion on international

From left, Rosalyn Yalow, Jeffrey Ross and Lloyd Cutler during Conference sessions.



Smithsonian Institution



affairs, Paul Warnke, chief arms negotiator in the Carter Administration, warned against American involvement in foreign disputes, such as Angola and Nicaragua. As long as Soviet bases are not established there, they should not be seen as a threat to U.S. security, he asserted, adding that the U.S.S.R. is no great rival in the economic and political spheres.

"We should endeavor to achieve our objectives by non-military means," he said, "separating out the ideological conflict from the security threat."

James Billington, a Soviet affairs specialist and director of the Wilson Center, in response declared that Mr. Warnke was minimizing the challenge from the U.S.S.R. Ehud Sprinzak, Hebrew University political scientist, added that Mr. Warnke underestimated the dangers of terrorism.

Mr. Perlmutter took issue with Mr. Warnke's views, calling them a "prescription for isolationism" which discounted "the preciousness of democracy."

## Satisfied Feeling

In summing up the Conference discussions, Mr. Bialkin noted the participants' general feeling of satisfaction with American democracy. "There is no cry for reform or change, no attack on institutions as such... even a lack of debate on the role of the federal government.

"The general consensus," he observed, "is that around the world it is evident that the U.S. system has won, the other system has lost. I am not suggesting that the world has embraced democracy... far from it. But the world has recognized that our system of free economic growth is one which will dominate as far as the world economies are concerned."

The Colloquium ended with a special reception at the historic Indian Treaty Room of the Old Executive Office Building with William Bennett, Secretary of Education, as the speaker.

The Secretary recommended that schools improve instruction about America's democratic legacy and teach more American history. He stressed the importance of using the classroom to communicate the principles of democracy and to give "children a sense of the expectations that adults have for them." □

## Time to Remember *cont. from p. 4*

ern world. Karsky succeeded in his mission but Western leaders failed to respond. He personally informed President Roosevelt, members of his Cabinet, the Catholic hierarchy and prominent Jewish leaders. Karsky alone strengthens a historical fact: The world knew, the world did painfully little.

Ada Celka, a Polish Christian woman, who lived in poverty with her sister and a paralyzed father, did stop Hitler in her own small way. By hiding a hungry poor Jewish girl, Danuta Brill, she stopped Hitler from killing her. Another Polish Christian family stopped Hitler from killing yet another Jew, Nechama Tec. Today, Nechama Tec has told the world about the horror in her book, "When Light Pierced the Darkness: Christian Rescue of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland."

To study the Holocaust is meaningless unless we learn from the acts of Ada Celka as much as we learn from those of Churchill or Roosevelt.

Read Deborah Lipstadt's book; read Nechama Tec's book; read "The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945" by David S. Wyman; read "The Unwanted European Refugees in the 20th Century" by Michael R. Marrus; read "Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945" by Bernard Wasserstein; read "The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust" by Monty Noam Penkower; read "None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933-1948" by Irving Abella and Harold Troper; read "The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth About Hitler's 'Final Solution'" by Walter Laqueur; read "Were We Our Brothers' Keepers?: The Public Response of American Jews to the Holocaust 1938-1944" by Haskel Lookstein; read "The Moses of Rovno" by Douglas K. Huneke; read "Wallenberg" by Kati Marton; read "Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web" by Elenore Lester; read "The Politics of Rescue" by Henry Feingold; and read "Accounting for Genocide" by Helen Fein.

While reading and remembering, ask why—why was the world so insensitive, so silent, so uncaring, so apathetic? Why did it permit the slaughter of six million? □

# ADL/America's Schools: Partners in Education

by Frances M. Sonnenschein

The American population is dramatically changing, becoming increasingly diverse both racially and ethnically. Between 1970 and 1980, while the general population grew by 11 percent, the number of Asian Americans increased by 256 percent and Hispanics by 65 percent. By the year 2000, minorities will be in the majority in 53 major American cities and the state of California.

This growing pluralism is reflected in the nation's schools. More than 25 percent of all public school students are now of minority backgrounds. The figure is notably higher in a number of states: 57 percent in New Mexico, 46 percent in Texas, 43 percent in California, 33 percent in Arizona and in Maryland, 32 percent in New York, and 35 percent in all the Southeastern states, combined.

As a result, schools are attempting to assimilate new arrivals from 75 or 80 different countries, most with no knowledge of English, many with cultural heritages far removed from our own.

The new demographics have presented the schools with a number of serious concerns in the area of intergroup relations. For example:

- How can educators best gain information about the cultural and behavioral backgrounds of their diverse student bodies?
- How can educators facilitate better intergroup understanding among pluralistic school populations?
- How, even as they foster respect and recognition of varying cultures, do educators also develop strong national identification and commitment to American ideals and values?

For help, many schools have turned to the Anti-Defamation League, which has been known for more than 40 years as the

premier source of materials and teaching techniques on prejudice reduction and multicultural education. The League has responded by adding new educational materials, both print and audiovisual; developing innovative new programs and projects; and working with major educational organizations to define the challenges presented by the changing nature of American society.

ADL has developed two curriculum modules, *The Wonderful World of Difference* for elementary schools and *Being Fair and Being Free* for secondary schools, which offer an interesting new format. Each consists of student activity sheets, self-contained lessons that can be reproduced in quantity. There are lessons on the evils of prejudice and how prejudiced attitudes and behavior conflict with the basic beliefs and values of democratic society.

The League is also updating and expanding materials to provide detailed knowledge about today's diverse student populations. The Department of Multicultural and Multilingual Education of the Chicago public schools and leaders of ethnic, racial and religious communities around the country are assisting the League in compiling data.

The agency's new film and video acquisitions echo the new prejudice reduction emphasis. They include: The 1986 Academy Award short subject, "Molly's Pilgrim," the story of a Russian-Jewish immigrant girl, teased by her classmates, who helps them discover the true nature of being American; "The Children's Story," a powerful film, focusing on the fragility of democratic beliefs; two new public service television spots, featuring Angela Lansbury

*Frances M. Sonnenschein is director of the Education Department of ADL's Intergroup Relations Division.*

and Michele Lee, who deliver the message "Prejudice Is Something America Can Do Without" and a 1986 Academy Award film nominee, *Courage To Care*, about people who helped Jews during the Holocaust.

To determine successful techniques to improve teacher competence and student awareness and understanding in the area of intergroup relations, ADL engaged in a two-year project from 1983-1985 in Florida, funded by the Strassler Endowment for Human Relations Programs.

Two middle schools were selected: a rural school in Apopka near Orlando and an urban school in Miami. The League helped the schools create broad-based coordinating councils consisting of school board members, administrators, teachers, students and parents. Curriculum was developed, in-service courses organized and guidance personnel and administrators worked with the League to develop an innovative series of school-wide activities. An ongoing evaluative process provided frequent analytic reports, both formal and informal, from the coordinating councils. Students were regularly tested on their attitudes.

## Positive Results

The project's results were positive. The knowledge base of teachers and administrators was significantly increased, and real and consequential changes were effected in student attitudes and behavior. The principals were unanimous in their appraisal that the project had not only resulted in measurable improvement of total school climate, but had also produced a significant diminution of prejudice in the community at large.

The project's impact went beyond the immediate schools. The superintendent of the Orange County Public Schools, where the Apopka model school is located, expanded the program to all the middle and junior high schools. The Association of Principals of the Dade County Public Schools, the largest school district in Florida and the fourth largest in the country, discussed ways to extend the Miami program to all county schools.

In addition, the Florida State Legislature passed a School Discipline Bill, mandating the State Education Department to provide

district-wide school-based services and programs to all Florida schools in the fields of group conflict resolution and prejudice reduction. ADL played a pivotal role in the development of the enabling legislation, and the League's Florida Regional Office in Miami has been asked to help formulate the program.

ADL is offering the Florida model to school districts around the country.

In another approach called "A World of Difference," a total package involving media, the business community and the schools in a partnership to improve intergroup relations, proved highly successful in Boston, where the project was initiated by the New England ADL Regional Office. The program is now being implemented by ADL regional offices around the country.

"A World of Difference" curriculum has been developed to be integrated into English, social studies and guidance classes. The variety of readings in the curriculum can provide the basis for a newspaper supplement on the subject of intergroup relations, which would then serve as both "background" for the general public and as a student reader. Each of the project cities will develop a special curriculum unit devoted to its intergroup relations concerns.

ADL will make available an audio-visual package for use by the schools to supplement programs on participating local TV stations.

The educational package will be presented to the schools through a series of teacher and administrator workshops. The purpose is to institutionalize intergroup relations education in the schools.

In still another approach, ADL is working with colleges of teacher education across the country to restructure their programs. In September, the League will initiate a three-year pilot project involving six major schools of education. The project will concentrate on improving the knowledge base of education faculties and on upgrading the quality of clinical and field experiences offered to prospective teachers.

The League will assist the colleges in curriculum redesign, focusing on courses that will enable prospective teachers to effectively teach diverse student pop-



ulations. This expertise will be passed on to neighboring school districts as the colleges assist in initiating holistic programs in intergroup relations in the schools where they send their student teachers. The result will be improved education for prospective teachers and also a considerable number of school districts will incorporate into their curriculums many elements from the Strassler Prejudice Reduction Project.

At the conclusion of the project, the models developed by the six colleges will be disseminated nationwide through the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, and the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education.

At the end of this month 18 professors from universities around the country who are the leading researchers on thinking skills will meet at the League's national headquarters in New York to analyze effective ways in which critical thinking can be used to reduce prejudice. The ultimate aim is the development of a book devoted to anti-prejudicial reasoning, and the preparation of a curriculum guide of appropriate teaching strategies for combatting prejudice through critical thinking.

Working with the schools also involves ADL in a close working relationship with many educational organizations. Two brief examples: The project with the colleges of teacher education was initiated at the 1986 convention of the American Association of

Colleges of Teacher Education (AACTE). At that session, ADL held an invitation-only, three hour session for the deans of 20 major schools of teacher education to discuss intergroup relations education.

When the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) initiated a new feature in its magazine, *Social Education*, the first piece was written by Nathan Perlmutter, ADL's national director.

ADL's Education director has been appointed chairman of the NCSS Committee on Racism and Social Justice. At the NCSS convention last November, she presented a special "Vital Issues" session on the school's role in prejudice reduction which was attended by 400 teachers. She has been invited to present a similar program at the 1986 convention on "Preparing Citizens for Our Democratic Pluralistic Society."

A Long Island, NY, school superintendent recently wrote a newspaper article in which he expressed his conviction that a "renewed national commitment must be engendered to uplift the status of brotherhood. Our survival as one nation . . . is the ultimate stake."

An active dynamic partnership between ADL and the schools will go far to assure that our country's heritage of democratic ideals will continue to be translated into a way of life for all Americans. □

## A Closer Look *continued from page 1*

in *Commentary*: "There is . . . overwhelming evidence that South Africa has been moving away from apartheid . . . It is quite clear that P. W. Botha . . . is convinced that apartheid has to go and has been dismantling it almost by stealth to avoid panicking the regime's followers."

Nevertheless, apartheid remains in force today. We, as Jews, with a collective memory of centuries in European ghettos and who have experienced the singular evil of racism, feel a special personal responsibility to insist on its dismantling.

But this is not to suggest closing our eyes to what may emerge once apartheid is gone. Political morality demands that the values that see us abhor apartheid also measure the society that will follow. We must distinguish between those who will work for a humane, democratic, pro-Western South Africa and those who are totalitarian, anti-humane, anti-democratic, anti-Israeli and anti-American.

It is in this context that the African National Congress (ANC), so frequently discussed as an alternative to the Botha Government, merits a close, unsentimental look.

The question can be fairly asked, what has all this to do with Jews?

As a revolutionary national liberation movement oriented toward Moscow, the ANC has long echoed Soviet attempts to undermine the legitimacy of Israel. Moreover, the ANC is a strident supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

—In 1970, the ANC denounced "Israel's aggressive expansionism" as "supported to the hilt by the ruling circles of the U.S. and their allies" and urged "all peace-loving non-aligned states . . . (to) immediately sever state relations with Israel . . ."

—An article in the September, 1971, issue of *Sechaba*, the monthly ANC magazine headlined, "Zionism, South Africa and Apartheid—a Paradoxical Triangle," was adapted from a pamphlet with the same title published by the Palestine Research Center, an affiliate of the P.L.O.

—In September, 1980, ANC president Oliver Tambo spoke in Paris at an International Conference on Solidarity with the Struggle of the Namibian People, spon-

sored by the World Peace Council, a Soviet front. He said:

" . . . I would like to assure our comrades in the liberation struggles . . . and the P.L.O . . . that their struggle is ours . . . our fight is carried on in the knowledge of the degree of intimacy and political, military and economic alliance that has been developed between racism and Zionism."

—At the 60th anniversary meeting of the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1981, Tambo stated: "Today, in the anti-imperialist struggle, we have won new allies like the struggling people of Palestine. We have thrown up new enemies of peoples, like those who murder civilians in Beirut."

—In July, 1982, during the Israeli military action against Lebanon-based P.L.O. terrorism, ANC chief United Nations observer Johnstone M. Makatini denounced Israel for its "flagrant and unprovoked aggression against Lebanon" and its "attempted extermination" of the Palestinian people. He referred to Prime Minister Begin's policies as "Zionist Nazism."

—Witnesses who had been associated with the ANC testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism in March, 1982, that the ANC cooperated with the P.L.O. and that some members trained in the U.S.S.R. with P.L.O. cadres.

—In 1983, a controversy erupted at the State University of New York at Stony Brook involving Professor Ernest (Fred) Dube, who taught a course on "The Politics of Race." Dube, an ANC representative at the United Nations serving on the ANC's National Educational Council, taught that Zionism is a form of racism and suggested as a term paper theme "Zionism is as much racism as Nazism is racism." Dube spoke at

Johnstone A. Makatini Yasir Arafat



Wide World

a "Teach-in on Palestine" in New York in December, 1983, sponsored by the November 29 Coalition, a pro-P.L.O. organization of radical leftist and Arab-American groups. In an interview published in the July-August 1985 issue of *Palestine Focus*, a publication of the now renamed November 29 Committee for Palestine, Dube said that "what the Zionists did to the Arabs in Palestine was exactly the same that the whites did to us" in South Africa.

—At the ANC National Consultative Conference in June, 1985, Oliver Tambo stated: "In 1973, the Arab armies succeeded to inflict a major defeat on Zionist Israel for the first time in a quarter of a century, forcing U.S. imperialism to seek new measures to protect its client state in the Middle East."

—The ANC, the P.L.O. and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) were observers at the second annual United Nations North American Regional Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Symposium on the Question of Palestine, in July, 1985, under U.N. auspices in New York. The symposium, held to plan an anti-Israel propaganda campaign in the U.S. and Canada, was replete with anti-Israel and pro-P.L.O. declarations that often straddled the fine line between criticism of Israel and its supporters and outright anti-Semitism. —The ANC and the November 29 Committee for Palestine cosponsored a meeting in New York in April, 1986, on the subject, "Israel-South Africa: The Apartheid Connection?" Similar meetings have since been held in many other American cities.

The ANC, which seeks to overthrow the South African government, is a "national liberation movement" that, plainly said, is under heavy Communist influence.

—The ANC has been allied with the South

Fidel Castro Daniel Ortega



Wide World

African Communist Party (SACP) for 30 years.

—The ANC is oriented toward the Soviet Union and its East Bloc allies, who have furnished it with arms, funding, military training and other logistic support.

—Oliver Tambo, who has headed the ANC since 1964 when former president Nelson Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment for acts of sabotage, is a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC), a leading Soviet-controlled front organization based in Helsinki. Tambo has been a speaker or guest at various forums sponsored by the U.S. Communist Party.

—The ANC is a member of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), described in 1983 by the U.S. State Department as a Soviet-controlled front.

—*Sechaba*, the ANC magazine, is printed in Communist East Germany.

—Moses Mabhida, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, speaking at the SACP 60th anniversary meeting in 1981, said: "Our Party . . . fully supports the same program of liberation as the African National Congress for the seizure of power and black majority rule."

—In 1982, seven members of the ANC national executive committee were identified in sworn testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism as SACP members. The 30-member national executive committee now has 12 to 15 members said to be affiliated with SACP.

—The ANC supports the Soviet Union on foreign policy issues. Tambo told the June, 1985, ANC National Consultative Conference: ". . . the democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution in Afghanistan had been saved, with the support of the Soviet Union."

—In a message to the same conference, the SACP Central Committee stated:

" . . . The SACP . . . pledges to do its utmost to ensure that your decisions are carried into the field of struggle and implemented."

—ANC spokesmen were featured speakers at banquets sponsored by the Communist Party newspaper, *People's World*, held this spring in California.

The fall of South Africa to such a Soviet-oriented and Communist-influenced force

would be a severe setback to the United States, whose defense industry relies heavily on South Africa's wealth of strategic minerals. If America's defense industry were handicapped, our allies' security would also be at peril. A recent Commerce Department report noted that South Africa possesses 83.6 percent of the world's chromium; 80.8 percent, platinum; 70.8 percent, manganese; and 47.7 percent, vanadium.

In the event of a Communist-influenced or controlled revolution, South Africa's dependence on income from the export of strategic metals would perhaps result in continued sales to the West. However, if South Africa's strategic metals were controlled by a regime favoring the Soviet Union, American vulnerability to making political concessions to Moscow would increase substantially.

Moreover, should South Africa be controlled by a regime supportive of the Soviet Union, sea lanes and "choke points" around the Cape of Good Hope through the Red Sea, trade routes to the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and from the Persian Gulf would be at risk.

During the last three decades, it has been made painfully clear to the American Jewish community and to all supporters of human rights, that while tyrannies can be overthrown, at times the regimes replacing them may be even worse.

Some examples: In Cuba, the authoritarian Batista was replaced by Castro's Communism; in Iran, the undemocratic Shah's fall brought to power the tyrannical Ayatollah Khomeini; in Nicaragua, the corrupt Somoza's ouster saw the Communist Sandinista regime rise to power. And in Vietnam, the boat people are our times' searing reminder of the spawn of Communism.

As Freedom House has stated, "... South Africa bears the major onus for the bloodshed. Oppressed by the system of apartheid imposed on them by the white minority, the Africans are fighting back in whatever ways possible."

The ANC and the South African Communist Party are not root causes of the upheaval in South Africa. Communists exploit and manipulate economic and political desperation and oppression for



Corazon Aquino

their own purposes. South Africa is a tinder box; the Communists are poised to strike the match.

Yet there is still time for other agents of change to take hold and a number of them exist today in South Africa. Those partisans of democratic alternatives can take heart at the recent outcome in the Philippines, in which a democratic force, Corazon Aquino, emerged triumphant.

One example of assistance to a democratic alternative is the two-month training program in political, economic and social self-sufficiency for leaders from the black township of Soweto taking place at the Afro-Asian Institute in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Israel's labor federation, the Histadrut, a staunch opponent of apartheid, runs the Afro-Asian Institute. The training program focuses on unionizing South Africa's black workers, developing black civil infrastructures, organizing black women and teaching social work.

Israel has repeatedly condemned apartheid and has expressed its willingness to join other countries in economic sanctions against South Africa.

The writer Thomas Mann wrote at the conclusion of his epic novel, "The Magic Mountain":

"Out of this universal feast of death, out of this extremity of fever, kindling the rain-washed evening sky to a fiery glow, may it be that Love one day shall mount?"

The same question applies to violence-ridden South Africa. The survival of freedom in South Africa will be possible only if the forces of violence on the far left and of racial violence on the far right are defeated by the democratic forces of moderation. □

## NEWS BRIEFS

**HISTORIC VISIT**—Dr. Eugene Fisher, director of the Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations of the National Council of Catholic Bishops, and Dr. Ronald B. Sobel, chairman of ADL's Intergroup Relations Committee and senior rabbi of New York's Temple Emanu-El, gave their views of Pope John Paul II's historic visit to Rome's central synagogue on a coast-to-coast teleconference.

The two also responded to questions phoned in by Catholics and Jews watching the telecast and satellite-fed video tapes of the Pope's visit from 61 diocesan centers participating. The program was produced by the Catholic Telecommunications Network of America in cooperation with ADL.

**ADL AROUND THE WORLD**—Prompted by recent outbreaks of anti-Semitism in West Germany, the Anti-Defamation League has commissioned a six-month definitive survey of the extent of anti-Jewish attitudes in that country. The survey will be carried out by the Institute for Demoscopy, a leading West German polling organization with the assistance of the Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism of the *Technische Universität Berlin*. . . ADL's annual audit of anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. served as the model for a similar report published in the Netherlands. The 1985 Netherlands report indicates a rise in anti-Semitic incidents there, from 41 in 1984 to 61 last year, contrasting with ADL's American report, which showed a decrease. . . Acting on a complaint by the Anti-Defamation Commission of B'nai B'rith District 21 of Australia and New Zealand, the Australian Press Council censured a Croatian weekly newspaper, *Hrvatski Tjednik*, for publishing "wild and unsubstantiated" anti-Semitic statements. . . A Chicago company corrected the Middle East area on its 12-inch globe in response to a complaint from ADL. Replogle Globes, Inc., was informed by ADL that the globe mistakenly showed the West Bank as part of Jordan. . . ADL called Spain's announcement that it will grant full diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization "a great disappointment." In a cable to Spain's

Foreign Minister, ADL lauded Spain's recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, but said the P.L.O. action is "a setback in furthering Middle East peace efforts."

**HONORS**—ADL's highly acclaimed "A World of Difference" prejudice reduction project won the Jack R. Howard Award for Public Service Broadcasting in a large television market, given by the Scripps Howard Foundation. The League shared the honor with WCVB-TV of Boston, which pioneered the project with ADL in Boston. More than 1,100 entries from all over the country competed for the prize which was accepted by Leonard Zakim, director of ADL's New England Regional Office, at a dinner in Cincinnati.

**NOT WHAT IT SEEMED TO BE**—An investigation by ADL's Civil Rights Department revealed that Florida real estate advertisements of offerings "not for New York or New Jersey residents" were not intended to exclude Jews from condominium and cooperative housing units. Far from discriminatory, the disclaimer is included by many advertisers to avoid violation of New York and New Jersey laws regulating public offerings, which require prior state approval. . . In another case, Michael Lieberman, the League's Midwest Civil Rights director, resolved a controversy resulting from a derogatory term being published in the 1986 official regulatory code book issued by the Building Officials and Code Administrators International (BOCA) in Illinois. After receiving many complaints about the wording "dago bomb" in a section about fire prevention, ADL suggested that the term "Molotov Cocktail" might be more appropriate. The organization assured ADL that the offensive term will not appear in the next edition.

**A GOOD PURPOSE**—They used to get thrown out, all the extra hors d'oeuvres and hot meals ordered—to be sure there was enough—but not served at ADL fund raising dinners and luncheons in New York. Now they're feeding the hungry. The gourmet kosher food is sealed in containers and delivered to the poor—Jewish and non-Jewish—through City Harvest, Inc., a non-profit agency established to help feed New York's needy. "We hope other Jewish agencies pick up on

the idea," said Deena Lee, director of ADL's Meetings and Conferences Department.

**NOT FORGOTTEN**—ADL joined the Boston College Holocaust/Human Rights Research Project in sponsoring the first annual International Holocaust and Human Rights Law Conference at the college's law school. Ruti G. Teitel, an assistant director of ADL's Legal Affairs Department and a member of the project's advisory board, served as moderator of a session on responses to war criminals and human rights violators.

**REMEMBERED**—Country singer Johnny Cash took time from his busy schedule to comment on the posthumous pardon granted Leo Frank by the State of Georgia more than 70 years after his 1913 conviction for a murder he denied committing. (Leo Frank Pardoned: ADL Closes File On Its First Case," April, 1986,

*ADL Bulletin*). Cash, in a Letter To The Editor of Nashville *Tennessean*, which uncovered the new evidence that made the pardon possible, congratulated the newspaper, going on to say: "Rest in Peace, Leo Frank."

**STAFF CHANGES**—David Friedman, assistant director of the DC/Maryland Regional Office, has been appointed director of ADL's newly-opened Northern Ohio office in Cleveland. . . Richard Hirschhaut, assistant director of the Florida Regional Office, will head the Central Pacific Office in San Francisco. . . Betsy R. Rosenthal has been appointed Western Area Civil Rights director, replacing David Lehrer, who is now director of the Pacific Southwest Regional Office in Los Angeles.

Jerome H. Bakst, director of the Civil Rights Division's Research and Evaluation Department, has retired after 32 years with the League. Mildred Price, New York Appeal office manager, retired after 27 years with the agency. At a farewell party in their behalf, Mr. Bakst reviewed the books and reports he and his department had been involved in, ranging from domestic to worldwide concerns. The Research Department, he observed with pride, is vital not only to the agency and the Jewish community, but to a vast array of scholars, public officials and the media who rely on it. Mr. Bakst was the recipient in 1979 of ADL's Milton A. Senn Award for Professional Excellence. He will continue to serve the League as a consultant.

#### Protect Your Retirement Years

You can supplement your Social Security and other retirement income while helping to eliminate anti-Semitism. For your free copy of ADL's annuity booklet, write to:

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Planned Gifts Committee  
Anti-Defamation League Foundation  
823 United Nations Plaza  
New York, New York 10017  
(212) 490-2525, Ext. 256

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# Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States







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# **Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States**

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Information in this publication is intended to provide background for study and discussion; it is not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, except where the material is specifically described as such. The publication summarizes currently available information and raises relevant questions (some of which admittedly may be unanswerable) as an aid to public discussion of important issues in U.S. foreign policy.



E



D



C



A



B

- A Young laborer in Zimbabwe.
- B Workmen pour molten aluminum into steel molds in Ghana.
- C Tsavo National Park, Kenya.
- D Mali village.
- E Business district, Abidjan, Ivory Coast.



# Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>1</sup> is the ancestral home of millions of Americans and, according to anthropological theory, the cradle of mankind—the birthplace of *Homo sapiens*. Perhaps the earliest development of settled agriculture began in Africa on the banks of the lower Nile, making possible the great advances in technology and the arts of ancient Egypt.

From at least the first millennium B.C. onward, elements of Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek, Roman, and Arab culture spread southward into Africa through conquest, trade, and the dissemination of Christianity and Islam. Trade in slaves, gold, copper, salt, spices, and many other items flourished both by sea and, following the introduction of camels in about the 3d century A.D., across the Sahara. Evidence of the extent of this trade can be found in the presence of Chinese porcelain and other oriental wares at archaeological sites in Africa.

<sup>1</sup>Although the generic term “Africa” frequently is used throughout this publication, and some data pertain to the entire continent, attention is focused on sub-Saharan Africa and the off-shore island states, which together include the majority of countries and of the continent’s population. Within the Department of State, the Bureau of African Affairs is responsible for the conduct of relations with this region. Relations with North Africa are conducted through the Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Access to the cultural exchange of the Mediterranean basin was impeded by the vast expanse of desert, causing the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa to develop cultures distinctly their own. Several great empires with large cultural centers emerged but were later destroyed by war or declined following changes in global trade patterns. Although European traders had frequented the African coast since the late 15th century, knowledge of these empires remained limited until the era of African exploration and colonization in the late 18th and 19th centuries.

By the early 20th century, most of Africa had fallen under colonial domination. In sub-Saharan Africa, only Liberia and Ethiopia remained independent. In the decades after World War II, however, the peoples of Africa increasingly rejected foreign rule and demanded for themselves the fundamental freedoms for which they had fought in support of the Allied powers. By the mid-1960s, most African countries had achieved independence. Only Namibia remained in a colonial status in 1985.

There are now 46 independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the nearby islands, and negotiations on Namibia’s independence are underway. Together with the countries of North Africa, these states play a significant role in the world community through the Organization of African Unity (OAU). But the process of forging cohesive national identities within boundaries drawn by European powers and among more than 1,000 ethnic groups is difficult; since independence, Africa has experienced considerable political upheaval.

It is important to understand sub-Saharan Africa’s potential, strengths, and problems because they present opportunities and challenges that no world power can ignore. For the United States, Africa represents:

- The political force of the world’s largest regional bloc;
- A rich source of natural resources;
- The ancestral home of 25 million Americans;
- A growing market for American exports;
- An opportunity to demonstrate, through private enterprise and government-to-government aid, that democratic institutions and individual initiative provide a better solution to the problems of the Third World than do totalitarianism and economic regimentation; and
- Possibilities for our adversaries to exploit regional tensions and foster insecurity through the indiscriminate provision of arms and support for violent solutions to local conflicts.

This Discussion Paper is designed to update information on developments in sub-Saharan Africa and to provide a basis for understanding U.S. policy toward this vital region of the world.



# Regional Profile

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## Geography

The Continent of Africa covers 11,635,000 square miles—nearly one-fifth of the world's total land surface and equal to the combined area of the United States, Western Europe, and India. The sub-Saharan portion of the continent is 9,312,375 square miles—more than three times the size of the continental United States. The African Continent stretches 5,000 miles from north to south and 4,600 miles from east to west. Its 18,900-mile coastline is washed by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

In addition to the continent itself, a number of island countries also are included in "Africa." With the exception of the Canary Islands and Reunion, all are identified with sub-Saharan Africa. These include Madagascar, Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mauritius. The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba are part of the United Republic of Tanzania.

### Topography

The African Continent consists of a series of level or slightly undulating plateaus that fall away from a central area of high formations to low-lying coastal zones averaging only 20 miles in width. Many of these plateaus lie at

altitudes anywhere from 3,000 to 9,000 feet in eastern and southern Africa, while in the north and west most of the land is between 500 and 1,000 feet above sea level.

Massive geologic changes in the plateaus have produced ridges that are among the most conspicuous features of the African landscape: the Great Rift Valley of East Africa, one of the deepest fractures in the earth's crust; Mt. Kilimanjaro (19,565 feet above sea level) and Mt. Kenya (17,058 feet) in East Africa are higher than any peak in the European Alps. These changes also produced Lake Chad in Central Africa; the lakes of East Africa, including Africa's largest, Lake Victoria; and the continent's four major rivers: the Nile (4,000 miles long), the Zaire (3,000 miles), the Niger (2,600 miles), and the Zambezi (1,650 miles).

The continent contains the world's largest desert, the Sahara; regions of heavy rainfall and lush forest vegetation; and, between desert and rain forest, broad savanna grasslands and woodlands. Nearly one-half of Africa's total area is desert, while 40% is partly forested grasslands and 10%, dense forests and thickets.

### Climate

Four-fifths of Africa lie in the tropics and have either a tropical or subtropical climate. Temperate climates are found in the north close to the Mediterranean, along the southern and southwestern areas of the Cape of Good Hope, and on

the higher parts of the inland plateaus. Air temperatures vary from hot in most parts of the continent to cold in the deserts (at night), on the plateaus, and in the mountains, where some peaks are permanently snowcapped.

Africa is divided into distinct climatic belts. The one bounded by the 5° line on either side of the Equator has a year-long hot-and-rainy climate, with some areas receiving more than 200 inches of rain annually. From 5°–15° on each side of the Equator, the climate is warm, with heavy rains during part of the year. Deserts predominate in areas 15°–30° from the Equator, and temperatures range from very hot to very cold. Accumulated rainfall in these areas is less than 10 inches annually, and sometimes no measurable rainfall occurs for years. More than 30° from the Equator, mild, rainy winters and warm, dry summers prevail.

Africa's varied climate has affected vegetation, river conditions, and the incidence of disease; it also has influenced settlement patterns. Africans sought out fertile lands, water, and areas suitable for grazing. Europeans settled near the coasts on the cool eastern and southern plateaus and in the temperate regions of northern and southern Africa. Modern cities, often former centers of colonial administration and trade, usually are located in these areas.

The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation not necessarily authoritative.






# History

Anthropological research and excavation in eastern Africa support the theory of the African origin of the human race. Remains of a forerunner of modern Homo sapiens, Australopithecus, and of other creatures with hominoid characteristics, such as Homo erectus and Homo habilis, have been unearthed in various parts of the continent. Some remains may be more than 2.5 million years old. Evidence of the evolution of primitive people throughout the Paleolithic Age (1 million-16,000 years B.C.) has been discovered, including remains of Neanderthal man dating to about 40,000 B.C. Some scholars believe that midway through this age groups of these African peoples migrated to other continents. Traces of humankind's continued development through the Mesolithic, Neolithic, Bronze, and Iron Ages also have been found in several African regions.

Three main physical types evolved in Africa: Negroid, Bushmanoid, and Pygmoid. Of these groups, the Negroid became dominant, learning first to hunt and forage, later to domesticate animals, and finally to plant crops. Between 1000 B.C. and 1000 A.D., a Negroid group (known by the linguistic classification of Niger-Congo and Kordofanian or Nigritic) exerted control over much of southern Africa, with a major subgroup, the Bantu, nearly eliminating the Pygmoid and Bushmanoid people in the process. Caucasoid peoples from the Mediterranean area first migrated to northeast Africa near the end of the Paleolithic period, and subsequent migrations to northeast and northern Africa occurred in the centuries preceding and following Christ. During the 7th to 10th centuries, bedouin Arabs spread Islamic influence across north Africa, while from the 10th to the 18th centuries, other Muslims continued to settle in eastern Africa from the Horn southward to Zimbabwe.

Sophisticated societies developed in early days. The Kush Kingdom (700 B.C.-200 A.D.) formed in the area of present-day Sudan. The Axum Empire, established by 350 A.D., comprised much of modern Ethiopia. For more than 1,000 years, ancient African kingdoms—such as Ghana, Kanem-Bornu, Mali, Songhai, and the Hausa



**Kingdoms and Empires  
1450 B.C. - A.D. 1800**

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states—developed primarily in the savanna lands. The kingdoms of Kongo and Lunda may have been founded as early as the 14th century, while the city-states of the Guinea Coast—Ife, Benin, Yoruba—date at least to the 15th century. These states were highly organized and engaged in long-distance trade in salt, gold, cattle, horses, and ivory.

In the early 15th century, Portuguese explorers began a gradual buildup of African trade relations with Europe and the Americas, leading eventually to Christian missionary contact with Africa. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Dutch, British, French, Spanish, and Arabs increased their trade with Africa. During this period, Europeans established trading posts and maritime stations on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts but rarely traveled to the interior of the continent. Slaves

became an important commodity, although trade in slaves had existed for centuries. Reliable figures concerning the extent of the slave trade are not available; estimates of the number of people sold into slavery during the 15th-19th centuries range from 10 million to 50 million.

## Colonial Era

Missionaries, traders, and adventurers penetrated the heart of the continent in the 19th century. These were the years of such explorers as Mungo Park, Savorgnan de Brazza, Rene Caille, H.M. Stanley, Sir Richard Burton, and David Livingstone. They were followed, especially after 1880, by government officials engaged in extending colonial domains.

Once the dimensions of Africa's inner geography and resources were known, colonization proceeded rapidly. Although only a small part of the African Continent was under foreign rule before 1880, all but 2 of the present 46 independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa were under European control by 1900. The two exceptions were Liberia, established by freed American slaves in the 1840s, and the ancient Empire of Ethiopia. The remainder of Africa was controlled by France, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Italy. During the next half century, Europeans settled in various areas of the continent, traded, extracted minerals, and established governments reflecting the different policies and institutions of the colonial powers.

### Postindependence Period

Many factors helped to create a climate in which most of the European-ruled colonies in Africa eventually became independent. These included the participation of Africans in World Wars I and II; the growth of African nationalist movements; the Atlantic Charter of 1941 proclaiming the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live; and changing European economic and political concerns with respect to the efficacy and burdens of empire.

The wave of African independence began in 1957. Led by Nkrumah of the Gold Coast (Ghana), Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Sékou Toure of French Guinea (Guinea), a host of sub-Saharan countries in rapid succession broke ties with their colonial rulers. Occasionally, the changeover was accompanied by violence, as in Zaire, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Since 1957, 42 nations have joined the four previously independent countries of Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, and South Africa. South Africa became an independent union with Dominion status within the British Commonwealth in 1910, and Sudan separated from Egypt and the United Kingdom in 1956. Namibia, under de facto South African control, remains the region's only dependent ter-



ritory; efforts are underway to move from violence to negotiation toward Namibian independence.

Africa's political evolution during the past two decades has been tumultuous, with nearly two-thirds of the countries undergoing nonconstitutional changes in government. Although more than half of the nations are led by military leaders or committees, some have now returned to constitutional civilian rule. Despite political trauma in many countries, examples exist of relative tranquility and stable leadership.

Secession attempts have threatened some nations. Eritrea has been seeking independence since 1962, when Ethiopia assumed direct control and terminated Eritrea's federated status. Shaba (formerly Katanga) unsuccessfully attempted to secede from Zaire (Belgian Congo) when it became independent in 1960, and Biafra from Nigeria in 1967.

Cultural and religious differences have led to periodic civil wars in Sudan and Chad. Warfare also has erupted between states. Somalia and Ethiopia have been fighting intermittently over possession of the Ogaden region. Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979 to oust the barbaric government of Idi Amin and to retaliate for Ugandan attacks on its territory. Libya forcibly annexed a portion of northern Chad in 1980-81 and pushed further south in 1983, halting only after regional and international pressures were applied. Nigeria and Cameroon also have had tense relations over poorly defined borders.



# People

Africa's estimated population is more than 400 million, 85% of whom live south of the Sahara. If the current growth rate of about 3% continues, the continent's population may reach 800 million by the year 2000—an increasing concern of many African governments.

Because of the vastness of the continent, population density is less than half that of the United States—about 30 persons per square mile. However, people are dispersed unevenly throughout the region. Large expanses of desert and mountains are virtually uninhabited. On the other hand, good climate, fertile land, navigable rivers, safe ports, and demographic movements have created several areas with a population density as high as 500 persons per square mile. Sub-Saharan Africa's most populated areas are:

- The lands bordering the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, particularly Nigeria and the southern parts of Ghana, Benin, and Togo;
- The Nile Valley in northern Sudan;
- The East African highlands, particularly the plateaus of Ethiopia, Kenya, eastern Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania; and
- The eastern and southern coasts and interior High Veld of South Africa.

Most Africans still live in small, rural groups. However, opportunities for a better standard of living have led to increased migration to cities, which are confronted with problems of overcrowding, unemployment, and insufficient municipal services. Among cities with more than 1 million inhabitants are: Kinshasa, Zaire; Lagos and Ibadan, Nigeria; Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Accra, Ghana.

Tremendous diversity exists among the people of sub-Saharan Africa. This diversity stems from a variety of causes—the infusion of elements from outside the African Continent, migration to new areas in search of better livelihood, rivalries that produced factions and subdivisions, and tendencies to organize into small, close-knit groups for protection and mutual support. Over thousands of years, this process has produced more than 1,000 ethnic divisions.




**A** Somali farmer and businessman check crop grown with seeds imported from U.S.

**B** Student at the Regional Training Center for Plant Protection, Cameroon.

**C** Djerma girls in traditional headdress, Niger.

**D** Liberian training officer and secretary in U.S. AID mission.






## Languages

The complexity of African society is graphically demonstrated by the number of languages. Of more than 800 languages, fewer than 10 are spoken by more than 1 million people. Most languages are native to groups of less than 100,000.

Of the numerous linguistic authorities, the classifications of Joseph Greenberg represent a contemporary consensus (see Bibliography). His listing of categories and map on this page show the general geographic location of groups. In the brief text that follows, references in parentheses are alternate names used by George Murdock, another eminent scholar.

The largest language family is the Niger-Congo and Kordofanian (Nigritic), of which the Bantu sublanguage group is the most important. Speakers of this family of languages are descendants of the earliest people on the continent and still occupy much of sub-Saharan Africa. The Afroasiatic (Hamitic)—including Semitic-, Berber-, and Cushitic-speaking people—stem from the early Caucasoids and live primarily in north and north-east Africa. The Sudanic can be found in a region stretching along the lower Nile and westward through the area known as the Sahel. The Bushmen and Hottentot peoples of southern Africa speak Khoisan or “click” languages. Some languages, such as Swahili and Hausa, serve as *linguae francae* between widely divergent groups, especially in trade.

## African Language Groups



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The approximate distribution of the main native language groups of Africa is shown on the above map. Although the number of different languages is very high (perhaps more than 800), all native languages derive from four basic stocks. These stocks are represented by the shaded and unshaded portions of the map. Key letters indicate divisions of the main stocks and are placed in localities where inter-related languages are spoken. European and European colonial languages, which often serve as a common language between language groups, are not included in this presentation. The dotted line at E shows the area where ancient Egyptian was spoken, but the present language is Arabic. Certain other distributions, too minute to be shown on the map, include complex variations in the Sudanic languages; pockets of Fulani in the Atlantic subgroup of Niger-Congo (L) found as far east as Lake Chad; and Bantu (R) encroachments on the territory of the Click speakers.

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The diversity of ethnic groupings, which reflect original racial strains and often bear names similar to the languages they speak, is illustrated on the map. This map includes a portion of the names of well-known ethnolinguistic or tribal groups. Their inclusion does not necessarily reflect their relative importance, nor is their location on the map definitive.

## Religion

Religion traditionally has played an important role in African culture. There are many indigenous religions, but most recognize a supreme being who created all things, gave the world its order, and infused it with energy. Many African religions attribute conscious life to nature and natural objects, which has led some scholars to use the term "animist" to refer to traditional African religions. Traditional religions, however, have been slowly giving way to Christianity and Islam as life in the African interior becomes less isolated.

Christianity was spread principally by European missionaries after the 16th century. With the advent of independence, the foreign missionary effort gradually has been replaced by African clergy. Today, some 95 million Christians live in Africa.

Islam swept across North Africa in the 7th century and then expanded southward. The Sahelian countries are predominantly Muslim, as are the northwest coastal areas of sub-Saharan Africa. With 125 million adherents, Islam is Africa's largest religion.

[illegible]

Groups selected show diversity,  
not relative importance.


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This Kongo (Congo) oath-taking figure represented a power figure whose importance derived from the special qualities that the Bakongo assigned to dogs. When activated by the driving in of a nail, the dog figure was presumed to hunt malevolent spirits in the night. The large number of nails it contains is testimony to the confidence of the Bakongo in its force.





D



C



A



B

- A Yoruba mask, Benin.
- B Zulu dancers in Swaziland.
- C Slit wooden drum, Central African Republic.
- D Yacouba stilt dancer in the Ivory Coast.



## Culture

The cultural richness of Africa is shown in four major forms: art, music, dance, and literature. All uniquely interpret traditional African values: religious beliefs; veneration of the deceased; respect for nature; and the importance of childbearing, the family, and the community and its leaders. The arts express reverence for the past, teach social roles and responsibilities, and encourage the assimilation of traditional beliefs.

Thanks to energetic collectors, from early colonial explorers to modern curators and tourists, sculpture is the best known African art form. Most recent sculptures are of wood, but museums maintain collections from Nigeria of terra-cotta Nok statues from the second and third centuries B.C. as well as ancient Benin and Ife bronzes. Other forms of traditional graphic or plastic arts include rock paintings, decorative metalwork, basketry, and jewelry.

Traditional dances reveal much of African lore and legend, philosophy, and belief. They may celebrate past glories and triumphs, mark contemporary events and rites of passage, or make supplication for a good harvest or the security of the community. Folk dances vary markedly throughout the continent, usually involving group efforts with participants massed in circles or lines.

Drums are most often identified with African music. For thousands of years, however, Africans also have played wind, string, and other percussion instruments, obtaining subtle and complex expressions from relatively simple devices. Although much of the music has served as accompaniment for dancing, soloists and ensembles perform on many other occasions. The rhythmic patterns of African music have influenced music outside the continent, most notably American jazz.

A rich oral tradition has existed in Africa for centuries. Experts estimate that more than 250,000 myths, legends, and folk tales flourish in sub-Saharan Africa. Timbuktu had a written tradition before the 16th century. In the 18th century other literary traditions

developed in Ethiopia and later in languages reflecting Arabic influence, such as Hausa in West Africa and Swahili in the east. In the past 80 years, published works on this subject have included such landmarks as Blaise Cendrars' *Anthology Negre*, Leopold Senghor's "Necritae" poetry, H.I.E. Dhlomo's *Valley of the Thousand Hills*, Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, and Thomas Mofolo's *Chaka*.

## Political Processes

Political institutions and processes vary greatly in sub-Saharan Africa. There are federations, constitutional monarchies, military oligarchies and autocracies, republics with democratic parliaments, unicameral and bicameral houses, fully elected and partly appointed legislatures, and single and multiparty systems. Most governments are strongly authoritarian, either single party or military based.

When independence was achieved, the first order of business was to survive, and survival required the building of authority rather than its limitation as in democratic countries. Authority could not be achieved with a multiparty system. Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania and one of the original group of African independence leaders, rationalized that the single party system is more democratic, "providing it is identified with the nation as a whole," since "the people can have more opportunity to exercise a real choice than where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community." Party loyalties and discipline, he maintained, limited freedom of expression and of choice. Unfortunately, "democratic" single party systems largely failed to create the authority necessary to govern. As a result, most became, in fact, no-party, authoritarian regimes.

The various forms of government in the subcontinent also reflect the heritage of colonial administrative and political institutions as well as indigenous historical and social backgrounds. Ethiopia's former constitutional monarchy, for example, was deeply rooted in the country's centuries-old royal history. Nigeria's attempt at American-style federalism, on the other hand, represented

an effort to maintain unity in one of Africa's largest states by accommodating its ethnic, cultural, and historical differences in a decentralized system. Africa's ethnolinguistic groupings were characterized by strongly developed traditional structures, which often crossed political boundaries superimposed by colonial powers with little or no regard for linguistic or cultural similarities. Despite the impact of modernization in urban areas, traditional ethnic loyalties remain strong and have impeded the development of national consciousness. Opposition often has been based on ethnolinguistic and regional special interests.

African states probably will continue to experience change in governmental form and process as they experiment with ways to organize political power effectively and to devise a durable basis for citizen participation in the political system.

## Economy

Africa's natural wealth is vast but unevenly distributed. The continent is a major exporter of minerals—such as diamonds, cobalt, gold, and petroleum—and of agricultural commodities—such as coffee, cocoa, and tea. Some countries—Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, and South Africa—have large mineral reserves. Yet other countries, such as those in the Sahel region, lack access to the coasts as well as natural resources. These contrasting circumstances have been accentuated by varied colonial and cultural heritages and postindependence theories of economic development.

Despite its natural wealth, Africa as a whole faces an unprecedented economic crisis. Falling per capita food production, severe drought, world recession, mounting debt burdens, and mistaken government policies have seriously affected development prospects. Widespread famine has accompanied the current drought; some 36 countries recently have been affected by abnormal food shortage. Untold

thousands of Africans have perished, and an estimated 30 million urgently require food, medical care, and shelter if they are to survive. Even before the drought, more than 20% of Africa's population consumed less than the minimum number of calories needed to sustain good health. Child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa is double the rate of all developing countries.

#### **Famine and the Decline in Agricultural Productivity**

Although little can be done to eliminate drought, which occurs periodically in Africa, much can be done to avoid famine. Drought has been transformed into famine by high population growth rates and the decline in farm output. Famine, in turn, has been aggravated by mistaken national policies and armed conflict.

Africa is the only region in the world in which per capita food produc-

tion has fallen during the past two decades. African dependence on outside food sources is growing at an alarming pace, and commercial imports of grain have risen at an annual rate of 9% over the past 20 years. Africa normally imports more than 10 million tons of cereals, excluding current emergency needs; if trends continue, this deficit will increase markedly. Per capita gross domestic product declined by 3%-4% per year from 1981 to 1983—attributable largely to the decline in agriculture, the primary component of most African economies.

Africa has serious agricultural constraints—insufficient rainfall, fragile soils, a variety of microclimates, high soil temperatures, extreme seasonability, and unique insect pests. Farmers have been shortening the fallow periods for their fields, which has led to decreased yields and increased soil erosion. Overuse of forests for firewood and intensive grazing also have contributed

to erosion. High population growth rates have stretched most African nations to the production limits of their traditional agricultures.

Nonetheless, Africa does have the potential to produce sufficient food for its increasing population and thereby reduce its vulnerability to future droughts. This potential depends greatly upon the ability of African governments to implement effective national policies that support small farmers and encourage the use of modern technology.


#### **Debt Problems**

During the 1960s, African governments benefited from high commodity prices and generous foreign aid. Government revenue was supplemented by borrowing from private commercial banks. With the onset of world recession in the 1970s, however, the prices of African commodities plummeted while the cost of imports remained high. Drought and

Drought victims in Ethiopia.







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declining agricultural productivity led to increasing commercial imports of basic foodstuffs.

As African economies declined, their governments turned increasingly to borrowing. From 1972 to 1982, medium- and long-term debt increased by an annual average rate of 22%. Debt service ratios (the relationship between debt payments due and exports of goods and services) worsened as well, with ratios of from 30% to 80% or more prevailing in some countries. Most African nations now have major debt problems. In the international forums where public and private debts are rescheduled, the majority of 1984 reschedulings were for African countries.

### Inefficient Government Policies

Africa's economic problems are closely linked to the inefficient use of its resources. Two decades after independence, African leaders are confronted with difficult choices and overwhelming economic obstacles that would try the patience and administrative capacity of more experienced governments elsewhere in the world. These leaders often discourage farm production by adopting politically expedient tax and pricing policies that have favored politically influential urban populations and have disadvantaged farmers, whose output has declined accordingly. They have created large bureaucracies, ignored the private sector, promoted state-run industries that do not produce or produce only at very high cost, maintained overvalued currencies that discourage exports and lead to balance-of-payments crises, and allowed physical infrastructure to deteriorate.

Increasingly, however, African governments are recognizing errors in past policies, and changes are occurring throughout the continent. In the last several years, attitudes have shifted dramatically on such issues as exchange rates, on measures to rehabilitate infrastructure and export industries, on reducing government regulation and bureaucracy, and on assuring that farmers are rewarded through pricing and marketing reform.

Aid donor countries and international institutions are beginning to realize that some of their practices also

have contributed unwittingly to inefficient use of resources. However well intentioned, donors have insisted on imposing their own requirements on recipients that have caused administrative problems and strained the absorptive capacity of African nations—for example, 50 donors have contributed to 188 projects in Malawi, 61 donors to 321 projects in Lesotho, and 69 donors to 614 projects in Zambia. Furthermore, aid donors sometimes have subsidized inefficient state enterprises and supported the creation of elaborate government projects that could not be maintained without continued foreign assistance. Nonetheless, foreign assistance has accomplished much in Africa. Notably, several major diseases have been eradicated, and physical infrastructure has been created to market crops and minerals. Foreign donors also helped to establish the first universities and technical training centers on the continent.



E



D



C





A



B

**A** Traditional farming in Nigeria.

**B** Grain storage in Niger.

**C** Many Africans, particularly in rural areas, lack access to safe water. In Burkina AID has helped provide improved water systems to replace open wells that are easily contaminated and spread disease.

**D** AID-supported project for dry-land rice cultivation in Senegal.

**E** African researcher on AID-supported project for dry-land farming in Cameroon.

# Multilateral Organizations

**United Nations.** Sub-Saharan African nations play an important role in international and regional organizations. They regard the United Nations as the major forum for presenting their views and as a useful arena for advancing foreign policy objectives. Because each country, large or small, has one vote in the UN General Assembly, and because all 46 independent sub-Saharan states are UN members, Africa represents nearly one-third of the Assembly's 159 votes. When taking a common stance, African states thus can have significant, sometimes crucial, influence on many issues in the Assembly and other UN bodies. The African members have been particularly concerned about issues involving colonialism, North-South economic issues, dependent peoples, and human rights. Members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have been prime movers in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions dealing with southern African problems. Occasionally, however, many have been reluctant to take controversial positions involving other African states, preferring to deal with such issues within the OAU or in other African forums.

Just as African nations participate actively in the General Assembly and Security Council, UN specialized agencies and other organizations have been deeply involved in Africa. Among these are the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the World Health Organization (WHO); the International Labor Organization (ILO); the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many of these bodies participate in the UN Development Program (UNDP), which allocates a major portion of its resources to sub-Saharan Africa.

**Organization of African Unity.** The Organization of African Unity is the most prominent and encompassing organization on the African Continent. Founded in May 1963, it includes all independent African states except the Republic of South Africa and Morocco. South Africa never belonged to the organization, and Morocco withdrew in 1985 because of the admission of the Saharoui Arab Democratic Republic (Polisario). Headquartered in Addis Ababa, the OAU has both political and economic responsibilities. The organization has no enforcement powers over its members and OAU resolutions are advisory rather than binding, although individual OAU member states historically have been reluctant in other international forums to depart from OAU positions adopted by resolution. An important OAU function is to obtain an African consensus on questions of interest at the United Nations, where the OAU maintains a permanent office.

The preamble of the OAU Charter reaffirms the principles of the United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also pledges to support the aspirations of the African peoples and to foster African political and economic development. Signatories

agree to coordinate and harmonize their general policies in order to promote African progress and unity, to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and to eradicate colonialism from Africa. Signatories agree to adhere to the principles of non-interference in one another's affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the condemnation of political assassination or subversive activity against neighboring states, respect for existing boundaries, the liberation of remaining dependent areas, and nonalignment with respect to non-African blocs.

The work of the OAU is carried on through four principal institutions—the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Specialized and ad hoc commissions deal with a variety of activities of common interest and attempt to instill a spirit of cooperation among member states.

Annual OAU summits endeavor to deal with current crises, often involving African interstate relations. Debates sometimes avoid confrontation on the tough issues and differences that divide nations, but they can be acrimonious. The OAU has attempted to limit external intervention in African problems and to assist in such issues as the use of mercenaries in Zaire, the Biafran rebellion, disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Algeria and Morocco, the transition to independence in Angola, the status of the Western Sahara, self-determination issues in southern Africa, and human rights. In 1981 the OAU established its first joint military force to help keep peace during the civil war in Chad. Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire contributed troops to the peacekeeping force during its 6 months in Chad.

A 1982 executive decision by the OAU Secretary General to seat the Polisario—a self-styled liberation movement fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara—was strongly opposed by Morocco and many African states. However, because the organization was increasingly paralyzed due to the controversy over this one issue, the Polisario finally was allowed to take its seat at the November 1984 OAU summit. Morocco withdrew from the OAU as a result.

## OAU Members

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Western Sahara (Saharoui Arab Democratic Republic), Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.



### **Economic Commission for Africa.**

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), a UN regional body in which all independent African states, except South Africa, are represented, was established in 1958 for the promotion and planning of African economic and social development through cooperative and regional action. The ECA performs extensive research and served as a catalyst in the creation of the African Development Institute and the African Development Bank. It maintains and endeavors to strengthen economic ties with other countries of the world. The headquarters of the ECA Secretariat is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

**African Development Bank and Fund.** The purpose of the African Development Bank and Fund, headquartered in Abidjan, is to contribute to its members' economic and social development. The Bank and Fund finance investment projects and development programs. After the Bank opened membership to nonregional countries, the United States joined in 1983, becoming the largest nonregional donor, with an annual commitment of \$18 million in paid-in capital and \$54 million in callable capital. It has increased its contribution to the Fund, the Bank's soft loan window, by \$50-\$75 million annually. The

United States remains the largest donor, providing 15.4% of the total Fund replenishment.

**Lome Convention.** The Lome III Convention was signed in Lome, Togo, in December 1984; it continues the special economic relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 67 nations of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. The new convention replaces Lome II, which expired in February 1985. Lome I was signed in 1975. The 5-year accord provides ACP countries with trade preferences, industrial cooperation, and \$6.3 billion in economic assistance, including the STABEX program, which helps to maintain stable export earnings for certain ACP commodities. Although similar to its predecessor conventions, Lome III adds provisions on private investment, fisheries, cultural coordination, and refugee aid.

**ACP Group.** The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States was convened originally to negotiate the Lome Convention with the EEC. Founded as a permanent organization in July 1975, the ACP Group aims to represent its members' views concerning the Lome Convention. It also tries to develop closer trade, economic, and cultural relations among ACP states and to promote effective interregional cooperation. ACP headquarters is in Brussels.

**Economic Community of West African States.** The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 16 members, including

nearly all the Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone countries of the West African region from Mauritania to Nigeria. Its objective is to create a common market in which internal trade barriers will be eliminated. The Community promotes free movement of people, services, and capital; harmonization of agricultural policies; joint development of economic and industrial policies; and elimination of disparities in levels of development. Community headquarters is in Lagos, Nigeria.

**Inter-African Coffee Organization.** The Inter-African Coffee Organization (ICAO) was founded in 1960 and now has 15 members. Its objective is to adopt a unified policy on coffee marketing. The organization facilitates contacts among member countries, coffee buyers, and the International Coffee Organization. It is headquartered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

**West African Rice Development Association.** The West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) has 14 members. Its purpose is to work cooperatively in the research, growing, and marketing of rice. It lobbies for increased quotas on the world market. WARDA's headquarters is located in Monrovia, Liberia.



FURNITURE FOR THE PEOPLE

UNITED STATES  
NOT TO BE SOLD  
WEIGHT: NET 50 POUND

AMERICA  
1950

USE NO HOOKS

610 FABRIC  
CONTRACT NO. KC (GF) 01376

CATHWEL

## U.S. Relations With Sub-Saharan Africa

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Although Portuguese, French, Dutch, British, Belgian, and German involvement in Africa preceded that of the United States and exceeded it in scope, U.S. relations with Africa, influenced by our status as a former colony and our absence from the ranks of colonial powers, have long been affected by humanitarian considerations and cultural links. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, following participation in the slave trade, the United States began slowly and more positively to increase its involvement through the activities of missionaries, explorers, and commercial companies. World War II changed American perceptions and shifted U.S. priorities and policies. Africa, the “sleeping giant,” was beginning to awaken, bringing the realization that the United States and the rest of the world would soon have to consider its political and economic potential.

Having played a major role in drafting provisions of the UN Charter, which provided the philosophical base for the end of colonialism, the United States welcomed African independence. Since then, the United States has actively

cooperated to promote economic development through bilateral and multilateral programs and in supporting enhanced regional security.

Africa is increasingly important to U.S. national interests.

- Africa is a significant factor in multilateral politics. With its bloc of 46 nations (51 with North Africa), Africa can play an important, often decisive, role in international organizations and multilateral meetings.
- The region possesses important natural resources—oil, copper, iron, bauxite, uranium, cobalt, chromium, platinum, manganese, gold, and diamonds.
- Africa offers a growing field for trade and economic cooperation with the United States. The United States needs to buy African raw materials; Africa requires capital investment, new technology, managerial skills, and markets to develop other products.
- The continent is strategically located. Many countries have deep-water ports, good airfields, and controlling positions in relation to major waterways and air corridors. The oil tanker routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Americas pass

through African waters. Thus, strategic cooperation with several African states is important to the exercise of U.S. global responsibilities.

- Continuing regional conflicts make sub-Saharan Africa a potential arena for rivalry and confrontation between external powers.
- North-South issues—raised by less developed African and other Third World countries concerned with economic disadvantages—could increase hostility and resentment toward the industrialized democracies; African economic stagnation could lead to greater instability and outside manipulation.
- Africa assumes particular significance for Americans of African descent who are deeply concerned about the continent's problems.

# Elements of U.S. Policy

Elements of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa have shifted from time to time, depending on the outlook of various administrations, changing congressional attitudes, and circumstances on the continent itself. However, in the past two decades a broad outline of U.S. policy has emerged that contains the following components.

**Maintenance of Mutually Satisfactory Bilateral Political Relations.** U.S. interests are compatible with African aspirations, and the United States has made major contributions to African development and stability. A principal U.S. objective in Africa is to maintain a


climate of understanding and cooperation while encouraging restraint on the part of outside powers so that African states can devise their own solutions and maintain their independence. An important goal is to develop more constructive relations with those few African countries with which the United States has significant problems.

**Opposition to Soviet-bloc Adventurism.** The United States has tried to keep Africa from becoming an area of East-West strategic competition and conflict. The Soviets have not been similarly restrained, however. Soviet military advisers and Soviet-supported Cuban troops decisively influenced the outcome of the internal contest for power in Angola. More than 37,000 Cuban soldiers remain in Angola and Ethiopia. This situation generates ap-

prehensions in neighboring countries and contributes to a deterioration of regional stability. Libya, with great quantities of Soviet arms, has supported subversion in many African countries and now occupies part of Chad.

**Security Cooperation.** Although most African states would prefer to avoid involvement in global political and security issues, it is all but impossible for them to do so when their own security is affected. Thus it is in the interest of the United States and several African countries to cooperate in helping to ensure regional security. This cooperation may involve U.S. access to African strategic facilities, such as ports and airfields, to help maintain the free flow of oil and other vital goods through the nearby sea routes. It also may include U.S. military assistance, both materiel and training, to African forces.

## U.S.-Soviet Military Balance





Such assistance remains, nevertheless, a small fraction of our total assistance, which is chiefly economic.

**U.S. Support for Civil and Human Rights Throughout Africa.** The U.S. Government supports the establishment, maintenance, and extension of full civil and human rights and the rule of law to all peoples throughout the African Continent. The United States has taken the lead in working for a negotiated settlement for independence in Namibia and is encouraging the progressive dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa. The United States has adopted specific measures against governments responsible for violations of their own citizens' human rights, for example, Uganda, South Africa, the Central African Republic, and Equatorial Guinea. For the most part, however, the United States promotes human rights through private diplomacy, which usually achieves the most direct benefits for the people affected.

**Resolution of African Conflicts.** Conflicts between or within Africa offer undesirable opportunities for foreign interference that may imperil regional stability and destroy the climate of confidence necessary for economic development and international cooperation. Thus it is in the interest of the United States and African nations to contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

**Economic Cooperation.** U.S. policy maintains a twofold approach to the economic crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States provides emergency humanitarian aid to those in urgent need, whether victims of the widespread drought or of violent conflict. To promote long-term development, the U.S. Government seeks to encourage efficient African economic policies and to establish programs—for example, in infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education—that provide the basis for sound economic growth. It also works to expand African and U.S. private-sector economic activities.



President Reagan with President Masire of Botswana.



Vice President Bush with Kenyan President Arap Moi.

## Policy Issues

The results of sub-Saharan Africa's first 20 years of independence have been mixed. Some of the former colonies have remained politically stable and have enjoyed economic growth rates above the global average. Among these are Kenya, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Botswana, and Cameroon. Others have experienced coups d'état resulting in extended periods of military rule. Most African economies, however, have stagnated or declined, with growth rates now far behind the figures for population increase. Long civil wars and insurgencies have plagued some countries (Ethiopia, Chad) and others (Angola and Mozambique) still suffer from the traumatic passage to independence. Many nations have been devastated by natural catastrophes such as the widespread drought. All African nations—even the oil producers—still face a doubtful economic future caused not only by their own misguided policies but also by global inflation and uncertain oil and primary commodity markets. Clearly, the feeling of euphoria that seized Africans upon independence is past. Chastened by experience, sub-Saharan Africa today faces the future sobered by a realization that independence is only one step toward national well-being.

Throughout this turbulent era, the United States, like the African nations themselves, has been learning the realities of the region. Since African independence, the American Government has sought to offer access to scientific, technological, and educational experience and has helped to provide the financial assistance necessary to fund development programs. Although the United States had relatively little experience in Africa before the 1960s, the record of American policy has been largely positive. Africa as a whole has not fallen prey to communism, as some once feared it might. Soviet gains on the continent generally have proved to be transitory, and Soviet opportunities have depended on local turmoil generating a demand for Soviet arms.

Development and stability normally are the first priorities of every African state. African governments are well aware that expanded trade opportunities and development capital, public or private, will come only from the West. Africa has welcomed U.S. assistance, and the majority of African governments have confidence in the good will and intentions of the United States.

Politically, African nations generally have not adopted the Western multiparty democratic model. Only a minority meet U.S. criteria for democracy, and many do not respect the human rights of their citizenry to the degree that most Americans would find desirable. Yet African countries have not followed the Soviet example, despite the Marxist rhetoric of several states. Most are humane but authoritarian or one-party regimes seeking to devise their own formulas for nation-building and development.

Because African nations acutely feel their poverty and disadvantages in the global economy, they differ from the United States on many international economic issues. They also desire greater U.S. participation in commodity support agreements, whereas the United States believes that the free market usually should determine prices and influence supply and demand.

The United States has had a wide range of policy concerns regarding Africa. The following are the principal U.S. policy issues.

### The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is strategically located with respect to the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region. This northeastern tip, or "Horn," is comprised of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Key neighboring states are Kenya on the south and Sudan on the west. The area's importance has increased as the United States strengthens its ability to protect U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean in the wake of instability in the Middle East. The political-military situation in the Horn is complicated by internal and regional conflicts, instabilities, and tangled external alliances. Somali irredentist claims to neighboring territories inhabited by ethnic Somalis led to an undeclared Somali-Kenyan war in the late 1960s and then to a Somali invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden region in

1977-78. This invasion was repulsed after massive infusions of Soviet aid and Cuban troops to Ethiopia. In return for their help, the Soviets have acquired naval and air facilities in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government also continues to rely primarily on military force to resolve long-festering internal unrest in other regions of the country, particularly the northern province of Eritrea.

A large Soviet-bloc presence, including Soviet advisers and some 7,000 Cuban combat troops, remains in Ethiopia. With large shipments of Soviet arms and a major expansion of its military forces, Ethiopia now has the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa. A tripartite pact concluded between Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen in August 1981 has been followed by terrorist and guerrilla attacks against Sudan and Somalia. In June 1982, Ethiopian regular troops, supporting a small number of Somali dissidents trained and armed in Ethiopia, attacked several points along the disputed Somali-Ethiopian border. Similar attacks against Somalia have occurred since then. At the end of 1985, Ethiopian forces continued to occupy two small areas of Somali territory. Ethiopia also has provided training safehavens and supplies for Sudanese rebels fighting in southern Sudan.

Over the past year the Horn has been devastated by serious drought and famine. More than 7 million people are affected by this disaster in Ethiopia alone. Many of them seek refuge in neighboring countries, particularly Sudan. The international community has responded generously to emergency needs in the region. The American public, through private contributions, has sent relief groups millions of dollars for food, medicine, and shelter. A major portion of the U.S. Government's aid to Africa is being sent to countries in the Horn, making the United States the largest single donor in the region.

The U.S. presence is not directed against any state in the region, nor do we wish to see any of these states forced to allocate additional resources to military purposes when the economic needs of their peoples are so great. However, African security is not served





Eritrean rebels.

if Soviet arms, Cuban forces, and Libyan money are combined to destabilize legitimate governments in the Horn. The United States will respond to such threats against friends and legitimate U.S. interests in the region, as illustrated by emergency arms shipments to Somalia at the time of the Ethiopian incursions. At the same time, the U.S. Government works cooperatively for political resolution of the underlying tensions that have long troubled this region and for the improvement of the economic conditions and welfare of all its people.

The United States is pursuing specific policies to advance its overall objectives in the region.

- We provide substantial assistance to the states of the region (more than \$300 million in economic assistance and more than \$100 million in security assistance in FY 1985); emergency food assistance in FY 1985 exceeded \$400 million.
- We have actively engaged with other major bilateral donor states and with the international financial institutions to promote more comprehensive programs to meet the economic problems facing Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya.
- We work diplomatically to encourage better relations among those countries in the region, such as Kenya and Somalia, with which we have close ties.

- We have made clear that we would welcome signs from Ethiopia that it, too, seeks a better structure of relationships in the region and an end to confrontational policies. We are the largest single donor to Ethiopian famine relief.
- We fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all regional states. We support the OAU position on the acceptance of postcolonial borders in Africa, as well as efforts to negotiate resolutions to specific regional conflicts.

#### Chad

A large, landlocked country in the center of Africa, Chad has often suffered from internal conflicts based on ethnic and religious differences—with factional leaders using private armies to compete for power—and, more recently, from Libyan aggression. Chad's long civil war began in 1965—just 5 years after its independence from France—with an uprising of northerners against the southern-led government. With the help of France, President Tombalbaye initially was able to repress the insurgency, but eventually the rebels gathered force. Gen. Felix Malloum, a southerner, led a successful coup d'état in 1975; his government was broadened

to include northerners in 1978. The northern Prime Minister, Hissein Habre, attempted a coup in February 1979 that led to fighting among 11 factions.

At this point, the civil war had become so intense that no effective government existed and external observers were obliged to intervene. A series of four international conferences, held first under Nigerian and then under OAU sponsorship, attempted to bring the 11 factions together. At the fourth conference, held in Lagos in August 1979, the Lagos accord was signed establishing a transitional government pending national elections. In November 1979, the National Union Transition Government (GUNT) was created with a mandate to govern for 18 months. Goukouni Oueddei, a northerner, was named President; Abdelkader Kamougue, a southerner, Vice President; and Hissein Habre, Defense Minister.

This coalition proved fragile; in March 1980 renewed fighting broke out between Goukouni's and Habre's forces. The war dragged on inconclusively until Goukouni obtained the intervention of Libya, which sent more than 7,000 troops to Chad and defeated Habre's forces. These Libyan troops then became an occupation force in Chad. In October 1981, Goukouni responded to regional and international concern over Libya's announced goal of unification with Chad and requested the complete withdrawal of Libyan troops. They pulled back to the contested Aozou Strip in northern Chad, which the Libyans have occupied since 1973, and were replaced by a 3,500-man OAU peacekeeping force from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire. The United States gave strong diplomatic backing to the creation of this force and authorized \$12 million for its support.

A special summit of the OAU Chad committee in February 1982 called for a process of reconciliation among all the factions, particularly Goukouni and Habre, who had resumed military activities in eastern Chad. Although Habre agreed to participate, Goukouni refused to negotiate. Defying the OAU February 1982 cease-fire, Goukouni ordered GUNT coalition forces to attack Habre. Habre's troops seized the Chadian capital on June 7, 1982. The OAU force remained neutral during the conflict. Habre then asked the peacekeep-



ing force to stay in Chad to oversee the reconciliation process, but the force withdrew when its OAU mandate expired on June 30. Habre established a government emphasizing reconciliation and including representatives of all major Chadian ethnic and regional groups. Goukouni, former President and Vice President Kamougue, and a number of other factional leaders fled the country. In late 1982 they formed a Libyan-supported "government-in-exile" in the Aozou Strip to overthrow the Habre government.

In mid-1983, Libyan-supported rebels launched an offensive against President Habre. They were later supported by Libyan ground and air forces that forced Chadian Government troops to withdraw from Faya Largeau and other northern oases. The military situation stabilized following the introduction of French and Zairian forces. In September 1984, France and Libya announced their agreement to a mutual withdrawal of forces from Chad. All French troops were withdrawn by mid-November, but a substantial number of Libyans remained.

The United States is seriously concerned by the continued Libyan military occupation of northern Chad, which threatens destabilization not only in Chad but also in the entire region. The United States and the majority of the international community—including the United Nations, OAU, and Nonaligned Movement—recognize President Habre's government. In response to a Chadian Government request in mid-1983, President Reagan authorized emergency military assistance amounting to \$25 million.

Under Habre's leadership, Chad has achieved a significant measure of unity and purpose despite Libyan aggression. The United States enjoys close ties with the Government of Chad, and we support peaceful efforts aimed at restoring the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. U.S. policy supplements the lead role assumed by France in assisting the Government of Chad to thwart Libyan aggression and to pursue reconstruction and internal political reconciliation. In FY 1985, the U.S. Government provided substantial amounts of emergency food as well as economic and rehabilitation grant aid to Chad totaling about \$55 million.

### **Southern Africa**

The countries of southern Africa—comprising South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique—are closely interrelated through political, socioeconomic, and cultural ties. It is a region of great mineral wealth, containing several critical resources, and occupies a strategic position along the West's oil supply route. Unfortunately, it has become one of the continent's major areas of political crisis, a region characterized by confrontation, destabilization, and armed strife.

One issue that motivated and united many sub-Saharan countries in their quest for independence still exists in southern Africa: domination by a white minority. For black Africans, colonial and racial issues are critical, while many whites in southern Africa believe their position and even their very survival are threatened. In consequence, conflicts in southern Africa have been particularly bitter—the wars to end colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique, the struggle for independence and the end of white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and continuing efforts to end South Africa's apartheid system and its control over Namibia.

An atmosphere of polarization envelops the region, providing fertile ground for exploitation by the Soviet bloc. The activity of communist countries consists principally of supplying war materiel, troops, and military support personnel, which only exacerbates the situation. Capital, technology, investment, and trade—rather than military assistance—are the paramount needs of these countries, and they must look primarily to the West for this assistance.

African attention now focuses on two principal issues: terminating South Africa's system of apartheid and achieving independence for Namibia on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 435. Efforts in Namibia by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and in South Africa by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) to achieve these goals by armed struggle, including cross-border guerrilla attacks,

have produced violent retaliatory responses from the South African Government. U.S. policy aims to end this cycle of violence, which contributes to instability throughout the region and decreases South Africa's willingness to negotiate.

**U.S. Policy.** Through frank dialogue and quiet diplomacy with all parties, the Reagan Administration has sought to develop an overall framework for regional security, to bring about the withdrawal of foreign troops from the region, to gain Namibian independence, to hasten positive change in South Africa, and to create an environment in which economic development can flourish. Our policy encourages the active involvement of the U.S. Government and private citizens or groups with all contending parties in the region. Although the U.S. Government does not regard the situation in southern Africa as satisfactory, the reality is that we can play a substantive role in encouraging peaceful evolution only if we are involved in regional diplomacy and support positive change in South Africa.

This is a role for which the United States is uniquely suited. As leader of the free world, the United States has global interests that require it to be vitally concerned about peace and stability in southern Africa. As a society that has moved with justice and humanity to resolve its own racial problems, the United States has earned the confidence of many black African countries. Thus, the United States aims to help to build bridges of comprehension and confidence between the races in southern Africa that will enable the region to avoid chaos and maintain stability while the inevitable process of evolution takes place.

**South Africa.** The United States has maintained official relations with South Africa since the establishment of a consulate in Cape Town in 1799. The many ties between the two countries include a shared language and cultural heritage, military cooperation embracing two World Wars and Korea, and important trade and investment relations. Since 1948, however, when the Government of South Africa officially adopted its policy of apartheid, which legally separated the various racial groups, relations with the United States have been troubled.



**A** Durban, South Africa, an industrial center, seaport, and resort.

**B** Funeral demonstration, South Africa.



**B**

Apartheid is incompatible with American values and has become increasingly intolerable as our international human rights policy has evolved. President Reagan has called apartheid repugnant, and Vice President Bush said in 1982: "Apartheid is wrong. It is legally entrenched racism—inimical to the fundamental ideals of the United States." Apartheid also is politically disastrous, since it fosters economic, military, and political instability both within South Africa and throughout the region. For both moral and practical political reasons, therefore, several U.S. administrations have sought to move the South African Government away from apartheid and toward a system of government based on participation and consent of all the governed. However, although U.S. policy objectives have remained fundamentally the same, the methods for achieving them have differed.

The Reagan Administration inherited a relationship with South Africa that was at its lowest point in recent history. It was characterized by official hostility on both sides, confrontational rhetoric often appearing in public print, and severely strained diplomatic relations. More important, a total stalemate existed on the key issues of a settle-

ment in Namibia and peaceful evolution away from apartheid in South Africa. By contrast, the current policy has worked to reestablish and maintain a relationship with South Africa that will allow effective bilateral communication and thereby enhance U.S. ability to influence South African policies and actions.

The principal issues plaguing southern Africa—apartheid, Namibia, regional security, and economic development—are closely related, and progress, or the lack of it, on one issue affects progress on the others. South Africa is the strongest power in the region, and its cooperation with other southern African nations is essential for

progress on any issue. Without such cooperation, the elements within South Africa favoring a more militant policy are strengthened; the climate in South Africa for positive change or for cooperation in economic development worsens in the face of cross-border guerrilla attacks or increased violence in Namibia. At the same time, South Africa's neighbors are less able and willing to participate in constructive regional diplomacy when that government pursues an aggressive regional policy and when hopes fade for sustained reform away from apartheid.



To achieve lasting peace and economic development, the nations of the region must evolve ground rules for cooperation and coexistence. The United States serves as an important catalyst to bring the contending parties together and to reverse the deteriorating regional security situation. Progress has been achieved. We helped to arrange the February 1984 Lusaka accord under which South Africa agreed to withdraw its forces from Angola and the two nations established a Joint South African-Angolan Monitoring Commission to oversee the withdrawal. We also helped South Africa and Mozambique to negotiate the March 1984 nonaggression pact at Nkomati—further evidence of the increased willingness of various parties to resolve their differences through negotiation and to move away from the concept of armed struggle and destabilization.

The many restrictions on trade, travel, and financial assistance and on military, scientific, and nuclear cooperation demonstrate that the United States does not have a normal diplomatic relationship with South Africa. The United States maintains an arms embargo and enforces other restrictions on the sale of equipment to South Africa's military, police, and other agencies enforcing apartheid. However, we believe that progress in obtaining South African cooperation to solve the problems in southern Africa cannot be achieved by further punitive economic actions; these tactics have proved unsuccessful and even counterproductive in the past.

We believe that South African and U.S. interests are best served by encouraging sustained movement away from apartheid. The reforms underway in South Africa in recent years represent a beginning, but the most fundamental aspects of apartheid have not been addressed. We are concentrating on positive steps to support constructive change and those who work for it. With the cooperation of Congress, we have spent more than \$10 million in FY 1985 to bring black South Africans to the United States for study; to train black trade unionists; to support the development and growth of small businesses in the black communities; and to support black education within South Africa. In addition, \$1.5 million during a 2-year

period has been allocated for specific human rights projects. These efforts supplement those of the U.S. business community, which, during the past 8 years, has spent more than \$130 million on similar programs to assist the black majority. More than 70% of all black South African employees of U.S.-affiliated private companies in the country are covered by the Sullivan code of fair employment practices.

The United States has been encouraged by some recent evidence of movement away from apartheid in South Africa, including abolition of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts; an end to the Political Interference Act, which prohibited racially integrated political parties; legalization of black labor unions; granting urban residency rights to more blacks; and increasing government spending for black education. In particular, we believe that the vote on November 2, 1983, on the new constitution—in which the white electorate indicated its support of change by a 2-1 margin—demonstrates the readiness of whites to move away from the discredited policy of apartheid. Although the new constitution is basically flawed because it grants only limited political rights to the country's colored and Asian populations and none to the black majority, we believe the vote itself indicates hope for future progress.

Unfortunately, as in the past, these encouraging signs have been accompanied by negative actions by the South African Government, such as the detention of opposition leaders on the eve of the August 1984 elections for the new tripartite Parliament and overreactions to black protests by police resulting in needless deaths, widespread detention, and actions against labor leaders.

Violence in South Africa's townships has been at a high level since the new constitution was inaugurated in 1984. Adding to black unrest have been school boycotts by students protesting inferior education; a nationwide recession, with skyrocketing black unemployment and galloping inflation; imposition of increased rents for black housing by township councils; and killings, ban-

nings, police brutality, and the detention of black leaders, some of whom were later charged with treason. In July 1985, the South African Government declared a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts to stem this violence. It subsequently announced its willingness to consider changes in laws covering influx control, the pass laws, and citizenship for blacks. If enacted, these reforms would constitute major changes away from apartheid and would continue the liberalization process. However, the government has yet to clarify its intentions or take concrete actions.

Even with these changes, major grievances would remain. There have been official hints and "trial balloons," but no significant change has occurred in the "homelands" policy under which blacks are deprived of South African citizenship and relegated to impoverished "homeland" enclaves that have little, if any, potential for independent economic or political viability. It is also unclear whether the central issue—political rights for blacks—will be resolved to the satisfaction of the government and its opponents. Although the government has indicated its willingness to negotiate this issue, many black leaders are skeptical about its sincerity.

As the pace of change increases, so do expectations for further modification, as well as resistance from substantial elements of the white minority. We believe in encouraging the reforms now underway and concentrating on positive steps that back constructive change and those working to achieve it. In doing this, one must keep in mind that the influence of outside powers on the course of events in South Africa is limited; however, it does exist and, when used judiciously, can be successful.

To indicate America's displeasure with the continued high level of violence and the slow pace of reform in South Africa, President Reagan announced in September 1985 further restrictions on U.S. ties with the South African Government. This followed nearly 5 years of consistent, forceful criticism by the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State of South Africa's human rights record and growing demands in the United States from Congress and the American public for stronger measures to bring about change in South Africa. The President carefully tailored his actions to avoid



punitive measures that would disrupt the country's economy and hurt those South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid and instead focused his actions on the apparatus that enforces apartheid.

The new measures—very similar to those in proposed congressional legislation that had been approved by the House of Representatives, except that they did not contain a ban on new investment—included expanded restrictions on nuclear and computer sales and on bank loans to the South African Government, a ban on arms imports from South Africa, a ban on importing Krugerrands, and a requirement that U.S. firms doing business in South Africa adhere to certain fair labor standards based on the Sullivan principles or forfeit marketing assistance from the U.S. Government anywhere in the world. The new measures also provided for more official U.S. assistance to black education, black entrepreneurs, black trade unions, and human rights and legal assistance programs.

**Namibia.** Following World War I, South Africa was given a League of Nations mandate to administer the former German colony of South West Africa (Namibia) until it was ready for independence. After World War II, South Africa, which had treated Namibia as an integral part of its national territory, refused to place it under a UN trusteeship and continued to administer it under South African law, including the apartheid system. In 1966 the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate, and in 1971 the International Court of Justice stated that South Africa was obligated to terminate immediately its administration of Namibia.

Confronted with a growing insurgency by the South West Africa People's Organization and worldwide disapproval of its refusal to abide by the Court's ruling, South Africa sought to establish an ethnically based structure of self-government in Namibia. In reality, South Africa retained control of the country, and African states and the international community rejected the arrangement as a basis for Namibian independence. In 1977 five Western members of the UN Security Council (the Contact Group—Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,

### Sullivan Principles

In 1977 Rev. Leon Sullivan—a Baptist minister in Philadelphia and General Motors Corp. director—formulated a set of principles for fair employment practices in South Africa. He encouraged U.S. companies with investments in South Africa to implement these principles in their South African facilities and thus break down the apartheid regulations which allow discrimination against non-white employees. These principles are:

- Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities;
- Equal and fair employment practices for all employees;
- Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time;
- Initiation and development of training programs that will prepare blacks, coloreds, and Asians in substantial numbers for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs;
- Increasing the number of blacks, coloreds, and Asians in management and supervisory positions; and
- Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.

the United Kingdom, and the United States) began an effort to negotiate a solution to the potentially explosive polarization of the region and thereby reduce the possibility for outside exploitation. This Western Contact Group formulated a plan approved in 1978 as UN Security Council Resolution 435 that was provisionally accepted by South Africa, SWAPO, and Namibia's black African neighbors—the front-line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Under the UN plan, a UN Transitional Assistance Group with civilian and military components would be established in Namibia during the transitional period leading to independence. South African troops would be restricted to base and gradually withdrawn. A constituent assembly would be elected to develop a constitution. Following the election, South African

military withdrawal would be completed. After the conclusion of the constituent assembly, independence would be proclaimed.

Although South Africa initially agreed to these principles, it broke off negotiations at Geneva in January 1981. The South African Government seemed to realize the inevitability of Namibian independence but feared that the territory's white and other minorities would be given insufficient opportunity to express their political wills in a fair constitutional process and that any preindependence agreement to protect them would be abandoned afterward.

Recognizing that Namibian independence was impossible without South Africa's cooperation, the Reagan Administration sought early in its first term to revive the Contact Group initiative, this time on a basis that addressed South African concerns more directly. In September 1981, a new, phased plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 contained features designed to satisfy all parties, including the following elements:

- Agreement on "constitutional principles" to guide the constitution's drafters and to ensure that the interests of all Namibians were protected;
- Agreement on the composition, size, and operation of the UN Transitional Assistance Group; on the disposition of all troops during the transition period; and on measures relating to UN impartiality; and
- Initiation of the transition procedure in Resolution 435.

Since 1981, the United States and its contact group partners have:

- Obtained South Africa's recommitment to arrangements for bringing about Namibian independence through adherence to Resolution 435—the only internationally acceptable basis for a solution;
- Obtained the agreement of SWAPO, the United Nations, and the concerned neighboring African states to the arrangements negotiated with South Africa; and

- Rejected South Africa's temptation to seek its own "internal" settlement in Namibia, which would have guaranteed many more years of regional turmoil. We consider the South African Government's 1985 action in establishing an interim government for Namibia to be null and void and without standing. It has no significant bearing on our policy, and we have made our position quite clear to the South Africans.

The presence of about 30,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola continues to complicate negotiations over Namibia and contribute to regional instability. Although the removal of these troops is not a requirement of the Namibian independence process under Resolution 435, South Africa has made clear its readiness to proceed only in the context of a parallel commitment to resolve the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal. We believe that this issue must be dealt with as a practical necessity to obtain a durable settlement acceptable to all parties.

Acceptance by South Africa and Angola of a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal is thus the one remaining issue to be resolved in order to proceed with implementation of the resolution. U.S. diplomacy is actively involved in working out details, based on the Angolan Government's October 1984 agreement to accept Cuban troop withdrawal in the same context as the Namibian settlement. Although much hard work remains, the parties are negotiating, and the United States has been accepted as a mediator. We believe that resolving this issue will have an important impact on southern African security and make a Namibian settlement possible. If we succeed, Africa's last colony will achieve statehood. This, in turn, will help to foster a regional climate conducive to constructive change away from apartheid in South Africa.

In July 1985, the U.S. Congress repealed the Clark amendment which prohibited U.S. aid to antigovernment forces in Angola. Measures subsequently were introduced in Congress to provide humanitarian and military assistance to the antigovernment forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), headed by Dr. Jonas Savimbi. UNITA fought for Angola's independence from Portugal alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which governs

Angola today. The United States views UNITA as a legitimate nationalist organization and supports its struggle against Soviet/Cuban adventurism in Angola. Although the Administration opposes legislatively mandated aid to UNITA, it announced that it would work with the Congress to find effective ways to demonstrate support in a manner consistent with overall U.S. goals in the region.

**Mozambique.** Mozambique attained its independence on June 25, 1975, after more than 470 years of Portuguese influence and colonial rule. The transition was the culmination of at least a decade of fighting, led principally by the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). It was marked by dramatic internal change and upheaval. A one-party socialist state, with close ties to the Soviet bloc, was installed, and some 180,000 out of 200,000 Portuguese settlers, seeing their privileged position undermined, abandoned the country and fled to South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), or back to Portugal. At the same time, more than 60,000 Mozambican refugees who had fled their country returned to Mozambique.

Newly independent Mozambique soon became increasingly involved in the Zimbabwean conflict. It pledged training and transit facilities as well as logistical support to Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting the Rhodesian regime. Rhodesian forces launched retaliatory and preemptive cross-border raids and a de facto state of war existed between the two countries. As part of the war effort, the antigovernment Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), later known as MNR or RENAMO, was created with Rhodesian, South African, and ex-Portuguese settler backing.

Postindependence Mozambique's new political, economic, and social policies, coupled with the impact of the continuing Rhodesian conflict and punitive measures taken by South Africa, had a devastating effect on the economy. In 1976, the cost to Mozambique of implementing sanctions against the Rhodesian regime was \$165 million, and 10,000 people lost their jobs. Trade between Mozambique and South Africa, amounting to 6.8 million tons in 1973, dwindled to 1.1 million tons by 1981. In 1975, some 118,000 Mozambicans working in South Africa remitted most of their

earnings in gold; by 1977 the number had been reduced to fewer than 45,000, and in 1978 South Africa withdrew its fixed-price gold remittances. By 1983, Mozambique's trade deficit stood at \$500 million, and its external debt to noncommunist countries at \$1.4 billion. Perhaps most significant, when 90% of the Portuguese settlers precipitously abandoned the country after independence, Mozambique found itself bereft of private capital and both skilled and managerial services.

Following the end of the Rhodesian conflict and the establishment of the new nation of Zimbabwe in April 1980, support for RENAMO was taken over almost entirely by South Africa, which used the organization as a destabilizing force to further its own national interests. Power lines and road and rail bridges were cut, the oil pipeline running into Zimbabwe was sabotaged, and terrorist attacks were made against civilians, including foreign nationals. By 1982 RENAMO was operating in 7 out of Mozambique's 10 provinces, and by 1984 its impact was being felt on the outskirts of Maputo. Meanwhile, South African military forces launched direct, cross-border raids against African National Congress installations in Mozambique in response to actual or potential guerrilla attacks inside South Africa.

To offset the threat first from Rhodesia and later from RENAMO and South Africa, Mozambique sought and received Soviet aid. Following the signing of a Treaty of Friendship in 1977, the Soviets sent advisers and materiel to help Mozambique strengthen its position against an increasingly aggressive Rhodesia. By 1981, an estimated 550 Soviet and East European and 1,000 Cuban military advisers were attached to the Mozambican Army. East Germany virtually controlled the country's security forces, and a plethora of economic projects brought nearly 2,000 Soviet and East German technicians to Maputo and the countryside.

In the early 1980s, when South Africa took over the support of RENAMO, the Soviets increased their military involvement, providing helicopter gunships, advanced surface-to-air missiles, tanks and armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. Soviet naval ships visited Maputo, a number of high-level military exchanges took place, President Machel visited Moscow, and Soviet declarations of military support were made. However, despite the rhetorical and military back-



ing, Soviet training, tactics, and armaments often were of poor quality and proved inadequate to the prosecution of the counterinsurgency war. Mozambique's disappointment with Soviet assistance was heightened by Moscow's refusal to support President Machel's request in late 1980 for association with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (the Warsaw Pact's economic community).

It is against this background of military threat from inside and outside, economic collapse, and inadequate support from their Soviet-bloc friends that Mozambique, in 1981 and 1982, began to signal an interest in improved relations with the West. It turned first to Portugal, which welcomed the approach, and in 1982 the United States received clear indications that President Machel wanted improved relations and hoped the United States could help to moderate the ever-increasing military threat from South Africa.

The United States grasped the offer to end the freeze in relations. They had reached a particularly low point in 1981 when Mozambique expelled four members of the U.S. Embassy on charges of spying, and the new Reagan Administration responded by halting the appointment of a new ambassador to Maputo and suspending food shipments. For some time the United States had been disturbed by the growing instability in southern Africa and South Africa's increasingly militant posture. It saw the approach from Mozambique as an opportunity to ameliorate the security situation in the area and to encourage Mozambique to move away from the Soviet and toward the Western camp. These developments paved the way for the March 1984 nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, known as the Nkomati accord. Although the United States has not claimed credit for Nkomati, it is no secret that it helped to bring the two sides together.

If it succeeds, the Nkomati accord, in addition to its specific security provisions and international political implications, could restore the strong pre-1975 economic links between Mozambique and South Africa and, thereby, contribute significantly to economic growth in Mozambique. Under the terms of the accord, each side agreed "not to allow its territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against the other state." This meant that Mozambique would no longer allow ANC guerrillas to use its territory and that South Africa

would expel and end its support for RENAMO. Whether the accord succeeds depends on a variety of factors, not the least of which are South Africa's own internal security situation, Soviet interest in the area, South Africa's ability to exercise control over RENAMO, Mozambique's ability to rebuild its economy, and the degree of interest and involvement by neighbors and outside supporters in Mozambique and RENAMO.

Certainly, current closer relations with the West will help. By the end of 1984, Mozambique finally subscribed to the Lome Convention, which opens the door for Common Market aid, and signed a modified Berlin clause, which permits West German assistance. Mozambique has joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which are preparing to make loans and provide technical assistance to the country. American aid also has increased, particularly for emergency relief efforts in connection with the devastating drought that has embraced much of the country for the past several years. In 1985, U.S. program aid to Mozambique amounted to \$15 million; emergency food aid totaled \$45.8 million. Meanwhile, Soviet-bloc assistance, both military and other, has tended to remain level.

On the other side of the coin, post-Nkomati developments have shown that there are limits to the South African Government's influence over RENAMO. In January 1985, South Africa's President Botha admitted that "elements inside South Africa" were still helping RENAMO, and, in September 1985, documents captured by Mozambique Government forces revealed continuing South African assistance and contacts. Certainly, South Africa's willingness to improve relations with Mozambique is affected by conditions within South Africa. When relative calm prevails internally, efforts for improved relations receive more support than at present or during the recent past, when conditions are unstable. Perhaps most important, RENAMO's leadership undoubtedly has objectives that are not always in harmony with those of South Africa and may, in fact, run counter to them, depending on current political considerations.

In any event, although the United States remains concerned that fighting between Mozambican forces and RENAMO has not ceased, there is satisfaction to be gained from increased interest in Mozambique during the past 2-3 years on the part of Western

governments and businesses. Italian assistance, for example, has become sizable, and South Africans are once again exploring business opportunities in Maputo. This appears to be a direct result of Mozambique's willingness to move toward a more neutral position vis-a-vis the West, a move confirmed by the successful visit by President Machel to the United States in September 1985.

**Zimbabwe.** The United States was actively involved with the British Government in achieving a settlement of the Rhodesian war and in establishing the new nation of Zimbabwe, which became independent on April 18, 1980. Since then, Zimbabwe has sought to improve its domestic and international credibility by balancing the need for change with that of building confidence in its government. The democratic institutions established by the 1980 constitution continue to operate, and parliamentary elections, generally peaceful and fair, were held in June-July 1985.

Zimbabwe inherited a strong and diversified economy with a significant private sector. Although affected by world recession, drought, and socialist rhetoric (which has discouraged new foreign investment), the government of Prime Minister Mugabe holds a respect for market principles and international economic realities. If peace and sound economic policies are maintained, Zimbabwe has the potential to help spark development in central and southern Africa. A healthy and stable Zimbabwe also could provide a positive example for the entire region and enhance chances for stability in this troubled area.

Zimbabwe remains strongly opposed to South Africa's apartheid policy but has not allowed its territory to be used to launch guerrilla attacks against its neighbor. It has accepted responsibility for building peace in the area and approves of its neighbors' efforts to resolve their differences. Zimbabwe maintains official contacts—but not diplomatic representation—with South Africa and has worked for effective coexistence.

The United States contributes substantially to Zimbabwe's economic growth and is, in fact, its largest aid donor. U.S. economic aid since independence totals more than \$300 million.



## Foreign Assistance and Economic Relations

The U.S. and African governments recognize that an inseparable relationship exists between economics and politics and that the United States and the West are uniquely qualified to respond to Africa's needs. The African nations' principal goal is development, and the United States cooperates with them in their efforts not only because their economic well-being is important to us in human terms but also because it is directly related to African security. In turn, African security and political stability are important to our foreign policy because they affect U.S. national interests. The economic crisis in Africa threatens most of our policy goals, including the search for peace in southern Africa.

In response to the economic crisis and human tragedy in Africa, the United States is providing unprecedented levels of assistance. We are attempting to alleviate the immediate needs of millions of starving people as well as to promote long-term solutions to Africa's economic problems. We are providing assistance through international organizations and bilateral programs and helping private voluntary groups in their efforts to deliver food and other necessities of life. We are now furnishing more than half of all emergency food reaching African famine victims. The United States has not allowed political differences with any government to weaken its determination to provide assistance to those in need. Indeed, we are the largest donor to Ethiopia, a country whose government has been openly hostile to us for several years.

### Emergency Famine Assistance

On July 10, 1984, President Reagan announced a major initiative to respond more quickly and effectively to the food needs of the people of Africa and others suffering from hunger and malnutrition. This five-point program includes:

- Prepositioning grain in selected Third World areas;



Ethiopian refugees in Somalia.


- Creating a special \$50 million presidential fund to allow a more flexible U.S. response to food emergencies;
- Financing or paying ocean and inland transportation costs associated with U.S. food aid in special emergency cases;
- Creating a government task force to provide better forecasts of food shortages and needs; and
- Establishing an advisory group of business leaders to share information on Third World hunger and food production.

The President also announced a comprehensive African Hunger Relief Initiative on January 3, 1985, directing the U.S. Government to provide more than 1.5 million metric tons of emergency food during FY 1985—three times the record amount from the previous year. In FY 1984, the U.S. Government provided \$200 million of emergency assistance—including more than 500,000 metric tons of emergency food aid as well as medicine and transport assistance—to 26 African countries. Total food aid to Africa amounted to more than 1.4 million metric tons in FY 1984.

In FY 1985, the U.S. Government delivered 1.8 million metric tons of emergency food assistance to Africa at a cost of \$770 million. When added to our regular PL-480 program, we provided African countries with more than 3 million metric tons of food grown in America at a delivered cost of \$1.1 billion. Another \$109 million of nonfood assistance was provided during the same period. Our entire assistance program in FY 1985—including both regular and emergency assistance—totaled a record \$1.9 billion, with almost one-half provided in response to the extraordinary famine conditions that existed on the continent.

U.S. commitment and concern were further highlighted by Vice President Bush during his visit to Sudan, Niger, and Mali in March 1985, his second trip to Africa since he took office in 1981. In order to draw attention to the widespread nature of the drought emergen-

**U.S. Economic Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, FY 1974-85<sup>1</sup>**



<sup>1</sup>Does not include refugee and emergency famine assistance which in FY 1985 amounted to \$879 million.



cy, the Vice President completed his trip by representing the United States at a special UN conference on the crisis held in Geneva. His message to the international community was that, in spite of all that had been done, more help was needed—needed from all those with the means to assist and needed immediately.

### Long-term Assistance

Because the roots of the economic crisis are so deep, the solution will necessarily require resources, time, and commitment. The U.S. Government provided \$1.1 billion in regular assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in FY 1985, over five times that provided in FY 1974.

The four major “pillars” of our assistance strategy are: policy reform, strengthening the indigenous private sector, institution-building, and technology transfer.

Our economic policy reform programs seek to create incentives for growth and to enable African farmers, as well as businessmen, to play a more dynamic role. At the same time, these programs help to develop the technologies, institutions, and human capital required for sustained growth. We have placed increased emphasis on promoting private sector activity in Africa and using private rather than public sector channels to deliver our aid resources to Africa. We are supporting agricultural pricing and marketing reforms, privatization of parastatals, and increased farmer productivity through investments designed to improve technologies, access to markets, productive infrastructure, and the supply of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs.

In FY 1985, the United States launched the African Economic Policy Reform Program, which provides additional and more flexible assistance to African countries undertaking critical policy reforms. In the first year, programs totaling \$75 million were developed for Malawi, Mauritius, Mali, Rwanda, and Zambia. Although these programs are still in their initial stages, they already have served as a catalyst for action on the part of donors and the

World Bank and moved the reform process more quickly and broadly than would have been the case without our presence.

The policy reform program is a precursor of, and gave impetus to, the creation of a similar World Bank program, the Special African Facility, which, together with bilateral funds available for cofinancing, will have about \$1.2 billion to finance policy reform programs in Africa. We have been coordinating our policy reform efforts with the World Bank and, as the Bank's Facility enters an operational phase, it will provide stronger opportunities for cooperation.

“Food for Progress,” another policy reform initiative, was announced by President Reagan in January 1985. This would provide food assistance on a multiyear basis to countries desiring to undertake policy reforms in the agricultural sector. The necessary legislative framework and funding for this program are being developed.

### Support for International Efforts


Although the United States has an influential role in mobilizing an effective response to Africa's economic problems, the task is not solely a U.S. responsibility and, in fact, is far too great for the United States to attempt alone. The crisis in Africa touches upon the welfare of the entire world and requires a sustained and coordinated international effort to promote long-term development.

The U.S. Government has intensified efforts to work with other donors and multilateral institutions to encourage African governments to implement policy reforms that will promote growth and development. Through international organizations and U.S. bilateral and regional programs, the United States is supporting agricultural development projects, land reclamation, and other programs to develop agricultural land and to train farmers in soil conservation techniques. The United States particularly supports the critical role of the International Monetary Fund in providing assistance for stabilizing African economies and of the World Bank in promoting economic development.

In the long run, however, primary responsibility must rest with the African nations themselves, whose actions and policies will largely determine how much progress toward long-term development is possible.

### Trade and Investment

Only a few years ago, many African regimes were either hostile or indifferent to foreign private enterprise. Today, even countries with a Marxist orientation are increasingly eager for trade and investment relations with the West. African leaders are attracted by the fact that American businesses have great expertise in fields important to economic development, such as agribusiness. They also recognize that U.S. private enterprise can provide much of the technical and managerial expertise required to promote economic growth, job creation, and improved standards of living.



However, between 1980 and 1984, sub-Saharan Africa's percentage of total U.S. private direct investment abroad remained constant at 2%—the level prevailing for the past 20 years. During 1980–84, the U.S. trade deficit with the region decreased by about one-half. Besides economic problems, other factors hinder the growth of U.S. business and trade activities in Africa. Despite growing African interest in trade and investment, the investment climate in many countries remains uncertain. Furthermore, many American businesses are indifferent to African markets or assume that opportunities are monopolized by former colonial powers.

The Departments of State and Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation seek to familiarize U.S. businesses with the problems of and opportunities for doing business in Africa, as well as with the available support services. The U.S. Government also encourages U.S. trade and investment abroad through tax and other incentives. At all U.S. Embassies, assisting U.S. businesses is a top priority. The Commerce Department's Foreign Commercial Service is represented in major African commercial centers, including Abidjan, Johannesburg, Lagos, and Nairobi. And the Agency for International Development works to enhance the role of the African private sector in development activities and to build institutions that will promote foreign and domestic business growth.

## Basic Data Tables

Data presented in the following tables have been assembled by the Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, to illustrate the diversity and complexity of sub-Saharan Africa. Profiles include selected information on the governments, people, geography, and economy of the 46 independent countries south of the Sahara. Data vary in accuracy and recency, depending on method of collection as well as economic and political considerations. Culled from a variety of sources, the data should not be regarded as definitive or finite and should not be used for accurate country comparisons. They are intended to provide a few basic facts for each country and an order of magnitude by which to gauge demographic changes and economic development.



Dogon rock paintings, Mali.



# Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>1</sup> (Numbered footnotes on p. 43)

Country			Population <sup>3</sup>			Culture			Education		Labor Force		
Familiar Name Official Name (Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Total Sq. Mi.	Est. Total 1985 (mil)	Est. Growth Rate 1984-85 (%)	Life Expect- ancy (yrs)	Ethnic Groups (%)	Religion (%)	Language	Lit- eracy (%)	Primary Students (% of age group)	Total (mil)	% in Agr.	% in Other <sup>*</sup>
<b>Angola</b> People's Repub- lic of Angola (Angola)	Luanda	481,351	8.0	2.7	38	Ovimbundu (38) Kimbundu (23) Bakongo (13) Other (26)	Christian (88) Indigenous (12)	Portu- guese Local	20	NA	1.9	60	40
<b>Benin</b> The People's Republic of Benin (Dahomey)	Porto-Novo	43,483	4.0	3.1	41	Fons Adjias Baribas Yoruba European	Indigenous (70) Christian (15) Muslim (15)	French Local	20	43	1.5	70	30
<b>Botswana</b> Republic of Botswana (Bechuanaland)	Gaborone	220,000	1.1	3.3	50	Tswana (94) Bushmen (5) White (1)	Indigenous (85) Christian (15)	English Setswana	30	93	0.4	75	25
<b>Burkina</b> Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	Ouaga- dougou	106,000	6.9	2.5	42	Mande Fulani Lobi Gurunsi Mossi Senufo Bobo	Indigenous (65) Muslim (25) Christian (10)	French Local	5	8	2.7	83	17
<b>Burundi</b> Republic of Burundi	Bujumbura	10,747	4.8	2.6	42	Hutu (85) Tutsi (14) Twa (1)	Christian (67) Indigenous (32) Muslim (1)	Kirundi French Swahili	25	29	1.9	93	7
<b>Cameroon</b> United Republic of Cameroon (French and British Cameroons)	Yaounde	183,568	9.8	2.7	47	200 groups	Indigenous (55) Christian (30) Muslim (15)	English French Local	65	70	3.0	83	17
<b>Cape Verde</b> Republic of Cape Verde (Cape Verde Islands)	Praia	1,557	0.3	2.0	61	Creole (71) African (28) European (1)	Catholic (65) Indigenous (35)	Portu- guese Crioulo	37	NA	0.1	NA	NA
<b>Central African Republic</b> Central African Republic (Central African Empire; Ubangi-Shari)	Bangui	247,000	2.7	2.8	41	Baya (34) Banda (28) Sara (10) Mandjia (9) Mboum (9) M'Baka (7) European (3)	Christian (50) Indigenous (40) Muslim (10)	French Sangho-	20	64	1.3	88	12
<b>Chad</b> Republic of Chad	N'Djamena	496,000	5.3	2.5	39	200 groups	Muslim Christian Indigenous	French Chadian- Arabic	20	37	2.0	85	15
<b>Comoros</b> Comoros Federal Islamic Republic (Comoros Islands)	Moroni	863	0.5	2.9	47	Antalote Cafre Makao Other	Muslim (86) Christian (14)	Shaafi- Islam Malagasy French	15	50	0.2	87	13

<sup>\*</sup>Industry, Services,  
Commerce, and Government

Gross Domestic Product						Imports		Exports			Est. US Econ. Assistance FY 1985 (\$ mil)	Government			Country
Annual (\$ bil)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita (\$)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Other†	Total (\$ mil)	From US 1984 (\$ mil)	Total (\$ mil)	To US 1984 (\$ mil)	Leading Exports		Date of Independ- ence	Type	Chief of State and/or Head of Government	Familiar Name
4.2	0	550	29	27	44	1500	103	1600	1010	Oil Coffee Diamonds Iron	1.9	11/11/75	People's Republic	Pres. Jose E. Dos Santos	Angola
1.1	-4.2	310	35	16	49	590	13	304	0.3	Palm Products Cotton Peanuts	0.8	8/1/60	Military (Revolutionary Republic)	Pres. (Col.) M. Kerekou	Benin
0.7	0	750	11	1	88	740	19	640	57	Diamonds Copper Nickel Beef	11.4	9/30/66	Republic	Pres. Dr. Quett K. J. Masire	Botswana
0.9	-1.3	157	35	20	45	230	21	110	0.1	Livestock Peanuts Shea Butter Cotton	15.6	8/5/60	Military Government	Pres. (Capt.) T. Sankara	Burkina
1.2	3	255	51	15	34	198	9	79	2	Coffee Tea Cotton Hides	6.0	7/1/62	Republic	Pres. (Col.) J.B. Bagaza	Burundi
6.7	5	734	30	9	61	1100	66	1904	721	Crude Oil Cocoa Coffee Timber Aluminum	20.5	1/1/60	Republic	Pres. P. Biya	Cameroon
0.1	0	353	NA	NA	NA	68	NA <sup>4</sup>	2	NA <sup>4</sup>	Fish Bananas Salt	2.1	7/5/75	Republic	Pres. A. Pereira	Cape Verde
0.6	-2.3	273	35	8	57	137	1	114	3	Diamonds Cotton Timber Coffee	2.0	8/13/60	Republic	Pres. (Gen.) A. Kolingba	Central African Republic
0.5	0.6	110	52	14	34	122	16	65	0.1	Cotton Livestock	18.5	8/11/60	Republic	Pres. H. Habre	Chad
0.1	-1.0	240	40	34	26	19	0.5	18	2	Oils Vanilla Copra Cloves	0.4	7/6/75	Republic	Pres. Ahmed Abdullah Abderemane	Comoros

†Services, Commerce,  
Mining, and Trade



Country			Population <sup>3</sup>			Culture			Education		Labor Force			
Familiar Name Official Name (Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Total Sq. Mi.	Est. Total 1985 (mil)	Est. Growth Rate 1984-85 (%)	Life Expect- ancy (yrs)	Ethnic Groups (%)		Religion (%)	Language	Lit- eracy (%)	Primary Students (% of age group)	Total (mil)	% In Agr.	% In Other <sup>4</sup>
<b>Congo</b> People's Republic of the Congo (French Congo)	Brazzaville	132,000	1.8	3	47	Bakongo Sangha Bateke M'Bochi European		Indigenous (51) Christian (47) Muslim (2)	French Lingala Kikongo	50	90 +	0.7	75	25
<b>Djibouti</b> The Republic of Djibouti (French Territory of Afars and Issas)	Djibouti	9,000	0.3	2.6	50	Somalis (Issas) Afars French Arab		Muslim (94) Christian (6)	French Somali Afar Arabic	20	NA	0.1	NA	NA
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b> Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Equatorial Guinea and Spanish Guinea)	Malabo	10,820	0.3	2.5	45	Fang Bubi Other	(80) (15) (5)	Nominally Christian	Spanish Pidgin English Fang	55	70	0.1	86	14
<b>Ethiopia</b> Socialist Ethiopia (Empire of Ethiopia)	Addis Ababa	445,000	42.3	0.7	38	Galla Amhara/ Tigray Sidamo Shankella Somali Other	(40) (32) (9) (6) (6) (7)	Muslim (45) Ethiopian Orthodox Christian (40) Indigenous (15)	Amharic Tigrinya Arabic Orominga English	15	23	13.0	90	10
<b>Gabon</b> Gabonese Republic (Gabon)	Libreville	102,317	1.0	3.1	44	Fang Eshira Bapounou Bateke		Christian (60) Indigenous (39) Muslim (1)	French Local	65	84	0.3	65	35
<b>Gambia, The</b> Republic of The Gambia (Gambia)	Banjul	4,003	0.8	3.5	33	Mandinka Fula Wolof Non-Gam- bian Jola Serahull Other	(38) (16) (14) (10) (9) (8) (5)	Muslim (85) Christian (14) Indigenous (1)	English Mandinka Wolof Fula	15	14	0.4	75	25
<b>Ghana</b> Republic of Ghana (Gold Coast)	Accra	92,100	13.2	3.0	49	Akan Ewe Ga		Indigenous (45) Christian (43) Muslim (12)	English Akan Mole- Dagbani Ewe Ga	30	60	3.7	55	45
<b>Guinea</b> Republic of Guinea (French Guinea)	Conakry	246,048	5.7	2.7	45	Fulani Malinke Sousou 15 Smaller Tribes		Muslim (75) Indigenous (24) Christian (1)	French Local	48	34	2.4	82	18
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b> Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese Guinea)	Bissau	14,000	0.9	1.9	35	Balanta Fulani Manjaca Mandinga		Indigenous (65) Muslim (30) Christian (5)	Portu- guese Crioulo Local	9	NA	0.3	90	10

<sup>a</sup>Industry, Services,  
Commerce, and Government

Gross Domestic Product						Imports		Exports			Est. US Econ. Assistance FY 1985 (\$ mil)	Government			Country
Annual (\$ bil)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita (\$)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Other†	Total (\$ mil)	From US 1984 (\$ mil)	Total (\$ mil)	To US 1984 (\$ mil)	Leading Exports		Date of Independence	Type	Chief of State and/or Head of Government	Familiar Name
1.8	3.1	1300	10	15	75	608	12	997	1001	Oil Wood Sugar Tobacco Coffee	1.0	8/15/60	People's Republic	Pres. (Col.) D. Sassou-Nguesso	Congo
0.1	NA	400	10	1	89	152	8	66	01	Hides Cattle Coffee	5	6/27/77	Republic	Pres. H.G. Aptidon	Djibouti
0.1	0	417	50	2	48	37	< 0.5	13	0.5	Cocoa Coffee Wood Bananas	1.0	10/12/68	Republic	Pres. (Lt. Col.) Obiang Nguema Mbasogo	Equatorial Guinea
5	3.7	142	52	14	34	906	174	403	82	Coffee Pulse Hides Meat	44.3	Since Ancient Times	Provisional Military	Chief of State Mengistu Haile-Mariam	Ethiopia
3.5	0.7	2742	4	6	90	700	36	2200	680	Petroleum Wood Manganese Uranium	0	8/17/60	Republic	Pres. El Hadj Omar Bongo	Gabon
0.1	13.4	190	75	15	10	87	14	66	0.6	Peanuts Palm Fish	4.7	2/18/65	Republic	Pres. Sir D.K. Jawara	The Gambia
10.5	-7.2	954	NA	NA	NA	669	46	857	47	Cocoa Minerals Wood	7.6	3/6/57	Provisional Military	Chairman of PNDC Ft. Lt. J.J. Rawlings	Ghana
1.5	1.3	276	40	10	50	403	33	537	110	Bauxite Alumina Fruit Coffee	8.6	10/2/58	Republic	Pres. (Col.) L. Conte	Guinea
.15	-5.1	182	NA	NA	NA	57	NA <sup>4</sup>	9	NA <sup>4</sup>	Peanuts Palm Products Fish	2.5	9/24/73	Republic	Pres. (Brig. General) J.B. Vieira	Guinea-Bissau

†Services, Commerce,  
Mining, and Trade



Country		Population <sup>3</sup>				Culture			Education		Labor Force		
Familiar Name Official Name (Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Total Sq. Mi.	Est. Total 1985 (mil)	Est. Growth Rate 1984-85 (%)	Life Expect- ancy (yrs)	Ethnic Groups (%)	Religion (%)	Language	Lit- eracy (%)	Primary Students (% of age group)	Total (mil)	% in Agr.	% in Other*
<b>Namibia</b> (Southwest Africa)	Windhoek	318,261	1.1	3.0	NA	African (86) European (7) Mixed (7)	Christian (60) Indigenous (40)	Afrikaans English German Local	39	25	0.5	60	40
<b>Niger</b> Republic of Niger (Niger)	Niamey	490,000	6.5	3.3	42	Hausa (56) Djerma (22) Fulani (9) Tuareg (8) Other (5)	Muslim (80) Indigenous and Christian (20)	French Hausa Djerma	5	15	2.5	90	10
<b>Nigeria</b> Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria)	Lagos	357,000	91.2	3.4	49	Hausa- Fulani Ibo Yoruba	Muslim (47) Christian (34) Indigenous (19)	English Hausa Ibo Yoruba	30	42	40	60	40
<b>Rwanda</b> Republic of Rwanda	Kigali	10,169	6.3	3.7	45	Hutu (85) Tutsi (14) Twa (1)	Christian (74) Indigenous (25) Muslim (1)	French Kinyar- Wanda Kiswahali	37	70	2.7	93	7
<b>São Tomé and Príncipe</b> Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe	São Tomé	372	0.09	0.8	NA	Portuguese- African African Portuguese	Christian (80) Other (20)	Portuguese	50	NA	0.02	70	30
<b>Senegal</b> Republic of Senegal (Senegal)	Dakar	76,000	6.8	3.2	44	Wolof (36) Fulani (17) Sere (17) Other (30)	Muslim (80) Christian (5) Other (15)	French Wolof Pulaar Local	10	53	1.7	70	30
<b>Seychelles</b> Republic of Seychelles (Seychelles Colony)	Victoria	171	0.07	0.9	66	Seychellois	Christian (98) Other (2)	English French Creole	60	95	0.03	19	81
<b>Sierra Leone</b> Republic of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone)	Freetown	27,925	3.9	2.6	46	Teme Mende	Indigenous (70) Muslim (25) Christian (5)	English Krio	15	NA	1.5	75	25
<b>Somalia</b> Somali Democratic Republic (British Somalia and Italian Somalia)	Mogadishu	246,155	7.6	3.0	44	Somali (85) Bantu (14) Other (1)	Muslim (99) Other (1)	Somali Arabic English Italian	10	50	2.2	82	18
<b>South Africa</b> Republic of South Africa (Union of South Africa)	Pretoria	472,359	32.5	2.4	66	African (70) White (18) Colored (9) Asian (3)	Christian Hindu Muslim Indigenous	English Afrikaans Zulu Xhosa Sotho Tswana	70	89	10.4	30	70

\*Industry, Services,  
Commerce, and Government



Gross Domestic Product						Imports		Exports			Est. US Econ. Assistance FY 1985 (\$ mil)	Government			Country
Annual (\$ bil)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita (\$)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Other†	Total (\$ mil)	From US 1984 (\$ mil)	Total (\$ mil)	To US 1984 (\$ mil)	Leading Exports		Date of Independence	Type	Chief of State and/or Head of Government	Familiar Name
1.5	-7.0	1429	10	6	84	988	4	1320	3	Copper Uranium Diamonds Cattle	0	Pending	International Territory	—	Namibia
2.0	-0.8	425	44	10	46	438	2	362	0.5	Uranium Livestock Cowpeas	37.9	8/3/60	Republic	Pres. (B. Gen.) Seyni Kountché	Niger
67.0	-4.4	760	25	10	65	12,100	577	10500	2508	Petroleum Cocoa Tin Coal	0	10/1/60	Federal Republic	Pres. Ibrahim Babangida	Nigeria
1.5	2.9	270	46	15	39	182	9	114	17	Coffee Cassiterite Tea Pyrethrum	11.4	7/1/62	Republic	Pres. (Maj. Gen.) J. Habyarimana	Rwanda
0.03	-10.0	300	40	8	52	20	NA <sup>4</sup>	9	NA <sup>4</sup>	Cocoa Copra Palm	0.3	7/12/75	Republic	Pres. M. Pinto Da Costa	São Tomé and Príncipe
2.5	-14.3	400	20	20	60	820	95	498	2	Peanuts Phosphate Fish	47.8	4/4/60	Republic	Pres. A. Diouf	Senegal
0.2	-0.2	2270	7	15	78	81	0.5	35	0.3	Tourism Copra Cinnamon	2.3	6/29/76	Republic	Pres. F.R. Rene	Seychelles
1.0	0.5	256	32	23	45	126	19	104	39	Minerals Agricultural Products	6.9	4/27/61	Republic	Pres. Dr. S.P. Stevens	Sierra Leone
1.9	9.6	375	55	7	38	407	76	101	0.7	Livestock Fruit Hides	70.7	7/1/60	Republic	Pres. (M. Gen.) Said Barre	Somalia
79.0	-3.0	2500	7	24	69	14400	2265	18200	2488	Gold Ore Uranium Diamonds Wool Sugar	10 <sup>6</sup>	5/31/10	Republic	Pres. P.W. Botha	South Africa

†Services, Commerce,  
Mining, and Trade



Country			Population <sup>3</sup>			Culture			Education		Labor Force		
Familiar Name Official Name <sup>1</sup> (Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Total Sq. Mi.	Est. Total 1985 (mil)	Est. Growth Rate 1984-85 (%)	Life Expectancy (yrs)	Ethnic Groups (%)	Religion (%)	Language	Literacy (%)	Primary Students (% of age group)	Total (mil)	% in Agr.	% in Other <sup>4</sup>
<b>Sudan</b> Democratic Republic of the Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan)	Khartoum	967,500	21.8	2.7	47	Black (52) Arab (39) Beja (6) Other (3)	Muslim (70) Indigenous (25) Christian (5)	Arabic English Local	20	50	5.7	78	22
<b>Swaziland</b> Kingdom of Swaziland (Swaziland)	Mbabane	6,704	0.7	3.0	47	African (97) White (3)	Christian (57) Indigenous (43)	English SiSwati Zulu	65	90	0.4	53	47
<b>Tanzania</b> United Republic of Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar)	Dar es Salaam	365,608	21.7	3.2	52	Over 130 Groups	Indigenous (34) Christian (33) Muslim (33)	Swahili English	66	87	7.2	83	17
<b>Togo</b> Republic of Togo (French Togoland)	Lome	21,853	3.0	3.1	47	Ewe Mina Kabyé	Indigenous (60) Christian (20) Muslim (20)	French Local	18	50	1.2	67	15
<b>Uganda</b> Republic of Uganda (Uganda)	Kampala	91,076	14.7	3.2	53	Bantu Nilotic Sudanic	Christian (66) Indigenous (18) Muslim (16)	English Swahili Luganda	52	53	5.8	90	10
<b>Zaire</b> Republic of Zaire (Belgian Congo)	Kinshasa	905,063	32.9	2.9	48	Bantu 80 Other Groups	Christian (70) Indigenous (30)	French English Lingala Other	27	90	13.0	75	25
<b>Zambia</b> Republic of Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)	Lusaka	290,724	6.8	3.2	47	African (99) Other (1)	Christian (51) Indigenous (48) Muslim (1)	English 70 Local	54	49	2.7	65	35
<b>Zimbabwe</b> (Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia)	Harare	150,333	8.7	3.3	52	African (96) White (3) Other (1)	Christian (75) Indigenous (24) Other (1)	English Shona Ndebele	50	90	3.4	35	60

<sup>4</sup>Industry, Services,  
Commerce, and Government

Gross Domestic Product						Imports		Exports			Est. US Econ. Assistance FY 1985 (\$ mil)	Government			Country
Annual (\$ bil)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita (\$)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Other†	Total (\$ mil)	From US 1984 (\$ mil)	Total (\$ mil)	To US 1984 (\$ mil)	Leading Exports		Date of Independence	Type	Chief of State and/or Head of Government	Familiar Name
7.3	-2.6	364	40	6	54	1800	136	790	20	Cotton Gum Arabic Peanuts	214.4	1/1/56	Republic	Chairman (Gen.) Suwar el-Dahab	Sudan
0.6	1.7	900	23	33	44	464	0.7	330	23	Sugar Wood Tourism Iron Asbestos	7.6	9/6/68	Monarchy	Queen Regent Ntombi Thawala PM—B. Dlamini	Swaziland
4.2	0.6	210	54	13	33	831	44	396	12	Coffee Cotton Sisal Spices	3.9	(Union) 1964	Republic	Pres. Ali Hassan Mwinyi	Tanzania
1.0	-3.2	340	27	21	52	290	13	202	35	Phosphates Cocoa Coffee	4.9	4/27/60	Republic	Pres. (Gen.) G. Eyadema	Togo
4.8	5.0	355	55	8	37	509	3	380	93	Coffee Tea Cotton	7.8	10/9/62	Republic	Chief of State (Gen.) T.O. Lutwa**	Uganda
3.4	3.0	570	16	30	54	1130	82	1611	502	Copper Cobalt Diamonds Coffee	49.1	6/30/60	Republic	Pres. (Marshal) Mobutu Sese Seko	Zaire
3.4	1.7	500	14	41	45	1060	91	1030	124	Copper Cobalt Zinc Lead Tobacco	25.0	10/24/64	Republic	Pres. Dr. K.D. Kaunda	Zambia
6.6	2.0	870	18	32	50	1430	63.6	1120	71	Tobacco Chrome Textiles Grain	37.6	4/18/80	Parliamentary System	Pres. Dr. C. Banana PM—Robert Mugabe	Zimbabwe

†Services, Commerce, Mining, and Trade

\*\*Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army seized power on January 27, 1986. Museveni was sworn in as President on January 29, 1986.

<sup>1</sup>Statistics are drawn from the latest, most reliable data available from a variety of sources, particularly from the Department of State's *Background Notes* and the Central Intelligence Agency's *The World Factbook*, which are periodically updated. Therefore, except where indicated, no specific year can be designated for each category of statistics. Furthermore, current figures do not exist in many cases (indicated by NA—not available), and some data are based on U.S. Government estimates.

<sup>2</sup>The earlier name listing is included to identify for readers unfamiliar with Africa earlier names by which some of the countries have been known. In some cases these names date to preindependence and in other instances relate to previous postindependence regimes. No political significance should be attached to selections, which are based largely on historical perceptions.

<sup>3</sup>Estimated and projected mid-year population and growth rates are from mid-year to mid-year.

<sup>4</sup>Trade statistics with the United States have been combined for the Cape Verde Islands, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe. Total 1984 imports from the United States were \$29.7 million, and total 1984 exports to the United States were \$0.9 million.

<sup>5</sup>Economic assistance includes development assistance, Economic Support Funds, and PL 480 Titles I, II, and III. Refugee and emergency famine assistance, which amounted to \$879 million in FY 1985, and military assistance are excluded. Some regional funds for the African economic policy reform program also are not included.

<sup>6</sup>These funds do not go to the South African Government. AID's program in South Africa works directly with regional organizations, private voluntary organizations, local groups, and individuals for the improvement of educational and training opportunities for South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid.



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4.2	0.6	210	54	13	33	831	44	396	12	Coffee Cotton Sisal Spices	3.9	(Union) 1964	Republic	Pres. Ali Hassan Mwinyi	Tanzania
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
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


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# INSIGHT

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Africa*

a politically independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa. R3,50 GST included.



**Africa at a glance  
1960-1985**



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Gen Yakubu Gowon receives Lt-Col Philip Effiong and the five-man Biafran delegation which signed the pact officially ending the two-and-a-half year Nigerian civil war on 16 January 1970.


On Independence Day, 6 March 1957, Dr Nkrumah waves to the waiting thousands outside Parliament House, Accra.



P W Botha of South Africa and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia after holding consultations in 1982.



Pres Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya (left) and Pres Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (1967).



# Africa at a glance,

## 1960-1985

This special edition of *Africa Insight* presents a statistical survey of developments since the year 1960 when one-third of the continent's countries became independent.

This quarter of a century of experience inevitably invites reflection on past and future trends. The more so because 1985 also marks a century of profound and often traumatic change since the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.

Whereas a great deal of attention is focused on Africa's economic failures and political instability, a factual compendium such as this serves to remind readers of the positive achievements which need to be noted.

Obviously, South Africans cannot content themselves with the predictions of impending doom for a continent whose destiny is also their's. They share the common problems emerging from a harsh environment and are inextricably part of an immensely diverse, complex and, despite all its excruciating problems, exhilarating continent.

Few South Africans will disagree with scholars in Africa and abroad that many of the problems and conditions affecting the continent are more or less of a permanent nature and that others will persist for many years. Social and ecological realities that have evolved over centuries cannot be erased within a few years by investing in physical capital or by putting one generation through school and university.

It is clear too that Africa, being the cradle of mankind, has gone through millenia adapting itself to natural environment and external influences. The past 25 years and

even the 100 years since the advent of the colonialists are therefore much too short to base forecasts far into the future.

Topics such as these are to be discussed at the Africa Institute's annual conference on 4 October 1985 which also commemorates the Institute's first quarter of a century as an independent centre for African studies in southern Africa.

Apart from serving as a background document at the conference, this *Africa at a Glance* Issue, like its predecessors since 1967, has been prepared to meet readers' need for readily accessible, up-to-date and concise data. The countries of Africa are dealt with individually in greater detail in our series *Country Profiles* which commenced in *Africa Insight* in 1984 (vol 14, no 1).

While every effort has been made to meet known needs, we are conscious that many gaps remain. This is inevitable because of the lack of reliable, comparable and fairly up-to-date data. Gaps also exist because of the need to keep the size of the publication to a reasonable length. The Institute will, however, welcome suggestions for further issues.

This issue has been designed and produced by the editorial and cartographical staff under the editorship of Madeline Munnik. Pieter Esterhuysen, assisted by the research and library staff, compiled the tables and wrote the explanatory notes.

ERICH LEISTNER  
DIRECTOR






Angolan woman.


The train line from Addis Ababa to the coast in Djibouti.



Angolan refugees (1976).



Dead Tanzanian soldier taken back from the front.



# Section 1: Basic data

The purpose of this section is to give a profile of all African countries and territories. In *table 1* the mainland countries (independent and non-independent) and independent island states are listed alphabetically to facilitate reference to name changes, political status, capitals, official languages, names of currencies and nationalities. The non-independent, including uninhabited, lesser-known islands, are listed in *table 2*.

## Population growth

Africa's population is rapidly approaching the 1 000 million mark. *Tables 3 and 4* reflect the rapid population growth and population density increases since 1960. The figures for 1985 and 2000 are based on United Nations and Africa Institute estimates and projections. *Table 4 (column 6)* also pinpoints the continent's landlocked states. African countries are ranked according to their population and territorial sizes in *table 5*. See also *map A*.

## Regions

The compiler's presentation of countries on a regional basis on *map B* and in *table 6* follows that of international agencies in general but deviates substantially regarding southern, eastern and central (middle) Africa. The compilation of some tables according to a regional pattern helps to present the vast African regions in a global context and to reduce the continent's infinite variety to smaller proportions. The grouping of countries into regions makes it easier not only to grasp the salient aspects of important geographical regions, but also to glean basic data on formal regional arrangements such as the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and the Customs Union of Southern Africa (Cusa). See also *maps C and D*.

It is clear from *table 6* what is meant by *Southern Africa* while the concepts *South Africa* and *SATBVC states* are explained in *table 7 (map E)*. The TBVC states (*table 7*) were formerly part of the Republic of South Africa but have since 1976 become sovereign independent republics outside the jurisdiction of the RSA. Their independence is recognized by the RSA and among themselves. Readers should note that a distinction is made at present between *South Africa* or *SATBVC states* on the one hand and *Republic of South Africa (RSA)* on the other. Yet for brevity's sake the term *South Africa* is used by South Africans instead of *Republic of South Africa*, an exchange of terms which causes confusion – as does the substitution of the term *Southern Africa* for *South Africa*. *National States (tables 7 and 8)* is the current official term for the ethnic homelands which are non-independent and form part of the Republic of South Africa (RSA). They are also shown on *map E*.

## Urbanization

*Tables 9 and 10* reflect the phenomenal growth of the continent's urban population. The general trend is movement of population from the rural areas of limited opportunity to urban areas of more rapid advancement. Generally speaking urban growth is double that of the total populations (compare *tables 3 and 9*). In 1960 there were 3 cities in Africa with more than one million inhabitants and 9 with more than 500 000. The latest available figures are somewhat dated but it can safely be assumed that there are now at least 50 with populations over 500 000 and 15 with more than one million people. Cairo is one of the largest cities in the world with an estimated population of some 10 million at present. Other large urban conurbations in Africa are Lagos in Nigeria, the Witwatersrand in South Africa and Kinshasa in Zaire with present populations ranging from four million (Witwatersrand and Kinshasa) to five million (Lagos).

## Cultural aspects

Africa's cultural diversity, fundamental to an understanding of Africa, is portrayed by means of an ethnic map (*map F*) and simplified lists next to the map, which also shows that the continent's cultural groups live in areas that bear little or no relevance to international boundaries. These data are supplemented by maps showing external influences such as foreign languages (*map G*) and the creeds of Christianity and Islam (*map H*).

## Editorial notes

Compilation of the data in this issue was completed on 15 September 1985.

Symbols used in the tables:

- indicates nil or a negligible figure
- .. indicates data is not available or relevant

This publication is a compilation of data from other sources and unpublished Africa Institute material. Although great care has been taken in preparing the contents, no responsibility for errors can be accepted on the part of the Africa Institute.



TABLE 1

## ALPHABETICAL CHECKLIST: ALL AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Some basic data on independent states and non-independent territories, 1985

(Inhabited island states in *italics*)

Official name and name changes since independence	Capital and name changes (See also table 10)	Date of independence and former/present ruling power (See also table 11)	Currency	Official/national languages (See also map)	Nationality
1 <b>ALGERIA</b> , Democratic and Popular Republic of	Algiers	3 July 1962 France	1 Dinar (AD) = 100 centimes	Arabic	Algerian(s)
2 <b>ANGOLA</b> , People's Republic of	Luanda	11 November 1975 Portugal	1 Kwanza (Kw) = 110 lwei	Portuguese	Angolan(s)
3 <b>BENIN</b> , People's Republic of (Rep of Dahomey until 1975)	Porto Novo	1 August 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Beninese
4 <b>BOPHUTHATSWANA</b> , Republic of	Mmabatho	6 December 1977 South Africa	1 Rand (R) = 100 cents	Setswana, English, Afrikaans	Motswana (sing) Batswana (plural)
5 <b>BOTSWANA</b> , Republic of	Gaborone	30 September 1966 Britain	1 Pula (Pu) = 100 thebe	Setswana, English	Motswana (sing) Batswana (plural)
6 <b>BURKINA FASO</b> , Popular Democratic Republic of (Rep of Upper Volta until 1984)	Ouagadougou	5 August 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Burkinian(s)
7 <b>BURUNDI</b> , Republic of (Kingdom of . . . until 1966)	Bujumbura	1 July 1962 Belgium	1 Bu Franc = 100 centimes	French, Kirundi	Burundian(s)
8 <b>CAMEROON</b> , Republic of (Federal Rep of . . . 1961-72, United Rep of . . . until 1984)	Yaounde	1 January 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French, English	Cameroonian(s)
9 <b>CANARY ISLANDS</b> (See table 2)					
10 <b>CAPE VERDE</b> , Republic of	Praia (on Sao Tiago Island)	5 July 1975 Portugal	1 Escudo (CV Esc) = 100 centavos	Portuguese, Crioulo	Cape Verdean(s)
11 <b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)</b> (Central African Empire 1977-79)	Bangui	13 August 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French, Sango	Central African(s)
<b>CEUTA</b> (See <i>Spanish North Africa</i> )					
12 <b>CHAD</b> , Republic of	N'Djamena (Fort Lamy)	11 August 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French, Arabic, Sara, Sango	Chadian(s)
13 <b>CISKEI</b> , Republic of	Bisho	4 December 1981 South Africa	1 Rand (R) = 100 cents	English, Isi Xhosa	Ciskeian(s)
14 <b>COMOROS</b> , <i>Federal Islamic Republic of the</i>	Moroni (on Grande Comore Island)	6 July 1975 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French, Swahili	Comoran(s)
15 <b>CONGO</b> , People's Republic of the	Brazzaville	15 August 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Congolese
16 <b>DJIBOUTI</b> , Republic of	Djibouti	27 June 1977 France	1 Dj Franc = 100 centimes	French	Djiboutian(s)
17 <b>EGYPT</b> , Arab Republic of	Cairo	28 February 1922 Britain	1 Pound (£) = 100 piastres = 1000 millièmes	Arabic	Egyptian(s)
18 <b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</b> , Republic of	Malabo (Santa Isabel) on Bioko Island	12 October 1968 Spain	1 Ekuele (E) = 100 céntimos	Spanish	Equatorial Guinean(s)
19 <b>ETHIOPIA</b> Socialist Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	Since ancient times Italian occupation . . . 1936-41	1 Birr (Br) = 100 cents	Amhara	Ethiopian(s)
20 <b>GABON</b> , Republic of	Libreville	17 August 1960	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Gabonese
21 <b>GAMBIA</b> , Republic of The (State of The . . . until 1970)	Banjul (Bathurst)	18 February 1965 Britain	1 Dalasi (Di) = 100 bututs	English	Gambian(s)
22 <b>GHANA</b> , Republic of (State of . . . until 1960)	Accra	6 March 1957 Britain	1 Cedi (C) = 100 pesewas	English	Ghanaian(s)
23 <b>GUINEA</b> , Republic of (Popular & Democratic Rep of . . . until 1984)	Conakry	2 October 1958 France	1 Syli (Sy) = 100 cauris	French	Guinean(s)

(Continued on next page)

**TABLE 1** (Continued from previous page)

Official name and name changes since independence	Capital and name changes (See also table 10)	Date of independence and former/present ruling power (See also table 11)	Currency	Official/national languages (See also map)	Nationality
24 <b>GUINEA BISSAU</b> , Republic of	Bissau	10 September 1974 Portugal	1 Peso (GBP) = 100 centavos	Portuguese	Guinean(s)
25 <b>IVORY COAST</b> , Republic of the	Abidjan (moving to Yamoussoukro)	7 August 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Ivorian(s)
26 <b>KENYA</b> , Republic of (State of . . . until 1964)	Nairobi	12 December 1963 Britain	1 Shilling (KSh) = 100 cents	English, Swahili	Kenyan(s)
27 <b>LESOTHO</b> , Kingdom of	Maseru	4 October 1966 Britain	1 Loti (Lo) = 100 lisente Plural: Maloti (Mo)	English, Sesotho	Mosotho (sing) Basotho (plural)
28 <b>LIBERIA</b> , Republic of	Monrovia	26 July 1847	1 Dollar (L\$) = 100 cents	English	Liberian(s)
29 <b>LIBYA</b> Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Kingdom of . . . until 1969, Republic of . . . until 1977)	Tripoli	24 December 1951 Britain and France	1 Dinar (LD) = 100 dirhams	Arabic	Libyan(s)
30 <b>MADAGASCAR</b> , Democratic Republic of (Malagasy Rep until 1975)	Antananarivo (Tananarive)	26 June 1960 France	1 Mg Franc = 100 centimes	French, Malagasy	Malagasy
31 <b>MADEIRA ISLAND</b> (See table 2)					
32 <b>MALAWI</b> , Republic of (State of . . . until 1966)	Lilongwe	6 July 1964 Britain	1 Kwacha (MK) = 100 tambala	English, Chichewa	Malawian(s)
33 <b>MALI</b> , Republic of (Federation of Mali until 22 Sept 1960)	Bamako	20 June 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Malian(s)
34 <b>MAURITANIA</b> , Islamic Republic of	Nouakchott	28 November 1960 France	1 Ouguiya (U) = 5 khoums	Arabic, French	Mauritanian(s)
35 <b>MAURITIUS</b> (See also table 2)	Port Louis	12 March 1968 Britain	1 Rupee (MR) = 100 cents	English, French	Mauritian(s)
36 <b>MAYOTTE ISLAND</b> (See table 2)					
<b>MELILLA</b> (See Spanish North Africa)					
37 <b>MOROCCO</b> , Kingdom of	Rabat	2 March 1956 France and Spain	1 Dirham (Dh) = 100 centimes	Arabic	Moroccan(s)
38 <b>MOZAMBIQUE</b> , People's Republic of	Maputo (Lourenco Marques)	25 June 1975 Portugal	1 Metical (Mt) = 100 centavos	Portuguese	Mozambican(s)
<b>NAMIBIA</b> (See SWA/NAMIBIA)					
39 <b>NIGER</b> , Republic of	Niamey	3 August 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Nigerien(s)
40 <b>NIGERIA</b> , Federal Republic of (State of . . . until 1963)	Lagos (moving to Abuja)	1 October 1960 Britain	1 Naira (N) = 100 kobo	English	Nigerian(s)
41 <b>REUNION ISLAND</b> (See table 2)					
42 <b>RWANDA</b> , Republic of	Kigali	1 July 1962 Belgium	1 Rw Franc = 100 centimes	French Kinyarwanda	Rwandan(s)
43 <b>SAINT HELENA COLONY</b> (See table 2)					
44 <b>SAO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE</b> , Democratic Republic of	Sao Tomé on Sao Tomé Island	12 July 1975 Portugal	1 Dobra (Db) = 100 cêntimos	Portuguese	Sao Tomean(s)
45 <b>SENEGAL</b> , Republic of (Federation of Mali until 20 Aug 1960)	Dakar	20 June 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Senegalese
46 <b>SEYCHELLES</b> , (See also table 2)	Victoria (on Mahé Island)	29 June 1976 Britain	1 Rupee (SR) = 100 cents	French, English, Creole	Seychellois
47 <b>SIERRA LEONE</b> , Republic of (State of . . . until 1971)	Freetown	27 April 1961 Britain	1 Leone (Le) = 100 cents	English	Sierra Leonean(s)

(Continued on next page)



**TABLE 1** (Continued from previous page)

Official name and name changes since independence	Capital and name changes (See also table 10)	Date of independence and former/present ruling power (See also table 11)	Currency	Official/national languages (See also map)	Nationality
48 <b>SOMALIA</b> , Democratic Republic of	Mogadishu	1 July 1960 Britain and Italy	1 Shilling (So Sh) = 100 centisimi	Somali, Arabic	Somali
49 <b>SOUTH AFRICA</b> , Republic of (Union of . . . until 1961)	Pretoria and Cape Town	31 May 1910 Britain	1 Rand (R) = 100 cents	English, Afrikaans	South African(s)
50 <b>SPANISH NORTH AFRICA</b> <sup>1</sup> Ceuta and Melilla		Spanish cities	1 Peseta (Pa) = 100 céntimos	Spanish	Ceutan(s), Melillan(s)
51 <b>SUDAN</b> , Democratic Republic of	Khartoum	1 January 1956 Britain and Egypt	1 Pound (£) = 100 piastres = 1000 millièmes	Arabic	Sudanese
52 <b>SWA/NAMIBIA</b> <sup>2</sup> (South West Africa)	Windhoek	Selfgoverning territory under South African control	1 Rand (R) = 100 cents	Afrikaans, English	South West African(s) or Namibian(s)
53 <b>SWAZILAND</b> , Kingdom of	Mbabane	6 September 1968 Britain	1 Lilangeni (Li) = 100 cents Plural: Emalangeni (Ei)	English, Siswati	Swazi
54 <b>TANZANIA</b> , United Republic of (State of Tanganyika until 1961, Rep of Tanganyika until 1964)	Dar es Salaam (moving to Dodoma)	9 December 1961 Britain	1 Shilling (TSh) = 100 cents	Swahili	Tanzanian(s)
55 <b>TOGO</b> , Republic of	Lomé	27 April 1960 France	1 CFA Franc = 100 centimes	French	Togolese
56 <b>TRANSKEI</b> , Republic of	Umtata	26 October 1976 South Africa	1 Rand (R) = 100 cents	English, Isi Xhosa, Sesotho	Transkeian(s)
57 <b>TUNISIA</b> , Republic of (Kingdom of . . . until 1957)	Tunis	20 March 1956 France	1 Dinar (TD) = 1000 millimes	Arabic	Tunisian(s)
58 <b>UGANDA</b> , Republic of (Kingdom of . . . until 1963)	Kampala	9 October 1962 Britain	1 Shilling (USh) = 100 cents	English	Ugandan(s)
<b>UPPER VOLTA</b> (See <i>Burkina Faso</i> )					
59 <b>VENDA</b> , Republic of	Thohoyandou	13 September 1979 South Africa	1 Rand (R) = 100 cents	English, Tshivenda	Venda
60 <b>WESTERN SAHARA</b> <sup>3</sup>	El Aaiun	Provinces of Morocco	1 Dirham (Dh) = 100 centimes	Arabic	Saharan(s)
61 <b>ZAIRE</b> , Republic of (Democratic Rep of the Congo until 1971)	Kinshasa (Leopoldville)	30 June 1960 Belgium	1 Zaire (Z) = 100 makuta	French	Zairian(s)
62 <b>ZAMBIA</b> , Republic of	Lusaka	24 October 1964 Britain	1 Kwacha (ZK) = 100 ngwee	English	Zambian(s)
63 <b>ZIMBABWE</b> , Republic of	Harare (Salisbury)	18 April 1980 Britain	1 Dollar (Z\$) = 100 cents	English	Zimbabwean(s)

**NOTES:**

1 Spanish North Africa consists of two ports on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast, *Ceuta* and *Melilla*, as well as the islands of *Penon de Velez*, *Ahucemas* and the *Chafarinas*. Spain secured control of Melilla in 1496 and of Ceuta in 1580. Both cities are claimed by Morocco.

2 South West Africa/Namibia is a former German colony administered by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate since 1920. Claimed by the United Nations since 1946, the process leading to its independence is being negotiated internationally.

3 A former Spanish colony, Western Sahara was annexed and divided between Morocco and Mauritania in February 1976. Since Mauritania's withdrawal in August 1979, Morocco assumed control of the entire territory. A government in exile, formed by the Polisario rebel movement, declared an independent republic (*Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic*) which was recognized by the Organization of African Unity at its 20th summit meeting in November 1984. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest.

TABLE 2

**ISLAND DEPENDENCIES IN AFRICAN OCEANS**  
**Excluding offshore islands<sup>1</sup>**

Administering power <sup>2</sup>	Ocean	Islands	Capitals	Surface area km <sup>2</sup>	Population '000	Facilities
BRITAIN	SOUTH ATLANTIC	ST HELENA COLONY: Ascension (Wideawake) Island	Jamestown	413 88	6 629 (1981) 1 038	Communications base Harbour, fishing Weather station on Gough US naval base
		St Helena Island Tristan da Cunha group (6 islands including Gough)	Jamestown Edinburgh	122 203	5 268 323	
	INDIAN	CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO (including Diego Garcia Island)	On Diego Garcia	60	No permanent population	
FRANCE	INDIAN	MAYOTTE (Mahoré) <sup>3</sup> RÉUNION (Bourbon) (Overseas department)	Dzaoudzi St Denis	376 2 512	53 (1982) 563 (1985)	Harbour French naval base Scientific research
		UNINHABITED ISLANDS: Amsterdam, Crozet, Kerguelen, Mozambique Channel Islands, <sup>4</sup> St Paul, Tromelin		7 600 (approx)	No permanent population	
MAURITIUS	INDIAN	RODRIGUES	Port Louis on Mauritius	104	32 (1981)	Fishing
		UNINHABITED ISLANDS: Agalega, Cargados Carajos (St Brandon)		71	Uninhabited	Fishing
NORWAY	SOUTH ATLANTIC	BOUVET		48	Uninhabited	
PORTUGAL	NORTH ATLANTIC	MADEIRA PROVINCE	Funchal	797	263 (1978)	
SEYCHELLES <sup>5</sup>	INDIAN	The state comprises the Seychelles Archipelago and outlying dependencies such as the Amirante, Aldabra, Assumption, Astove, Cosmoledo, Desroches, Farquhar, Providence, and other archipelagos	Victoria	10 360 000 (ocean area) 444 (land area)	65 (1983)	
SOUTH AFRICA	INDIAN	MARION AND PRINCE EDWARD		308	No permanent population	Weather station on Marion
SPAIN	NORTH ATLANTIC	CANARY ARCHIPELAGO Las Palmas Province (13 islands)	Las Palmas (on Gran Canaria)	4 065	756 (1981)	Harbour, fishing, tourism Harbour
		Santa Cruz Province (4 islands)	Santa Cruz (on Tenerife)	3 208	668 (1981)	

**NOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> Prominent offshore islands forming part of coastal and island states' territory are:  
*Bissagos (Bijagos) Archipelago* – Guinea Bissau  
*Bioko (Fernando Po) and Pagalu (Annobon) Islands* – Equatorial Guinea  
*Dahlak Archipelago* – Ethiopia  
*Mozambique, Bazaruto and Inhaca Islands* – Mozambique  
*Nossi Bé* – Madagascar  
*Penguin Islands* – South Africa  
*Socotra* – South Yemen

- Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia* – Tanzania  
<sup>2</sup> Independent island states are listed in table 1.  
<sup>3</sup> See also table 11, note 8.  
<sup>4</sup> The uninhabited French islands of *Bassas da India, Europa, Glorieuses* and *Juan da Nova* in the Mozambique Channel are claimed by Madagascar.  
<sup>5</sup> See also table 4, note 10.

**SOURCES:** 4, 26, 27, 28.



TABLE 3

**POPULATION GROWTH**  
**Censuses, estimates and projections, 1960-2000**

Country	Number			Growth rate		
	1960 '000	1985 '000	2000 '000	1960-65 %	1985-90 %	1995-00 %
World	3 037 215	4 826 328	6 115 514	1,99	1,65	1,50
Africa	275 246	546 166	852 885	2,48	3,02	2,90
Algeria	10 800	22 583	37 041	1,98	3,53	3,02
Angola	4 481	8 073	12 376	1,46	2,80	2,88
Benin	2 050	4 127	6 756	2,47	3,27	3,29
Bophuthatswana	—	1 935 <sup>1</sup>	3 000	—	3,60	—
Botswana	507	1 100 <sup>2</sup>	2 000	1,96	3,50	3,53
Burkina Faso	4 354	7 900	11 895	2,18	2,75	2,68
Burundi	2 426	4 824	7 207	1,94	2,68	2,68
Cameroon	5 681	9 553	13 937	1,68	2,52	2,50
Cape Verde	201	351	427	3,03	1,50	1,14
CAR	1 538	2 593	3 914	1,78	2,68	2,79
Chad	3 032	4 954	7 063	1,74	2,30	2,41
Ciskei	—	974 <sup>1</sup>	1 500	—	3,00	—
Comoros	203	414 <sup>3</sup>	620	3,16	2,82	2,57
Congo	969	1 760	2 717	2,03	2,86	2,92
Djibouti	80	450	—	7,6	—	—
Egypt	25 929	47 240	64 421	2,50	2,19	1,96
Equatorial Guinea	244	400 <sup>4</sup>	613	1,69	2,62	2,71
Ethiopia	20 093	35 631	54 666	2,31	2,93	2,69
Gabon	472	695 <sup>5</sup>	900	0,51	1,59	1,67
Gambia	327	686	1 046	3,19	2,77	2,83
Ghana	6 804	13 755	22 348	2,65	3,29	3,16
Guinea	3 213	5 734	8 823	1,82	2,84	2,89
Guinea Bissau	520	866 <sup>6</sup>	1 200	-1,08	1,99	2,18
Ivory Coast	3 300	9 418	14 775	4,71	3,04	2,95
Kenya	8 189	20 210	37 138	3,01	4,12	3,98
Lesotho	869	1 519	2 222	1,83	2,55	2,50
Liberia	1 004	2 355	4 002	3,24	3,61	3,43
Libya	1 349	3 661	6 077	3,71	3,66	3,25
Madagascar	5 474	10 037	15 208	2,10	2,80	2,73
Malawi	3 419	7 290	12 014	2,69	3,39	3,26
Mali	4 224	7 994	12 620	2,42	3,01	3,07
Mauritania	970	1 890	3 022	2,45	3,10	3,14
Mauritius	664	1 041	1 248	2,61	1,42	1,02
Morocco	11 640	23 869	36 509	2,42	3,08	2,58
Mozambique	6 546	15 000 <sup>7</sup>	30 000	2,08	5,00	—
Niger	2 876	6 192	10 045	3,99	3,23	3,18
Nigeria	42 366	98 000	150 000	2,78	3,38	3,24
Rwanda	2 762	5 631	9 333	2,49	3,35	3,37
Sao Tomé	64	107 <sup>8</sup>	—	1,50	2,10	—
Senegal	3 076	6 474	9 747	3,13	2,75	2,68
Seychelles	42	65 <sup>9</sup>	—	2,10	2,10	—
Sierra Leone	2 165	3 997	6 090	2,09	2,84	2,76
Somalia	2 274	5 588	7 156	1,98	2,80	2,54
South Africa	16 003	23 439 <sup>10</sup>	42 600	3,20	3,00	2,90
Spanish N Africa	150	150 <sup>11</sup>	—	—	—	—
Sudan	11 256	21 211	32 328	2,15	2,88	2,72
SWA/Namibia	596	1 150 <sup>12</sup>	1 800	2,42	2,99	2,89
Swaziland	345	750 <sup>13</sup>	1 200	2,32	3,50	2,99
Tanzania	10 201	21 057 <sup>14</sup>	34 031	2,56	3,25	3,13
Togo	1 506	3 061	4 844	2,47	3,11	2,99
Transkei	—	3 298 <sup>1</sup>	4 500	—	3,00	—
Tunisia	4 221	7 156	9 556	1,85	2,20	1,66
Uganda	6 806	15 478	25 396	3,72	3,31	3,28
Venda	—	435 <sup>1</sup>	600	—	3,00	—

(Continued on next page)

**TABLE 3** (Continued from previous page)

Country	Number			Growth rate		
	1960 '000	1985 '000	2000 '000	1960-65 %	1985-90 %	1995-00 %
Western Sahara	25	180 <sup>15</sup>	—	—	—	—
Zaire	17 756	32 648	49 982	1,90	2,87	2,79
Zambia	3 207	6 819 <sup>16</sup>	11 276	2,72	3,39	3,29
Zimbabwe	3 605	8 400 <sup>17</sup>	14 726	4,13	3,50	3,33

**NOTES:**

- 1 Estimates for 1984. There were censuses in Bophuthatswana (1 329 000) and Ciskei (677 820) in 1980. See also table 7.
- 2 Africa Institute estimate for 1985. Census 1981 (941 027).
- 3 Census 1980 (408 000) includes Mayotte Island. See also tables 2 and 11.
- 4 Census 1983 (304 000). Equatorial Guinea comprises *Mbini* or *Rio Muni* enclave on the continent (240 000), *Bioko* or *Fernando Po Island* (60 000), and *Pagalu* or *Annobon Island* (3 000).
- 5 World Bank estimate for 1983. An official decree in 1981 declared a population of 1 232 000.
- 6 World Bank estimate for 1983. Census 1979 (767 739).
- 7 Africa Institute estimate for 1985. Census 1980 (12 130 000).
- 8 Africa Institute estimate for 1985; 95 per cent of population on Sao Tomé Island.
- 9 World Bank estimate for 1983; 90 per cent of population on Mahé Island.
- 10 Census of 1985 (provisional results) for Republic of South Africa excluding TBVC states. See table 7.
- 11 Census 1981: Ceuta 70 864 and Melilla 58 449. See also table 1, note 2.
- 12 Africa Institute estimate for 1985, excluding population of Walvis Bay enclave (20 740 in 1980). Census for SWA/Namibia in 1981 (1 025 324). See also table 4, note 12.
- 13 Africa Institute estimate for 1985. Census 1976 (494 534).
- 14 Census 1978 (17 527 564): Tanzania comprised Tanganyika (17 492 000) and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba (490 000).
- 15 Africa Institute estimate for 1985. Official estimate 1979 (165 000). See also table 1, note 3.
- 16 Census 1980 (5 679 808).
- 17 Africa Institute estimate. Census 1982 (7 539 000).

**SOURCES:** 4, 9, 20, 31, 37.

**WORLD POPULATION AND DENSITY**

	1960 million	1983 million	1985 million	2000 million	1985-90 increase % pa	Area '000 km <sup>2</sup>	People per km <sup>2</sup> 1985
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>3 037</b>	<b>4 670</b>	<b>4 826</b>	<b>6 115</b>	<b>1,65</b>	<b>136 000</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>853</b>	<b>3,02</b>	<b>30 331</b>	<b>18</b>
Nigeria	42	85	98	150	3,38	924	
<b>ASIA</b>	<b>1 692</b>	<b>2 718</b>	<b>2 814</b>	<b>3 872</b>	<b>2,02</b>	<b>27 576</b>	<b>100</b>
China PR	682	1 033	1 060	1 257	1,24	9 597	110
India	439	725	753	960	1,73	3 287	230
<b>USSR</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>0,93</b>	<b>22 402</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>425</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>492</b>	<b>512</b>	<b>0,30</b>	<b>4 937</b>	<b>101</b>
France	46	54	54	56	0,25	547	99
Germany FR	55	60	60	59	-0,16	248	242
United Kingdom	52	56	56	55	-0,06	244	228
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>2,28</b>	<b>20 566</b>	<b>20</b>
Brazil	72	131	137	187	2,20	8 512	16
Mexico	37	76	80	116	2,67	1 972	41
<b>NORTH AMERICA</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>0,95</b>	<b>21 515</b>	<b>12</b>
United States	181	230	235	299	0,91	9 363	25
<b>OCEANIA</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1,36</b>	<b>8 510</b>	<b>3</b>
Australia	10	15	15	18	1,05	7 687	2

**SOURCE:** 13, 31, 32



TABLE 4

## SIZE AND DENSITY

Country	Surface area km <sup>2</sup>	Population density persons per km <sup>2</sup>			Coastline km
		1960	1985	2000	
Africa	30 331 000	9	18	28	32 000
Algeria	2 381 741	5	9	16	1 183
Angola <sup>1</sup>	1 246 700	4	6	10	1 600
Benin	112 622	18	37	60	121
Bophuthatswana <sup>2</sup>	40 000	—	48	75	none
Botswana	581 730	1	2	3	none
Burkina Faso	274 200	16	29	43	none
Burundi	27 834	105	173	259	none
Cameroon	475 442	12	20	29	402
Cape Verde <sup>3</sup>	4 033	50	87	106	islands
CAR	622 984	2	4	6	none
Chad	1 259 200	2	4	6	none
Ciskei <sup>2</sup>	8 000	—	114	122	60
Comoros <sup>4</sup>	2 236	93	190	285	islands
Congo	342 000	3	5	8	169
Djibouti	21 783	4	20	—	314
Egypt	1 001 449	26	47	64	2 450
Equatorial Guinea <sup>5</sup>	28 051	9	15	22	296
Ethiopia	1 223 600	16	29	45	1 094
Gabon	267 667	2	2	3	885
Gambia	11 295	29	61	93	80
Ghana	238 537	29	58	94	539
Guinea	245 857	13	23	36	346
Guinea Bissau <sup>6</sup>	36 125	14	17	24	274
Ivory Coast	322 462	10	29	46	515
Kenya	582 646	14	35	64	536
Lesotho	30 355	29	50	73	none
Liberia	111 369	9	21	36	579
Libya	1 759 540	1	2	3	1 770
Madagascar	587 041	9	17	26	4 825 (island)
Malawi	118 484	29	62	101	none
Mali	1 240 000	3	6	10	none
Mauritania	1 030 700	1	2	3	754
Mauritius <sup>7</sup>	2 040	325	509	610	island
Morocco <sup>8</sup>	458 730	26	53	82	1 835
Mozambique	801 590	8	15	23	2 470
Niger	1 267 000	2	5	8	none
Nigeria	923 768	46	99	162	853
Rwanda	26 338	105	214	354	none
Sao Tomé <sup>9</sup>	964	66	111	—	islands
Senegal	196 192	16	33	50	531
Seychelles <sup>10</sup>	444	95	146	—	islands
Sierra Leone	71 740	30	56	85	402
Somalia	637 657	4	9	11	3 025
South Africa <sup>2</sup>	1 124 000	14	21	38	2 700
Spanish N Africa <sup>11</sup>	31	—	4 194	—	enclaves
Sudan	2 505 813	4	8	13	853
SWA/Namibia <sup>12</sup>	823 144	1	1	2	1 489
Swaziland	17 365	20	37	59	none
Tanzania <sup>13</sup>	945 087	11	22	36	1 424
Togo	56 785	27	55	87	56
Transkei <sup>2</sup>	42 000	—	79	107	275
Tunisia	163 610	26	44	58	1 143
Uganda	241 139	29	66	108	none
Venda <sup>2</sup>	7 000	—	62	86	none

(Continued on next page)

**TABLE 4** (Continued from previous page)

Country	Surface area km <sup>2</sup>	Population density persons per km <sup>2</sup>			Coastline km
		1960	1985	2000	
Western Sahara <sup>14</sup>	305 240	—	0,6	—	1 110
Zaire	2 344 885	8	14	21	37
Zambia	752 614	4	9	15	none
Zimbabwe	390 759	9	23	38	none

**NOTES:**

- 1 Including Cabinda enclave (7 270 km<sup>2</sup>) which is separated from Angola by the mouth of the Zaire River (Zaire).
- 2 Approximate figures. See also table 7.
- 3 Cape Verde comprises 10 islands and 5 islets: Sao Tiago (992 km<sup>2</sup>), Fogo (477 km<sup>2</sup>), Maio (267 km<sup>2</sup>), Brava (65 km<sup>2</sup>), Santo Antao (754 km<sup>2</sup>), Boa Vista (622 km<sup>2</sup>), Sao Nicolau (342 km<sup>2</sup>), Sao Vicente (228 km<sup>2</sup>), Sal (215 km<sup>2</sup>), and Santa Luzia (34 km<sup>2</sup>).
- 4 Including Mayotte Island (see tables 2 and 11). The archipelago consists of 4 main islands: Njazidja or Grande Comore (1 148 km<sup>2</sup>), Nzwani or Anjouan (424 km<sup>2</sup>), Mwali or Mohéli (290 km<sup>2</sup>), and Mahoré or Mayotte (374 km<sup>2</sup>).
- 5 Equatorial Guinea comprises Mbini or Rio Muni enclave on the continent (26 017 km<sup>2</sup>), Bioko or Fernando Po Island (2 017 km<sup>2</sup>), and Pagalu or Annobon Island (17 km<sup>2</sup>).
- 6 Including the Bissagos or Bijagos Archipelago comprising 18 main islands.
- 7 Including Rodrigues (104 km<sup>2</sup>) and other islands (71 km<sup>2</sup>). See table 2.
- 8 Excluding Western Sahara.
- 9 Sao Tomé Island (854 km<sup>2</sup>), Principe Island (110 km<sup>2</sup>).
- 10 The Seychelles Republic comprises the Seychelles Archipelago and the outlying island groups (see table 2). There are altogether some 115 islands covering a total land area of 308 km<sup>2</sup> (444 km<sup>2</sup> including the lagoon of Aldabra Island). The largest island is Mahé (148 km<sup>2</sup>) in the Seychelles Archipelago. The Republic covers an ocean area of approximately 10 360 000 km<sup>2</sup>.
- 11 Ceuta (19 km<sup>2</sup>), Melilla and coastal islands (12,3 km<sup>2</sup>). See table 1, note 2.
- 12 Excluding the South African enclave of Walvis Bay (1 124 km<sup>2</sup>).
- 13 Tanzania comprises mainland Tanganyika and Mafia Island (942 446 km<sup>2</sup>), and Zanzibar (1 657 km<sup>2</sup>) and Pemba (984 km<sup>2</sup>) Islands.
- 14 See table 1, note 3.

**SOURCES:** 4, 27, 28, 39.


**LARGEST DAMS**

Dam/River	Country	Width (m)	Height (m)	Lake area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Maximum capacity (million m <sup>3</sup> )	Generating capacity (MW)
ASWAN HIGH (Nile)	Egypt	4 200	111	3 994	152 000	2 200
AKOSOMBO (Volta)	Ghana	640	113	8 480	144 000	882
KARIBA (Zambezi)	Zimbabwe/ Zambia	633	131	5 200	185 000	1 200
CAHORA BASSA (Zambezi)	Mozambique	320	120	2 660	66 000	2 000

Inga I in the River Zaire has a generating capacity of 350 MW while Inga II will generate about 1 400 MW when completed. The potential capacity of the entire scheme, i.e. when all the stages are completed, is 39 000 MW – one of the largest hydro-power schemes in the world.



## POPULATION DENSITY 1985



## COUNTRIES RANKED IN ORDER OF POPULATION DENSITY

*More than 50 persons per km<sup>2</sup>:* Ceuta, Melilla, Mauritius, Rwanda, Angola, Mali, Congo, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco.

*31-50 persons per km<sup>2</sup>:* Lesotho, Bophuthatswana, Egypt, Tunisia, Benin, Swaziland, Kenya, Senegal.

*10-30 persons per km<sup>2</sup>:* Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Liberia, South Africa, Cameroon, Djibouti, Africa, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea, Zaire.

*Less than 10 persons per km<sup>2</sup>:* Algeria, Somalia, Zambia, Sudan, Angola, Mali, Congo, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, Botswana, Libya, Mauritania, SWA/Namibia, Western Sahara.

TABLE 5

**COUNTRIES IN ORDER OF SIZE**  
**Population and surface area 1985**

Country	Population '000 (rounded)	Country	Surface area '000 km <sup>2</sup> (rounded)
More than 20 million people		More than 1 million km <sup>2</sup>	
Nigeria	98 000	Sudan	2 506
Egypt	47 000	Algeria	2 382
Ethiopia	36 000	Zaire	2 345
Zaire	33 000	Libya	1 760
Morocco	24 000	Chad	1 284
South Africa	23 400	Niger	1 267
Algeria	22 600	Angola	1 247
Sudan	21 200	Mali	1 240
Tanzania	21 000	Ethiopia	1 224
Kenya	20 200	Mauritania	1 031
		South Africa	1 124
		Egypt	1 001
10 to 20 million people		500 000 to 999 000 km <sup>2</sup>	
Uganda	15 500	Tanzania	945
Mozambique	15 000	Nigeria	924
Ghana	14 000	SWA/Namibia	823
Madagascar	10 000	Mozambique	801
5 to 9,9 million people		Zambia	753
Cameroon	9 500	Somalia	638
Ivory Coast	9 400	CAR	623
Zimbabwe	8 400	Madagascar	587
Angola	8 000	Kenya	582
Mali	8 000	Botswana	582
Burkina Faso	7 900		
Malawi	7 300	100 000 to 499 000 km <sup>2</sup>	
Tunisia	7 200	Cameroon	475
Zambia	6 800	Morocco	459
Senegal	6 500	Zimbabwe	391
Niger	6 200	Congo	342
Guinea	5 700	Ivory Coast	322
Rwanda	5 600	Western Sahara	305
Somalia	5 600	Burkina Faso	274
1-5 million people		Gabon	268
Chad	5 000	Guinea	246
Burundi	4 800	Ghana	239
Benin	4 200	Uganda	241
Sierra Leone	4 000	Senegal	196
Libya	3 700	Tunisia	164
Transkei	3 300	Malawi	118
Togo	3 000	Benin	113
CAR	2 600	Liberia	111
Liberia	2 400		
Bophuthatswana	2 000	Less than 100 000 km <sup>2</sup>	
Mauritania	1 900	Sierra Leone	72
Congo	1 800	Togo	57
Lesotho	1 500	Transkei	42
SWA/Namibia	1 200	Bophuthatswana	40
Botswana	1 100	Guinea Bissau	36
Mauritius	1 000	Lesotho	30
Less than 1 million people		Equatorial Guinea	28
Ciskei	1 000	Burundi	28
Guinea Bissau	900	Rwanda	26
Swaziland	750	Djibouti	22
Gabon	700	Swaziland	17
Gambia	700	Gambia	11
Djibouti	450	Ciskei	8
Venda	450	Venda	7
Comoros	400	Cape Verde	4
Equatorial Guinea	400	Comoros	2
Cape Verde	350	Mauritius	2
Western Sahara	200	Sao Tomé	1
Sao Tomé	100	Seychelles	0,4
Ceuta and Melilla	100		
Seychelles	70		



TABLE 6

## THE WORLD AND AFRICA

Basic data on macro regions and countries, 1983

Region Country	Population				Surface area				GNP per capita 1983 US \$
	Total 1983 <sup>1</sup> '000	Percentage of world %	Africa %	sub-region %	Total 1983 km <sup>2</sup>	Percentage of world %	Africa %	sub-region %	
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>4 669 685</b>	<b>100</b>			<b>133 922 150</b>	<b>100</b>			<b>3 833</b>
<b>DEVELOPED WORLD</b>	<b>1 194 561</b>	<b>25</b>			<b>56 181 950</b>	<b>42</b>			..
<b>DEVELOPING WORLD</b>	<b>3 475 124</b>	<b>75</b>			<b>77 740 200</b>	<b>58</b>			..
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>514 317</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>30 331 030</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>968</b>
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>59 736</b>		<b>12</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5 395 365</b>		<b>18</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>360</b>
Burundi	4 577			7.6	27 834			0.5	240
Cameroon	9 087			15.2	475 442			8.8	800
CAR	2 465			4.1	622 984			11.5	280
Chad	4 743			7.9	1 259 200			23.3	80 <sup>6</sup>
Congo	1 665			2.8	342 000			6.3	1 230
Equatorial Guinea	304			0.5	28 051			0.5	..
Gabon	695			1.2	267 667			5.0	4 250
Rwanda	5 276			8.8	26 338			0.5	270
Sao Tomé	103			0.2	964			0.01	310
Zaire	30 821			51.6	2 344 885			43.5	160
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>103 221</b>		<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>4 243 673</b>		<b>14</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>241</b>
Comoros	391			0.4	2 236			0.1	340 <sup>6</sup>
Djibouti	340			0.3	21 783			0.5	480 <sup>7</sup>
Ethiopia	33 765			32.7	1 223 600			28.8	140
Kenya	18 612			18.0	582 646			13.7	340
Madagascar	9 492			9.2	587 041			13.8	290
Mauritius	1 008			1.0	2 040			0.04	1 150
Seychelles	65			0.1	444			0.01	2 400
Somalia	5 301			5.1	637 657			15.0	250
Tanzania	19 736			19.1	945 087			22.3	270
Uganda	14 511			14.1	241 139			5.7	220
<b>NORTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>119 030</b>		<b>23</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>8 576 154</b>		<b>28</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 170</b>
Algeria	21 027			17.7	2 381 741			27.8	2 400
Egypt	45 111			37.9	1 001 449			11.7	700
Libya	3 348			2.8	1 759 540			20.5	7 500
Morocco	22 383			18.8	458 730			5.4	750
Sp N Africa <sup>2</sup>	130			0.1	31			0.003	..
Sudan	20 020			16.8	2 505 813			29.2	400
Tunisia	6 831			5.7	163 610			1.91	1 290
Western Sahara <sup>3</sup>	180			0.2	305 240			3.6	..
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>78 237</b>		<b>15</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5 886 741</b>		<b>19</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 252</b>
Angola	7 651			9.8	1 246 700			21.2	470 <sup>7</sup>
Botswana	1 000			1.3	581 730			9.9	920
Lesotho	1 444			1.8	30 355			0.5	470
Malawi	6 813			8.7	118 484			2.0	210
Mozambique <sup>4</sup>	14 000			17.9	801 590			13.6	270 <sup>7</sup>
South Africa <sup>5</sup>	31 345			40.1	1 124 000			19.1	2 450
SWA/Namibia	1 100			1.4	823 144			14.0	1 760
Swaziland	688			0.9	17 365			0.3	890
Zambia	6 374			8.1	752 614			12.8	580
Zimbabwe	7 822			10.0	390 759			6.6	740
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>155 703</b>		<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>6 142 682</b>		<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>604</b>
Benin	3 873			2.5	112 622			1.8	290
Burkina Faso	7 483			4.8	274 200			4.5	180
Cape Verde	340			0.2	4 030			0.1	360
Gambia	652			0.4	11 295			0.2	290
Ghana	12 878			8.2	238 537			3.9	320
Guinea	5 429			3.5	245 857			4.0	300
Guinea Bissau	866			0.5	36 125			0.6	180
Ivory Coast	8 846			5.7	322 462			5.2	720
Liberia	2 190			1.4	111 369			1.8	470
Mali	7 547			4.8	1 240 000			20.2	150
Mauritania	1 781			1.1	1 030 700			16.8	440
Niger	5 819			3.7	1 267 000			20.6	240
Nigeria	85 215			54.7	923 768			15.0	760
Senegal	6 131			3.9	196 192			3.2	440
Sierra Leone	3 777			2.4	71 740			1.2	380
Togo	2 876			1.8	56 785			1.0	280

## NOTES:

1 FAO and World Bank estimates.

2 Census 1981.

3 Official estimate 1979, 165 000.

4 Africa Institute estimate for 1983.

5 Including Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. World Bank estimate.

6 1982.


7 1980.

SOURCES: 13, 37

# AFRICAN REGIONS: TOTAL POPULATIONS

1983


**B**



	Macro regions	Million	%
A	Southern	78	15
B	Eastern	103	20
C	Central	60	12
D	Western	156	30
E	Northern	119	23
	Total Africa	514	100
	World	4 670	



## REGIONAL GROUPINGS



**THE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AREA OF SOUTHERN AND  
EASTERN AFRICAN STATES (PTA)**

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES  
(ECOWAS)**






TABLE 7

**SOUTH AFRICAN REGION (SATBVC STATES)**  
**Population, surface area and density, 1984-85**  
 (See map)

Region and States	Sub-region	Population groups					Surface area <sup>2</sup> km <sup>2</sup>	Density persons per km <sup>2</sup>
		Total '000	Asian '000	Black '000	Coloured '000	White '000		
<b>SATBVC TOTAL (South Africa)</b>		<b>30 080</b>	..	..	..	..	<b>1 221 000</b>	<b>25</b>
1 RSA (Republic of South Africa)		<b>23 438<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>794</b>	<b>15 243</b>	<b>2 825</b>	<b>4 576</b>	<b>1 124 000</b>	<b>21</b>
	PROVINCES	16 548	791	8 365	2 820	4 572	1 053 000	16
	Cape of GH	5 044	29	1 405	2 398	1 212	646 000	
	Natal	2 148	638	854	94	561	55 000	
	Orange FS	1 776	—	1 383	62	331	127 000	
	Transvaal	7 580	123	4 723	265	2 468	225 000	
	NATIONAL STATES	6 890	3	6 878	5	4	71 000	97
	Gazankulu	496	—	495	—	1	8 000	
	Kangwane	390	—	389	1	—	4 000	
	Kwandebele	233	—	233	—	—	3 000	
	Kwazulu	3 744	3	3 737	3	2	32 000	
	Lebowa	1 844	—	1 842	1	1	23 000	
	Qwaqwa	183	—	183	—	—	1 000	
<b>TBVC TOTAL</b>		<b>6 642<sup>1</sup></b>	..	..	..	..	<b>97 000</b>	<b>68</b>
2 TRANSKEI, Republic of		3 298	..	..	..	..	42 000	82
3 BOPHUTHATSWANA, Republic of		1 935	..	..	..	..	40 000	48
4 VENDA, Republic of		435	..	..	..	..	7 000	62
5 Ciskei, Republic of		974	..	..	..	..	8 000	122

**NOTES:**

1 Provisional results of the 1985 census for the RSA. Estimates (1984) for the TBVC states.

2 Approximate figures.

**SOURCES:** 9, 16, 21.**BANTU-SPEAKING GROUPS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA\***

Major groups	Approximate location	Estimated number '000	Major groups	Approximate location	Estimated number '000
<b>NGUNI</b>		18 000	W Sotho (Tswana)	Botswana, SWA/Namibia	1 000
Ndebele	Central Transvaal and Kwandebele (RSA)	700		Bophuthatswana	1 300
Ndebele (Matabele)	South-western Zimbabwe, northern Botswana	1 500	<b>TSONGA</b> (Shangana)	Western Transvaal and northern Cape (RSA)	1 600
Swazi	Swaziland, southern Mozambique	800		Southern Mozambique	4 500
Xhosa-speakers	Eastern Transvaal and Kangwane (RSA)	1 000		North-eastern Transvaal and Gazankulu (RSA)	1 500
	Transkei and Ciskei	4 000	<b>VENDA</b>	Venda, southern Zimbabwe	500
	Eastern Cape and southern Natal (RSA)	3 000	<b>SHONA- SPEAKERS</b>		
Zulu	Natal and southern Transvaal (RSA)	7 000		Zimbabwe, central Mozambique	8 000
<b>SOtho</b>		10 500	<b>WAMBO</b>	Northern Namibia, southern Angola	500
N Sotho (Pedi)	Lebowa and northern Transvaal (RSA)	3 000	<b>KAVANGO</b>	Northern Namibia, southern Angola	100
S Sotho (Basotho)	Lesotho, Transkei	1 600	<b>HERERO</b>	North-central Namibia	100
	Orange Free State and Qwaqwa (RSA)	2 000			

\* Republic of South Africa (RSA) and neighbouring states south of the Zambezi River. See also map *Ethnic Africa*.





Monument of Heroes, Zambia.



Ghardaia market place, Algeria.

Miner.



A raft on the Oubangi River between Zaire and CAR.



# SOUTH AFRICAN STATES




TABLE 8

**AUTONOMOUS NATIONAL STATES IN SOUTH AFRICA**  
**Basic data**

	Lebowa	Gazankulu	Gwaqwa	Kwazulu	Kwandebele	Kangwane
Date phase 1 status <sup>1</sup>	1971.07.01	1971.07.01	1971.10.01	1972.03.30	1979.10.01	1977.10.01
Date phase 2 status <sup>1</sup>	1972.10.02	1973.02.01	1974.11.01	1977.02.01	1981.04.01	1984.08.31
Capital	Lebowakgomo	Giyani	Phuthaditjaba	Ulundi	Siyabuswa	Louisville
Other growth points	Seshego	Nkawkowa	—	Isithebe	Elangala	Kabokweni
Principal culture	North Sotho	Shangana	South Sotho	Zulu	Ndebele	Swazi
Chief Minister	Cedric N Pathudi since 1972	Hudson W E Ntsanwisi since 1973	T Kenneth Mopeli since 1975	Mangosuthu G Buthelezi since 1977	Simon S Skosana since 1981	Enos J Mabuza since 1984
Governing party	People's Party	—	Dikwankwetla	Inkatha	—	Inyandza
Seats in legislature <sup>2</sup>	100 (40)	68 (26)	60 (20)	136 (55)	70 (16)	45
Last election	1983	1983	1985	1983	1984	—
Area (km <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>3</sup>	22 680	6 750	1 300	31 680	3 410	3 720
Geographical units <sup>3</sup>	7	3	1	8	2	2
Population, 1984 ('000)	1 844	496	183	3 744	233	390
Gross National Product, 1982	R1 023 000	R264 000	R224 000	R2 907 000	R200 000	R320 000
GNP per capita, 1982	R492	R436	R985	R740	R918	R782
Structure of GDP, 1980						
Agriculture (%)	29,4	25,0	5,7	27,5	23,8	17,4
Mining (%)	13,4	1,4	—	2,5	—	34,7
Industry (%)	14,5	19,7	31,9	18,4	27,5	13,4
Services (%)	42,7	53,9	62,4	51,6	48,7	34,5
Government expenditure 1984/85 (R'000)	R337 869	R167 258	R94 690	R685 125	R56 674	R65 338
RSA grants, 1984/85 (R'000) <sup>4</sup>	R264 519	R120 719	R42 416	R494 385	R37 500	R53 491
Adult literacy, 1980	62,1%	58,5%	73,5%	65,6%	49,7%	64,2%
Primary school enrolment <sup>5</sup>	84,3%	87,8%	76,3%	79,7%	84,3%	85,5%
Secondary school enrolment <sup>5</sup>	53,9%	51,1%	48,2%	44,6%	33,9%	45,1%
Persons per hospital bed, 1984	412	315	991	404	..	459

**NOTES:**

- 1 Phase 1 signifies the introduction of nominated legislatures with limited self-government. Phase 2 is the final phase before independence which means that the states are governed by partly elected legislative assemblies with wide-ranging powers and cabinets which are normally representative of the strongest political party.
- 2 Number of elected members shown in parentheses.
- 3 As the borders of the national states are subject to change pending negotiations between the RSA and the governments concerned, the figures referring to surface areas and geographical units should be regarded as approximate data.

- 4 Budgetary aid by the South African government consists of a statutory amount, an additional amount, development project aid, and technical assistance. This does not include expenditure by agencies such as SA Transport Services, Post and Telecommunications, Electricity Supply Commission etc.
- 5 Enrolment expressed as a percentage of the school age population, i.e. primary (5-14 years) and secondary (15-19 years).

**SOURCES:** 2, 9.**BIGGEST LAKES**

Lake	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Depth (m)
VICTORIA	69 216	81
TANGANYIKA*	32 766	1 412
MALAWI	29 928	694
CHAD	22 000	7
TURKANA (Rudolf)	6 380	73
MOBUTU (Albert)	5 312	50

\*Lake Tanganyika (672 km long) is the largest fresh water lake in the world.





Agostinho Neto (MPLA) and Jonas Savimbi (Unita).



President Kenneth Kaunda awards a decoration to a Zambian civil servant at State House, Lusaka.



Talks held between the South African government and the UN Secretary General, Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, in Cape Town on 23 August 1983.




Heads of African Frontline States, Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (in white), Samora Machel of Mozambique (left), Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (second from left) and Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana (right).



Senegalese President Leopold Senghor leaving the Elysee Palace after a meeting with French President Charles de Gaulle (1964).









## MAJOR INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES

(Official and national languages in bold)

Language families	Number of speakers and approximate location <sup>1</sup>			
	More than 10 million	Region	1-10 million	Region
<b>AFRO-ASIAN</b> <sup>2</sup> Berber Chadic Cushitic Semitic  <b>NIGER-CONGO</b> <sup>2</sup> Fragmentation belt languages	Berber-Tamasheq Hausa <sup>3</sup> Galla (Oromo) <b>Amharic</b> <b>Arabic</b> <sup>3</sup>	North-western Africa Central Sahel Ethiopia-Kenya Ethiopia Northern Africa	<b>Somali</b> Tigrinya   Edo Ibibio-Efik Nupe Tiv Akan (Twi-Fante) Ewe-Fon Mossi (More) Wolof Gbaya <b>Sango</b> Zande	Horn of Africa Ethiopia   South-central Nigeria South-east Nigeria Central Nigeria Eastern Nigeria Ghana-Ivory Coast Togo-Benin Upper Volta Senegal Cameroon-CAR CAR CAR-Zaire
Bantu languages	<b>Swahili</b> <sup>3</sup> Lingala <b>Kirundi-Kinyarwanda</b> <b>Nguni</b> (isiZulu, isiXhosa, Siswati, Sindebele) <b>Sotho</b> (Setswana, Sesotho, Sepedi)	Eastern Africa Congo-Zaire Burundi-Rwanda Southern Africa  Southern Africa	Ewondo-Fang Kikongo Kimbundu Umbundu Luba Chibemba Chishona <b>Chichewa</b> (Chinyanja) Makua Sukuma-Nyamwezi Kamba Kikuyu Lunya (Luyia) Luganda Tara	Cameroon-Gabon Northern Angola-Zaire Central Angola Southern Angola Southern Zaire Northern Zambia Eastern Zimbabwe Malawi Northern Mozambique North-central Tanzania South-east Kenya Central Kenya Western Kenya Southern Uganda Western Uganda
<b>OTHER INDIGENOUS</b> <sup>2</sup>	Manding	Western Africa	Songhai Kanuri Dinka Luo <b>Malagasy</b> <b>Afrikaans</b>	Mali-Niger Central Sahel South-west Sudan Kenya-Uganda Madagascar South Africa-SWA/Namibia

### NOTES:

- More than 2 000 languages and dialects are spoken in Africa, but this number may be reduced to less than 50 major languages by grouping together related and inter-intelligible tongues and selecting those spoken by at least one million people (including both first and second language speakers). Most languages are spoken in geographical areas that have little or no relevance to the national boundaries of African states.
- Despite the diversity of languages, most belong ultimately to two great linguistic families: the *Afro-Asian* or *Hamito-Semitic* family comprising various subfamilies spoken in the vast area known as northern Africa and the Middle East; and the *Niger-Congo* family comprising at least five subfamilies spoken in the so-called fragmentation belt covering the area between the Sahara and the equator from Senegal in the west to Sudan in the east. Although the Bantu languages are treated above as a separate subfamily because they represent some 400 related languages spoken across the entire Africa south of the fragmentation belt, it should be borne in mind that ethno-

graphers regard Bantu as a subordinate branch of the Central or Bantoid subfamily of the main Niger-Congo family. Languages not belonging to the two major linguistic families are indicated above as *other indigenous*.

- Arabic*, *Hausa* and *Swahili*, each spoken by more than 20 million people, are the three most important languages of regional communication in Africa. Arabic is the official language of seven African countries with a total population of 120 million. The Hausa are unique among black African peoples in having practiced true writing before contact with the Europeans. Their language is widely spoken in the populous northern Nigeria across the Sahel belt as far as the Sudan-Ethiopian border. Swahili is basically Bantu culture that has been influenced by Arabic and Islam since the ninth century. It is today the official language of Tanzania and the national language of Kenya and Uganda, as well as the *lingua franca* in eastern Zaire.

**SOURCES:** 4, 8



## ARABIC AND EUROPEAN LANGUAGES




TABLE 9

**URBAN POPULATION**  
**Macro regions and 20 selected countries, 1960-2000**

Region Country	Percentage of total population			Annual growth rate		Percentage in cities of over 500 000 inhabitants		Number of cities of over 500 000 inhabitants	
	1960 %	1985 <sup>1</sup> %	2000 <sup>1</sup> %	1970-82 %	1985-90 <sup>1</sup> %	1960 %	1980 %	1960	1980
WORLD	33,8	43,3	51,2	..	2,7	..	..	..	..
DEVELOPED WORLD	60,2	73,5	79,7	..	1,2	..	..	..	..
DEVELOPING WORLD	22,0	33,7	43,8	..	3,8	..	..	..	..
AFRICA	18,4	32,2	49,0	..	5,0	..	..	7	45
Algeria	30,4	45,0 <sup>3</sup>	66,6	5,4	4,8	27	12	1	4
Angola	10,4	24,5	36,2	5,8	5,7	—	64	—	1
Botswana	1,8	16,0 <sup>3</sup>	..	15,0 <sup>4</sup>	..	—	—	—	—
Cameroon	13,9	41,6	56,4	8,0	7,1	—	21	—	1
Egypt	37,9	47,7	57,4	2,9	3,3	53	53	2	2
Ghana	23,3	39,6	51,2	5,0	5,2	—	48	—	2
Ivory Coast	19,3	42,6	55,2	8,2	6,3	—	34	—	1
Kenya	7,4	16,7	26,2	7,3	7,3	—	57	—	1
Lesotho	1,5	10,0	..	15,4	..	—	—	—	—
Malawi	4,4	10,0 <sup>3</sup>	..	6,4	..	—	—	—	—
Morocco	29,3	43,9	55,0	4,1	4,6	16	50	1	5
Mozambique	3,7	10,6	..	8,1	..	—	83	—	1
Nigeria	13,1	23,0	33,4	4,9	5,9	22	58	2	9
South Africa <sup>2</sup>	46,7	47,0	56,4	3,2	3,8	44	53	4	7
SWA/Namibia	23,3	26,0 <sup>3</sup>	..	3,3	4,8	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	3,9	10,0	15,9	4,2 <sup>4</sup>	5,8	—	—	—	—
Tanzania	4,8	14,8	25,0	8,5	7,3	—	50	—	1
Zaire	16,0	40,0	56,3	7,6	..	14	38	1	3
Zambia	23,1	45,0 <sup>3</sup>	54,1	6,5	5,3	—	35	—	1
Zimbabwe	12,6	25,0	38,2	6,0	6,2	—	50	—	1

**NOTES:**

1 Projections.

2 Including TBVC states. The figures are for 1960, 1980 and 2000.

3 1982.

4 1970-1979.

**SOURCES:** 11, 20, 25, 31, 38.

Batshioko man decorating a drum, Zaire.



# RELIGIONS




TABLE 10

## AFRICA'S LARGEST CITIES

Metropolitan areas and urban conurbations with more than 500 000 inhabitants

City and country	Earlier population		Present population		Notes
	Date	Number '000	Date*	Number '000	
1 Cairo (Egypt)	1959	3 035	1979	8 500	Arabic: Al Qahira; including Al Giza, capital, 5 universities, principal Arab cultural centre
2 Lagos (Nigeria)	1960	364	1980	4 500	Capital (temporary), main seaport, university
3 Witwatersrand (South Africa)	1960	2 031	1980	3 500	Including Johannesburg, Soweto, Germiston; principal industrial and commercial centre in Africa; 2 universities
4 Kinshasa (Zaire)	1959	402	1976	2 500	Formerly Leopoldville; capital, major river port, university
5 Alexandria (Egypt)	1959	1 416	1976	2 300	Arabic: Al Iskandariyah, main seaport, university
6 Casablanca (Morocco)	1960	961	1978	2 200	Main seaport
7 Algiers (Algeria)	1960	806	1978	1 700	Arabic: Al Djazair; capital, main seaport, 2 universities
8 Cape Peninsula (South Africa)	1960	731	1980	1 500	Capital, major seaport, 3 universities
9 Abidjan (Ivory Coast)	1960	178	1978	1 250	Capital (temporary), main seaport, university
10 Copperbelt (Zambia)	..	..	1980	1 200	Mining towns including Kitwe and Ndola
11 Luanda (Angola)	1955	190	1982	1 200	Capital, main seaport, university
12 Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)	1958	400	1978	1 200	Capital, OAU headquarters, university
13 Durban (South Africa)	1960	750	1980	1 200	Including Pietermaritzburg; principal seaport, 2 universities
14 Accra (Ghana)	1960	491	1970	1 000	Capital, main seaport, university
15 Ibadan (Nigeria)	1960	600	1977	1 000	Capital of Oyo state, university
16 Fez-Meknes (Morocco)	1960	393	1978	950	Two universities, royal residence
17 Tunis (Tunisia)	1960	680	1975	900	Capital, main seaport, university
18 Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)	1957	129	1978	900	Capital (temporary), main seaport, university
19 Nairobi (Kenya)	1960	261	1979	850	Capital, tourist centre, university
20 Dakar (Senegal)	1957	235	1976	800	Capital, main seaport, university, French military base
21 Maputo (Mozambique)	1955	170	1982	800	Formerly Lourenco Marques; capital, main seaport, university
22 Harare (Zimbabwe)	1959	271	1982	800	Formerly Salisbury; including Chitungwiza; capital university
23 Pretoria (South Africa)	1960	415	1980	800	Capital, 2 universities
24 Rabat (Morocco)	1960	225	1978	700	Capital, university
25 Kananga (Zaire)	1959	116	1976	700	Formerly, Luluabourg, major river port
26 Oran (Algeria)	1960	389	1978	700	Arabic: Wahran; seaport, university
27 Bangui (CAR)	1960	78	1980	700	Capital, major river port, university
28 Khartoum (Sudan)	1956	209	1973	700	Including Omdurman; capital, main river port, 2 universities
29 Port Elizabeth (South Africa)	1960	271	1980	700	Including Uitenhage; major seaport, university
30 Tripoli (Libya)	1954	184	1973	600	Arabic: Tarabulus; capital, main seaport, university
31 Lusaka (Zambia)	1959	78	1980	500	Capital, university

(Continued on next page)



**TABLE 10** (Continued from previous page)

City and country	Earlier population		Present population		Notes
	Date	Number '000	Date	Number '000	
32 Conakry (Guinea)	1960	112	1972	500	Capital, main seaport
33 Antananarivo (Madagascar)	1959	248	1978	500	Formerly Tananarive; capital, university
34 Marrakesh (Morocco)	1960	242	1978	500	University
35 Constantine (Algeria)	1960	221	1978	500	Arabic: Qacentina, university
36 Ogbomoshos (Nigeria)	1960	140	1975	450	Major Yoruba centre
37 Douala (Cameroon)	1960	100	1976	450	Main port
38 Lubumbashi (Zaire)	1959	184	1976	450	Formerly Elizabethville, mining centre, university
39 Blida (Algeria)	1960	69	1978	450	Arabic: Al Boulaïda
40 Kampala (Uganda)	1955	40	1980	450	Capital, port, university
41 Vaal Triangle (South Africa)	1960	100	1980	450	Including Vanderbijlpark and Vereeniging
42 Brazzaville (Congo)	1959	94	1980	450	Capital, river port, university
43 Kano (Nigeria)	1960	130	1975	400	Capital of Kano state, university
44 Bamako (Mali)	1957	69	1976	400	Capital, river port
45 Asmara (Ethiopia)	1958	120	1978	400	Capital of Eritrea, university

**SOURCES:** 3, 4, 27, 28.

## HIGHEST WATERFALLS

Waterfall	Country	Height* (m)
TUGELA	South Africa	933
KALAMBO	Tanzania	215
MALETSUNYANE	Lesotho	189
AUGRABIES (Orange River)	South Africa	186

\*Not all free-falling.  
The Victoria Falls (1.7 km wide) in the Zambezi River is the widest curtain of falling water in the world.





South African army outpost at Caprivi.



Security check in the Central African Republic.



Ogaden front line.



# Section 2: Political data

## Decolonization

Before 1951, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and South Africa were the only Independent states in Africa. The rapid transition from colonial dependence to sovereign independence since 1951, and especially between 1960 and 1969, is recorded in *table 11* and on *map I*. There are at present 55 independent African states of which 13, including the Republics of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, have become independent during the last 11 years. Non-independent territories are discussed in the footnotes to *tables 1* and *2*.

## Changes of leadership

*Table 12* presents a running record of the successive heads of state and government since independence. These events are analysed in the two subsequent tables. According to *table 13*, more than 80 government leaders were unceremoniously deposed as a result of military (and even a few civilian) take-overs, purges, dismissals and assassinations. *Coups d'état* (*diagram 1*) were responsible for at least 68 violent changes of leadership and there were many more unsuccessful coups and counter coups. Governments were voted out of office only in South Africa (1948), Rhodesia (1962), Sierra Leone (1967), Lesotho (1970), Mauritius (1982) and in Sudan the government suffered parliamentary defeats during 1965 to 1967. In these countries, except in Sierra Leone and in Lesotho where the government refused to stand down, the change-overs went smoothly.

## Stability

*Table 14* and *map J* show that a total of 68 coups occurred in 30 of Africa's 55 independent states. Of these 30 states, 11 accounted for 43 or 78 per cent of all coups. Among them are Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Benin, each with five violent military take-overs, though the last coup in Benin took place 13 years ago.

The endemic turmoil in a minority of states obscures the fact that large parts of Africa, especially south of the equator and along the Mediterranean, have experienced remarkably peaceful transitions and continuity of governments and leadership. There were non-violent or no changes of government in 25 states and 15 leaders who led their countries to independence are still in power. In fact, it can be concluded that 65 per cent or 36 out of 55 states have experienced relative political stability, although not tranquillity, during the last decade. This excludes countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia where governmental stability is threatened by internal unrest and whose governments (especially Angola and Ethiopia) have to be assisted by external forces.

It also appears that the stability enjoyed by states such as Tunisia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Egypt and others,

can to a large extent be attributed to the quality of their past and present leadership. See *table 15* for details about leaders.

## Political parties

From *tables 16* to *18* and *map K* it can be deduced that the one-party or single-party system has become the general pattern. Even in multi-party countries the opposition is generally weak and the ruling parties dominant. In countries like Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Tunisia, opposition parties are not proscribed but are either not viable or have been absorbed by the dominant ruling parties. Thus, these states (including Bophuthatswana and Ciskei) actually have *de facto* one-party systems.

It should be noted that all one-party states are not stagnant and that some tend to become multi-party, or rather dominant-party, states. Examples are Egypt, Senegal and Tunisia. Several military dictatorships (the prevalent form of government after a *coup*) have chosen to become elected one-party states, thereby returning to civilian rule. Prominent examples are Algeria, Sudan (until this year), Somalia, Madagascar and Zaire. However, in Nigeria and Ghana the return to civilian rule proved to be abortive.

It should be borne in mind that the electorate in countries like Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast, have a choice of ruling-party candidates. Generally speaking, the governments enjoy mass support and in these, as in many other African countries, it is practically impossible to vote the top leaders out of office. There are few checks on arbitrary action by the rulers and corruption is generally rife because some of the major guarantees against public malpractice, a strong opposition and a free press, are largely absent.

## African unity

*Table 19* is a brief, chronological record of proceedings at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – the major force behind African collective action in international forums (see also *diagrams 2* and *3*). Despite its inability to solve the major upheavals in Africa and most of the disputes between member states over more than two decades (*map L*), the OAU is the world's largest regional organization embracing almost the entire African continent and adjacent islands. Representing 50 member states with some 500 million people or 10 per cent of the world's population, it exerts an influence in international politics quite unrelated to its members' economic stature.

*Table 20* is a survey of the military strengths of the largest and strategically important African states, based on the latest overt information. Military linkages indicate their general international orientation, although other factors such as diplomatic links, trading partners, foreign aid and investment, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements should also be taken into consideration.

TABLE 11

**INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE**  
**In order of independence dates**

COUNTRY	DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	STATUS AND NAME BEFORE INDEPENDENCE	STATUS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
1 ETHIOPIA <sup>1</sup>	Ancient		Monarchy Republic 1974.09.12
Eritrea	Incorporated	Italian colony until 1941	
2 LIBERIA	1847.07.26	Homeland for liberated slaves	Republic
3 SOUTH AFRICA <sup>2</sup>	1910-1934	British colonies	Monarchy Republic 1961.05.31
4 EGYPT	1922.02.28	Turkish colony until 1914 British protectorate 1914-1922	Monarchy Republic 1953.06.18
5 LIBYA	1951.12.24	Turkish colony until 1914 Italian colony 1914-1942 British and French control 1942-1951	Monarchy Republic 1969.09.01
6 SUDAN	1956.01.01	Anglo-Egyptian condominium 1899-1956	Republic
7 MOROCCO	1956.03.02	French and Spanish protectorates 1912-1956 Union 1956	Monarchy
8 TUNISIA	1956.03.20	French protectorate 1881-1956	Monarchy Republic 1957.07.25
9 GHANA	1957.03.06	British colony and protectorate ( <i>Gold Coast</i> ) 1873-1957	Monarchy Republic 1960.07.01
10 GUINEA	1958.10.02	French colony 1898-1958	Republic
11 CAMEROON <sup>3</sup>	1960.01.01	German protectorate 1884-1919, League of Nations mandate under France and Britain until 1945, Then UN trust territory	Federal republic Unitary republic 1972.06.02
12 TOGO <sup>4</sup>	1960.04.27	German protectorate 1894-1919, League of Nations mandate under France and Britain until 1945, Then UN trust territory	Republic
13 MADAGASCAR	1960.06.26	French colony 1896-1960	Republic
14 ZAIRE	1960.06.30	Belgian colony (Congo) 1885-1960	Republic
15 SOMALIA <sup>5</sup>	1960.07.01	Italian colony 1899-1941, British control until 1950, UN trust territory under Italian control 1950-1960	Republic
16 MALI <sup>6</sup>	1960.06.20	French colony ( <i>Soudan</i> ) 1893-1959	Federal republic Unitary republic 1960.09.22
17 BENIN	1960.08.01	French colony ( <i>Dahomey</i> ) 1893-1960	Republic
18 NIGER	1960.08.03	French colony 1906-1960	Republic (See table 1)
19 BURKINA FASO (UPPER VOLTA)	1960.08.05	French colony 1892-1960	Republic
20 IVORY COAST	1960.08.07	French colony 1914-1960	Republic
21 CHAD	1960.08.11	French colony 1900-1960	Republic
22 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1960.08.13	French colony (Oubangi-Chari) 1891-1960	Republic Empire 1977-1979
23 CONGO	1960.08.15	French colony 1880-1960	Republic
24 GABON	1960.08.17	French colony 1860-1960	Republic
25 SENEGAL <sup>6</sup>	1960.06.20	French colony 1890-1959	Federal republic (Mali) Unitary republic 1960.08.20
26 NIGERIA	1960.10.01	British colony 1861-1960	Monarchy Republic 1963.10.01
27 MAURITANIA	1960.11.28	French colony 1910-1960	Republic
28 SIERRA LEONE	1961.04.27	British colony 1808-1961	Monarchy Republic 1971.04.19
29 TANZANIA <sup>7</sup>	1961.12.09	German protectorate (Tanganyika) 1885-1919, League of Nations mandate under Britain until 1945, Then UN trust territory	Monarchy Republic 1962.12.09
Zanzibar		British protectorate 1890-1963	

(Continued on p 182)



# AFRICA'S INDEPENDENCE



TABLE 11 (Continued from p 180)

COUNTRY	DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	STATUS AND NAME BEFORE INDEPENDENCE	STATUS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
30 BURUNDI	1962.07.01	Part of German protectorate Ruanda-Urundi, 1885-1919. League of Nations mandate under Belgium until 1945. Then UN trust territory. Rwanda and Burundi separated on independence	Monarchy Republic 1966.11.29
31 RWANDA	1962.07.01	(See Burundi)	Republic
32 ALGERIA	1962.07.03	French colony 1830-1962	Republic
33 UGANDA	1962.10.09	British protectorate 1893-1962	Monarchy Republic 1963.10.09
34 KENYA	1963.12.12	British colony 1895-1963	Monarchy Republic 1964.12.12
35 MALAWI	1964.07.06	British protectorate ( <i>Nyasaland</i> ) 1891-1964. Member of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1953-1963	Monarchy Republic 1966.07.06
36 ZAMBIA	1964.10.24	British protectorate ( <i>Northern Rhodesia</i> ) 1924-1964. Member of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1953-1963	Republic
37 GAMBIA, The	1965.02.18	British colony 1817-1965	Monarchy Republic 1970.04.24
38 BOTSWANA	1966.09.30	British protectorate ( <i>Bechuanaland</i> ) 1895-1966	Republic
39 LESOTHO	1966.10.04	British protectorate ( <i>Basutoland</i> ) 1868-1966	Monarchy
40 MAURITIUS	1968.03.12	British colony 1810-1968	Monarchy
41 SWAZILAND	1968.09.06	British protectorate 1902-1968	Monarchy
42 EQUATORIAL GUINEA	1968.10.12	Spanish colony 1778-1968	Republic
43 GUINEA BISSAU	1974.09.10	Portuguese colony 1884-1974	Republic
44 MOZAMBIQUE	1975.06.25	Portuguese colony 1881-1975	Republic
45 CAPE VERDE	1975.07.05	Portuguese colony 1587-1975	Republic
46 COMOROS <sup>8</sup>	1975.07.06	French colony 1912-1975	Republic
Mayotte			(See note 8)
47 SAO TOMÉ	1975.07.12	Portuguese colony 1522-1975	Republic
48 ANGOLA	1975.11.11	Portuguese colony 1891-1975	Republic
49 SEYCHELLES	1976.06.29	British colony 1810-1976	Republic
50 TRANSKEI	1976.10.26	South African Xhosa state 1894-1976	Republic
51 DJIBOUTI	1977.06.27	French Somaliland 1859-1967. <i>French Territory of the Afars and Issas</i> 1967-1977	Republic
52 BOPHUTHATSWANA	1977.12.06	South African Tswana territory 1913-1977	Republic
53 VENDA	1979.09.13	South African Venda territory 1913-1979	Republic
54 ZIMBABWE	1980.04.18	Self-governing British colony ( <i>Southern Rhodesia</i> ) 1923-1965. Member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1953-1963. Unilaterally independent 1965-1979	Republic
55 CISKEI	1981.12.04	South African Xhosa territory 1913-1981	Republic

## NOTES:

- 1 An independent Ethiopian state has existed since earliest times. The country was re-united in 1855 and ruled by emperors until the monarchy was overthrown on 12 September 1974. Ethiopia was invaded by Italy in October 1935 and occupied from 5 May 1936 until it was liberated by South African forces on 6 April 1941. The former Italian colony of *Eritrea* federated with Ethiopia on 11 September 1952 but was incorporated as a province on 15 November 1962.
- 2 The British colonies, Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal, united on 31 May 1910 to become the *Union of South Africa*. The British Statute of Westminster of 11 December 1934 changed the status of the autonomous Union

of SA (and other British dominions) to independent monarchies within the British Commonwealth. The South African Status Act of 1934 confirmed this development. On 31 May 1961 the Union of SA adopted a republican constitution and subsequently withdrew from the Commonwealth.

- 3 *French Cameroon* became an independent republic on 1 January 1960. The northern part of *British Cameroon* elected to join Nigeria on 1 June 1961 where it became the province of *Sardauna* (presently *Gongola* state). The southern area preferred to federate with former French Cameroon. The federation was converted to a unitary state in 1972 and the word *United* was dropped from the country's name in January 1984.
- 4 After a referendum British (Western) Togo joined Ghana on 6




March 1957 while French (Eastern) Togo became independent on 27 April 1960.

- 5 Apart from *Italian Somaliland* (Mogadishu), there was also (a) *British Somaliland* (Berbera) which joined Somalia (Mogadishu) on independence in July 1960, and (b) *French Somaliland* which gained separate independence (see Djibouti).
- 6 In April 1959 *French Soudan* and *Senegal* were joined in the *Federation of Mali* which became independent on 20 June 1960. Senegal seceded on 20 August 1960 and Mali officially became a unitary republic on 22 September 1960.
- 7 The island of *Zanzibar* became independent on 9 December 1963 and joined independent *Tanganyika* on 26 April 1964 to form the *United Republic of Tanzania*.
- 8 Three islands in the Comoro Archipelago – *Njazidja* (Grand Comore), *Nzwani* (Anjouan), and *Mwali* (Moheli) – unilaterally declared themselves independent from France on 6 July 1975. The fourth island, *Mayotte* (Mahoré) refused to join the others and has remained under French control with the status of *collectivité territoriale*.
- 9 *Southern Rhodesia* became *Rhodesia* after the dissolution of the self-governing *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* in 1963.

Mr Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front government (in power since 1962) unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent (UDI) on 11 November 1965 and introduced a republican constitution in 1970. A settlement on 3 March 1978 between the Rhodesian Front and the internal black parties was followed by a joint interim government and universal franchise elections in April 1979, which were won by Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council. Muzorewa took office on 1 June 1979 but resigned later that year after an external settlement (Lancaster House, London) had produced a new constitution and provided for new elections in which the exiled Zapu and Zanu parties would also participate. In terms of this agreement a British governor, Lord Soames, arrived on 12 December 1979 to take over the government on behalf of the British government. He supervised the elections of February-March 1980 which were won by Mr Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union and culminated in internationally recognized independence on 18 April 1980.

**SOURCES:** 4, 28.



Himba men and women at the polls in Kaokoveld, SWA/Namibia.

TABLE 12

## GOVERNMENT LEADERS SINCE INDEPENDENCE

COUNTRY AND DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	LEADERS AND TENURES	ACCESSION TO OFFICE
ALGERIA 1962.07.03	Pres Ferhat Abbas, 1962-1963 P M Ahmed Ben Bella, 1962-1963 Pres Ahmed Ben Bella, 1963-1965 Pres (Col) Houari Boumedienne, 1965-1978 <b>Pres (Col) Benjeddid Chadli, 1979-</b>	Election 1962 Election 1962 Election 1963 Military coup 1965.06.19, elections Predecessor died, elections 1979, 1984
ANGOLA 1975.11.11	Pres (Dr) Agostinho Neto, 1975-1979 <b>Pres Jose Eduardo dos Santos, 1979-</b>	Elected by MPLA Congress Predecessor died, party election
BENIN 1960.08.01	Pres Hubert Maga, 1960-1963 Pres Sourou Apathy, 1964-1965 Pres (Gen) Christophe Soglo, 1965-1967 Pres (Col) Alphonse Alley, 1967-1968 Pres Emile Zinzou, 1968-1969 Pres (Col) Paul de Souza, 1969-1970 Pres Hubert Maga, 1970-1972 Pres Justin Ahomadegbe, 1972 <b>Pres (Lt-Col) Mathieu Kerekou, 1972-</b>	Election 1960 Civil strife/military intervention Military coup Dec 1965 Military power struggle Civilian appointed by army Military coup Dec 1969 Civilian rule restored Rotation Military coup 1972.10.26, elections 1980, 1984
BOPHUTHATSWANA 1977.12.06	<b>Pres Lucas M Mangope, 1977-</b>	Elections 1977, 1982
BOTSWANA 1966.09.30	Pres (Sir) Seretse Khama, 1966-1980 <b>Pres Quett Masire, 1980-</b>	Elections 1966, 1969, 1974, 1979 Khama died 1980.07.13, elected by parliament 1980, election 1984
BURKINA FASO (Upper Volta) 1960.08.05	Pres Maurice Yameogo, 1960-1966 Pres (Gen) Sangoule Lamizana, 1966-1980 Pres (Col) Saye Zerbo, 1980-1982 H S (Maj) Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, 1982-1983 <b>H S (Capt) Thomas Sankara, 1983-</b>	Election 1980 Military coup 1966.01.03 Military coup 1980.11.25 Military coup 1982.11.07 Military coup 1983.08.04
BURUNDI Independent 1962.07.01 Republic 1966.11.29	King Mwanbutsa IV, 1915-1966 King Ntare V, 1966 Pres (Gen) Michel Micombero, 1966-1976 <b>Pres (Lt-Col) Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, 1976-</b>	Succession Palace revolution Military coup 1966 Military/ethnic power struggle 1976.11.09, election 1984
CAMEROON 1960.01.01	Pres Ahmadou Ahidjo, 1960-1982 <b>Pres Paul Biya, 1982-</b>	Elections 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 Predecessor retired, election 1984
CAPE VERDE 1975.07.05	<b>Pres Artistides Pereira, 1975-</b>	Elections 1975, 1980, 1985
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Republic 1960.08.13 Empire 1977.12.04 Republic 1979.09.20	Pres David Dacko, 1960-1965 Life-Pres (Marshal) Jean-Bedel Bokassa, 1966-1977 Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, 1977-1979 Pres David Dacko, 1979-1981 <b>Pres (Gen) André Kolingba, 1981-</b>	Elected by parliament Military coup 1965.12.31 Self-appointed Military coup 1979.09.20, election 1981 Military coup 1981.09.01
CHAD 1960.08.11	Pres N'Garta Tombalbaye, 1960-1976 Pres (Gen) Felix Malloum, 1976-1979 Pres (Gen) Goukouni Oueddei, 1979-1982 <b>Pres Hissene Habre, 1982-</b>	Elections 1960, 1962, 1969 Military coup 1976.04.13, predecessor killed Civil war, predecessor forced to resign, 1979.03.23 Civil war, predecessor deposed 1982.10.21
CISKEI 1981.12.04	<b>Pres Lennox L W Sebe, 1981-</b>	Elections 1978, 1983
COMOROS 1975.07.06	Pres Abdallah Abderemane 1975 Pres Mohammed Jaffar, 1975-1976 Pres Ali Soilih, 1976-1978 <b>Pres Abdallah Abderemane, 1978-</b>	Election 1975.07.07 Civilian coup 1975.08.03 Election 1976.01.02 Civilian coup 1978.05.14, elections 1978, 1984
CONGO 1960.08.15	Pres Abbé Fulbert Youlou, 1960-1963 Pres A Massamba-Debat, 1963-1968 Pres (Maj) Marien Ngouabi, 1968-1977 Pres (Col) Yhombi-Opango, 1977-1979 <b>Pres (Col) Denis Sassou-Nguesso, 1979-</b>	Election 1959 Civil strife/military intervention Military coup 1968.08.02 Ngouabi assassinated 1977.03.18, party election Military power struggle/purge, elections 1979, 1984

(Continued on next page)



**TABLE 12** (Continued from previous page)

COUNTRY AND DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	LEADERS AND TENURES	ACCESSION TO OFFICE
DJIBOUTI 1977.06.27	<b>Pres Hassan Gouled Aptidon, 1977-</b>	Elections 1977, 1981
EGYPT Independent 1922.02.28 Republic 1953.06.18	King Fuad, 1922-1936 King Farouk, 1936-1953 P M (Gen) Mohammed Naguib, 1952-1953 Pres (Gen) Mohammed Naguib, 1963-1954 Pres (Gen) Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1954-1956 Pres Anwar Sadat, 1970-1981 <b>Pres Hosni Mubarak, 1981-</b>	Sultan under British rule Succession Military coup 1952.07.23 Military decree 1953.06.18 Military power struggle 1954.11.14, elections Nasser died, elections 1970, 1976, 1979 Sadat assassinated 1981-10-06, election 1981, 1984
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1968.10.12	Life-Pres Macias Nguema, 1968-1979 <b>Pres (Lt-Col) Nguema Mbasogo, 1979-</b>	Election 1968 Military coup 1979.08.03, reappointed 1982.08.02
ETHIOPIA Independent since earliest times Republic 1974.09.12	Emperor Menelik II, 1889-1913 Emperor Lij Iyasu, 1913-1916 Empress (Regent) Zawditu, 1916-1930 Emperor Haile Selassie I, 1930-1974 H S (Gen) Aman Andom, 1974 H S (Gen) Teferi Bente, 1974-1977 <b>H S (Gen) Mengistu Haile Mariam, 1977-</b>	Founder of last dynasty Succession Succession Succession Military coup 1974.09.12 Andom executed, purge 1974.11.29 Bente executed, purge 1977.02.03
GABON 1960.08.17	Pres Leon Mba, 1960-1964 Pres Jean Aubame, 1964 Pres Leon Mba, 1964-1967 <b>Pres Omar Bongo, 1967-</b>	Election 1961 Military coup 1964.02.18 French military intervention Feb 1964 Vice-Pres when Mba died, 1967.11.28, elections 1973, 1979
GAMBIA, The Independent 1965.02.18 Republic 1970.04.24	P M (Sir) Dawda Jawara, 1965-1970 <b>Pres (Sir) Dawda Jawara, 1970-</b>	Elections 1960, 1966 Elections 1972, 1977, 1982
GHANA Independent 1957.03.06 Republic 1960.07.01	P M Kwame Nkrumah, 1957-1960 Pres Kwame Nkrumah, 1960-1966 H S (Gen) Joseph Ankrah, 1966-1969 H S (Brig) Kwasi Akrifa, 1969-1970 P M (Dr) Kofi Busia, 1969-1972 Pres Akufo-Addo, 1970-1972 H S (Gen) Ignatius Acheampong, 1972-1978 H S (Gen) William Akuffo, 1978-1979 H S (Lt) Jerry Rawlings, 1979 Pres (Dr) Hilla Limann, 1979-1981 <b>H S (Lt) Jerry Rawlings, 1981-</b>	Election 1956 Election 1960 Military coup 1966.02.24 Predecessor resigned Election 1969/civilian rule restored Elected by parliament Military coup 1972.01.13 Palace coup 1978.07.05 Military revolt 1979.06.04/3 predecessors executed Election July 1979/civilian rule restored Sep 1979 Military coup 1981.12.31
GUINEA 1958.10.02	Pres Ahmed Sekou Touré, 1958-1984 Pres Lansana Beavogui, 1984 <b>H S (Col) Lansana Conte, 1984-</b>	Elections 1958, 1961, 1968, 1974, 1980, 1982 Predecessor died 1984.03.26 Military coup 1984.04.03
GUINEA BISSAU 1974.09.10	Pres Luiz de Almeida Cabral, 1974-1980 <b>Pres (Maj) Joao Vieira, 1980-</b>	Elected by PAIGC Congress Military coup 1980.11.14, election 1984
IVORY COAST 1960.08.07	<b>Pres Felix Houphouët-Boigny, 1960-</b>	Elections 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985
KENYA Independent 1963.12.12 Republic 1964.12.12	P M Jomo Kenyatta, 1963-1964 Pres Jomo Kenyatta, 1964-1978 <b>Pres Daniel arap Moi, 1978-</b>	Election 1963 Elections 1969, 1974 Vice-Pres when Kenyatta died, elections 1979, 1983
LESOTHO 1966.10.04	<b>King Moshweshwe II, 1960-</b> <b>P M (Chief) Leabua Jonathan, 1966-</b>	Succession Elections 1965, 1970, (1985) <sup>1</sup>
LIBERIA 1847.07.26	Pres Joseph J Roberts, 1847-1856 Pres Stephen A Benson, 1856-1864 Pres Daniel B Warner, 1864-1868 Pres James S Payne, 1868-1870 Pres Edward J Roye, 1870-1871 Pres James S Smith, 1871-1872 Pres Joseph J Roberts, 1872-1876 Pres James S Payne, 1876-1878 Pres Anthony W Gardiner, 1878-1883 Pres Alfred H Russell, 1883-1884	Election Election Election Election Election Succession of Vice-Pres Election Election Election Succession of Vice-Pres

(Continued on next page)

TABLE 12 (Continued from previous page)

COUNTRY AND DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	LEADERS AND TENURES	ACCESSION TO OFFICE
LIBERIA (cont)	Pres Hillary R W Johnson, 1884-1892 Pres Joseph J Cheeseman, 1892-1896 Pres William D Coleman, 1896-1900 Pres Garrett W Gibson, 1900-1904 Pres Arthur Barclay, 1904-1912 Pres Daniel E Howard, 1912-1920 Pres Charles D B King, 1920-1930 Pres Edwin Barclay, 1930-1944 Pres William V S Tubman, 1944-1971 Pres William R Tolbert, 1971-1980 <b>H S (Sgt) Samuel Kanyon Doe, 1980-</b>	Election Election Election Election Election Election Election Election Vice-Pres when Tubman died, elections 1972, 1976 Military coup 1980.04.12, Tolbert killed
LIBYA Independent 1951.12.24 Republic 1969.09.01	King Idris I, 1951-1969 <sup>2</sup> <b>H S (Col) Muammar al-Gaddafi, 1969-</b>	Traditional ruler (Amir) Military coup 1969.09.01
MADAGASCAR 1960.06.26	Pres Philibert Tsiranana, 1960-1972 Pres (Gen) Gabriel Ramanantsoa, 1972-1975 Pres (Col) Richard Ratsimandrava, 1975 Pres (Gen) Gilles Andriamahazo, 1975 <b>Pres (Lt-Col) Didier Ratsiraka, 1975-</b>	Elections 1960, 1965, 1972 Civil strife/military intervention Predecessor resigned 1975.02.05 Predecessor assassinated 1975.02.11 Appointed by army 1975.06.15, elections 1975, 1982
MALAWI Independent 1964.07.06 Republic 1966.07.06	P M (Dr) Kamuzu Banda, 1963-1966 Pres Kamuzu Banda, 1966-1971 <b>Life-Pres Kamuzu Banda, 1971-</b>	Election 1961 Election 1966 Elected by party and parliament
MALI 1960.08.20	Pres Modibo Keita, 1960-1968 <b>Pres (Gen) Moussa Traore, 1968-</b>	Elections 1959, 1964 Military coup 1968.11.19, elections 1979, 1985
MAURITANIA 1960.10.28	Pres Moktar Ould Daddah, 1960-1978 Pres (Gen) Ould Mohammed Salek, 1978-1979 Pres (Lt-Col) Mahmoud Ould Louly, 1979-1980 Pres (Lt-Col) Khouna Ould Haidalla, 1980-1984 <b>Pres (Lt-Col) Ahmed Ould Taya, 1984-</b>	Elections 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976 Military coup 1978.07.09 Military power struggle Military power struggle 1980.01.04 Military coup 1984.12.12
MAURITIUS 1968.03.12	<b>Queen Elizabeth II, 1968-</b> P M (Sir) Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, 1968-1982 <b>P M Aneerood Jugnauth, 1982-</b>	Elections 1968, 1976 Election 1982, election 1983
MOROCCO 1956.03.02	King Mohammed V, 1956-1961 <b>King Hassan II, 1961-</b>	Sultan under French rule Succession
MOZAMBIQUE 1975.06.25	<b>Pres Samora Moises Machel, 1975-</b>	Elected by Frelimo Congress
NIGER 1960.08.03	Pres Hamani Diori, 1960-1974 <b>H S (Brig-Gen) Seyni Kountché, 1974-</b>	Elections 1960, 1965, 1970 Military coup 1974.04.15
NIGERIA Independent 1960.10.01 Republic 1963.10.01	P M Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, 1960-1966 Pres (Dr) Nnamdi Azikiwe, 1963-1966 H S (Gen) Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, 1966 H S (Gen) Yakubu Gowon, 1966-1975 H S (Gen) Murtala Mohammed, 1975-1976 H S (Gen) Olusegun Obasanjo, 1976-1979 Pres Shehu Shagari, 1979-1983 H S (Maj-Gen) Muhammed Buhari, 1983-1985 <b>H S (Maj-Gen) Ibrahim Babangida</b>	Elections 1959, 1964 Republican constitution Military coup 1966.01.15, Balewa killed Military purge 1966.07.29, Ironsi killed Military power struggle Predecessor assassinated Election Aug 1979/civilian rule restored, election 1983 Military coup 1983.12.31 Military coup 1985.08.27
RWANDA 1962.07.01	Pres Gregoire Kayibanda, 1962-1973 <b>Pres (Gen) Juvenal Habyarimana, 1973-</b>	Elections 1961, 1963, 1965, 1973 Military coup 1973.07.05, elections 1978, 1983
SAO TOMÉ 1975.07.12	<b>Pres Manuel Pinto da Costa, 1975-</b>	Elections 1975, 1979, 1983
SENEGAL 1960.08.20	Pres Leopold Sédar Senghor, 1960-1980 <b>Pres Abdou Diouf, 1980-</b>	Elections, 1960, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978 Predecessor retired voluntarily 1980.12.31, election 1983
SEYCHELLES 1976.06.29	Pres (Sir) James Mancham, 1976-1977 <b>Pres Albert René, 1977-</b>	Election 1974 Civilian coup 1977.06.05, elections 1979, 1984

(Continued on next page)



**TABLE 12** (Continued from previous page)

COUNTRY AND DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	LEADERS AND TENURES	ACCESSION TO OFFICE
SIERRA LEONE Independent 1961.04.27 Republic 1971.04.19	P M (Sir) Milton Margai, 1961-1964 P M (Sir) Albert Margai, 1964-1967 P M Siaka Stevens, 1967 H S (Col) Andrew Juxon-Smith, 1967-1968 P M Siaka Stevens, 1968-1971 Pres Siaka Stevens, 1971-1985 <b>Pres (Maj-Gen) Joseph Momoh 1985-</b>	Elections 1956, 1961 Predecessor died Election 1967.03.17 Military coup March 1967 Civilian coup 1968.04.18/civilian rule restored Republican constitution, elections 1976, 1978 Election 1985, predecessor retired
SOMALIA 1960.07.01	Pres Abdullah Osman, 1961-1967 P M Ali Shermarke, 1960-1964 P M Abdirizak Hussein, 1964-1967 Pres Ali Shermarke, 1967-1969 P M Mohammed Egal, 1967-1969 <b>Pres (Gen) Siyad Barré, 1969-</b>	Elected by parliament Elections 1960, 1964 Predecessor deposed Elected by parliament Appointed by president Shermarke assassinated, military coup 1969.10.21, election 1980
SOUTH AFRICA Independent 1910-1934 Republic 1961.05.31	P M (Gen) Louis Botha, 1910-1919 P M (Gen) J C Smuts, 1919-1924 P M (Gen) J B M Hertzog, 1924-1939 P M (Gen) J C Smuts, 1939-1948 P M (Dr) D F Malan, 1948-1954 P M J G Strijdom, 1954-1958 P M (Dr) H F Verwoerd, 1958-1966 P M B J Vorster, 1966-1978 P M P W Botha, 1978-1984  Pres C R Swart, 1961-1968 Pres J J Fouché, 1968-1975 Pres (Dr) N Diederichs, 1975-1978 Pres B J Vorster, 1978-1979 Pres M Viljoen, 1979-1984 <b>Pres P W Botha, 1984-</b>	Elections 1910, 1915 Predecessor died, elections 1920, 1921 Elections 1924, 1929, 1933, 1938 Parliamentary victory 1939, election 1944 Elections 1948, 1953 Malan retired, election 1958 Strijdom died, elections 1961, 1966 Verwoerd assassinated, elections 1970, 1974, 1977 Vorster elected president, election 1981  Republican constitution Predecessor retired Predecessor retired Predecessor died Predecessor resigned New constitution 1984.09.05
SUDAN 1956.01.01	Pres Ismail al-Azhari, 1956-1958, 1964-1969 P M Abdallah Khalil, 1956-1958 H S (Gen) Ibrahim Abboud, 1958-1964 P M Serr al-Khatim Khalifa, 1964-1965 P M Mohammed Mahgoub, 1965-1966 P M Sadik al-Mahdi, 1966-1967 P M Mohammed Mahgoub, 1967-1969 H S (Col) Gaafar al-Nimeiry, 1969-1971 Pres (Gen) Gaafar al-Nimeiry, 1971-1985 <b>H S (Gen) Sowar al-Daheb, 1985-</b>	Elected by parliament Elections 1956, 1958 Military coup 1958 Civilian coup 1964/general strike Election 1965 Parliamentary victory Parliamentary victory Military coup 1969.05.25 Elections 1971, 1977, 1983 Military coup, 1985.04.06
SWAZILAND 1968.09.06	King Sobhuza II, 1921-1982 Queen Regent Dzeliwe, 1982-1983 <b>Queen Regent Lathwala Ntombi, 1983-</b> P M Makhosini Dlamini, 1967-1976 P M Maphevu Dlamini, 1976-1979 P M Mabandla Dlamini, 1979-1983 <b>P M Bekhimpi Dlamini, 1983-</b>	Succession Succeeded after Sobhuza's death 1982 Predecessor dismissed 1983.08.09 Elections 1967, 1972 Predecessor retired Predecessor died Predecessor dismissed, election 1983
TANZANIA Independent 1961.12.09 Republic 1962.12.09	P M Julius K Nyerere, 1961-1962 Pres Julius K Nyerere, 1962-1985 <b>Pres Ali Hassan Mwinyi, 1985-</b>	Election 1959 Elections 1962, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 Election Oct 1985, Nyerere retired
TOGO 1960.04.27	Pres Sylvanus Olympio, 1960-1963 Pres Nicolas Grunitzky, 1963-1967 <b>Pres (Gen) Gnassingbe Eyadéma, 1967-</b>	Elections 1958, 1960 Military revolt 1963.01.13, Olympio killed Military coup 1967.01.13, election 1979
TRANSKEI 1976.10.26	Pres (Chief) Botha Sigcau, 1976-1978 P M (Par Chief) Kaizer D Matanzima, 1976-1979 <b>Pres Kaizer D Matanzima, 1979-<sup>3</sup></b>  <b>P M George Matanzima, 1979-</b>	Elected by parliament Election 1976 Predecessor died  Predecessor elected president, election, 1981
TUNISIA Independent 1956.03.20 Republic 1957.07.25	King Mohammed al-Amin, 1943-1957 P M Habib Bourguiba, 1956-1957 Pres Habib Bourguiba, 1957-1974 <b>Life-Pres Habib Bourguiba, 1974-</b>	Traditional ruler (Bey) Election 1956 Elections 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974 Elected by parliament

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TABLE 12 (Continued from previous page)

COUNTRY AND DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	LEADERS AND TENURES	ACCESSION TO OFFICE
UGANDA Independent 1962.10.09 Republic 1963.10.09	P M Milton Obote, 1962-1966 Pres (Sir) Edward Mutesa, 1963-1966 Pres Milton Obote, 1966-1971 Pres (Field Marshal) Idi Amin Dada, 1971-1979 Pres (Dr) Yussuf Lule, 1979 Pres Godfrey Binaisa, 1979-1980 H S Paulo Muwanga, 1980 Pres Milton Obote, 1980-1985 <b>H S (Lt-Gen) Tito Okello 1985-</b>	Election 1962 Republican constitution Coups by Obote Feb-Apr 1966 Military coup 1971.01.25 Tanzanian invasion, Amin deposed Predecessor deposed Predecessor deposed Election Dec 1980 Military coup 1985.07.27
VENDA 1979.09.13	<b>Pres Patrick Mphahlele, 1979-</b>	Elections 1978, 1983
ZAIRE 1960.06.30	Pres Joseph Kasavubu, 1960-1965 P M Patrice Lumumba, 1960 Col Joseph Mobutu, 1960 P M Cyrille Adoula, 1964-1964 P M Moise Tshombe, 1964-1965 P M Evariste Kimba, 1965 <b>Pres (Marshal) Mobutu Sese Seko, 1965-</b>	Elected by parliament 1960 Election 1960 Lumumba dismissed, military intervention Appointed by president Adoula resigned, election 1965 Tshombe dismissed Military coup 1965.11.24, elections 1970, 1977, 1984
ZAMBIA 1964.10.24	<b>Pres Kenneth K Kaunda, 1964-</b>	Elections 1964, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983
ZIMBABWE <sup>4</sup> 1980.04.18	<b>Pres (Rev) Canaan Banana, 1980-</b> <b>P M Robert Mugabe, 1980-</b>	Elected by parliament Elections Feb 1980, July 1985

## NOTES:

Abbreviations: Pres=President  
H S=Head of State  
P M=Prime Minister

- 1 The government candidates in Lesotho were nominated unopposed.
- 2 Several prime ministers resigned or were dismissed in Libya during the reign of King Idris.
- 3 Pres Matanzima of Transkei announced his intention to retire as head of state when his term expires early in 1986.
- 4 The government leaders of Southern Rhodesia since 1924 were Prime Ministers, Sir Charles Coghlan, 1924-1927; H U Moffat, 1927-1933; George Mitchell, 1933; Sir Godfrey Huggins (later

Lord Malvern), 1933-1953; Garfield Todd, 1953-1958; Sir Edgar Whitehead, 1958-1962; Sir Winston Field, 1962-1964; Ian Douglas Smith, 1964-1979; Bishop Abel Muzorewa, 1979; heads of state since UDI, Clifford du Pont (Chief Executive 1965-1970, President 1970-1976); Pres John J Wrathall, 1976-1978; Pres Josiah Gumede, 1979 (See also table 11). The prime ministers of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) were Sir Godfrey Huggins (Lord Malvern), 1953-1956, and Sir Roy Welensky, 1956-1963, both of the United Federal Party.

SOURCES: 1, 2, 4, 28.






TABLE 13

## CAUSES OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES SINCE 1948

VIOLENT CHANGES: *COUPS/PURGES/MILITARY INTERVENTION/CIVIL WARS*

1 King Farouk Egypt, Jul 1952	24 Col A Juxon-Smith Sierra Leone, Apr 1968	47 Gen I Acheampong Ghana, Jul 1978
2 Pres Naguib Egypt, Nov 1954	25 Pres Massamba-Debat Congo, Aug 1968	48 Col Yhombi-Opango Congo, Feb 1979
3 P M Abdallah Khalil Sudan, Nov 1958	26 Pres Modibo Keita Mali, Nov 1968	49 Pres Felix Malloum Chad, Mar 1979
4 Pres Sylvanus Olympio Togo, Jan 1963	27 P M M Mahgoub Sudan, May 1969	50 Pres Idi Amin** Uganda, Apr 1979
5 Pres Fulbert Youlou Congo, Aug 1963	28 King Idris Libya, Sept 1969	51 Gen William F Akuffo Ghana, Jun 1979
6 Pres Hubert Maga Benin, Oct 1963	29 P M Ali Shermarke Somalia, Oct 1969	52 Pres Macias Nguema Equatorial Guinea, Aug 1979
7 Pres Leon Mba Gabon, Feb 1964	30 Pres Emile Zinzou Benin, Dec 1969	53 Emperor Bokassa** CAR, Sept 1979
8 Pres Jean Aubame** Gabon, Feb 1964	31 Pres Milton Obote Uganda, Jan 1971	54 Pres William Tolbert Liberia, Apr 1980
9 Gen Ibrahim Abboud* Sudan, Oct 1964	32 Pres Kofi Busia Ghana, Jan 1972	55 Pres Godfrey Binaisa Uganda, May 1980
10 Pres Ahmed Ben Bella Algeria, Jun 1965	33 Pres P Tsirinana Madagascar, May 1972	56 Pres Luiz Cabral Guinea Bissau, Nov 1980
11 Pres Joseph Kasavubu Zaire, Nov 1965	34 Pres J Ahomadegbe Benin, Oct 1972	57 Pres S Lamizana Upper Volta, Nov 1980
12 Pres Sourou Apithy Benin, Dec 1965	35 Pres G Kayibanda Rwanda, Jul 1973	58 Pres David Dacko CAR, Sept 1981
13 Pres David Dacko CAR, Dec 1965	36 Pres Hamani Diori Niger, Apr 1974	59 Pres Hilla Limann Ghana, Dec 1981
14 Pres Maurice Yameogo Upper Volta, Jan 1966	37 Emperor Haile Selassie Ethiopia, Sept 1974	60 Pres Goukouni Oueddei Chad, Sept 1982
15 P M Abubakar Balewa Nigeria, Jan 1966	38 Gen Aman Andom Ethiopia, Nov 1974	61 Pres Saye Zerbo Upper Volta, Nov 1982
16 Pres Kwame Nkrumah Ghana, Feb 1966	39 Pres Yakubu Gowon Nigeria, Jul 1975	62 Pres Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo Upper Volta, Aug 1983
17 Pres Edward Mutesa* Uganda, Apr 1966	40 Pres Abdallah Abderemane Comoros, Aug 1975	63 Pres Shehu Shagari Nigeria, Dec 1983
18 Gen Aguyi-Ironsi Nigeria, Jul 1966	41 Pres N'Garta Tombalbaye Chad, Apr 1976	64 Pres Lansana Beavogui Guinea, Apr 1984
19 King Mwambutsa Burundi, Jul 1966	42 Col M Micombere Burundi, Nov 1976	65 Pres Ould Haidallah Mauritania, Dec 1984
20 King Ntare Burundi, Nov 1966	43 Gen Tefere Bente Ethiopia, Feb 1977	66 Pres Gaafar al-Nimeiry Sudan, April 1985
21 Pres Nicolas Grunitzky Togo, Jan 1967	44 Pres James Mancham** Seychelles, Jun 1977	67 Pres Milton Obote Uganda, Jul 1985
22 P M Siaka Stevens Sierra Leone, Mar 1967	45 Pres Ali Soilih** Comoros, May 1978	68 Pres Mohammed Buhari Nigeria, Aug 1985
23 Gen Christophe Soglo Benin, Dec 1967	46 Pres Moktar Ould Daddah Mauritania, Jul 1978	

\*Civilian coups

\*\*Coups staged with the help of external forces

**TABLE 13** (Continued from previous page)**EXECUTION DURING OR AFTER COUPS AND PURGES**

1 Pres Sylvanus Olympio Togo, Jan 1963	6 Gen Teferi Bente Ethiopia, Feb 1977	11 Gen Akwasi Afrifa* Ghana, Jun 1979
2 P M Abubakar Balewa Nigeria, Jan 1966	7 Pres Massamba-Débat* Congo, Mar 1977	12 Pres Macias Nguema Equatorial Guinea, Aug 1979
3 Gen Aguyi-Ironsi Nigeria, Jul 1966	8 Pres Ali Sollih Comoros, May 1978	13 Pres William Tolbert Liberia, Apr 1980
4 Gen Aman Andom Ethiopia, Nov 1974	9 Gen I Acheampong* Ghana, Jun 1979	
5 Pres N'Garta Tombalbaye Chad, Apr 1976	10 Gen William F Akuffo Ghana, Jun 1979	*Execution long after retirement from office.

**ASSASSINATIONS**

1 P M Pierre Ngendandumwe Burundi, Jan 1965	4 Gen Ratsimandrava Madagascar, Feb 1975	7 Pres Anwar Sadat Egypt, Oct 1981
2 P M H F Verwoerd South Africa, Sept 1966	5 Gen Murtala Mohammed Nigeria, Feb 1976	
3 Pres Ali Shermarke Somalia, Oct 1969	6 Pres Marien Ngouabi Congo, Mar 1977	

**FORCED RESIGNATIONS/DISMISSALS**

1 P M Patrice Lumumba Zaire, Sept 1960	5 Gen Ramanantsoa Madagascar, Feb 1975	9 P M Mabandla Dlamini Swaziland, Mar 1983
2 P M Ali Shermarke Somalia, 1964	6 Gen Ould Salek Mauritania, May 1979	10 Queen Regent Dzeliwe Swaziland, Aug 1983
3 P M Moise Tshombe Zaire, Oct 1965	7 Pres Yussuf Lule Uganda, Jun 1979	
4 Gen Joseph Ankrah Ghana, Apr 1969	8 Col Ould Louly Mauritania, Jan 1980	

**VOLUNTARY RESIGNATIONS/RETIREMENT**

1 P M D F Malan South Africa, Oct 1954	7 P M B J Vorster South Africa, Sept 1978	13 Pres Paulo Muwanga* Uganda, Dec 1980
2 Col Alphonse Alley* Benin, Jul 1968	8 Pres B J Vorster South Africa, Jun 1979	14 Pres Leopold Senghor Senegal, Dec 1980
3 Col Paul de Souza* Benin, May 1970	9 P M Ian Smith Rhodesia, May 1979	15 Pres Ahmadou Ahidjo Cameroon, Nov 1982
4 Gen Andriamahazo Madagascar, Jun 1975	10 Lt Jerry Rawlings* Ghana, Sept 1979	16 Pres Julius Nyerere Tanzania, Oct 1985
5 Pres Mohammed Jaffar Comoros, Jan 1976	11 Gen O Obasanjo* Nigeria, Oct 1979	17 Pres Siaka Stevens Sierra Leone, Oct 1985
6 P M Makhosini Dlamini Swaziland, Mar 1976	12 P M Abel Muzorewa Zimbabwe, Dec 1979	*Restoration of civilian rule



**TABLE 13** (Continued from previous page)**DEATH BY NATURAL CAUSES DURING OFFICE**

1 P M J G Strijdom South Africa, Aug 1958	7 Emperor Haile Selassie* Ethiopia, Aug 1975	13 Pres Agostinho Neto Angola, Sept 1979
2 King Mohammed V Morocco, Feb 1961	8 Pres Nico Diederichs South Africa, Aug 1978	14 P M Maphevu Dlamini Swaziland, Oct 1979
3 P M Milton Margai Sierra Leone, 1964	9 Pres Jomo Kenyatta Kenya, Aug 1978	15 Pres Seretse Khama Botswana, Jul 1980
4 Pres Leon Mba Gabon, Nov 1967	10 Pres John Wrathall Rhodesia, Aug 1978	16 King Sobhuza II Swaziland, Aug 1982
5 Pres Gamal Nasser Egypt, Sept 1970	11 Pres Houari Boumedienne Algeria, Dec 1978	17 Pres Ahmed Sekou Touré** Guinea, Mar 1984
6 Pres William Tubman Liberia, Jul 1971	12 Pres Botha Sigcau Transkei, Dec 1978	*After dethronement **Followed by military coup

**ELECTION/PARLIAMENTARY DEFEATS**

1 P M J C Smuts South Africa, May 1948	4 P M Mohammed Mahgoub Sudan, Jul 1966	7 P M Leabua Jonathan** Lesotho, 1970
2 P M Edgar Whitehead Rhodesia, Dec 1962	5 P M Albert Margai* Sierra Leone, Mar 1967	8 P M Seewoosagur Ramgoolam Mauritius, Jun 1982
3 P M Ser al-Khatim Khalifa Sudan, Jun 1965	6 P M Sadik al-Mahdi Sudan, May 1967	*Followed by military coup. **Suspended the constitution. No change of government.

**NO CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP\***

Life-Pres Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia, since 1956	Pres Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia, since 1964	Pres Aristides Pereira, Cape Verde, since 1975
Pres Houphouët-Boigny, Ivory Coast, since 1959	P M Leabua Jonathan, Lesotho, since 1965	Pres Manuel da Costa, Sao Tomé, since 1975
King Moshweshwe II, Lesotho, since 1960	Pres Lucas Mangope Bophuthatswana, since 1972	Pres Gouled Aptidon, Djibouti, since 1977
Pres Dawda Jawara, The Gambia, since 1962	Life-Pres Patrick Mphephu, Venda, since 1973	Pres Canaan Banana, Zimbabwe, since 1980
Life-Pres Kamuzu Banda, Malawi, since 1963	Pres Lennox Sebe, Ciskei, since 1973	P M Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe, since 1980
Pres Kaizer Matanzima,** Transkei, since 1963	Pres Samora Machel, Mozambique, since 1975	

\*Since the introduction of responsible self-government prior to independence

\*\*Due to retire in 1986

## AFRICA'S LONGEST SERVING LEADERS



**Pres Habib Bourguiba**  
since 1956 (Tunisia)



**Pres Houphouët-Boigny**  
since 1959 (Ivory Coast)



**King Moshweshwe II**  
since 1960 (Lesotho)



**King Hassan II**  
since 1961 (Morocco)



**Pres Dawda Jawara**  
since 1962 (The Gambia)



**Pres Kamuzu Banda**  
since 1963 (Malawi)



**Pres Kenneth Kaunda**  
since 1964 (Zambia)



**Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan**  
since 1965 (Lesotho)



**Pres Lucas Mangope**  
since 1972 (Bophuthatswana)



**TABLE 14****RELATIVELY STABLE AND UNSTABLE GOVERNMENTS****A IN THE 42 STATES THAT BECAME INDEPENDENT BEFORE 1969****PEACEFUL OR NO CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE**

Country	Independence date	Number of coups	No change of government since (date)	Last change of leader	Comment (see also table 12)
1 South Africa*	1910	—	1948	1978	Dr Malan's National Party defeated Gen Smuts' United Party in 1948. Prime Minister Botha succeeded Prime Minister Vorster after Vorster had become president.
2 Tunisia	1956	—	1956	—	Life-Pres Bourguiba still in power (age 83).
3 Morocco*	1956	—	1956	1961	King Hassan II succeeded father (King Mohammed V) after his death.
4 Cameroon	1960	—	1960	1982	Pres Biya succeeded Pres Ahidjo after his retirement.
5 Ivory Coast	1960	—	1960	—	Pres Houphouët-Boigny still in power (age 80).
6 Senegal*	1960	—	1960	1980	Pres Diouf succeeded Pres Senghor after his retirement.
7 Tanzania	1961	—	1961	1985	Pres Mwinyi succeeded Pres Nyerere after his retirement in Oct 1985.
8 Kenya	1963	—	1963	1978	Pres Moi succeeded Pres Kenyatta after his death.
9 Malawi	1964	—	1964	—	Life-Pres Banda still in power (age 79).
10 Zambia	1964	—	1964	—	Pres Kaunda still in power (age 61).
11 The Gambia*	1965	—	1965	—	Pres Jawara still in power (age 61).
12 Botswana*	1966	—	1966	1980	Pres Masire succeeded Pres Khama after his death.
13 Lesotho*	1966	—	1966	—	Prime Minister Jonathan staged a bloodless coup to stay in power after his election defeat in 1970.
14 Swaziland	1968	—	1968	1983	Queen Regent Ntombi and Prime Minister Bhekimpi Dlamini appointed after their predecessors were dismissed by the Supreme Council.
15 Mauritius*	1968	—	1982	1982	Prime Minister Jugnauth's party defeated Prime Minister Ramgoolam's party in the first change of government after an election in Africa since 1967 (see table 16).

**NO VIOLENT CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT SINCE 1974**

Country	Independence date	Number of coups	No change of government since (date)	Last change of leader	Comment (see also table 12)
1 Egypt*	1922	2	1954**	1981	Pres Mubarak succeeded Pres Sadat after his assassination.
2 Libya	1951	1	1969**	1969	Head of State Gaddafi in power since dethronement of King Idris.
3 Togo	1960	2	1967**	1967	Pres Eyadema in power since deposition of Pres Grunitzky.
4 Madagascar	1960	1	1972**	1975	Pres Ratsiraka appointed by military government.
5 Zaïre	1960	1	1965**	1965	Pres Mobutu in power since deposition of Pres Kasavubu.
6 Somalia	1960	1	1969**	1969	Military take-over by Pres Barré after assassination of Pres Shermarke.
7 Mali	1960	1	1968**	1968	Pres Traore in power since deposition of Pres Keita.
8 Niger	1960	1	1974**	1974	Pres Kountché in power since deposition of Pres Diori.
9 Gabon	1960	2	1964**	1967	Short-lived military take-over of Pres Mba's government in 1964. Pres Bongo elected after Mba's death in 1967.
10 Sierra Leone	1960	2	1968**	1985	Prime Minister Stevens prevented from taking over government after election victory in 1967. Installed after second coup in 1968. Succeeded by Pres Joseph Mwinyi after his retirement in Oct 1985.
11 Benin	1960	5	1972**	1972	Relatively stable since military take-over by Pres Kerekou.
12 Algeria	1962	1	1965**	1979	Pres Chadli succeeded Pres Boumedienne after his death.
13 Rwanda	1962	1	1973**	1973	Pres Habyarimana in power since deposition of Pres Kayibanda.

*(Continued on next page)*

**TABLE 14** (Continued from previous page)**VIOLENT CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT UNTIL RECENTLY**

Country	Independence date	Number of coups	No change of government since (date)	Last change of leader	Comment (see also table 12)
1 Ethiopia	Ancient	3	1977**	1977	Head of State Mengistu in power since bloody purges by radicals in government. Civil war and widespread famine.
2 Liberia	1847	1	1980**	1980	Pres Doe overthrew Pres Tolbert in bloody take-over and announced return to civilian rule in 1986.
3 Sudan	1956	4	1985**	1985	Pres Nimeiry, in power since 1969, deposed in April 1985.
4 Ghana	1957	5	1981**	1981	Head of State Rawlings in power since 1981.
5 Guinea	1958	1	1984**	1984	Military coup by Col Conté terminated week-long rule by Pres Beavogui following death of Pres Toure (1984) who governed since 1958.
6 Burkina Faso	1960	4	1982**	1983	Capt Sankara succeeded Maj Ouedraogo in military purge by radicals.
7 Chad	1960	3	1982**	1982	Latest take-over in 20 years of civil war by Hissène Habré.
8 CAR	1960	3	1981**	1981	Pres Dacko (twice president) deposed by Gen Kolingba.
9 Congo	1960	3	1968**	1979	Pres Sassou-Nguesso in power since forced resignation of Pres Yhombi-Opango.
10 Nigeria	1960	5	1985**	1985	Military government of Gen Buhari, in power since 1983, overthrown in military coup by Gen Babangida.
11 Mauritania	1960	2	1984**	1984	Military government of Col Haidallah, in power since 1980, overthrown in military coup by Col Taya.
12 Burundi	1962	3	1976**	1976	Pres Bagaza in power since deposition of Pres Micombero.
13 Uganda	1962	5	1985**	1985	Pres Obote (twice president) deposed by Gen Okello.
14 Equatorial Guinea	1962	1	1979**	1979	Pres Mbasogo, in power since deposition of Pres Nguema, announced return to civilian rule in 1989.

**B IN THE 13 STATES THAT BECAME INDEPENDENT SINCE 1974**

Country	Independence date	Number of coups	No change of government since (date)	Last change of leader	Comment (see also table 12)
1 Guinea Bissau	1974	1	1980**	1980	Pres Vieira in power since deposition of Pres Cabral.
2 Mozambique	1975	—	1975	—	Pres Machel still in power. Civil war since independence.
3 Cape Verde	1975	—	1975	—	Pres Pereira still in power.
4 Comoros	1975	2	1978**	1978	Pres Abdallah returned to power with the help of mercenaries after being ousted in 1975.
5 Sao Tomé	1975	—	1975	—	Pres Da Costa still in power.
6 Angola	1975	—	1975	1979	Pres Dos Santos succeeded Pres Neto after his death. Civil war since independence.
7 Seychelles	1976	1	1977**	1977	Pres René deposed Pres Mancham with the help of external forces.
8 Transkei*	1976	—	1976	1979	Prime Minister Kaizer Matanzima became president. Due to retire in 1986.
9 Djibouti	1977	—	1977	—	Pres Gouled still in power.
10 Bophuthatswana	1977	—	1977	—	Pres Mangope still in power.
11 Venda*	1978	—	1978	—	Pres Mpephu still in power.
12 Zimbabwe*	1980	—	1980	—	Prime Minister Mugabe's government won 1985 election despite internal unrest since independence.
13 Ciskei	1981	—	1981	—	Pres Sebe still in power.

\*Multi-party states

\*\*Date of latest coup d'état



## SUCCESSFUL COUPS D'ETAT



TABLE 15

# AFRICA'S PRESENT LEADERS

## in order of seniority since first election or independence

<p><b>Habib Bourguiba</b>, born 1902. Life-President of Tunisia 1974, President 1957, Prime Minister March 1956, founder Neo Destour Party 1934 (journalist).</p> <p><b>Dr Felix Houphouët-Boigny</b>, born 1905. President of Ivory Coast Aug 1960, Prime Minister 1959, founder African Democratic Rally and of Democratic Party 1946 (physician).</p> <p><b>Moshweshwe II</b>, born 1938 as Constantine Bereng Seelso. King (Mothlotlehi) of Lesotho 1966, inaugurated 12 March 1960.</p> <p><b>Hassan II</b>, born 1929. King of Morocco Feb 1961 (succeeded King Mohammed V).</p> <p><b>Sir Dawda K Jawara</b>, born 1924. President of The Gambia 1970, Prime Minister 1962, founder People's Progressive Party 1960 (veterinary surgeon).</p> <p><b>Dr Kamuzu Banda</b>, born 1906. Life-President (Ngwazi) of Malawi 1971, President July 1966, Prime Minister of Malawi July 1964, Prime Minister of Nyasaland July 1963, first leader Congress Party 1960 (physician).</p> <p><b>Paramount Chief Kaizer D Matanzima</b>, born 1915. President of Transkei Oct 1976, Chief Minister Dec 1963, founder of TNIP 1964 (lawyer).</p> <p><b>Dr Kenneth K Kaunda</b>, born 1924. President of Zambia 1964, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia Jan 1964, leader ANCN(R) 1953, founder UNIP 1959 (teacher).</p> <p><b>Chief Leabua Jonathan</b>, born 1914. Prime Minister of Lesotho 1966, Prime Minister of Basutoland July 1965, founder National Party 1959 (administrator).</p> <p><b>Marshal Mobuto Sese Seko</b>, born 1930. President of Zaire Nov 1965, Commander in Chief Congolese Forces 1961 (journalist).</p> <p><b>Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema</b>, born 1937. President of Togo Jan 1967, Chief General of Staff 1965.</p> <p><b>Albert Bernard (Al Hadj Omar) Bongo</b>, born 1935. President of Gabon Dec 1967, Vice President 1967 (administrator).</p> <p><b>Brig-Gen Moussa Traoré</b>, born 1936. President of Mali Nov 1968, lieutenant Armed Forces College 1964.</p> <p><b>Col Muammar al-Gaddafi</b>, born 1942. Head of State of Libya Sept 1969, colonel Libyan Army 1965.</p> <p><b>Gen Siyad Barré</b>, born 1919. President of Somalia Oct 1969, Commander Somali Army 1966.</p> <p><b>Chief Lucas L M Mangope</b>, born 1927. President of Bophuthatswana Dec 1977, Chief Minister 1 June 1972, founder National Party 1972 and of Democratic Party 1974 (teacher).</p>	<p><b>Chief Lennox L W Sebe</b>, born 1926. President of Ciskei Dec 1981, Chief Minister 1 Aug 1972, founder CNIP 1973 (teacher).</p> <p><b>Brig-Gen Mathieu Kerekou</b>, born 1933. President of Benin Oct 1972, Deputy Chief of Staff 1970.</p> <p><b>Chief Patrick Mphephu</b>, born 1925. Life-President of Venda 1983, President Sept 1978, Chief Minister 1 Feb 1973, founder National Party 1973 (administrator).</p> <p><b>Maj-Gen Juvenal Habyarimana</b>, born 1937. President of Rwanda July 1973, Minister of Defence and Police 1965.</p> <p><b>Brig-Gen Seyni Kountché</b>, born 1931. President of Niger April 1974, Chief of Staff 1973.</p> <p><b>Lt-Cdr Didier Ratsiraka</b>, born 1936. President of Madagascar June 1975, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1972.</p> <p><b>Samora M Machel</b>, born 1933. President of Mozambique June 1975, leader Frelimo 1970.</p> <p><b>Aristides M Pereira</b>, born 1924. President of Cape Verde July 1975, leader PAIGC 1956.</p> <p><b>Manuel P da Costa</b>. President of Sao Tomé &amp; Príncipe July 1975, leader MLSTP 1972.</p> <p><b>Col Jean-Baptiste Bagaza</b>, born 1946. President of Burundi Nov 1976, previously Chief of Staff Armed Forces.</p> <p><b>Gen Mengistu Haile Mariam</b>, born 1937. Head of State of Ethiopia Feb 1976, first Vice President 1974.</p> <p><b>F Albert René</b>, born 1935. President of Seychelles June 1977, Prime Minister 1976, leader People's United Party 1964 (lawyer).</p> <p><b>Hassan Gouled Aptidon</b>, born 1916. President of Djibouti June 1977, leader African League for Independence 1967.</p> <p><b>Pieter Willem Botha</b>, born 1916. State President of South Africa Sept 1984, Prime Minister Sept 1978 (politician/administrator).</p> <p><b>Daniel arap Moi</b>, born 1924. President of Kenya Oct 1978, Vice President 1967 (teacher).</p> <p><b>Abdallah Abderemane</b>, born 1919. President of Comoros Oct 1978, also President in 1975 but deposed in coup (businessman).</p> <p><b>Col Benjeddid Chadli</b>, born 1929. President of Algeria Feb 1979, Minister of Defence 1978.</p> <p><b>Chief George Matanzima</b>, born 1918. Prime Minister of Transkei Feb 1979, Minister of Justice 1976 (lawyer).</p> <p><b>Col Denis Sassou-Nguesso</b>, born 1943. President of the Congo March 1979, Minister of Defence 1979.</p>	<p><b>Lt-Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo</b>. President of Equatorial Guinea Aug 1979, previously Deputy Minister of Defence/Chief of National Guard.</p> <p><b>José Eduardo dos Santos</b>, born 1942. President of Angola Sept 1979, Minister of Planning 1978, of Foreign Affairs 1975.</p> <p><b>C-in-C Samuel K Doe</b>, born 1952. Head of State of Liberia April 1980, previously Master-Sergeant Liberian Army.</p> <p><b>Rev Canaan S Banana</b>, born 1936. President of Zimbabwe April 1980. Nationalist leader (Wesleyan theologian).</p> <p><b>Robert G Mugabe</b>, born 1924. Prime Minister of Zimbabwe April 1980, leader Zanu-PF 1963 (teacher).</p> <p><b>Dr Quett K Masire</b>, born 1925. President of Botswana July 1980, Vice President/Minister of Finance 1966 (journalist/politician).</p> <p><b>Commr Joao B Vieira</b>, born 1939. President of Guinea Bissau Nov 1980, Chief State Commissioner (Prime Minister) 1978.</p> <p><b>Abdou Diouf</b>, born 1935. President of Senegal Jan 1981, Prime Minister 1970 (politician/administrator).</p> <p><b>Gen André Kolingba</b>. President of Central African Republic Sept 1981, Army Chief of Staff 1981.</p> <p><b>Lt-Gen M Hosni Mubarak</b>, born 1929. President of Egypt Oct 1981, Commander Air Force 1972, Vice President 1975.</p> <p><b>Flight-Lt Jerry Rawlings</b>, born 1947. Head of State of Ghana Dec 1981.</p> <p><b>Aneerood Jugnauth</b>, born 1930. Prime Minister of Mauritius June 1982, leader of Militant Movement until 1983 and since then of Militant Socialist Movement (lawyer).</p> <p><b>Hissène Habré</b>, born 1942. Head of State of Chad Oct 1982 (lawyer, soldier).</p> <p><b>Paul Biya</b>, born 1933. President of Cameroon Nov 1982, Prime Minister 1975 (lawyer).</p> <p><b>Prince Bhekimpfi Dlamini</b>. Prime Minister of Swaziland March 1983.</p> <p><b>Capt Thomas Sankara</b>, born 1949. Head of State of Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) Aug 1983.</p> <p><b>Queen (Ndlovukazi) Ntombi LaThwala</b>. Queen Regent of Swaziland Aug 1983, mother of Crown Prince (Umntfwana) Makhosetive born 1968.</p> <p><b>Col Lansana Conté</b>. Head of State of Guinea April 1984.</p> <p><b>Lt-Col Ahmed Ould Taya</b>, born 1936. Head of State of Mauritania Dec 1984.</p> <p><b>Gen Abdul Rahman Sowar al-Dahab</b>, born 1934. Head of State of Sudan April 1985.</p> <p><b>Maj-Gen Tito Okello</b>, born 1920. Head of State of Uganda July 1985.</p> <p><b>Maj-Gen Ibrahim Babangida</b>, born 1941. Head of State of Nigeria Aug 1985.</p>
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TABLE 16

## MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS

Country Independence date Dates of major constitutional changes	Political parties <sup>1</sup> and founding dates	Number of seats <sup>2</sup>	Last election and tenure of legislature (years)	Leaders and tenures of executive presidents <sup>3 10 11</sup>
<b>BOTSWANA</b> 1 1966 2 —	Democratic P (DP) 1962 National Front (NF) 1967 People's P (PP) 1960 Nominated	28 5 1 6 40	Sept 1984 (5 years)	Pres Quett Masire (5 years) Dr Kenneth Koma Dr Knight Maripe
<b>EGYPT</b> <sup>4</sup> 1 1922 2 1953/54/56/71/77	National Democratic P (NDP) 1978 New Wafd P (NWP) 1983	389 59 448	May 1984 (5 years)	Pres Hosni Mubarak (6 years) Fuad Serageddin
<b>GAMBIA, The</b> 1 1965 2 1970/82	People's Progressive P (PPP) 1958 National Convention P (NCP) 1975 Independents Nominated	27 3 5 14 49	May 1982 (5 years)	Pres Dawda Jawara (5 years) Sherif Dibba
<b>LESOTHO</b> <sup>5</sup> 1 1966 2 1970/73	National P (BNP) 1959 Congress P (BDP) 1952 Marema Tlou Freedom P (MTFP) 1962 United Democratic P (LUDP) 1967 United Democratic Alliance (UDA) 1984 Nominated	34 26    33 93	Jan 1970 (5 years)	P M Leabua Jonathan Ntsu Mokhehle Edwin Leanya Charles Mofeli Phoka Chaolane
<b>MAURITIUS</b> <sup>7</sup> 1 1968 2 1983	Mouvement socialiste militant (MSM) 1983 P mauricien social democrate (PMSD) 1963 P travailliste (PTR) 1936 Mouvement militant mauricien (MMM) 1970 Nominated	41   21 8 70	Aug 1983 (5 years)	P M Aneerood Jugnauth Sir Gaetan Duval Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam Paul Berenger
<b>MOROCCO</b> <sup>6</sup> 1 1956 2 1962/72/80	Constitutional Union (UC) 1982 National Independence Assembly (RNI) 1978 Popular Movement (MP) 1959 Istiqlal 1944 Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) 1959 National Democratic P (NDP) 1981 Other	83 61 47 41  36 24 14 306	Sept 1984 (6 years)	P M Maati Bouabid Ahmed Osman Mahjoubi Aherdene Mohammed Boucetta  Abderahim Bouabid Arsalani Al-Jadidi
<b>SENEGAL</b> 1 1960 2 1963/78	P socialiste (PSS) 1959 P démocratique (PDS) 1974 Rassemblement national démocratique (RND) 1976	111 8 1 120	Feb 1983 (5 years)	Pres Abdou Diouf (5 years) Abdoulaye Wade Anta Diop
<b>SOUTH AFRICA</b> <sup>8</sup> 1 1910 2 1934/61/84	<b>House of Assembly</b> National P (NP) 1914 Progressive Federal P (PFP) 1977 Conservative P (CP) 1982 New Republic P (NRP) 1977 <b>House of Representatives</b> Labour P (LP) 1965 Democratic Workers P (DWP) 1985 Freedom P (FP) <b>House of Delegates</b> National People's P (NPP) 1981 Solidarity 1984 Progressive Independent P (PIP) 1984 Independents	178 128 27 18 5 85 81 3 1 45 22 18 1 4	Apr 1981 (5 years)     Aug 1984 (5 years)  Aug 1984 (5 years)	Pres P W Botha (5 years) Dr F van Zyl Slabbert Dr Andries Treurnicht William Sutton  Rev Allan Hendrickse D T de la Cruz Arthur Booysen  Amichand Rajbansi Dr J N Reddy Faiz Kahn
<b>SWA/NAMIBIA</b> <sup>9</sup> 1 Dependent 2 1977/79/85	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) 1977 Labour P (LP) National P (NP) Rehoboth Free Democratic P (RFDP) SWA National Union (Swanu) 1959 Swapo Democrats (Swapo-D) 1978	22 8 8 8 8 8 62		Kuaima Riruako/Dirk Mudge David Bezuidenhout Jacobus Pretorius Hans Diergaardt Moses Katjiuanga Andreas Shipanga

(Continued on next page)

**TABLE 16** (Continued from previous page)

Country Independence date Dates of major constitutional changes	Political parties <sup>1</sup> and founding dates	Number of seats <sup>2</sup>	Last election and tenure of legislature (years)	Leaders and tenures of executive presidents <sup>3 10 11</sup>
<b>TRANSKEI</b> <sup>10</sup> 1 1976 2 —	National Independence P (TNIP) 1964 Democratic Progressive P (DPP) 1979 Nominated	74 1 75 150	Sept 1981 (5 years)	P M George Matanzima Caledon Mda
<b>VENDA</b> 1 1978 2 —	National P (VNP) 1973  National Independence P (VNIP) 1973 Nominated	41  4 46 91	1983 (5 years)	Life-Pres Patrick Mphahlele (5 years) Gilbert Bakane
<b>ZIMBABWE</b> <sup>11</sup> 1 1980 2 —	African National Union (Zanu) 1963 African People's Union (Zapu) 1962 Conservative Alliance (CAZ) 1984 Independent Group (IZG) 1985 Independent Zanu-Sithole 1977	64 15 15 4 1 1 100	Jul 1985 (5 years)	P M Robert Mugabe Joshua Nkomo Ian Smith William Irvine Chris Anderson Ndabaningi Sithole

**NOTES:**

- 1 Political parties represented in the legislatures.
- 2 State of the parties at the last election.
- 3 The executive presidents of Egypt, The Gambia and Senegal are directly elected by the electorates and those of Botswana, South Africa and Venda indirectly by the legislatures.
- 4 Egypt: last presidential election, October 1981.
- 5 Lesotho: constitution suspended and parliament dissolved in January 1970. Since 1973 members of the National Assembly have been nominated by the government, including 26 representatives of various opposition parties. Mr Gerard Ramoreboli leads the Congress Party in parliament while the leader, Mr Mokhehle, is in exile.
- 6 Morocco: the king appoints members of the Chamber of Representatives (parliament) to his government at his discretion. Two-thirds of the members are directly elected and one-third by an electoral college composed by local governments and employers' and employees' representatives.
- 7 Mauritius: the governing coalition comprises the MSM, PMSD and PTR.
- 8 South Africa: the term of the House of Assembly has been extended to 1989. The parliamentary representative of the People's Congress Party is Mr D T de la Cruz.
- 9 SWA/Namibia: the parties nominate representatives to the National Assembly as was agreed by the participants at the Multi-Party Conference (Nov 1983–June 1985). The DTA is an alliance of 11 political parties.
- 10 Transkei has a ceremonial president (currently Pres Kaiser Matanzima) serving seven-year terms.
- 11 Zimbabwe has a ceremonial president (currently Pres Canaan Banana) serving six-year terms.

**SOURCES:** 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 28.**HIGHEST MOUNTAINS**

Mountain	Country	Height (m)
KILIMANDJARO	Tanzania	5 802
KENYA	Kenya	5 117
RUWENZORI	Rwanda	5 029
RAS DASHAN	Ethiopia	4 547
MERU	Tanzania	4 493
ELGON	Uganda	4 253



## POLITICAL PARTIES




TABLE 17

**ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS**  
**(also no-party systems)**

Country 1 Independence date 2 Major constitutional changes	Political party 1 Founding date 2 Introduction of one-party system	Seats in legislature	Last election and tenure of 1 president 2 legislature	Method of presidential election <sup>1</sup>
<b>ALGERIA</b> 1 1962 2 1963/65/76/79	Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) <sup>7</sup> 1954 1963	281	1984 (5 yrs) 1982 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>ANGOLA</b> 1 1975 2 1980	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Parti de Trabalho (MPLA-PT) <sup>7</sup> 1956 1975	223	1980 1980	Indirect
<b>BENIN</b> 1 1960 2 1965/70/72/77	Parti de la Révolution Populaire (PRP) <sup>7</sup> 1975 1975	336	1984 (5 yrs) 1984 (5 yrs)	Indirect
<b>BOPHUTHATSWANA</b> 1 1977 2 ..	Democratic Party (DP) 1974 <i>De facto</i> since 1982 election	105	1982 (5 yrs) 1982 (5 yrs)	Indirect
<b>BURUNDI</b> 1 1962 2 1966/76/81	Unité pour le Progrès National (Uprona) 1958 1966	65	1982 (5 yrs) 1982 (5 yrs)	Indirect
<b>CAMEROON</b> 1 1960 2 1972/75	Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple (RDPC) 1985 <i>De facto</i> since 1966	120	1980 (5 yrs) 1983 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>CAPE VERDE</b> <sup>2</sup> 1 1975 2 1981	Partido Africano da Independencia da Cabo Verde (PAICV) <sup>7</sup> 1981 1975	56	1980 (5 yrs) 1980 (5 yrs)	Indirect
<b>CISKEI</b> 1 1981 2 ..	National Independence Party (CNIP) 1973 <i>De facto</i> since 1980	89	1981 (5 yrs) 1978 (5 yrs)	Indirect
<b>COMOROS</b> 1 1975 2 1978/79/82	Union Comorienne pour le Progrès (UCP) 1979 1979	38	1984 (6 yrs) 1982 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>CONGO</b> 1 1960 2 1968/73/79	Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT) <sup>7</sup> 1969 1969	153	1984 (5 yrs) 1984 (5 yrs)	Indirect
<b>DJIBOUTI</b> 1 1977 2 1977/81	Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP) 1979 1981	65	1981 (6 yrs) 1982 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>ETHIOPIA</b> <sup>3</sup> 1 Ancient 2 1931/74/84	Ethiopian Workers' Party (EWP) <sup>7</sup> 1984 1984	—	None	
<b>GABON</b> 1 1960 2 1967/75/81	Parti Démocratique Gabonais (PDG) 1968 1968	93	1979 (7 yrs) 1985 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>GUINEA BISSAU</b> <sup>2</sup> 1 1974 2 1980/84	Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) <sup>7</sup> 1956 1974	150	1984 1984	Indirect
<b>IVORY COAST</b> 1 1960 2 1971/75	Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) 1946 <i>De facto</i> since 1960	147	1985 (5 yrs) 1985 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>KENYA</b> 1 1963 2 1964/69/82	Kenya African National Union (Kanu) 1960 1982	172	1983 (5 yrs) 1983 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>LIBYA</b> <sup>4</sup> 1 1951 2 1969/77	No political parties permitted since 1977	—	1977 1977	Indirect

(Continued on next page)



TABLE 17 (Continued from previous page)

Country 1 Independence date 2 Major constitutional changes	Political party 1 Founding date 2 Introduction of one-party system	Seats in legislature	Last election and tenure of 1 president 2 legislature	Method of presidential election <sup>1</sup>
<b>MADAGASCAR</b> <sup>5</sup> 1 1960 2 1975	Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution Socialiste (FNDR) <sup>7</sup> 1976 1977	137	1982 (7 yrs) 1983 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>MALAWI</b> <sup>6</sup> 1 1964 2 1966/70	Congress Party (MCP) 1959 1966	102	See note (5 yrs) 1983 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>MALI</b> 1 1960 2 1979/81	Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM) 1979 1974	82	1985 (6 yrs) 1985 (3 yrs)	Direct
<b>MOZAMBIQUE</b> 1 1975 2 1977	Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo) <sup>7</sup> 1962 1975	210	1977 1977	Indirect
<b>RWANDA</b> 1 1962 2 1973/78	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) 1975 1975	64	1983 (5 yrs) 1982	Direct
<b>SAO TOMÉ</b> 1 1975 2 ..	Movimento de Liberacao de Sao Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP) <sup>7</sup> 1972 1975	40	1983 (4 yrs) 1983 (4 yrs)	Indirect
<b>SEYCHELLES</b> 1 1976 2 1977/79	People's Progressive Front (SPPF) <sup>7</sup> 1978 1978	25	1984 (5 yrs) 1984 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b> 1 1961 2 1971/78	All-People's Congress (APC) 1960 1978	104	1978 (7 yrs) 1982 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>SOMALIA</b> 1 1960 2 1969/79	Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) 1976 1976	127	1980 (6 yrs) 1985 (5 yrs)	Indirect
<b>SWAZILAND</b> 1 1968 2 1973/78	No political parties permitted since 1973	50	Monarchy 1983 (5 yrs)	—
<b>TANZANIA</b> 1 1961 2 1962/65/77/79	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) <sup>7</sup> 1977 1965	239	1985 (5 yrs) 1985 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>TOGO</b> 1 1960 2 1967/79	Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) 1969 1969		1979 (7 yrs) 1985 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>TUNISIA</b> <sup>6</sup> 1 1956 2 1957/59/81	Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD) 1934 <i>De facto</i> since 1981 election	136	See note 1981 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>ZAIRE</b> 1 1960 2 1965/70/71/78	Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) 1967 1970	310	1984 (7 yrs) 1982 (5 yrs)	Direct
<b>ZAMBIA</b> 1 1964 2 1973	United National Independence Party (Unip) 1959 1972	135	1983 (5 yrs) 1983 (5 yrs)	Direct

## NOTES:

- 1 Directly elected by the electorate or indirectly elected by the legislature or an electoral college of the legislature.
- 2 Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau shared one party (PAIGC) until 1981 when the former withdrew and founded the PAICV.
- 3 Ethiopia: the monarchy was overthrown in 1974 and no legislative body has been installed yet.
- 4 Libya has a nominated legislature (General People's Congress) composed of representatives of local and regional people's congresses, popular committees, trade unions and vocational

syndicates.

- 5 Madagascar: the FNDR is a grouping of some seven parties including the dominant *Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache* (Arema) which is led by President Ratsiraka.
- 6 The current presidents of Malawi and Tunisia have been elected for life; Pres Banda in 1971 and Pres Bourguiba in 1975.
- 7 Marxist-Leninist and radical socialist parties.

SOURCES: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 28.

TABLE 18

## MILITARY GOVERNMENTS

Country and date of independence	Major constitutional changes	Latest change of government	Remarks
<b>BURKINA FASO</b> 1960	1970/74/77/80	Aug 1983	Maj Ouedraogo's military government overthrown by Capt Thomas Sankara.
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REP</b> 1960	1966/76/79/81	Sept 1981	Pres Dacko deposed by Gen Kolingba prior to reintroduction of civilian rule.
<b>CHAD</b> 1960	1975/79/82	Oct 1982	Pres Oueddei ousted by Hissène Habré during civil war.
<b>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</b> 1968	1973/79/82	Aug 1979	Pres Nguema's dictatorship overthrown by Lt-Col Nguema Mbasogo. Return to civilian rule envisaged for 1989.
<b>GHANA</b> 1957	1960/64/66/69/72/79/81	Dec 1981	Civilian government of Pres Hilla Limann overthrown by Flight-Lt Jerry Rawlings.
<b>GUINEA</b> 1958	1963/82/84	Apr 1984	Pres Touré's successor, Lansana Beavogui, deposed by Col Lansana Conté.
<b>LIBERIA</b> 1847	1945/47/75/80	Apr 1980	Pres Tolbert and ministers killed in coup led by Master-Sgt Samuel Doe. Return to civilian rule planned for 1986.
<b>MAURITANIA</b> 1960	1978/80	Dec 1984	Pres Haidalla's military government overthrown by Lt-Col Ould Taya.
<b>NIGER</b> 1960	1974	Apr 1974	Pres Diori's civilian government overthrown by Col Seyni Kountché.
<b>NIGERIA</b> 1960	1963/79/83	Aug 1985	Gen Buhari's military government overthrown by Maj-Gen Ibrahim Babangida.
<b>SUDAN</b> 1956	1969/73	Apr 1985	Pres Gafar al-Nimeiry's civilian government deposed in coup staged by Gen Sower al-Dahab.
<b>UGANDA</b> 1962	1963/67/71/80/85	July 1985	Pres Obote's civilian government overthrown in coup led by Lt-Gen Tito Okello.

SOURCES: 1, 2, 4, 6, 28.

## LONGEST RIVERS

River	km	Drainage basin (km <sup>2</sup> )
NILE*	6 671	2 800 000
ZAIRE (Congo)	4 650	3 700 000
NIGER	4 262	2 000 000
ZAMBEZI	2 720	1 300 000
ORANGE	2 030	1 000 000


\*The Nile is the longest river in the world.



# Organisation of African Unity

Founded in May 1963 to co-ordinate policies of independent African states

Headquarters: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



## AIMS OF THE OAU

- 1 To promote unity and solidarity among African states.
- 2 To intensify and co-ordinate efforts to improve living standards in Africa.
- 3 To defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states.
- 4 To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.
- 5 To promote international co-operation in keeping with the charter of the UN.

## LIBERATION COMMITTEE

(Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation Movements in Africa)  
 Headquarters Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
 Regional offices Maputo, Lusaka, Luanda  
 Founded 1963 to provide financial and military aid to recognised insurgency movements.

## Specialised agencies

### SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND RESEARCH COMMISSION

Lagos, Nigeria  
 Formerly Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa (CCTA)

### ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN TRADE UNION UNITY

Accra, Ghana

### PAN-AFRICAN POSTAL UNION

Arusha, Tanzania

### PAN-AFRICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION

Kinshasa, Zaïre

### UNION OF AFRICAN RAILWAYS

Kinshasa, Zaïre

### AFRICAN CIVIL AVIATION COMMISSION

Dakar, Senegal

### SUPREME COUNCIL FOR SPORTS IN AFRICA

Yaounde, Cameroon

### PAN-AFRICAN NEWS AGENCY

Dakar, Senegal. Regional offices Tripoli, Khartoum, Lagos, Kinshasa, Lusaka

TABLE 19

## 22 YEARS OF THE OAU

With many African colonies attaining their independence – especially during 1960 – the desire for unity led to several attempts at establishing an inter-African organization.

Through the efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, representing the Monrovia Group of African states, and President Sekou Touré of Guinea, acting on behalf of the Casablanca Group, the leaders of 32 independent African states were brought together at Addis Ababa in May 1963. After two days of speeches, a charter creating the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was approved on 25 May.

The charter was signed within half an hour the next day as 30 heads of state and prime ministers mounted the podium in groups of four to non-stop thunderous applause. Morocco and Togo ratified the charter at a later stage. The emperor, who acted as chairman, expressed the hope that this continental union "may last a thousand years".

During the next decades many states joined the OAU as they became independent and currently the total membership stands at 50, including the independent mainland and island states as well as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) which is administered by Morocco as an integral part of its territory. African states not belonging to the OAU are Morocco, which left after the Western Sahara's government-in-exile was admitted, as well as the republics of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.

Of the 32 leaders who signed the charter in 1963 only three are still ruling their countries (King Hassan and presidents Bourguiba and Houphouët-Boigny). Among those who fell victim to military take-overs through the years, were founding fathers of the OAU like Emperor Haile Selassie and President Kwame Nkrumah.

Apart from disputes between member states, refugee matters, United Nations' issues, security, and socio-economic problems, the topics of recurrent interest at the OAU have included the decolonization of the Portuguese African provinces, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South West Africa (Namibia), and South Africa's internal problems.

From the outset the OAU laid the basis for action against white-controlled governments in southern Africa by setting up a Liberation Committee and a special fund to support insurgency movements. In addition, all member states were called upon to refrain from maintaining, inter alia, diplomatic, trade, and transport links with South Africa. Although this programme is at present in full operation, numerous African states have ignored it for practical reasons.

## ASSEMBLIES OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

- 1 JULY 1964, CAIRO. Chairman: Pres Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.  
Reaffirmation of the principle of "strict respect" for the colonial boundaries inherited at independence; verbal clash between Presidents Nyerere and Nkrumah over

the latter's concept of a "United States of Africa", border dispute between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya; Prime Minister Moise Tshombe of Congo Kinshasa (Zaire) boycotted conference because of "antagonism" against him; Holden Roberto of FNLA recognized as "legitimate" leader of Angola. Pres Banda explained Malawi's relations with South Africa; finally resolved that Addis Ababa and not Accra would be the headquarters of the OAU.

- 2 OCTOBER 1965, ACCRA. Chairman: Pres Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.  
Eight presidents of French-speaking states boycotted the conference because of Nkrumah's support for subversive elements within these states; other main issues were outside interference in Congo Kinshasa, instability in southern Sudan and developments in Rhodesia.
- 3 NOVEMBER 1966, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Emp Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.  
Concern over unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia a year ago; only 18 heads of state attended; Nkrumah had disappeared from scene after military take-over.
- 4 SEPTEMBER 1967, KINSHASA. Chairman: Pres Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.  
Concern over Biafran secessionist war in Nigeria, over war between Egypt and Israel (June 1967), over foreign mercenaries in Zaire and over incidents across the borders between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia; UN Secretary-General U Thant attended to help salvage "crumbling image" of OAU.
- 5 SEPTEMBER 1968, ALGIERS. Chairman: Pres Houari Boumedienne of Algeria.  
Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Zambia had previously recognized Col Ojukwu's secessionist Biafra (eastern Nigeria) and, after a stormy debate, voted against resolution calling for support for the Nigerian Federal Government of Gen Gowon.
- 6 SEPTEMBER 1969, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Pres Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon.  
Confirmation of the *Manifesto on Southern Africa* signed at Lusaka in April 1969.
- 7 SEPTEMBER 1970, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Pres Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.  
Reconciliation between Nigeria and countries which had supported Biafra; Kaunda requested to lead OAU delegation to Western countries supplying arms to South Africa in order to dissuade them from doing so.
- 8 JUNE 1971, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Pres Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania.  
Ivory Coast, Gabon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, and Mauritius voted in favour of dialogue with South Africa; Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Swaziland, Togo, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) abstained; Pres Houphouët-Boigny maintained that the use of force was not the solution to the problems of South Africa.

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**TABLE 19** (Continued from previous page)

- 9** JUNE 1972, RABAT. Chairman: King Hassan of Morocco. Concern over mass massacre of Hutus in Burundi and over civil war in Chad; end of civil war in southern Sudan; reconciliation between Senegal and Guinea; aid to Liberation Committee increased by 50 per cent; new policy reinsurgency movements aimed at helping only those who had proved themselves to be the strongest.
- 10** MAY 1973, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Pres Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria. Discussion of Somalia's claims on Ethiopian territory and conflict between Rwanda and Burundi; concern over economic problems, especially in view of the rising oil price; Col Gaddafi's proposal that OAU headquarters be moved elsewhere because "Ethiopia is not a free country" rejected.
- 11** JUNE 1974, MOGADISHU. Chairman: Pres Siyad Barré of Somalia. Black African states demonstrated solidarity with Arab states by their severance of diplomatic relations with Israel after October War in 1973, calls on members to get South Africa expelled from United Nations General Assembly; resignation of OAU Secretary-General Ekangaki after criticism of his relations with transnational company, Lonrho.
- 12** AUGUST 1975, KAMPALA. Chairman: Pres Idi Amin of Uganda. Several heads of state boycotted the conference because, as Pres Nyerere explained, "by meeting in Kampala, we are giving respectability to one of the most murderous administrations in Africa"; it was noted that the struggle for independence in the Portuguese colonies was over; the *Dar es Salaam Declaration* of April 1975 providing a dual strategy with regard to Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa was ratified (peaceful methods if possible, but armed struggle if inevitable); calls on France to withdraw from Mayotte in Comoro Archipelago; Emperor Haile Selassie had disappeared from the scene and there was a break in diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Ethiopia.
- JANUARY 1976, ADDIS ABABA. Extraordinary assembly. Chairman: Pres Amin. The conference ended in stalemate on 13 January after 22 members had voted in favour of recognizing the MPLA regime in Angola while 22 were in favour of a government of national unity; Uganda (chairman) and Ethiopia (host) abstained; by February a majority of member states had recognized the MPLA government and Angola was admitted as a member.
- 13** JULY 1976, PORT LOUIS. Chairman: Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius. Outgoing chairman Amin left early to negotiate with Palestinian highjackers who were holding some 100 Israeli hostages at Entebbe Airport; the freeing of the hostages by Israeli forces on 4 July condemned by OAU as an "act of aggression"; Pres Nimeiry arrived late due to an attempted coup in Sudan; acrimonious debate between Somalia and Ethiopia on future of Djibouti; France condemned for its continuous presence on Mayotte Island; Western Sahara issue remained unresolved after Morocco and Mauritania had taken over the territory from Spain in February 1976; much attention devoted to South Africa where Soweto riots had occurred on 16 June; member states were ordered not to recognize Transkei and other parts of South Africa that were due to become independent states.
- MARCH 1977, CAIRO. Joint conference of OAU and Arab League. Arab oil-producing states agree to increase their aid to African countries and to participate in joint development projects.
- 14** JULY 1977, LIBREVILLE. Chairman: Pres Omar Bongo of Gabon. Support for efforts of five Western members of UN Security Council to negotiate peaceful solution in Namibia while continuing OAU aid for Swapo; Pres Kaunda's advice accepted that Nkomo's and Mugabe's Patriotic Front in Rhodesia be recognized; concern over invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province in March 1977 by insurgents from Angola; discussion of Libya's occupation of northern Chad, and the Western Sahara issue.
- 15** JULY 1978, KHARTOUM. Chairman: Pres Gafaar al Nimeiry of Sudan. Aftermath of the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia (Sept 1977-March 1978) and second Shaba invasion (May 1978); Comoros expelled from this session because mercenaries helped to reinstall Abdallah government; moderate leaders responded to criticism of French and United States intervention in Africa by strongly attacking Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola and Ethiopia; moderates also urged that all the Rhodesian parties should participate in an election in order to avoid a repetition of the "Angolan debacle".
- 16** JULY 1979, MONROVIA. Chairman: Pres William Tolbert of Liberia. Controversy over Tanzania's role in the overthrow of Idi Amin by invading Uganda (Oct 1978-April 1979); walkout by delegations of Arab African states during Pres Sadat's explanation of Egypt's peace agreement with Israel (27 March 1979); Mauritania's new military government (after coup which deposed Pres Daddah) withdrew from Western Sahara in July 1979 and it was noted with concern that Mauritania's sector had been annexed by Morocco.
- APRIL 1980, LAGOS. Extraordinary assembly on economic affairs. Acting chairman, Pres Senghor of Senegal as Pres Tolbert had been killed during recent military coup in Liberia; Secretary-General Edem Kodjo warned that "Africa is dying . . ."; *Lagos Plan of Action* adopted to prevent Africa's economic collapse.

(Continued on next page)

**TABLE 19** (Continued from previous page)

**17** JULY 1980, FREETOWN. Chairman: Pres Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone.  
Western Sahara's government-in-exile recognized by majority (26) of OAU member states; Morocco and other moderate members threatened to leave OAU if Western Sahara (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic) were admitted as a member state; Zimbabwe had joined as the 50th member state.

**18** JUNE 1981, NAIROBI. Chairman: Pres Daniel arap Moi of Kenya.  
Morocco agreed to hold referendum in Western Sahara to decide on future of the territory; establishment of OAU peace-keeping force in Chad; controversy over decision to hold next session in Libya; OAU *Charter of Human Rights* adopted.

AUGUST AND NOVEMBER 1982, TRIPOLI.

A quorum of 34 member states could not be assembled because 19 states boycotted the meeting as a result of Secretary-General Kodjo's decision to admit the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member. In November another effort to achieve a quorum failed because of the dispute concerning which delegation from Chad – that of the new Habré government or that of deposed Goukouni Oueddei – should be recognized as representing Chad.

**19** JUNE 1983, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Pres Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia.  
Libya boycotted the conference but the voluntary withdrawal of the SADR delegation ended the boycott by 22 member states and a quorum was obtained; however, the Western Sahara and Chad issues remained unresolved.

**20** NOVEMBER 1984, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Pres Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.  
As the SADR delegation was admitted, Morocco announced its withdrawal from the OAU and Zaire "suspended" its membership; Pres Machel explained Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa.

**21** JULY 1985, ADDIS ABABA. Chairman: Pres Abdou Diouf of Senegal.  
Extensive debate on Africa's socio-economic problems and review of Lagos Plan of Action (1980); adoption of *Addis Ababa Declaration*, including a 5-year economic programme to accelerate implementation of Lagos Plan; emphasis placed on rehabilitation of Africa's drought-ravaged agriculture and on easing of repayment terms for member states' escalating debts which have reached figure of \$170 billion; noted that OAU Charter of Human Rights (1981) had up to now been ratified by only 15 member states.

**SOURCES:** 2, 4, 18

#### SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE OAU


1964-72	Dialo Telli (Guinea)
1972-74	Nzo Ekangaki (Cameroon)
1974-78	William Eteki M'Boumoua (Cameroon)
1978-83	Edem Kodjo (Togo)
1983-85	Peter Onu (Nigeria) (Acting)
1985-	Ide Oumarou (Niger)



The incwala feast of the first fruits – an annual rite of kingship among the Swazi.




# MAJOR TERRITORIAL AND BORDER DISPUTES, 1956 - 1985



# 3

## UNITED NATIONS

**Total membership: 159 (1985) Main budget \$1587 million 1984/85**





## AFRICAN MILITARY POWERS AND LINKAGES

**SOUTHERN AFRICA****ANGOLA**

Military links with the USSR (treaty of friendship Oct 1976; and military co-operation agreements including one signed May 1983). Cuba and East Germany who respectively maintain some 700, 19 000 and 450 men in Angola.

Armed forces currently employed against Unita forces numbering 15 000 regulars and a militia of 20 000 men.

*Total permanent force:* 43 000

*Army:* 40 000

*Air force:* 1 500 (64 combat aircraft, 10 armed helicopters)

*Navy:* 1 500 (30 vessels based at Luanda, Lobito, Mocamedes)

*Expenditure (estimated):* \$800 m (1981)

*Para-military forces:* Militia 10 000 OPD 500 000

**MOZAMBIQUE**

Military links with the USSR (treaty of friendship March 1977) Cuba, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and China PR. Armed forces currently employed against the Renamo movement numbering some 6 000 trained and 3 000 reserve men.

*Total permanent force:* 15 650 (excl 200 Tanzanians, 600 Zimbabweans)

*Army:* 14 000 (perhaps 75% conscripts)

*Air force:* 1 000 (35 combat aircraft)

*Navy:* 650 (14 coastal patrol craft at Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Pemba and Metangula)

*Expenditure (estimated):* \$196,721 m (1982)

**SOUTH AFRICA**

Mandatory arms embargo by UN Security Council against RSA since 1977. Armed forces currently employed against Swapo insurgents on SWA/Namibia border.

*Total armed forces:* 83 400 (53 000 conscripts). Total mobile strength 404 500

*Army:* 67 400 (including 50 000 conscripts)

*Air force:* 10 000 (1 000 conscripts); (304 combat aircraft, 10 armed helicopters); reserve citizen force: 25 000

*Navy:* 6 000 (incl 900 marines, 2 300 conscripts); bases at Simonstown and Durban; reserve citizen force 2 000

*Para-military forces:* commandos 90 000, police 35 500, police reserves 20 000

*Expenditure (estimated):* \$2,700 billion (1983/84)

**ZAMBIA**

Military links with the United Kingdom, arms deals with USSR since 1980.

*Total permanent force:* 14 300

*Army:* 12 500

*Air force:* 1 800; (44 combat aircraft)

*Para-military forces:* 1 200 (police mobile unit 700, police para-military unit 500)

*Expenditure (estimated):* \$325,877 m (1981)

**ZIMBABWE**

Military links with United Kingdom, North Korea (100 trainers), Mozambique. Troops deployed against Renamo rebels.

*Total armed forces:* 41 300

*Army:* 40 000

*Air force:* 1 300 (35 combat aircraft)

*Para-military forces:* Police force 10 000, police support unit 3 000; national militia 20 000

*Expenditure:* \$458,585 m (1983/84 budget)

**CENTRAL AFRICA****ZAIRE**

Military links with France, Belgium, Israel, USA (1972), China PR (under a 1982 sales credit). Military intervention in the civil war in Chad as part of an inter-African peace-keeping force, with 2 000 paratroopers.

*Total armed forces:* 26 000

*Army:* 22 000

*Navy:* 1 500 (51 vessels based at Banana, Matadi, Kinshasa [river] and Kalémié [lake])

*Air force:* 2 500 (39 combat aircraft)

*Para-military forces:* Gendarmerie 22 000

*Expenditure:* \$149,643 m (1980)

**EASTERN AFRICA****ETHIOPIA**

Military links with USA (1975 – now in abeyance), USSR (November 1978 treaty of friendship and military co-operation agreement), Libya, Djibouti, South Yemen (1981), Cuba, Kenya, East Germany (friendship treaty). Some 1 400 Soviet and 3 000 Cuban and 250 East German technicians and advisers deployed against internal rebel movements. Soviet navy has facilities at the Dahlak Islands.

*Total armed forces:* 306 000

*Army:* including people's militia 30 000

*Navy:* 2 500 (22 vessels at Massawa and Assab)

*Air force:* 3 500 (160 combat aircraft, 24 armed helicopters)

*Para-military forces:* 169 000; mobile emergency police force of 9 000 included.

*Expenditure:* \$439,610 m (1981/82)

**KENYA**

Military links with the United Kingdom, USA (1980), friendship treaty with Ethiopia (Jan 1979). Agreement with Somalia to curb border incursions (1981). USA has limited access to naval and air facilities.

*Total armed forces:* 13 650

*Army:* 13 000

*Navy:* 650 (7 vessels at Mombasa base)

*Air force:* disbanded in 1982

*Para-military forces:* Police 1 800

*Expenditure (estimated):* \$239,630 m (1982/83)

**SOMALIA**

Military links with the USSR abrogated in Nov 1977; USA (access to naval and air facilities). Military equipment from Saudi Arabia, Iran, USA. Friendship treaty with Djibouti (1981); agreement with Kenya in 1981 to control border incursions.

*Total armed forces:* 62 550

*Army:* 60 000

*Navy:* 550 (16 vessels at Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayu)

*Air force:* 2 000 (64 combat aircraft)

*Para-military forces:* 29 500

*Expenditure:* \$148,211 m (1984)

**TANZANIA**

Military links with China PR, United Kingdom, Uganda, Mozambique. Deployed forces against Uganda's Amin regime in 1979-1980.

*Total permanent force:* 40 350

*Army:* 38 500

*Navy:* 850 (24 vessels at Dar-es-Salaam and Zanzibar)

*Air force:* 1 000 (39 combat aircraft)

*Forces abroad:* Mozambique 200, Seychelles 120

*Para-military forces:* Police 1 400, citizen's militia 50 000

*Expenditure (estimated):* \$307,314 m (1982/83)

**WEST AFRICA****GHANA**

Military links with USA and United Kingdom. Member of Ecomog intervention or peace-keeping force (May 1981).

*Total armed forces:* 12 600

*Army:* 10 000

*Navy:* 1 200 (18 vessels at Sekondi and Tema)

*Air force:* 1 400 (10 combat aircraft)

*Para-military forces:* 5 000

*Expenditure:* \$158 m (1980)

(Continued on next page)

**TABLE 20** (Continued from previous page)

<p><b>NIGERIA</b>  Military links with United Kingdom, USA and arms deals with USSR.  Deployed troops in 1981 in Chadian civil war.  <i>Total armed forces:</i> 133 000  <i>Army:</i> 120 000  <i>Navy:</i> 4 000 (68 vessels at Apapa, Calabar)  <i>Air force:</i> 9 000 (42 combat aircraft)  <i>Expenditure:</i> \$1,240 billion (1984)</p> <p><b>NORTH AFRICA</b></p> <p><b>ALGERIA</b>  Military links with Libya (agreement 1975), arms deals with the USSR.  Arms supplier to Polisario in Western Sahara.  <i>Total permanent force:</i> 130 000  <i>Army:</i> 110 000  <i>Navy:</i> 8 000 (25 vessels at Algiers, Annaba Mers el Kebir)  <i>Air force:</i> 12 000  <i>Para-military forces:</i> 24 000  <i>Expenditure (estimated):</i> \$877,046 m (1983) – excludes equipment expenditure</p> <p><b>EGYPT</b>  Military links with USA, United Kingdom, China PR (1978/79 and 1983), Sudan and Morocco, arms deals with France. Agreement in 1981 enables USA to use Egyptian bases, friendship treaty with USSR (1971) abrogated in March 1976. Forces deployed against Israel June 1967 and Oct 1973. Forces in Iraq, Oman, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire.  <i>Total permanent force:</i> 460 000 (255 000 conscripts)  <i>Army:</i> 315 000 (180 000 conscripts, 300 000 reserves)  <i>Navy:</i> 33 000 (15 000 conscripts, 1 500 reserves) (120 vessels at Alexandria, Port Said, Mersa Matruh, Port Tewfig, Hurghada and Safaqa)  <i>Air force:</i> 27 000 (10 000 conscripts, 20 000 reserves); (504 combat aircraft)  <i>Para-military forces:</i> 139 000  <i>Expenditure:</i> \$3,715 billion (1984/85)</p> <p><b>LIBYA</b>  Military links with the USSR, Syria, Algeria, arms deals with France. Treaties of friendship signed with Bulgaria and Romania (Jan 1983)</p>	<p>and North Korea (1982). Supplier of arms to Polisario in Western Sahara. Forces abroad in Chad (7 000), Lebanon (800).  <i>Total permanent force:</i> 73 000  <i>Army:</i> 58 000  <i>Navy:</i> 65 000 (56 vessels at Benghazi, Damah, Tubruq, Bandiyan)  <i>Air force:</i> 8 500 (535 combat aircraft, 42 armed helicopters)  <i>Para-military forces:</i> 10 000, and people's militia 40 000  <i>Expenditure (estimated):</i> \$709,22 million (1982)</p> <p><b>MOROCCO</b>  Military links with Spain, USA, France, Egypt, arms deals with USSR, South Africa, Egypt. Forces deployed against Polisario in Western Sahara annexed by Morocco in 1976. Assisted Zaire during two Shaba interventions. Forces abroad in Equatorial Guinea 300.  <i>Total permanent force:</i> 144 000  <i>Army:</i> 125 000  <i>Navy:</i> 6 000 (26 vessels at Casablanca, Safi, Agadir, Kenitra, Tangier)  <i>Air force:</i> 13 000 (106 combat aircraft)  <i>Para-military forces:</i> 30 000  <i>Expenditure (estimated):</i> \$1,097 billion (1983)</p> <p><b>SUDAN</b>  Military links with United Kingdom, USA, Egypt, arms deals with China PR, Egypt. Forces deployed in southern Sudan against rebel forces.  <i>Total permanent force:</i> 58 000  <i>Army:</i> 53 000  <i>Navy:</i> 2 000 (63 vessels at Port Sudan)  <i>Air force:</i> 3 000 (34 combat aircraft)  <i>Para-military forces:</i> 3 500  <i>Expenditure (estimated):</i> \$230,770 m (1983)</p> <p><b>TUNISIA</b>  Military links with USA and France.  <i>Total permanent force:</i> 35 100 (13 000 conscripts)  <i>Army:</i> 30 000 (12 000 conscripts)  <i>Navy:</i> 2 600 (500 conscripts, 25 vessels based at Tunis and Susa)  <i>Air force:</i> 2 500 (500 conscripts, 8 combat aircraft)  <i>Para-military force:</i> gendarmerie 5 000  <i>Expenditure:</i> \$454,307 m (1984)</p>
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**SOURCES:** 1, 2, 4, 6, 28, 29.



Swazi girls in traditional dress.



# Section 3: Economic data

The data profiles and accompanying diagrams are not primarily intended to reflect Africa's overall socio-economic performance since independence, but rather to furnish information on production and achievement in selected sectors by individual and groups of countries in relation to the rest of the world in the early 1980s. It has to be stressed that the methods used by countries in compiling their statistics vary and that figures should be used with due caution, especially in comparing countries.

## Resources, development and policies

Africa is blessed with an abundance of natural resources such as arable land, water and minerals but these riches are unevenly distributed (*map M*). Furthermore, production factors such as entrepreneurial ability, technical skills and capital are largely lacking among the indigenous populations whose levels of living are, generally speaking, among the lowest in the world. In addition, there are economic problems such as limited internal markets, dependence on only one or two export products, inadequate physical and social infrastructures, and the islandic patterns of economic activity, to mention only a few.

As most African countries rate low on the scale of economic development, despite having achieved political independence, the emphasis has switched from independence to development during the last two decades. The tendency nowadays is to view development as a process encompassing the whole of society and implying cultural and social as well as economic and technical change. Consequently, the need for economic and social indicators of development or quality of life arise. Indicators such as GNP per capita, calorie supplies, life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy rates are respectively to be found in *tables 22, 32, 37 and 38*.

*Table 21* represents an effort to group countries according to their economic policies or systems. A high proportion of African governments opted, at least nominally, for a socialist economic policy after independence. Since the mid-1970s some have been trying to remould their societies along Marxist-Leninist or scientific socialist lines. It should, however, be noted that no African country has achieved a purely socialist economy and even the most Marxist-orientated governments continue to stress their desire for increased foreign investment and trading links with Western industrial countries. The bulk of national economies are "mixed", i.e. market economies with varying degrees of state-run enterprises and government intervention. It should also be borne in mind that African economies have

relatively small modern sectors and generally more than half of the populations eke out a living in the subsistence sector.

## Economic structure and production

No doubt quantitative growth has been achieved in national income (*tables 22 and 23*), public expenditure (*table 26*), development aid (*tables 27 to 30*), exports (*table 31*), agricultural, mineral and energy production (*tables 32 to 35*) as well as the provision of electricity, transport and communications (*table 36*). However, if the continent's socio-economic progress is expressed in per capita terms, it is generally disappointing. If the current average population increase of about 3 per cent is taken into account, it becomes clear that the average person's economic progress in real terms is correspondingly small: per capita incomes in the 1970s decade declined by one per cent annually as compared with an annual increase of one per cent during 1960 to 1970. The indications are that GNP per capita may increase during 1980 to 1990 by only 0.1 per cent annually, but it could also decrease by as much as one per cent per year. Twenty-six of the world's 34 poorest countries (that is those with a per capita GNP of less than about \$400 per year) are in Africa (*table 22*) and the continent as a whole accounts for less than 4 per cent of world output (*diagram 13*).

## Social services

Striking advances have been made in the provision of social services as measured by increases in the number of hospitals and clinics, the ratio of physicians and medical personnel to population, life expectancy (*table 37*), literacy (*table 38*), school enrolment ratios (*table 40*) and the numbers attending schools and colleges (*tables 39 and 41*). Yet despite this rapid expansion of educational services, the absolute number of illiterates tend to increase because of the equally rapid increase in population. Likewise, the potential number of school pupils increases faster than the number that can be accommodated in schools. Although admirable reductions have been achieved regarding infant mortality, the rate of 111 per 1 000 births is still the world's highest. The high incidence of poverty and the generally low standard of living also combine with ignorance to create a situation in which the bulk of Africa's inhabitants still suffer from various preventable diseases adversely affecting human productivity.

TABLE 21

## ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Economic policy	Multi-party systems	One-party systems, no parties and military rule (tables 16-18)	
<b>MIXED ECONOMIES</b> (State and private enterprise) <sup>1</sup>	Botswana Egypt Gambia Lesotho Mauritius Morocco Senegal South Africa Zimbabwe <sup>2</sup>	Burundi Cameroon CAR Chad Comoros Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Gabon Ivory Coast Kenya Liberia Malawi	Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sierra Leone Swaziland Togo Tunisia Uganda Zaire Zambia
		Algeria Angola <sup>3</sup> Benin <sup>3</sup> Burkina Faso <sup>3</sup> Cape Verde Congo <sup>3</sup> Ethiopia <sup>3</sup> Ghana Guinea	Guinea Bissau Libya Madagascar <sup>3</sup> Mozambique <sup>3</sup> Sao Tomé Seychelles <sup>3</sup> Somalia Sudan Tanzania <sup>3</sup>



## NOTES:

- 1 Most of the states listed have small modern sectors and in many cases more than half of the populations live in the subsistence sector.
- 2 Moving towards a single party system and pervasive socialism.
- 3 Striving towards central planning (complete state control).

4

## MAIZE PRODUCTION

LEADING WORLD PRODUCERS (1982, million mt)



Source: FAO YB



TABLE 22

## NATIONAL INCOME

Gross National Product (GNP) – total and per capita at market prices<sup>1</sup> in descending order, 1983  
(See also table 6)

Country	Total GNP (US \$ million) 1973	1983	Country	GNP per capita (US \$) 1973	1983
Africa	114 570	384 664	Africa	292	748
More than \$10 000 million pa			More than \$1 000 pa		
South Africa	25 240	76 890	Libya	3 530	7 500
Nigeria	15 050	71 030	Gabon	1 310	4 250
Algeria	8 340	49 450	Reunion	1 210	3 710
Egypt	8 820	31 880	South Africa	1 050	2 450
Libya	7 620	25 100	Algeria	570	2 400
Morocco	5 080	15 620	Seychelles	370	2 400
More than \$5 000 million pa			SWA/Namibia	800 <sup>4</sup>	1 760
Tunisia	2 530	8 860	Tunisia	460	1 290
Sudan	2 260	8 420	Congo	340	1 230
Cameroon	1 530	7 640	Mauritius	410	1 050
Ivory Coast	2 250	6 730	More than \$500 pa		
Kenya	2 150	6 450	Bophuthatswana	..	954 <sup>3</sup>
Zimbabwe	2 520	5 820	Botswana	230	920
Zaire	3 200	5 050	Swaziland	330	890
More than \$1 000 million pa			Cameroon	250	800
Tanzania	1 830	4 880	Nigeria	210	760
Ethiopia	2 290	4 860	Morocco	320	750
Ghana	2 760	3 980	Zimbabwe	430	740
Zambia	2 020	3 630	Ivory Coast	380	720
Angola	2 780	3 320 <sup>2</sup>	Egypt	250	700
Uganda	1 610	3 090	Zambia	430	580
Gabon	680	2 950	Ciskei	..	504 <sup>3</sup>
Mozambique	3 110	2 810 <sup>2</sup>	More than \$250 pa		
Madagascar	1 260	2 730	Venda	..	494 <sup>3</sup>
Senegal	1 160	2 730	Transkei	..	472 <sup>3</sup>
Congo	410	2 180	Angola	490	470 <sup>2</sup>
Reunion	570	2 060	Lesotho	100	470
SWA/Namibia	690 <sup>4</sup>	1 920	Liberia	310	470
Guinea	570	1 740	Mauritania	200	440
Bophuthatswana	..	1 736 <sup>3</sup>	Senegal	280	440
Rwanda	290	1 540	Sudan	130	400
Transkei	..	1 471 <sup>3</sup>	Sierra Leone	160	380
Niger	450	1 460	Cape Verde	340	360
Malawi	530	1 390	Comoros	170	340 <sup>3</sup>
Mauritius	360	1 250	Kenya	170	340
Sierra Leone	460	1 230	Ghana	300	320
Burkina Faso	410	1 210	Sao Tomé	470	310
Somalia	250	1 140	Guinea	110	300
Mali	370	1 110	Benin	110	290
Benin	330	1 110	Gambia	130	290
Burundi	270	1 050	Madagascar	150	290
Less than \$1 000 million pa			CAR	160	280
Liberia	450	990	Togo	180	280
Botswana	150	920	Mozambique	380	270 <sup>2</sup>
Togo	380	790	Rwanda	70	270
Mauritania	250	720	Tanzania	130	270
CAR	280	690	Somalia	80	250
Lesotho	120	670	Less than \$250 pa		
Swaziland	150	610	Burundi	80	240
Ciskei	..	426 <sup>3</sup>	Niger	100	240
Chad	320	360 <sup>3</sup>	Uganda	150	220
Venda	..	201	Malawi	110	210
Gambia	60	200	Burkina Faso	70	180
Seychelles	20	160	Guinea Bissau	330	180
Guinea Bissau	170	150	Zaire	140	160
Comoros	40	120 <sup>3</sup>	Mali	70	150
Cape Verde	90	110	Ethiopia	90	140
Sao Tomé	40	30	Chad	80	80 <sup>3</sup>

## NOTES:


<sup>1</sup> GNP at market prices is the total market value of the final output of goods and services claimed by the residents of a country in a year. GNP per capita is a country's total GNP divided by its total population in a particular year.

<sup>2</sup> 1980.

<sup>3</sup> 1982.

<sup>4</sup> 1974.

SOURCES: 9, 37.



Nomad family in central Niger.  
(Photo: Pretoria News)



TABLE 23


**ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES**  
**Gross National Product (GNP) per capita and population.**

Country	Average annual growth rates			Country	Average annual growth rates		
	Real GNP per capita		Population		Real GNP per capita		Population
	1960-82 %	1973-82 %			1960-82 %	1973-82 %	
Algeria	3,2	2,4	3,1	Mali	1,6	2,1	2,7
Angola	..	-9,6	2,5	Mauritania	1,4	0,7	2,3
Benin	0,6	2,7	2,8	Mauritius	2,1	2,3	1,6
Bophuthatswana	8,6 <sup>1</sup>	4,7 <sup>2</sup>	3,6 <sup>1</sup>	Morocco	2,6	2,1	2,6
Botswana	6,8	5,0	4,6	Mozambique	..	-5,3	4,9
Burkina Faso	1,1	1,6	2,1	Niger	-1,5	2,8	3,2
Burundi	2,5	..	2,1	Nigeria	3,3	0,7	2,6
Cameroon	2,6	4,6	3,1	Reunion	..	-0,5	1,7
Cape Verde	..	4,1	1,0	Rwanda	1,7	2,3	3,4
CAR	0,6	-1,3	2,3	Sao Tomé	1,2	1,4	2,1
Chad	-2,8	-7,7	2,0	Senegal	0,4 <sup>3</sup>	-0,7	2,7
Ciskei	5,6 <sup>1</sup>	3,7 <sup>2</sup>	5,0 <sup>1</sup>	Seychelles	..	3,7	1,3
Comoros	0,9	0,0	2,6	Sierra Leone	0,9	-0,3	2,1
Congo	2,7	3,6	3,1	Somalia	-0,1	1,9	2,8
Egypt	3,6	6,6	2,6	South Africa	2,1	0,5	2,8
Ethiopia	1,4	0,7	1,9	Sudan	-0,4	3,5	3,2
Gabon	4,4	-4,7	1,4	SWA/Namibia	..	1,8	3,0
Gambia	2,5	-0,8	3,7	Swaziland	4,2	0,0	3,5
Ghana	-1,3	-3,8	2,9	Tanzania	1,9	0,1	3,3
Guinea	1,5	0,5	2,1	Togo	2,3	0,4	2,6
Guinea Bissau	-1,7	-2,1	4,6	Transkei	5,1 <sup>1</sup>	2,9 <sup>2</sup>	2,8 <sup>1</sup>
Ivory Coast	2,1	1,1	4,4	Tunisia	4,7	4,1	2,4
Kenya	2,8	1,0	4,0	Uganda	-1,1	-5,6	2,7
Lesotho	6,5	4,0	2,4	Venda	9,8 <sup>1</sup>	7,2 <sup>2</sup>	3,0 <sup>1</sup>
Liberia	0,9	-0,9	3,5	Zaire	-0,3	-4,2	3,0
Libya	4,1	0,3	4,1	Zambia	-0,1	-2,5	3,2
Madagascar	-0,5	-2,5	2,7	Zimbabwe	1,5	0,4	3,3
Malawi	2,6	1,1	3,1				

## NOTES:

- 1 1970-1980  
 2 1975-1980  
 3 1960-1978

SOURCES: 5, 37, 38








Xhosa women hoeing.

West African washday scene.



Basket weavers in Cape Town.



Meat market in Togo.





TABLE 26

**GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND DEBT**  
**Selected countries**

Country	Date	Exchange rate with US \$ <sup>1</sup>	Total expenditure <sup>2</sup> US \$ million	Foreign public debt			
				US \$ million		as percentage of GNP	
				1970	1982	1970	1982
Angola	1981	\$1=Kw29,62	3 094	..	..	..	..
Bophuthatswana	1982/83	R1=\$0,92	526 <sup>3</sup>	..	..	..	..
Botswana	1982/83	Pu1=\$0,91	267	..	..	..	..
Congo	1982	\$1=CFA Fr 329	650	135	1 370	50,4	67,5
Ghana	1980/81	\$1=C 2,75	2 161	489	1 116	22,6	3,6
Ivory Coast	1983	\$1=CFA Fr 381	1 142 (766)	256	4 861	18,3	74,3
Kenya	1981/82	\$1=Ks 10	1962 (564)	313	2 359	20,3	39,2
Lesotho	1982/83	Lo1=\$0,92	247	8	123	7,8	20,4
Liberia	1982	US \$1=L \$1	273 (147)	158	641	49,6	68,1
Malawi	1982/83	\$1=MK 1,05	254 (160)	121	692	43,2	48,8
Mauritania	1979	\$1=U 46	242	27	1 001	13,9	146,5
Mozambique	1981	\$1=Mt 40,6	416 (443)	..	..	..	..
Nigeria	1983	N1=\$1,38	4 743 (9 966)	478	6 085	4,8	8,7
South Africa	1982/83	R1=\$0,92	16 779	1 089	2 600	6,3	3,2
SWA/Namibia	1982/83	R1=\$0,92	773	..	..	..	..
Swaziland	1982/83	L1=\$0,92	109	..	..	..	..
Tanzania	1982/83	\$1=TSh 11,2	1 263 (430)	248	1 659	19,4	32,7
Togo	1983	\$1=CFA Fr 381	199	40	819	16,0	104,5
Transkei	1982/83	R1=\$0,92	551 <sup>3</sup>	..	..	..	..
Zaire	1982	\$1=Z5,75	1 537	311	4 087	17,6	78,4
Zambia	1982	ZK1=\$1,07	1 415	623	2 381	37,0	66,3
Zimbabwe	1982/83	Z\$1=US \$1,32	2 810	233	1 221	15,7	19,1

**NOTES:**

- 1 See also table 1 (Currency).
- 2 Additional expenditure on development shown in parentheses.
- 3 South African official aid accounted for approximately 15% of the Bophuthatswana and 50% of the Transkei budget.


**SOURCES:** 5, 19, 23, 38


TABLE 27

## TRENDS IN OFFICIAL AID DISBURSEMENT TO DEVELOPING WORLD


DONORS (1981 prices & exchange rates)	1970 \$ million	% of total	1975 \$ million	% of total	1982 \$ million	% of total	Percentage change 1971-82 1976-82	
West and Japan (OECD)	17 904	83,4	21 221	63,6	28 744	74,8	+ 3,5	+5,3
Oil exporters (Opec)	1 026	4,8	9 540	28,6	6 999	18,2	+19,4	-2,3
East Bloc (CMEA)	2 537	11,8	1 913	5,8	2 490	6,5	+ 2,2	+4,5
Other	..	..	683	2,0	193	0,5	..	..
Total	21 467	100,0	33 357	100,0	38 426	100,0	+ 5,2	+3,4
RECIPIENTS (Excluding aid from CMEA)	1980 \$ million	% of total	1981 \$ million	% of total	1982 \$ million	% of total	Percentage change 1975-81	
<b>DEVELOPING WORLD</b>								
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34 609</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>33 827</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>30 626</b>	<b>100,0</b>		10,9
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>10 755</b>	<b>31,0</b>	<b>10 512</b>	<b>31,0</b>	<b>10 408</b>	<b>34,0</b>		..
Sub-Saharan	8 057	23,3	8 045	23,8	7 771	25,4		17,3
North Africa	2 527	7,3	2 259	6,7	2 429	7,9		..
Unallocated	171	0,4	207	0,5	207	0,7		..
MID-EAST & N AFRICA	(7 769)	(22,4)	(8 648)	(25,6)	(6 275)	(20,5)		7,4
<b>ASIA</b>	<b>13 466</b>	<b>38,9</b>	<b>12 309</b>	<b>36,4</b>	<b>10 994</b>	<b>35,9</b>		7,2
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>3 040</b>	<b>8,8</b>	<b>3 203</b>	<b>9,5</b>	<b>3 302</b>	<b>10,8</b>		12,1
Brazil	85	0,2	235	0,7	206	0,7		3,0
<b>OCEANIA</b>	<b>1 024</b>	<b>3,0</b>	<b>978</b>	<b>2,9</b>	<b>1 004</b>	<b>3,3</b>		10,8
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>1 226</b>	<b>3,5</b>	<b>935</b>	<b>2,8</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>2,4</b>		34,2
Turkey	1 002	2,9	735	2,2	623	2,0		51,1
<b>UNALLOCATED</b>	<b>5 098</b>	<b>14,8</b>	<b>5 890</b>	<b>17,4</b>	<b>4 191</b>	<b>13,6</b>		..

SOURCE: 10

## 9

## HARD COAL PRODUCTION


LEADING WORLD PRODUCERS (1982, million mt)



Source: Un Energy YB



10

**STEEL 1982**


PERCENTAGE SHARE OF AFRICA TOTAL

'000 m t

Africa	17 445
South Africa	6 467
Algeria	2 291
Nigeria	1 930
Egypt	2 084
Libya	1 155
Zimbabwe	806
Morocco	594

Source: UN Statistical YB

11

**ELECTRIC ENERGY PRODUCTION 1982**

PERCENTAGE SHARE OF AFRICA TOTAL

million kWh

Africa	201
South Africa	109
Egypt	18
Zambia	11
Nigeria	8
Algeria	7
Libya	6
Morocco	6
Ghana	5
Zaire	4
Zimbabwe	4

12

**AGRICULTURAL TRACTORS, 1982**


PERCENTAGE SHARE OF AFRICA TOTAL

'000 Tractors

Africa	471
South Africa	182
Algeria	45
Egypt	40
Tunisia	36
Morocco	25
Zimbabwe	21
Tanzania	19
Libya	16
Sudan	12
Nigeria	9

Source: FAO YB

13

**WORLD PRODUCTION 1982**

US \$ billion (GNP)

World	105 520
Western states	6 876
Asia	2 084
Latin America	771
Africa	391
Other	397

(Excluding USSR and most of its satellites)

Source: The World Bank

TABLE 28

## DEVELOPMENT AID AND GNP

DONOR GROUPS				MAJOR RECIPIENTS			
Groupings and selected countries	GNP per capita 1983 US \$	Official development assistance as percentage of total GNP		Regions and selected countries	GNP per capita 1980 US \$	Official development assistance as percentage of total GNP	
		1960 %	1983 %			1975-76 %	1980-81 %
<b>WEST AND JAPAN</b>	<b>10 848</b>	<b>0,51</b>	<b>0,37</b>	<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>3,5</b>	<b>4,1</b>
Switzerland	16 390	0,04	0,31	Sahel countries	260	13,9	17,1
United States	14 090	0,53	0,24	Ethiopia	140	5,0	5,8
Norway	13 820	0,11	1,10	Rwanda	200	13,9	15,4
Sweden	12 400	0,05	0,88	Zaire	220	7,2	7,4
Canada	12 000	0,19	0,47	Tanzania	260	10,7	14,7
Denmark	11 490	0,09	0,73	Somalia	380	16,8	28,6
Germany FR	11 420	0,31	0,48	Kenya	420	4,5	6,6
Australia	10 780	0,37	0,49	Ghana	420	1,9	1,3
Finland	10 440	..	0,33	Sudan	470	7,0	8,6
France	10 390	1,35	0,76	Cameroon	670	4,9	4,3
Japan	10 100	0,24	0,33	Congo	730	9,3	7,3
Netherlands	9 910	0,31	0,91	Nigeria	1 010	0,2	0,0
Austria	9 210	..	0,23	Ivory Coast	1 150	2,5	1,8
Belgium	9 160	0,88	0,59	Reunion	3 830	20,9	29,9
United Kingdom	9 050	0,56	0,36	<b>NORTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST</b>	<b>2 440</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>1,7</b>
New Zealand	7 410	—	0,28	Egypt	580	18,9	6,1
Italy	6 350	0,22	0,24	Morocco	860	2,5	3,8
<b>OPEC (Oil producers)</b>	<b>14 820</b>	<b>2,92</b>	<b>1,22</b>	<b>ASIA</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>1,3</b>	<b>1,1</b>
Saudi Arabia	15 820	7,76	2,82	<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>1 860</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>0,4</b>
Kuwait	19 870	7,40	4,86	<b>OCEANIA</b>	<b>1 280</b>	<b>14,8</b>	<b>16,5</b>
UAE	23 770	11,68	2,06				
Iraq	..	1,62	—				
Qatar	..	15,58	3,80				
Other	..	0,66	0,08				
<b>EAST BLOC (CMEA)</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>0,11</b>	<b>0,14</b>				
USSR	..	0,13	0,14				
German DR	..	0,04	0,15				
Eastern Europe	..	0,08	0,13				

SOURCES: 10, 38



Togo young Agricultural Pioneers march on Independence Day.



TABLE 29

**PRINCIPAL AID RECIPIENTS AND SOURCES**  
**Annual average 1980-81**

From West and Japan (OECD) <sup>1</sup>		From oil exporters (OPEC) <sup>2</sup>		From East Bloc (CMEA) <sup>3</sup>		From multilateral agencies <sup>4</sup>		From all sources	
Recipient	\$ million	Recipient	\$ million	Recipient	\$ million	Recipient	\$ million	Recipient	\$ million
Egypt	1 217	Syria	1 288	Vietnam	900	India	1 298	India	2 570
India	1 127	Jordan	942	Cuba	617	Pakistan	379	Egypt	1 472
Bangladesh	986	Morocco	370	Afghanistan	273	Bangladesh	351	Syria	1 450
Indonesia	970	Lebanon	290	Kampuchea	138	China	234	Bangladesh	1 414
Israel	883	Yemen	279	Laos	90	Egypt	198	Vietnam	1 140
Turkey	720	Turkey	234	Syria	64	Sudan	179	Pakistan	1 126
Tanzania	580	Pakistan	218	Pakistan	61	Kampuchea	172	Indonesia	1 122
Pakistan	468	Oman	203	Iraq	49	Somalia	159	Jordan	1 088
Sudan	360	Sudan	192	Algeria	48	Tanzania	145	Turkey	1 035
Kenya	336	Bahrain	155	Turkey	46	Ethiopia	136	Israel	883
Thailand	327	Mauritania	119	India	33	Indonesia	130	Tanzania	749
South Korea	317	Somalia	112	Egypt	33	Zaire	103	Sudan	736
(46% of total)	8 291	(81% of total)	4 515	(92% of total)	2 375	(50% of total)	3 484	(45% of total)	14 785

**NOTES:**

- 1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
- 2 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
- 3 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Communist countries).


- 4 United Nations agencies, World Bank Group, European Investment Bank, regional development banks and other international bodies.

**SOURCE:** 10

TABLE 30

**PRINCIPAL AFRICAN AID RECIPIENTS****25 African countries' share in total aid from all sources, annual average 1980-81 (see also tables 27 & 29)**

	%		%		%
Egypt	4,4	Tunisia	0,9	Madagascar	0,6
Tanzania	2,3	Zambia	0,8	Zimbabwe	0,6
Sudan	2,2	Ethiopia	0,8	Niger	0,6
Morocco	2,1	Mali	0,8	Ivory Coast	0,6
Reunion	1,8	Cameroon	0,7	Ghana	0,6
Kenya	1,3	Algeria	0,7	Mozambique	0,5
Somalia	1,3	Burkina Faso	0,7	Rwanda	0,5
Zaire	1,3	Mauritania	0,7	Malawi	0,5
Senegal	1,0			<b>Total above</b>	<b>28,3</b>

**SOURCE:** 10

African games in Brazzaville 1965.

TABLE 31

## EXPORT ECONOMIES

- A Single commodity: more than 75% of export earnings derive from one primary commodity**  
**B Semi-diversified: bulk of export earnings derive from a few primary commodities**  
**C Diversified: a variety of manufactured products accounting for at least 15% of total export earnings**

Country Currency	Dates	Total exports	Principal exports			Country Currency	Dates	Total exports	Principal exports		
			Total	% of total	Description				Total	% of total	Description
A ALGERIA	1978	24	23	96	Petroleum	B GUINEA BISSAU	1980	382	285	75	Fish, groundnuts, coconuts
AD billion	1980	52	51	98		GBP million					
A ANGOLA	1978	28	18	63	Petroleum	B IVORY COAST	1979	535	319	60	Cocoa, coffee, timber
Kw billion	1979	40	30	75		CFA Fr billion	1981	689	393	57	
A BURUNDI	1978	6	5	83	Coffee	B KENYA	1980	10,0	3,3	34	Coffee, tea
Bu Fr billion	1980	6	5	83		KSh billion	1982	11,0	4,4	41	
A CONGO	1978	27	14	50	Petroleum	B LIBERIA	1979	547	378	69	Iron ore, rubber
CFA Fr billion	1980	203	182	90		L \$ million	1981	524	412	78	
A GAMBIA	1980	65	56	86	Groundnuts	B MADAGASCAR	1979	84	56	67	Coffee, rice, cloves, vanilla
Di million						MG Fr billion	1981	84	74	88	
A GUINEA	1976	6,0	5,7	94	Bauxite, alumina	B MALAWI	1980	218	168	77	Tobacco, tea, sugar
Sy billion						MK million	1982	262	229	87	
A LIBYA	1979	47	44	93	Petroleum	B MALI	1977	61	46	75	Cotton, groundnuts
LD billion	1981	48	46	95		M Fr billion	1978	46	31	67	
A NIGER	1980	120	91	76	Uranium	B MAURITANIA	1978	6	5	95	Iron ore, fish
CFA Fr billion	1982	109	82	75		U billion	1981	13	12	99	
A NIGERIA	1980	14,0	13,6	96	Petroleum	B MAURITIUS	1980	3,3	2,3	68	Sugar
N billion	1982	9,0	8,6	99		MR billion	1982	4,0	2,5	63	
A REUNION	1981	573	444	77	Sugar	B MOZAMBIQUE	1981	13	7	53	Cashew nuts, fish, sugar, tea
Fr million						Mt billion	1983	5	3	55	
A SAO TOMÉ	1979	730	584	80	Cocoa	B RWANDA	1978	8	7	84	Coffee, tin, tungsten
Db million						Rw Fr billion	1980	11	9	84	
A SOMALIA	1980	839	640	76	Livestock	B SENEGAL	1978	95	78	82	Groundnuts, fish, phosphates
So Sh million	1982	1 836	1 517	83		CFA Fr billion	1980	101	76	76	
A UGANDA	1977	4,6	4,4	96	Coffee	B SEYCHELLES	1982	20	17	85	Copra, fish
U Sh million	1979	2,3	2,2	98		SR million					
A ZAMBIA	1978	687	634	92	Copper, cobalt	B SIERRA LEONE	1981	158	117	74	Diamonds, bauxite, cocoa
ZK million	1980	980	931	95		Le million	1983	197	121	62	
B BENIN	1977	7,6	3,0	40	Palm products, cotton	B SWAZILAND	1981	913	806	88	Uranium, diamonds, other minerals
CFA Fr billion						R million	1983	748	599	80	
B BOTSWANA	1981	348	209	60	Diamonds, livestock	B SWAZILAND	1981	318	213	67	Sugar, wood pulp, chemicals
Pu million	1983	587	464	80		Ei million	1983	248	167	67	
B BURKINA FASO	1980	19	15	79	Cotton, livestock, karite nuts	B SUDAN	1979	253	181	71	Cotton, groundnuts, sesame
CFA Fr billion	1982	18	13	71		S £ million	1981	280	155	55	
B CAMEROON	1977	173	109	63	Cocoa, coffee, timber	B TANZANIA	1981	4,7	2,6	55	Coffee, cotton, cloves
CFA Fr billion	1979	199	128	64		TSh billion	1983	4,0	2,9	71	
B CAPE VERDE	1981	147	100	80	Bananas, salt, fish	B TOGO	1979	46	32	70	Phosphates, cocoa
CV Esc million						CFA Fr billion	1981	57	38	67	
B CHAD	1976	15	11	70	Cotton, livestock	B ZAIRE	1980	5,7	3,6	64	Copper, cobalt, petroleum
CFA Fr billion						Z billion	1982	9,9	6,6	67	
B CAR	1979	17	16	92	Diamonds, wood, coffee	C MOROCCO*	1979	7,6	6,1	80	Phosphates, fruit, vegetables, manufactures
CFA Fr billion	1981	32	23	73		Dh billion	1981	12,0	10,0	83	
B COMOROS	1980	54	37	68	Cloves, vanilla, ylang-ylang	C SOUTH AFRICA*	1981	18,2	16,3	89	Gold, diamonds, other minerals, manufactures
Fr million						R billion	1984	24,9	23,3	94	
B EGYPT	1980	2,1	1,7	81	Petroleum, cotton	C TUNISIA*	1980	0,9	0,7	75	Petroleum, phosphates, manufactures
E £ billion	1982	2,2	1,7	79		TD billion	1982	1,2	0,8	69	
B EQUAT GUINEA	1981	25	18	96	Cocoa, timber	C ZIMBABWE*	1982	1,0	0,7	76	Tobacco, chrome, other minerals, manufactures
E billion						Z \$ billion	1984	1,5	1,1	76	
B ETHIOPIA	1979	864	742	85	Coffee, livestock						
Br million	1982	835	612	73							
B GABON	1976	271	270	99	Petroleum, manganese, uranium, timber						
CFA Fr billion	1978	250	248	99							
B GHANA	1980	3,4	2,5	71	Cocoa, gold						
C billion	1982	2,4	1,7	70							

\* Manufactured and semi-manufactured products' approximate share in total export earnings were 15% for Morocco and Tunisia, 34% for South Africa and 38% for Zimbabwe.

SOURCES: 4, 19, 21, 23, 27, 28



TABLE 32

**FOOD PRODUCTION**  
**Selected countries, 1972-1981**

Region Country	Index: per capita food production 1974-76=100		Calorie supply per capita per day <sup>1</sup>		Cereal production '000 metric tonnes		Meat production '000 metric tonnes	
	1972	1981	1964-66	1979-81	1974-76	1981	1974-76	1981
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>96,01</b>	<b>103,17</b>	<b>2 411</b>	<b>2 624</b>	<b>1 397 476</b>	<b>1 653 608</b>	<b>113 160</b>	<b>135 021</b>
<b>DEVELOPED WORLD</b>	<b>94,05</b>	<b>104,46</b>	<b>3 169</b>	<b>3 385</b>	<b>726 157</b>	<b>841 453</b>	<b>80 218</b>	<b>90 026</b>
United States	93,15	116,75	3 341	3 641	237 507	333 805	22 630	24 981
<b>DEVELOPING WORLD</b>	<b>95,79</b>	<b>107,32</b>	<b>2 074</b>	<b>2 350</b>	<b>671 319</b>	<b>812 155</b>	<b>32 943</b>	<b>44 995</b>
India	94,63	108,34	1 972	2 056	118 742	147 584	714	940
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>101,96</b>	<b>95,24</b>	<b>2 213</b>	<b>2 367</b>	<b>69 899</b>	<b>78 974</b>	<b>5 598</b>	<b>6 802</b>
Angola	102,67	87,67	1 908	2 353	547	330	71	81
Botswana	115,54	72,11	1 963	2 352	100	52	52	51
Egypt	102,49	91,81	2 595	3 183	8 001	8 239	399	344
Ethiopia	107,80	102,58	2 100	2 149	4 364	5 394	479	526
Ghana	101,66	68,21	2 004	1 769	750	418	84	122
Ivory Coast	91,55	117,89	2 547	2 643	771	817	87	121
Kenya	103,20	83,69	2 241	2 011	3 052	2 651	219	274
Lesotho	87,71	80,96	2 043	2 424	180	171	20	24
Liberia	98,13	93,43	2 394	2 276	241	260	13	17
Malawi	111,59	99,71	2 116	2 208	1 268	1 419	26	32
Mozambique	113,96	82,37	2 007	1 881	700	510	60	64
Nigeria	103,67	101,63	2 250	2 378	8 237	9 670	538	799
South Africa	107,90	105,97	2 718	2 862	11 701	17 761	930	1 050
SWA/Namibia	114,53	89,10	2 212	2 197	61	63	54	62
Swaziland	102,19	116,33	2 013	2 553	110	103	16	21
Tanzania	96,95	102,78	1 983	1 955	1 961	2 821	157	190
Togo	104,20	96,45	2 241	2 126	254	264	17	20
Zaire	99,35	94,36	2 151	2 130	754	937	174	175
Zambia	94,13	73,42	2 059	2 146	1 532	1 068	72	81
Zimbabwe	113,75	95,81	2 095	2 108	2 337	3 226	137	109

**NOTE:**

<sup>1</sup> Indicating the average *supply* of food for the population as a whole and *not* what is actually consumed by individuals.

**SOURCES:** 13



Zimbabwe ruins.

TABLE 33

## AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Selected principal crops and leading producers in the various regions<sup>1</sup>  
 '000 metric tonnes, 1983

Region Country	Coffee beans	Cocoa beans	Sugar cane	Cotton lint	Ground- nuts	Roots and tubers	Maize	Fruit
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>5 537</b>	<b>1 557</b>	<b>888 735</b>	<b>14 692</b>	<b>19 792</b>	<b>556 676</b>	<b>344 103</b>	<b>295 976</b>
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>1 188</b>	<b>865</b>	<b>63 483</b>	<b>1 203</b>	<b>4 099</b>	<b>86 044</b>	<b>27 536</b>	<b>32 313</b>
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>2 465</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>719</b>	<b>22 027</b>	<b>1 359</b>	<b>6 891</b>
Cameroon	115	90	1 000	30	100	1 970	400	903
Chad	—	—	230	44	80	501	—	—
Zaire	50	—	740	26	370	15 359	668	2 473
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>17 284</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>15 509</b>	<b>6 341</b>	<b>8 209</b>
Ethiopia	204	—	—	27	—	1 574	1 600	209
Kenya	90	—	3 920	11	—	1 275	2 000	637
Mauritius	—	—	5 500	—	—	—	—	—
Tanzania	48	—	1 320	57	58	7 266	2 000	2 139
Uganda	192	—	700	43	100	2 610	450	3 890
<b>NORTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>10 000</b>	<b>618</b>	<b>979</b>	<b>2 987</b>	<b>3 823</b>	<b>5 774</b>
Egypt	—	—	9 000	410	—	1 360	3 510	2 705
Morocco	—	—	600	7	—	450	261	1 487
Sudan	—	—	4 000	201	900	311	—	802
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>24 756</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>396</b>	<b>5 834</b>	<b>13 174</b>	<b>4 406</b>
Angola	27	—	350	11	—	2 170	275	425
Malawi	—	—	1 830	8	180	210	1 500	230
Mozambique	—	—	1 000	17	60	2 010	200 <sup>2</sup>	310
South Africa	—	—	13 370	27	92	945	8 359 <sup>2</sup>	3 076
Swaziland	—	—	3 486	12	—	—	—	113
Zimbabwe	7	—	3 700	53	32	—	1 657 <sup>2</sup>	116
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>744</b>	<b>5 377</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>1 767</b>	<b>38 688</b>	<b>2 839</b>	<b>5 936</b>
Ghana	—	160	—	3	70	2 450	—	721
Ivory Coast	225	400	2 500	66	61	3 484	2 000	1 443
Mali	—	—	—	43	70	—	—	—
Nigeria	—	150	1 150	15	450	28 477	1 600	2 470
Senegal	—	—	600	12	650	—	—	—

## NOTES:

\* A producer but not a leading producer.

1 The regional subtotals include all countries, not only leading producers.

2 1982 (1983 figure abnormally low because of drought).

SOURCE: 13



Road to Lusaka, Zambia.



TABLE 34

## MINERAL PRODUCTION

Selected minerals and leading producers within the various regions<sup>1</sup>

Region Country	Chromium ore 1981 '000 mt	Cobalt ore 1981 '000 mt	Copper ore 1983 '000 mt	Diamonds gem/Industrial 1981 '000 carats	Gold 1981 '000 kg	Iron ore 1982 '000 mt	Manganese ore 1981 '000 mt	Phosphate rock 1981 million mt
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>3 980</b>	<b>30 910</b>	<b>8 150</b>	<b>38 595</b>	<b>1 232 878</b>	<b>450 260</b>	<b>8 765</b>	<b>138 531</b>
USSR	1 010	2 250	1 200	10 600	262 047	244 000	2 761	30 950
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>1 627</b>	<b>17 608</b>	<b>1 338</b>	<b>27 237</b>	<b>684 501</b>	<b>61 820</b>	<b>3 004</b>	<b>32 652</b>
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>	—	<b>14 000</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>7 800</b>	<b>2 049</b>	—	<b>764</b>	—
Gabon	—	—	—	—	—	—	759	—
Zaire	—	14 000	503	7 500	2 027	—	—	—
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	<b>41</b>	—	—	<b>280</b>	<b>392</b>	—	—	—
<b>NORTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>14</b>	—	—	—	—	<b>5 890</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>25 576</b>
Morocco	—	689	—	—	—	—	56	18 562
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	<b>1 572</b>	<b>2 569</b>	<b>835</b>	<b>17 135</b>	<b>667 674</b>	<b>25 700</b>	<b>2 077</b>	<b>3 040</b>
Botswana	—	—	—	4 961	—	—	—	—
South Africa <sup>2</sup>	1 320	—	208	9 526	655 806	24 600	2 077	2 910
SWA/Namibia	—	—	54	1 248	—	—	—	—
Zambia	—	2 569	515	—	328	—	—	—
Zimbabwe	252	—	—	—	11 540	—	—	—
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	—	—	—	<b>1 972</b>	<b>14 386</b>	<b>30 230</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>4 036</b>
Ghana	—	—	—	1 000	10 596	—	107	—
Liberia	—	—	—	286	3 760	22 020	—	—
Mauritania	—	—	—	—	—	8 210	—	—
Sierra Leone	—	—	—	595	—	—	—	—

## NOTES:

\* A producer but not a leading producer.

<sup>1</sup> Regional subtotals include minor producers not listed.<sup>2</sup> Including Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.

SOURCES: 4, 28, 34



Local residents working on the Lake Chad project.

TABLE 35

**INDUSTRIAL INDICATORS**  
**Selected countries**

Region Country	Per capita energy consumption '000 kg of oil equivalent <sup>1</sup>		Electricity production kWh million		Cement production '000 metric tonnes		Crude steel consumption '000 metric tonnes	
	1960	1981	1960	1982	1963	1980	1960	1980
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>896</b>	<b>1 279</b>	<b>2 310 000</b>	<b>8 436 000</b>	<b>373 000</b>	<b>867 720</b>	<b>346 000</b>	<b>740 000</b>
United States	5 535	6 900	844 188	2 304 211	64 379	67 675	90 067	115 591
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>36 026</b>	<b>200 456</b>	<b>10 000</b>	<b>29 593</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>17 615<sup>2</sup></b>
Algeria	221	931	1 387	7 170	601	4 159	31	2 291
Angola	46	210	..	1 500	194	400	..	81
Cameroon	61	122	..	1 655	..	227	..	..
Congo	89	139	..	165	..	34	..	94
Egypt	197	448	2 639	18 590	2 528	2 994	136	2 084
Ghana	72	161	374	5 053	..	294	..	32
Ivory Coast	50	191	..	1 903	..	1 030	..	226
Kenya	114	147	..	1 715	344	1 228	..	238
Libya	198	2 309	105	5 600	..	1 594	..	1 155
Morocco	118	283	1 012	5 400	580	3 561	..	594
Mozambique	76	85	122	14 000	769	277	..	7
Nigeria	20	143	528	7 260	163	1 714	..	1 930
Senegal	381	206	..	599	190	371	..	67
South Africa	1 512	2 392	22 561	119 874	2 884	7 125	2 120	6 746
Sudan	40	70	..	1 000	..	181	..	135
Tanzania	30	50	..	715	..	306	..	83
Tunisia	119	497	..	3 090	361	1 780	..	637
Zaire	65	76	2 456	4 560	246	399	..	81
Zambia	..	443	836	9 100	115	299	..	31
Zimbabwe	..	578	2 388	4 196	..	469	86	806

**NOTE:**

1 Commercial forms of primary energy such as petroleum, natural gas, coal and electricity converted into oil equivalents.

2 Total includes all Africa, not only those listed.

**SOURCES:** 27, 33, 34, 38



The Ahaggar Mountain Region in the Central Sahara near Tamanrasset, Algeria.



TABLE 36

**PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**  
**Selected countries, 1980-83<sup>1</sup>**

Region Country	Electricity Installed capacity '000 kW	Railways		Airways Passengers million passenger - km	Paved roads km	Passenger cars <sup>1</sup>		Telephones per 1 000 persons
		Length km	Freight million tonne - km			number '000	per 1 000 persons	
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>2 087 790</b>	<b>1 330 000</b>	<b>6 834 000</b>	<b>1 137 000</b>	..	<b>316 400</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>121</b>
North America	769 955	355 000	1 635 000	441 137	..	128 713	534	788
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>46 012</b>	<b>80 000<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>127 200</b>	..	..	<b>5 800</b>	..	..
<b>CENTRAL AFRICA</b>								
Cameroon	339	1 320	612	485	2 500	74	8	4
Congo	118	800	538	197	900	27	13	9
Gabon	175	224	..	394	650	10	58	21
Zaire	1 716	5 254	..	852	..	85	3	1
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>								
Ethiopia	318	987	..	760	..	52	1	3
Kenya	541	2 650	..	943	6 800	114	7	12
Madagascar	100	1 036	201	296	4 500	57	6	4
Mauritius	243	—	..	..	1 600	25	26	39
Tanzania	258	3 550	..	284	3 000	44	2	5
Uganda	163	1 286	..	..	1 600	..	1	4
<b>NORTHERN AFRICA</b>								
Algeria	2 006	3 890	..	2 400	36 000	322	29	25
Egypt	4 500	4 667	333	3 670	14 000	432	10	12
Libya	1 175	—	..	1 337	25 700	263	144	53
Morocco	1 179	1 756	3 934	1 866	26 500	394	21	11
Sudan	302	4 786	..	633	3 000	30	2	4
Tunisia	929	2 208	1 716	1 531	11 000	103	20	31
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>								
Angola	600	2 800	..	692	6 000	127	20	6
Botswana	..	716	1 703	..	1 500	10	10	15
Lesotho	..	2	..	..	350	6	3	4
Malawi	104	789	234	..	1 600	14	3	5
Mozambique	1 800	3 933	..	508	3 200	80	8	4
South Africa	20 763 <sup>3</sup>	21 324 <sup>4</sup>	103 885 <sup>3</sup>	9 213 <sup>3</sup>	49 300 <sup>5</sup>	2 700 <sup>6</sup>	86 <sup>7</sup>	118 <sup>3</sup>
SWA/Namibia	700	2 340	— <sup>8</sup>	— <sup>8</sup>	4 000	28	50	56
Swaziland	..	220	..	..	250	13	25	22
Zambia	1 728	2 188	..	558	3 000	94	17	10
Zimbabwe	1 192	3 394	5 283	556	6 400	225	30	30
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>								
Ghana	900	953	..	300	8 000	72	6	6
Ivory Coast	1 028	680	600	215	3 700	112	23	11
Liberia	305	490	..	..	750	8	11	5
Mauritania	55	652	..	..	1 500	4	7	1
Nigeria	2 497	3 524	..	2 308	30 000	115	3	3
Senegal	165	1 186	..	250	3 400	45	10	7
Togo	35	516	..	179	1 500	13	10	3

**NOTES:**

- 1 Latest available information approximately 1980-1983 (1970-1980 for number of passenger cars)
- 2 Countries with no railways: Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Somalia, Venda.
- 3 Including TBVC states.
- 4 Including **Transkei** (285 km), **Bophuthatswana** (86 km) and **Ciskei** (128 km).

- 5 Excluding **Transkei** (800 km), **Bophuthatswana** (700 km), **Venda** (140 km) and **Ciskei** (460 km).
- 6 Excluding Transkei, **Bophuthatswana** (19 500 in 1982), **Venda** (1 700 in 1982) and Ciskei.
- 7 Including **Transkei** (6), **Bophuthatswana** (13), **Venda** (7) and **Ciskei** (7).
- 8 Included with South Africa.

**SOURCES:** 4, 7, 25, 27, 28, 34

## RAILWAYS AND RIVERS





TABLE 37

**HEALTH AND LIFE EXPECTANCY**  
**Selected regions and countries, 1980-1982**

Region Country	People per			Life expectancy no of years at birth			Infant mortality per 1 000 live births	
	physician	nursing person	hospital bed	Total	Male	Female	1960	1982
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>1 100</b>	..	<b>262</b>	<b>61</b>	..	..	..	<b>68</b>
<b>WESTERN STATES</b>	<b>544</b>	..	<b>108</b>	<b>74</b>	..	..	..	<b>12</b>
United States	524	140	164	75	71	78	26	11
<b>ASIA</b>	<b>7 749</b>	..	<b>942</b>	<b>59</b>	..	..	..	<b>73</b>
India	3 690	5 460	1 254	55	55	54	165	94
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>2 069</b>	..	<b>372</b>	<b>66</b>	..	..	..	<b>47</b>
Brazil	1 647	2 500	245	64	62	66	118	73
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>16 789</b>	..	<b>679</b>	<b>51</b>	..	..	..	<b>111</b>
Algeria	2 630	740	389	57	55	59	165	111
Angola	15 404 <sup>1</sup>	2 000 <sup>1</sup>	322 <sup>1</sup>	43	42	44	216	165
Botswana	9 500	879	323	..	47	50	..	..
Cameroon	13 990	1 950	372	53	52	55	134	92
Congo	5 510	790	212	60	59	62	118	68
Egypt	970	1 500	490	57	56	59	128	104
Gabon	2 560	..	130	49	..	..	..	..
Ghana	7 630	780	662	55	53	57	132	86
Ivory Coast	21 040	1 590	804	47	46	49	167	119
Kenya	7 890	550	601	57	55	59	112	77
Lesotho	18 640	4 330	488	53	51	55	137	94
Liberia	9 610	1 420	582	54	52	56	173	91
Libya	734	400	197	57	56	59	158	95
Malawi	40 950	3 830	594	44	36	43	206	137
Mozambique	39 110	5 600	920	51	49	52	154	105
Nigeria	12 550	3 010	1 069	50	48	52	190	109
Senegal	13 800	1 400	850	44	44	46	178	155
SWA/Namibia	4 000	..	130	..	..	..	..	..
Swaziland	7 200	..	294	..	44	47	..	..
Sudan	8 930	1 430	1 020	47	46	49	168	119
Tanzania	17 560	2 980	490	52	51	54	144	98
Zaire	14 780	1 920	359	50	49	52	150	106
Zambia	7 670	1 730	212	51	49	52	164	105
Zimbabwe	6 580	1 190	374	56	54	58	100	83
<b>SATBVC STATES</b>								
South Africa	2 016	337	152	63	60	65	92	55
Transkei	21 906 <sup>2</sup>	494	353	57	..	..	..	89
Bophuthatswana	17 265 <sup>2</sup>	462	290	57	..	..	..	89
Venda	30 314 <sup>2</sup>	490	253	57	..	..	..	89
Ciskei	4 505 <sup>2</sup>	228	352	57	..	..	..	89

**NOTES:**

1 Around 1973


2 Based on physicians employed in hospitals.

**SOURCES:** 5, 9, 22, 27, 32, 34, 38

**EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION**  
**(around 1975-1976)**

	As % of GNP	As % of total public expenditure	Per inhabitant
<b>WORLD</b>	5,7	..	109
<b>DEVELOPED WORLD</b>	6,0	..	264
Europe & USSR	5,8	..	298
North America	6,6	..	479
<b>DEVELOPING WORLD</b>	3,9	..	40
Asia	4,8	..	32
Arab states	5,9	..	62
Latin America	3,5	..	44
Africa	4,6	..	21
<b>AFRICA</b>	4,6		
Botswana	7,2	13,9	..
Congo	8,1	18,2	..
Ethiopia	3,3	13,4	..
Ghana	5,9	21,5	..
Ivory Coast	5,7	19,0	..
Kenya	6,3	19,4	..
Liberia	2,4	11,6	..
Libya	6,7	14,5	..
Malawi	2,5	9,6	..
Nigeria	4,2	16,5	..
South Africa	4,3	15,0	..
Tanzania	5,4	17,8	..
Zambia	6,7	11,9	..

SOURCE: 35



Bridge over the river at Benguela.



TABLE 38


**LITERACY AND MEDIA INDICATORS**  
**Selected regions and countries**

Region Country	Literate population <sup>1</sup>				Newspaper circulation <sup>2</sup>		Radio & TV receivers <sup>3</sup> per 1 000 people	
	Date	Total %	Male %	Female %	Total '000	Per 1 000 people	Radio	TV
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>61</b>	..	<b>134</b>	..	..
<b>WESTERN STATES</b>	<b>1982</b>	..	<b>95</b>	<b>93</b>	..	..	..	..
United States	1979	99	99	99	62 415	269	2 133	646
<b>ASIA</b>	<b>1982</b>	..	<b>69</b>	<b>51</b>	..	..	..	..
India	1971	34	48	19	13 033	20	56	3
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>1982</b>	..	<b>81</b>	<b>76</b>	..	..	..	..
Brazil	1978	76	78	84	5 094	44	355	122
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>1982</b>	..	<b>49</b>	<b>30</b>	..	<b>20</b>	..	..
Algeria	1982	45	57	32	448	22	207	65
Angola	1960	20	..	..	50	7	20	4
Botswana	1971	41	37	44	19	22	116	—
Cameroon	1976	40	55	25	35	4	90	—
Congo	1960	16	..	..	23	14	63	3
Egypt	1976	38	54	22	3 484	78	157	41
Ethiopia	1970	4	8	1	40	1	92	1
Gabon	1960	12	..	..	15	27	176	27
Ghana	1970	70	43	18	345	31	172	6
Ivory Coast	1980	35	45	24	70	8	128	41
Kenya	1980	47	60	35	220	12	34	4
Lesotho	1970	59	..	..	47	33	28	—
Liberia	1974	21	30	12	11	6	173	11
Libya	1973	39	61	15	41	17	50	65
Malawi	1970	22	..	..	31	5	46	—
Mauritius	1980	79	86	72	67	68	209	86
Mozambique	1980	26	37	14	46	4	25	—
Nigeria	1980	34	46	23	613	9	80	6
Senegal	1970	13	..	..	45	8	62	1
South Africa	1980	76 <sup>4</sup>	78 <sup>4</sup>	75 <sup>4</sup>	1 200	66	274	71
SWA/Namibia	1970	35	..	..	21	20	46	14
Swaziland	1976	55	57	53	10	16	152	3
Tanzania	1978	46	62	31	208	11	28	—
Togo	1970	16	27	7	7	3	209	4
Zaire	1980	54	74	27	45	..	53	—
Zambia	1970	47	..	..	113	18	26	12
Zimbabwe	1980	69	76	61	155	21	40	11


**NOTES:**

- 1 Population over 15 years who can read and write.
- 2 Daily newspapers, 1975-1982
- 3 Based on number of licences issued or estimated number of receivers in use, 1979-1982.
- 4 Total adult population, including black population who are estimated to be 70% literate, and TBVC states (65%). Transkei (62%), Bophuthatswana (75%), Venda (51%) and Ciskei (73%).


**SOURCES:** 25, 27, 35



Lesson at primary school.



Modern hospital in Bophuthatswana.



Zambian laboratory worker.



TABLE 39

**EDUCATION**  
**Selected regions and countries**

Region Country	Number of pupils and students				Number of teachers			
	Primary		Secondary	Tertiary	Primary		Secondary	Tertiary
	1970 '000	1980-82 '000	1980-82 '000	1980-82 '000	1970 '000	1980-82 '000	1980-82 '000	1980-82
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>432 000</b>	<b>579 000</b>	<b>241 000</b>	<b>50 000</b>	<b>14 000</b>	<b>21 000</b>	<b>14 000</b>	<b>3 916 000</b>
<b>DEVELOPED WORLD</b>	125 000	117 000	88 000	31 000	6 000	6 000	6 000	2 429 000
<b>DEVELOPING WORLD</b>	307 000	462 000	154 000	19 000	9 000	15 000	8 000	1 487 000
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>33 000</b>	<b>71 000</b>	<b>17 500</b>	<b>1 500</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>1 900</b>	<b>780</b>	<b>109 000</b>
Algeria	1 887	3 242	1 155	78	47	100	48	9 778
Botswana	83	178	23	1,3	2,3	5,6	1,4	144
Cameroon	923	1 379	234	11	19	27	8	447
Congo	241	407	191	7	4	7	5	292
Egypt	3 795	4 748	2 919	455 <sup>2</sup>	100	137	121	14 250 <sup>3</sup>
Ethiopia	655	2 374	500	16	14	38	11	1 269
Gambia	17	49	11	..	0,1	2,4	0,6	..
Ghana	1 420	1 500	694	13	48	51	35	1 103 <sup>2</sup>
Ivory Coast	503	954	214	19	11	24	5	1 204
Kenya	1 428	3 981	477	13	41	115	18	2 000
Lesotho	183	245	23	2	4	5	1,5	..
Liberia	120	227	55	4	3	9	1	164
Libya	350	722	341	15	12	43	24	951 <sup>2</sup>
Malawi	363	810	20	2	8	13	1	301
Mauritius	150	132	65 <sup>2</sup>	1	5	6	3	175
Mozambique	497	1 163 <sup>1</sup>	121 <sup>1</sup>	2	7	21 <sup>1</sup>	3,5 <sup>1</sup>	323
Nigeria	3 516	12 557	1 827	177	20 <sup>3</sup>	..	17	14 417
Senegal	263	453	104	13	6	11	5	925
Swaziland	69	120	24	2	2	4	1,5	247
Tanzania	856	3 513	77	4	18	82	4	1 068
Togo	229	499	130	4	4	10	4	346
Zaire	3 088	3 919	704	32	12 <sup>3</sup>	73 <sup>3</sup>	..	2 010 <sup>2</sup>
Zambia	695	1 042	102	9	5	15	21	717
Zimbabwe	736	2 044 <sup>1</sup>	228	3	8,5	21 <sup>2</sup>	50	325
<b>SATBVC STATES</b>								
South Africa	3 739	4 528 <sup>1</sup>	1 292 <sup>1</sup>	207 <sup>1</sup>	111 <sup>4</sup>	180 <sup>4</sup>	.. <sup>4</sup>	12 517
Transkei	..	620	167	2,4	..	9	6	130
Bophuthatswana	..	354	137	1,4	..	7	4	82
Venda	..	122	31	0,3	..	3	1	..
Ciskei	..	194	53	1,2	..	4	2	188

**NOTES:**

1 1983.

2 1975.


3 1970-1972

4 Primary and secondary levels.

**SOURCES:** 4, 5, 21, 22, 35

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PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION  
PER INHABITANT US \$ 1982



Source: Unesco YB



TABLE 40

**SCHOOL ENROLMENT AND PUPIL/TEACHER RATIOS**  
**Selected countries**

Region Country	Pupils and students enrolled as percentage of <sup>1</sup>						Pupils per teacher	
	Age group 6-11/14		Age group 12-17/19		Age group 18/20-24		Primary level	
	1960	1980-81	1960	1980-81	1960	1980-81	1970	1980-81
<b>WORLD</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>14</b>	..	..
<b>DEVELOPED WORLD</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>30</b>	..	..
<b>DEVELOPING WORLD</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	..	..
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>0,7</b>	<b>3</b>	..	..
Algeria	46	94	8	36	..	5	40	32
Botswana	..	102	..	23	..	1	36	32
Cameroon	65	107	2	19	..	2	48	52
Congo	78	156	4	69	1	6	62	58
Egypt	66	76	16	52	5	15	38	34
Ethiopia	7	46	..	12	..	1	48	63
Gambia	..	52	..	14	..	..	27	23
Ghana	38	69	5	36	..	1	30	30
Ivory Coast	46	76	2	17	..	3	45	39
Kenya	47	109	2	19	..	1	34	36
Lesotho	83	104	3	17	..	2	46	50
Liberia	31	66	2	20	..	2	36	41
Libya	59	123	9	67	1	6	28	18
Malawi	..	62	1	4	..	..	43	65
Mauritius	..	107	..	51	..	1	32	20
Mozambique	48	90	2	6	..	..	69	73
Nigeria	36	98	4	16	..	3	34	..
Senegal	27	48	3	12	1	3	45	43
Swaziland	..	110	..	40	..	4	40	33
Tanzania	25	102	2	3	..	..	47	43
Togo	44	111	2	31	..	2	58	52
Zaire	60	90	3	23	..	1	43	..
Zambia	42	96	2	16	..	2	47	49
Zimbabwe	96	126	6	15	..	..	40 <sup>2</sup>	47
<b>SATBVC STATES</b>								
South Africa	..	67	..	60	..	9	39 <sup>3</sup>	33 <sup>3</sup>
Transkei	..	74	..	54	..	..	..	69 <sup>4</sup>
Bophuthatswana	..	74	..	68	..	..	..	51 <sup>4</sup>
Venda	..	107	..	62	..	..	..	42 <sup>4</sup>
Ciskei	..	93	..	56	..	..	..	42 <sup>4</sup>

**NOTES:**

1 Gross enrolment ratio: the enrolled number of pupils expressed as a percentage of the total number of children in their age group. As the enrolment figures in African countries also include older people such as adults receiving education, the enrolment ratios tend to exceed 100% in many countries, particularly in the case of primary education.

2 1975 figure.

3 Primary and secondary levels.

4 1984 figures.

**SOURCES:** 9, 21, 22, 35, 38

TABLE 41

**UNIVERSITIES IN AFRICA**  
**Latest available information**

Country	University*	Year founded	Students	Country	University*	Year founded	Students
Algeria	Alger	1879	17 086	Madagascar	Madagascar (Antananarivo)	1961	21 000
	Houari Boumedienne (Algiers)	1974	11 500	Malawi	Malawi (Zomba)	1964	1 877
	Annaba	1975	6 126	Mali	—	—	—
	Boumerdes	1981	..	Mauritania	Nouakchott	1983	1 000
	Constantine	1969	8 340	Mauritius	Mauritius (Reduit)	1965	388
	Oran	1965	9 000	Morocco	Cadi Ayyad (Marrakesh)	1978	15 000
	Sétif	1978	5 800		Mohammed Ben Abdallah (Fez)	1975	17 000
	Sciences & Technologie (Oran)	1975	..		Mohammed I (Oujda)	1978	7 000
Angola	Angola (Luanda)	1963	3 146		Mohammed V (Rabat)	1957	39 000
Benin	Benin (Cotonou)	1970	4 335		Quaraouyine (Fez)	859	5 000
Botswana	Botswana (Gaborone)	1976	1 031		Hassan II (Casablanca)	1976	21 000
Burundi	Burundi (Bujumbura)	1960	2 000	Mozambique	Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo)	1962	836
Cameroon	Yaoundé	1962	10 000	Niger	Niamey	1973	1 825
Cape Verde	—	—	—	Nigeria	Ahmadu Bello (Zaria)	1962	14 806
Central African Republic	Bangui	1969	2 000		Technology Akure	1981	..
Chad	Tchad (N'Djamena)	1971	800		Technology Anambra State (Enugu)	1980	1 000
Comoros	—	—	—		Technology Bauchi	1980	500
Congo	Marien-Ngouabi (Brazzaville)	1961	7 420		Bayero (Kano)	1975	2 997
Djibouti	—	—	—		Bendel State (Ekpoma)	1981	1 300
Egypt	Ain Shams (Cairo)	1950	122 000		Imo State (Etihi)	1981	800
	Alexandria	1942	92 000		Benin (Benin City)	1970	8 000
	Al-Azhar (Cairo)	970	90 000		Calabar	1975	4 000
	American (Cairo)	1919	2 000		Ibadan	1962	10 281
	Assiut	1957	42 000		Ife (Ile-Ife)	1961	9 176
	Cairo	1908	114 000		Ilorin	1976	4 000
	Helwain (Cairo)	1975	33 000		Jos	1975	5 000
	Mansoura	1972	45 000		Lagos	1962	10 000
	Menia	1976	16 000		Maiduguri	1975	5 000
	Menufia	1976	17 000		Technology Makurdi	1980	500
	Suez Canal (Ismalia)	1976	10 000		Nigeria (Nsukka)	1960	13 000
	Tanta	1972	36 000		Obafemi Awolowo (Ado-Ekiti)	1982	150
	Zagazig	1974	71 000		Technology Owerri	1980	400
Equatorial Guinea	—	—	—		Port Harcourt	1975	4 000
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	1961	11 200		Science & Technology Rivers State (Port Harcourt)	1975	3 186
	Asmara	1958	600		Sokoto	1975	2 000
Gabon	Omar Bongo (Libreville)	1970	2 651		Technology Yola	1981	250
Ghana	Ghana (Accra)	1961	3 707		Ogun State (Ago-Iwoye)	1983	1 500
	Science & Technology (Kumasi)	1961	3 072	Rwanda	Rwanda (Butare)	1963	683
	Cape Coast	1962	1 450	Sao Tomé	—	—	—
Guinea	—	—	—	Senegal	Dakar (Dakar-Fann)	1957	12 000
Guinea Bissau	—	—	—	Seychelles	—	—	—
Ivory Coast	National University (Abidjan)	1964	12 656	Sierre Leone	Sierre Leone (Freetown)	1967	2 500
Kenya	Nairobi	1970	5 567	Somalia	Somalia (Mogadishu)	1954	3 810
Lesotho	National University (Roma)	1966	1 060	South Africa	Cape Town	1918	12 000
Liberia	Liberia (Monrovia)	1951	3 216		Durban-Westville	1960	6 000
Libya	Alfateh (Tripoli)	1973	7 500		Medical University of SA (Garankuwa)	1976	1 000
	Bright Star Univ of Technology (Al-Brega)	1981	250		Natal (Pietermaritzburg-Durban)	1949	9 000
	Ghar Yunis (Benghazi)	1955	9 410				

(Continued on next page)



**TABLE 41** (Continued from previous page)

Country	University	Year founded	Students	Country	University	Year founded	Students
South Africa (continued)	Orange Free State (Bloemfontein)	1949	8 000	Sudan	Gezira (Wadi Medani)	1975	600
	Port Elizabeth	1964	3 500		Juba	1975	425
	Potchefstroom for CHE	1951	8 000		Khartoum	1956	14 000
	Pretoria	1930	17 000		Cairo (Khartoum)	1955	20 000
					Omdurman Islamic	1965	2 000
	Rand Afrikaans (Johannesburg)	1966	6 000	Swaziland	Swaziland (Kwaluseni)	1982	1 100
	Rhodes (Grahamstown)	1949	3 000	Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	1970	4 000
	South Africa (Pretoria)	1873	61 000	Togo	Université du Benin (Lomé)	1965	4 447
	Stellenbosch	1918	12 000	Tunisia	Tunis	1958	30 000
	Western Cape (Bellville)	1960	6 000	Uganda	Makarere (Kampala)	1970	4 739
	Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)	1922	17 000	Upper Volta	Ouagadougou	1969	1 681
	Zululand (Kwa-Dlangezwa)	1960	4 000	Zaire	Kinshasa	1954	5 858
Bophuthatswana	Bophuthatswana (Mmabatho)	1979	1 500		Kinsangani	1963	978
Ciskei	Fort Hare (Alice)	1970	3 200		Lubumbashi	1955	4 370
Transkei	Transkei (Umtata)	1977	3 000	Zambia	Zambia (Lusaka Campus) (Ndola Campus)	1965	3 177
Venda	Venda (Thohoyandou)	1981	150	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe (Harare)	1970	4 000

\*Name of city where university is located in parentheses if not the same as that of university.

**SOURCE:** 40



Refugees, a familiar sight in Africa.

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