THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL March 17, 1988

TO:	FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
FROM:	Rebecca G. Range REBECCA RANGE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON
REQUEST:	Address young scientists working on SDI projects.
PURPOSE:	To build public support for the SDI program.
BACKGROUND:	In the five years since the President announced the inception of the SDI program there has been greater than expected progress in developing a defense against ballistic missiles. However, progress in the future may be much slower due to Congress' cutting Administration budget requests. It is essential at this time to increase awareness of the need for SDI, the program's achievements and the threats to the viability of the program coming from Capitol Hill. A speech to bright young scientists who are working on SDI projects would be a perfect opportunity to make this case, and would provide inspiration to those working on the project.
PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:	None
DATE:	Open (late March) DURATION: 20 minutes
LOCATION:	Room 450 OEOB
PARTICIPANTS:	200 young SDI scientists, TBD with NSC
OUTLINE OF EVENT:	The President would follow senior Administration spokesmen in an "SDI Briefing" and make remarks.
REMARKS REQUIRED:	Address
MEDIA COVERAGE:	TBD
RECOMMENDED BY:	Rebecca Range
PROJECT OFFICER:	Max Green, x6270

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RECOMMENDED BY: Rebecca Range, NSC Staff (Steiner)

PROJECT OFFICER: Max Green, x6270

. . . But the Soviets would love it if we dropped SDI

By Edward L. Rowny

It seems a day never passes that I am not asked by a journalist or a scientist about the "grand compromise." They ask me such questions as: "What compromise can we make on SDI to get the START deal?" "Will the compromise take the form of an explicit trade-off or will it be 'finessed' with intentionally vague language?" "Isn't President Reagan planning to sign a START treaty on his watch and 'kick the can'—that is, the SDI question—down the road to his successors?"

I'm afraid that those who ask such questions fail to understand Ronald Reagan. These fanciers of the "grand compromise" are out of touch with the President's thinking and leadership on strategic defense, which, according to opinion surveys, is consistently supported by the majority of the American people.

The "grand compromise" formulation turns the problem and the solution inside out. The problem is the Soviets' drive for strategic superiority, manifested in their massive offensive build-up and their unwillingness, as yet, to agree to equitable and verifiable strategic arms reductions. The Soviets have also run up a record of violating the ABM treaty and other arms control agreements. The Strategic Defense Initiative, on the other hand, has the same purpose and supports the same goals as sound arms control; its aim is to enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of war.

When I first began to advise President Reagan in 1979, he was already concerned with the issue of strategic defense. He believed the so-called doctrine of mutual assured destruction was deeply inconsistent with the American ethos. He asked me if there were not a safer, more civilized way to protect ourselves than to "hold a gun at the other fellow's head just because he has a gun at yours." I replied that the concept of a shield against ballistic missiles was not considered feasible to the scientific experts.



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President Reagan was determined, however, to make strategy drive technology, and I heard him ask that question again and again. In 1983, his science and defense advisers replied that technology was far enough along to warrant an SDI research program.

On March 23, SDI will mark its fifth anniversary. I have observed its progress hopefully but realistically. Today I am much encouraged by SDI's progress in such categories as sensors and optics, energy sources, miniaturization, survivability and battle management.

It is now clear that a mix of strategic defense systems with offensive systems is not simply possible but inevitable. While it is too early to foresee with certainty SDI's architecture or its cost, I am encouraged that an effective layered defense can be developed according to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization's current estimates—about $10 billion a year, less than 3 percent of the total defense budget.

SDI is going to make possible a return to the common-sense view that effective defenses, which threaten no one, contribute to peace and stability. When we signed the ABM treaty, the U.S. declared that the restrictions it placed on defense were premised on the necessity of achieving agreement on more complete limitations on offensive strategic nuclear arsenals than were provided for under SALT I.

However, the promise of deep and stabilizing offensive nuclear cuts has not yet been fulfilled. Instead, the arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons have continued to grow, with the largest growth by far on the part of the Soviet Union, which has about four times the number of strategic nuclear weapons it had when the ABM treaty was signed. It continued this build-up under the SALT I agreement and during and after negotiation of the flawed SALT II treaty.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have deployed and modernized the full complement of strategic defense systems permitted by the treaty. Moreover, they have violated the ABM treaty, giving the U.S. government reason to believe they may be planning an illegal nationwide territorial ABM defense system. In addition, the Soviets are pursuing a robust strategic defense program costing an estimated $20 billion annually. The Soviet leadership has never embraced the mutual assured destruction concept. It has, in fact, followed an action plan based on fighting and winning a nuclear war, despite rhetoric to the contrary.

No nation is as strong a proponent of strategic defenses as the Soviet Union and no nation is more strongly opposed to our SDI than the Soviet Union. Clearly, there is a message in this.

The Soviets have had a near-monopoly on strategic defenses for many years. In the Soviet view, a U.S. decision at this point to give up on defense and to rely solely on offensive weapons for deterrence not only would preserve the Soviet monopoly in strategic defense, but would be a key indicator of a loss of U.S. will to compete militarily. Failure to proceed with an American strategic defense would hand the Soviets a unilateral military advantage of historic consequence—with awesomely negative implications for strategic stability and peace.

Edward L. Rowny is a special adviser for arms control to President Reagan and the secretary of state.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE, MARCH 18, 1988

NEWSWATCH
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DESPITE SDI'S TECHNICAL PROGRESS "ANTIS" CLING TO EMPTY ARGUMENTS

by Susan G. Long

Despite the rapid technical progress achieved in all areas of SDI research since the program's inception in 1983, and the countless successful experiments which have demonstrated clearly that defenses against nuclear ballistic missiles are possible with current technology, critics of SDI continue their public and predictable tirade against SDI.

The left's temper tantrum over SDI, like most strictly emotional spectacles, relies solely on claims which although long ago refuted still alarm and ignite.

What is most maddening about the left's temper tantrum over SDI is that, like most strictly emotional spectacles, it relies solely on claims which although long ago refuted still carry enough residual clout to alarm and ignite the uninformed audience.

The arguments most preferred by the anti-SDI lobby are those which behave like "triggers" to elicit a familiar, negative response – it will cost a trillion dollars, it will be destabilizing, it can't be 100 percent perfect. Rather than truths based on engineering or scientific reality, they are but another form of political propaganda.

To quote former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, "No major technical roadblocks stand between us and the deployment of the first phase of SDI. The roadblocks are almost entirely political."

Yet, like the deliberately perpetrated hoax of "Nuclear Winter" put forth by Carl Sagan and others, the political rhetoric and oversimplistic arguments continue to surface in college debates, on local radio and television stations, and receive wide circulation in the daily press. Uninformed reporters are as guilty as the average lay audience of failing to dig below the surface of the claims to see if there is any credibility to be found.

The arguments most preferred are those which behave like "triggers" to elicit a familiar, negative response.

A simple analysis of the typical debate, for example, would expose the essential contradictions in the arguments:

Opponent: SDI won't work.

Supporter: If SDI won't work, why are the Soviets so opposed to it?

Opponent: Because it will be destabilizing.

Supporter: How can it be destabilizing if the Soviets know it won't work?

Opponent: Because it will start an arms race and the Soviets will try to overwhelm the system or build countermeasures to get around it.

Supporter: Why would they need to overwhelm or countermeasure a system that won't work?

And so it goes. Said former Arms Control and Disarmament Director Ken Adelman recently, "The truth is that the Soviets are not seeking a world without SDI. They are seeking a West without SDI."

In an "anti"-sponsored forum on Capitol Hill, the best and the worst in the SDI debate spoke to the question: Is the Strategic Defense Initiative in the National Interest? SDIO chief Lt. General James Abrahamson and former Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle debated anti-SDI scientist Richard Garwin and pop cosmologist Carl Sagan.

"The truth is that the Soviets are not seeking a world without SDI. They are seeking a West without SDI."

—Kenneth Adelman

Garwin, who still maintains that a good terminal defense would be "burying bombs across the northern territory of the country and blowing it up in such a way that the dust will stop the warheads on the way in," derided SDI as a stumbling block to further arms reductions. When pressed about why SDI would be a stumbling block, Garwin said, "I think the Soviets are so unhappy about the U.S. SDI because they don't like to sign an

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Inside:

A SHIELD, NOT A SWORD

Why SDI Is Not Offensive

A recent *Backgrounder* Report published by The Heritage Foundation (January 21, 1988), exposes the fallacies behind opposition claims that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is merely a cover for a U.S. effort to develop space-based offensive weapons or a shield behind which the U.S. might launch a first strike on the Soviet Union.

Heritage called such claims "part of the Soviet propaganda campaign against SDI" and said "U.S. opponents of SDI echo similar views."

The publication, entitled, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: A Shield, Not a Sword,* comprehensively explained why these arguments are without merit.

SDI Provides No New Strategic Capabilities

There are several problems with the suggestion that SDI will use lasers to destroy military targets on the earth's surface and to start urban conflagrations. For one thing, there are serious technical difficulties in using laser weapons to strike down through the Earth's atmosphere; cloud cover over a target area, for instance, dissipates laser beam intensity. For another, even if defensive technologies could start "urban conflagrations," this would not give the U.S. a militarily meaningful capability in the age of nuclear-armed ICBMs.

There is no way, moreover, that SDI weapons could destroy missiles in their silos or other hardened military targets as confidently and effectively as highly accurate nuclear-armed ICBMs. Without being able to approach the capability of ICBMs, the impact of SDI technologies on the offensive strategic military balance is likely to be no more than marginal.

SDI opponent Robert English, a member of the group that calls itself the Committee for National Security, claims that: "While the presence of thick clouds would impede a laser strike, an attacker has the luxury of waiting until conditions are ideal (the defender does not)." This ignores the obvious facts that the U.S. has neither a first-strike policy nor capability and that, if hostilities were already under way, it would be ridiculous in an age of high-speed weapons, such as ICBMs, to wait for good weather before striking. A laser weapon that must wait for good weather or a favorable position in orbit to be used provides little added offensive capability to U.S. strategic forces.

Space-based Offenses Incompatible with U.S. Targeting Policy

Use of SDI lasers in an offensive role to cause urban incineration makes no sense in terms of current or projected U.S. national security policy. For nearly two decades, official U.S. strategic policy has placed the highest target priority on the Soviet military, its political leadership, and critical economic targets. The objective is to strike such targets with as few non-combatant deaths and as little residual damage as possible. To the extent that militarily important targets that are underground, well defended, or otherwise protected can be attacked at all, they can be struck far more effectively with nuclear weapons than with any present or prospective SDI weapons, such as lasers or other directed-energy devices. And even if it were U.S. policy to cause urban conflagrations (which it is not), it could do so far more effectively with nuclear weapons than with any know defensive technologies.

A U.S. First Strike Is Impossible

Moscow's assertion that Washington might use space-based strategic defenses as a shield behind which the U.S. might launch as nuclear first strike is contradicted by the U.S. force structure. While the Soviet Union has developed and deployed a first-strike nuclear force, the U.S. has not. The Soviets have deployed 1,398 large land-based ICBMs, giving Moscow a superiority of 3 to 1 in overall nuclear throw-weight and 10 to 1 in hard target kill throw-weight. Moscow has 5,240 nuclear warheads on its first-strike capable SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, or five times the number of such weapons needed to destroy the entire U.S. land-based nuclear deterrent force.

By contrast, the U.S. has operational only 14 MX ICBMs and 300 Minuteman missiles with the new MK 12A warhead. These missiles carry a total of 1,040 of those warheads whose total yield and accuracy make them first-strike capable weapons, although the capability of the 300 Minutemen is questionable. Even including the Minutemen, this is not nearly enough warheads for the U.S. to contemplate a first strike. It would require at least three warheads for each Soviet ICBM or 4,200 first-strike capable warheads. This is nearly four times as many as the U.S. has operational.

Insufficient numbers of U.S. first-strike offensive weapons prevents the U.S. from contemplating a first strike, even if it wanted to do so. SDI does not change this fact in any way. Even if the U.S. wanted to launch a first strike behind a SDI shield, it would not be able to do so. On the other hand, Moscow's huge arsenal of such weapons means that the Soviet first-strike threat to the U.S. would be greatly increased if Moscow were to deploy comprehensive strategic defenses.

Offensive SDI Would Face Effective Countermeasures

SDI opponents curiously are silent about possible Soviet countermeasures to an offensive use of SDI. This is in sharp contrast to the host of countermeasures that SDI opponents envision against the defensive use of SDI. Yet, even cursory examination reveals that it is likely to be far easier to develop countermeasures to space-based offensive attacks against targets on land than it is to develop countermeasures for SDI

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Vol. V No. 3

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From the Editor

Dear Readers:

If you listen carefully to the litany of negative arguments about SDI, you can't help but be struck by the obvious contradictions. Are the naysayers against SDI because it *won't* work or because it *will*? If the defenses are impossible, why worry about their destabilizing effects on the Soviets? And how do you figure out how much an *impossible* defense would cost?

Few opponents will admit they oppose SDI because they actually support Mutual Assured Destruction. That would mean advocating nuclear terror as the status quo. Ironically, those who are genuinely afraid of nuclear weapons never realize that, by supporting MAD, they are actually perpetuating the condition that causes their fears—a precarious balance of nuclear terror.

There are many who have staked their political, academic, or journalistic reputations on the proposition that accomodation with the Soviet Union via arms control negotiations is the only answer to the nuclear dilemma. For them, opposing SDI is the only way to go.

But the proven success of the SDI program makes it harder and harder to claim that strategic defense is impossible. Hence, the purely emotional approach.

As with its predecessor, the Nuclear Freeze, the anti-SDI movement will soon be forced to admit that there is an alternative to freeze or fry. That alternative is SDI.

Terri Lukach

IN BRIEF

REAGAN CLEARS SPACE BOOSTER FOR 1990s

President Reagan recently gave his approval for a joint Defense Department/NASA effort to develop the Advanced Launch System (ALS), a new unmanned super booster for the 1990s.

The Soviet Union already has the world's largest booster, the Energia, which they say "can lift the blocks from which cities will be formed" in space.

The ALS rocket will be based on new technology and capable of carrying more than 100,000 pounds of payload into low orbit. One goal of the program is to reduce the launch price per pound from about $3,600 to $400.

Currently, NASA's manned space shuttle and the Air Force's new Titan IV rocket can only safely orbit fewer than 40,000 pounds of cargo. The ALS rocket will be able to carry more than twice the cargo of the Titan IV.

SOVIETS CAPABLE OF LAUNCH ON DEMAND

According to Vice Admiral William E. Ramsey, deputy commander-in-chief of the U.S. Space Command, the Soviets possess a tremendous security advantage over the U.S. because of their ability to launch satellites on demand while the U.S. can only launch on schedule.

Ramsey said the Soviet Union's ability to "launch in hours" gives the Kremlin a responsiveness and flexibility in a crisis that the Pentagon lacks.

Soviet space analyst Nicholas Johnson told a recent space conference that "within a few days, if not the next day" the Soviets can "see" any spot on Earth with their satellites.

The U.S.'s fewer,although more sophisticated, satellites are ironically less able to maneuver to any given spot as easily, Johnson said. He added that the low-tech Soviet satellites are also less susceptible to the effects of radiation from nuclear weapons explosions than the high-tech American models.

BRAZIL SIGNS MISSILE CONTRACT WITH LIBYA

The Brazilian government's missile and rocket building company, ORBITA, over objections from the U.S., has signed a $2 billion contract to build intermediate-range nuclear missiles for Libya.

Despite the recent treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union banning intermediate nuclear forces, the ability to build this class of missiles by other-than-superpower countries is widespread.

Now that Brazil has made the decision to build and sell INF missiles to Third World countries, it is expected they will experience no shortage of customers.

SPOTTING MIR

The light you see streaking across the sky some star-filled evening may be the Soviet Union's space station, Mir.

According to the National Space Society, the most surprising thing about Mir is that most people don't know it exists.

"We want to let people know that the Soviets have a serious, aggressive space program," said the Society's deputy executive director, Greg Barr.

For the past year, Soviet cosmonauts in Mir have orbited 200 miles above the Earth performing hosts of sophisticated scientific and reconnaisance tasks while U.S. plans for a space station have been thwarted by budget cuts and repercussions following the Challenger tragedy.

If you would like to try to spot the Soviet space station, the National Space Society's hot line, answered by a Mir expert, will tell you where and when to look to see the best of Mir's upcoming 90-minute orbits. Radio conversations between the cosmonauts have reportedly been picked up on 143.625 MegaHerz using an air and police band radio.

The hotline's number is (202) 546-6010. People who spot the space station qualify for an "I saw Mir" button from the Society.

SHORT ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS

Opposition to the President's Strategic Defense Initiative has always been *political*, not technical as demonstrated by the fact that opponents almost never argue the facts, but choose instead to set up "straw men" arguments which can be easily defeated. They conveniently avoid debating the real question which is whether or not it's a good idea to defend the American homeland.

In the five years since the program was officially launched on March 23, 1983, not a single new argument has come forward and one doesn't need to be a "technical" expert to debate the merits of each.

In one small and easy-to-understand brochure called **20 Questions**, High Frontier has provided short answers to the most frequently asked questions about the Strategic Defense Initiative. Those used most often by opponents are listed below.

Q: Don't scientists say it can't be done?

A: There are some scientists who say SDI is impossible, but what they are *really* saying is that a *100% perfect* defense is impossible (the straw man argument). But neither the President nor any other supporter has ever asked for perfection. Even a 50% *effective* defense can be 100% *efficient* by deterring any deliberate attack in the first place and easily coping with any accidental or madman nuclear launch.

The fact is we could begin building defenses *today* using mature, non-nuclear technology and have a robust, three-layered defense in place with 6-8 years.

For every Orville Wright, there has been an Orville Wrong. There will always be scientists who say "it can't be done" and scientists who say they can. They're both right – those who say they can't, can't. And those who say they can, can.

Q: Won't SDI cost a trillion dollars?

A: Reputable analysts both inside and outside government place the cost of building a robust strategic defense at somewhere between $30 billion and $60 billion, depending on which component parts are selected for the final "architecture." The trillion dollar figure is a shibboleth created by opponents like the Union of Concerned Scientists with no basis in reality.

SDI *might* cost as much as $10 billion a year, or about three percent of the Defense budget. Meanwhile, it would *save* a trillion dollars in costs for offensive modernization which would no longer be necessary and put trillions into the civil economy through increased production and spin-off technologies.

Q: Even if SDI is 95 percent effective, won't 5 percent of Soviet missiles cause terrible damage?

A: Strangely enough, this argument always begins with the war already started. Again, there is a vast distinction between *effective* and *efficient*. No sane Russian would attack if he knew only 5 percent of his missiles would get through. What this question really asks is what would happen if they attacked anyway? If they attacked anyway today, *100 percent* of the missiles would get through.

Q: Doesn't SDI protect just missiles and not people?

A: No. With today's technology, it would be almost impossible to design a defense that does not protect both our retaliatory forces and our people.

Consider this: How many of the six or seven thousand of the existing Soviet missile warheads do you think are aimed a your hometown rather than at our missile launchers and SAC bases? Two or three, perhaps – if they really wanted to destroy your town. If 95 percent of those warheads are destroyed when launched, what is the chance of those two or three aimed at your town getting through? Awfully small is the answer. So does SDI protect your hometown and missiles, too? You bet it does!

Q: Why not trade SDI away for a reduction in weapons. Wouldn't that reduce the risk of nuclear war?

A: Even with greatly reduced nuclear arsenals, we would still be on the nuclear treadmill – depending on the awesome destruction power of *offensive* nuclear weapons and a policy of revenge. But revenge is not defense. SDI is a change of strategy based not on assured destruction but on assured survival. SDI is a way to save lives, not merely avenge them.

The larger question is shouldn't we place all our hopes on arms control treaties instead of technology, on Soviet integrity rather than American ingenuity. If it came down to a bet, I'd bet on American ingenuity.

Q: Couldn't the Soviets "simply" overwhelm any defense? What about other Soviet countermeasures?

A: When the calvary, once considered to be the "ultimate weapon," was defeated by advances in defensive technology, did the Army go out and buy twice as many horses? Neither will the Soviets build more missiles when the "ultimate weapon," the long-range ballistic missile, is suddenly made less useful by a measure of strategic defense. However, if they were foolish enough to try, with a 50 percent effective defense in *only one layer* would take not 3000 but 6000 Soviet warheads to overwhelm the defense. With a three-layered, 50 percent effective defense it would take 29,000 warheads or

more than 3 1/2 times their entire inventory. With a 90% effective defense in three layers, it would take not 3000 but 3,888,000 warheads to overwhelm the defense. I wonder how long and how much it would cost the Soviets to build that many warheads, not to mention delivery systems.

Other "countermeasures" like space mines and fast-burn boosters have not been invented yet, they are merely measures we are anticipating as a precaution. According to the founder and former director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, Dr. Robert Jastrow, "Probably a heavy ICBM as a fast-burn rocket could not be built at all" but even if it could it would cost the Soviets $900 billion to do so and a U.S. defense at $100 billion would be cheap by comparison. As to space mines, Jastrow says space mines cannot be deployed or kept in orbit covertly and present NORAD capabilities allow tracking of small objects in space out to 1,000 miles. Moreover, the SDI space platforms would not be sitting ducks but able to both maneuver and defend themselves.

Q: Wouldn't SDI militarize space?

A: No. Space was "militarized" in 1945 during WW II when the Germans fired over 1000 V-2 rockets through space at London and Antwerp. Those who speak of militarizing space refuse to admit that long-range missiles are space weapons. Once launched, they travel through space to deliver destruction. SDI's mission is to prevent the use of space by the weapons that would surely militarize it. In that sense, SDI *de*-militarizes space.

Q: Aren't the Soviets justified in believing we are creating a shield so that we can strike them with impunity?

A: No. And they don't believe it nor do our own SDI opponents who make the charge. The Soviets know that if we harbored any ideas about nuclear attack against them we would have done so long ago when they had no way to retailiate. With SDI in place, they know they can't contemplate a first strike, and they also know U.S. and Allied political systems rule out a first strike.

Q: Doesn't SDI get in the way of peaceful uses of space?

A: No. SDI has already created a demand for more and better space transportation and that is the key to all U.S. and allied space efforts—commercial uses, scientific uses, and further exploration. The uses of space technology for our security and for other purposes have always gone hand-in-hand and will continue to do so. Photography from space serves both military intelligence purposes and the needs of geologists, meteorologists, oceanographers and other civilian efforts. The boosters that place defense satellites in orbit also place scientific instruments and TV relay satellites in orbit. It is a myth that space technology can be neatly divided into military and non-military categories.

Q: What about cruise missiles and bombers which SDI doesn't defend against.

A: These are not weapons which can be used in a deliberate attack. It takes too long for them to reach their targets—8 to 16 hours if launched from the U.S.S.R., weeks if sent over on ships and submarines. They are retaliatory weapons. We can prevent a retaliatory attack by not attacking first, and we can already cope with an accidental or rogue nation attack involving cruise missiles or bombers.

FIRST STRIKE MISSION REQUIREMENTS

Critics who say that the Soviets would simply overwhelm any U.S. defenses with additional offensive missiles should consider the table below. Even a 50% efficient defense in only one layer requires not 1,000 but 6,000 Soviet RVs for the same mission—more than their current inventory.

A conservative estimate of High Frontier's three-layer SD^3 system recommended in October, 1986 is 70% per layer. To overcome SD^3 and achieve a successful first strike, the Soviets would have to launch 142,000 warheads to have the necessary confidence that the attack would succeed. Not even the command economy of the Soviet Union could afford to build that many nuclear warheads and the necessary launchers—not to mention how long it would take. There is an important distinction between efficiency and effectiveness in evaluating strategic defense. A 90% efficient defense can be 100% effective by making the success of an attack so improbable as to assure it will never be launched.

NUMBER OF RVs NEEDED TO ACHIEVE 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL

DEFENSE EFFICIENCY	ONE LAYER	TWO LAYERS	THREE LAYERS
50%	6,000	14,000	29,000
60%	8,000	22,000	59,000
70%	11,000	41,000	142,000
80%	18,000	95,000	484,000

EMPTY ARGUMENTS
continued from Page 1

agreement with an insane partner . . . they think that the SDI will not work against a Soviet first strike, and they ask what we want it for. There is no real explanation why." So, the Soviets are against SDI because they think we're crazy?

Mr. Perle pointed out that even if deep cuts like the ones currently under discussion were to occur, offensive nuclear weapons would be reduced only to about 6,000 which would still "leave enormous scope for horrendous damage. To go utterly undefended in the face of nuclear forces of that scale," Perle said, "would be dangerous and unwise."

General Abrahamson and Mr. Perle also disputed the opposition's instability claims by arguing that there is no fundamental difference in concept between an adequate deterrent and the active defenses that could serve as a last resort if indeed deterrence failed, or an accident occurred.

In this debate, as always, Dr. Garwin, a member of the American Physical Society and Dr. Carl Sagan, a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists, dutifully deployed the same old figures and fallacies to illustrate that SDI would be detrimental to the world's security.

Sagan: "SDI is fine, if it is perfect .. the near perfect reliability required for Star Wars .. is simply not achievable." Sagan also cited "$1 to $3 trillion dollar range" costs.

However, when contacted on several occasions, the Union of Concerned Scientists was repeatedly unable to come up with any figures, background, or rationale to support the $1 trillion cost estimate which they initiated and which has become a "buzz" word of the anti-SDI lobby.

Said Perle, "The simple fact is that SDI is affordable and manageable, particularly if one looks at the enormous investment that we now make in offensive forces, and can look forward to a future in which we can reduce that emphasis on offense and use the consequent budget reduction to finance SDI.

"It is all very well to talk about a trillion dollars in some future program. But that is not the program we are operating. No request has been made for a trillion dollars," Perle said.

The Union of Concerned Scientists is fond of publicizing figures that upon analysis are meaningless. Like the American Physical Society, which was forced by its chairman to admit to bogus use of statistics to generate an anti-SDI argument in their report, the UCS has had to retract some of its other factoids.

For example, in its first SDI report in March, 1984, the UCS said that SDI would require lasers placed on 2,400 battle stations.

"Over time, they have finally come to the point that, in fact, it is not 2,400 but on the order of 46-59 battle stations," said General Abrahamson.

Speaking to the necessity of perfection put forward by Dr. Sagan, Mr. Perle said the "perfect defense" is a straw man erected by the opposition to divert attention from the fact that there are objectives and purposes of the SDI program other than the construction of a perfect defense.

"Is there not something in between perfection and absolutely nothing that makes sense, that is in our national security interests, that might protect lives if a disaster should happen," Perle asked.

"One of those objectives is to strengthen deterrence by diminishing the Soviet capacity to execute an effective attack. Another one, a vital one, is to deal with precisely the kind of accident Dr. Sagan referred to in another context, Chernobyl."

It's clear that the arguments put forth by the Sagans and Garwins are not arguments based on facts but on emotion.

The latest amusing twist, however, is that even hard-core SDI dissenters like Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis), whose amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill cut back SDI tests, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn have found it politically necessary to endorse the insurance policy of at least a limited defense. Nunn caused a sensation by owning up to the fact that nuclear vulnerability is not a strategy that promotes a secure future for the Free World.

Perhaps Nunn's conversion demonstrates that the anti-SDI lobby is tiring of their own argument that nothing less than a perfect shield would be useful or worthy of the cost. Now that a prominent Democrat has endorsed the concept of at least a limited defense, it will be interesting to watch what happens to the old cliches. Will they say—Anything but a limited SDI won't work . . . anything but a limited SDI would be destabilizing . . . anything but a limited defense would militarize space . . . anything but a limited SDI would be too expensive . . . ?

In concluding that Capitol Hill debate, moderator Congressman Edward Markey (D-MA) recited the familiar litany of old questions and then cautioned Americans not to put their faith in technological solutions but in politically-negotiated solutions.

Richard Perle reminded the audience of the danger of putting American ingenuity at the mercy of Soviet integrity. He recalled the difficult decision facing President Truman in the 1940s. "The scientific community was 90% against the development of the hydrogen bomb. Yet even as the U.S. debate raged, a young Soviet physicist named Andre Sakharov had already been assigned by Stalin the task of developing the hydrogen bomb.

"Had Harry Truman waited to see the facts as they emerged from the research, had Harry Truman decided with Robert Oppenheimer and not with Edward Teller, the Soviet Union would have emerged in the late 1940s or early 1950s with a monopoly of thermonuclear weapons.

"I leave it to you to conclude how the face of the globe, how the values that Carl Sagan and Dick Garwin and General Abrahamson and I all share, might have been altered," Perle said.

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Dr. Edward Teller
IMPORTANT SUPPORT FOR SDI

On February 19 of this year, America's preeminent nuclear physicist, Dr. Edward Teller, testified to the U.S. Senate that the United States can, and indeed, *must,* deploy the kinetic energy defensive systems (KEW) currently available, and continue to research directed energy weapons (DEW) to ensure the future effectiveness of SDI.


Dr. Edward Teller

High Frontier applauds and supports Dr. Teller's views, and deplores the recent attempts by anti-SDI scientists at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories to discredit Dr. Teller. It was Teller's great prestige which made his early support of SDI instrumental in President Reagan's adoption of the program.

We also note with satisfaction that Dr. John Nuckolls, who was recently nominated to head up the Livermore labs, joins Dr. Teller in support of SDI.

SDI SPIN-OFF CAN CLEANSE BLOOD

A Texas medical research team, financed in part by Pentagon SDI funding, has used a laser to clear donated blood samples of viruses and other infectious agents.

The Baylor University Medical Center team reported that a combination of non-toxic dye and laser light could destroy a number of viruses in blood, including the AIDS virus, without harming the blood itself.

Although the procedure is experimental, the team's director, Dr. James Matthews, thinks that within five years, the system may be refined enough to cleanse a pint of blood every fifteen minutes.

The research findings were recently disclosed by DoD officials in discussions of the potential medical and scientific spin-off benefits of SDI research.

LATEST DEFENSE CUTS DELAY DEPLOYMENT ANOTHER YEAR

The latest round of Congressional cuts in Defense has cost the FY 1988 SDI budget $1.7 billion, delaying Phase I programs and testing and pushing the overall date for a deployment decision back at least a year. An "informed decision" is now not expected before 1993.

SDIO's Director of Program Planning Dr. Richard Bleach said funding priorities had been set by top-level DoD officials who decided to cut the program the same amount in 1989 as had been cut in 1988. This, apparently, in keeping with Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci's pledge to Congress to reduce Defense spending.

The delays will cause all of the Phase I programs (BSTS, SSTS, GBSS and ERIS) to lose momentum, create potential cost increases and in the case of at least one program, BSTS (Boost Surveillance and Tracking System), reduce the systems performance.

Budgetary cuts in Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) will also take place.

The Space-Based Interceptor (SBI), the only space-based weapon in Phase I, will have its contracts altered for a lower level of technical activity and its flight tests restructured and delayed. Demonstration/validation test flights for ERIS will also be reduced.

SDI ANNIVERSARY
March 23, 1988

High Frontier's annual celebration of the SDI program will be held this year at Washington's Capitol Hilton Hotel. The gala black tie event is always a fun-filled evening for Star Warriors with lots of notables on hand.

For your tickets or more information, call Elizabeth McDonald at (202) 737-4979.

UPCOMING HIGH FRONTIER SEMINARS ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND SPACE POLICY

March 12,	Cleveland, OH
April 9,	Newark, NJ
April 21,	Boston, MA

For more information, contact Sheila Combs at (202) 737-4979.

PUBLIC LECTURE

Strategic Defense: Impossible Dream or Dire Necessity

by Gene Vosseler

Americans for the High Frontier

High Frontier's veteran writer, lecturer and activist, E. Gene Vosseler, in a follow-up to his successful tour of the Western United States continues his 32-city lecture tour of the East.

In an effort to help make SDI a major focus of the 1988 presidential debate, Vosseler has visited the New England cities of Burlington, Boston, Providence, Hartford, and New Haven; New York City; Mendham, NJ; Baltimore, MD; Philadelphia, PA; Washington, D.C.; Arlington and Richmond, VA; and Pinehurst, NC.

March and April will find Vosseler in Charlotte and Columbia, NC; Atlanta, GA; Birmingham and Mobile, AL; Orlando, Miami, and Sarasota, FL; New Orleans, LA; Nashville, TN; and Pittsburg, PA.

For more information, contact Kate Gordon at (202) 737-4979.

SWORD, NOT SHIELD
continued from Page 1

defensive attacks against Soviet missiles in space on their way to U.S. targets.

Most surface targets could be shielded, placed underground, or otherwise hardened to a very high degree against a space-based offense, and probably could be protected to a degree that would require laser power beyond the inherent capability of space-based or redirected weapons.

Concern about offensive attacks by ground-based laser beams, which are reflected and directed by space-based mirrors to targets on the ground, fails to consider that the mirrors themselves would have to be made sufficiently reflective to withstand the laser effects. But if mirrors could be developed to reflect high-energy laser beams without damage, then as a countermeasure, protective reflector mirrors could be placed on the ground as passive defenses to deflect laser beams away from high priority land-based targets.

Limited Military Value Against Soviet Targets

Even if SDI weapons had some offensive capability against stationary Soviet targets on the ground, it would be of limited future value. Moscow has given high priority to both defensive and offensive mobile weapons systems, thereby reducing their vulnerability to attack. The Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs are both mobile and difficult to target and track and there is some suspicion that even many fixed Soviet ICBM silos are empty and the missiles themselves are dispersed and hidden throughout the vastness of the Soviet land mass.

KEW Space Use Limited

The use in space of kinetic energy weapons to attack Soviet surface-based strategic targets is neither militarily nor economically effective. Kinetic energy weapons designed to be launched from platforms in space against targets on earth would require enormous and costly space-launch payloads to get all that equipment into orbit. Moreover, the weapons would suffer major problems on re-entering the earth's atmosphere. Even if designed to prevent burn-up upon re-entry, they would still have to contend with the problem of serious air drag and deteriorating accuracy. In addition, the terminal guidance system being considered for advanced U.S. strategic missile systems could not be applied to small spaced-based offensive kinetic energy weapons nor would they be sufficiently effective to produce anything approaching a credible alternative to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

Incompatible with Offensive Use

It is simply untrue that offensive kinetic energy weapons could be developed and deployed in space clandestinely as part of the SDI program. There are fundamental differences between the development and testing of kinetic energy offensive and defensive systems, involving different radars and sensors and different targeting and atmosphere penetration requirements. There is no way that an offensive space-based system could be deployed under the aegis of a defensive system. It is also incomprehensible that any U.S. administration would try to deploy a "covert" strategic offensive capability under the guise of a defensive one and close to impossible to carry out such a subterfuge in the open American society without Congress or the press learning about it, at least in peacetime.

Conclusion

Heritage concludes that assertions by Moscow and some American critics of SDI that the SDI program may have strategic offensive applications have been neither accurate nor objective.

The attempt to label SDI as offensive was compared to the attacks made against the development of the neutron bomb a decade ago. Many of the leading foes of that weapon have re-emerged as outspoken opponents of SDI, using similar arguments – arguments which closely match the positions of the Soviet Union.

These SDI opponents previously had put forth almost every conceivable reason why SDI defenses would not work while at the same time arguing that, if strategic defenses did work, they would dangerously destabilize the strategic balance. Now that it has become clear that SDI indeed is technically feasible, these same SDI opponents appear to claim that SDI technology is so highly feasible that it holds great offensive potential.

High Frontier
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Special
Report
No. 129

The Strategic Defense Initiative

June 1985

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program is designed to determine whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision.

The Strategic Context

The U.S. SDI research program is wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to research permitted by the ABM Treaty which the Soviets have been conducting for many years, and is a prudent hedge against Soviet breakout from ABM Treaty limitations through the deployment of a territorial ballistic missile defense. These important facts deserve emphasis. However, the basic intent behind the Strategic Defense Initiative is best explained and understood in terms of the strategic environment we face for the balance of this century and into the next.

The Challenges We Face. Our nation and those nations allied with us face a number of challenges to our security. Each of these challenges imposes its own demands and presents its own opportunities. Preserving peace and freedom is, and always will be, our fundamental goal. The essential purpose of our military forces, and our nuclear forces in particular, is to deter aggression and coercion based upon the threat of military aggression. The deterrence provided by U.S. and allied military forces has permitted us to enjoy peace and freedom. However, the nature of the military threat has changed and will continue to change in very fundamental ways in the next decade. Unless we adapt our response, deterrence will become much less stable and our susceptibility to coercion will increase dramatically.

Our Assumptions About Deterrence. For the past 20 years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. Our idea of what our forces had to hold at risk to deter aggression has changed over time. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation provided by offensive nuclear forces, as the essential means of deterring aggression, has not changed over this period.

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) process of the 1970s. At the time that process began, the United States con-

cluded that deterrence based on the capability of offensive retaliatory forces was not only sensible but necessary, since we believed at the time that neither side could develop the technology for defensive systems which could effectively deter the other side.

Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. Scientific developments and several emerging technologies now do offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist and could hardly have been conceived earlier. The state of the art of defense has now progressed to the point where it is reasonable to investigate whether new technologies can yield options, especially non-nuclear options, which could permit us to turn to defense not only to enhance deterrence but to allow us to move to a more secure and more stable long-term basis for deterrence.

Of equal importance, the Soviet Union has failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process began. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as the growing pattern of Soviet deception and of noncompliance with existing agreements, if permitted to continue unchecked over the long term, will undermine the essential military balance and the mutuality of vulnerability on which deterrence theory has rested.

Soviet Offensive Improvements. The Soviet Union remains the principal threat to our security and that of our allies. As a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its military capabilities, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard-target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the survivability of forces we have deployed to deter aggression. It has posed an especially immediate challenge to our land-based retaliatory forces and to the leadership structure that commands them. It equally threatens many critical fixed installations in the United States and in allied nations that support the nuclear retaliatory and conventional forces which provide our collective ability to deter conflict and aggression.

Improvement of Soviet Active Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development and improvement of active defenses. These active defenses provide the Soviet Union a steadily increasing capability to counter U.S. retaliatory forces and those of our allies, especially if our forces were to be degraded by a Soviet first strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are extensive. For example, the Soviet Union possesses the world's only currently deployed antiballistic missile system, deployed to protect Moscow. The Soviet Union is currently improving all elements of this system. It also has the world's only deployed antisatellite (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive air defense network, and it is aggressively improving the quality of its radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. It also has a very extensive network of ballistic missile early warning radars. All of these elements provide them an area of relative advantage in strategic defense today and, with logical evolutionary improvement, could provide the foundation of decisive advantage in the future.

Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. The Soviet Union is also spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership. These efforts range from providing rail and road mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] to extensive hardening of various critical installations.

Soviet Research and Development on Advanced Defenses. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a wide range of strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive elements. The resulting trends have shown steady improvement and expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current patterns of Soviet research and development, including a longstanding and intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas which our SDI program will address, indicate that these trends will continue apace for the foreseeable future. If unanswered, continued Soviet defensive improvements will further erode the effectiveness of our own existing deterrent, based as it is now almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation by offensive forces. Therefore, this longstanding Soviet program of defensive improvements, in itself, poses a challenge to deterrence which we must address.

Soviet Noncompliance and Verification. Finally, the problem of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in constructing either new phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia, has very immediate and ominous consequences. When operational, this radar, due to its location, will increase the Soviet Union's capability to deploy a territorial ballistic missile defense. Recognizing that such radars would make such a contribution, the ABM Treaty expressly banned the construction of such radars at such locations as one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty. The Soviet Union's activity with respect to this radar is in direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

Against the backdrop of this Soviet pattern of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, the Soviet Union is also taking other actions which affect our ability to verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their increased use of encryption during testing, are directly aimed at degrading our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Other Soviet actions, too, contribute to the problems we face in monitoring Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet increases in the number of their mobile ballistic missiles, especially those armed with multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles, and other mobile systems, will make verification less and less certain. If we fail to respond to these trends, we could reach a point in the foreseeable future where we would have little confidence in our assessment of the state of the military balance or imbalance, with all that implies for our ability to control escalation during crises.

Responding to the Challenge

In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet offensive and defensive improvements, the United States is compelled to take certain actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near term and to ensure these conditions in the future. We must act in three main areas.

Retaliatory Force Modernization. First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in the near term and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue complementary actions in the areas of arms reduction negotiations and defensive research. For our part, in 1981 we embarked on our strategic modernization program aimed at reversing a long period of decline. This modernization program was specifically designed to preserve stable deterrence and, at the same time, to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to

join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

In addition to the U.S. strategic modernization program, NATO is modernizing its longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF). Our British and French allies also have underway important programs to improve their own national strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI research program does not negate the necessity of these U.S. and allied programs. Rather, the SDI research program depends upon our collective and national modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we explore options for future decision on how we might enhance security and stability over the longer term.

New Deterrent Options. However, over the long run, the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that pattern of activity, suggest that continued long-term dependence on offensive forces may not provide a stable basis for deterrence. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition could destroy the theoretical and empirical foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation.

Therefore, we must now also take steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and stability over the long term, and we must do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces and to channel longstanding Soviet propensities for defenses toward more stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is specifically aimed toward these goals. In the near term, the SDI program also responds directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet antiballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its antiballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. However, the overriding, long-term importance of SDI is that it offers the possibility of reversing the dangerous military trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing offensive nuclear arsenals.

The Soviet Union recognizes the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, postboost, and mid-course defenses—to change the strategic situation. In our investigation of the potential these systems offer, we do not seek superiority or to establish a unilateral advantage. However, if the promise of SDI technologies is proven, the destabilizing Soviet advantage can be redressed. And, in the process, deterrence will be strengthened significantly and placed on a foundation made more stable by reducing the role of ballistic missile weapons and by placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one.

Negotiation and Diplomacy. During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

To support these goals, we will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve reductions but will judge these mechanisms on their ability to enhance the security of the United States and our allies, to strengthen strategic stability, and to reduce the risk of war.

At the same time, the SDI research program is and will be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies about the potential next steps. We would then consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union, pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. This commitment does not mean that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome anymore than the Soviets have a veto over our current strategic and intermediate-range programs. Our commitment in this regard reflects our recognition that, if our research yields appropriate results, we should seek to move forward in a stable way. We have already begun the process of bilateral discussion in Geneva needed to lay the foundation for the stable integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations may make it desirable to do so.

The Soviet Union's View of SDI

As noted above, the U.S.S.R. has long had a vigorous research, development, and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment.

Allied Views Concerning SDI

Our allies understand the military context in which the Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the SDI research program. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following President Reagan's meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, to the effect that:

First, the U.S. and Western aim was not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments;

Second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;

Third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and,

Fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

This common understanding is also reflected in other statements since then—for example, the principles suggested recently by the Federal Republic of Germany that:

- The existing NATO strategy of flexible response must remain fully valid for the alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war; and,
- The alliance's political and strategic unity must be safeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of security in the alliance, and Europe's security must not be decoupled from that of North America.

SDI Key Points

Following are a dozen key points that capture the direction and scope of the program:

1. The aim of SDI is not to seek superiority but to maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable deterrence.

A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI is designed to secure military superiority for the United States. Put in the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is certainly not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses—defenses that threaten no one.

2. Research will last for some years. We intend to adhere strictly to ABM Treaty limitations and will insist that the Soviets do so as well.

We are conducting a broad-based research program in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made to proceed beyond research. The SDI research program is a complex one that must be carried out on a broad front of technologies. It is not a program where all resource considerations are secondary to a schedule. Instead, it is a responsible, organized research program that is aggressively seeking cost-effective approaches for defending the United States and our allies against the threat of nuclear-armed and conventionally armed ballistic missiles of all ranges. We expect that the research will proceed so that initial development decisions could be made in the early 1990s.

3. We do not have any preconceived notions about the defensive options the research may generate. We will not proceed to development and deployment unless the research indicates that defenses meet strict criteria.

The United States is pursuing the broadly based SDI research program in an objective manner. We have no preconceived notions about the outcome of the research program. We do not anticipate that we will be in a position to approach any decision to proceed with development or deployment based on the results of this research for a number of years.

We have identified key criteria that will be applied to the results of this research whenever they become available. Some options which could provide interim capabilities may be available earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we maintain options against a range of contingencies. However, the primary thrust of the SDI research program is not to focus on generating options for the earliest development/deployment decision but options which best meet our identified criteria.

4. Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost effective at the margin.

Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment of defensive systems would harm crisis stability and that it would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We have identified specific criteria to address these fears appropriately and directly.

Our survivability criterion responds to the first concern. If a defensive system were not adequately survivable, an adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike first at vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this criterion will ensure that such a vulnerable system would not be deployed and, consequently, that the Soviets would have no incentive or prospect of overwhelming it.

Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while other systems can discourage such a counter effort. We seek defensive options which provide clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces.

In addition, we are pressing to reduce offensive nuclear arms through the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles to equal levels significantly lower than exist today.

5. It is too early in our research program to speculate on the kinds of defensive systems—whether ground-based or space-based and with what capabilities—that might prove feasible and desirable to develop and deploy.

Discussion of the various technologies under study is certainly needed to give concreteness to the understanding of the research program. However, speculation about various types of defensive systems that might be deployed is inappropriate at this time. The SDI is a broad-based research program investigating many technologies. We currently see real merit in the potential of advanced technologies providing for a layered defense, with the possibility of negating a ballistic missile at various points after launch. We feel that the possibility of a layered defense both enhances confidence in the overall system and compounds the problem of a potential aggressor in trying to defeat such a defense. However, the paths to such a defense are numerous.

Along the same lines, some have asked about the role of nuclear-related research in the context of our ultimate goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our current research program certainly emphasizes non-nuclear technologies, we will continue to explore the promising concepts which use nuclear energy to power devices which could destroy ballistic missiles at great distances. Further, it is useful to study these concepts to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of similar defensive systems that an adversary may develop for use against future U.S. surveillance and defensive or offensive systems.

6. The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear—to find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they can reach any of their potential targets.

We ultimately seek a future in which nations can live in peace and freedom, secure in the knowledge that their national security does not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, the SDI research program will place its emphasis on options which provide the basis for eliminating the general threat posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal of our research is not, and cannot be, simply to protect our retaliatory forces from attack.

If a future president elects to move toward a general defense against ballistic missiles, the technological options that we explore will certainly also increase the survivability of our retaliatory forces. This will require a stable concept and process to manage the transition to the future we seek. The

concept and process must be based upon a realistic treatment of not only U.S. but Soviet forces and out-year programs.

7. U.S. and allied security remains indivisible. The SDI program is designed to enhance allied security as well as U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered.

This has been a fundamental part of U.S. policy since the inception of the Strategic Defense Initiative. We have made a serious commitment to consult, and such consultations will precede any steps taken relative to the SDI research program which may affect our allies.

8. If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive deployments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations.

If, at some future time, the United States, in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for U.S.-Soviet consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own expansive defensive system research program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.

9. It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.

Soviet propagandists have accused the United States of reneging on commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is just the opposite—a jointly managed approach designed to maintain, at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems of both sides and thereby increase the confidence of all nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic balance.

10. SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring war and enhancing stability.

Successful SDI research and development of defense options would not lead to abandonment of deterrence but rather to an enhancement of deterrence and an evolution in the weapons of deterrence through the contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one. *We would deter a potential aggressor by making it clear that we could deny him the gains he might otherwise hope to achieve rather than merely threatening him with costs large enough to outweigh those gains.*

U.S. policy supports the basic principle that our existing method of deterrence and NATO's existing strategy of flexible response remain fully valid, and must be fully supported, as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war. It is in clear recognition of this obvious fact that the United States continues to pursue so vigorously its own strategic modernization program and so strongly supports the efforts of its allies to sustain their own commitments to maintain the forces, both nuclear and conventional, that provide today's deterrence.

11. For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces.

This point reflects the fact that we must simultaneously use a number of tools to achieve our goals today while looking for better ways to achieve our goals over the longer term. It expresses our basic rationale for sustaining the U.S. strategic modernization program and the rationale for the critically needed national modernization programs being conducted by the United Kingdom and France.

12. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence-building measures.

We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means. ■

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 14, 1988

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY
ANALYSIS CONFERENCE:
"SDI: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS"

The Omni Shoreham Hotel
Washington, D.C.

10:56 A.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. (Applause.) Well, Dr. Pfaltzgraff, thank you, and thank you all very much. Let me say it's a great honor to be addressing so many distinguished scientists, business leaders, and academics, so many who live the life of the mind and use their talents for the benefit of mankind.

I want to thank the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, a staunch ally when it comes to strategic defenses, for bringing this first class group together on SDI's fifth anniversary. And it's good to see so many other friends here as well: Dr. Teller, who is proof that life begins at 80; -- (laughter and applause) -- and three of SDI's best friends in the Congress, Senators Wallop and Quayle, Congressman Chappel; and the frontline offense on our strategic defense team, Ambassador Rowny, General Abrahamson, and Bill Graham; and we're all hoping this event will be chronicled in his indubitable fashion by Tom Clancy. (Laughter.)

It hardly seems like five years since we first embarked together on this noble enterprise to find an alternative to nuclear terror. When I addressed the American people on that March, 1983 day, I said it was time to turn the great technological might of our nation, not to inventing ever more deadly weapons of destruction, but instead to creating new instruments of peace, defensive technologies that harm no one. I said it would take years, probably decades of effort. There would be setbacks and failures as well as successes. But we could not ignore this great challenge -- to develop the means of rendering ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete.

If anything, we overestimated the technological challenge back then. The technologies of our Strategic Defense Initiative have progressed more rapidly than many of us ever dreamed possible. The creative genius and ingenuity of U.S. and allied scientists and engineers and the steadfast support of so many in this room have helped make that rapid progress possible.

But if we've learned anything in five years, it's that it's sometimes easier to bring into being new technologies than it is to bring about new thinking on some subjects. Breakthroughs in physics are sometimes easier than breakthroughs in psyches.

Perhaps the most astounding reaction to the announcement of our Strategic Defense Initiative was the sudden conversion of many -- on a certain side of the political spectrum -- to the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction, whose very appropriate acronym is MAD. I remember that only a few months before the announcement of SDI, I received a letter from 41 academic leaders -- presidents and board chairmen of many of our most distinguished colleges and universities.

And in that letter they called upon me to, and I quote, "to make a major investment in planning, negotiating and cooperating to establish civilized, effective and morally acceptable alternatives

to nuclear war." We could no longer rely on the notion, they said, that, quote, "No nation with nuclear weapons will 'pull the trigger.'" Well, I couldn't agree more.

In fact, I've been waiting for another letter from that same group supporting SDI -- (laughter and applause) -- I guess the mails are a bit slow. (Laughter.) I do promise to write back right away.

The philosopher, John Stuart Mill, said -- I think aptly -- that "no great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until a great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought." Sometimes, however, it's not so much mankind in general as it is the "experts" who have trouble changing the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought.

The fact is, it would probably stop any inventor dead in his tracks if he listened for too long to the advice of experts in his field. Throughout history, it seems, they have agreed on the one basic principle -- progress must stop at the limits of their expertise. (Laughter.) I'm fond of quoting Charles Duell, the Commissioner of the U.S. Office of Patents, who advised President McKinley in 1899 to abolish the Patent Office because, he said, "Everything that can be invented, has been invented." (Laughter.)

Of course, presidents aren't immune from such blunders either. There's the story of Rutherford B. Hayes, who said after witnessing a scientific demonstration, "That's an amazing invention, but who would ever want to use one of them?" He was talking about the telephone.

Well, we've had our share of naysayers when it comes to SDI as well. But some of the difficulties they said were insurmountable have already been surmounted -- much more rapidly and effectively than anticipated. For example, our Delta 180 and -- most recently 181 tests, demonstrating among other things our ability to track fast-moving targets in space and distinguish between dummy warheads from the real thing, showed a technical ability that some scientists, concerned and otherwise, had said could not be achieved so quickly.

But, you know, I don't give up hope for our opponents. It has been estimated that the sum total of human knowledge doubles every eight years -- maybe they just need a little bit more time.

Now, for the impressive technological feats that we've recently seen, immense credit goes to the brilliant and hardworking scientists and engineers who made them possible.

And I want them to know, they are not working late into the night to construct a bargaining chip. They are building a better future -- (applause) -- a better future free from the nuclear terror, and generations to come will thank them. We'll continue to research SDI, to develop and test it. And as it becomes ready -- we will deploy it.

There's one serious problem that the SDI program has had a great deal of difficulty with, however. It would probably be listed in the physics textbooks under the heading, "Inertial Resistance of Large Bodies" -- (laughter) -- in this case, some in the U.S. Congress. In every one of the last four years, Congress has cut back on our requests for SDI funding. And those cuts have already set the program back one to two years. In what can only be described as a self-fulfilling prophesy, they have voted down funding because they say SDI won't work. Well, it won't if we don't develop it and test it.

Congress should realize that it's no longer a question of whether there will be an SDI program or not -- the only question will be whether the Soviets are the only ones who have strategic defenses,

while the United States remains entirely defenseless. It seems to me that it was a watershed event when General Secretary Gorbachev, after years of concerted Soviet efforts to kill our SDI program and deny their own efforts in this area, stated publicly on T.V. to Tom Brokaw and the American people that when it comes to SDI, "the Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing."

Well, everything, one might add, and more. The Soviet defense effort, which some call "Red Shield," is now over 15 years old and they have spent over $200 billion on it -- that's 15 times the amount that we have spent on SDI. The Soviets already have the world's only deployed ABM defenses. Congress, in effect, killed our ASAT program. The Soviets already have an operational antisatellite system. While the U.S. Congress cuts back on our SDI, 10,000 top Soviet scientists and engineers work on their military laser program alone.

Even now that the Soviets have acknowledged their own SDI-like program, some in Congress would bind us to an artificially restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty that would effectively block development of our SDI program and perpetuate the Soviets' advantages in advanced strategic defenses. This effort makes even less sense when the Soviets aren't even abiding by the ABM Treaty, while we are. (Applause.) Virtually all experts, even some of our biggest critics, agree that the Soviet construction of the large, phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk is an out-and-out violation of the ABM Treaty.

A few months ago, I raised a serious specter. I pointed out that it is not only in the development of strategic defenses that the United States could be left behind. A recent report released by the Department of Defense, called "The Soviet Space Challenge," warns that the Soviet space program points in one disturbing direction, and I quote, "the methodical pursuit of a war-fighting capability in space."

Soviet launch capacity far outstrips our own. We should be concerned that, together with the long-standing program and the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar as part of an updated early warning system, the Soviets may be preparing a nationwide ABM defense of their territory. In other words, they may be preparing to break out of the ABM Treaty. In that eventuality, without SDI, we would be dangerously unprepared.

There has been a tendency by some in Congress to discuss SDI as if its funding could be determined purely by domestic considerations, unconnected to what the Soviets are doing. Well, that is, to put it plainly, irresponsible in the extreme.

The fact is that many Americans are unaware that at this moment the United States has absolutely zero defenses against a ballistic missile attack. If even one missile were to be accidentally fired at the United States, the President would have no way of preventing the wholesale destruction of American lives. All he could do is retaliate -- wipe out millions of lives on the other side.

This is the position we find ourselves in -- to perpetuate it forever is simply morally untenable. Vengeance is not the American way. It certainly cannot form any plausible long-standing basis for Western strategy, if a better form of deterrence can be established. Flexible response has worked, and we, of course, remain committed to our present strategy, but we remain equally committed to our search for a safer way to deter aggression.

It can be said that the old discredited policy of MAD is like two adversaries holding loaded guns to each other's head. It may work for a while, but you sure better hope you don't make a slip. People who put their trust in MAD must trust it to work 100 percent -- forever. No slipups, no madmen, no unmanageable crises, no

mistakes -- forever.

For those who are not reassured by such a prospect, and I count myself among their number, we must ask -- isn't it time we invented a cure for madness? Isn't it time to begin curing the world of this nuclear threat? If we have the medicine, can we in good conscience hold out on the patients?

I believe that given the gravity of the nuclear threat to humanity, any unnecessary delay in the development and deployment of SDI is unconscionable. And that's why we will move forward, when ready, with phased deployments of SDI.

As of last August, the Department of Defense has begun focusing on six specific defensive technologies, and they are now moving ahead with them to the demonstration and validation phase. The development and deployment of an initial phase, when it is ready, will be undertaken in such a way that it provides a solid foundation for a continued evolution toward a fully comprehensive defense system, which is SDI's ultimate goal.

Among the objectives of this first phase will be to strengthen deterrence by denying the Soviet Union confidence in their ability to achieve any objectives through the use of ballistic missiles. It will also protect the population of the United States and its allies against an accidental launch of ballistic missiles. Every extra minute that we leave the population of the West defenseless against ballistic missiles is one minute too long.

Equally important, SDI will continue to prove an irresistible force behind offensive arms reductions. Our SDI program, in fact, already has helped to make this world safer -- because, along with NATO's INF deployments, it was one of the major factors that led to the treaty signed by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself that will, for the first time, reduce the nuclear arsenals threatening mankind. It was an historic reversal of the trend of more and more nuclear weapons -- and SDI helped make it happen.

At the same time, we must work to strengthen our conventional deterrence. SDI will likely prove instrumental here, too, by providing high-tech spinoffs for NATO's Conventional Defense Initiative -- CDI -- that could help to address the imbalance of forces in Europe.

And SDI helps to solve what is perhaps the greatest paradox of arms reduction, that reductions, if not carefully managed, could mean greater instability and risk. As arms are reduced to lower and lower levels, each violation could become more and more threatening.

SDI can play a key role in solving this paradox of nuclear arms reductions. We may build an edifice of peace and arms reductions, but just like your homes, it needs an insurance policy against fire and theft. SDI is it -- vital insurance against Soviet cheating.

A few days ago when I went to Notre Dame, nostalgia was much the order of the day, but I did bring up an issue, a very serious issue. I spoke about when I was in college and a debate that I remember having in one of my classes in those post-World War I days when the bomber was just being recognized as the potent weapons that it later became. Our class debated whether or not Americans -- people who, to our way of thinking, stood for high moral standards -- would ever drop bombs from a plane on a city. And the class was about evenly divided -- half felt it might be necessary, the other felt that bombing civilians would always be beyond the pale of decency -- totally unacceptable human conduct, no matter how heinous the enemy. We believed that young men in America would refuse such an order.

But a decade later, during World War II, few, if any, who had been in that room objected to our country's wholesale bombing of cities under the hard pressures of total war. Civilization's standards of acceptable conduct had changed. It's hard to say they changed for the better.

We have the opportunity to reverse this trend -- to base the peace of this world on security rather than threats, on defense rather than on retaliation. Those who say it can't be done -- who stand in the way of progress and insist that technology stops here -- I plead with them to consider what they're saying. For no matter how effective arms reduction negotiations ever are, we can never uninvent the nuclear weapon. We can never erase the knowledge of how to build a ballistic missile. If they were able to succeed in stopping SDI, then we would be left forever with that loaded pistol to our heads -- with an insecure and morally tenuous peace, based forever on the threat of retaliation.

But the world is rapidly changing, and technology won't stop here. All we can do is make sure that technology becomes the ally and protector of peace -- that we build better shields rather than sharper and more deadly swords. In so doing, maybe we can help to bring an end to the brutal legacy of modern warfare. We can stop the madness from continuing into the next century. We can create a better, more secure, more moral world, where peace goes hand-in-hand with freedom from fear -- forever.

Thank you all very much. God bless you all. (Applause.)

END 11:15 A.M. EST

HIGH FRONTIER *COMMENTARY*

by Lt. General Daniel O. Graham
Director, High Frontier

March 1988

SOVIET ABM BREAKOUT?

The evidence is piling up that the Soviets are working feverishly to deploy their own nationwide anti-missile defense system. More accurately, evidence of the Soviet SDI program that has been piling up for years is now being noticed by official Washington and the press. The evidence includes new missile defense radars (not least among them the Krasnoyarsk giant that obviously breaks the ABM Treaty), large-scale production of anti-missile missiles, and heavy investment of scarce resources in "Star Wars" technology.

None of this evidence should be particularly newsworthy to military intelligence analysts. As far back as 1975 when I was the Director of DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), I became sufficiently concerned with such evidence that I prepared a special report to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the matter. I warned that the Soviets had adopted programs and policies that made sense only if they intended one day to break out of the ABM Treaty of 1972.

Some of the elements of that analysis remain classified but most are not common knowledge. For one thing, the precepts of the Mutual Assured Destruction theory that underpinned the ABM Treaty were totally rejected by Soviet strategists. The MAD notion that nuclear forces should be entirely offensive with no significant strategic defenses was denounced by the Soviets as "bourgeoius naivete." They were not about to abandon the search for nationwide defenses as the U.S. side had done. (By 1975, the U.S. was for practical purposes undefended against nuclear attack.) Marshall Grechko, then top man in the Soviet military, had assured the officers and scientists working on Soviet strategic defenses that the ABM Treaty would in no way hinder their efforts.

By 1975, it was already clear that the Soviets would violate the ABM Treaty in letter and spirit any time it posed a serious obstacle to progress toward a nationwide defense — dozens of violations were detected by intelligence agencies but not vigorously protested by State Department lest progress toward SALT II be jeopardized. The ring of ballistic missile defense battle management radars — of which Krasnoyarsk was to be the final link — was being built at a fast pace.

In light of all this evidence it was clear twelve years ago that the Soviets would be ready today to break out of the ABM Treaty. In fact, they already have "broken out:" According to Congress which voted 418-0 in the House and 92-0 in the Senate, the Soviets are in violation of the ABM Treaty. What then would constitute "breaking out?" — the Soviets declaring in advance that they were going to violate the Treaty?

The spirit of the ABM Treaty was this: "Let us both remain vulnerable to nuclear annihilation so that neither of us will attack the other." The Soviets never bought that idea and therefore never were

really *in* that Treaty. They signed it because they correctly guessed that the U.S. would for many years actually leave itself defenseless against Soviet missiles.

Evidence of the Soviet Strategic Defense Initiative may be surfacing now because Gorbachev recently let slip the fact that it exists – this to the disgruntlement of American SDI opponents who had pooh-poohed the notion of a Soviet "Star Wars" program. Perhaps, since their boss had blown their cover, Soviet SDI bosses are getting a little lax with their security and allowing U.S. military intelligence to find out more about their efforts.

Whatever the reasons, the revelation of the huge Soviet SDI program is certain to be misused in arguments for and against the U.S. SDI program.

Pro-SDI spokesmen will point to the Soviet program as reason to proceed immediately with SDI. The problem with this reasoning is that the U.S. SDI will not be built to counter Soviet defenses system, but Soviet *offensive* system. Two thousand long-range nuclear ballistic missiles pointed at us today is reason enough to deploy SDI. Assuming a 50 percent reduction, *half* that number (which in the odd arithmetic of the State Department comes out at 1600 missiles) is *also* reason enough to deploy SDI.

Anti-SDI spokesmen, including Pentagon turf-guarders, will argue that the Soviet ability to break out of the ABM Treaty is a reason to *prolong* the Treaty for the 10-years requested by Moscow. Already, this has been put forward as a reason not to deploy defenses while the ABM Treaty has been in effect should indicate its dangerous uselessness. The ABM Treaty has been used like a holy icon by the anti-military lobby to eradicate once strong U.S. strategic defenses and to cripple the U.S. SDI program. Yet it is often Pentagon spokesmen who use Soviet "breakout" capabilities as a reason to prolong the ABM Treaty and delay deployment of SDI.

In reality, should the Soviets "break out" of the ABM Treaty, it might not make much difference in the pace of their strategic defense program. After all, they have been putting as much money into it over the past 15 years as they have into the unprecedented offensive build up we have heard more about. If *both* the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. should "break out" of the ABM Treaty and deploy defenses, the Soviets would be adding increments to their already impressive capability; the United States on the other hand would start from scratch. The Soviets would go from some defenses to more defenses; the U.S. would go from *no* defenses to some. Even if the Soviets should deploy faster, the United States gains the most.

If our leaders are to react wisely to the newly revealed Soviet strategic defenses, they will bear in mind that there is no foreseeable future where *neither* side has strategic defensive systems deployed. It will be the Soviet Union only, or both of us. We do not need defenses to defeat defenses; the danger comes from a combination of a first strike ballistic missile force *and* a strategic defense. We have neither. The Soviets have *both*.

Herein lies grave danger with no answer in sight except SDI, and SDI *deployed.*

Lt. General Daniel O. Graham was formerly Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Director of Defense Intelligence. He retired from the military in 1976.

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mailing to SDI list

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Note on top from MG
"On behalf of SDI Assn. SDI,
interested in speech.

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THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. (Applause.) Well, Dr. Pfaltzgraff, thank you, and thank you all very much. Let me say it's a great honor to be addressing so many distinguished scientists, business leaders, and academics, so many who live the life of the mind and use their talents for the benefit of mankind.

I want to thank the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, a staunch ally when it comes to strategic defenses, for bringing this first class group together on SDI's fifth anniversary. And it's good to see so many other friends here as well: Dr. Teller, who is proof that life begins at 80; -- (laughter and applause) -- and three of SDI's best friends in the Congress, Senators Wallop and Quayle, Congressman Chappel; and the frontline offense on our strategic defense team, Ambassador Rowny, General Abrahamson, and Bill Graham; and we're all hoping this event will be chronicled in his indubitable fashion by Tom Clancy. (Laughter.)

It hardly seems like five years since we first embarked together on this noble enterprise to find an alternative to nuclear terror. When I addressed the American people on that March, 1983 day, I said it was time to turn the great technological might of our nation, not to inventing ever more deadly weapons of destruction, but instead to creating new instruments of peace, defensive technologies that harm no one. I said it would take years, probably decades of effort. There would be setbacks and failures as well as successes. But we could not ignore this great challenge -- to develop the means of rendering ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete.

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But if we've learned anything in five years, it's that it's sometimes easier to bring into being new technologies than it is to bring about new thinking on some subjects. Breakthroughs in physics are sometimes easier than breakthroughs in psyches.

Perhaps the most astounding reaction to the announcement of our Strategic Defense Initiative was the sudden conversion of many -- on a certain side of the political spectrum -- to the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction, whose very appropriate acronym is MAD. I remember that only a few months before the announcement of SDI, I received a letter from 41 academic leaders -- presidents and board chairmen of many of our most distinguished colleges and universities.

And in that letter they called upon me to, and I quote, "to make a major investment in planning, negotiating and cooperating to establish civilized, effective and morally acceptable alternatives

to nuclear war." We could no longer rely on the notion, they said, that, quote, "No nation with nuclear weapons will 'pull the trigger.'" Well, I couldn't agree more.

In fact, I've been waiting for another letter from that same group supporting SDI -- (laughter and applause) -- I guess the mails are a bit slow. (Laughter.) I do promise to write back right away.

The philosopher, John Stuart Mill, said -- I think aptly -- that "no great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until a great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought." Sometimes, however, it's not so much mankind in general as it is the "experts" who have trouble changing the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought.

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Of course, presidents aren't immune from such blunders either. There's the story of Rutherford B. Hayes, who said after witnessing a scientific demonstration, "That's an amazing invention, but who would ever want to use one of them?" He was talking about the telephone.

Well, we've had our share of naysayers when it comes to SDI as well. But some of the difficulties they said were insurmountable have already been surmounted -- much more rapidly and effectively than anticipated. For example, our Delta 180 and -- most recently 181 tests, demonstrating among other things our ability to track fast-moving targets in space and distinguish between dummy warheads from the real thing, showed a technical ability that some scientists, concerned and otherwise, had said could not be achieved so quickly.

But, you know, I don't give up hope for our opponents. It has been estimated that the sum total of human knowledge doubles every eight years -- maybe they just need a little bit more time.

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And I want them to know, they are not working late into the night to construct a bargaining chip. They are building a better future -- (applause) -- a better future free from the nuclear terror, and generations to come will thank them. We'll continue to research SDI, to develop and test it. And as it becomes ready -- we will deploy it.

There's one serious problem that the SDI program has had a great deal of difficulty with, however. It would probably be listed in the physics textbooks under the heading, "Inertial Resistance of Large Bodies" -- (laughter) -- in this case, some in the U.S. Congress. In every one of the last four years, Congress has cut back on our requests for SDI funding. And those cuts have already set the program back one to two years. In what can only be described as a self-fulfilling prophesy, they have voted down funding because they say SDI won't work. Well, it won't if we don't develop it and test it.

Congress should realize that it's no longer a question of whether there will be an SDI program or not -- the only question will be whether the Soviets are the only ones who have strategic defenses,

while the United States remains entirely defenseless. It seems to me that it was a watershed event when General Secretary Gorbachev, after years of concerted Soviet efforts to kill our SDI program and deny their own efforts in this area, stated publicly on T.V. to Tom Brokaw and the American people that when it comes to SDI, "the Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing."

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As of last August, the Department of Defense has begun focusing on six specific defensive technologies, and they are now moving ahead with them to the demonstration and validation phase. The development and deployment of an initial phase, when it is ready, will be undertaken in such a way that it provides a solid foundation for a continued evolution toward a fully comprehensive defense system, which is SDI's ultimate goal.

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Equally important, SDI will continue to prove an irresistible force behind offensive arms reductions. Our SDI program, in fact, already has helped to make this world safer -- because, along with NATO's INF deployments, it was one of the major factors that led to the treaty signed by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself that will, for the first time, reduce the nuclear arsenals threatening mankind. It was an historic reversal of the trend of more and more nuclear weapons -- and SDI helped make it happen.

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A few days ago when I went to Notre Dame, nostalgia was much the order of the day, but I did bring up an issue, a very serious issue. I spoke about when I was in college and a debate that I remember having in one of my classes in those post-World War I days when the bomber was just being recognized as the potent weapons that it later became. Our class debated whether or not Americans -- people who, to our way of thinking, stood for high moral standards -- would ever drop bombs from a plane on a city. And the class was about evenly divided -- half felt it might be necessary, the other felt that bombing civilians would always be beyond the pale of decency -- totally unacceptable human conduct, no matter how heinous the enemy. We believed that young men in America would refuse such an order.

But a decade later, during World War II, few, if any, who had been in that room objected to our country's wholesale bombing of cities under the hard pressures of total war. Civilization's standards of acceptable conduct had changed. It's hard to say they changed for the better.

We have the opportunity to reverse this trend -- to base the peace of this world on security rather than threats, on defense rather than on retaliation. Those who say it can't be done -- who stand in the way of progress and insist that technology stops here -- I plead with them to consider what they're saying. For no matter how effective arms reduction negotiations ever are, we can never uninvent the nuclear weapon. We can never erase the knowledge of how to build a ballistic missile. If they were able to succeed in stopping SDI, then we would be left forever with that loaded pistol to our heads -- with an insecure and morally tenuous peace, based forever on the threat of retaliation.

But the world is rapidly changing, and technology won't stop here. All we can do is make sure that technology becomes the ally and protector of peace -- that we build better shields rather than sharper and more deadly swords. In so doing, maybe we can help to bring an end to the brutal legacy of modern warfare. We can stop the madness from continuing into the next century. We can create a better, more secure, more moral world, where peace goes hand-in-hand with freedom from fear -- forever.

Thank you all very much. God bless you all. (Applause.)

END 11:15 A.M. EST

WHITE HOUSE PRESS GUIDANCE March 28, 1988

SUNDAY WASHINGTON POST STORY ON SDI

Q: Do you have any reaction to the story alleging that the Administration's basic goals for SDI have been cut back?

A: The story is wrong.

-- Our goal in SDI remains to establish comprehensive defenses, defenses which protect US and Allied populations and enable us to move gradually to a form of deterrence based increasingly on defenses, rather than offense. we believe that this would be a more stable, safer, and morally preferable peace way to keep the peace over the long term.
-- SDI's goal has never been to protect our offense or, as the article says, to protect "military installations."

-- The President took the occasion of SDI's fifth anniversary to reiterate our goals for the program. He did this, for example, in his address to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis SDI forum on March 14, in his Statement of March 23 and in his Defense Daily interview of the same date.

-- Since a comprehensive strategic defense system obviously cannot be deployed in one step, we have made it clear as a matter of policy that when deployments begin, they will take place in phases. We have emphasized at the same time that a first phase deployment must be one that moves us in a significant manner toward our ultimate goal of comprehensive defenses. The President made this clear as well in the last two weeks.

-- The Defense Acquisition Board decision of last ~~August~~ September, which advanced six promising SDI technologies to the demonstration and validation phase, recognized this concept and pointed the way toward a possible first phase deployment. Although Congressional cutbacks have already lost us 1-2 years, we still see such a first phase ~~deployment~~ decision as possible for the early to mid-90s.

-- The Phase I strategic defense system envisioned to meet the JCS requirement would be a comprehensive, primarily space-based system, with the ability to intercept large numbers of an attacker's missiles regardless of their target. Thus, the system would not be limited to defending military installations.

BACKGROUND ONLY

-- The JCS memo referred to in the article discussed only the military requirements for a first phase deployment, not the overall concept. The requirements would ensure that such a deployment enhanced deterrence by introducing significant additional uncertainty in any aggressor's planning, while beginning to put into place a system which ultimately would meet the goals of the overall program. It was, in no way, a scaling back of our goals.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR STEVE STEINER

FROM: MAX GREEN

SUBJECT: SDI Event

The SDI briefing you remember was a Presidential event. Even so, we had only 140 guests. Since we will not get the President for an SDI event before the Summit, we should invite far fewer people to attend. However, I fully expect that all key figures in the the SDI camp will come up with a few alternatives.

I would suggest the following speeches:

1.) Colin Powell on SDI general defense forces policy.
2.) General Abrahamson on substituting a technology review.
3.) Max Kampelman on arms control negotiations and SDI.

I will call the office later today for your agreement that I should proceed in setting up a briefing.

HIGH FRONTIER *COMMENTARY*

The organization that pioneered the concept behind the Strategic Defense Initiative

March 28, 1988

What the Joint Chiefs Really Said About SDI

by Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham USA (Ret.)
Director, High Frontier

The Jeffrey Smith article in the Sunday, March 27 *Washington Post* is a remarkable distortion of non-news. The headline "Pentagon Scales Back SDI Goals" is misleading because no one in the Pentagon or elsewhere ever had the goal of perfect protection, inferred throughout the article in describing Mr. Reagan's "creation" now "jettisoned" by the Pentagon. It is not news, either. The JCS Report that Mr. Smith hangs his story on was a document prepared about a year ago and leaked almost immediately thereafter.

The "four page JCS document," Mr. Smith refers to, simply points out a fact, obvious from the start of the SDI programs: that the primary effect of First Phase deployment of strategic defenses would be a sharp increase in our capability to deter deliberate attack against our military forces, specifically our nuclear deterrent forces.

The only quote from the JCS paper in the article is "the defensive systems the President is talking about are not designed to be partial." That is to say, if the warhead destroyed by SDI is on its way to destroy a silo, SDI protects the silo. If it is on the way to slaughter people, it protects people. If the warhead is likely to destroy both, SDI protects both.

Mr. Smith would have us believe that the Department of Defense "jettisoned" the idea of population defense in light of an analysis by Princeton University's anti-SDI professors, indicating that should the Soviets ever go crazy and attempt an attack with SS-18 missiles against our military forces despite the fact that early SDI defenses would stop 50% of them, 13 to 34 million Americans would be killed outright. This is probably wildly exaggerated, but what would be the number of dead Americans if 100% of that attack reached our soil? Certainly the JCS would never use such sophomoric "analysis" to make the decision about SDI that Mr. Smith reports as fact.

The Joints Chiefs wisely measured the capabilities of early phases of SDI deployment which might only be 30 percent effective against an implausible attack by non-existing Soviet forces against a "plausible attack" by the accurate, first-strike Soviet force, the SS-18s. They concluded that the early available SDI systems could stop 50% of them--and that such a U.S. capability is of great importance to deterring deliberate nuclear attack. Without having to deal with these early deployed defenses, the Soviets (according to the Carter Administration) enjoy very high confidence that their attack would

destroy over 90% of our ICBM's, two-thirds of our bombers, and one third of our missile submarines. *With* a U.S. defense in place capable of stopping 50% of their first strike missiles the Soviets would have very low confidence of such success in a first strike.

And, although it is not clear whether the Joint Chiefs' paper addressed the matter, initial defenses that could stop 30% of a fictitious all-out Soviet attack could certainly deal with light attacks, accidental or rogue-nation attacks, the latter becoming ever more worrisome as long-range missiles proliferate, with increasing possibilities for ballistic missile attack, not only with nuclear warheads, but chemical and biological ones.

This "news" story consists of a rehash of the case anti-SDI spokesmen have been trying to make for three years. The opponents of SDI, not Ronald Reagan, attempted to offset the appeal of SDI to commonsense Americans by telling them that defenses had to be perfect to protect anyone and, of course, we can't get a perfect defense. The Smith article tries to make the case that the Joint Chiefs agree with this old argument. They don't.

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 13, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GEN COLIN POWELL
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: REBECCA G. RANGE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON

SUBJECT: SDI Briefing

Due to misreporting in newspapers, and other reasons, many of SDI's strongest supporters have sensed a weakening of the Administration's commitment to the SDI program. To counter their impression and to encourage their continued active support for the program, OPL proposes hosting a briefing on the SDI program.

We would like to you be one of three speakers, the others being Amb. Edward Rowney, whose office we have been coordinating with, and General Abrahamson or a suitable alternate from SDIO. You would speak on SDI in the context of our overall defense policy; Ambassador Rowney, on SDI in the context of arms control negotiations; and General Abrahamson on the progress of the program. We have discussed this with Steve Steiner of your staff, who favors the proposal.

We could set up the briefing for either May 4th or May 6th, whichever would be more convenient for you. We will contact your office to find out if you could be with us on either the 4th or 6th.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 23, 1988

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today marks the fifth anniversary of a program vital to our future security. On March 23, 1983, in announcing our Strategic Defense Initiative -- SDI -- I put forward the vision of a safer and more secure future for our children and our grandchildren, a future free from the threat of the most dangerous weapon mankind has invented: fast-flying ballistic missiles.

It was on that date that I challenged our best and brightest scientific minds to undertake a rigorous program of research, development and testing to find a way to keep the peace through defensive systems which threaten no one. If we can accomplish this, and I am more and more convinced that we can, we will no longer have to face a future that relies on the threat of nuclear retaliation to ensure our security.

The Soviets not only are ahead of us in ballistic missiles, but also are deeply engaged in their own SDI-like program. If they are allowed to keep their near-monopoly in defenses, we will be left without an effective means to protect our cherished freedoms in the future. But with our own investigation of defenses well underway, we have been able to propose to the Soviets at our arms negotiations in Geneva that both of us protect our nations through increasingly effective defenses, even as we cut back deeply our strategic offensive arms.

SDI, in fact, provided a valuable incentive for the Soviets to return to the bargaining table and to negotiate seriously over strategic arms reductions. And as we move toward lower levels of offense, it will be all the more important to have an effective defense.

The SDI program is progressing technologically even faster than we expected. We have demonstrated the feasibility of intercepting an attacker's ballistic missiles. We have made rapid progress on sensors, the eyes and ears of a future defensive system. And our research has produced useful spinoffs for conventional defenses and for medicine, air traffic control and high speed computing.

The problems we face now are largely political. Every year, Congress has cut back the SDI budget. We are now 1-2 years behind schedule. Some of our critics question SDI because they believe we are going too fast and doing too much, while others say we should move now to deploy limited defenses -- perhaps to protect our own missiles. While such a defense may initially strengthen today's uneasy balance, SDI's goal is to create a stronger, safer and morally preferable basis for deterrence by making ballistic missiles obsolete. Thus, we seek to establish truly comprehensive defenses, defenses which will protect the American people and our allies.

The American people can never be satisfied with a strategic situation where, to keep the peace, we rely on a threat of vengeance. And we must recognize that we live in an imperfect, often violent world, one in which ballistic missile technology is proliferating despite our efforts to prevent this. We would be doing a grave and dangerous disservice to future generations if we assumed that national leaders everywhere, for all time, will be both peaceful and rational.

The challenge before us is of course difficult. But, with SDI, we are showing already that we have the technological know-how, the courage and the patience to change the course of human history.

# # #

THE IMPORTANCE OF SDI

"What is totally unacceptable...is the Soviet tactic of holding...reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative.... We won't bargain away SDI."

--- President Reagan
November 4, 1987

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) offers our best hope of a safer world -- where our security and that of our allies would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of mass annihilation.

The Reagan Administration has had a well-defined strategy for countering the threat posed by the Soviet offensive nuclear buildup. Our goal is to build a safer peace and to ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term.

This strategy has three key elements:

- Modernization of our strategic deterrent because, to keep the peace, we still rely on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons;

- Pursuit of deep, equitable, and effectively verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms; and

- The search, through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, for a safer and morally preferable means to deter war, by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance our security.

SDI is a research and technology program to demonstrate, by the early 1990s, the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for intercepting an attacker's missiles in all phases of their flight -- boost, mid-course, and terminal.

- Our commitment to SDI is firm. As the President has stated: "SDI is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990s and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we'll deploy it."

SDI serves a number of vital purposes:

- Through SDI, we seek a defensive means of deterring aggression based on systems protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.

- SDI helped to bring the Soviets back to the nuclear arms negotiating table in early 1985, after their late-1983 walkout.

- SDI underwrites the integrity of any new arms agreements by diminishing Soviet incentives to cheat. The record of Soviet violations of past arms control agreements makes this especially important.

- SDI provides a strong incentive to the Soviets to agree to the President's proposal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent.

  -- Even if 50 percent strategic arms cuts are achieved, SDI will remain essential in persuading the Soviets to reduce further.

- Finally, SDI is insurance against an accidential missile launch or possible future ballistic threats -- nuclear, conventional, or chemical -- from outlaw countries.

- The potential benefits of SDI far outweigh the dollar costs. Expenditures for SDI from fiscal years 1984 through 1988 will amount to about $12 billion, or approximately $13.00 per year for each American citizen -- a small price to pay for a safer future.

The importance of SDI is underscored by the Soviets' long-standing and extensive strategic defense programs.

- In contrast to our own far more modest expenditures, the Soviets have spent roughly $200 billion on their strategic defense programs over the last ten years, roughly the same as they have spent on their strategic offensive forces.

The Soviets' programs include:

- The world's only anti-ballistic missile defenses, surrounding Moscow, which the Soviets are steadily improving;

- Construction of a large, phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and

- Research, development, and testing, including a $1 billion annual program on laser weapons -- employing some 10,000 skilled scientists and engineers.

We cannot let the Soviets have a monopoly on strategic defenses.

- Possessed by both sides, strategic defense systems can be stabilizing and reduce the threat of war. Possessed by the Soviets alone, such systems would threaten peace by undermining the credibility of our deterrent.

  -- This would be devastating to Western security.

1987 JAN -5 AM 10:05

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

JANUARY 2, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 467917

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED DECEMBER 12, 1986

TO: PATRICK BUCHANAN

FROM: MR. DANIEL R. STANLEY
MANAGER, STRATEGIC ISSUE
WASHINGTON STUDIES AND ANALYSIS
GROUP
1550 WILSON BOULEVARD
SUITE 550
ARLINGTON VA 22209

SUBJECT: URGES PRESIDENT REAGAN TO RE - AFFIRM
COMMITMENT TO SDI

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

Pro SDI #2
Pro Def

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

W16101

467917

ID # ND018

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING
☐ H - INTERNAL
☐ I - INCOMING
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 86 / 12 / 29

Name of Correspondent: Daniel R. Stanley

☐ **MI Mail Report** **User Codes: (A)** _____ **(B)** _____ **(C)** _____

Subject: Urges President Reagan to re-affirm commitment to SDI.

ROUTE TO: | **ACTION** | **DISPOSITION**

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
WHO/OPL	KOJELIS	ORIGINATOR CJ	86/12/29		C	86/12/29 CJ
		Referral Note:				
DOD		D CJ	87/01/02		C	870210 TR
		Referral Note:				
OPL KOJELIS	PLKOJE	A	87/02/12 TR			/ /
		Referral Note:				
			/ /			/ /
		Referral Note:				
			/ /			/ /
		Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:
A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:
A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

5/81

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Prime Subject Code: ND 018-__

Secondary Subject Codes: SP 230-87 __ ____-__
ND 016-__ __ ____-__
AT ____-__ __ ____-__

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form

C __ __ _____ Time: _____ P- _____

DSP _____ Time: _____ Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

CPn - Presidential Correspondence
- **n - 0** - Unknown
- **n - 1** - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- **n - 2** - Ronald Reagan
- **n - 3** - Ron
- **n - 4** - Dutch
- **n - 5** - Ron Reagan
- **n - 6** - Ronald
- **n - 7** - Ronnie

CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
- **n - 0** - Unknown
- **n - 1** - Nancy Reagan
- **n - 2** - Nancy
- **n - 3** - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
- **n - 1** - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- **n - 2** - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- **B** - Box/package
- **C** - Copy
- **D** - Official document
- **G** - Message
- **H** - Handcarried
- **L** - Letter
- **M** - Mailgram
- **O** - Memo
- **P** - Photo
- **R** - Report
- **S** - Sealed
- **T** - Telegram
- **V** - Telephone
- **X** - Miscellaneous
- **Y** - Study

Hart 407917

WASHINGTON STUDIES AND ANALYSIS GROUP

1550 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 550
Arlington, Va. 22209

December 12, 1986

Mr. Partick J. Buchanan
Director, White House Communications
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Buchanan:

Enclosed is a copy of my letter to President Reagan urging him to push for near-term deployment of SDI in his upcoming State of the Union address. I believe that this issue has the potential to raise the President above the current din and show him to be pressing on with his agenda. But regardless of the political benefits, the nation needs SDI and needs it now. Perhaps the President would be interested in an article describing a nuclear war without SDI which was published in the January issue of Conservative Digest. I am sure that no one knows better than the President what awesome consequences would result from a nuclear conflict. He must make it clear to the American people that there is only one true defense against such horror. The best way to show his committment to peace is to call for near-term deployment, and there is no better time than now.

Sincerely,

Daniel R. Stanley

Daniel R. Stanley
Manager, Strategic Issues
Washington Studies and Analysis Group

December 12, 1986

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

I strongly urge you to re-affirm your committment to the Strategic Defense Iniative during the upcoming State of the Union address and to call for near-term deployment of these defensive shields. We must not allow recent events to draw attention away from the only endeavor which can truly protect this nation from the horrors of nuclear war. This is your vision, Mr. President, and we share it, but it is time, again, to remind the American people.

Sincerely,

Daniel R. Stanley

cc: Patrick Buchanan

DRS:kw

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 FEB 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

SUBJECT: OSD White House Case Number W16101

In accordance with your request, attached is a draft reply to Mr. Daniel Stanley.

James F. Lemon
Executive Secretary

Attachment

D R A F T

Mr. Daniel R. Stanley
Manager, Strategic Issues
Washington Studies and Analysis
Group
1550 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 550
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Stanley:

Thank you for the copy of your correspondence to President Reagan urging him to discuss near-term deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during his State of the Union Address.

President Reagan reaffirmed his commitment to SDI during his State of the Union Address. Like you, he believes SDI is the most positive and promising defense program we have undertaken; it is the path (for both sides) to a safer future--a system that defends human life instead of threatening it. The Soviets have tried to cripple our program, albeit they have been conducting their own ballistic missile research for many years. The President asserted: "SDI will go forward" despite Soviet propaganda efforts.

With regard to your comment about early SDI deployment, I refer you to the enclosed statements on the subject by Secretary of Defense Weinberger. The Secretary has explained that what we are thinking of is a phase one that would be a foundation and integral part of the whole system. This could be followed by a second phase to deal with more Soviet missiles and a third phase that could deal with even more at different stages of their trajectories. The

initial partial deployment would be the beginning phase of a thoroughly reliable, effective system.

The major problem the program faces is that the reduction in SDI funding prevents us from tackling these problems in a reasonable time. Defense Department officials intend to commend to Members of Congress the need to provide the required levels of program funding.

Again, thank you for your support. I hope the enclosed compilations about SDI and the parallel program of the Soviet Union will add to your interest and will be helpful during your discussions with others about this worthwhile program.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
at the Godfrey Sperling Breakfast
Tuesday, January 6, 1987

Q: Let's chat a little bit about the Iran situation or affair or scandal or mess, depending on your point of view. It seems to me, and of course, we've had a holiday period and maybe that explains it, but it seems to me that at least it hasn't been given quite so much attention in the last couple of weeks on television or in the newspapers. What do you think we have now, is it beginning to slide off the stage or is this merely the lull before the storm, how do you view it?

A: I really don't know. I think the important thing is to have a full examination of whatever happened. If any action after is indicated -- punishment or anything else -- that should follow in the normal course, but I hope all of this can be conducted on a separate tract and that it doesn't block consideration or proper attention being given to the important things that the government is doing and has to do, not just the Executive Branch but the Congress and all of us, that, of course, is to get on with the work of the budget, the funding of the government for the next year -- in our case for the next two years. The other critically important things we have to do in foreign policy and domestic policy. It's quite proper that this other matter be investigated and be examined and whatever appropriate action is required but it proper also to keep a sense of proportion and I think that's on a separate investigation tract while the other things are moving forward.

Q: How destructive has this been?

A: It's very hard to tell. I don't know that it's been all that destructive, I hope it won't be. It's certainly proper to have it investigated and examined and fully considered and then, as I say, whatever appropriate action is indicated, take it. I think initially it caused some problems certainly with our allies, but I was very pleased with the reception that I had when I was at the NATO meetings in December. I think George Shultz had a similar experience when he was there at the Foreign Ministers meeting. I think there is an understanding now that what was attempted was attempted in good faith and while it didn't work, why we're moving on with other things.

We did have a very important event yesterday with the submission of the two-year budget for the first time. There are a lot of interesting items in that that I'll be happy to go into.

Q: Have you conducted any sort of internal investigation inside the Defense Department to find out what Defense Department employees might have done in connection with the dealings, the transfer of arms, the meetings, with the evasion of the Operation Staunch?

A: No, we have conducted an investigation to get all the facts out of the one event that we had anything to do with which was the sale of the weapons to the CIA. We are completing our examination of that. I've turned over all the data that we've had thus far to the two Congressional committies that I've testified before -- the House and Senate Intelligence Committies. But that's all we had anything to do with and that's what we have investigated and we'll have a full report on it.

Q: Secretary of State Shultz, as you know, sent a round-robin telegram to all of our Ambassadors asking them whether they had met with Secord or North or Pointdexter. Have you done anything similar to that?

MORE

Q&A Session with
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Following remarks at
National Press Club, Washington, D.C.
Thursday, January 15, 1987 - 1:25 p.m.

Q: Would you clarify the Administration's current position on Phase I of SDI?

A: Well, I'm surprised that any clarification is needed. I've talked about it so many times, but I welcome the opportunity to repeat myself. Essentially what we are talking about is, first of all, acquiring a thoroughly reliable, effective defense against incoming Soviet missiles -- to put a shield over the continent, not over any particular target and to be sure that that can work and to do it as quickly as we can. Obviously, we can't do it tomorrow or the next day. We hope we will be able to do it soon. We need funding of course to develop and test and determine what is the best way to do this; we're actually exploring four or five different ways to do it. We are quite sure that we will arrive at a set of solutions, maybe two or three different ways to do it, that we will then be in a position to start deploying.

Phase I as I've envisioned it, as the people who are working on the program envision it, would be a beginning part of the system, a foundation, an infrastructure, whatever you like, on which we could add a second phase to deal with more Soviet missiles, be more effective, and a third stage could deal with more at different stages of their trajectory. The important thing is not to deploy something just because you can deploy it, but to deploy something that is an integral part of the whole system, that will helps us achieve and on which we can build to achieve, this very noble vision and goal of the President, which is as I say, nothing more nor less than trying to build a system that can destroy weapons rather than people. It is a noble concept, it is one that offers the world more hope than anything else and that has been our policy ever since the President first announced it in 1983.

Q: You talk about an early partial deployment of SDI. Wouldn't such a move harm the chances of progress in the arms control talks that resumed today in Geneva?

A: No, I think they would enhance it. Partial deployment, as I say, is the beginning phase of a thoroughly reliable, effective system and one that is an integral part of such a system. I suspect that one of the reasons there are talks in Geneva now and have been the last year or so is because we are working on this.

The Soviets, though they deride the whole concept, been working on it very intensively for about 17 years; they've made real progress; they are ahead of us in some areas which wouldn't be surprising in view of the amount technology they've stolen and the fact that they've been working on it a lot longer. It is vital that we work on it and I think it is our progess and perhaps the fear of our further progress that gives the Soviets some incentive to talk about arms reduction.

Q: How soon do you expect a decision on early deployment?

A: Essentially whenever we're told by the people who are working on it that they have such a system, are confident it will work, has been developed and tested and the beginning phase is ready to be installed. And I don't know when that will be.

Q: Have you placed or do you know of anyone else who has placed restrictions on the SDI office that is preventing it from achieving applied near-term off the shelf solutions to the SDI effort?

MORE

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Interview by Pentagon Newspaper Correspondents
Wednesday, January 14, 1987 - 11 a.m.

Q: Mr. Secretary, recently you've told us that based on information you have gotten so far, it looked as though the Pentagon had under charged the CIA for the TOW missiles used in the transaction...

A: I said it was possible. I do not have the Army IG report. I am told that I'm getting a briefing tomorrow, and hope this is true, but I have nothing to add. All I said at that time was there was an indication that was a possible statement of what might of happened. I've had nothing new since then.

Q: At that time you also said you saw no evidence, or you couldn't fine correlative evidence that the money actually got to the Contras. Could you bring us up to date on that?

A: I have nothing to add to that. I have seen nothing since that statement. I don't know what other people are doing or what the special investigator is finding out or anything of that kind. I have still, personally, not seen nor heard anybody who has anything that changes that statement.

Q: Are you just making up a loyality statement that you're not convinced or do you really doubt that it ever happened?

A: I'm saying I don't know. I don't have any evidence. I haven't seen any evidence. The whole thing, as far as I know, rests on one statement. It was not a statement I heard but was repeated and the situation is still in that category.

Besides, what's the difference between a loyality statement and a statement? (Laughter)

Q: Is there any inquiry, though, in terms of DSAA funds possibly being misused or anything like that?

A: There certainly is no suggestion they have been. The DSAA funds are not in question in any way that I know of. They has never been any slight suggestion raised and the accounting procedures are such I would think that's quite impossible. The funding -- the $100 for the Contras -- the legitimate legal, authorized funding was not funded to the Defense Department. It was funded literally to the State Department with the covert aspect asending it over to the CIA. But it doesn't even go through it. Our DSAA Funds are voted by Congress for specific countries for specific amounts. There's no suggestion of that.

Q: There are some of the people involved who have been involved with the DSAA in the past and there are suggestions that they may have personally profitted. This isn't the first time. That's why I was interested in...

A: Any of those charges with respect to those people were all investigated. Whatever was found was turned over to the authorities and there were separate investigations. I don't know if there are any pending proceedings or not. Those are all an entirely different matter.

Q: This year as the debate over the Contra aid goes forward, one of the key issues will be what they can do with the money, whether they can accomplish anything militarily. I wonder if you would outline what you think...

A: First of all, I know they can't do anything without the money. They have now I think, made an impressive showing against the Sandinistas even though they're heavily outnumbered and have all the logistics and supplies against them and all the rest. They still have got a very large number, comparatively speaking, in Nicaragua.

MORE

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Interviewed by Pentagon News Bureau Correspondents
Friday, January 16, 1986 - 11 a.m.

Q: I'm trying to follow up where Senator Levin left off Monday on the request for two new CVNs. Those requests emerged into your budget after no previous indications that it was going to be necessary.

A: I guess I have trouble with "suddenly emerged". It sounds as if we declared war on somebody and I'm rushing up to COngress to get the two new carriers. This is not the case.

We have a five year plan. Every year we review the five year plan. We don't just review the last year, we review the whole plan. As it becomes apparent as is the case that the two carriers -- the WASHINGTON and LINCOLN -- that were authorized in 1982, will finish ahead of schedule, both of them, will deliver ahead of schedule, it became clear that the important thing was to get the same kind of benefits for the next two carriers that we had with those two. Those two will save us about a billion dollars and they will finish early. You got two alternatives, you can let all that finish and all those workers go home, go elsewhere and get other jobs and then come back in a year or two and put them all back to work again -- start buying the parts and all the rest to beat the delivery dates required for the next two carriers that don't add to the force but replace the ones that will be over 50 years old then -- we can get the names for you -- it is desirable to try to get that billion dollar savings.

On review of the five year plan, during the course of this year, it became apparent that was the case. So to take advantage of all of those things we concluded that it would be better to start the process for getting those two carriers at about the same time we always plan to get them, maybe a few months early, but about the same time, but to get the long lead time for the parts now and to keep the work force together and start on it a bit earlier and we will save a billion and a half dollars. I am totally unable to see either the mystery about it or the difficulty of getting it. But in any event, those are the facts.

Q: But the budget doesn't project enough aircraft to equip 15 carrier task forces.

A: It's because we have enough aircraft, we don't have to buy all new aircraft for each carrier. We will have enough aircraft, we can transfer some of the aircraft that will still be very serviceable from the 50 year old carriers that will no longer be serviceable.

Q: ...not get the 14 carrier air wings and you are not projected to...

A: It is difficult enough for me to think ahead six months, but I have to try think ahead seven years and that's essentially what we're doing. On the basis of all of that the aircraft that are ordered that will fill out the whole fleet of the two new ones that are coming on and the ability to transfer aircraft from carrier to carrier, gives us what we need in the budget. I assure you that if we find we're short we're going to ask for more. But one way or another, we will need 15 carriers ready to deploy at all times although that doesn't give you 15 deployed carriers. We need the 15 carriers to deploy our needs and we also need them to be fully equipped with aircraft. The requirements that we have we believe are in the five year plan. Bear in mind that these two aircraft carriers deliver after the five year plan. So you don't show everything in this five year plan that will need in the next five year plan. On the other hand, we have it mind and we will include it as we add each year to this five year plan. We will not get aircraft without notifying Congress.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have plans for two mobile ICBM system, the Midgetman and the railroad...at the same time we have proposal on the table for a ban on mobile systems. Has the Administration been able to come to grips with that discrepancy?

MORE

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 1987

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REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TO THE NATIONAL SPACE FOUNDATION
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 1987

GOOD MORNING LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. I APPRECIATE YOUR INVITING ME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS VERY IMPORTANT SYMPOSIUM.

I MUST ADMIT THAT I AM A BIT APPREHENSIVE ABOUT SPEAKING WITH YOU TODAY. BUT I THINK THAT IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE. AFTER ALL -- HERE I STAND -- IN COLORADO SPRINGS -- A CITY THAT IS THE HOME OF TWO OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL SPACE FACILITIES, THE CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN COMPLEX AND FALCON AIR FORCE STATION -- ACROSS TOWN FROM THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY WHERE WE ARE TRAINING YOUNG AMERICANS TO LEAD THE AEROSPACE EFFORTS OF TOMORROW -- FACING AN AUDIENCE OF ABOUT SIX HUNDRED OF THE WORLD'S LEADING EXPERTS ON ALL MANNER OF SPACE RELATED SUBJECTS -- SHARING A PODIUM WITH PEOPLE WHO RUN THE FREE WORLD'S SPACE PROGRAMS. THIS, I PROMISE YOU, IS A HUMBLING EXPERIENCE FOR ANY LAYMAN, AND I CANNOT IMAGINE A MORE COMPLETE LAYMAN THAN A HARVARD LAWYER.

STILL, I AM HERE TO PRESENT MY CASE, AND SO I SHALL. MY CLIENT, TO PARAPHRASE A PREDECESSOR OF MINE, ELIHU ROOT, IS THE GREATEST OF ALL CLIENTS, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE CASE I PRESENT TODAY IS AN IMPORTANT ONE. THIS IS THE CASE FOR PURSUING THE BENEFITS OFFERED BY SPACE EXPLORATION AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FREE WORLD. THIS AUDIENCE MAY NOT FEEL THERE IS REALLY ANY OPPOSITION TO SUCH A CASE -- BUT I HAVE TO ASSURE YOU THAT THERE IS.

IT IS APPROPRIATE IN 1987 THAT WE FOCUS ON THE OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED BY OUR EXPLORATION OF SPACE. THIS YEAR, WE COMMEMORATE THE 30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST SPUTNIK -- AN EVENT THAT SIGNALLED THE BEGINNING OF THE SPACE AGE.

THAT EVENT CHANGED THE WORLD. FOR THE FIRST TIME, MANKIND WAS FREE TO EXPLORE BEYOND HIS TERRESTRIAL HOME. SINCE THAT DAY IN 1957, WE HAVE VISITED THE MOON, RECEIVED IMAGES FROM THE OUTER REACHES OF OUR PLANETARY SYSTEM, SAMPLED THE CLIMATE OF MARS, AND ACHIEVED WHAT IS ALMOST ROUTINE ACCESS TO SPACE. WE HAVE LEARNED AND ACCOMPLISHED MUCH IN THE THREE DECADES SINCE THAT FIRST "FELLOW TRAVELLER WITH EARTH" CIRCLED THE GLOBE. BUT CLEARLY, AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSONS IS JUST HOW LITTLE WE KNOW ABOUT SPACE, AND HOW WE CAN USE THIS HIGH GROUND TO BENEFIT MANKIND.

MORE

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REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THURSDAY, JANUARY 15, 1987

GOOD AFTERNOON AND THANK YOU, MARY KAY (QUINLAN), FOR THAT GENEROUS INTRODUCTION. I AM PLEASED TO HAVE BEEN INVITED AGAIN TO ADDRESS YOUR "NEWSMAKER" LUNCHEONS. IT IS AN HONOR TO BE ASKED BACK.

WINSTON CHURCHILL ONCE SAID THAT "HISTORY WILL BEAR ME OUT, PARTICULARLY AS I SHALL WRITE THAT HISTORY MYSELF." FEW OF US, OF COURSE, ARE ABLE TO CAPTURE THE PAST WITH THE SKILL AND GENIUS OR GRACE AND STYLE OF A CHURCHILL; NOR INFLUENCE THE FUTURE WITH SUCH DYNAMIC STATECRAFT. BUT WE CAN SEE TO IT THAT CURRENT PROBLEMS DO NOT OBSCURE THE PAST AND THEREBY MAKE US IGNORE THE FUTURE. THIS, IN SOME WAYS, IS THE PROBLEM WE FACE TODAY.

IN THE MIDST OF ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL ERAS IN U.S. HISTORY, IN WHICH THE NATION'S INTERESTS ABROAD, AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AT HOME, HAVE NEVER BEEN SO SECURE, SOME IN WASHINGTON WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE WORLD BELIEVE THIS ADMINISTRATION IS A FAILURE. I AM NOT SPEAKING ABOUT THE EBB AND FLOW OF PUBLIC OPINION. UNDERSTANDABLY, THE PUBLIC IS CONFUSED AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE IRAN ARMS SALES AFFAIR; IT IS NO WONDER THAT THIS ANXIETY REGISTERS IN THE POLLS. BUT, MY CONCERN TODAY IS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF JUST HOW MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN THE LAST SIX YEARS. OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE THIS REMARKABLE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE IS THE REAL ISSUE FACING THE COUNTRY TODAY.

WE MUST NOT ALLOW REASONABLE POLITICAL DEBATE OVER PRESSING NATIONAL CONCERNS TO BE SUBMERGED FROM VIEW WHILE INVESTIGATIONS PROCEED ON THE IRAN AFFAIR. OF COURSE THOSE INVESTIGATIONS MUST AND WILL PROCEED. I HOPE THEY WILL BE COMPLETED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND THAT REPORTS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES AND CONCLUSIONS WILL BE GIVEN PROMPTLY TO THE PUBLIC. BUT WE MUST NOT ALLOW AMERICA'S REMARKABLE SUCCESS, AND THE REASONS FOR THAT SUCCESS, TO BE BELITTLED BY THOSE WHO FOCUS NARROWLY, AND ONLY ON THE IRAN CONTROVERSY.

SIX YEARS AGO, THE UNITED STATES BEGAN AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY. UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, WE REACHED BACK INTO THE SOUL OF OUR DEMOCRATIC SPIRIT TO DISCOVER A NEW TRUST IN THE INDIVIDUAL AND INDIVIDUAL EFFORT, A HEALTHY SUSPICION OF BIG GOVERNMENT, AND A BELIEF IN

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