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CURRENT NEWS EARLY BIRD EDITION



FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1986

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WASHINGTON POST

12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Pg. 10

Senate Unit Votes to Divert Defense Funds to NASA

Subcommittee's \$2.96 Million Shuttle Proposal Assailed by Pentagon Officials

By Molly Moore
Washington Post Staff Writer

A Senate subcommittee approved a controversial proposal yesterday to use \$2.96 million in defense money to build a new space shuttle. Defense Department officials were sharply critical.

The Appropriations subcommittee on defense accepted the plan by Chairman Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) to construct the fourth orbiter with money saved from proposed cutbacks, including reductions in airplane, tank and submarine outlays.

"It would have Defense assume a large portion of the NASA budget," said Robert B. Sims, spokesman for Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger. "That would reduce national defense programs significantly."

The Air Force would launch and operate the new shuttle, but the National Aeronautics and Space Administration would award the construction contracts under Stevens' proposal. The fourth orbiter would replace the shuttle Challenger, destroyed in a Jan. 28 explosion that killed seven astronauts.

NASA...Pg. 4

NEW YORK TIMES 12 SEP 1986

Pg. D19

Test on Missile Defense Is Hailed by the Military

By JOHN H. CUSHMAN Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 — An experiment in space last week was an elaborate test using several sensors, two rockets and a panoply of supporting equipment to investigate ways of intercepting ballistic missiles rising above the earth, Pentagon officials said today.

* Before the launching on Sept. 5, the Defense Department kept all details classified, but today officials said the

experiment was a significant achievement. In an hourlong briefing, the officials gave a detailed description of the \$150 million experiment, replete with models, video animations, and footage taken from cameras used in the test, which ended in a spectacular high-speed collision of two specially modified stages of a Delta rocket.

Lieut. Col. Michael Rendine, program manager for the first large-scale experiment in space-based weapons to destroy nuclear missiles, described the

TEST...Pg. 2

NEW YORK TIMES

12 SEPTEMBER 1986 Pg. 1

House Supports Use of Military To Fight Drugs

Votes Death Penalty for Some Related Crimes

By JONATHAN FUERBRINGER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 — In a mood to get tough on drugs, the House of Representatives today voted to require use of the military to curb the flow of narcotics into the United States and called for the death penalty for some drug-related crimes.

In another move against drug use, which led some members to express fears about civil liberties, the representatives approved the use of illegally obtained evidence in drug trials.

The measures, adopted as amendments to an broadscale antidrug bill,

DRUGS...Pg. 6

NEW YORK TIMES

12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Pg. 25

House and Senate Reach Accord On Military Command Structure

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 — House and Senate negotiators agreed today on compromise legislation that would change the command structure of the armed forces by strengthening officers who command joint operations and reducing the authority of the individual services.

Its sponsors say the legislation was meant to prevent the sort of mixups that occurred in the invasion of Grenada when Army troops on the ground could not communicate with Air Force fliers. "In this day and age," said Senator Barry Goldwater, the Arizona Republican who heads the Armed Services Committee, "one service, acting

alone, just cannot handle all the complex challenges of warfare."

Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Armed Services panel, called the measure "probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress."

2 More Passages Needed

The bill would have to pass each house of Congress one more time before it could go to President Reagan. It

ACCORD...Pg. 2

NEW YORK TIMES

12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Pg. 25

Military Forbids Active Role Of Soldiers in 'Hate Groups'

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 — Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger has given commanders new and explicit authority to prevent the active participation of servicemen in "hate groups" like the Ku Klux Klan, Pentagon officials said today.

The military has long opposed participation in groups that sponsor threats, abuse or violence toward racial, religious or other groups. But the new message from Mr. Weinberger, signed Sept. 5, states, "Active participation, including public demonstrations, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading such organizations, is utterly incompatible with military service."

Policies Reviewed This Summer

The directive follows a review of policies this summer, after members of

the Marine Corps in North Carolina were reported to have actively participated in Ku Klux Klan activities.

Mr. Weinberger's directive does not actually bar membership in groups that promote discrimination, a step officials said would be overly intrusive and impossible to enforce. Servicemen thus could enroll in the groups and pay dues.

But the message said that the requirements of military service, including the trust and cohesiveness among service members and the need for discipline, "demand that service personnel reject the goals of such groups."

Mr. Weinberger granted commanders full authority to take disciplinary steps, including expulsion from the military, against those who actively participate in the activities of what a Pentagon spokesman called "hate

groups." The term encompasses such groups as white supremacist organizations, neo-Nazi organizations, and any other group that espouses similar causes.

Commanders were told that they could declare off limits to the troops the facilities used by such groups or the events sponsored by them.

In the past, military personnel were mainly restricted from taking part in rallies, recruiting drives and distribution of literature while in uniform or on military posts. That policy, which dated to the 1960's, applied equally to dissent and protest groups, like anti-war activities.

The new directive goes further, encompassing a wide range of activities regardless of where they take place or whether military personnel wear their uniforms.

Officials said the basic decisions on applying the policy would be left in the hands of commanders, based on their role in keeping morale and discipline high.

TEST...from Pg. 1

successful test as "a storybook mission" that showed "our job is going to be a lot easier than we ever imagined."

In a separate development, the Army today successfully shot down a short-range Lance tactical missile using a modified Patriot missile, normally used to destroy aircraft.

That test at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico was the first test of any system designed specifically to defend against tactical missiles like those deployed by the Soviet Union in Europe.

House Vote Is Noted

In announcing the test, the Pentagon noted that the House recently voted not to continue the program to shoot down tactical missiles, which the Senate approved in its version of the military spending bill for the fiscal year 1987.

Speaking of the Sept. 5 test, Lieut. Gen. James Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, which oversees the program to develop a space-oriented defense against missiles, said today that the experiment did not test prototype weapons but served mainly to collect data and to explore technologies that need further development before they could be deployed.

The 1972 treaty governing antimissile systems prohibits testing them or their components in space. The Pentagon says experiments like this one do not violate the treaty.

The eventual goal of the research involved in the latest test is to build small rockets that could stay in space, to be fired against missile boosters before nuclear warheads are released. Such projectiles, because they destroy their targets by direct collision. More advanced space-based weapons might use laser beams to destroy their tar-

gets.

No Predictions on Technology

General Abrahamson declined to say when the technologies involved in last week's experiment might reach fruition, saying that it depended largely on Congressional willingness to pay for further experiments.

Congress, in drafting military budgets for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, already has voted to sharply reduce the Pentagon's request for antimissile research, although a final bill deciding exactly how much to cut has not yet passed.

The Pentagon has argued that the cuts being contemplated, on the order of a \$1.3 billion reduction from the requested \$4.8 billion, would prevent some experiments like this one from being pursued.

Some of the devices used in the test were new inventions, such as a radar-like laser to track targets. Others were modified versions of sensors used on such conventional weapons as the Phoenix air-to-air missile and the Maverick anti-tank missile.

The main point of the experiment was to use several heat-sensing devices and cameras to examine details of rocket exhaust plumes in space, a complex phenomenon that has never been examined at close range.

In order to successfully intercept a burning rocket, a projectile would have to find its way through a huge cloud of hot gases surrounding the rocket. If this could be done, a single interceptor might destroy a nuclear missile carrying 10 or more warheads, decoys, or countermeasures against defenses.

In the experiment, a modified Delta rocket was fired from Cape Canaveral, Fla., the first launching of such a rocket since one exploded on liftoff on May 3.

ACCORD...from Pg. 1

had been opposed by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and many Pentagon officials.

Parochialism in the services has been a problem since World War II, Mr. Aspin said. It was partly solved by the creation of the Defense Department but it has continued to undermine the nation's military preparedness, he said.

But the bill confers added authority on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who becomes the chief military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The Joint Chiefs now operate on "leadership by committee," said Representative Bill Nichols, Democrat of Alabama, an advocate of the bill.

The bill would also enhance the role of commanders of joint operations in specific war theaters. They would have veto power over their subordinates for the first time. In the past, they were subject to the authority and discipline of individual service chiefs.

The House bill would have given the commanding officers "full command" over operations, while the Senate measure conferred "operational command." Both terms were eliminated and the conferees simply detailed the powers conferred.

'All-Stars' Working Together

A third revision creates a "joint officer," comparable, say, to an officer who concentrates on public relations, or procurement. These officers would staff joint commands strengthened by the act. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, said, "Under the leadership of these joint officers, our team of military all-stars will have to

ACCORD...Pg. 4

B

Committee on
THE PRESENT DANGER

905 Sixteenth Street N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • 202/628-2409

Press Contact: Suzanne M. Crow
(202) 628-2409

SD1
HOLD FOR RELEASE
10:15 A.M. WEDNESDAY, 27 AUGUST 1986

COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER RELEASES

NEW NATIONAL POLL ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S. DEFENSE EFFORT

The Committee on the Present Danger today released the results of a national, in-depth poll on "Public Attitudes Toward the U.S. Defense Effort." The poll was conducted for the Committee late last month by the independent polling organization, Penn + Schoen Associates.¹

The poll, conducted among a scientific sample of 1,004 Americans, revealed overwhelming support for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), approval of current or greater levels of U.S. defense spending and a strong belief that the Soviet Union is involved in promoting world terrorism.

Eighty-one percent of Americans favored the development of an SDI system -- outnumbering those who oppose it by more than six to one. Seventy-eight percent said they favored using such a system in the United States if it could be developed.

- more -

Defense spending
inc. 27 48 22
dec.

¹Penn + Schoen Associates is a highly respected, independent, national polling organization which has conducted polls for, among others, former Vice President Walter Mondale, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, Mayor Edward Koch of New York City and Mayor Marion Barry of the District of Columbia, as well as a broad spectrum of corporate clients and public interest groups.

A nonprofit, nonpartisan educational organization of citizens devoted to the Peace, Security and Liberty of the Nation

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Director: Charles Tyroler, II General Counsel: Max M. Kampelman* Special Counsel: Bernard T. Renzy

*On leave in public service

Overall, three out of every four Americans oppose cutting the defense budget. Ninety-two percent believe that the importance of a strong military has either remained the same or increased in the past year, with less than ten percent of those polled expressing a decreased confidence in the U.S. defense effort.

Among the poll's other key findings:

-- 72% believe the Soviet Union is trying to expand rather than simply defend its territory.

-- 80% believe the Soviet Union is involved in promoting world terrorism.

-- Of those who favor increasing the defense budget, 31% believe that it should be achieved through cuts in non-defense spending and 18% feel that it should come from a tax increase.

-- While a plurality (48%) of those polled believe that the United States has a stronger military than the Soviet Union, a smaller plurality (44%) feel that the United States has a stronger nuclear force.

-- 88% have the same or greater confidence in the U.S. defense effort as compared to a year ago.

A full analysis of the poll's findings and copies of the complete results are available at the Committee's offices at 905 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Contact: Suzanne M. Crow, Research and Education Associate, (202) 628-2409.

The Committee on the Present Danger is a non-profit, bipartisan research and educational organization of private citizens founded in November 1976 to facilitate a national discussion of U.S. foreign and national security policies and programs directed toward a secure peace with freedom.

- end -

To: The Committee on the Present Danger

**From: Mark J. Penn and Douglas Schoen
Penn and Schoen Associates, Inc.**

Re: Public Opinion of the U.S. Military

Date: August 25th, 1986

Our poll of 1004 U.S. residents conducted July 21st-23rd, 1986, shows that opinion of the strength and importance of the U.S. military has greatly increased in the last year.

Americans remain skeptical of Soviet intentions, however, as 72% believe that the Soviets are trying to expand their territory rather than defend what they have. And they continue to support the Strategic Defense Initiative in overwhelming numbers.

Eighty per cent said that the Soviets are very (23%) or somewhat (57%) involved in world terrorism.

The successful U.S. action in Libya over the past year has apparently served to bolster confidence in the military.



Forty-eight per cent of the sample said that the U.S. now has a stronger military than the Soviet Union, while 36% said the Soviets are stronger.

By 44%-35%, Americans also believe that we have a stronger nuclear arsenal than the Soviets. There are sharp differences by sex on this question, as men are evenly divided on the question while women believe the U.S. arsenal is stronger by wide margins.

The answers on the military strength of the U.S. are sharply different from last year, when a plurality felt that the Soviets had stronger conventional and nuclear arsenals.

Confidence in the U.S. military increased among 35% of the sample, decreased among 9% and stayed the same among 53%. 44% said that having a strong military became more important in the last year, 6% said it became less important and 48% said its importance remained the same.

Twenty-seven per cent said they would like to see defense spending increased, 22% said it should be decreased and 48% said it should remain the same. Among those who wanted more spent on defense, 37% wanted some new way (such as cutting waste) to be found to finance it. Thirty-one per cent thought

social spending should be cut for defense, and 18% favored higher taxes. Only 7% of those who favored more defense spending would want to increase the deficit to pay for it.

Americans continue to support the concept of the SDI strongly. 81% favor development in principle of a system to destroy incoming missiles before they reach their targets. And if such a system could be developed, 78% would favor its deployment.

METHODOLOGY


A total of 1004 interviews were conducted during the evenings of July 21st to July 23rd from Penn + Schoen's central telephone banks in New York City.

To ensure all U. S. residents an equal chance of being selected for the survey, a sample of phone numbers from 100 randomly chosen communities across the continental United States was drawn. A computer then replaced the last three digits of the selected phone numbers with randomly drawn digits. The use of the "random-digit dialing" sampling method ensured that individuals with listed and unlisted numbers had an equal probability of being selected.

The sample was balanced by region, age and sex to reflect current national demographics.

Sampling error for the CPD Poll is 3 percentage points in either direction at the 95 percent confidence level.





**Penn + Schoen
Associates, Inc.**

1501 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10028 • (212) 734-300

Mark Pen
Douglas Schoe

COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

The following volume contains the general summary and detailed tabular results of a survey conducted by Penn and Schoen Associates, Inc. for the Committee on the Present Danger. A total of 1,004 interviews with adult U.S. citizens were conducted between July 21 and July 23rd, 1986. All interviews were conducted from Penn and Schoen's New York City phone facilities.

Mark Penn

Douglas Schoen

August 15, 1986

"Public Attitudes Toward the U.S. Defense Effort"

GENERAL SUMMARY
COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER #977

NO. 1

QUEST: Do you think presently that the Soviets are trying to expand their territory and influence or are they just trying to defend their own territory?

| | expand | defend | don't know |
|-----|--------|--------|------------|
| ALL | 72 | 22 | 6 |

NO. 2

QUEST: Do you think that the Soviets are heavily involved in promoting world terrorism, somewhat involved or not involved?

| | heavily involvd | smwht involved | not involved | don't know |
|-----|-----------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
| ALL | 23 | 57 | 14 | 6 |

NO. 3

QUEST: Who has a stronger military right now -- the United States or the Soviet Union?

| | United States | Soviet Union | don't know |
|-----|---------------|--------------|------------|
| ALL | 48 | 36 | 16 |

NO. 4

QUEST: Who has the stronger nuclear force -- the United States or the Soviet Union?

| | United States | Soviet Union | don't know |
|-----|---------------|--------------|------------|
| ALL | 44 | 35 | 21 |

NO. 5

QUEST: In general, do you think that spending on defense should be increased, decreased or kept the same?

| | increased | decreased | kept the same | don't know |
|-----|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|
| ALL | 27 | 22 | 48 | 4 |

NO. 6

QUEST: How would you finance the increases in the defense budget -- principally through higher taxes, by making cuts in non-defense spending, by increasing the deficit or another way? (ASKED ONLY OF THOSE WANTED DEFENSE SPENDING INCREASED)

| | higher taxes | cut social sp | incr the defct | another way | don't know |
|-----|--------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|------------|
| ALL | 18 | 31 | 7 | 37 | 7 |

NO. 7

QUEST: Has your confidence in our defense effort increased in the last year, decreased or stayed the same?

| | increased | decreased | styed the same | don't know |
|-----|-----------|-----------|----------------|------------|
| ALL | 35 | 9 | 53 | 2 |

NO. 8

QUEST: In your opinion, has the importance of a strong military increased, decreased or remained the same over the last year?

| | increased | decreased | styed the same | don't know |
|-----|-----------|-----------|----------------|------------|
| ALL | 44 | 6 | 48 | 2 |

NO. 9

QUEST: The Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, is a research program to develop a system to destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they reach their targets. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. going ahead with the research and development phases of the SDI?

| | favor | oppose | don't know |
|-----|-------|--------|------------|
| ALL | 81 | 13 | 7 |

NO. 10

QUEST: If such a system could be developed, would you favor or oppose using it in the United States?

| | favor | oppose | don't know |
|-----|-------|--------|------------|
| ALL | 78 | 13 | 9 |

NO. 11
QUEST: In what age group are you?

| | 18-24 | 25-34 | 35-49 | 50-64 | 65 and over |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------------|
| ALL | 15 | 27 | 27 | 19 | 13 |

NO. 12
QUEST: What was the last grade of school that you completed?

| | less than h.s. | H.S. grad | some college | college grad/+ |
|-----|----------------|-----------|--------------|----------------|
| ALL | 12 | 37 | 25 | 26 |

NO. 13
QUEST: For statistical purposes only, we need to know your total family income for 1985. Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your total family income?

| | Under \$10,000 | \$10-\$29,999 | \$30-\$49,999 | \$50,000+ |
|-----|----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|
| ALL | 15 | 43 | 30 | 12 |

NO. 14
QUEST: Are you white, black, Hispanic or Asian?

| | White | Black | Hispanic | Asian |
|-----|-------|-------|----------|-------|
| ALL | 85 | 10 | 3 | 2 |

NO. 15
QUEST: What is your occupation?

| | Profl/Exec/Man | Sml Bus/Slsmn | Clkl/Semi-skld | Skilled labor | Unskld labor |
|-----|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| ALL | 21 | 8 | 12 | 17 | 7 |

| | Homemaker | Retd/dn't work | Student | Other |
|-----|-----------|----------------|---------|-------|
| ALL | 13 | 14 | 6 | 2 |

NO. 16
QUEST: Generally speaking, do you consider yourself liberal, moderate or conservative?

| | liberal | moderate | conservative |
|-----|---------|----------|--------------|
| ALL | 25 | 40 | 35 |

NO. 17

QUEST: Are you registered to vote in the United States? Are you registered as a Democrat, Republican or Independent?

| | No, not reg | Democrat | Republican | Independent | other |
|-----|-------------|----------|------------|-------------|-------|
| ALL | 13 | 38 | 24 | 21 | 3 |

NO. 18

QUEST: Are you or is any member of your household a member of a union?

| | yes | no |
|-----|-----|----|
| ALL | 26 | 74 |

NO. 19


QUEST: CODE SEX

| | male | female |
|-----|------|--------|
| ALL | 49 | 51 |

NO. 20

QUEST: What region of the country are you from?

| | northeast | south | midwest | west |
|-----|-----------|-------|---------|------|
| ALL | 28 | 30 | 22 | 20 |



QUEST: Do you think presently that the Soviets are trying to expand their territory and influence or are they just trying to defend their own territory?

| | expand | defend | don't know |
|----------------|--------|--------|------------|
| ALL | 72 | 22 | 6 |
| REGION | | | |
| northeast | 71 | 23 | 7 |
| south | 73 | 21 | 6 |
| midwest | 72 | 24 | 4 |
| west | 75 | 18 | 7 |
| INCOME | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 66 | 27 | 7 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 72 | 22 | 6 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 79 | 18 | 3 |
| \$50,000+ | 74 | 20 | 6 |
| AGE | | | |
| 18-24 | 59 | 38 | 3 |
| 25-34 | 77 | 19 | 5 |
| 35-49 | 76 | 17 | 7 |
| 50-64 | 73 | 21 | 6 |
| 65 and over | 69 | 19 | 12 |
| EDUCATION | | | |
| less than h.s. | 67 | 23 | 10 |
| H.S. grad | 70 | 23 | 7 |
| some college | 77 | 20 | 3 |
| college grad/+ | 73 | 21 | 6 |
| RACE | | | |
| White | 73 | 21 | 6 |
| Black | 65 | 26 | 9 |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 76 | 19 | 5 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 70 | 22 | 8 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 74 | 25 | 2 |
| Skilled labor | 78 | 18 | 4 |
| Unskld labor | 71 | 23 | 6 |
| Homemaker | 69 | 22 | 9 |
| Retd/dn't work | 66 | 22 | 12 |
| Student | 60 | 37 | 4 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | |
| liberal | 69 | 25 | 6 |
| moderate | 73 | 22 | 5 |
| conservative | 75 | 20 | 5 |
| PARTY ID | | | |
| No, not reg | 61 | 28 | 11 |
| Democrat | 75 | 18 | 7 |
| Republican | 77 | 20 | 3 |
| Independent | 70 | 26 | 4 |
| UNION | | | |
| yes | 77 | 20 | 3 |
| no | 71 | 22 | 7 |
| SEX | | | |
| male | 77 | 19 | 4 |
| female | 68 | 24 | 8 |

QUEST: Do you think that the Soviets are heavily involved in promoting world terrorism, somewhat involved or not involved?

| | heavily invold | smwht involved | not involved | don't know |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
| ALL | 23 | 57 | 14 | 6 |
| REGION | | | | |
| northeast | 22 | 57 | 14 | 7 |
| south | 25 | 61 | 10 | 5 |
| midwest | 26 | 51 | 17 | 7 |
| west | 19 | 59 | 18 | 4 |
| INCOME | | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 25 | 53 | 13 | 9 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 22 | 59 | 14 | 6 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 25 | 59 | 15 | 2 |
| \$50,000+ | 17 | 68 | 12 | 4 |
| AGE | | | | |
| 18-24 | 16 | 68 | 14 | 1 |
| 25-34 | 22 | 58 | 17 | 4 |
| 35-49 | 25 | 58 | 13 | 3 |
| 50-64 | 26 | 52 | 13 | 10 |
| 65 and over | 25 | 50 | 13 | 12 |
| EDUCATION | | | | |
| less than h.s. | 27 | 44 | 14 | 14 |
| H.S. grad | 22 | 61 | 12 | 4 |
| some college | 22 | 61 | 14 | 3 |
| college grad/+ | 23 | 54 | 17 | 5 |
| RACE | | | | |
| White | 23 | 57 | 14 | 5 |
| Black | 21 | 57 | 14 | 8 |
| OCCUPATION | | | | |
| Prof1/Exec/Man | 23 | 60 | 14 | 4 |
| Sml Bus/Slsman | 21 | 57 | 20 | 3 |
| Clk1/Semi-skld | 28 | 56 | 13 | 3 |
| Skilled labor | 19 | 65 | 11 | 5 |
| Unskld labor | 30 | 47 | 16 | 7 |
| Homemaker | 20 | 58 | 17 | 5 |
| Retd/dn't work | 26 | 48 | 12 | 14 |
| Student | 16 | 56 | 25 | 4 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | | |
| liberal | 26 | 53 | 19 | 3 |
| moderate | 18 | 64 | 15 | 4 |
| conservative | 27 | 54 | 11 | 8 |
| PARTY ID | | | | |
| No, not reg | 20 | 52 | 22 | 6 |
| Democrat | 26 | 54 | 12 | 7 |
| Republican | 23 | 62 | 11 | 3 |
| Independent | 19 | 62 | 15 | 5 |
| UNION | | | | |
| yes | 23 | 59 | 15 | 3 |
| no | 23 | 57 | 14 | 6 |
| SEX | | | | |
| male | 22 | 59 | 14 | 5 |
| female | 24 | 56 | 14 | 6 |

QUEST: Who has a stronger military right now -- the United States or the Soviet Union?

| | United States | Soviet Union | don't know |
|----------------|---------------|--------------|------------|
| ALL | 48 | 36 | 16 |
| REGION | | | |
| northeast | 52 | 30 | 17 |
| south | 51 | 36 | 13 |
| midwest | 41 | 40 | 19 |
| west | 45 | 38 | 17 |
| INCOME | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 53 | 32 | 15 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 49 | 36 | 15 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 48 | 37 | 15 |
| \$50,000+ | 40 | 42 | 19 |
| AGE | | | |
| 18-24 | 53 | 35 | 11 |
| 25-34 | 49 | 37 | 14 |
| 35-49 | 49 | 36 | 15 |
| 50-64 | 46 | 32 | 22 |
| 65 and over | 42 | 38 | 20 |
| EDUCATION | | | |
| less than h.s. | 57 | 24 | 19 |
| H.S. grad | 48 | 37 | 15 |
| some college | 46 | 40 | 14 |
| college grad/+ | 46 | 35 | 19 |
| RACE | | | |
| White | 47 | 36 | 17 |
| Black | 60 | 27 | 13 |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 43 | 37 | 19 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 46 | 34 | 20 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 53 | 36 | 11 |
| Skilled labor | 49 | 32 | 19 |
| Unskld labor | 49 | 40 | 11 |
| Homemaker | 54 | 27 | 20 |
| Retd/dn't work | 45 | 39 | 16 |
| Student | 49 | 47 | 4 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | |
| liberal | 48 | 36 | 16 |
| moderate | 49 | 36 | 15 |
| conservative | 47 | 37 | 16 |
| PARTY ID | | | |
| No, not reg | 54 | 36 | 10 |
| Democrat | 49 | 34 | 16 |
| Republican | 45 | 38 | 17 |
| Independent | 45 | 38 | 17 |
| UNION | | | |
| yes | 49 | 38 | 13 |
| no | 48 | 35 | 17 |
| SEX | | | |
| male | 45 | 39 | 16 |
| female | 51 | 32 | 17 |

QUEST: Who has the stronger nuclear force -- the United States or the Soviet Union?

| | United States | Soviet Union | don't know |
|----------------|---------------|--------------|------------|
| ALL | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| REGION | | | |
| northeast | 47 | 33 | 20 |
| south | 43 | 39 | 18 |
| midwest | 40 | 37 | 23 |
| west | 43 | 30 | 27 |
| INCOME | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 44 | 32 | 24 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 47 | 32 | 21 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 40 | 42 | 18 |
| \$50,000+ | 42 | 35 | 23 |
| AGE | | | |
| 18-24 | 44 | 41 | 14 |
| 25-34 | 42 | 38 | 20 |
| 35-49 | 45 | 34 | 21 |
| 50-64 | 48 | 29 | 22 |
| 65 and over | 38 | 32 | 30 |
| EDUCATION | | | |
| less than h.s. | 48 | 27 | 25 |
| H.S. grad | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| some college | 39 | 41 | 20 |
| college grad/+ | 45 | 34 | 20 |
| RACE | | | |
| White | 44 | 34 | 22 |
| Black | 46 | 38 | 17 |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 41 | 38 | 21 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 45 | 37 | 18 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 40 | 32 | 27 |
| Skilled labor | 43 | 38 | 20 |
| Unskld labor | 43 | 37 | 20 |
| Homemaker | 51 | 22 | 27 |
| Retd/dn't work | 42 | 36 | 22 |
| Student | 52 | 43 | 5 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | |
| liberal | 43 | 35 | 22 |
| moderate | 40 | 37 | 22 |
| conservative | 47 | 35 | 18 |
| PARTY ID | | | |
| No, not reg | 46 | 34 | 20 |
| Democrat | 44 | 34 | 21 |
| Republican | 45 | 32 | 23 |
| Independent | 38 | 43 | 19 |
| UNION | | | |
| yes | 45 | 36 | 19 |
| no | 43 | 35 | 22 |
| SEX | | | |
| male | 42 | 41 | 16 |
| female | 45 | 29 | 26 |

QUEST: In general, do you think that spending on defense should be increased, decreased or kept the same?

| | increased | decreased | kept the same | don't know |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|
| ALL | 27 | 22 | 48 | 4 |
| REGION | | | | |
| northeast | 22 | 24 | 51 | 3 |
| south | 35 | 18 | 43 | 4 |
| midwest | 20 | 22 | 54 | 3 |
| west | 28 | 24 | 44 | 4 |
| INCOME | | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 26 | 20 | 46 | 7 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 26 | 22 | 49 | 3 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 31 | 23 | 44 | 2 |
| \$50,000+ | 25 | 20 | 51 | 4 |
| AGE | | | | |
| 18-24 | 30 | 24 | 44 | 2 |
| 25-34 | 24 | 27 | 47 | 2 |
| 35-49 | 31 | 21 | 44 | 4 |
| 50-64 | 24 | 17 | 55 | 4 |
| 65 and over | 24 | 15 | 53 | 8 |
| EDUCATION | | | | |
| less than h.s. | 25 | 23 | 45 | 7 |
| H.S. grad | 30 | 18 | 49 | 3 |
| some college | 25 | 23 | 50 | 2 |
| college grad/+ | 25 | 26 | 45 | 4 |
| RACE | | | | |
| white | 27 | 21 | 49 | 4 |
| Black | 25 | 23 | 51 | 1 |
| OCCUPATION | | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 27 | 25 | 45 | 3 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 29 | 27 | 43 | 1 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 25 | 21 | 53 | 2 |
| Skilled labor | 31 | 21 | 46 | 2 |
| Unskld labor | 30 | 24 | 40 | 6 |
| Homemaker | 23 | 20 | 49 | 8 |
| Retd/dn't work | 25 | 15 | 56 | 4 |
| Student | 23 | 28 | 47 | 2 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | | |
| liberal | 28 | 30 | 39 | 3 |
| moderate | 22 | 23 | 52 | 3 |
| conservative | 31 | 15 | 50 | 4 |
| PARTY ID | | | | |
| No, not reg | 24 | 26 | 45 | 5 |
| Democrat | 27 | 21 | 48 | 4 |
| Republican | 30 | 16 | 50 | 4 |
| Independent | 25 | 25 | 48 | 2 |
| UNION | | | | |
| yes | 27 | 23 | 48 | 3 |
| no | 27 | 21 | 48 | 4 |
| SEX | | | | |
| male | 30 | 21 | 45 | 4 |
| female | 23 | 22 | 51 | 3 |

QUEST: How would you finance the increases in the defense budget
 -- principally through higher taxes, by making cuts in non-defense
 spending, by increasing the deficit or another way? (ASKED ONLY OF THOSE
 WHO WANTED DEFENSE SPENDING INCREASED)

| | higher taxes | cut social sp | incr the defct | another way | don't know |
|----------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|------------|
| ALL | 18 | 31 | 7 | 37 | 7 |
| REGION | | | | | |
| northeast | 20 | 27 | 10 | 37 | 7 |
| south | 17 | 31 | 6 | 42 | 6 |
| midwest | 16 | 38 | 7 | 38 | 2 |
| west | 22 | 33 | 5 | 27 | 13 |
| INCOME | | | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 17 | 22 | 19 | 33 | 8 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 17 | 32 | 5 | 41 | 5 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 17 | 35 | 6 | 39 | 4 |
| \$50,000+ | 26 | 26 | 4 | 33 | 11 |
| AGE | | | | | |
| 18-24 | 20 | 32 | 7 | 34 | 7 |
| 25-34 | 16 | 40 | 6 | 33 | 5 |
| 35-49 | 16 | 27 | 10 | 43 | 5 |
| 50-64 | 20 | 30 | 4 | 39 | 7 |
| 65 and over | 25 | 28 | 3 | 28 | 16 |
| EDUCATION | | | | | |
| less than h.s. | 13 | 16 | 9 | 53 | 9 |
| H.S. grad | 15 | 31 | 7 | 41 | 6 |
| some college | 17 | 36 | 8 | 31 | 8 |
| college grad/+ | 28 | 34 | 3 | 28 | 6 |
| RACE | | | | | |
| White | 19 | 34 | 5 | 36 | 7 |
| Black | 12 | 19 | 19 | 42 | 8 |
| OCCUPATION | | | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 19 | 39 | 5 | 35 | 2 |
| Sm Bus/Sismn | 17 | 39 | 4 | 30 | 9 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 13 | 37 | 7 | 43 | 0 |
| Skilled labor | 18 | 20 | 4 | 47 | 12 |
| Unskld labor | 19 | 5 | 10 | 62 | 5 |
| Homemaker | 7 | 50 | 13 | 20 | 10 |
| Retd/dn't work | 22 | 33 | 6 | 28 | 11 |
| Student | 31 | 15 | 15 | 31 | 8 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | | | |
| liberal | 19 | 27 | 6 | 42 | 6 |
| moderate | 18 | 32 | 8 | 41 | 1 |
| conservative | 18 | 36 | 7 | 30 | 10 |
| PARTY ID | | | | | |
| No, not reg | 25 | 28 | 9 | 31 | 6 |
| Democrat | 17 | 22 | 10 | 42 | 9 |
| Republican | 15 | 43 | 4 | 28 | 9 |
| Independent | 23 | 34 | 4 | 40 | 0 |
| UNION | | | | | |
| yes | 13 | 34 | 7 | 41 | 6 |
| no | 20 | 30 | 7 | 36 | 7 |
| SEX | | | | | |
| male | 25 | 26 | 3 | 41 | 6 |
| female | 11 | 38 | 11 | 32 | 8 |

QUEST: Has your confidence in our defense effort increased in the last year, decreased or stayed the same?

| | increased | decreased | stayed the same | don't know |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|------------|
| ALL | 35 | 9 | 53 | 2 |
| REGION | | | | |
| northeast | 38 | 9 | 51 | 3 |
| south | 36 | 10 | 50 | 4 |
| midwest | 30 | 8 | 60 | 2 |
| west | 36 | 9 | 54 | 2 |
| INCOME | | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 29 | 9 | 58 | 4 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 35 | 9 | 54 | 2 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 41 | 7 | 51 | 1 |
| \$50,000+ | 38 | 10 | 50 | 2 |
| AGE | | | | |
| 18-24 | 43 | 5 | 49 | 2 |
| 25-34 | 36 | 11 | 50 | 2 |
| 35-49 | 35 | 8 | 55 | 2 |
| 50-64 | 34 | 9 | 55 | 2 |
| 65 and over | 27 | 10 | 57 | 5 |
| EDUCATION | | | | |
| less than h.s. | 25 | 9 | 62 | 5 |
| H.S. grad | 38 | 7 | 52 | 2 |
| some college | 36 | 11 | 51 | 2 |
| college grad/+ | 36 | 10 | 53 | 2 |
| RACE | | | | |
| White | 36 | 9 | 53 | 2 |
| Black | 29 | 9 | 56 | 6 |
| OCCUPATION | | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 34 | 9 | 54 | 2 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 38 | 11 | 49 | 3 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 42 | 7 | 48 | 3 |
| Skilled labor | 41 | 9 | 49 | 1 |
| Unskld labor | 34 | 9 | 53 | 4 |
| Homemaker | 30 | 6 | 61 | 2 |
| Retd/dn't work | 29 | 11 | 55 | 5 |
| Student | 35 | 11 | 53 | 2 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | | |
| liberal | 33 | 10 | 54 | 3 |
| moderate | 35 | 9 | 55 | 1 |
| conservative | 39 | 9 | 50 | 3 |
| PARTY ID | | | | |
| No, not reg | 34 | 7 | 56 | 3 |
| Democrat | 35 | 12 | 50 | 3 |
| Republican | 38 | 7 | 55 | 1 |
| Independent | 35 | 8 | 54 | 3 |
| UNION | | | | |
| yes | 39 | 12 | 47 | 1 |
| no | 34 | 8 | 55 | 3 |
| SEX | | | | |
| male | 42 | 10 | 45 | 3 |
| female | 29 | 8 | 61 | 2 |

QUEST: In your opinion, has the importance of a strong military increased, decreased or remained the same over the last year?

| | increased | decreased | stayed the same | don't know |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|------------|
| ALL | 44 | 6 | 48 | 2 |
| REGION | | | | |
| northeast | 42 | 7 | 49 | 3 |
| south | 49 | 5 | 43 | 3 |
| midwest | 41 | 6 | 51 | 2 |
| west | 41 | 5 | 52 | 2 |
| INCOME | | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 42 | 6 | 46 | 6 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 44 | 6 | 49 | 1 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 45 | 5 | 49 | 1 |
| \$50,000+ | 48 | 10 | 40 | 2 |
| AGE | | | | |
| 18-24 | 56 | 4 | 38 | 2 |
| 25-34 | 47 | 4 | 47 | 2 |
| 35-49 | 42 | 7 | 49 | 2 |
| 50-64 | 41 | 7 | 51 | 1 |
| 65 and over | 31 | 6 | 56 | 7 |
| EDUCATION | | | | |
| less than h.s. | 31 | 10 | 55 | 4 |
| H.S. grad | 48 | 4 | 46 | 2 |
| some college | 46 | 8 | 44 | 2 |
| college grad/+ | 41 | 5 | 52 | 2 |
| RACE | | | | |
| White | 42 | 6 | 49 | 2 |
| Black | 50 | 8 | 40 | 2 |
| OCCUPATION | | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 44 | 5 | 50 | 1 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 42 | 9 | 46 | 3 |
| Clk/semi-skld | 46 | 8 | 45 | 1 |
| Skilled labor | 52 | 5 | 41 | 2 |
| Unskld labor | 49 | 10 | 40 | 1 |
| Homemaker | 41 | 2 | 53 | 5 |
| Retd/dn't work | 31 | 5 | 58 | 6 |
| Student | 51 | 7 | 42 | 0 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | | |
| liberal | 42 | 8 | 48 | 1 |
| moderate | 40 | 6 | 51 | 3 |
| conservative | 50 | 4 | 44 | 2 |
| PARTY ID | | | | |
| No, not reg | 49 | 5 | 45 | 2 |
| Democrat | 41 | 7 | 50 | 2 |
| Republican | 44 | 4 | 47 | 4 |
| Independent | 42 | 6 | 50 | 2 |
| UNION | | | | |
| yes | 51 | 5 | 43 | 1 |
| no | 41 | 6 | 50 | 3 |
| SEX | | | | |
| male | 51 | 7 | 40 | 2 |
| female | 37 | 5 | 56 | 3 |

QUEST: The Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, is a research program to develop a system to destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they reach their targets. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. going ahead with the research and development phases of the SDI?

| | favor | oppose | don't know |
|----------------|-------|--------|------------|
| ALL | 81 | 13 | 7 |
| REGION | | | |
| northeast | 78 | 14 | 8 |
| south | 80 | 12 | 8 |
| midwest | 80 | 13 | 7 |
| west | 85 | 12 | 3 |
| INCOME | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 81 | 12 | 7 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 80 | 15 | 5 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 84 | 12 | 3 |
| \$50,000+ | 81 | 12 | 7 |
| AGE | | | |
| 18-24 | 82 | 11 | 6 |
| 25-34 | 80 | 14 | 6 |
| 35-49 | 82 | 13 | 5 |
| 50-64 | 80 | 11 | 9 |
| 65 and over | 76 | 14 | 10 |
| EDUCATION | | | |
| less than h.s. | 74 | 13 | 13 |
| H.S. grad | 83 | 10 | 7 |
| some college | 83 | 11 | 6 |
| college grad/+ | 78 | 18 | 4 |
| RACE | | | |
| White | 83 | 12 | 6 |
| Black | 66 | 18 | 16 |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 79 | 16 | 4 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 89 | 11 | 0 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 79 | 15 | 7 |
| Skilled labor | 84 | 9 | 7 |
| Unskld labor | 76 | 14 | 10 |
| Homemaker | 80 | 10 | 10 |
| Retd/dn't work | 75 | 13 | 12 |
| Student | 82 | 18 | 0 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | |
| liberal | 75 | 18 | 7 |
| moderate | 80 | 15 | 5 |
| conservative | 86 | 7 | 7 |
| PARTY ID | | | |
| No, not reg | 81 | 11 | 8 |
| Democrat | 76 | 15 | 9 |
| Republican | 88 | 9 | 4 |
| Independent | 83 | 13 | 5 |
| UNION | | | |
| yes | 83 | 13 | 4 |
| no | 80 | 13 | 8 |
| SEX | | | |
| male | 84 | 12 | 4 |
| female | 77 | 14 | 9 |

QUEST: If such a system could be developed, would you favor or oppose using it in the United States?

| | favor | oppose | don't know |
|----------------|-------|--------|------------|
| ALL | 78 | 13 | 9 |
| REGION | | | |
| northeast | 75 | 14 | 11 |
| south | 78 | 13 | 9 |
| midwest | 78 | 14 | 8 |
| west | 81 | 12 | 8 |
| INCOME | | | |
| Under \$10,000 | 71 | 15 | 14 |
| \$10-\$29,999 | 79 | 14 | 7 |
| \$30-\$49,999 | 83 | 10 | 6 |
| \$50,000+ | 77 | 12 | 11 |
| AGE | | | |
| 18-24 | 82 | 12 | 5 |
| 25-34 | 79 | 14 | 7 |
| 35-49 | 82 | 12 | 6 |
| 50-64 | 74 | 15 | 11 |
| 65 and over | 66 | 12 | 22 |
| EDUCATION | | | |
| less than h.s. | 70 | 14 | 16 |
| H.S. grad | 77 | 12 | 11 |
| some college | 82 | 13 | 6 |
| college grad/+ | 77 | 15 | 8 |
| RACE | | | |
| White | 79 | 12 | 9 |
| Black | 67 | 19 | 14 |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Prof/Exec/Man | 80 | 16 | 4 |
| Sml Bus/Slsmn | 79 | 16 | 5 |
| Clkl/Semi-skld | 75 | 15 | 10 |
| Skilled labor | 84 | 8 | 8 |
| Unskld labor | 79 | 11 | 10 |
| Homemaker | 70 | 14 | 16 |
| Retd/dn't work | 70 | 12 | 18 |
| Student | 86 | 14 | 0 |
| IDEOLOGY | | | |
| liberal | 72 | 19 | 9 |
| moderate | 77 | 13 | 10 |
| conservative | 84 | 10 | 6 |
| PARTY ID | | | |
| No, not reg | 80 | 9 | 11 |
| Democrat | 73 | 14 | 12 |
| Republican | 82 | 11 | 7 |
| Independent | 79 | 16 | 5 |
| UNION | | | |
| yes | 82 | 11 | 6 |
| no | 76 | 14 | 10 |
| SEX | | | |
| male | 83 | 12 | 6 |
| female | 73 | 14 | 13 |

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 12, 1986

NOTE FOR: MAX GREEN

FROM: RON SABLE *R*

Max - as requested - also,
am including some TP's for
use against the Aucoin
amendment on SDI contracts.

OPPOSE THE AUCCOIN AMENDMENTA Buy America Provision for SDI Contracts Over \$100,000

- o A fundamental tenet of our SDI policy has been that U.S. and allied security are indivisible--from the beginning we have been committed to consulting with our allies to ensure that their views are considered.
- o The U.S. invited our allies to participate in SDI because it is manifest that the SDI program and Western security as a whole be strengthened by taking advantage of allied excellence in many research areas relevant to SDI.
- o Allied contributions could:
 - o reduce both the schedule and cost of research
 - o provide access (not now available to the U.S.) to existing facilities and special teams of researchers with special experience
 - o offer unique insights into theater defense architecture studies
- o It has been our policy that allied participation should be considered when it seems that a project can be completed more effectively, at less cost or more quickly than if performed by a domestic contractor.
- o Allied participation in the SDI program will be on the basis of technical merit, there will be no set-asides or guarantees of research contracts. Most contracts will be granted through competitive procurement.
- o All of our agreements with allies contain provisions restricting and governing military and commercial uses by the allies of the research findings -- and ensure the full protection of controlled technical data.
- o The AuCoin amendment would be inconsistent with the spirit of mutual arms cooperation that the U.S. as a matter of national policy has tried to foster with the allies.
- o Placing restrictions on the ability of allies to compete fairly for SDI contracts could undermine existing US trade relationships with the allies, particularly our defense sales.

(6) Byrd (for Bumpers) Amendment No. 2688, to require agencies to make a separate determination of the mission or missions of each of their laboratories.

Page S11099

National Defense Authorization Act, 1986: By 86 yeas to 3 nays (Vote No. 207), Senate passed S. 2638, to authorize funds for military functions of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel levels for such Department for fiscal year 1987, to revise and improve military compensation programs, to improve defense procurement procedures, to authorize certain construction at military installations for fiscal year 1987, and to authorize funds for national security programs of the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1987, after taking action on additional amendments proposed thereto, as follows:

Pages S10925, S10936, S10960, S11011

Adopted:

(1) Glenn Amendment No. 2671, to prohibit the Department of Defense from entering into contracts with foreign governments and foreign firms for the purpose of carrying out research in connection with the Strategic Defense Initiative that could be reasonably performed by a United States firm. (By 33 yeas to 64 nays (Vote No. 199), Senate earlier failed to table the amendment.)

Page S10925

(2) Andrews Amendment No. 2610, to delete the requirement relating to purchase of alcohol beverages for resale. (By 41 yeas to 56 nays (Vote No. 202), Senate earlier failed to table the amendment.)

Page S10936

(3) Chiles Amendment No. 2674, to promote increased use of multiyear contracting authority by the Department of Defense.

Page S10945

(4) Corrections to Cohen Amendment No. 2567, to enhance the capabilities of the United States to combat terrorism and other forms of unconventional warfare (which was agreed to on August 7).

Page S10945

(5) Levin Amendment No. 2676, to express the support of Congress for the policy of the President that a special objective of the United States in negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms is to reverse the erosion of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed on May 26, 1972, and that the action by Congress in approving funds for research on the Strategic Defense Initiative does not express or imply an intention on the part of Congress that the United States should abrogate, violate, or otherwise erode such treaty, and does not express or imply any determination or commitment on the part of the Congress that the United States develop, test, or deploy ballistic mis-

sile strategic defense weaponry that would contravene such treaty.

Page S10966

(6) Nunn Amendment No. 2677, to establish a Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Program.

Page S10968

(7) Wilson modified Amendment No. 2595, to provide funding for the Rolling Airframe Missile Program.

Page S10974

(8) Byrd Amendment No. 2678, to prohibit using funds authorized for the Advanced Technology Bomber and the Advanced Cruise Missile programs for any other purposes, and to limit the B-1B Bomber Fleet to 100 aircraft.

Page S10975

(9) Kasten Amendment No. 2681, to provide that no funds may be expended for the procurement of a lead minesweeper hunter ship or a partially outfitted hull of a minesweeper hunter ship from a foreign country until the Secretary of the Navy has certified to the Congress in writing (a) that purchase of up to 2 foreign built ships responds to an urgent national security requirement, and (b) that no United States shipbuilder has demonstrated the capability, or that no shipbuilder can demonstrate the ability to acquire that capability to meet that requirement in a timely fashion.

Page S10989

(10) Hawkins Amendment No. 2262, to extend and improve the National School Lunch Act and the Child Nutrition Act of 1966.

Page S10991

(11) Goldwater-Nunn Amendment No. 2682, of a technical nature.

Page S10994

Rejected:

(1) Melcher Amendment No. 2672, to reduce the authorization by an amount equal to 20 percent of any funds that remain unobligated as of the end of fiscal year 1986. (By 89 yeas to 8 nays (Vote No. 200), Senate tabled the amendment.)

Page S10930

(2) Melcher Amendment No. 2607, to reduce authorization of funds for research, development, test and evaluation. (By 93 yeas to 4 nays (Vote No. 201), Senate tabled the amendment.)

Page S10933

(3) Simon Amendment No. 2673, to increase the amount of special incentive pay that may be paid to members of the Armed Forces who are proficient in foreign languages. (By 57 yeas to 39 nays (Vote No. 203), Senate tabled the amendment.)

Page S10941

(4) Moynihan Amendment No. 2675, to prohibit the United States Government from subsidizing the sale or transfer of goods or services to Communist

8/14/06

Talking Points Opposing the AuCoin Amendment
Requiring SDI Contracts Over \$100,000 to be
Subject to Buy American Provisions

o Ever since President Reagan announced the SDI program, a fundamental tenant of our SDI policy has been that U.S. and allied security are indivisible.

o We are committed to consult with our allies on the SDI program, and we will continue to work closely with them to ensure that as research progresses, their views are carefully considered.

o Secretary Weinberger invited our allies to participate in SDI because it is manifest that the SDI program and Western security as a whole will be strengthened by taking advantage of allied excellence in many research areas relevant to SDI.

o Allied contributions could reduce both the schedule and cost of research; Allied participation could also provide access (not now available to the U.S.) to existing facilities and special teams of researchers with special experience; finally, the Allies can offer unique insights into theater defense architecture studies.

o Thus, it has been our policy that allied participation should be considered when it seems that a project can be completed more effectively, at less cost, or more quickly than if performed by a domestic contractor. *To fail to do so would be unfair to our own taxpayers.*

o In our discussions with allies we have emphasized that participation in the SDI program will be on the basis of technical merit; there will be no set-asides or guarantees of research contracts, and most contracts will be granted through competitive procurement; moreover, all of our agreements contain provisions restricting and governing military and commercial uses by the allies of the research findings and will ensure the full protection of controlled technical data.

o We strongly believe, therefore, that our policy of providing the widest possible basis for allied participation consistent with US laws, regulations, and policies is a sound one.

o If the amendment proposed by Representative AuCoin passes, it would restrict severely our ability to take advantage of allied technical expertise, would slow progress in the SDI research program, would increase the costs of SDI, and would damage the shared U.S. and allied security interests upon which the SDI program has been built.

o Moreover, it would be inconsistent with the spirit of mutual arms cooperation that the US as a matter of national policy has tried to foster with the allies.

o Finally, placing restrictions on the ability of the allies to compete fairly for SDI contracts could undermine existing US trade relationships with the allies, particularly our defense sales.

AMENDMENT TO HR 4428, as reported
Offered by Mr. KuCoin of Oregon

Buyer

81

404
AUG 01 1966

SDI BUY-AMERICAN - HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE

SEC. _____ Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated for the Strategic Defense initiative by this or any other Act shall be used to enter into any contract in excess of \$100,000 with any foreign government or foreign contractor.

2
NO
Reject
minor
II

Effect of Bennett Amendment on SDI Program

- Amendment would cripple SDI, forcing us to:
 - ° scale back or drop promising technologies;
 - ° incur greater costs as contracts and experimental schedules would be juggled;
 - ° delay integration of critical technologies, which is needed to validate them; and,
 - ° forfeit our goal of a decision as soon as possible on the feasibility of effective defenses.
- It is inconsistent to support "a vigorous ballistic missile defense research program," while urging such funding cuts. To carry out such a program, for example, we need to continue efforts already begun, which itself will require approximately \$4.1B in FY 87.
- Specific projects in danger of delay or cancellation would be: space based sensors; directed and kinetic energy systems; advanced technology for low-cost space transport; interactive discrimination to detect decoys; and, the National Test Bed.
- Cutbacks also risk losing the best qualified and brightest researchers, further compounding delay and making attainment of our goals even more difficult.
- In addition to drastic DOD reductions for SDI, Congressman Bennett proposes to reduce appropriated funds for DOE research in SDI to below FY 86 level.
 - ° It is critical to explore nuclear-driven directed energy concepts. Soviet research here predates our own. We need to understand the extent to which such weapons could counter U.S. retaliatory forces, destroy space-based elements of U.S. surveillance systems, or counter a future U.S. strategic defense system.
 - ° Further, of the \$371 million authorized by the HASC for FY 87, \$70 million will be used for capital construction. Therefore, actual research in this area will only experience a \$20 million dollar increase over last year's level.
- We are at a critical moment for arms control. SDI funding cuts or restrictions would tie the President's hands and could cause the Soviets to misjudge our resolve in reducing and ultimately hopefully eliminating the threat of ballistic missiles.

[7-29-86]

FINCH

Charles E. Bennett
100

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4428, AS REPORTED
OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT OF FLORIDA

Page 34, line 4, strike out ``\$7,678,782,000`` and insert
in lieu thereof ``\$7,124,782,000``.

Strike out section 208 (page 43, lines 7 through 11) and
insert in lieu thereof the following:

1 SEC. 208. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

(DON) 2 Of the amount authorized in section 201 for research,
3 development, test, and evaluation for the Defense Agencies,
4 not more than \$2,846,000,000 is available for the Strategic
5 Defense Initiative (SDI) program, such amount being the
6 amount of \$2,750,000,000 provided for fiscal year 1986 plus
7 an additional \$96,000,000 representing a 3.5 percent increase
8 for inflation.

Strike out section 3013 (page 329, lines 21 through 25)
and insert in lieu thereof the following:

9 SEC. 3013. AUTHORIZATION FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

(DOE) 10 Of the funds authorized to be appropriated in sections
11 3011 and 3012, \$279,000,000 is authorized for programs,
12 projects, and activities of the Strategic Defense Initiative,

- 1 such amount being the amount of \$270,000,000 provided for
- 2 fiscal year 1986 plus an additional \$9,000,000 representing a
- 3 3.5 percent increase for inflation.

Page 332, line 23, strike out `` (a) IN GENERAL.--``.

Page 333, strike out lines 4 through 11.

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School of International and Public Affairs • Columbia University

Richard N. Perle

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE:

Addressing Some Misconceptions

It has been two years since President Reagan spoke of his vision of a world free of its overwhelming dependence on nuclear weapons, a world free once and for all of the threat of nuclear war. His speech caused two major developments. It launched a major policy and technology review which led to the initiation of an extensive research program known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It also initiated an extensive debate in the United States and throughout the world. In view of the important technological and political implications of the SDI, such a debate is both expected and appropriate. Unfortunately, because much of this debate has been based on a number of commonly held myths about the nature of the SDI program in particular, and strategic defenses in general, it has been seriously misinformed. While there are many myths related to the SDI effort, I propose to deal with some of the more prevalent misconceptions.

I will begin with a short discussion of what SDI is not. First, and most importantly, SDI *is not* a system development or deployment program. It is

a long-term, broadly-based, research program designed to answer a number of technological questions that must be answered before the promise of emerging defensive technologies can be fully addressed. No decision has been made to pursue development of defensive technologies nor has any decision been made to deploy such a system. These decisions will be made by a future president and a future Congress. Additionally, these decisions should be based on the results of this comprehensive research program and the state of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

SDI is not based on any single preconceived notion of what an effective defense against ballistic missiles should or would look like. A number of concepts, based on a range of different technologies have been and will be investigated—but no single concept or technology has been identified as the most appropriate. Until more is known about the technological possibilities for providing an effective defense against ballistic missiles, we do not believe that we should commit ourselves to a particular technology or a specific defense system configuration. If, on the basis of an incomplete review of the pertinent technologies, we settled prematurely on a particular system, we could be denying ourselves the use of other technologies which, with additional research, may ultimately prove more effective than the technologies we might choose today.

To achieve the benefits which advanced defensive technologies could offer, they must, at a minimum, be able to destroy a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attacking forces so as to deny him either confidence in the outcome of his attack or the

ability to destroy a credible portion of the targets he wishes to destroy. The level of defense capability required to achieve these ends cannot be determined at this time. Defensive capability will be extremely dependent upon the size, composition, effectiveness and passive survivability of U.S. forces relative to those of the Soviet Union. Any effective defensive system definitely must be both survivable and cost-effective.

To achieve the required level of survivability, the defensive system need not be invulnerable, but must be able to maintain a sufficient degree of effectiveness to fulfill its mission, even in the face of determined attacks against it. This characteristic is essential not only to maintain the effectiveness of a defensive system, but also to maintain strategic stability.

Finally, in the interest of discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missile forces, a defensive system must be able to maintain its effectiveness against the offense at less cost than it would take to develop offensive countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to overcome the defense.

Having touched quickly on what SDI is and is not, I would like now to deal individually with some of the misconceptions that have received a great deal of attention in the media and in the general public debate.

Defenses and Stability

Many critics argue that although a fully deployed strategic defense might be an advantageous goal, the transition to such a defense would be destabilizing. The opposite is indeed the case.

The initial phases of a defense against the threat of ballistic missiles on the path to a more complete deployment of a multi-layered defense would enhance the stability of our present deterrent.

The security of the United States and of our friends and allies rests on our collective ability to deter aggression, both conventional and nuclear. Our nuclear retaliatory forces help maintain this security and have deterred war for nearly forty years. Yet we have no defenses against nuclear attack by Soviet ballistic missiles. The Soviet modernization of their offensive forces continues at a steady pace and increasingly widens the imbalance in crucial offensive capabilities. In the event that deterrence fails, our only recourse would be to surrender or to retaliate with our offensive forces. President Reagan stressed in his speech that we must find a better way to assure credible deterrence. The SDI offers the promise of finding the technologies to defend against ballistic missiles, so that we will be able to deter war by means other than the threat of devastation.

Our policy has always been one of deterrence and will remain so even if a decision were made in the future to deploy defensive systems. Such systems are consistent with a policy of deterrence both historically and theoretically. While today we rely exclusively on offensive forces for our strategic deterrence, this has not always been the case. Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the United States maintained an extensive air defense network to protect North America from attack by Soviet bomber forces. At that time, this network formed an important part of our deterrent capability. However, with the advent of con-

tinuously increasing numbers of relatively invulnerable Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) by the late 1960s, it made little sense to continue to invest in air defenses. Because recent advances in defensive technologies may provide a means of effectively defending against ballistic missiles, there may again come a time when defenses can make a useful contribution to deterrence.

The Strategic Defense Initiative is not being pursued with the intention of acquiring superiority over the Soviet Union through the unilateral deployment by the United States of an advanced ballistic missile defense system. First, even if that was our goal, the fact that the Soviet Union has a major research and development effort investigating similar technologies for several years would make such a goal unachievable. Second, even if superiority were possible, the effort to achieve it through unilateral deployments would be too dangerous and would probably not be a permanent condition. Consequently, if effective defenses against ballistic missiles prove possible, we assume that both the United States and the Soviet Union would deploy such defenses.

Perfect Defenses

Another persistent assumption about ballistic missile defense is that since a single nuclear ballistic missile can destroy a large city, any defense which is not perfect is of little value. This premise is seriously flawed in that it is based on a false view of Soviet military purposes. Based on what we know of Soviet military doctrine, the primary threat to nuclear deterrence has always been that

the Soviets could come to believe that, under certain circumstances, they could achieve their military and political goals by preemptively attacking NATO's military forces in order to deny us the ability to retaliate effectively. Direct threats against population centers are deterred relatively easily because such attacks cannot support any useful military or political purpose. Thus, when viewed from the perspective of Soviet military doctrine, and ultimately from that of the Soviet leadership, effective defenses against ballistic missiles can blunt their primary instrument of aggression. As a result, such defenses can have a highly beneficial effect on deterrence and stability in three quite specific ways.

First, by destroying the bulk of an attacker's ballistic missile warheads, an effective defense can undermine a potential aggressor's confidence in his ability to predict the likely outcome of an attack on an opponent's military forces. No aggressor is likely to contemplate initiating a nuclear conflict, even in crisis circumstances, while lacking confidence in his ability to predict a successful outcome.

Second, by effectively destroying attacking ballistic missiles, and thus rendering them "impotent and obsolete" for military or political purposes, such defenses also can eliminate the potential threat of first strike attacks.

Third, by reducing or eliminating the utility of Soviet shorter-range ballistic missiles which threaten Europe, defenses can have a significant and specified impact on deterring Soviet aggression in Europe. Soviet SS-20s and shorter-range ballistic missiles provide overlapping capabilities to target all of NATO Europe. This capability is

combined with a Soviet doctrine which stresses the use of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles to initiate rapid and wide-ranging attacks on crucial NATO military assets throughout Europe. The purpose of this tactic would be to reduce significantly NATO's ability to resist the initial thrust of a Soviet conventional force attack and to impede its ability to resupply and reinforce combatants from outside Europe. By reducing or eliminating the military effectiveness of such ballistic missiles, defensive systems have the potential for enhancing deterrence not only against strategic nuclear war, but against nuclear and conventional attacks on Europe as well.

The Air-Breathing Threat

Even if defenses prove to be effective against ballistic missiles, many critics argue that a defense could not stop cruise missiles or aircraft. It is true that if we plan to defend against aircraft and cruise missiles, we would have to add air defense systems. In fact, these defensive systems might utilize some of the same technologies under investigation in the SDI program.

The SDI program is focusing on defense against ballistic missiles because these missiles, with their speed, short warning time and great destructive capability, pose a greater threat to stability than do the slower flying, air-breathing systems. Because an effective defense against ballistic missiles is the more difficult technology to achieve, priority is being given to the examination of those technologies that might prove effective against that particular threat.

As our research program continues to progress

toward President Reagan's goal of exploiting recent advances in ballistic missile defense technologies, effective defenses against ballistic missiles combined with effective air defenses could reduce or eliminate the military utility of ballistic missiles and other airborne nuclear weapons and thus raise the threshold of nuclear conflict.

Fortress America

Many critics are quick to point out that if the United States and the Soviet Union deploy defensive systems against ballistic missiles, our allies will be defenseless against the threat ballistic missiles pose to their security. This assertion is not correct. From the beginning of our research efforts, President Reagan emphatically stated that no change in technology can or will alter our commitments to our allies. He also clearly stated that our security is inextricably linked to the security of our allies. It is because of this commitment that the SDI program is not focusing solely on the exploitation of technologies to meet the threat posed by ICBMs and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM). Technologies will also be examined which address the threat posed by shorter-range ballistic missiles against our allies. Since President Reagan's decision, we have consulted closely with our allies to ensure that, in the event of any future decision to deploy defensive systems, Allied as well as U.S. security would be strengthened.

U.S. Unilateralism

One of the most stubbornly held myths about the SDI program is that *only* the United States is

conducting research on technologies which may provide effective defenses against ballistic missiles and that such efforts will force the Soviets down a similar path. Again the opposite more accurately describes the current situation. The Soviet Union has always considered defense to be an important part of their national security policy. In fact, the Soviets have spent nearly as much on defensive forces as they have on building their extensive offensive nuclear capability.

The Soviets have for many years been working on a number of technologies, both traditional and advanced, which have the potential for effectively defending against ballistic missiles. Intelligence information indicates that the Soviet Union is currently upgrading the capability of the world's only operational anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in existence today—the Moscow ABM defense system. The Soviets are also pursuing research and development on a rapidly deployable ABM system that raises concerns about their potential ability to rapidly break out of the ABM Treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM defense system within the next ten years should they chose to do so. In addition to these ABM efforts, the Soviet Union is also deploying a surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and is flight testing another, the SA-X-12, both of which have potential to intercept some types of U.S. ballistic missiles. The Soviets also maintain an extensive air defense network and a large civil defense capability, which combined with their interest in traditional and advanced ballistic missile technologies are clear indications that they consider defense to be an important part of the security of the Soviet Union.

While these developments are indeed signifi-

cant, of most concern to the United States is the fact that since the late 1960s the Soviet Union has been pursuing a substantial, advanced defensive technologies program which includes research on directed energy weapons. These efforts could lead to the testing of space-based ABM systems in the mid-1990s and deployment sometime after the year 2000. Therefore, rather than encouraging the Soviet Union to pursue a defensive technologies program, the Strategic Defense Initiative is being pursued as a prudent hedge against unilateral Soviet efforts to develop and deploy an advanced defensive system. Unilateral Soviet deployment of such advanced technologies, in concert with the Soviet Union's massive offensive forces and its already impressive air and passive defense capabilities, would have a very serious, adverse effect on U.S. and Allied security.

Treaty Commitments

Another prevalent argument raised against the Strategic Defense Initiative is that the research program violates our current treaty commitments. As directed by President Reagan, the SDI will be conducted in a manner which is fully compliant with out treaty obligations, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. However, Gerard Smith, chief negotiator of the ABM Treaty, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972 that the agreement does permit research short of field testing of a breadboard

model or prototype.¹ The type of research envisaged under the SDI program can be conducted within the treaty constraints.

Article XIV of the ABM Treaty allows for amendments and occasional reviews at which time possible modifications to the treaty can be discussed. Only after research efforts have uncovered promising approaches for developing and deploying defenses against ballistic missiles would we consider discussing changes to the existing treaty.

The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the deployment in space of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. As in the case of the ABM Treaty, because the SDI contemplates only broadly-based research efforts on the appropriate technologies and is not a systems development or deployment effort, the Outer Space Treaty is not violated by the SDI Program.

Arms Control

Many critics believe that the SDI will discourage and eventually destroy all hope of equitable and verifiable arms control, since ballistic missile defenses will inevitably lead to the proliferation of ballistic missiles in an effort to overcome or saturate such defenses.

This is an argument which has served so long as orthodoxy that it no longer accords with reality. Unlike the technologies of the past, recent advances made in the essential technologies of ballistic missile defense may make it possible to develop defenses that can maintain their effectiveness at less cost than would be required to develop offensive countermeasures or to in-

crease the number of deployed ballistic missiles sufficiently to overcome the defense. This is one of the central issues which the SDI research program is examining. If, as now appears possible, these new technologies can reverse the cost advantages that offensive forces have traditionally enjoyed over defenses, they can exert powerful incentives for significant arms reductions. By reducing the military and political value of ballistic missiles (a condition for which offensive countermeasures or proliferation are no cure), such defenses could increase the likelihood of negotiated reductions of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative and equitable and verifiable arms control agreements are not mutually exclusive, in fact, they are mutually supportive. If a decision were made in the future to deploy an effective defensive capability, there would, of course, be broader implications for arms control. In this regard, effective defenses against ballistic missiles have the potential of complementing our policy of pursuing significant reductions in ballistic missiles forces. To the extent that defensive systems can reduce the effectiveness and, thus, the value of ballistic missiles, they also can increase the incentives for negotiated reductions. Should significant reductions in offensive arsenals occur, such reductions, in

1. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (June - July, 1972), p. 377. At the hearings, "It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on 'development' applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage, wherever performed."

turn, would serve to increase the deterrent potential of defensive systems. A decision to deploy defensive systems would, of course, lead to a rather dramatic change in the structure of U.S. and Soviet military forces that would require the formulation of a new and broader U.S.-Soviet arms control environment than that to which we have been accustomed. Because the United States does not view defensive measures as a means of establishing military superiority and because it has no ambitions in this regard, deployments of defensive systems would be most useful in the context of a cooperative, equitable and verifiable arms control environment that regulates the offensive and defensive developments and deployments of the United States and the Soviet Union. This will be important both in the period of transition from an offense-dominant deterrent to one based on a balance of offensive and defensive forces and in the period following the transition when defensive systems are deployed.

The Prospects for Arms Control

On March 12, 1985 arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed for the first time since the Soviets walked out of

the talks in December 1983. We believe that the SDI effort played a major role in the resumption of these talks. Both the United States and the Soviet Union agree that offensive and defensive forces are inextricably linked. Consequently, we have agreed to structure the negotiations in three parts: strategic nuclear forces, intermediate nuclear forces, and space and defense issues. Though we agree with the Soviets that the subjects to be dealt with in these three categories are closely related, we do not believe that progress in the negotiations on one or more of these categories should be held up until agreement is reached in all three subgroups.

During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, whether on Earth or in space. We are now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

SECURITY AFFAIRS

Ambassador Kirkpatrick Addresses JINSA Gathering

Before a standing-room-only audience of Washington area friends and members of JINSA on December 10, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations, attacked those UN members who ceaselessly seek to delegitimize Israel.

The ambassador spoke candidly about her experiences in the United Nations, where Israel and the United States share many of the same adversaries. One of her goals since assuming the position in 1981 has been to reward nations who side with us and our democratic values, while penalizing those nations consistently and openly hostile.

Before she took over the position, nations attacking us with every strident expression in their vocabulary were often excused for their verbal excesses on the grounds that they were only speaking for public consumption. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, however, said she refused to accept this rationale on the grounds that nations attacking us in the General Assembly should not be rewarded in private for their public attacks.

"The most obnoxious of all resolutions passed by the United Nations (on April 10, 1975) declaring Zionism to be a form of racism...is the landmark in the campaign in the United Nations—which is now very far advanced—to delegitimize Israel."

Current behavior by many of the radical Arab states and their Third World allies is an extension of this effort, she pointed out.

It actually began "after the 1967 war, and took on added urgency after the 1973 war, as Israel's Arab neighbors decided that they could not achieve their goals by military means and so would seek to do so by political means."

The site they selected to wage this political war was the United Nations. At first, the "campaign" was concentrated in UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), but it spread very quickly to the General Assembly, the Security Council, WHO (World Health Organization), ILO (International Labor Organization), and to virtually all of the associated organizations of the United Nations."

The campaign was sponsored in part by nations such as Gaddafi's Libya which believe that *there are no conditions under which the legitimacy of Israel will even be contemplated.*

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said that she has "always felt friendly to Israel." The audience, familiar with her remarkable performance at the United Nations, gave her an enthusiastic ovation. A question-and-answer period followed.

She explained her departure from the United Nations on the grounds that she was very tired, having served in that position longer than any other representative in the past 20 years or so. Furthermore, she said she was anxious to resume a life of teaching and writing.

While shedding no light on the name of her replacement, Ambassador Kirkpatrick noted that organizations such as JINSA can be very effective in democracies by expressing their interest in appointments of those who will vigorously pursue America's best interests in the United Nations.

The audience consisted of about 125 guests of Mr. and Mrs. Robert Rolnick, who hosted the dinner meeting in their Bethesda, Maryland home. Mrs. Susan Rolnick introduced Ambassador Kirkpatrick.



Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

The Strategic Defense Initiative— Chimera or Necessity?

Francis P. Hoerber

Mutual Assured Destruction

For two decades the United States has lived under the assumptions of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD): once the nuclear threshold is crossed, escalation would be uncontrollable and a holocaust in which neither side wins would be inevitable; therefore, only if each side can destroy the other, even after it has been attacked, can nuclear war be deterred.

When the SALT I Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed in 1972, it was said—indeed, claimed by Henry Kissinger for the Nixon Administration—that the Treaty demonstrated Soviet acceptance of the MAD doctrine. However, not only have the Soviets scoffed at the very concept of MAD (in the words of Paul Nitze, "Mad has never been *Mutually Assured Destruction*"), but their actions have shown that this time their words can be believed. For over two decades they have been spending as much on strategic defense as offense. They have been building the largest air defense system in the world, plus a vast civil defense system for protection of both the population and the leadership. (We may note a characteristic of civil defense: the expenditures on it tend to be cumulative, since shelters are long-lived capital assets.) The Soviets have also striven for superiority in numbers of weapons and in warhead yield-accuracy combinations that would provide a first-strike capability. The generally-assumed Counterforce (CF) first strike (against silos, C³, bomber bases, and missile-carrying

submarine bases) must be counted as defensive as well as offensive, i.e., defensive as a means to destroy the weapons before they are even launched. And the Soviets have built and tested antisatellite (ASAT) defenses, and devote large resources to antisubmarine warfare (ASW).

In short, the Soviets have built all types of strategic defenses except a nationwide ballistic missile defense (BMD).

(Continued on page 6)

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EDITORIALS

U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations appear off to a good start; a necessary first step in a process fraught with pitfalls. It is our hope that the businesslike agreement on topics for negotiation and procedures presages talks that will continue in earnest, reduce tensions and reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We will be commenting from time to time on the course of the talks, beginning here with an assessment of the philosophical bases from which both sides open.

Arms Control 1985: A Good Beginning

An arms control treaty that protects the physical security and political integrity of the U.S. and our allies must answer three questions: "Does the treaty protect what we have defined as being vital to our interests?" "Can we be reasonably certain the Soviets will fulfill the spirit and letter of the contract?" and "What protection do we have if they don't?"

The Soviet nuclear arsenal had grown both quantitatively and qualitatively by 1980, causing the political—if not the actual nuclear—balance to shift toward the Soviets. However, we have begun our strategic modernization program and are arguably stronger than we have been in many years.

Within the Administration, there is general agreement that we have regained the political advantage, but this has led to divergent views on the appropriate negotiating strategy toward the Soviets. There are those who favor continuation of the generally hard line policies of the past four years, with changes only in response to changes in Soviet behavior. There are also those who believe it is time to alter our own behavior in certain areas. Those who favor this renewed spirit of 'detente' emphasize the importance of trade and political deals, and agreement with the Soviets on nuclear weapons.

While it is not unusual for an Administration to have divergent views represented internally, it could prove exceedingly costly in the course of negotiations. If the U.S. fails to have a coordinated posture and clearly stated goals, we will forfeit a great deal in the propaganda battle shaping up. The Soviets have access to our media, and to those of our allies, and they need to influence Western opinion to achieve negotiating, as well as political goals. We need to influence Western opinion as well, but we cannot be seen as strong and reliable if our own negotiating house is not in order. (At the same time, we must remember that we are negotiating with the Soviets, not the Western media.)

JINSA is in general agreement with those who remain skeptical of Soviet intentions and who prefer to negotiate according to Soviet behavior. It is clear to us that the United States cannot pursue arms talks simply for the sake of a piece of paper. As the unratified SALT II agreement shows, while we continue to observe its provisions, the Soviets looked for ways to violate it. That must be one of our chief concerns this time. A treaty that results in an expansion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal is worse than no treaty, for it simply lends an air of legitimacy to aggressive Soviet policies.

The Soviets did not return to Geneva because we coaxed them along. The fact is, their attempt to achieve their ends by cutting off negotiations failed to produce the desired results; they are operating under weak leadership; and world opinion is souring on many of their policies. That puts us in a relatively good position. However, excessive American eagerness for a treaty could cause them to raise their sights again.

Their objectives are already considerable, and include: blunting the rebuilding of our defenses; stopping further deployment of intermediate range American weapons in Western Europe—on their terms, thereby weakening U.S. leadership in NATO; working to sustain important programs they have underway; and halting US projects, such as space defense, that threaten their strategic weapons investment. To succeed, they must sell their own offers of arms reduction as genuine.

American objectives must include both slowing the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons and strengthening alliance confidence in American leadership. We earnestly desire an agreement with the Soviet Union. But we must make it abundantly clear that having security with no agreement is preferable to having an agreement with no security.

President Reagan summed up the American position well, when he said, "Our differences with the Soviets are many and profound, and these new negotiations will be difficult as we grapple with the issues so central to peace and security... But we will persevere. And while we must continue to restrict actions by the Soviet Union that threaten our freedom and vital interests, or those of other nations, we must also be prepared to work together wherever possible to strengthen the peace... We'll be flexible, patient, and determined. And we now look to the Soviet Union to help give new life and positive results to that process of dialogue."

Battles in the War of Ideas

"Everyday experience is not...a very useful guide to the big questions:

What does the world want, who stands for what, what is true, what is right and who is on which side?

"Information is the cheapest, safest, most important instrument of American foreign policy."

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Permanent Representative of the
US to the United Nations

Israel is in a dilemma: should the government accede to a U.S. request to locate a Voice of America transmitter there? The VOA provides people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with one of the few opportunities they have to hear news that has not been censored by Soviet censors. It is their link to the West, to free speech and to liberal thought. As such, it is part of the war of ideas—a war the Soviets have waged very successfully over the past decade, by disinformation and by jamming—and one which we have too often declined to fight.

The Reagan Administration deserves credit for placing emphasis on VOA as an element of U.S. policy, and for seeking a transmitter site to replace the one lost in Iran with the fall of the Shah. However, such an operation cannot be undertaken lightly by Israel.

At first glance, Israel would appear to be the ideal location. Technically, it is a suitable place. Ideologically, Israel is a democratic part of the anti-Soviet West. Politically, present emphasis on strategic cooperation underscores the fact that Israel and the U.S. do have generally congruent foreign policy goals.

However, Israel is faced with some tough policy considerations. It should be kept in mind that Greece and Turkey, NATO members are unwilling to locate transmitters on their soil, presumably to avoid antagonizing the Soviets. Israel, too, may not be willing to be deliberately antagonistic, although the two countries have been at odds for many years.

The fate of Soviet Jewry weighs heavily on the Israeli government. Since Soviet Jews are hostage to the Soviet government, Israel is loath to do anything to provide an additional excuse to harass the Jewish community. Broadcasting pro-western information to Soviet citizens from Israeli soil by VOA might be just such an excuse. Ironically, Soviet Jews might pay a price for the Israeli government providing assistance to Ukrainians, Estonians and Latvians—historically not friendly to the Jewish people.

Israel's present economic situation makes it difficult for her to refuse the U.S. something the Administration considers important. Clearly Israel wants and needs a great deal from us, and, while we are willing to help, we may be tempted to extract a political price for our aid. It would be unfortunate, if the Administration were to press Israel to do something she genuinely believed to be harmful to Jewish people.

On balance, the emigration of Soviet Jews appears to have more to do with the state of U.S.-Soviet relations than with the state of Israeli-Soviet relations, and internal crackdowns appear to be related to internal Soviet problems. However, the Israeli involvement in the rescue of Ethiopian Jews should remind us of Israel's responsibility to Jewish communities in various parts of the world as she plans her foreign policy.

If Israel does accept the VOA transmitter, its installation should be accompanied by recognition in this country of the careful balancing of risks Israel is prepared to do on our behalf. Just as we rightly insist that strategic cooperation does not mean we will subjugate our foreign policy interests to those of our ally Israel, neither should we expect Israel to do so for us.

SHORT TAKES

1. The Marxist government of Ethiopia accused Israel of "trafficking in Ethiopian citizens" by effecting the rescue of part of the Ethiopian Jewish community. The Ethiopians know whereof they speak when they talk about "trafficking," since they have spent the past ten years selling millions of their citizens down the river. They used their meager resources to buy Soviet weapons, while neglecting the food and transportation needs of the people. The drought could not have been prevented, but some of the concomitant problems could have been. The lesson should not be wasted on other African nations.

2. Kudos to the Administration for sticking to its decision to leave UNESCO after that agency failed to correct its major shortcomings. We are pleased to note that Singapore, Great Britain and West Germany have announced their intention to leave at the end of 1985 unless substantial changes are made.

3. The Italian government is willing to conduct counterterrorist actions against the Red Brigades, and has courageously investigated the Bulgarian involvement in the plot to kill the Pope. Yet the same government is unwilling to issue warrants against members of the PLO in Italy, despite strong evidence by an Italian prosecutor of links between the PLO and the Red Brigade. Why?

4. We are not surprised by Jordan's decision to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union. Nor are we unduly alarmed. We would simply point out that they have to look elsewhere, since we have—rightly—chosen not to sell them advanced weapons until they join the peace process.

JINSABRIEFS

This month we are instituting a new feature: JINSABRIEFS. In this space we will be reporting on JINSA activities and providing information about upcoming events. Lt. Col. Charles Krohn (USA, Ret.), our Director of

Development, will be bringing you news about our members and programs, and suggesting ways in which you can participate more actively in our endeavor.

The Editors

SPEAKING ABOUT JINSA

Charles A. Krohn
Director of Development

One of the more satisfying aspects of my job at JINSA is appearing before Jewish audiences to tell them about our organization. Talking about JINSA is easy. Once I begin, the words start flowing—about how we got started, our current programs, our membership campaign, and where we hope to be a few years from now. The audience is generally receptive to these messages, and an important byproduct is a group of new members.

While this approach does increase our membership, there is no substitute for an active JINSA member recruiting one or more of his or her friends.

My personal belief is that every JINSA member could—with little effort—recruit 10 new members. Recruiters may need some help obtaining JINSA brochures, but I can put whatever is needed in the mail the same day I get the request.

Numbers mean clout, and we cannot hope to achieve our aims without numbers. Usually, people don't have to be persuaded to join, it is enough to inform them that an organization exists that reflects their own views on safeguarding U.S. and Israeli security.

Most JINSA members look upon our organization as if they own a part of it. Recently, I called one of our contributors to thank him for his donation. "Why are you thanking me?" he asked. "The future of JINSA means as much to me as it does to the staff. This isn't a matter of givers and takers: we're all in this together."

Many of our larger contributors are also our best recruiters. This isn't absolutely true, of course, but it tends to be. We also have several members in college (or recently graduated) who have done an outstanding job passing the word to their friends and associates.

G.F., a third year law student, has organized three luncheons for me to present JINSA's case. I work hard at these affairs because I want these people to see JINSA as an organization that mirrors their own idealism and ambitions. The questions I get from these luncheons are friendly, but direct. I see no point in being evasive.

"Could joining JINSA affect my getting a security clearance later on, if I should go to work for the government?"

"Does the idea of JINSA obscure the notion of separation of church and state?"

"What can JINSA accomplish that wouldn't happen anyway?"

"If many American Jews are indifferent to a strong US defense as protection for Israel, after all that has happened, do you really think JINSA can make them change their minds?"

As I said, when you deal with the best of future generations, it would be disappointing if the questions were easy. Fortunately, when G.F. selects the luncheon guests, he makes sure they are predisposed to listen with an open mind. This doesn't make the questions any easier, but it does help the digestive process.

The important point is, JINSA has appeal to all concerned Americans, particularly American Jews. Yes, we have \$1,000 and \$5,000 donors, we also have supporters who send in checks for \$1. We even have some who send only their best wishes.

Our recent excursion into direct mail has proven that there are many who will affiliate with JINSA, provided they are asked. It really is important that we help such people understand that we exist to provide a philosophical sanctuary and action center for other like-minded people.

Surely you know 10 people who ought to be part of JINSA. Why not jot down their names and addresses and send them to us. Better yet, contact them yourself. We'll provide the brochures and the newsletters.

We now have about 14,000 members. Next year we should have 20,000. That is less than 1/2 of 1% of the Jewish population of the United States. You can help your organization reach this goal.

**Ask about our
speakers bureau**



Ambassador Kirkpatrick and JINSA Chairman of the Board Herbert A. Fierst, at a JINSA meeting in Maryland.



Asbury Park, NJ. Approximately 60 members of the Men's Club of Congregation Sons of Israel gathered to hear a JINSA presentation by Director of Development Charles Krohn, on Krohn's second visit to the Asbury Park area. In front of the JINSA banner are (l. to r.) Krohn, Club President Abe Kasliner, and Rabbi Josef Z. Carlebach.

JINSA Trip to Israel April 1985

Our third trip, hosted by the IDF, will focus on Israel's security problems and her innovative solutions.

We will be joined by retired members of the US armed forces, as we meet with Israeli leaders and visit defense installations and industries.

Approximate cost \$2000.

Details to follow. Limited space available.

**Please Reserve
Sunday, 31 March 1985**

JINSA Symposium and Annual Meeting

Plan to join us for a symposium dealing with US and Israel security. Meet our Board Members and offer your comments and suggestions for the year ahead. We look forward to seeing you in Washington.

Air Force Readiness—1984

Brigadier General Robert F. Durkin

Editor's Note: General Durkin is deputy director of operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. Following his presentation at Pentagon Fly-In VI, we asked him to share his information with our readers.

During the past year, the subject of readiness has occupied more time and effort than almost any other Air Force issue at the Pentagon and, in fact, throughout DOD. Early in 1984, the current readiness of the Armed Forces (i.e., "Are we more ready than we were in 1980?") became an election year media issue. Interest over this issue has not abated, and it is a safe bet to assume that it will continue throughout upcoming budget deliberations.

The notion that your Air Force is less "ready" than it was in 1980 is absolutely incorrect. The United States Air Force is a much more capable fighting force than it was in 1980. Our overall military capability has been improved in almost every area. These improvements, both quantitative and qualitative, are demonstrated by the calibre, motivation, and dedication of highly trained personnel; more modern, effective equipment; and major increases in supporting resources. My purpose here is to explain and dispel some of the more prevalent misperceptions regarding the state of Air Force readiness and to illustrate some of our many significant improvements in combat capability.

What Is Readiness

Part of the controversy surrounding the "readiness" issue is embedded in definition—a semantics problem if you will. For many years, the concept of "readiness" has been a cornerstone element of all DOD related activities. More than a Pentagon catchword, "readiness" became a sanctified term central to planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of the force. In reality, although used constantly at all levels within the defense establishment, the term "readiness" had different meanings to different people. An Air Force study conducted in 1980 indicated that there were in excess of 44 different definitions of readiness.

Realizing the continued confusion resulting from this situation, Mr. Frank Carlucci (then Deputy Secretary of Defense) proposed in 1981 for the Services to establish standard definitions for describing the capability of the armed forces. Subsequently staffed and accepted by the Services, these definitions have become working terminology within DOD. Briefly, the overall capability of the force is known as "military capability" and includes four major components or subelements. Often referred to as the "four pillars" of military capability, these components are: *force structure*—the number of units, the size, and composition of the force; *modernization*—the technological sophistication of the force; *readiness*—the present ability of our force and units to deploy and employ; and *sustainability*—the staying power of our forces.

Why All The Confusion?

While the Carlucci definitions have worked well within DOD for budgeting and resource allocation purposes, general usage still equates readiness to the overall capability of the force. Consequently, some confusion still persists. A classic example of this semantics problem was demonstrated in 1984 during Congressional testimony on the Fiscal Year 1985 DOD budget.

By aggregating data from the Combat Readiness Reporting (C-rating) System, it was alleged that Air Force readiness had declined 15% because we had 15% more units reporting C-3 (marginally combat ready) than we had in 1980. While a 15% increase in C-3 units was essentially correct, the conclusion that the Air Force was less capable was erroneous.

The C-rating system, as used by the Air Force, is a unit measure, not an overall force measure of military capability. Rather, it is an implied indication of single unit "readiness" in the narrower Carlucci sense, plus a limited degree of sustainability. The C-rating system does not even consider the impacts of force structure and modernization on our military capability. Consequently, using a subset of C-rating statistics to describe the overall capability of the force leads to incomplete and faulty conclusions.

The C-rating information revealed during Congressional hearings was only partial information. What was not pointed out was that the total number of units in the Air Force had actually increased. In fact, the Air Force experienced a noted increase in the total number of units that were in the C-1 and C-2 categories (fully and substantially combat ready, respectively). Also, during the 1980-84 period, we were expanding and modernizing the force. A newly created unit or a unit converting to a new aircraft is almost by definition marginally ready (C-3) or not ready (C-4). This is due to the transition time required for the unit to build to its full complement of aircraft and supporting resources and to train the crews to become proficient in the new weapon systems.

Another factor not highlighted in past media considerations of the C-rating system is that the Air Force toughened its measurement standards. This was done to provide a more realistic assessment of the unit



Brigadier General Robert F. Durkin

resources required to be presently ready for combat. The new measurement criteria, in turn, has made it more difficult for a unit to be C-1 or C-2 today than it was in 1980. Spare parts kits assigned to aircraft units provide a good example. These spare parts kits are composed of many different items. Some are simple and inexpensive things like nuts, bolts, and washers. Others are very sophisticated and expensive items which are critical to the operation of the aircraft. In 1980, we simply counted all of the items in the kit without taking into account the more severe impact caused by shortages of the sophisticated critical items. Today, this impact is considered in our calculations.

Aircraft spare engines also serve as an example. We have changed our assessments to give more weight to spare engines when determining the unit's C-rating. In 1980, a severe shortage of spare engines would not cause a

fighter unit to be less than C-2. Today, the same spare engine shortage could drive a unit to the C-4 (not combat ready) category.

The Truth: Increased Combat Capability

The purpose of the above discussion has been to indicate that unit C-ratings do not tell the entire readiness story. In fact, they are but one portion of our overall capability assessment. When one folds in the other elements of force structure, modernization, and sustainability, a more in-depth appreciation of Air Force combat capability results. There are many variables which contribute to overall capability, and they are not easily reduced to a single rating or index number. Many indications of capability are quality measures which are extremely difficult to integrate or quantify. If one looks beyond bureaucratic semantics and the compulsion for numerical ratings, many significant indicators are apparent. By considering the broad categories of people, equipment, training, and support, we will find examples of some of the other things that make up combat capability.

Air Force people have never been better. Nearly all of our new enlistees are high school graduates and nearly a fifth of these new enlistees have 20 hours or more of college credit. We are doing a better job of retaining our people than we did in 1980. In 1980, we reenlisted one out of every three; today, we are reenlisting two out of three. In a two-year period (1981-83), shortages of experienced enlisted people with critical career skills were reduced by approximately one-half (8,400 to 4,200), even though the requirement for these people grew by about 7,300. We have seen the same positive trend in our pilot retention. Our most critical group of pilots are those with 6 to 11 years experience. These pilots lead our flights and serve as our instructors—the core of unit leadership and capability. In 1980, we were only retaining less than half of the pilots in this group. During some

(Continued on page 7)

NEWSLETTER

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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CO-PRODUCTION: Two-Way Street for the United States and Israel

Emanuel Karbeling

Editor's Note: Mr. Karbeling has been a public affairs specialist for the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, and an Information and Security Review Specialist for the Department of the Army.

Israel and the United States are on the threshold of a military development program that can reap long-term benefit for the people of both nations and the security of the world. It is known as co-production, and its potential rewards are limited only by the imagination and skill of statesmen and military planners in both countries.

What is co-production? Simply stated, it involves the cooperative production of military equipment between equipment researchers, developers, and producers of our two nations.

An idea for the development of a new weapon system or for the improvement of an existing one is put forward by researchers in one country. The need for and value of that new weapon idea is agreed on by the planners in the two nations. Then, the originating partner's research scientists move forward on development of the weapon concept.

Once the new concept has been developed and tested to the point that it is ready for production, that production know-how is passed to the co-production partner and the weapon is produced by equipment suppliers in the partner country.



IMI produces the Clear Lane Marking System (CLAMS) which marks cleared lanes in a minefield without exposing personnel. The CLAMS can be mounted to the rear of a tank or other vehicle.

Israel Military Industries (IMI) began development of the B-300 in the early 1970s to meet Israel's requirement for a mobile, effective antitank weapon that could be carried and used by the infantryman in the field against enemy tanks. Meanwhile, the United States Marines identified a need for a "bunker-busting" launcher to be used in conjunction with a warhead developed by the marines. They expressed interest in the B-300 SMAW.

Modifications were developed in Israel to meet Marine Corps requirements for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). IMI drew up a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and entered into an agreement with McDonnell Douglas Corporation here in the United States for production of the SMAW launcher to meet Marine specifications. That agreement was drawn up in 1980.

Research and testing continued through 1981 and 1982. The SMAW was finally type classified and accepted for production and use by the Marine Corps in 1983.

The history of the United States-Israel co-production effort is a checkered one that really began during the Camp David Accords and the follow-on Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in 1979 between the United States and Israel.

Co-production and the effort of Israel and other foreign countries to sell military goods and services to the United States through their defense industries had been severely limited by the Buy American Act, passed into law before World War II. That Act required the Defense Department and other government agencies to consider any bid from non-domestic sources as being 50 percent higher than the actual bid. Thus, any foreign supplier had to drastically underbid the American supplier in order to be awarded a defense equipment contract.

The Buy American Act also limited the ability of American companies to include foreign-made components in American military items.



The B300 Rocket Launcher is an example of US-Israel co-production in action.

It was not until the mid-1970s that a consensus began to develop which would make the American defense equipment market more accessible to firms in foreign countries. NATO nations were seeking standardized weapons systems and components. They wanted to eliminate wasteful duplication.

In 1975, the Gulliver-Nunn amendment to the DOD Appropriations Act directed U.S. armed forces to set up policies that would standardize equipment used by American and other NATO armed forces. Follow-on laws called on the Secretary of Defense to waive Buy American Act provisions when they stood in the way of equipment standardization and interoperability efforts.

The 1979 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Department of Defense and the Israeli Ministry of Defense opened the first real avenues for freer exchange of defense-related industrial research, development, and production know-how between Israel and the United States. It committed both governments to policies that would promote real cooperation between their defense industries.

When the 1979 MOA expired in 1984, representatives of the two nations replaced it with a new MOA that includes improved procedures for insuring constructive cooperation between defense industries of the United States and Israel (see JINSA Newsletter Editorial, June/July 1984).

The new MOA still points out that Israel industry items will be bought by United States defense forces mainly when Israeli prices are significantly lower or when Israeli industries offer items not available in the United States—and time or cost pressures prevent licensed production in this country in time to meet American defense needs.

But the 1984 Memorandum of Agreement does provide that American defense material purchases from Israel industries, and Israeli purchases from American industries, may include appropriate joint development projects. It also lays clearer groundwork for the licensing of United States production on Israeli-developed projects—and for the subcontracting of defense materials by Israeli industries to United States industries for production here.

The policies are now in place for ensuring fuller defense industry cooperation between the research and production geniuses of the United States and Israel in the months and years ahead. They still need to face the obstacles posed by bureaucratic delay or inattention and the "Not Invented Here" attitude of military planners in both countries. Those obstacles and any others must be watched, challenged, and overcome.

As they are, the co-production two-way street will provide a growing highway for improved security, efficiency, and employment opportunity in the United States and Israel for years to come.

The Buy American Act, passed into law before World War II...required the Defense Department and other government agencies to consider any bid from non-domestic sources as being 50% higher than the actual bid.

The co-production potential of Israel and the United States are uniquely suited to each nation's defense needs at this point in history. Israel has an abundance of research and development expertise to draw on in the development of important gap-filling defense innovations. Most of its research scientists have seen recent combat duty and so are aware at first hand of the weapons considerations that most researchers in the United States study only in a laboratory setting.

The ongoing daily defense activity in Israel also permits—in fact, requires—real world applications and field testing of the new military equipment concepts.

The United States has the production capacity to turn out these new weapons and can insure continued employment for workers in its defense industries as it co-produces new items developed in Israel.

There are now 15 military items in the United States-Israel co-production stream. One interesting example is the B-300 Soldier Multiple Assault Weapon (SMAW).

SDI

(Continued from page 1)

Soviet R&D

While the ABM Treaty has been called the "crown jewel" of arms control, many students find a simpler rationale than MAD for Soviet acceptance of the Treaty: the United States had a tremendous technological lead in ballistic missile defense; the Soviets wanted to stop U.S. progress while they caught up.

If this was their rationale, it worked. For a decade after the Treaty was signed, the U.S. R&D on BMD fell to a fraction of former levels, while Soviet expenditures on R&D grew to a considerable multiple of the U.S. figure. The United States, moreover, after the 1974 Protocol to the Treaty, dismantled its one permanent site (at Grand Forks,

Many believe the Soviets are "creeping out" of the (ABM) Treaty, whether or not they intend abrogation and a declared breakout.

North Dakota) while the Soviets kept theirs (at Moscow) and used it as an operational test-bed for steady development and improvement of their capabilities.

Today, there is serious question as to whether the Soviets are planning, or even starting, to build the missing "crown jewel" of their strategic defenses—BMD. The President has cited as a Treaty violation the new Soviet phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk. The Treaty provided that such radars should only be deployed on the national borders, looking outward for early warning. Krasnoyarsk, however, is in southern Siberia, facing northeast, toward Alaska. Moreover, it is located near existing Soviet ICBM fields, so that it could easily be used for defensive "battle management." In addition, others have reported additional violations of the Treaty, and many believe that the Soviets are "creeping out" of the Treaty, whether or not they intend abrogation and a declared breakout.

In short, the SDI is an initiative of the Reagan Administration, but strategic defense is not a U.S. initiative; the Soviets took the initiative

first (excluding the U.S. air defenses built in the 1950s, when bombers were the only strategic threat).

Toward a New Doctrine

Interestingly, even while negotiating SALT I, and putting at least temporary brakes on development of its lead in missile accuracy in order to preclude a real or putative first-strike capability, the United States started a doctrinal shift away from MAD. (Its strategic targeting plans had never been completely MAD, but its capabilities had.) In 1971, President Nixon stated the crucial dilemma: "I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges..." Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in 1974 announced a new nuclear weapons employment policy (NUWEPS), moving away from Assured Destruction—urban-industrial targeting, which was all that could be effectively accomplished with the first generation of strategic weapons—toward greater emphasis on selective options and on military and economic targeting.

This doctrinal trend continued through the 1970s, under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

In this decade, many opponents of MAD were also getting a better hearing for their view that the doctrine was immoral. Your present author argued in print that it was, to paraphrase Menckel, illegal, immoral, but *not* fattening: population targeting is illegal under international law; it is to many of us immoral; and, by the time of the "window of vulnerability" (to Soviet Counterforce attack) in the early to mid-1980s, it would not even be *feasible*.

The United States could not be confident, after a Soviet first strike and in the face of Soviet defenses, of achieving Assured Destruction as it had been defined by Secretary of Defense McNamara in the 1960s (as a percentage of population and industry destroyed, varying over the years, or even in his most general 1968 formulation as "an unacceptable degree of damage"). Moreover, we would be deterred by larger Soviet than U.S. nuclear forces remaining after the first strike, as well as self-deterred by our own scruples and fears (i.e., good sense). In short, by the 1980s MAD would no longer be, if it ever had been, a credible deterrent.

In August 1980, during the Presidential campaign, a new Carter National Security Presidential Directive (PD) was leaked and then briefed to the press. This was PD-59, which enunciated a new strategic nuclear targeting policy. Population and cities could no longer be targeted per se. The targeting priorities would be political, especially leadership; military, including other military targets as well as strategic weapons—what the writer calls "lower case" counterforce; and war-supporting industries, not the general economy or "economic recovery

We would be deterred by larger Soviet than US nuclear forces remaining after the first strike, as well as self-deterred by our scruples and fears (i.e., common sense)...By the 1980s MAD would no longer be...a credible deterrent.

assets." There would also be the maintenance and growth of a Secure Reserve Force (SRF), i.e., a residual "assured Destruction" retaliatory force (mainly submarine-launched ballistic missiles—SLBMs) to deter Soviet escalation to city targeting.

While much remains to be done to make such targeting feasible, and whatever the political motives for leaking the document, PD-59 was a milestone. It codified the shift from threatening the victims of a totalitarian regime to threatening the regime itself and its tools of regime-maintenance (there being no orderly, or constitutionally-provided, process for leadership succession in the Soviet Union, the regime must always look to its own preservation and power).

Moreover, PD-59 was supported by a series of prior decision-directives:

- PD-58 (also leaked in August 1980) provided for the "continuity of government," starting with the protection of the President and his successors, in order to provide not only for crisis diplomacy and the prosecution of a possible war but also for the maintenance of constitutionality and an endeavor to assure the survival of not only the nation but also the Constitution, so that after a war the nation may be restored as we know it in its political organization, objectives and values.

- PD-57 provided for preparation of a mobilization base and for potential mobilization in crisis or war.

- PD-53 provided for planning communications to support mobilization in any war or national security emergency. The Directive provided for maximum utilization of commercial and private, as well as government assets.

- PD-41 made civil defense a national policy. (The substance of the Directive was incorporated into the law in the Fall of 1980, in Title V of the Federal Civil Defense Act, as amended.)

The Imperative of Defense

These supporting directives reflect what the author considers the imperative of defense if we are to implement PD-59 doctrine, which envisages the possibility of a prolonged war in which nuclear weapons are used. This possibility is contemplated not, of course, because it is desired but in order to deter Soviet attack or coercion and to prevent a Soviet short-war victory if deterrence fails and they have taken the initiative. Therefore,

forces,
government,
C³,
population, and
industry (including infrastructure)

must be defended to give them endurance, as implied by the word "secure" in "Secure Reserve Force"; the possible use of forces in "prolonged war" and the need to survive while prosecuting such a war; and the necessity for continuity of government.

Defense may be "active," destroying attacking weapons. It may also be passive, enhancing inherent characteristics of targets, including hardness (as we already do for missile silos, for example, and are in the process of doing for C³), mobility (bombers and submarines, and in the future possibly ICBMs), dispersal, and concealment (including deception). But the requirement for defense underlies the SDI, both to make deterrence plans credible and to minimize damage if deterrence fails (the primary stated purpose of arms control, which, where it proves feasible, might be added to our list of passive defenses). We may argue later about the potential relative advantages of "Star Wars" defenses vs. other measures, but we must conclude here, as prelude to analysis of the SDI, that the answer to our first question is: *MAD is not viable and defenses must be sought.*

We cannot have Assured Survival, as some have claimed. Nothing is assured in this life, but we have an obligation to strive to assure survival of our nation, its people, their resources, and their liberty. Some defense is by definition feasible, e.g., hardness and dispersal of some targets. Whether, at what risks, and how to achieve comprehensive defenses are the subjects of future articles.

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READINESS

(Continued from page 4)

months of 1984, we were keeping over three-quarters of these pilots. However, there have been recent indications that these retention rates are starting to go down.

Both the quality and quantity of our major equipment have improved as a result of much needed force modernization programs. The number of modern fighters in the inventory (A-10s, F-15s, and F-16s) has increased dramatically. In 1980, only one out of three aircraft in our inventory was considered a modern fighter. Today, two out of every three aircraft are in that category. During the 1980-84 period, the total inventory has increased by nearly 600 fighters. Likewise, our number of major combat units increased by 30 squadrons. During the same period, our Air Reserve Forces retired six older aircraft types and are now receiving more new, modern aircraft like the A-10 and F-16 at an increasing rate. A most significant addition to our force structure has been the ground launched cruise missile (Tomahawk) which is now operational and continuing to be fielded.

"Readiness" has become a sanctified term... (But) an Air Force Study conducted in 1980 indicated that there were in excess of 44 different definitions of readiness.

Real capability gains can often be realized by modifications to existing or older equipment. The aging B-52 serves as a good example. We have expanded its missions and its versatility by adding the air-launched cruise missile and the HARPOON antishipping missile. Avionics enhancements have doubled the B-52's bombing accuracy and its chances of survival have increased with additions of new electronic countermeasures equipment.

The strategic (long-haul) airlift fleet has increased its daily cargo carrying capability by over one-fourth since 1980. This has been achieved by lengthening all the C-141 aircraft, replacing the wings on the C-5A, procuring more KC-10s, and increasing the number of potential flights through additional spare parts acquisitions. These aircraft modifications/acquisitions and the increased availability of spare parts has also increased the cargo carrying capability of our airlift fleet over extended periods of time.

Deployment and employment of our forces has been improved by enhancements to our airborne refueling capability. Due to acquisition of the KC-10 and by putting new engines on some KC-135 aircraft, we can off-load 13% more fuel today than we could in 1980.

Our people and equipment are better supported than in 1980. At that time, we were seriously short of spare parts in the Air Force. We still have some shortages in this area, but due to increased funding, we are making significant gains. Today, when we go out on the flightline, we find that more and more aircraft are available for flying than was the case in 1980. This is because the spare parts we ordered in the past are showing up at our bases in

increasing numbers. This type of improvement translates into actual war-fighting capability.

There is another important story with some of our new fighter squadrons. There are 14 newly created fighter squadrons that did not exist in 1980. These new squadrons are equipped with A-10s, F-15s, and F-16s, all modern, highly capable aircraft. To show you how capable these aircraft are, let us look at a typical F-16 and compare the results of some recent GUNSMOKE competitions, bi-annual gunnery meets during which the tactical air forces demonstrate the proficiency of their crews and the quality of their equipment. In GUNSMOKE 81, the "top gun" was an A-7 pilot. He dropped his bombs within 29 feet of the bullseye and that was considered very good. But, it was not good enough in 1983, when the F-16s were out in force. The top gun in the 1983 competition was an F-16 pilot who dropped his bombs within five feet of the bullseye. The bombs used were not even what we call smart munitions. Instead, what we had was a smart airplane and a well-trained pilot.

In addition to flying more capable aircraft, typical F-16 pilots are getting excellent training by flying about 20 missions a month. They are participating in realistic exercises and have deployed to their overseas warfighting location to practice all of the things that would be necessary if they had to deploy in a real-world crisis. Having told you that our equipment is more modern and more capable and that our people are more experienced and better trained, let me round out the story by presenting a few facts about our ability to take our fighting forces where needed in defense of our vital national interests.

On any one day, we can airlift more now than we could in 1980 and, over a sustained period of reinforcement, we can airlift two-thirds more cargo now than we could in 1980. Once our fighting forces get in theater, they can sustain themselves for a period nearly two-thirds longer now than they could in 1980. Let me assure you—our combat forces are ready.

Combat Capability: A Public Trust

The level of military capability I have described here has not been achieved without expensive outlays—enormous costs. We in the Air Force are acutely aware of economic reality and our responsibility to provide for the most capable national defense via the most prudent management of national resources. In this age of conflicting priorities, costly high technology weapon systems, and high deficit spending, the priority Air Force concern remains the threat confronting our nation. Today, we are opposed with a threat that possesses military capability that has increased at an astonishing rate. At the same time, some of our traditional advantages are less apparent than in the recent past. Our quality edge has been diminished somewhat because of the technological gains of our potential adversaries. Our historical reliance on industrial mobilization does not provide the comfort it has in the past. To ensure meaningful deterrence, we must be ready with little or no warning time to provide the most effective counter in any contingency. We must be ready to engage and prevail across the full spectrum of potential military conflict.

We are prepared. We are ready. Our overall military capability is high. Air Force programs have been and continue to be structured in a well-reasoned fashion. These programs are designed to provide the optimum military capability—applying the proper level of effort across all four pillars: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. I will assure you that the entire Air Force organization is absolutely committed to obtaining maximum combat capability for each defense dollar entrusted to us.

The state of readiness we enjoy today is the result of strong public support—the support of taxpayers and their elected representatives. With the continued support of the American people, your Air Force will maintain the needed readiness and overall capability necessary to deter the threat and preserve our national security.



USAF/McDonnell Douglas KC-10 tanker refueling TAC's F-15.

NEWSBRIEFS

USO OPENS IN HAIFA: The American United Services Organization (USO) has recently opened a center in Haifa, Israel. The USO is a private group that was organized in WWII by parents of American servicemen to provide troops overseas with entertainment facilities. The center in Haifa, which is one of 32 in the area of the Mediterranean, opened at the same time that 6000 sailors and airmen from the USS Eisenhower and Mississippi visited the city.

SOVIETS BREAK ICE: Researchers from the University of Alaska took photographs from a civilian satellite that indicated that Soviet submarines may be able to break through the Arctic ice cap. The photos, showing a break in the ice and three large jets circling the area, pointed to the suspicion that the Soviet Union may have an instrument that would allow the submarine to bore a hole through the ice and then launch missiles from subs that are still submerged. The most difficult area of submarine detection is under the ice pack, where subs are nearly invisible to radar.

LIBYA AND TUNISIA SIGN ACCORDS: Libya and Tunisia recently signed several cooperation pacts after two months' delay because of the unstable relations between them. Major developments include the establishment of a minimum level of trade for the next three years and a series of cooperative cultural projects.

JAPANESE STOP TECH TRANSFER: Japanese customs officials, responding to a request by the US, succeeded in seizing an American submarine tracking system before it was illegally sent to the Soviet Union. The sonar device is on the list of high-tech items that is prohibited from export to Soviet bloc countries by the Coordinating Committee for Export Control (CoCOM); Japan is a member of the Committee. This detection system is capable of producing highly-detailed pictures of the ocean's bottom to a depth of 39,600 feet.

ARABS IN IDF: The Israel Defense Forces have decided to accept the voluntary enlistment of 18 Arab men from the Galilee. There still remain over 200 requests from Arabs who want to serve in the Israeli Army. Most of the volunteers are Christian Arabs, although there are also some Muslims under consideration. These do not include Druze recruits, or requests from Bedouins who have been recruited in the IDF for the past several years.

SYRIA AND FRANCE NEGOTIATE: According to Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, negotiations are in progress for Damascus to purchase French weapons, including replacements for 15 helicopters that were shot down by the Israeli Air Force in the 1982 war in Lebanon. Syria is also interested in buying missiles for those helicopters as well as antitank missiles. About 1000 Syrian soldiers are being trained in France.

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WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

LEON SLOSS (Contributing Editor to *Security Affairs*) **AMBASSADOR SEYMOUR WEISS**: "The Soviets built their forces to support the strategy they have held to consistently, based not on targeting US cities, but the US military establishment. As a result, they are today capable in a first strike (and their doctrine has always emphasized the importance of surprise) of reducing the US retaliatory force to a relatively small fraction of its nominal strength. Thus, we could be left with a force that, while having some countermilitary capability, was most suitable for attacking Soviet cities, even though our own cities had not yet been attacked by the Soviets—an unenviable choice for any president."

"Soviet exploitation of military power—the one thing the Soviets are good at developing—is not just some minor aberration in otherwise reasonable behavior. The Soviets develop that power because they require it for purposes of political intimidation and, should they fail, for actual employment, as they pursue their goal of a world pliant to Soviet views." (January *The Washington Post*)

HOSNI MUBARAK (President of Egypt, during King Hussein's visit

to Cairo): "Today we hear voices accusing us of plotting...We are seeking Arab integration among all Arab countries in all fields...If this is plotting in the view of certain people, we are the happiest people with a great plot to unify the Arabs and make the Arab will a strong force that can impose its stand and protect its land from aggression and liberate what the aggressors usurped...From this standpoint, we greet the PNC which convened in Amman. The convocation of the PNC, in our opinion, is an indication of the Arab ability to surmount artificial obstacles and proof that the will to unite and rally around a crucial issue is much stronger than recriminations and acrimonyes." (December)

TARIQ 'AZIZ (Iraqi Foreign Minister). "We believe that it is only natural that we have normal relations with the two superpowers and the other countries with which it is necessary for us to have relations...The USSR is undoubtedly a country which is Iraq's friend. These relations are based on mutual respect and on noninterference in each other's domestic affairs. I am certain that the USSR understands our move to resume relations with the United States as we understand it and in the way we view it." (November)

PEDRO JOAQUIN CHAMORRO (former editor of *La Prensa*, the only independent Nicaraguan newspaper): "[Censorship] is the clearest symptom of the difference between a dictatorship and a democracy. There is no dictatorship in the world where freedom of the press exists unfettered, nor a genuine democracy where it is antagonized...I cannot stand this situation any longer, and unless there is a genuine change in the direction of permitting the right to dissent and of allowing freedom of the press...I will not return to Nicaragua...I wish to ask the following question of the commanders who are guiding the well-known course of the revolution: if you cannot tolerate one single independent newspaper, how will you be able to tolerate democracy?" (Jan)

PRINCE SAUD AL-FAYSAL (Saudi Foreign Minister, at the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference): "The Afghan problem occupies its place in the vanguard of the adversities afflicting our Islamic world. It demands the exertion of further efforts to secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country unconditionally and to guarantee the inalienable right of the Afghan people to choose the regime they want without any foreign interference or pressure...As the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is growing more ferocious day by day and is expanding, and as the cause of the Afghan people has been gaining wider support in international quarters...our conference should adopt a decision reflecting the unanimous Islamic support it deserves..." (December)

YASSER ARAFAT (Chairman of the PLO): "The PLO rejects [Resolution 242] even if it is amended, and that the PLO insists that another resolution be issued which recognizes the Palestinian people's right to self-determination...The recent PNC session has contributed to the escalation of Palestinian resistance against the US-Israeli conspiracy aimed at establishing sectarian entities in the Middle East, and...President Hosni Mubarak's recent stands have shown that Egypt wishes to free itself from the Camp David Accords." (December)

YITZHAK RABIN (Israeli Defense Minister): "To the best of my knowledge, an increasing number of PLO members who engage in terrorism are finding their place in Amman...When it comes to attacks from Jordanian territory, we regard Jordan as being responsible for them. I am aware that the Jordanian Government is making great efforts to prevent them. However, the very invitation to the PLO leaders, including the leaders of the executive bodies—or, in other words, their terrorists—to come and settle in Jordan jeopardizes the Jordanian objective, and King Husayn had better realize this as soon as possible in order to prevent a degeneration of the calm that has prevailed for 14 years along our joint border." (November)

NEWSBRIEFS

(Continued from page 7)

GULF RDF: The six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council will establish a joint rapid deployment force to protect themselves against "any emergency that threatens any gulf state." The creation of the force, which will not respond to internal subversion in any one country and which will be comprised of several units from each nation, was stimulated by the five-year old Iran-Iraq war. Although professing neutrality in that conflict, the gulf nations have actually supported Iraq because of their fear that radical Islamic fundamentalism would threaten them in the case of an Iranian victory.

NATO TECHNOLOGY: According to the spokesman for NATO's Supreme Commander, General Bernard Rogers, NATO's newly approved Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) strategy will probably emphasize proven technology rather than the "emerging technologies" favored by the Reagan Administration. General Rogers must submit a report in May that will include the types and numbers of weapons needed, a schedule for producing those weapons and a cost estimate for FOFA requirements. In other news, NATO defense ministers have recently agreed to a 40% increase conventional defense spending of \$7.85 billion over the next six years. In order to counterbalance Soviet advantages in that area, the alliance will work on improving its communications facilities and airfields, among other projects.

GREECE MAY REDEPLOY: The Government of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou has announced that it may redeploy some of its armed forces away from its northern border, which it shares with Eastern bloc countries, to the east, where it faces Turkey. Although both Greece and Turkey are members of NATO, they have been at odds for centuries over such issues as Cyprus. Meanwhile, Greece has declined to participate in any NATO exercises until it is allowed to restation troops on the Aegean island of Lemnos, restoring her full operational control over the area. Turkey has demanded that the island be demilitarized and Greece has vetoed the inclusion of Turkish troops in a NATO presence on Lemnos.

CHINESE ARMY TO REINSTATE RANKS: The Chinese army has been consulting with representatives of the US military to garner advice on how to reestablish its system of military rank and pay scale, which was abandoned 20 years ago. Dr. Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations and Logistics, said that the US will train Chinese officials in modernizing China's military logistics system, which includes such topics as distribution of military supplies, military pay incentives and cataloguing spare parts as part of an effort to professionalize the Chinese armed forces.

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