The Intelligent Layperson's Guide to "Star Wars"

16 Questions & Answers on
Strategic Defense and Space Weaponry



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Joyce E. Larson
William C. Bodie

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National Strategy Information Center, Inc.

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The center espouses no political causes. Its Directors and Officers represent a wide spectrum of responsible political opinion from liberal to conservative. What unites them, however, is the conviction that neither isolationism nor pacifism can provide realistic solutions to the challenge of 20th century totalitarianism.

NSIC exists to encourage civil-military partnership on the grounds that, in a democracy, informed public opinion is necessary to a viable US defense system capable of protecting the nation's vital interests and assisting other free nations which aspire to independence and self-fulfillment.

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Preface

In 1983 the National Strategy Information Center, in response to the growing "nuclear freeze" debate, published a question-and-answer booklet which packaged available data on the nuclear weapons debate in a concise, readable fashion for busy people with an interest in defense topics. *The Intelligent Layperson's Guide to the Nuclear Freeze*, by Joyce E. Larson and William C. Bodie, became one of NSIC's best selling publications, and has been widely reviewed and utilized in debate forums on security issues.

Owing to the success of the 1983 *Guide*, as well as the prominence and complexity of the SDI debate, the editors at NSIC produced a follow-up booklet on the "Star Wars" controversy. *The Intelligent Layperson's Guide to "Star Wars"* is a distillation of perspectives on the technical, political, economic, and strategic aspects of a potential defense against nuclear attack. After the authors collected and refined their material, the draft was sent for review to a distinguished group of scientists and scholars. The authors would like to acknowledge the generous advice of the following reviewers: Roger W. Barnett, Karl R. Bendetsen, Angelo Codevilla, Jacquelyn K. Davis, Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., Robert Jastrow, R. Daniel McMichael, S.W.B. Menaul, William C. Mott, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Simon P. Worden. The sixteen questions and answers are preceded by an introductory essay by Frank R. Barnett, President of NSIC.

Joyce E. Larson, currently attending the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, was a writer, editor, and program officer at the National Strategy Information Center for nine years. A graduate of the University of Washington and New York University's National Security Studies Program, she was editor of *New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1979), and co-authored *The Intelligent Layperson's Guide to the Nuclear Freeze and Peace Debate* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1983).

William C. Bodie is Research Coordinator at the National Strategy Information Center. Educated at Columbia University and New York University, he has written, lectured, and appeared on television and radio on behalf of NSIC since 1982. Mr. Bodie is co-author of *The Intelligent Layperson's Guide to the Nuclear Freeze and Peace Debate* and is co-editor of *War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1983). He has written articles and reviews for *Freedom at Issue*, *The Detroit News*, and *Strategic Review*.

At first glance, the Star Wars debate seems to be about science and strategy, economics and engineering. Here the layperson might expect to be guided by the consensus of experts; yet, in each of these disciplines, professionals are found on both sides of every issue. This is true partly

because linear "forecasting" about future costs and capability is routinely confounded by mutations in the third or fourth generation of a given technology. Familiar to everyone is television's startling evolution from studio-confined, black and white programs to satellite transmission in color of play at Wimbledon and the Olympics, plus VCR's magic recapture of a Verdi opera that, in first generation t.v., would have been forever lost to those who watched baseball on another channel.

But experts disagree about Star Wars for reasons that have little to do with unpredictable transfigurations of hardware wrought by leapfrogs in technology. For what appears on the surface to be chiefly a scientific debate is more often a philosophical disagreement over the staying power of ideology, the nature of Soviet man, the mainsprings of human motivation, the premises for calculating risk, and the width of the culture gap between dictatorship and democracy. Long before laser specialists can prove their wares, the future of the SDI may be decided by psychological judgments as to whether Gorbachev "in his heart" has renounced Leninism or political hopes that traditional Soviet guile can be modified by positive Western example. On these issues, the intelligent layperson may have as much competence (if not more) than the experts.

Introduction

Suppose that an Alien—untouched by the loyalties, hopes, and fears that animate earthlings—were sent here by the rulers of his remote planet to evaluate "Star Wars." Some of the questions on his check-list might be similar to ours:

- Can Western science build the requisite hardware and software?
- Will an exotic stratoshield protect cities and people, or only retaliatory forces, or none of the above?
- Assuming that efficient "defensive screens" could be built, would it cost one side less to saturate or dupe the defense than it would the other to multiply and improve the screens?
- Will a strenuous effort to bring Defense into parity (or parity-plus) with Offense unhinge the Balance of Terror which thus far has seemingly kept peace on earth?
- Will any shield worth building cost far too much? (And is "too much" defined differently by different societies?)
- Will a new strategy, based on the primacy of defense, alienate Allies or reassure them?
- Will the Soviets escalate their own Star Wars activities, or will they be driven into a neurotic frenzy of even greater diversification of offensive arsenals?
- Will the SDI ennervate the arms control process or improve its chances?
- During that prolonged "dread interval" of the piecemeal, *gradual* deployment of defensive American screens which, once fully in place, might render Soviet weapons obsolete, how will fallible human nature cope with the temptation to "use or lose" enormously expensive nuclear stockpiles?

We can imagine our Alien from a far-off galaxy applying his cold, computer intelligence to each of these fateful questions. He refines raw data from the literature, ignoring all ideological bias. He listens to every debate but is deaf to polemics and political chaff. He discards all arguments tainted by the polluted words in his automatic reject index: "doubtless, hopeful, intolerable, humane, suicidal, affordable, bankrupting, imperialist, Communist-inspired." Finally, this Recon Officer from outer space, having weighed the bits of irrefutable evidence on hand at present, sends to his chiefs the same, succinct answer to every question: "It remains to be seen."

By his criteria of extraterrestrial thought, the Alien would be right in his judgment. On his own planet, the research phase of any enterprise is accompanied by attitudes of cautious and open-minded curiosity. On his planet, lobbies are not formed to defeat or support anticipated outcomes before the investigation has left the laboratory. On his planet, scientists do

not marinate "facts" in their private ethical or political preferences, and then choose up sides to perplex the public with contradictory *ex cathedra* predictions.

The stranger from another galaxy could not know that pure logic and detached enquiry, ideals honored on earth, seldom dominate the actual conduct of human affairs. Hence, the Alien failed to list a question that would be irrelevant to his civilization, yet crucial to ours:

> "If a majority of congressmen, and their constituents, come to *believe* that a scientific experiment probably won't work — even if their belief were to become false to fact in the context of emergent technology — are they likely to finance adequately the intermediate steps required to fully prove or disprove the grand design?"*

Over the next decade, Congress and the public will be asked repeatedly if the US should gamble first scores, then hundreds, of billions of dollars — even the future of American civilization — on what many regard as the impossible dream of innovating effective shields against Soviet missiles. The purpose of this modest booklet is to invite the intelligent reader to consider the pros and cons of some of the most troublesome questions about what has come to be known as the *Star Wars* program. The discerning reader will note that most of the debate is future oriented. There is astonishingly little controversy over what the Pentagon is doing today: funding research into "feasibility."

The decibels grow more shrill when advocates and critics begin to dispute the ethics, efficacy, cost and legality of deploying (as yet largely unknown) diverse layers of a novel defense system. The Alien to our planet, untutored in the force of passion, would reiterate his detached opinion: "It remains to be seen." But emotion helps to drive politics and change votes on defense budgets. Neither newspaper editors nor Members of Congress can long satisfy their constituents by humming the tune of "It all depends. . . ." Hence, the heated discussion of *Star Wars* will shape the reality of research expenditure today, even though the technology of tomorrow may render a good part of the current debate irrelevant.

Neither side to the SDI debate should find it embarrassing to concede they are differing over a gamble. (The future viability of NATO is another gamble.) It is legitimate to quarrel over the odds on SDI success, but not to assert at the start that the outcome is either certain or hopeless. It is popular to argue there might be more prudent gambles than SDI, such as more persistent tries at arms control. Yet, arms control is scarcely an

*One wonders if the Manhattan Project would have given us the A-bomb before Stalin got it, had Roosevelt's directive not been implemented in the absolute secrecy of war-time emergency, which also permitted the authoritarian management style of General Groves and Dr. Oppenheimer.

untested hazard. We have played at the arms limitation table now for more than sixty years, first against Nazi Germany and Japan, then against the Soviet Empire. For the most part, we gained little more than euphoria from being seen in the Peace Casino, while our adversaries went home to convert "lawful" winnings into larger stockpiles of more advanced weapons. Arms control agreements have been so ineptly crafted, or so poorly enforced by the West, that the Soviet military threat has demonstrably increased in the wake of the ABM, Outer Space, and SALT I and II Treaties.

Moreover, history is replete with evidence that "Treaties" between nations with incompatible moral and legal premises do not usually benefit that society which is reluctant to resort to conspiracy and deceit. Between 1983 and 1985, five Presidential Reports to Congress have detailed the means by which the USSR has evaded the aim of nearly half the arms control pledges it has signed since the end of World War II. For all its utopian rhetoric, the arms control "process" has had virtually no impact in modifying ideological zeal and political intentions which, more than arms, are the genesis of aggression.

Some criticism of the SDI is based on unexpressed premises about Soviet behavior which, too often, is perceived as being similar to ours, at least with regard to the paramount need to avoid a nuclear war. Hence, not a few Americans and Europeans predicate new peace proposals on their confidence that Moscow — despite both deployment patterns and military doctrine to the contrary—*really* adheres to the wisdom of Mutual Assured Destruction. In this view, it follows that, if (a) the Russians are subliminally devoted to MAD and (b) Star Wars would nullify MAD, (c) SDI must be repudiated. Otherwise, the current state of stability-through-terror would be undermined.

Further, critics of the SDI assert, even if Star Wars research and testing do not induce a Soviet first strike before the American shield is in place, the effort to upgrade defense will only cause the Soviet side to vastly proliferate offensive missiles, warheads, and decoys to overwhelm the barriers erected against them.

One trouble with this analysis is the flawed premise: the Soviets have never embraced the orthodoxy of MAD; they have always been stubborn heretics from the McNamara dogma, unwilling to concede that Mother Russia must be delivered as a passive hostage to American warheads. No number of patronizing tutorials from American arms control enthusiasts seems likely to deflect Soviet strategy from its historic commitment to a ferocious defense. Those whose ancestors survived the invasions of Napoleon and Hitler are psychologically able to allocate resources to the defense of the homeland on a scale unimaginable to us.

For more than two decades, the Kremlin has applied awesome energy to achieve both (a) damage-limitation to Soviet industrial plant and (b) assured survival for the *Nomenklatura*, the elite who manage the political,

military, internal security, and economic consortia of the USSR. Since the Politburo presides over a vast defensive enterprise of its own, we need not be overly concerned that its Members will become paranoid over a US program with parallel aims. What should alarm us more is the Russian definition of what, to us, seems an innocuous term: "damage limitation." In Soviet military doctrine, the efficient (and acceptable) way to limit damage to one's own cities and people is to destroy enemy missiles before they are launched.

Hence, despite the "spirit of SALT," between 1972 and 1985, the Kremlin multiplied on its giant rockets its counterforce (silo-busting) warheads from 300 to 5,000. This ominous trend shows how little Moscow's nuclear strategy has been influenced by the novel idea from the West that "sufficiency" is not really worse than "superiority." While American think-tanks debate "How much is enough?", the Russians suffer no such indecision. What is "enough" — in modern nuclear weapons as in the awesome mass of Stalin's World War II artillery — is not only "more than the opponent," but conspicuously enough more to overawe, intimidate, preempt, and annihilate.

President Carter's Secretary of Defense, Dr. Harold Brown, rebutted the notion that there is a direct correlation between American initiative and Soviet response with regard to offensive weapons production. Secretary Brown observed that when we build, they build; but when we cease building they continue to build. The Kremlin's programs in defense are likewise grounded in Soviet strategy and gather momentum from Soviet priorities, not from Western example.

In short, forbearance on our part will deter neither Moscow's production of SS-18s nor its advanced research on war lasers and particle beams. We have inside evidence for this evaluation. Thirty emigré scientists from the USSR wrote an open letter to the American people in June of 1986. Based on their experience, they asserted that, since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union has devoted more of its resources to strategic defense than does the United States. Moreover, added the former Soviet scientists, Communist leaders will continue to work on their own version of "Star Wars," either overtly or covertly, and with high priority, no matter what they say or what they sign, or what the US does.

Given the magnitude and lead-time of Soviet efforts to produce synergistic systems of defense, the SDI seems more an imperative than an option. Moreover, our political culture is not comfortable with the endless refinement and production of "brutal mass weaponry" to keep the balance. The "nuclear freeze" movement in Europe and America together with opposition to our current strategy by Catholic and Methodist Bishops indicate that the old consensus in favor of "defense through reprisal" is coming unraveled. Most of our European partners were against the neutron

weapon. Nobody in NATO likes chemical arsenals. Our nuclear warheads are smaller and cleaner than the Kremlin's. We have no aggressive doctrine of war-fighting. We don't plan to preempt. Thus, in terms of culture as well as strategy, the goals of the SDI are more harmonious with the deepest values of our society than is the relentless perfection of offensive megatons required to undergird the strategy of MAD.

Hence, knowing that Moscow has been in vigorous pursuit of strategic defense for nearly twenty years—as usual, behind a cloak of disinformation — is more than a sufficient motive for Washington to engage in the SDI. At minimum, our research effort should lead to early warnings of potential Soviet "breakouts" and provide safeguards against technological ambush. Moreover, even if SDI does not produce a 100% effective missile barrier, the concentrated pursuit of novel defensive technologies is likely to offer unforeseen options to future presidents who, absent the SDI, would find themselves in a strategic straitjacket. Chance often favors those with enlarged freedom of choice. To expand that choice, we are asked to place a practical wager on the proven genius of US scientific laboratories and aerospace firms which, in turn, are improving the odds by enlisting crack research and engineering talent from Germany, Britain, Japan, France and Israel. No wonder Moscow's propaganda seeks to nullify a judicious bet on such an aggregate of ingenuity and industrial competence. (No wonder, too, Gorbachev seeks to vitiate the momentum of the SDI by proposing a 20-year extension of the ABM Treaty.)

Rhetoric aside, as of now there are two quite different force deployments to back up two quite different theories on how to prevent nuclear war, or at least greatly limit the damage to one's own side. Soviet heavy missiles, very accurate, are deployed in support of the doctrine that the best strategy is to destroy an enemy's missiles before they can be launched. US lighter, less accurate, missiles are deployed to underpin the doctrine that the best strategy is to demonstrate unequivocally that the enemy's cities will be destroyed even if he has fired first — thus deterring war in the first place. Now President Reagan advances a *tertium quid:* the best strategy is to deploy a defensive system which, if the enemy launches offensive missiles, will destroy them in flight.

Note the psychological and moral distinctions between Soviet military doctrine and the concept of "Star Wars." To destroy American missiles before they leave their silos would necessitate a surprise first strike by Moscow. That improbable "bolt from the blue" could be a cold-blooded act of decapitation. However, a more likely possibility exists — an "unwanted" Soviet launch, prompted by misplaced fear. A first strike could be based on the Politburo's *assumption* that Washington "might" be thinking of mounting its own attack on the USSR. Such a "launch-on-assumption" could even be triggered by the miscalculation of a jealous

faction inside the dictatorship seeking, by a *coup de main* against the imperialists, to prevail in a power struggle between the Red Army and the KGB.

The anti-missile shields of "Star Wars," by way of contrast, would not lead to holocaust through a wrong assumption. Only after Soviet missiles were actually in flight would they be attacked. In other words, SDI defense would not be triggered by what Washington *thought* Moscow's intentions *might* be; the force of the shields would only be invoked against the unmistakable fact of Soviet missiles under way. Moreover, the Soviet destruction of US missiles in their silos would inevitably kill millions of American civilians; whereas "Star Wars" intercepts of Soviet missiles en route through space would wreak little havoc on earth.

At present, America does not have a true "counterforce" potential to strike Soviet missiles in their silos. Thus, as of now, Moscow has a unilateral edge in "damage limitation" by preemption of an opponent's weapons. As we have seen, an SDI system would attack Soviet missiles in flight, chiefly, with non-nuclear weapons, a humane method of limiting damage to both American and Soviet cities. Our other viable option — to build a huge, mobile, counterforce capability of our own — could entail exploding thousands of US warheads directly on Russian silos, killing scores of millions of Russian citizens in the resultant blast, fire, and fallout.

Thus, given the inescapable horror of "damage limitation" through first-strike incineration of enemy silos, the SDI alters the rules of an arms race in which the Soviets are ahead and have an unbeatable momentum in acquiring more and bigger offensive missiles. SDI doesn't upset a "safe" status quo; rather it shifts the context from a track on which we are losing to a playing field on which, eventually, both sides (and mankind as a whole) can win by competing to build better defenses instead of more lethal warheads. Finally, unlike the posture required by MAD, the SDI would devalue the worth of Soviet missile stockpiles, reduce the potential for a successful first strike and provide protection should deterrence fail.

In assessing the pros and cons of Star Wars, we should be sensitive to the danger of distorting thought with clever cliches, even those to which we are partial. The public debate, after all, is not conducted with blueprints and logarithms; the battle is waged with memorable allusions (however inexact) borrowed from history and even theater. Since most producers and consumers of mass media are uncomfortable with technical formulae, it is inevitable that literary phrases will only dimly approximate the reality of complex scientific systems. Knowing this should instill in each of us both humility and a passion for probing beyond the catch phrase of the moment, no matter how congenial to our preconceptions.

For example, "Star Wars" itself is a misleading metaphor. In some quarters the term generates less light about the feasibility of space mirrors than heat about the identity or ideology of Darth Vader. For no one,

however, does the prospect of putting devices in near-earth space as roadblocks on the present missile freeway have anything remotely to do with war amidst the stars. Similarly, we should be wary of two overworked terms, one from each side of the debate: "shield" and "Maginot Line".

If the SDI succeeds, it must produce an ineffable constellation of diverse kill-mechanisms — connected by computers, guided by infrared sensors, survivable and deception proof — rather than a static, one-dimensional "shield." If the SDI eventually fails, it will not be because it tried simply to create a fixed site "Maginot Line" with it electromagnetic railguns oriented in one direction. In the media, one columnist's reassuring shield may be another's impotent Maginot Line, but not in the laboratories.

The analogy with the most damaging potential to unnerve friends and Allies equates the SDI with an impenetrable "astrodome" over the continental USA. In this context, the SDI seems to mean "insured isolationism." Such imagery in the minds of Europeans, Israelis and Japanese leads easily to the suspicion that the SDI is really intended to become the electronic moat for a 21st century Fortress America. It also seems to pose an insurmountable task for each of our closest partners; for how can Europe, Israel, and Japan possibly provide comparable "astrodomes" for themselves? A good deal of diplomatic heartburn can be avoided by examining the fallacy of the astrodome analogy. The aim of Star Wars is scarcely to hold a hi-tech umbrella solely over the United States. Rather, it is to clamp a hi-tech lid over the war-routes through space from the USSR, foiling the escape of Soviet offensive missiles in *any* direction.

Admittedly, the analogy of putting the "dome" over Soviet launch-paths, rather than U.S. real estate, also falls short of reality; since Europe, Japan and Israel would presumably need to build their own terminal defenses. That task, however, could well be within their capabilities, inasmuch as all SDI intercepts in the boost and mid-course phases of Soviet missile flights would greatly benefit all defenders. Hence cooperative research and technology transfer between partners in the Star Wars enterprise should enhance free world confidence that SDI can strengthen alliances, not loosen them.

Nor is Star Wars the antithesis of the current strategy of deterrence. If it works, in successive stages the SDI would first enhance, then complement, and lastly modify deterrence; almost certainly it would never abolish it. Thus, while we debate the wisdom of the SDI gamble, we must not forget that our security in the forseeable future must still rest largely on deterrence. Whether the hopes of the SDI materialize or wither by the year 2000, there is an imperative and continuing need to modernize, disperse, and protect our retaliatory forces at least for the next decades. To some, MAD is a pragmatic, lesser evil; to others, the doctrine is immoral and intolerable; but, until a reliable Star Wars apparatus is actually in place, the first defense priority is to ensure that the Kremlin will always know it

can never escape the mutuality of destruction, even with a surprise first strike.

It is a paradox that many who oppose SDI simultaneously criticize the Reagan Administration for having no national strategy. Yet the SDI could lead to the most revolutionary and pervasive change in strategy since 1917-18 when defense dominated the battlefield, only to be superseded by the primacy of the offense in the following seven decades. Moreover, if SDI technology generates "spinoffs" applicable to conventional war-fighting, strategy may be profoundly altered at the theater level as well as in the nature and methods of global deterrence.

Thus, the SDI is not only a quest for novel defensive weapons, but a decisive change in strategy; and history suggests that, once creators have been animated by such a challenge, the technological means to support a new strategy will follow. Of course strategic defense is still an uncertain venture; but serendipity often smiles on those who risk exploration of multiple pathways. Some may lead to a *cul de sac*, but others may open on to a mountain pass invisible from the placid meadows below.

It is also a paradox that many of those prepared to parade against nuclear weapons seem disinclined to mobilize the scientific laboratory, in addition to the picket line, to reduce the danger of atomic holocaust. If one advocates using human chains to surround American silos on earth, why not also favor building an obstacle-course-in-the-sky against Soviet weapons? When some pacifists are accused of failing to apply moral suasion evenhandedly to both superpowers, some reply candidly they would do so if Moscow allowed public protests. Fair enough; but then why oppose scientific barriers against nuclear missiles launched by commissars who permit no candlelight vigils to illuminate the secret dispositions of the Soviet war-machine? There is almost a Luddite tendency to behave as if peace can never be advanced by engineering measures, but only by mass incantation.

Finally, there is what might be called a "Marxist paradox" in a dialectical analysis of the antagonists in the Star Wars debate—i.e., "bourgeoisie and the officer corps" on the side of free enquiry, intellectuals on the side of theological taboos against adventuring into the unknown. (Exceptions in both camps, of course!) One might suppose that those who prize innovation and detest dogma would be hospitable to the process of at least assessing options to reciprocal genocide as the only means to keep the peace. Yet it is ironic that "liberal" culture — allegedly so open to heresy and revisionism — should so zealously protect the orthodoxy of Mutual Assured Destruction.

A presumed virtue of the intellectual community is its eagerness to ask the forbidden question; and the surest way to rouse its ire is to warn that a search after truth has been put off limits by reactionary church or state bureaucracies. Yet in the Star Wars confrontation, President Reagan

inherits the role of Galileo, while a sizable faction of the intelligentsia behave like bailiffs of the Inquisition. Some would even have the White House "recant" the SDI before the scientific experiments have been subcontracted.

No discussion of the pros and cons of Star Wars would be complete without reference to the escalating pressure on President Reagan to "trade off" his grand design for large Soviet reductions in heavy, offensive missiles. By gracefully abandoning his "illusion" that defense can be made viable, it is artfully insinuated, the President can wrest an historic victory from embarrassment. By boldly butchering his White Elephant, he can persuade the Russians to abjure their current edge in silo-busting, first-strike warheads. In what they may conceive as subtle blandishment, pundits reiterate that the high road to the Nobel Peace Prize lies through the graveyard of SDI. The wary student of the Star Wars controversy will scarcely be deceived by this political mode of map-reading; nor are statesmen so easily disoriented by faulty coordinates drawn to camouflage the contours of flattery.

That giving up the SDI will be an American arms control *coup* of the first magnitude is, at this stage, an extravagant, implausible hypothesis — not revealed wisdom. It would require a thick notebook simply to list questions that would need analysis before the validity of this dubious premise could emerge. For example, what would motivate the Russians to forgo their advantages in missile accuracy and throwweight if "everybody knows that the SDI won't work"? If Soviet experts truly concur with American critics that the Pentagon is wasting our money and energy, why should Moscow stop us from pursuing an ennervating folly? Indeed, so seldom does the Kremlin act as a benign Samaritan that, in such a unique case, the prudent man might remind himself to beware of giftbearers from the Tartar Steppe.

The Soviets, after all, have expended many millions of man-hours over the past decade to acquire expertise in diverse building blocks of a continental defense: from ground-based ABMs, through the Krasnoyarsk battle management radar, to particle beam research.

Recalling "Sputnik," is it implausible to assume that at least several of Moscow's scientific task forces discern promising pathways to decisive breakout? In which case, it would be standard operating procedure for the Kremlin to employ every ruse of diplomacy and disinformation to induce the Americans — with an assist from Allied public delusion — to rev down and eventually stall out the Star Wars engine.

Optimists about the efficacy of treaties with the Soviets will object that Washington would be permitted to hedge against Soviet breakouts by continuing to fund *some* SDI research. That arrangement would ensure that the cup final for the mastery of space would be played by Moscow rules. On one side would be precariously financed handfuls of US scientists, dispirited by the loss of teammates to consumer industry, humiliated by

constant reminders that they had committed their professional lives to a bargaining chip throwaway. On the other side, representing the command authority of the Soviet State, would be the first 10,000 draft picks from the cream of Russian science. Sequestered in their well-funded research centers, subject to military discipline but animated also by the prospect of Lenin Prizes and the personal interest in results from Politburo members, the Soviet team would feel confident that the correlation of forces favors the system that can sustain its priorities over decades.

Moreover, there are sub-plots to this bleak scenario that would have to be anticipated in any equitable "grand compromise." Assume that, if the Americans are content neither to test nor deploy SDI components, the Soviets will then substantially reduce the number of their heavy missiles. How would those "reductions" be counted and policed? Are there scores, if not hundreds, of heavy missiles already hidden in the wastelands of Siberia? Will a new Treaty forbid Soviet cold-launch technology, so the agreed number of silos cannot be reloaded? What verifiable safe-guards will there be against the clandestine conversion of medium range missiles into ones that can span the poles and oceans?

Will the Soviet production lines of heavy missiles be so totally dismantled they could not quickly be restarted? Have alternate facilities already been constructed in underground factories in one or several of the many military zones of the USSR that are, like Gorky, sealed off by security forces? Given the enormity of the Soviet land mass, how could questions about possible illegal concealment be resolved? Despite recent hints that Moscow might consider *some* forms of on-site inspection, its past refusals and evasions scarcely encourage any student of totalitarian structures.

So far, the Kremlin seems to have found a way to make the arms control apparatus pay it dividends from both ends. At the front end, Soviet negotiators employ obduracy against American opponents impatient for results. Given the pressures of time and public expectations, they can usually count on Washington's being generous with concessions and blase about the fine print. Once the Treaty is signed, Moscow reaps another bonus with a tactic of "creep-out" from the Treaty provisions.

When no resistance is met, Leninist cadres move from indirect circumvention to outright violation. Even when they are caught, the Soviets can count on keeping most of their gains, for they have come to learn that Western democracies are loathe to hold Communist dictatorships too severely to account for "ambiguous infractions." How often foreign offices rationalize that the world tension ensuing from "confrontation" will prove more uncomfortable than living with "minor" cheating by Moscow!*

The outcry about President Reagan's reluctance to unilaterally sub-

*The Reagan Administration *has* been successful in thwarting Soviet "peace" stratagems thus far, a singular accomplishment in the history of US-Soviet Treaty engagements.

merge US security in SALT II restraints is a case in point. The record of specific Soviet violations of the unratified (and relapsed) Treaty is incontestable. The President's move to redress the obvious imbalance was overdue and, given the provocations, almost conciliatory. Instead of slamming the SALT door with belligerent finality, he invited Gorbachev to reopen it by showing reciprocal respect for the Treaty restraints the Russians have repeatedly loosened. Was this unreasonable? The CEO of a corporation who allowed a competitor persistently to violate a contract would rightfully be sued by his stockholders. Surely, contracts about national security are more important than those about commerce.

Yet such was the media outrage against the White House penalty applied to Moscow for foul play, and so ingenious were the exculpations of Soviet outlaw behavior that the layperson must wonder if any level of duplicity by the Politburo would puncture arms control euphoria. Of what value is any contact when the attitude of one party towards enforcement ranges from indifference to forgiveness? We can doubtless survive Soviet SALT II violations, owing to Trident, the B-1 and future applications of *stealth*. But were we to lay the proposed "SDI tradeoff" on the board of the irreparably flawed Verification Game, we would be tempting Moscow to engineer a type of strategic ambush from space from which, unlike the limited damage to Pearl Harbor, there would be no recovery.

Frank R. Barnett
President
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
June 1986

1 Why has strategic defense become such a hotly-debated issue in recent years?

For more than a generation, we have relied on the threat of using nuclear weapons to deter a military attack and thus prevent World War III. Assuming an East-West "balance of terror," the doctrine of nuclear retaliation rests on the expectation that neither side will contemplate aggression if both sides are vulnerable to a devastating nuclear response. This "balance," however, may not remain viable when an adversary possesses a surplus of nuclear weapons that are powerful and accurate enough to disarm an opponent in a surprise first strike. As arms control advisor Paul H. Nitze has stated, "If we can, we must find a more reliable basis for security and for peace."

Reflecting this conviction, on March 23, 1983 President Ronald Reagan challenged scientists to undertake research aimed at "eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." To be examined were possible technologies for a defensive system that could intercept and destroy offensive missiles before they reach their targets. Formally entitled the Strategic Defense Initiative (and often referred to popularly as "Star Wars"), the President's proposal has sparked intense interest and controversy among scientists, politicians, and the public at large.

Several reasons account for the emergence of strategic defense at the center of public policy debate. Across the political spectrum there is a conviction that old assumptions and policy decisions about war and peace in the nuclear age are inadequate. Some sectors of Western opinion are anxious about a perceived nuclear arms race, while others worry about the wisdom of previous arms control treaties that have not curbed the growth of Soviet nuclear weapons. Military technology has advanced so rapidly in recent years that questions have been raised about the durability of deterrence based on assured nuclear destruction. The use of space for a variety of civilian and military functions has stimulated discussion about competition in this arena. These factors have combined to create new questions, as well as potential answers, about the nature of international security.

MAD and Strategic Defense

Since the 1960s, strategic thinking in the United States has been dominated by a concept of deterrence known as "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD), which relies principally on the ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a force so devastating as to cause unacceptable damage

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to the attacker. The knowledge of such certain retaliation, the theory holds, will be sufficient to deter the potential aggressor. Based on the idea that mutual vulnerability to nuclear weapons would contribute to peace between the superpowers, MAD has led to official US decisions that have kept the American homeland undefended against nuclear attack.

Fortunately, a US-USSR clash of arms has been avoided; but the strategic environment today is vastly different from the one in which MAD was first discussed, when cities were considered the most likely targets. Because of near-perfect precision guidance, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles now offer a potential aggressor the chance to substantially disarm an opponent with a first-strike attack aimed at the retaliatory forces of the victim. Moreover, improvements in data processing techniques, miniaturization of high-powered radars, lasers, and optical systems provide to both aggressors and victims the ability to build defensive weapons to destroy launched nuclear missiles.

The United States and its allies face a two-fold danger today. The Soviet Union has established an advantage in accurate, disarming offensive devices, and is working to achieve an anti-missile capability that could effectively destroy remaining US weapons launched after a Soviet first strike. In such a situation, the theory of peace through mutual destruction loses its mutuality, and hence its relevance.

In fact, Soviet military writings and weapons programs indicate that the Kremlin never embraced the notion of deterrence through mutual vulnerability. Since the early 1970s, Moscow has dramatically increased its investment in land-based nuclear missiles, which exceed the quantitative and qualitative requirements of a purely retaliatory force. As a result, a major leg of America's nuclear deterrent is theoretically vulnerable to an attack by Soviet multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), such as the SS-18. With the most important part of Washington's strategic retailiatory force in danger of preemption, doubts have been raised about the credibility of America's ability to fulfill its deterrent responsibilities.

Soviet efforts in strategic defense and in anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons also alter the security equation for the West. Over the past fifteen years the USSR reportedly has spent as much on anti-missile programs as on its expanding offensive missile force. Moscow maintains the world's only operational system of ballistic missile defense (BMD), which is being modernized through the introduction of new radars and missile interceptors. The USSR is violating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by

constructing a large radar installation in Siberia, and has probably violated another treaty provision by testing air defense missiles in a prohibited anti-ballistic missile mode. Soviet air defenses and civil defenses, although not proscribed by any treaty, make little sense unless the Politburo is committed to an overall strategic defense posture. In analyzing these activities, a recent US Department of Defense document noted that, "Cumulatively, they suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory." Given the reduced size of modern anti-missile devices, deployment today is not the obvious, laborious process of years past.

"No offensive deterrent, no matter how fearsome, is likely to work forever, and the consequences of its failure would be intolerable for civilization."

(Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1984)

In combination with other unfavorable military trends, such as Soviet advantages in conventional military forces and first-strike nuclear missiles, unilateral Soviet strategic defenses would be alarming for the West. Even an imperfect Soviet ABM system, in concert with a disarming first strike, would cripple Washington's ability to respond effectively. The danger is not so much that the Soviets would immediately launch a nuclear strike, but rather that the Politburo could indulge in nuclear blackmail against the United States and its allies.

With these developments as a backdrop, many citizens and policy-makers are searching for safer ways to deter war. Rapid advances in technology have spurred thinking about self-protection against ballistic missiles. Many persons feel that deterrence through defense is morally preferable to a peace based entirely on the threat of nuclear holocaust. Gradual deployment of missile defenses could reduce the danger of a first strike, since even a few BMD devices would greatly complicate plans for a disarming attack against military targets. If the military value of offensive nuclear weapons were degraded by strategic defenses, then the incentive for their negotiated reduction would increase. Moreover, even a partial defense could protect against an accidental nuclear launch or a deliberate smaller attack by a third country.

While opinion polls show that support for strategic defense is growing, the idea also has drawn much criticism and debate. Even the most ardent proponents of the SDI acknowledge that some difficult questions and problems have yet to be addressed. Given Soviet offensive and defensive systems, as well as the potential contribution that strategic defense could make to Western security, however, the grounds for proceeding with strategic defense research far outweigh the alleged risks and uncertainties incurred.

2 Wasn't defense against nuclear missiles considered, and rejected for valid reasons, fifteen years ago?

The issue of defense against nuclear weapons was debated in the United States between 1969 and 1972, and then lay relatively dormant until the 1980s. Many key strategic, political, and technological factors changed significantly during this period, reopening the strategic defense debate in new dimensions.

The ABM Story

In the 1960s the Soviet Union deployed a system of ballistic missile defense, first around Leningrad (the *Tallin Line*) and later around Moscow (the *Galosh* system). In 1967 the United States announced its intention to deploy a limited missile defense system (*Safeguard*), and simultaneously proposed arms control talks to restrict offensive and defensive weapons. Negotiations between the two sides began in 1969 and culminated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) accords in 1972. SALT I included an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which essentially outlawed comprehensive defenses against ballistic missiles. The Treaty allowed each side two ballistic missile defense sites employing no more than 100 ground-based ABM launchers each, and was tied to an Interim Agreement limiting *offensive* nuclear systems. American acceptance of the treaty package was based on the presumption that a permanent treaty effecting deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons would be swiftly negotiated. That did not happen; but in 1974 a protocol to the ABM Treaty was negotiated, cutting the ABM site allocation to one for each side. A year later, the United States dismantled its one site (near Grand Forks, North Dakota), citing high costs and system ineffectiveness.

During the debate on the ABM Treaty and the subsequent abandonment of America's rudimentary missile defense network, opponents of strategic defense argued that (1) defense against nuclear weapons would upset an understanding of deterrence based on vulnerability to nuclear attack; (2) defenses would stimulate an expensive and risky offensive arms race, as each side sought to offset the defense by building more missiles and warheads; and (3) defense against a determined, unrestrained offensive attack would be "leaky" at best, resulting in millions of casualties.

The above assumptions, if they were not faulty to begin with, have been superceded by recent developments. The argument that defense against ballistic missiles would destabilize a mutually acceptable deterrent assumes that the USSR shares with the United States a set of strategic premises and deterrent responsibilities. In fact, however, Soviet force de-

ployments since SALT I are consistent with Soviet military writings, which describe a nuclear "war-fighting" doctrine emphasizing strategic superiority, surprise, and preemptive attack against adversary military targets. In addition, the combination of arms control agreements and the absence of US strategic defense has not limited Soviet offensive deployments since SALT I. Finally, technological developments have created opportunities for strategic defense effectiveness that were unheard of during the ABM Treaty debate.

The assumption by US negotiators that both sides would be equally constrained by the ABM Treaty has proven dubious at best. While the United States drastically reduced its BMD, air defense, and civil defense programs in the aftermath of the SALT I accords, the Soviet Union actually intensified its efforts at defending itself from nuclear attack. Much of this effort, such as the expansion of air defenses, early warning radars, and even the modernization of the Moscow ABM site, was legal. Other activities, including extensive research into laser and particle beam technologies, the Soviet anti-satellite program, and the testing of certain missiles, could be interpreted as violations of the *spirit* of the ABM Treaty. Finally, the construction of an advanced, phased-array radar site near Krasnoyarsk is a clear violation of the *letter* of the accord.

"America's retaliatory forces, people, and production base are naked to nuclear attack. Official acceptance of such a defenseless posture is unprecedented among major world powers in world history."

(John M. Collins, in Jacquelyn K. Davis, et al., *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 1980)

Major technological advances have occurred since the ABM debate, particularly in computers, robotics, optical and sensor technology, and laser systems. System designers have been encouraged by the progress in microengineering and communications systems. Whereas the options for ballistic missile defense were basically limited to kinetic energy interceptors, or a "bullet hitting a bullet," these new technologies may make a more effective, multilayered strategic defense system possible.

In sum, the growing vulnerability of US retaliatory forces, the problematic record of arms control, the Soviet strategic defense program, and new technological vistas have contributed to the reevaluation of strategic defense in the context of national security planning.

3 What is the Strategic Defense Initiative?

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a US governmental research effort designed to examine advanced technologies to build an effective defense against ballistic missiles. Research is being conducted within the government and with private sector contractors in the United States and Western Europe. The goal of the research is to determine the feasibility and costs of a defensive "architecture," enabling the President and the Congress to make informed judgments regarding development and deployment of a defensive system. The costs of the SDI program are estimated at roughly $27 billion over a five-year period.

In the months following President Reagan's March 1983 speech, two studies were conducted to evaluate the various problems and opportunities associated with strategic defense. The Defensive Technologies Study Team, also known as the Fletcher Commission (after its head, Dr. James C. Fletcher, current Administrator of NASA), focused on technological issues and outlined a proposed research and development program. The Future Security Strategy Study, referred to as the Hoffman Panel (after Dr. Fred S. Hoffman of the Pan Heuristics Corporation), looked at the strategic and arms control aspects of the President's proposal. On the basis of these studies, the various research programs underway in the military services and a number of civilian agencies were placed under the general auspices of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), headed by Air Force Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson.

Many commentators, both supporters and critics, refer to the SDI as "Star Wars," a vivid but somewhat inaccurate term. The objectives of strategic defense have nothing to do with conducting a war in space, but rather are aimed at developing a more stable form of deterrence, one that would reduce the current overwhelming dependence on the threat of punitive nuclear retaliation. Entirely defensive and responsive in nature, the Strategic Defense Initiative represents a search for a strategic insurance policy against nuclear aggression, accident, or irrationality. Even opponents of strategic defense believe that research is necessary. Former arms control advisor Paul Warnke has said that strategic defense research should be conducted, "if only to make sure that the other side doesn't come up with a rude surprise in the form of a hitherto unexpected technology."

SDI researchers have been tasked with determining the criteria for a worthwhile strategic defense system. According to Randall Poole, contributing editor of *National Defense* magazine, "The ballistic missile defenses that could be deployed if SDI is successful would differ in important respects from their predecessors of the 1960s and early 1970s. 'Success' will be

determined by whether SDI-related technologies prove that BMD would be *cost effective at the margin* and *survivable.*" Cost effectiveness at the margin means that once an initial system is deployed, additional defenses could be installed more cheaply than additional enemy offenses (e.g., missiles, warheads, or decoys). Survivability means that any defensive structure must be able to defend itself against attacks from nuclear explosions in space, anti-satellite systems, electronic warfare, and other offensive weapons.

The primary research focus of the SDI is on defense against Soviet ballistic missiles, which—with their high speed, short warning time, and great destructive capacity—might lead the Kremlin (and the world) to believe the USSR could disarm the US land-based missile fleet. Technologies for defending against "air-breathing" systems such as strategic bombers or cruise missiles are under examination in related projects. The SDI program, in concert with European efforts, will also investigate technologies to defend against the shorter-range ballistic missiles—such as the SS-20, SS-21, and SS-23—that now threaten Western Europe. Since American and allied security are inextricably linked in US defense planning, consultation with US allies will play an important part in any US decision to go ahead with defensive systems.

4 How would a strategic defense system actually work?

It is too early to define precisely the structure of a strategic defense system. At the same time, several technological options show great promise, and a scientific framework for creating such a system is now emerging.

Most scientists agree that a comprehensive defense against massive nuclear attack would require multiple layers. Using a variety of technologies at each level, progressive tiers of sensors and interceptors would locate, track, and destroy enemy warheads before they could reach the United States. The layers of a comprehensive system are commonly discussed in terms of the four basic flight phases of a ballistic missile: *boost, post-boost, midcourse,* and *terminal.* At each tier, an attempt would be made to intercept those weapons that had "leaked" through the previous level. Four layers that were each 70% effective, for example, would produce an overall intercept efficiency of greater than 99%. Similarly, only one warhead in 10,000 would penetrate a system composed of four layers with individual effectiveness rates of 90%. Moreover, the attacker would have no way of knowing which targets would be hit by the few warheads that did get through the defensive shield. Hence, a potential aggressor, unsure of his ability to mount a disarming first strike, would not risk bringing catastrophe upon his own civilization.

Ballistic Missile Flight Phases

The initial attempt to intercept an attacking missile would occur during the *boost phase,* the first 2-to-5 minutes of flight when the rocket engines are still burning. During this phase, the red-hot exhaust flames of the rocket booster could be readily detected and precisely located by satellite-based sensors. Effective boost phase interception is a critically important element in a comprehensive defensive structure, since the potential efficiency of the system is highest during this stage. Many Soviet missiles can carry ten or more warheads each, as well as a quantity of decoys. Interception of a single missile in its boost phase, therefore, could destroy ten or more warheads and many more decoys at once, drastically reducing the number of threatening objects to be identified and targeted by succeeding defensive layers. Boost phase components must attempt to locate, track, and destroy perhaps as many as several thousand missiles launched simultaneously—all within the first several minutes after enemy missiles have left their silos. American scientists have identified a group of technologies which may, individually or in tandem, eventually meet the requirements of boost phase

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defense. These include several types of laser beams, the x-ray laser, the neutral particle beam, and a variety of kinetic energy technologies.

Those missiles that escaped the first defensive tier would be targeted again during the *post-boost phase.* Technologies under consideration for boost phase defense could be applied to this tier as well. During this 2-to-3 minute period, the warhead carrier—known as the "bus"—separates from the main rocket engines in order to release its warheads and decoys into their own separate trajectories. Early destruction of the bus would eliminate all warheads and decoys still on board. Because the colder flame of the warhead carrier's low-thrust rocket is harder to detect, target identification and location would become more difficult during this phase. Additionally, space-based sensors would face the challenge of locating and tracking a proliferation of individual, separated warheads. The need to distinguish between decoys and actual warheads also would emerge during this phase.

The *midcourse phase* would provide a relatively long engagement time for targeting and destruction of those weapons that had survived the first two layers of defense. For approximately 20 minutes, surviving warheads and decoys would follow predictable (and hence easily targeted) paths as they coasted on their free-fall trajectories through space. The ability to discriminate between actual targets and perhaps hundreds or thousands of decoys—launched by the offense to attract interceptors and exhaust defensive resources prematurely—would be imperative during this period. Advanced space-based sensors would continuously monitor threatening objects to ensure that all decoys were recognized as such. As with the previous defensive layers, kinetic energy armaments, several types of lasers, the neutral particle beam, and/or the x-ray laser device could be employed during this phase to intercept and destroy attacking nuclear weapons.

For those few weapons that had not yet been destroyed, a final attempt at interception would occur during their *terminal phase* of flight as the warheads reentered the earth's atmosphere. Terminal defense can either engage enemy warheads outside the atmosphere (exoatmospheric), or target reentry vehicles (RVs) within the atmosphere during the last two minutes of the vehicle's flight trajectory (endoatmospheric). Since the reentry period lasts only for 30 to 100 seconds, detection and targeting must be accomplished very quickly and with great precision. Because decoys and chaff would burn up or be greatly slowed as they reentered the atmosphere, the remaining warheads would be relatively easy to detect.

Airborne sensors could work in conjunction with ground-based radars during this phase to provide the final stage of interceptor guidance. Since enemy warheads might be designed to explode if approached by another object, interception and destruction should be accomplished whenever possible at the outer reaches of or beyond the atmosphere to avoid terrestrial damage. Much reliance might be placed on ground-based kinetic weapons during this final layer of the defensive effort.

Defensive Technologies

Kinetic energy and directed energy technologies represent two major categories of interceptor devices being investigated under the Strategic Defense Initiative. Regarding the first category, SDI researchers are working on *kinetic energy systems* capable of destroying attacking weapons in all flight phases. This technology is already quite well developed, and it is expected that these components could be deployed earlier than directed energy weapons. Kinetic energy interceptors disarm the intended target through the physical force of high-speed collision. No explosive is necessary; at such high velocity, mere impact causes destruction.

At the center of kinetic energy research is the "smart bullet" (also known as the "smart rock"). This small projectile, containing an elaborate miniaturized computer system, can be launched either from a satellite or from ground-based interceptors. The vehicle is steered to the vicinity of its target by airborne or spaceborne sensors. Powered by small rocket thrusters and maneuvered by an on-board guidance system, the projectile then "homes in" on the attacking missile, bus, or warhead. The target may be destroyed by direct collision with the kinetic energy vehicle. Alternatively, the smart bullet might burst open just before impact, releasing a cloud of flying metal fragments. These pellets would puncture the target's skin in many places, disabling its electronic apparatus and disarming its nuclear device.

The effectiveness of the smart bullet could be enhanced by placing in orbit a new device known as the *electromagnetic railgun*. By using electrical power and a magnetic field to accelerate projectiles to great velocities before propelling them toward their targets, the railgun could dramatically extend the range and capability of kinetic energy systems, especially for interception during the first two defensive tiers. While much work remains to be done on the electromagnetic railgun, this option shows

considerable promise. In recent tests the railgun has exhibited a tremendous increase in the rate of fire of "smart bullets," with a current capability of ten per second.

Directed energy weapons under examination by SDI researchers include laser beams, the x-ray laser, and the neutral particle beam. *Lasers* are devices that generate high-powered, concentrated beams of light, almost perfectly parallel and of a single wavelength. Laser technologies, of which there are several types, can inflict damage upon a distant target at the speed of light. Although directed energy systems have at least some difficulty penetrating the atmosphere, many scientists view the laser as an especially promising technology for boost phase defense. Some lasers may be able to intercept a Soviet missile very early in flight, while others must wait until the missile has emerged from the atmosphere before attempting interception. A laser beam would destroy its target by burning a hole in or weakening the "skin" of the designated missile, bus, or warhead, causing structural failure and disintegration. Lasers may be powered by burning fuel, by electrical current, or in one case by a small nuclear explosion.

The *long wavelength laser* (also known as the chemical laser) already is in a relatively advanced state of development. Lasers of this type are powered by a chemical reaction and emit infrared light. Scientists usually envision deploying this potential defensive component on satellites to respond rapidly to a Soviet missile launching. A very large mirror of near-perfect optical quality would be mounted at the top of each satellite to focus the beam intensely onto a small spot on the target's surface. While the use of this technology for strategic defense would require lasers of somewhat greater power than are now available, many experts are convinced that such defensive weapons are within the realm of technical possibility. In fact, a mid-infrared chemical laser was demonstrated successfully against a ground-based missile casing in September 1985.

At a less mature but rapidly expanding developmental state are two kinds of short wavelength lasers, which could be based either in space or on the ground. Because these components could destroy a target by focusing on it for only a second or so, their potential effectiveness against attacking nuclear weapons may be greater than that offered by chemical lasers. The *excimer laser* is powered by an electrical discharge into a mixture of reactive and inert gases; it emits ultraviolet light. Electrical energy powers the *free electron laser,* which so far has emitted infared light. In

one possible basing scheme, excimer lasers would be deployed on mountains above the densest layers of the atmosphere. In the event of a Soviet or third country nuclear attack, laser beams would be bounced off huge relay mirrors in high orbit and then off smaller aiming mirrors in low orbit before hitting and destroying their targets. A free electron laser has already been generated at a peak power of one billion watts, far greater than the twenty million watts needed for an anti-missile laser.



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Technology for the *x-ray laser,* which generates x-ray rather than infrared, ultraviolet, or visible light, has progressed rapidly in recent years. The energy for this component would come from the detonation of a nuclear device. The explosion in space would have no harmful effects on earth. "Pumping" the resulting x-ray through lasing rods would produce focused x-ray energy beams, which would travel at the same speed as beams from ordinary lasers. The power of this weapon would enable it



to destroy a missile, bus, or warhead instantaneously. Because the x-ray laser cannot penetrate deeply into the atmosphere, it would be most useful against offensive missiles at the end of the boost phase and during successive stages of flight. The x-ray laser weighs the least of any of the proposed directed energy technologies, and therefore may be appropriate for a "pop-up" deployment scheme. On the first warning of attack, a fleet of x-ray laser "battle stations" could be launched into space, perhaps fired from US submarines stationed off Soviet shores.



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In September 1985 a new laser reflector—known as the *rubber mirror*—was tested, creating new opportunities for laser defense. By sharpening laser beams as they are reflected, the mirror actually offsets the atmosphere's weakening effect on lasers. The rubber mirror thus would allow laser systems to be ground-based, reducing costs and necessary lead times.

Still another promising directed energy technology is the *neutral particle beam*, composed of atomic or subatomic particles. After the particles



are accelerated to nearly the speed of light, they are focused into a narrow beam of great intensity. The atoms in the beam must be electrically neutral, so as not to be bent off course by the earth's magnetic field. Like the x-ray laser, the neutral particle beam cannot penetrate deeply into the atmosphere. Still, this device, mounted on a satellite, could be used to defend against offensive nuclear weapons during most phases of their trajectories. Whereas a laser beam is absorbed at the surface of a missile and cannot penetrate into the interior of a target, a neutral particle beam can pass through the target's metal skin to scramble its internal electronic components.

Another new technology now under development is the *scramjet engine,* designed to power a cargo craft able to deploy orbiting payloads and return to earth. This engine, which combines rocket and jet technology, could reduce the costs of lifting strategic defense components into space.

While scientists are working on each of these prospective approaches, many analysts have called for the near-term establishment of a *partial defensive system* that would emphasize ground- and space-based kinetic energy interceptors. The technological requirements for such a system, in the view of most specialists, have already been met or will be available in the very near future.

Several alternate systems of intermediate capability have been proposed. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, physicist Robert Jastrow, and arms control negotiator Max M. Kampelman, for example, have suggested near-term deployment of a two- or three-tiered defensive system that would utilize satellite-launched smart bullets for boost phase interception and ground-launched smart bullets for late-midcourse and terminal phase defense. The High Frontier organization, a private group devoted to strategic defense issues, has advocated a potential interim system that would employ three tiers of kinetic energy components. Space-based kinetic energy projectiles would attempt to destroy enemy missiles and warheads in their boost and midcourse phases of flight. Offensive weapons able to penetrate these first two layers would be targeted during the terminal phase by ground-based kinetic energy devices.

5 What has the Soviet Union been doing in the strategic defense area?

While Moscow has denounced the American strategic defense research effort as provocative and militaristic, it has directed a vigorous military space program of its own for many years. In addition to "conventional" military space activities such as the launching of spy satellites, the Soviets have placed special emphasis on all areas of strategic defense in their space program.

Many Western critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative appear unaware of, or drastically downplay, Soviet military efforts in space as well as Moscow's existing strategic defense capability. Although Soviet propagandists insist that their space program is limited to scientific and economic pursuits, available evidence suggests that Soviet space activities are overwhelmingly military in nature. Moreover, many reported Soviet construction, testing, and research activities appear consistent with the requirements of a comprehensive anti-missile network.

According to the Defense Department, 80% of Soviet space launches are purely military in character. The Soviet Union possesses the world's only operational anti-satellite (ASAT) system, and is currently developing more advanced weapons which may have an anti-satellite capability. Manned Soviet space systems—such as the *Salyut* space station, the *Soyuz* space ship, and numerous vehicles under development, such as a modular space station, a space plane, and a space shuttle—are largely military in nature. The Soviets continue to upgrade the only system of ballistic missile defense on earth, and are exploring all areas of strategic defense technology.

Strategic Defense in Soviet Doctrine

Soviet military strategy has assigned high value to damage limitation in wartime throughout the post-World War II period. The most influential Soviet military publication of the past 40 years, *Military Strategy* by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, emphasizes the destruction of as many Western nuclear weapons and command posts as possible in a first strike, and protection of the Soviet leadership and key Soviet industries against a retaliatory strike by the West. As defense analyst Sayre Stevens has written, "The Soviet Union takes the possibility of nuclear war seriously, seeking to endure the consequences of strategic nuclear warfare should it occur." A 1982 pamphlet by Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov stresses the importance of surprise in military operations in order to prevent the adversary from effectively responding to a preemptive blow.

In this context, an impressive number of synergistic Soviet deployments are consistent with the goal of damage limitation through offensive nuclear preemption and strategic defense. Since 1980, the ballistic missile defense complex deployed around Moscow has been expanded with the installation of a new generation of radars and ground-based interceptor missiles. These new missiles (the SH-04 exoatmospheric and the SH-08 supersonic endoatmospheric), which are now being emplaced, will give Moscow a layered defensive capability. The enhancement of this system, along with the development of five phased-array radar systems which may be used for early warning of a missile attack and possibly "battle management," accords the Soviet Union the basis for rapid deployment of a nationwide defensive network. The Soviets have been testing missiles which, if deployed, would exceed the 100-launcher limit set in the ABM Treaty. These systems include a rapidly deployable, and probably mobile, site defense system (the ABM-X-3) and an extensive air defense system incorporating ABM-capable interceptors. *The Military Balance 1985-86*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, notes that "The USSR is on the verge of deploying the SA-X-12 SAM (surface-to-air missile), which may have some ABM capability."

In the summer of 1983, US photo reconnaissance satellites discovered a new phased-array radar under construction at Abalakova, a village 130 miles north of Krasnoyarsk in south-central Siberia. The radar most certainly constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty in view of its location. The agreement permits the deployment of phased-array radars, consisting of thousands of small components connected so as to sweep the sky electronically, provided they are located "along the periphery of . . . national territories" and are "oriented outward." These stipulations are designed to ensure that the radars will be used only for *early warning* of missile attack, which is permitted by the Treaty, and not as part of a prohibited *battle management* defensive system. The Krasnoyarsk radar, significantly, is situated near several Soviet missile fields, and is oriented toward the northeast. According to physicist Robert Jastrow, the installation "has every characteristic of a radar intended for defense against enemy missiles."

Soviet air defense capabilities are formidable, and the upgrading of the Soviet air defense system raises doubts about Moscow's compliance with the ABM Treaty. Soviet air defenses include over 1,200 jet fighters, some 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers, and some 7,000 warning systems, including satellites, early warning radars, and ground intercept radars. The ABM Treaty prohibits the testing or use of air defense com-

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ponents "in an ABM mode." However, the mobile SA-X-12 missile is believed to have potential capability against ballistic missiles, particularly intermediate-range missiles, if coupled with a sufficient radar.

In addition to "active" defenses such as the ABM system around Moscow and the massive Soviet air defenses, the Soviet leadership has also devoted significant resources to "passive" defenses such as "hardening" military assets and civil defense mechanisms. Soviet command, control, and communications systems, which serve as the eyes, ears, and brains of Soviet strategic power, have been designed to survive a nuclear strike, as have military and industrial facilities considered vital in a post-attack recovery phase. An elaborate program of civil defense provides for the evacuation of key Soviet elites from urban areas, the sheltering of elites and other citizens, and the maintenance of critical production and services following a nuclear strike.

"Idleness in the face of Soviet BMD programs would in all probability be far more destabilizing and far more injurious to Western security interests than competing in BMD with the USSR."

(David S. Yost, *The Washington Quarterly,* Fall 1984)

The possible use of air defense weapons for ABM purposes, the location and apparent capabilities of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the expansion and modernization of the Moscow ABM system, and the Soviet passive defense infrastructure could seriously affect the strategic balance. The East-West military equation has been rendered precarious by the Kremlin's massive offensive buildup (particularly the 300-plus SS-18 missiles, each with 10 independently targetable warheads) in fulfillment of Sokolovsky's doctrinal tenets described above. Further erosion in the balance resulting from the illegal fielding of strategic defenses by the Soviets would generate a strategic problem of severe proportions.

Soviet Technology

It is generally assumed that the United States is technologically superior to the Soviet Union in most areas of technology, engineering, and weapons development. The Soviet strategic defense program, however,

apparently has been much larger than the US effort in terms of facilities, capital, and manpower invested; and the USSR is at least equal to the United States in basic research on exotic directed-energy weapons. In fact, in the area of particle-beam technologies, the United States is pursuing, among other options, a Soviet research design. The Soviets have achieved progress in ground-based lasers for ASAT use. Prototypes for ground-based lasers for strategic defense could be available by the end of the decade, and testing of the components for a large-scale deployment system could follow soon thereafter. Space-based laser systems for defense against ballistic missiles also are being explored. Furthermore, Soviet particle beam research could yield a prototype space-based system ready for testing in the late 1990s.

The Soviet Union does lag behind the United States in technologies such as data processing, computer software, optics, telecommunications, and guidance systems. However, Moscow's emphasis on military space launches, the Soviet investment in ABM research and development (R&D), and persistent Soviet efforts to steal advanced Western technology indicate a determination to close the technology gap. A recent Pentagon report asserts that Moscow has spent at least as much on strategic defense activities as on its offensive buildup since the ABM Treaty was signed. The Soviet R&D infrastructure is impressive by any standards. More than 3,000 institutes have been established for scientific and technological research, many in support of military functions. Over 10,000 Soviet scientists and engineers are reportedly working on laser technologies alone.

Soviet and Western critics of the SDI argue that the American program will carry US military ambitions into previously untarnished terrain. The USSR's monopoly on an *operational* ABM network, circumvention of ABM Treaty provisions, and extensive exploration of directed-energy technologies clearly demonstrate otherwise. Given the pace and intensity of Moscow's defensive efforts, physicist Edward Teller has commented, the Strategic Defense Initiative "would be more appropriately named if it were called the Strategic Defense Response."

6 Haven't many scientists argued that it is impossible to build a reliable, effective strategic defense shield?

The technological viability of strategic defense has stimulated much debate within the scientific community. Some well-known figures, in many cases affiliated with the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Federation of American Scientists, argue that it is technically impossible to build a comprehensive shield against ballistic missile attack. Critics doubt that the technologies proposed for tracking, targeting, and intercepting enemy missiles can actually be made to function. Other skeptics hold that even if the basic physical principles of strategic defense were sound, it is unlikely that these technologies could be fashioned into a full-scale system in a cost-effective manner.

Scientific Pessimism

History reveals that scientists themselves often make pessimistic and false predictions about the feasibility of emerging technology. A writer for the *Economist* has noted that, "Technology has a habit of outflanking skeptics, especially where space is concerned." Even since the end of World War II and the dawn of the space age, reputed scientists have scoffed at ideas which now are taken for granted. Dr. Vannevar Bush, a high-ranking advisor to President Truman on scientific issues, concluded in dismissing the notion of long-range nuclear missiles, "I think we can leave that out of our thinking." Shortly before the Soviet launch of "Sputnik," Britain's Astronomer Royal described the idea of orbiting artificial satellites as "utter bilge." More than one scientific expert claimed that sending a rocket to the moon was beyond our technological reach. In some segments of the scientific community, this predilection for pessimism has reappeared in response to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Many of the scientist critics of SDI also have displayed a surprising tendency toward error and imprecision in their analyses of strategic defense. These mistakes have tended to make defense against nuclear attack appear more difficult and costly than in fact is the case. Robert Jastrow has taken the lead in identifying and exposing a number of distortions and erroneous calculations that have appeared in reports published by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). Two major errors were acknowledged by UCS analysts in Congressional testimony, and have been at least partially corrected.

The UCS originally claimed that an effective defensive system employing laser or other directed energy technologies would require approximately 2,400 satellite "battle stations"—a number far beyond the technical

or economic resources of the United States. After the detection by other physicists of erroneous assumptions and faulty computations in the Union's work, the UCS reduced its estimated satellite figure to 800 and then again to 300. Professional military scientists estimate that approximately 100 such satellites would suffice. In a second error later corrected by UCS officials, the group vastly overestimated the weight of the neutral particle beam accelerator, leading to the faulty conclusion that it could not be launched into space. These errors have clouded the debate over strategic defense. As noted in *The Wall Street Journal,* "Although the UCS has acknowledged some of its more egregious distortions, leading journalists and politicians continue to repeat the group's initial misstatements."

Without question, building any viable system of defense against thousands of nuclear weapons mounted on ballistic missiles will pose formidable challenges. The precise difficulties in constructing strategic defenses will be proportionate to the degree of complexity envisioned by system architects. Complexity in turn will be governed by analyses of the effectiveness rates of individual layers of defense, the integration of exotic systems with currently available technology, and overall battle management requirements. Strategic defense adherents frankly recognize that some components for a comprehensive defense network are far from the performance levels needed for deployment, particularly in the computer software area. One scientific panel, headed by University of Southern California professor Danny Cohen, has expressed concern about the lack of emphasis placed on software issues by SDI researchers. Dr. Cohen himself believes that the software for a space-based defense system can be designed, sufficiently tested, and engineered to tolerate faults.

Recent breakthroughs in laser experiments, "space lift" vehicles, and sensor technologies have occurred years ahead of the schedule laid out by the Fletcher Commission in 1983. British researchers have made progress on infrared radiation detectors, which can track missiles soon after they are launched. West German firms are developing systems to stabilize space instruments so that they can help aim space-based weapons. As defense analyst Kim Holmes has noted, 1985's "bumper crop of successful tests of strategic defense technologies is bad news for critics who say that SDI will not work. . . . The feasibility of SDI is slowly and inexorably becoming not a matter of 'if' but of 'when'."

A major reason for US rejection of the strategic defense option during the debate of the early 1970s was the very restricted technological base then available. At the time the ABM Treaty was signed, there existed no

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credible means for intercepting missiles during their boost, post-boost, and early midcourse phases of flight. Destroying attacking enemy weapons during the late midcourse and terminal phases would have required nuclear-tipped interceptors, causing intolerable collateral damage. The survivability of critical radar sensor systems could not have been assured. Furthermore, efficient firing of defensive weapons would have been hampered by the inability to discriminate between decoys and actual targets. These and other technological obstacles are now being overcome by progress in a number of critical areas, such as the ability to detect and track enemy missiles in flight; sensors for discriminating between decoys and warheads; non-nuclear technologies for interception and warhead "kills"; and technologies for sophisticated command, control, and communications management.

"If strategic defense is technically impossible, as its critics assert, why is the Soviet Union devoting such great diplomatic and propaganda effort to halting the Reagan Administration's program?"

(Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *The Boston Herald,* February 3, 1985)

The optimism about strategic defense feasibility comes in part from the new technologies for tracking and intercepting nuclear weapons early in flight. Sophisticated sensors, such as the US Army's Airborne Optical Adjunct, are under development, designed to detect and follow missiles and warheads as they leave their launchpads and streak through space. US scientists are achieving breakthroughs in the ability to generate, focus, and aim high-powered directed energy systems to intercept and destroy offensive weapons. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Harvey, a strategic defense specialist in the White House science office, has indicated that the United States is about five years ahead of schedule in developing short wavelength lasers and the neutral particle beam. Rapid advances can be cited as well in the development of kinetic energy devices, guided by tiny sensors and thrusters, which can "home in" on and destroy attacking missiles and warheads. Precision guidance systems have made feasible the use of non-nuclear warheads for ground-based interceptor missiles, greatly reducing the problem of collateral damage. Progress has been cited in the ability to discriminate between decoys and warheads, a requirement for post-boost and midcourse defense.

Software—Can It Be Built?

Critics of the SDI effort argue that management and coordination of the myriad elements of a defensive system will be impossible, especially under the fog of nuclear war. The data processing demands are daunting, requiring computers able to perform as many as one billion operations per second. Designing the computer software for such super-computers will demand intensive research and experimentation. The amazing progress in the computer field over the last ten years, however, was inconceivable in the early 1970s. Computer programs of similar size and complexity as those needed in a strategic defense network are operating today in the AT&T telephone system. University of Southern California scientist Danny Cohen advocates redundant layers of software, so that an error in one layer would not negate the whole system. Although absolutely error-free software may never be developed or fully tested, much testing activity could be conducted in the laboratory under simulated attack conditions.

While much scientific and engineering work relating to advanced defenses must still be done, the technological requirements for a partial defensive system already have been met or will be available in the very near future. Such a partial defensive structure, perhaps based on two or more layers of ground- and space-based kinetic energy interceptors, could provide operational experience and lay the groundwork for the future construction of a multitiered shield against nuclear attack.

Continued American advances in strategic defense will require firm leadership, adequate funding, and a steady national commitment to the research effort. When the historical record of human ingenuity and achievement is viewed along with the current progress in advanced defensive technologies, however, it is difficult to agree with those who have prematurely concluded that a US defensive system will not work.

7 Couldn't a strategic defense system be easily nullified by various offensive "countermeasures"?

Critics assert that Moscow could cheaply devise a variety of countermeasures to evade, overwhelm, or destroy American defense capabilities. In comparison with building and maintaining an intricate defensive system, it is argued, offensive countermeasures would be relatively easy and inexpensive to develop. The end result of a technological "White Elephant" in space would be less security, not more.

The issue of countermeasures, however, is basically a conjectural one at this stage. In order to develop militarily effective countermeasures, a Soviet planner must know exactly what means are to be countered. In the case of the SDI, just how missiles might best be destroyed in their trajectories is the very focus of current research. Countering a strategic defense before that defense has been precisely described may not be as simple or as cheap as SDI critics predict. Moreover, an examination of all potential Soviet countermeasures reveals problems overlooked by these same critics.

Some potential countermeasures, such as missile boosters with reduced burn time that would shorten the boost phase, would be very expensive and would involve performance penalties for Soviet offensive missile forces. Countermeasures designed to elude sensors or interceptors at one tier of the defensive system would not necessarily be effective against other elements of a multitiered network, and might make penetration of the remaining defensive layers more difficult.

Some SDI critics warn that the Soviet Union could employ ground- or space-based lasers and particle beams, or release a cloud of metal fragments in space, to destroy or cripple sensors, interceptors, and battle management apparatus. An orbiting "space mine" could demolish defensive components, as could a nuclear explosion in space that could set off an electromagnetic pulse designed to "blind" the entire defensive structure.

The vulnerability of orbiting components is one of the major challenges facing SDI researchers. There are mechanisms and tactics which, if properly engineered, could reduce this vulnerability. The maneuverability of satellites could be increased, for example, and a fleet of backup "battle stations" might be concealed in orbit until needed. Satellites could be placed in higher orbits to make detection more difficult. Space platforms could be "hardened" with shielding to protect against direct attack as well as the effects of electromagnetic pulse. Space-based defensive components could defend themselves with onboard active defensive devices. Satellites could be equipped with "escort defenses" that would shoot down any offensive armament that drew too near. Defensive systems, space-based

or otherwise, need not be 100% invulnerable. Rather, they must be sufficiently survivable to accomplish their mission in the face of attack.

Another potential countermeasure is proliferation of the warheads carried by each missile in order to saturate any defensive system. One of the criteria for deployment of strategic defenses, as stated earlier, is cost effectiveness at the margin, that is, it must cost the defense less to destroy an additional warhead than it costs the offense to deploy one. New sensor technologies to discriminate between decoys and warheads will allow for a more economical allocation of defensive resources to counter real nuclear warheads. Additionally, the scramjet-powered lift vehicle now under development could radically reduce the cost of placing defensive components in orbit, making additional defenses relatively cheap to deploy.

Other potential countermeasures include new offensive missiles capable of evading boost phase defenses. Soviet planners might develop a "fast-burn" missile booster that would finish burning while still in the atmosphere, where US particle beams, x-ray laser devices, and some laser beams could not effectively penetrate. Soviet rockets no longer firing when they cleared the atmosphere would be harder to detect, and therefore to destroy.

Even if the fast-burn booster were to prove technologically viable, shifting to this new force structure would involve performance penalties (principally in terms of accuracy and, therefore, military usefulness). The Soviet Union has invested massive resources in its current ballistic missile force, and revamping the Soviet offensive arsenal with fast-burn boosters would be enormously costly. Substantial shielding would be required to protect missiles against the intense heat and friction generated by the increased acceleration rate, as well as against possible US laser defenses. This added weight would reduce the number of decoys and warheads each missile of a given size could carry.

SDI skeptics also have drawn attention to ways in which the Soviets might protect their missile force against the effects of US laser beams. A thin coat of shiny material might be applied to each missile to reflect lasers, thereby weakening their destructive power. Missiles could be spun to prevent the buildup of laser heat, or shielded with an ablative coating. Under the heat of launching, however, the reflective surface would be dulled or could tend to disintegrate. Further, the energy of a laser beam could be concentrated on a single point on a spinning missile by firing the laser in pulses, or a laser could bathe a whole side. Ablative shielding is quite

heavy, and would reduce the quantity of decoys and warheads a missile could carry. Finally, those weapons able to escape destruction by the laser beam would still be vulnerable to other kinetic technologies at a multitude of points along their flight trajectories.

During the post-boost and midcourse phases, it is argued, the Soviet Union could launch hundreds of thousands of decoys to attract interceptors and prematurely exhaust US defensive resources. American capabilities in the area of decoy discrimination, however, are advancing steadily. One research area focuses on sophisticated space-based sensors that would monitor threatening objects to ensure that most decoys were recognized as such. If the offense is forced to develop and deploy large, heavy decoys, as costly as actual warheads, then the cost-exchange ratio will benefit the defense.

The possibility of Soviet countermeasures does pose a challenge to American strategic planners. When certain scientific advances and the multitiered approach to defense are taken into account, however, it is by no means clear that Soviet efforts could nullify the overall effectiveness of an American defensive shield.

8 Won't the SDI effort be inordinately expensive? Won't SDI expenditures drain funds from other vital defense components?

Clearly the eventual costs of developing and deploying an effective defensive shield could be substantial. At this time, however, the Strategic Defense Initiative is a program to investigate the feasibility of new technologies. As such, current and near future budget projections do not greatly exceed the research outlays that would have occurred even without the SDI. The Pentagon has estimated SDI costs at $27 billion for the five-year period between fiscal years 1985 and 1989. This figure represents less than 2% of projected overall defense spending and less than 15% of the Defense Department's research and development (R&D) budget. According to the National Science Foundation, the SDI would consume about 3.9% of the total national R&D effort during the 1985-1989 time period.

Estimates of full system deployment costs vary widely, ranging from $60 billion for an intermediate, two-layered defense using kinetic technologies to $1 trillion for a multitiered system with exotic technologies and "redundant" battle management and communications facilities. All such figures will remain conjectural, however, until more is known about the technologies involved. While total system costs are likely to be high, these expenditures would be spread over many years. Defense analyst Colin S. Gray has argued that a full deployment cost of $500 billion, for example, would represent only 8% of the defense budget for the next 20 years, assuming a constant defense budget of around $300 billion per annum. If the defensive transition were spread over a longer period, that percentage would be even smaller.

There is virtually no opposition to strategic defense research, even among skeptics. A former defense official, currently opposed to the SDI program, was quoted in *Aerospace America* magazine as supporting "a couple of billion" dollars for such research in the fiscal year 1986 defense budget. The actual figure appropriated by Congress for FY 1986 was $2.75 billion. Critics focus their attacks against actual development and deployment. Yet arguments against development and deployment on economic grounds are premature, since operational questions on concepts, structures, and attack strategies have not been fully answered. These issues are the crux of the SDI research effort. To write off "Star Wars" in 1986 as being too costly would be analogous to halting research on personal computers on the basis of similar assumptions in the 1960s.

History demonstrates that technological breakthroughs lead to striking reductions in product costs. Examples can be found every day in any electronics store, where pocket calculators, digital watches, and video cassette recorders sell for a fraction of their costs a few years ago. According

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to science expert Francis P. Hoeber, "A $3000 personal computer of today has essentially the capabilities of a $5 million IBM 36-40 'mainframe' computer of the mid-1960s." There is little reason to conclude that similar cost benefits will not follow in lasers, microchips, optics, communications, and other SDI technologies. Moreover, further miniaturization of rocket components means the cost of "lifting" strategic defense systems into space will be reduced. If technologies such as the "rubber mirror" (see Question 4) prove feasible, more defensive weapons can be based more cheaply on earth.

A look at the defense budget indicates that SDI research is not undercutting the commitment to modernize the US nuclear deterrent and American conventional forces. The United States currently spends an estimated $40 billion, or roughly 13% to 14% of its defense budget, on strategic offensive systems. That sum funds the Reagan Administration's program to modernize the US strategic triad, including the new B-1 bomber, the Ohio-class submarine with the new Trident D-5 missile, and the production of the MX missile. The remainder of the defense budget is devoted to conventional weaponry, personnel, operations, maintenance, and support facilities. New technologies, such as precision-guided munitions, and new strategies, such as the maneuver warfare ideas implicit in the Army's "Air-Land Battle," may well increase the cost effectiveness of conventional defense. The United States has also urged its European and Japanese allies, so far with mixed results, to increase their own levels of defense spending so as to raise conventional capabilities.

> **"The task of the strategic defense community should not be that of proving the marginal effectiveness of dollars versus rubles. Rather the task should be that of showing that SDI, among other options, is a good investment for the West toward peace and freedom in the world."**
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> (Harry A. Gieske, *The Washington Times*, January 1, 1986)

A sizable deterrent will have to be sustained during a transition era from assured destruction to strategic defense. There will be an "overlap" period when it will be expensive to bear both sword and shield. Eventually, in a defense-dominant world, the costs of strategic defense (at, say, 8% of the defense budget per year) would be partially offset by potential reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. Moreover, just as the space pro-

gram of the 1960s had implications for the computer revolution of the 1970s, SDI research should produce conventional defense byproducts, particularly in areas useful in offsetting the numerical edge of Soviet tanks and artillery (e.g., advanced precision guidance and data processing).

The costs, and particularly the cost effectiveness, of a strategic defense program are valid factors in determining its utility. As in national security policy as a whole, however, the cost is not the only criterion for deciding the merits of strategic defense. What price would the American people be prepared to pay to defend the nation against nuclear annihilation? On the other hand, what "price" would we have to pay, for example, if Soviet space lasers—like Sputnik—were deployed first? The SDI is a commitment to find alternatives to an increasingly unstable nuclear world, in which, by the year 2000, there may be a dozen players. A system of defense that may drastically reduce the dangers of nuclear holocaust is an investment in the future of civilization. Manifestly, sacrifice is justified for such an imperative commitment.

9 Even if strategic defense can work against ballistic missiles, how can it shield us from jet bombers and cruise missiles, which don't travel through space?

The charge is often made that the defensive technologies being pursued under the Strategic Defense Initiative will not be effective against bombers and cruise missiles. This objection misses a central point. Critics should recognize that "slow flying" systems are not an effective means for surprise attack. Since large Soviet ballistic missiles—which afford their victim only a brief warning time and have the ability to destroy hardened military targets—could be used in a first strike, the SDI effort is correctly concentrated against these weapons. The first mission of strategic defense is to ensure that Soviet war planners can never be sure they can eliminate the US deterrent with one sudden blow. Admittedly, however, if a space shield against ICBMs is successful, the United States will continue to face a secondary threat from bombers and low-flying cruise missiles, and full defensive coverage for cities eventually must include protection against these air-breathing vehicles.

According to SDIO officials, defense against bombers and cruise missiles will be examined in related Defense Department projects. As argued in a recent *Arms Control Impact Statement* presented to Congress, "Technologies that will form an integral part of an effective defense against ballistic missiles, especially sensors and high speed data processing, also could contribute to an effective defense against bombers and cruise missiles." In addition, West European nations are examining the possibilities of defense against shorter-range weapons and air breathing systems under the auspices of the emerging European Defense Initiative. Even a critic of the SDI, Robert E. Hunter of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, suggests that "technological solutions could be developed to deal with these threats, but at a price."

The "price" of dealing with the bomber and cruise missile threats certainly includes upgrading US air defense capabilities, a neglected aspect of defense preparedness for many years. The requirements of an effective air defense system—detection, tracking, interception and destruction, and assessment—are similar to those of missile defense. A new Air Defense Initiative program within the United States Air Force has been approved, based on a 1981 air defense plan which emphasized the need for improved over-the-horizon radar coverage, modernization of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, and the expansion of the US jet interceptors assigned to air defense missions. Roughly $50 million has been allocated in the FY 1987 Air Force budget for the Air Defense Initiative.

When dealing with nuclear weapons, one must focus on the main dangers first, and not be distracted by secondary challenges. An opponent

deterred from launching a surprise ICBM attack by strategic defense is scarcely likely to fire cruise missiles that will give the President hours, rather than minutes, to respond or defend against them. If strategic defense can make a nuclear first strike obsolete, it will have gone a long way towards making nuclear war itself obsolete.

10 What are anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons? Why is the Reagan Administration so interested in acquiring an ASAT capability?

Anti-satellite devices are designed to disrupt, disable, or destroy enemy satellites. Current ballistic missiles could be targeted against satellites in space, or "space mines" could be developed to knock out an opponent's satellites. In one existing Soviet system, an ASAT warhead is launched by an ICBM booster rocket into an orbit closely matching that of its target. The interceptor then positions itself near the targeted satellite and fires a blast of pellets to destroy it. The American ASAT, which, unlike the operational Soviet system, is still in the testing stage, is a miniature non-explosive warhead mounted on a two-stage booster rocket and launched directly toward the target from a modified F-15 fighter jet. The computer-guided, heat-sensing interceptor is designed to home in on and collide with the designated satellite, destroying it on impact.

The Soviet Union has had an operational ASAT capability since 1971. The Reagan Administration argues that the US ASAT is required to redress this strategic asymmetry and deny unilateral Soviet control of space should conflict occur. The US system, if deployed, will exhibit greater mobility, flexibility, and speed than current Soviet ASAT weaponry. A number of Soviet military satellites that directly support Warsaw Pact combat units and target Western forces operate at the low altitudes reachable by the proposed US anti-satellite system. By denying Moscow the freedom in wartime to conduct reconnaissance and targeting activities from space (particularly with the Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite, which can locate US naval ships), an American ASAT would reduce the Kremlin's confidence in its ability to mount a successful surprise attack on earth.

> **"In effect, Soviet satellites operate in a sanctuary, while those of the United States are vulnerable."**
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> (Francis X. Kane, Rockwell International, *Strategic Review*, Winter 1982)

Kremlin leaders regard their anti-satellite capability, which has been fully tested, as major part of the Soviet military arsenal. A major simulation exercise of Soviet strategic forces conducted in June 1982 involved the orchestrated launching of four intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, two ABM interceptors, two military satellites, and an orbital ASAT system. According to military analyst Donald L. Hafner, "The lower orbits reachable with the Soviet ASAT are . . . used by the United States for many of its photoreconnaissance, electronic intelligence, meteorolog-

ical, and navigational [functions]." Given the high degree of US dependence on space assets for military communications, the loss of even a small portion of the US satellite fleet could have serious consequences. While many of the West's most important satellites currently are beyond the range of the Soviet system or can be redeployed to a higher orbit, the Soviet interceptor could be modified to reach these satellites simply by using a more powerful booster rocket.

The Soviets also are developing more advanced and versatile anti-satellite weaponry. In addition to two ground-based test lasers with enough power and precision for an ASAT application, Moscow appears to be seriously investigating space-based laser ASAT systems. The Department of Defense publication *Soviet Military Power*, 1986 reports that the Soviets "could have prototype space-based anti-satellite laser weapons by the end of the decade. . . . If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets may deploy operational space-based anti-satellite lasers in the mid-to-late 1990s. . . ." Laser ASAT weapons could offer major advantages over the USSR's present orbital interceptor, including longer range, multishot capabilities, and greater resistance to satellite defenses.

The United States must ensure the survivability of its satellites. Some protection may be offered by such passive defensive techniques as the hardening of space assets, enhancing the ability of spacecraft to maneuver evasively, and the proliferation of replacement satellites and atmospheric drone aircraft. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, however, has testified to Congress that these measures would not be sufficient to offset the threat to current US satellites now posed by the Soviet ASAT weapon; and such defensive capabilities could have a negative impact on the operational effectiveness of American satellites in a period of crisis or conflict. Deployment of a US anti-satellite system would redress the existing strategic asymmetry. By providing Washington the ability to retaliate in kind after a Soviet ASAT strike, an operational US anti-satellite capability would function as a deterrent against an assault on the the Western satellite fleet.

11 Won't strategic defense and anti-satellite weapons "militarize" space? Shouldn't we try to sanitize space through international agreements?

Space has already been "militarized," despite some prohibitions that have been instituted over the past 25 years. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban of 1963 outlaws nuclear explosions in outer space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty forbids the placing in orbit of objects carrying "weapons of mass destruction," the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or their deployment in space through any other means. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, part of the 1972 SALT I accords, enjoins the superpowers from developing, testing, or deploying space-based defensive systems or components.

Nevertheless, given the development of ballistic missiles, military satellites, and anti-satellite weapons, space has been a militarily active sphere since the 1950s. Space currently serves as an unobstructed corridor for nuclear ballistic missiles. Additionally, orbiting satellites perform many military activities more effectively from the "high ground" of space than do earthbound counterparts. Some satellites provide very early warning of missile launches, while others monitor routine military maneuvers, crisis situations, and compliance with arms control treaties. Modern satellites also are vital for the command and control of military forces, and are critical communications, navigational, and meteorological instruments.

Critics of the US military space program argue that the SDI and the American anti-satellite project will extend the terrestrial arms competition into the heavens, violating space as a weapon-free sanctuary. On the surface, efforts to restrain the arms competition in space may appear to offer a sensible alternative to intensified US-Soviet rivalry in that arena. Yet the same problems that afflict traditional arms control treaties with the Soviet Union—compliance questions, a lack of reciprocity, and unwanted side effects—also apply to space arms control proposals.

Space Rhetoric Versus Reality

The Soviet Union has exploited the space "demilitarization" theme for its own propaganda purposes. While issuing a series of vaguely-worded calls for bans on "space strike weapons" at the United Nations and elsewhere, Soviet spokesmen ignore or misrepresent their own country's military programs in space. Despite a declaratory moratorium, Moscow has maintained an operational anti-satellite system since 1971. The Pentagon reports that two prototype lasers, capable of "blinding" low orbiting satellites, are under advanced development at the Sary Shagan missile range

in Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet have deployed a fleet of Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSATs), designed to track and target Western ships for attack by Soviet strike forces. By maintaining and testing weapons, as well as placing "gunsights" in orbit, the USSR contributes to the militarization of space as surely as if it had placed the "gun" itself there.

For the Kremlin, only American satellites and planned anti-satellite or missile defense programs are "destabilizing." Soviet negotiators seem determined to prevent future US development of military capabilities already functional in the USSR. Beyond the obvious propaganda value of promoting "Star Peace," the Soviet leadership is obviously concerned about losing its monopoly on anti-satellite and missile defense capabilities, which in turn would negate the strategic and political leverage gained by the Kremlin's massive investment in first-strike offensive missiles such as the SS-18 and the latest Soviet SS-X-24 and SS-25 ICBMs. Consequently, Soviet concerns for "demilitarizing" space are motivated more by a desire to preserve the Soviet edge in the correlation of forces than by pious commitments to world peace.

ASAT Arms Control Pitfalls

Calls for the "demilitarization" of space frequently translate into proposals for controls on anti-satellite systems. A testing ban or moratorium would abort the US anti-satellite weapon (and with it a near-term opportunity for judging the feasibility of space-based missile defense, since the technologies are related). The Soviets, in that case, would retain the world's only operational ASAT system. No treaty could guard against the possibility of covert improvements in the current Soviet ASAT system that would leave the United States even more vulnerable.

The problem of verification and the record of Soviet cheating on past arms control measures also dim the prospects for worthwhile arms control in space. Monitoring of space treaties would be complicated by the nature of the weapons systems involved and the closed nature of Soviet society. Because ASAT weapons can be small and easily concealed, they cannot be readily counted by reconnaissance satellites (unlike, say, large ballistic missile silos). Moreover, it is almost impossible to determine whether an object launched into space on standard "scientific" booster rockets is a legal satellite or a weapon. There are even ways to test ASAT armaments clandestinely, which would complicate US efforts to monitor Soviet com-

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pliance with normal testing restrictions. Like the ABM Treaty, Soviet proposals for anti-satellite arms control include ambiguous wording and loopholes, leading some to wonder whether an agreement would cover ground- and space-based lasers under development at Sary Shagan that may be ASAT-capable.

> **"The ASAT ban . . . would paralyze the West, not the East. It would not verifiably prevent Soviet anti-satellite actions. It *would* prevent the United States from effectively defending its satellites."**
>
> (Albert Wohlstetter and Brian Chow, *The Wall Street Journal*, July 17, 1985)

A more basic problem is that satellite destruction is not restricted to specific ASAT devices. Even if "dedicated" ASAT weapons could be banned, the Soviets would still have the ability, for example, to conduct electronic warfare against satellites. The ABM system surrounding Moscow could be reprogrammed for ASAT missions. Any of the thousands of Soviet land- or sea-based ballistic missiles could be used for anti-satellite purposes. Even non-military ventures in space, including manned flights, present opportunities to conduct ASAT activities.

Finally, there is no clear dividing line between anti-satellite technology and strategic defense research. Some proponents of ASAT arms control, such as Paul Stares of the Brookings Institution, view such potential treaties as an "indirect route to shoring up the ABM Treaty." Thus, in addition to being patently unverifiable and one-sided in its effects, an effort to "demilitarize" space through ASAT arms control would preempt a program to evaluate the prospects for strategic defense—even before serious judgments about strategic defense could be made.

Concern over the "militarization" of space is misplaced; space has been "militarized" since Sputnik and the inception of the ballistic missile age. Some military space systems contribute to international stability, just as some agreements on "rules of the road" for US and Soviet spacecraft could reduce the risks of misinterpretation or accidental confrontation. Proposals for "banning" weapons in space should not obscure the more realistic options that exist for looking at a possible alternative to the balance of terror. By bolstering and balancing deterrence, the American military space effort may do more for international peace and security than any utopian appeals or lofty rhetoric.

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12 Won't the SDI spark a new, double-edged arms race, as the Soviets react to the US program by building more offensive and defensive weapons?

SDI critics assert that an American strategic defense system would stimulate a Soviet buildup in offensive weapons to overwhelm US defensive capabilities. A corollary argument holds that Moscow would be forced to respond to the SDI by building a Soviet "Star Wars" system. The end result, say these critics, would be the end of arms control and the opening of a new round in the arms race.

This line of argument, emphasized by the Union of Concerned Scientists and Common Cause among others, ignores the fact that the USSR for many years had been expanding both its offensive and defensive weapons programs, quite independent of US defense plans. The modernization of Soviet missile defense capabilities and the four-fold increase in Soviet ballistic missile warheads took place before the SDI was announced. The proliferation of Soviet rockets—with larger and more accurate warheads—was scarcely restrained by the offensive limits or defensive restrictions in the SALT treaties. On the other hand, pursuit of strategic defense by Washington could increase Soviet incentives to negotiate future reductions in offensive arms. (Even SDI critics acknowledge that the American research program brought the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva.)

The pluralistic nature of Western defense and security debates provides many conflicting explanations for the "arms race." One point that can be empirically supported, however, is that restrictions on missile defenses through arms control treaties have not limited, let alone reduced, the growth of Soviet offensive nuclear warheads. Nor have such treaties stopped Moscow from upgrading its ballistic missile defense capacity, which is proceeding at the fastest pace allowed by the Soviet industrial base. Although the SDI could spur a defensive competition between the superpowers, such an arms race would certainly be preferable to unilateral Soviet efforts in strategic defense. Mutual US and Soviet establishment of defensive systems could alter the very basis of deterrence in a positive way, by placing the burden of war prevention on defensive weapons rather than on instruments of mass destruction.

Strategic Defense and Treaty Verification

Strategic defense also could facilitate constructive arms control agreements by making the precise verifiability of treaty compliance a less critical concern. In the absence of defensive systems, strict verification of offensive

reductions is crucial. As Keith Payne and Colin Gray have argued in *Foreign Affairs*, major offensive reductions "would place a higher premium on each delivery system. At much lower force levels, even a relatively small level of noncompliance could have a significant impact upon the strategic balance, and thus be of great concern." Absent an SDI shield, covert retention or deployment of even a few Soviet missiles could threaten the survivability of an important fraction of America's reduced arsenal. If offensive cuts were accompanied by emplacement of defensive systems, however, a strategically decisive evasion would require a much larger number of Soviet clandestine missiles, thereby increasing the risks of detection. "Cheating would have to be conducted on a massive scale," Payne and Gray write, "before it could provide a capability sufficient to yield important military or political advantage."

"Thirty years of 'arms control' have shown that the United States cannot reform the Soviet strategic world view through diplomacy. . . . The Strategic Defense Initiative—Star Wars—is really a conceptual tool for dismantling the political utility of nuclear weapons."

(Michael Vlahos, *The Washington Times*, December 19, 1985)

Not everyone is convinced that the Politburo will agree to a mutual phasing-in of defensive systems, accompanied by gradual offensive force reductions. Although favored by the Reagan Administration, Moscow is not likely to participate in such a plan if it believes that political developments in the West will eventually scuttle the SDI. The Soviet leadership will surely evaluate the SDI debate in the United States to determine whether the United States has the long-term resolve to deploy strategic defenses. Future US decisions on a defensive shield, therefore, should not be held hostage to Soviet cooperation. The United States should retain the right to explore strategic defense, regardless of Soviet protestations and psychological warfare.

As defense analyst Rebecca V. Strode has argued, in view of current Soviet advantages in defensive deployments and Moscow's advanced R&D program in defensive technologies, the consequences for the United States of not pursuing strategic defense could well be more onerous than even the worst-case scenario of Soviet reactions sketched by opponents of the SDI.

13 Aren't there less exotic ways to deal with our strategic problems, such as improving our offensive deterrent and/or negotiating better arms control treaties?

The United States and the Soviet Union almost certainly face a future of continued strategic rivalry, given their fundamentally different political-military traditions, human rights values, and ideologies. Neither increased arms control efforts nor a continuing offensive buildup, however, is likely to provide the United States with effective means to meet the ongoing Soviet challenge.

Offensive Modernization

Some critics of America's strategic defense effort argue that restructuring the US military posture and building improved offensive systems can strengthen deterrence more efficiently. Washington's most serious strategic vulnerabilities lie in its fixed land-based missiles and strategic command centers. It is often suggested that this problem could be bypassed by relying more heavily on the sea-based and bomber legs of the US retaliatory triad. Other analysts call for a land-based force composed of small, mobile, and less vulnerable single-warhead missiles.

Allowing the continued deterioration of America's land-based deterrent leg would be hazardous in a number of respects. It must be remembered that, in a surprise attack, many US strategic bombers and submarines would be vulnerable to destruction on base or in port. Surviving bombers would require hours to retaliate after a strike, and would encounter serious difficulties trying to penetrate Soviet air defenses. No current warheads on surviving American submarines would have the necessary accuracy and megatonnage to destroy hardened Soviet military targets. Communications difficulties between submerged submarines and national command authorities pose serious operational problems. Additionally, Soviet advances in the area of anti-submarine warfare eventually could threaten the survivability of US submarines at sea. Therefore, retention of ground-launched weapons is necessary for a balanced and prudent diversity of deterrents.

Still, years of intense deliberation have not yielded a satisfactory solution to the problem of land-based missile vulnerability. In search of a more stable deterrent posture, the Scowcroft Commission called for near-term deployment of 100, ten-warhead MX missiles, eventually to be supplemented by a new mobile, single-warhead missile known as the Midgetman. It appears unlikely, however, that the Scowcroft plan will be fully implemented. The MX itself faces political opposition, in large part due to the lack of an acceptable basing mode, and its future appears in jeopardy.

Congress recently limited MX funding to 50 missiles. The Midgetman, favored by some defense experts as a long-term solution, also faces political and military obstacles to deployment. In addition to its high costs and lack of a realistic mobile basing plan, many critics argue that its size prevents the Midgetman from being an adequate deterrent.

The growing reluctance of Congress to fund more offensive weapons has made it increasingly difficult for the United States to reduce its strategic vulnerabilities through offensive arms alone. A system of strategic defense offers an alternative by diminishing Moscow's ability to mount an effective first strike. "A mixed force including defense and an effective and, more discriminating offense," Fred Hoffman has written, "appears to be more compatible with current political trends in the West than sole reliance on offensive forces."

Arms Control Solutions

Opponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative often argue that Western security can be best ensured through more arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. The notion that negotiations with Moscow will make the world safer is appealing. Actual success in this area, however, is disappointing. The period of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) witnessed a massive build-up in all areas of Soviet weaponry, creating the severe strategic vulnerability that confronts the United States today. Arms control also has been marred by failures of Soviet treaty compliance. The verification of arms accords by "national technical means" (i.e., satellites, radar, and other electronic devices) is becoming more difficult as a result of new weapon technologies (e.g., cruise missiles) and mobile basing modes. The task of arms control monitoring is complicated by the closed nature of Soviet society and Moscow's reluctance to agree to on-site verfication of strategic force deployments. Although Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has talked about allowing outside observers into the USSR to observe treaty compliance, *The Wall Street Journal* aptly notes that "there is a lot of difference between hinting at on-site inspection and actually doing it the way the US will demand."

Some in the arms control community propose negotiations towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, arguing that if tests were outlawed, no new systems could be built and confidence in existing weapons would decline. Aside from US concerns about Soviet compliance with existing

limited test ban treaties, nuclear tests are needed as long as the United States must rely on nuclear weapons for the deterrence of war. Periodic tests are required to ensure the continued reliability of existing warheads and "fail safe" mechanisms, and current modernization programs cannot be completed without the data provided by nuclear tests. One part of the SDI program, the x-ray laser, may require some nuclear testing at some point in its development. Even without strategic defense, however, occasional nuclear tests are part of an overall effort to maintain a robust deterrent.

Given the historical record, there is little reason to believe that arms control alone can safeguard US security interests. Yet arms control efforts, in tandem with a strong defense, are favored by Western electorates. In principle, the American strategic defense program and continued arms negotiations might work well together, once the Kremlin comes to understand that the deployment of defensive systems by both superpowers could create incentives for force reductions by decreasing the military value of offensive weapons. Some arms control advocates have suggested that the United States should offer to limit its strategic defense effort, or even abandon the program entirely, in exchange for Soviet willingness to cut offensive forces deeply. In view of the current and potential Soviet strategic defense programs, the troubled record of arms control, and the security contributions that strategic defense may make, such a policy would entail a grave risk for the United States and its allies.

Neither the continued strengthening of US offensive force nor the ongoing quest for arms control agreements constitutes the complete solution to Western security ills. Each provides, however, a pillar of support to the search for a safer deterrent structure through strategic defense.

14 Won't the transition from today's nuclear deterrent to one based on defensive systems be risky? Couldn't the SDI program be viewed as part of a US first-strike strategy?

During the gradual process of building any defense against nuclear weapons there would be ongoing communications among the United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union. Even now, while the SDIO is simply researching defensive technologies, US officials are consulting with allies and negotiating with Moscow on strategic defense issues. Since the Soviets are clearly interested in their own missile defense shield, despite the propaganda and disinformation to the contrary, it is conceivable that certain "rules of the road" could be established to manage the transition from the balance of terror to deterrence through defense.

There are several plans for a cooperative shift to strategic defense by both superpowers. The Reagan Administration evisions a long-term, phased transition that would "build down" nuclear weapons as defensive systems were constructed. The initial stage would permit limited defenses by both sides in conjunction with verified offensive reductions. A second stage would entail more radical offensive reductions as more extensive defenses were deployed, leading finally to the elimination of offensive nuclear weapons as full-scale defenses were put into place. Throughout the transition, regular discussions would take place regarding schedules, limits on potential countermeasures, and confidence building mechanisms. Other observers foresee strengthening the current deterrent posture by the retention of reduced nuclear forces protected by defensive systems, thereby reducing the prospect of a disarming first strike. Such a course could be managed through amending the ABM Treaty and negotiating new offensive accords that would require deep cuts in strategic arsenals.

> **"A development pulling the world away from the precipice of nuclear terror goes far to help create an encouraging atmosphere for dialogue and agreement, a vital prerequisite for peace."**
>
> (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Jastrow, and Max M. Kampelman, *The New York Times Magazine*, January 27, 1985)

Soviet spokesmen claim that Washington seeks a defensive shield as an adjunct to its offensive, first-strike strategy. In this view, the US President could launch an attack against Soviet land-based missiles, using defensive weapons to degrade the "ragged" Soviet response. Although this argument is a mirror-image of what US officals fear to be Soviet doctrine, the United

States does not and will not possess the capability to conduct a disarming first strike against Soviet strategic forces, with either current or planned nuclear systems. If a first strike against the USSR were compatible with US strategic doctrine or values, it could have been done "safely" during the era of massive US nuclear superiority. As far as present US defensive plans are concerned, the deployment of a missile shield would be linked to offensive reductions, paring down alleged US "first strike" capabilities even further.

Some critics, who themselves may reject the notion that the SDI is fueled by a hidden offensive agenda, nevertheless worry that an American defensive shield would be perceived by Moscow as provocative, leading to a dangerous and unnecessary breakdown in US-Soviet relations. A recent publication by Common Cause, an organization opposed to strategic defense, notes that, "The Soviet Union, fearing that it would be effectively disarmed by a US attack, might be tempted in a crisis to launch a preemptive strike against the United States rather than risk its ability to retaliate." A similar rationale was used to argue against US deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe in 1983, and it has similar flaws. The Soviets were not in practice tempted to "preempt" the Pershing II missiles, but rather are now negotiating with the United States in Geneva on mutual reductions. Moreover, an American defense would tilt the Kremlin's perceptions about the strategic balance only if the Soviets were inactive in the strategic defense area, which they most assuredly are not.

Another criticism of strategic defense is that a transition to deterrence based on defense in space would delegate to computers the authority to destroy incoming missiles seconds after launching. According to Robert E. Hunter, "strategic defenses on both sides would further truncate the amount of time available to national leaders to make decisions in the heat of a crisis. In fact, with strategic defenses designed to begin intercepting missiles soon after they have left their silos or submarines, human intervention would probably be impossible." It is true that computers would decide whether to activate boost phase defenses. Still, there could be no "innocent" reason for launching large numbers of missiles at the United States. Even today, national command authorities are highly reliant on computer technology to assess nuclear attacks and to command and control nuclear forces. The computers in a strategic defense system would decide only to disarm hostile weapons in space, preventing casualties on earth.

The challenge of strategic defense is not merely a technological one; it is also a political challenge to Western leaders, who must demonstrate consistency, resolve, and foresight in pursuing the defensive transition. While American deployment of a defensive shield will entail uncertainties, they will be manageable given adroit leadership. Carried out in a measured, non-threatening manner, the transition process would endanger no nation and would enhance the security of the United States and its allies.

15 Won't the SDI program eventually violate the ABM Treaty? Wouldn't abrogation of ABM Treaty harm US interests?

A primary product of SALT I was an agreement to restrict ballistic missile defenses. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty putatively outlawed any nationwide defense network by allowing each side to maintain only two ballistic missile defense sites, each employing no more than 100 ABM launchers. Further, the Treaty prohibited advanced development and testing or deployment of ABM components (as defined by the Treaty to include radars, interceptors, and launchers) in sea-, air-, and space-based modes, including mobile launchers. The ABM agreement also proscribed the testing of air defense systems in an "ABM mode." Defensive technologies based on "other physical principles" not evisioned at the time were to be subject to separate "discussion."

Treaty Interpretation

There is no consensus regarding how far the SDI program can proceed without conflicting with the 1972 ABM agreement. The ABM Treaty contains some ambiguous language, and certain terms and provisions have been interpreted differently. Some critics believe that various SDI activities could conflict with Treaty restrictions on testing and development. Article V of the Treaty states that "each side undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems which are sea-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." The Reagan Administration has adopted a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty in its SDI plans, stating that any testing will involve sub-components (as opposed to systems or components) until the early 1990s, when research is projected to have yielded the basis for a deployment decision.

A careful reading of the Treaty (especially Agreed Statement D), as well as US negotiators' statements before Congress, reveals that a more permissive interpretation of the Treaty may be warranted regarding the testing and development of laser and directed-energy technologies. Agreed Statement D, appended to the ABM Treaty, states that if "ABM systems based on other physical principles . . . are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion. . . ." Gerard Smith, one of the chief negotiators of the ABM Treaty, noted in Congressional testimony that, according to Agreed Statement D, "if ABM technology is created based on different physical principles, ABM systems or components based on them can only be deployed if the Treaty is amended. Work in that direction, development work, re-

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search, is not prohibited, but deployment . . . would not be permitted unless both parties agree by amdending the Treaty." Judge Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor to the State Department, in reviewing the secret Treaty negotiating records, recently concluded that "a much stronger case exists in the record for the broader interpretation than for the restrictive one."

In any case, all current SDI work complies with US treaty obligations, including the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the ABM agreement. If technologies prove promising, beginning in the early 1990s prototypes for actual defensive systems could be designed, built, and tested. The American strategic defense program at that point would require modification of the Treaty, and would in all likelihood lead to its renegotiation or eventual US withdrawal. Should the USSR refuse to cooperate in a transition to a defense-reliant world, the United States may still find that its national security interests require the construction of a defensive system.

> **"The ABM Treaty itself should not be considered an immutable fact of international life, especially since the premises from which its signatories proceeded . . . have proved so demonstrably false."**
>
> (Alun Chalfont, *SDI: The Case for the Defence,* 1985)

The ABM Treaty allows for revision and/or withdrawal by either party if "supreme national interests" seem endangered, and provides for periodic review sessions in which possible amendments can be discussed. More fundamentally, the Treaty was based on the premise that both sides would reduce drastically their respective offensive arsenals. In light of the explosive growth in Soviet strategic offensive forces—not to mention Soviet arms control treaty violations—that basic assumption is no longer valid.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are legally empowered to withdraw from the ABM accord with six months prior notice. "Each party shall," Article XV of the Treaty reads, "have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme national interests." Since that time, Moscow has deployed a new generation of offensive ballistic missiles, has begun to deploy two new mobile land-based nuclear missiles (the SS-X-24 and SS-25), and has probably laid the foundation

for the deployment of a nationwide defense system. In light of that evidence, and what we know about the increased accuracy of Soviet warheads and their ability to target US command sites and retaliatory forces, it would appear that US "supreme national interests" are indeed at risk.

On a number of occasions the ABM Treaty has been referred to as "the single most successful arms control agreement to date." The accord plays an important symbolic role, it is argued, reflecting an all-too-rare example of superpower restraint. Critics of the Treaty doubt the wisdom of entrusting US security to "symbols" or to faith in a "general" process, especially given the disquieting facts about the particulars of arms control. In the view of SDI supporters, the SALT I accords failed to achieve their purposes. The Soviet missile force is a greater threat to the US deterrent today as a result of its allowed growth since SALT I. Moreover, without formally abrogating the ABM Treaty, Moscow is engaged in defensive strategems (e.g., ABM modernization, air defense, civil defense) that circumvent the purposes of the agreement—or, in at least one instance, clearly violate the accord.

"If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty."

(Gerard Smith, Chief of the US Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, May 9, 1972)

A stated objective of the ABM Treaty was the prevention of a nationwide missile defense system in either the United States or the Soviet Union. The Soviets have expanded and modernized the Moscow ABM complex with modified interceptors (one of which, the ABM-X-3, may be mobile and therefore a violation) and engagement and guidance radars. Some Soviet modernization and research activities do not violate the Treaty per se, but they do grant the Soviets unilateral technical experience that could be parlayed into a clandestine endeavor to develop and deploy a continental defensive system.

The phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk provides evidence that a Soviet "creep-out" of the ABM Treaty may be underway. The radar constitutes a clear violation of the Treaty due to its location and orientation.

The Krasnoyarsk complex, along with the other radars of its class, is a link in a nationwide radar network which may be used for early warning purposes or for providing information to ABM batteries so as to permit them to assign targets and discriminate between actual warheads and decoys (i.e., battle management). Since many years are required to build such a radar, it appears that Soviet leaders decided to pursue actions directly contradicting the terms of the accord shortly after signing it.

Due to sustained Western concerns about the Krasnoyarsk radar, which even ABM Treaty supporters admit is a violation, the Soviets in 1985 offered to stop construction on the system if the United States would halt the legal modernization of two existing early warning radars in Greenland and Great Britain. External construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar had been completed at the time of the Soviet offer, however, and there is no way to assure that internal construction would not proceed. Moreover, Moscow did not offer to "dismantle" the system. As Rep. James Courter (R-NJ) has remarked, "they offered not to give up their illegal battle management capability if we gave up our legal early warning capability." Such posturing hardly bodes well for future Soviet good faith at the negotiating table.

No treaty should be considered sacrosanct. American leaders may determine that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized the "supreme national interests" of the United States, thereby compelling US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty if it cannot be modified by mutual consent. Since the signing of the agreement, the Soviet offensive threat to US retaliatory forces has greatly expanded, undermining the American strategic deterrent. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue a wide range of defensive capabilities, in the process violating both the spirit and the letter of ABM Treaty provisions. In the coming years, the United States must consider whether it should allow a treaty seriously compromised by faulty assumptions, destabilizing consequences, and failures of compliance to stand in the way of the strategic defense option.

16 Won't the SDI have adverse effects on relations with America's allies, renewing fears about "Fortress America" and a decoupling of NATO?

Unfettered debate is natural in a democratic, multilateral union, and individual members of NATO bring different perspectives to issues of common concern. An overriding consensus about collective security, however, has preserved the Atlantic alliance through nearly four decades of political crises–from the Suez Crisis of 1956, to the withdrawal of France from the military command structure of NATO in 1966, to the mass demonstrations against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe in 1983. Although initially confused or concerned about the goals of the SDI program, many European leaders are coming to support the idea. Some Europeans now are making the case that strategic defense could strengthen the NATO alliance by reducing US strategic vulnerability, enhancing European defenses against a preemptive strike by Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and improving conventional defense capabilities through technological variants and "spinoffs" from the space defense program.

To offset Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional military advantages, the United States extends a nuclear guarantee to its NATO allies in Western Europe. The commitment to employ US strategic forces in defense of Europe, known as "extended deterrence," has bonded the security interests of the NATO countries, and has guided the military doctrine and force structures that have maintained peace in Europe since the end of World War II. The tangle of uncertainties facing Soviet war planners, aware that any conventional assault might be met with a nuclear response, has served to deter war even while arousing moral qualms in many Europeans and Americans.

Some Europeans worry that strategic defense could undermine the nuclear status quo, while others criticize the SDI on economic or arms control grounds. Some in Western Euorpe argue that strategic defenses in the United States and the Soviet Union would degrade the very deterrent function of nuclear weapons, making the world "safe" for a conventional conflict far more destructive than the two World Wars combined. Others worry that the costs of the SDI will detract from spending on NATO's vital conventional forces. Still others argue that the SDI will undermine arms control efforts, while a small minority simply oppose all Western military programs and/or initiatives from America.

Strategic Defense and Nuclear Deterrence

Effective strategic defenses will transform deterrence rather than degrade it, shifting the very basis of war prevention from increasingly incre-

dible threats of retaliatory annihilation to a more balanced mix of defensive and offensive forces. Some doubts, particularly among European political and military leaders, raised about the American commitment to NATO can be traced to the perceived weaknesses in the overall US strategic posture. The ability of the United States to ensure the survivability of its retaliatory forces in the short run and its population centers in the long run could solidify NATO ties by erasing doubts about Washington's capabilities. As one NATO defense minister, quoted by Richard Perle in Congressional testimony, noted to his European colleagues, "For years, I have been listening to you fellows raise questions about the credibility of the American commitment. . . . I would like to see the United States with a strategic defense even if it could not protect Europe, because in the fundamental sense it would assure the credibility of the American deterrent."

The transition to strategic defense would be gradual, open, and, judging from unpublicized Soviet activities, bilateral. At no point, according to US officials, would conventional defenses in Europe be sacrificed to achieve a defensive shield for the United States. The costs of enhancing the conventional defense prospects of NATO—through the introduction of "emerging technologies" and the amendation of NATO strategy for employing high-technology conventional systems—was estimated by the European Security Study Group at $22.5 billion over a ten-year period, or an annual additional increase of about 1% in NATO defense budgets. The research into high-powered lasers, sensors, guidance systems, and data processing now taking place under the SDI could yield new applications for conventional weapons systems, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons critical to the non-nuclear defense of NATO territory.

The SDI and European Defense

NATO defense officials are considering the prospects for a European Defense Initiative that would complement the SDI by focusing research on defenses against intermediate and tactical missiles. The relatively shorter warning times and lower trajectories of Soviet land-based and sea-based missiles aimed at Western Europe are offset by the reduced missile payloads and lower velocities involved. All ballistic missiles, regardless of range, must exit the atmosphere and thus become "visible" and vulnerable to space-based or pop-up defenses. Boost phase and terminal defense systems would be very similar for both intercontinental and intermediate-

range missiles, making a multitiered American defensive system applicable to European and Japanese defense needs. An upgraded version of the Patriot—a high-velocity, surface-to-air interceptor designed for anti-air missions—might function well against short-range missiles if coupled with advanced sensing, tracking, and data processing equipment. Supplemental defenses would be needed against the shortest-range "battlefield" missiles; such defenses should be a primary focus of a European defense research effort.

A European strategic defense system could also play in important role by denying the Soviets confidence in their blitzkrieg military strategy, which relies on surprise, preemption, and rapid territorial advance. According to defense experts Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, "new technologies emerging from the SDI effort could eventually be adapted for conventional defense missions, including that of countering enemy armor, and the surveillance and sensor assets critical to the NATO defense concept." Clearly, Soviet attack incentives would be lowered if NATO air and naval facilities, supply and storage depots, and command centers were protected against the preemptive missile assault forshadowed in Soviet military manuals. The development of new NATO conventional defense concepts, which emphasize mobility and economy of force, highlights the potential linkage between missile defense and conventional deterrence. The survivability of military forces and command posts against preemptive nuclear "decapitation" will bear directly on the prospects of outnumbered NATO defenders seeking to stultify Soviet invasion forces. If a European-centered defense could enhance the firepower and sustainability of NATO conventional forces, it would raise Soviet uncertainties about the wisdom of attacking in the first place.

Strategic Defense and "Fortress America"

In its structure and orientation, the SDI is not compatible with a new era of American isolationism; indeed, US officials have repeatedly stressed the importance of European participation in the project. Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany have responded favorably to the research program in Memoranda of Understanding with the United States, and a number of European aerospace firms are participating in the effort. The new Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac, supports the SDI, an important change in a government critical of the American program in the past.

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The United States today stands undefended against nuclear attack, and yet it is committed to the defense of Europe by nuclear means if necessary. Most Europeans seem to accept that guarantee. Therefore, it is difficult to fathom why critics doubt America's prospective commitment to its allies once a missile defense shield were in place. Surely, the reverse case is more plausible. With American cities totally naked to attack, and US silos vulnerable, might not some future President flinch, as General de Gaulle postulated, when he had to decide whether to sacrifice Chicago for Paris? Seen in this perspective, the SDI should make both the US President and the other leaders of the alliance more confident of NATO's cohesion even as it renders the USSR less certain that surprise attack or nuclear blackmail could gain anything of value to Moscow. Surely, the event most likely to decouple the alliance and terrify the Americans into an isolationist phobia would be the uncontested appearance of Soviet laser weapons while the SDI was still in the laboratory phase.

"Unilateral control of space by the USSR would signal the death knell of the Atlantic Alliance and Western democracy."

(S.W.B. Menaul, *Space Policy*, May 1985)

Over time, it is true that an effective defense by both sides would reduce the value of French and British nuclear weapons as well as Soviet and American arsenals. But if mankind itself can be freed from an unstable balance of terror, is it necessarily a bad thing for the health of an alliance of democracies if jointly developed technology gradually renders obsolete the sovereign suicide pacts of the past? With its eventual application to both European strategic and conventional defense, as well as its potential to refocus superpower competition towards better shields, the SDI can be an instrument of increased transatlantic solidarity.

Active Sensor — A system that includes both a detector and a source of illumination. A camera with a flash attachment is an active sensor.

Airborne Sensors — A set of sensors carried as an airborne optical adjunct to a ground-based radar system designed to detect, track, and discriminate incoming warheads. The sensors are typically optical or infrared devices carried in an aircraft stationed above the clouds.

Architecture — The physical structure of a computer system, which can include both hardware and software (programs).

Birth-to-Death Tracking — The ability to track a missile and its payload from launch until it is intercepted or destroyed.

Boost Phase — The portion of a missile flight during which the payload is accelerated by large rocket motors.

Booster — The rocket that "boosts" the payload to accelerate it from the earth's surface into a ballistic trajectory, during which no additional force is applied to the payload.

Chemical Laser — A laser in which chemical action is used to produce pulses of intense light.

Decoy — A device constructed to look and behave like a nuclear weapon-carrying warhead, which can be deployed in large numbers to complicate defenses.

Directed Energy — Energy in the form of particle or laser beams that can be transmitted long distances at nearly the speed of light.

Discrimination — The process of observing set of attacking objects and determining which are the real warheads and which are decoys or other non-threatening objects.

Electromagnetic Railgun	A gun that accelerates a projectile by electromagnetic force rather than by an explosion, as in a conventional gun.
Endoatmospheric	Within the earth's atmosphere, generally considered altitudes below 100 kilometers.
Exoatmospheric	Outside the earth's atmosphere, generally considered altitudes above 100 kilometers.
Imaging	The process of identifying an object by obtaining a high-quality image of it.
Infrared Sensor	A sensor to detect the infrared radiation from a cold body, such as a missile reentry vehicle.
Interception	The act of destroying a target.
Kinetic Energy	The energy from the momentum of an object.
Laser	A device for generating intense visible or infrared light.
Laser Tracking	The process of using a laser to illuminate a target so that specialized sensors can detect the reflected laser light and track the target.
Leakage	The percentage of warheads that get through a defensive system intact and operational.
Midcourse Phase	The long period of a warhead's flight to its target after it has been dispensed from the post-boost vehicle until it reenters the atmosphere over its target.
Particle Beam	A stream of atoms or subatomic particles (electrons, protons, or neutrons) accelerated to nearly the speed of light.
Phased-Array Radar	Radar system that tracks many targets simultaneously by electronically pointing a beam in different directions. Does not move an antenna mechanically. Crucial system for anti-missile battle management mission.

Post-boost Phase The portion of missile's flight during which multiple warheads are deployed on different paths to different targets. The warheads on a single missile are carried on a platform or "bus" which has small rocket motors to move the bus slightly from its original path.

Post-boost Vehicle The portion of a rocket payload that carries the multiple warheads and has maneuvering capability to place each warhead on its final trajectory to a target (also referred to as a "bus").

Rubber Mirror Mirror designed to sharpen the focus of a laser beam, offsetting atmospheric effects on lasers.

Scramjet Rocket engine that combines rocket and jet engine components, designed to power a vehicle for lifting payloads into space and returning to earth.

Signal Processing A computer system's capability to organize the raw data received from many different sources.

Terminal Phase The final phase of a ballistic missile trajectory, during which warheads and penetration aids reenter the atmosphere.

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

The Intelligent Laypersons Guide
to "Star Wars"

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JINSA
Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs

SECURITY AFFAIRS

Soviet Proxies in Central America: Part I

Yossef Bodansky

The emergence of "progressive national liberation movements" in Latin America in the late 1960s (and the support provided to them by the Cubans and Palestinians) was not accidental. To some degree, they were the outcome of a long-term Soviet strategic plan, launched in 1966, designed to bring about the deterioration of the West within 20 years. One major element of the plan was a massive campaign of terrorism.

Through economic pressure, the Soviets prevailed upon the Cubans to take the lead. However, while professional expertise existed in Cuba, the island was too small and, owing to intensive US intelligenee, too exposed for large scale training and support facilities to remain secret. In July 1968, Egypt's President Nasser visited Moscow to ask for the rebuilding of the Egyptian armed forces and additional Soviet support in the escalating War of Attrition with Israel. He was accompanied by Yasser Arafat (on his first visit to Moscow). Arafat, extremely ambitious, boasted to his hosts of the unlimited freedom of action his organization enjoyed in Jordan.

The Sandinistas vowed to "Vietnamize Central America" by creating a Marxist-Leninist underground, considering this to be their regional commitment to the Soviet Union.

Arafat readily agreed to provide training and support in return for Soviet recognition of him as a world leader. Nasser, aspiring to remain leader of the Arab world, promised to deliver Jordan's King Hussein. Since then, Arab states have provided the Soviets with vital services in support of world terrorism. The "progressive" Arab states and organizations considered the US the enemy of the Muslim world (and Israel as its prime instrument) and were eager to support the Soviet Union.

Since the late 1960s, Soviet-backed Palestinian terrorist organizations have supported virtually all the leftist terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. According to Jorge Mandi, a Sandinista leader, Sandinista terrorists were fighting in the ranks of the PLO in Black September. On the other side, Nicaragua now constitutes the only place from which the PLO can launch major terrorist operations against its enemy—the US.

Nicaragua

Following the success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, the Soviets designated Bulgaria (already involved in support of the PLO and others in Europe and the Middle East) as an intermediary between Moscow and Managua. Cuba was designated to provide "humanitarian and economic" assistance to Nicaragua. And the PLO was to move a large portion of the training activities for Spanish-speaking terrorists from Lebanon to Nicaragua, including their Palestinian instructors. (Following Operation Peace for Galilee, the Nicaraguan facilities became the only functioning PLo assets for the training and support of terrorists.)

In July 1981, the Sandinistas vowed to "Vietnamize Central America" by creating a Marxist-Leninist underground, considering this to be their regional commitment to the Soviet Union.

By the 1980s, through exploitation and manipulation, the Soviets succeeded in establishing in Nicaragua the Third World revolutionary infrastructure necessary to carry out the subversive offensive in the Western Hemisphere in suport of Soviet strategic aims.

Disinformation

The Soviet Union has always recognized the value of disinformation in attaining its goals. Following adoption of the strategic plan in 1966, a major disinformation campaign was set into motion. Since that time, the Soviet approach to any strategic-politieal challenge has had two stages:

1) Consolidation of credible military capabilities; and

2) Luring the West, through a disinformation campaign, into overconfidence and self-disarming action to enable the Soviets to attain their goals with little or no military struggle.

By mid-1984, they realized that President Reagan would be reelected, but that he was reluctant to commit US troops to active fighting in Central America. Despite their setback in Grenada, the Soviets felt strong enough through their positions in Cuba and Nicaragua to confront the US and attain local goals.

They began to consider, and even start, the supply of strategic weapon systems, such as the SA-5, to Nicaragua. These systems are usually manned and operated by Soviet crews. Furthermore, the Soviets deployed SPETSNAZ (special forces) detachments in Nicaragua as the decisive factor in the subversion offensive planned against the US. By Soviet definition, all the requirements for completion of the first stage and the onset of the second stage above were fulfilled by late 1984.

Iran

In the mid-1950s, following collapse of the Mossadeq revolution in Iran, the Soviets realized that the Tudeh Communist Party (like any other socialist-progressive party) was incapable of garnering enough support to consolidate control of the country. The Soviets then also began supporting the most fundamentalist, reactionary elements of Iranian society. They believed that if these elements were inflamed, they would destroy the Monarchy, creating chaos that would enable the Tudeh to take over the country.

In the late 1960s, the Soviets decided to substantially increase the number of trained and fully equipped fundamentalist terrorists in Iran. They picked the supporters of a relatively obscure religious leader in exile—the Ayatollah Khomeini. For the next decade, the PLO trained and equipped thousands of Iranians in camps in Jordan and Lebanon. Large caches of weapons and ammunition were transferred to Iran for the revolution. According to Arafat, Fatah played an effective role in overthrowing the Shah and consolidating Khomeini in power. He claimed hundreds of Fatah commandos in Iran sabotaged government installations, trained and organized the Revolutionary Guard, and executed leaders of the Imperial Army. ("Keyhan" 5 July 1984) Palestinians provided communications and logistical support for the seizure of the US Embassy in Teheran.

Over the years, the Soviets became more and more disillusioned with the ability of the Tudeh Party to be a credible alternative to the fundamental Muslim rule. By the mid-1980s, a large portion of the Party was sacrificed to the Islamic Revolutionary Party and the SAVAMA to further Soviet influence in Iran and secure fundamentalist cooperation for clandestine operations ranging from industrial espionage in Japan, to fighting the resistance in Afghanistan to bankrolling Soviet activities in Central America.

The vocal Muslim anti-Soviet rhetoric and the crushing of certain elements of the Tudeh created the impression of an uncontrollable Iran as anti-Soviet as it was anti-American. As a result, Iran can perform services for

(Continued on page 7)

Kemp to be Honored at JINSA Dinner

The Honorable Jack Kemp will be presented with the JINSA Distinguished Service Award on Sunday 31 March in Washington on the occasion of the JINSA Annual Dinner.

Mr. Kemp, a member of the Board of Advisors, will be honored for his commitment to a strong US defense posture and his staunch advocacyof US-Israel strategic cooperation. Previous recipients of the Distinguished Service Award include the late Senator Henry M. Jackson and Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick.

The dinner, which will be held at the Regent Hotel, follows a meeting of the JINSA Board of Directors at 3:00 pm and a seminar on energy and security at 4:00. JINSA members and friends are invited to attend allof the scheduled events.

Please call 202-347-5425 for ticket prices and reservations.

The Honorable Jack Kemp

EDITORIALS

Our Soldiers Come First

By 1981, the modernization of our armed forces was long overdue. Equipment was outdated, spare parts were in short supply or nonexistent, training levels were low, military pay was a disgrace, and retention rates for skilled personnel were poor.

Rectifying each problem required expenditures of time and money—a great deal of money. For four years, Congress has approved large defense budgets and most of the programs the Administration has requested. We have been in agreement with most of those large program expenditures—notably strategic modernization. Now, however, in the face of mounting deficits, Congress appears ready to cut the defense budget.

While not withdrawing our support for weapon systems we have advocated in the past, it does appear clear to us that the chief item that must be ensured in any future budget is not a weapon system: it is money for personnel and training.

Over and over, we have heard from our military leaders that the key to our superiority over our foes will never be numbers—of soldiers, of tanks, or of planes. We rely on qualitative superiority, and this is clearly evidenced in the area of personnel. We spend a large percentage of our defense budget on salaries, benefits and pensions. Unlike the Soviets, we concern ourselves with the education of our soldiers and their "quality of life". Our military leaders express great pride in the people who serve under them in the armed forces.

This is at it should be. Ultimately, we are defended not by tanks or planes, but by the men and women who operate and support them. This generation of military recruits is the next generation of military leaders. Their education, their training, their morale, and their commitment determine our future security as well as our present safety. Historically, the draft has produced the highest caliber soldiers for our armed forces, and to some extent, allowed us to focus less attention on their compensation. However, the draft is not a politically attractive option now. Thus we must concern ourselves with issues of compensation, training and retention.

There isn't a budget that does not contain extraneous items. Our defense budget can, and perhaps should, be reduced in light of other economic priorities. However, freezing military pay, reducing benefits, reducing training, or otherwise taking our fiscal difficulties out on the people who defend our nation will ultimately be more costly than whatever it puts back into the public treasury.

SHORT TAKES

1. While considering the Defense Budget, and any possible cuts to be made there, it is useful to remember that no department spends money that is not allocated by Congress. And Congress works according to its own priorities, not necessarily those of national security. Such items as the closing of obsolete or inefficient military bases are annually proposed by DoD, only to be rejected or ignored by Senators and Congressmen not wanting to see the cuts take effect in their districts.

2. African countries still castigate Israel in public, but at least in Kenya, the practical has overcome the political. An American doctor, Nancy Caroline, intends to develop a 5,000 acre cooperative farm in Kenya, funded by the Kenyan government, and assisted by Israeli agricultural experts. A healthy development for Israel and, most certainly, for the Kenyan people who will benefit from assistance in desert reclamation.

3. Soviet President Constantin Chernenko must really be ill to have missed a visit from his one-man European cheering section, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreau.

Caveat Vender

We welcome the Administration's decision to hold off new arms sales to the Middle East pending completion of a "comprehensive review of our security interests and our strategy in the region". For too long, arms sales have been used to achieve limited objectives having little to do with each other. Certainly there has been little systematic understanding of how to promote US security interests, including regional peace, by arms sales to the region. All too often, the result has been costly, destabilizing escalation.

Arms to Saudi Arabia, for example, have variously been justified as satisfying different US interests. But arms have brought the Saudis no closer to recognizing Israel, defying Syrian and PLO demands for money, opposing Soviet expansion effectively, or allowing the US access to facilities in the Gulf. Reviewing our interests in the region means more than just debunking some of the myths about Saudi Arabia. A review such as the one the Administration appears to be conducting should consist of weighing possible scenarios and the arms various countries could bring to bear, in our interest and that of the recipient. We must be sure the weapons are not used against our interests, such as in an Arab-Israel war, or as a result of Khomeini-style revolution, or given to terrorists.

First, the US is determined to block Soviet expansion in the region. While Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have been unwilling to consider that a priority, Oman and North Yemen could be strengthened to help encourage the Soviet Bloc out of Aden. Returning Aden to the Western fold would be a true strategic accomplishment. Turkey, Pakistan and Afghan freedom fighters can provide barriers to the Soviets and should be aided. Israel and Egypt perform a similar function at the Western end of the region.

Another American priority must be the war against terrorist activity, and producing disincentives for Middle Eastern states to support terrorists. Iran, Libya and Syria are the chief culprits, and Saudi Arabia still supports at least one of them—Syria. In our relationship with Isarel, there is a great deal we can learn about combatting terrorism. Counterterrorism requires no big ticket defense items, just cooperation.

The United States has an interest in and an obligation to support democracies wherever they are. In the Middle East, Israel is the only democracy, and merits American assistance on those grounds.

The US must decide which of the regional conflicts merit our attention. For example, in every war Israel has fought, it has faced combinations of arms from more than one Arab state. Which states might possibly ally against Israel in the future? Egypt faces a threat from Libya. What arms does Egypt need to counter that threat? What is the threat to Saudi Arabia? What combination of arms would help to counter that, while not providing the sort of offensive capability that would threaten Israel? Jordan has more trouble with Syria than with Israel. Can King Hussein rely on assistance from Israel if threatened by Syria? What combination of assets in Israel and Jordan would be sufficient?

The best way to consider such a review is country-by-country, always bearing in mind the cumulative effect of escalation.

1) Egypt: which seems to believe that Camp David guaranteed them arms parity with Israel. It did not, and while recognizing the utility of exercises such as Bright Star, the US must consider those areas in which Egyptian policies run counter to our interests. Not only have they frozen the peace with Isael, but on the strategic level they are unwilling to make facilities that we financed available to us, such as Ras Banas, into which the US put considerable capital.

2) Oman: is one of the few Arab countries which considers the US an ally and, itself, behaves as one. It should be treated accordingly.

3) Jordan: is consistently one peace plan behind.

4) Kuwait: finds itself with problems of subversion. Offensive weaponry should not be their first priority.

5) Iraq: The mistake was taking them off the list of terrorist countries. It should be recalled that Iraq, not Iran, spent months attacking international shipping in the Gulf.

These countries do have security concerns. Real ones. The US review of strategic policy and arms sales identify those areas in which we can help friendly (or even moderately friendly) Arab states overcome real problems. In exchange, we should identify areas in which those Arab countries can help us overcome real American strategic difficulties.

Where there is a confluence of interest, arms transactions are appropriate, but they must be security deals, not just arms sales. Furthermore, true comonality of interest should lead to a program that does not produce a threat to Israel.

6) Our arms relationship with Israel is also on hold, pending review. However, the review will show that Israel is strategically located; has volunteered bases to us; is staunchly anti-Soviet; acts as a US ally in the UN and other international fora; has supplied us with much intelligence and battle data over the years; and has been willing to talk to any country in the area about the requirements of a stable Middle East. (This is a good place to recall that NONE of the Arab states currently seeking arms—save Egypt—has shown the slightest interest in discussing regional stability with Israel.) Israel, accordingly, remains high on our priority list.

JINSABRIEFS

Charles A. Krohn,
Director of Development

Speaking to the Philadelphia Board of Rabbis was one of last month's highlights, thanks to an invitation by Rabbi FREDERIC KAZAN of Adath Israel in Merion, PA. Nearly 40 Rabbis attended the event at Gratz College. Most, although not all, were supportive of the principle that a strong US defense means a more secure Israel. At least one person was concerned about the negative implication of Israel's dependence on US economic support and armed forces.

In the practical sense, all agreed that Israel needs the specter of a US military presence to resist Soviet power expansion, but there was concern that Israel might sacrifice a measure of independence. I hope we can pull together some ideas to explore this apparent dilemma in a future edition of "Security Affairs".

Looking to the immediate future, JINSA has two events planned in the Chicago area in February-March. First, I will appear at a Mens Club and Sisterhood breakfast at Beth Hillel Congregation in Wilmette, following an invitation by Rabbi DAVID LINCOLN. On 10 March will have a fundraiser hosted by TED KAPLAN and assisted by Board Member CLEM CADITZ.

A JINSA event is planned in Denver in March, prompted by the interest of JACK GREENWALD. This will include a tour of Lowry Air Force Base and a visit with the commander Major General William R. Usher.

PAUL PINTEL has been helpful in arranging spring speaking dates in the Newark, NJ area, and ALLEN DICKERMAN has offered to host JINSA events in Boca Raton, FL and Lexington, MA.

A JINSA event is set for 1 April in Houston, TX, thanks to the enthusiastic support of Board Member PHIL ARONOFF. General Ury Simhony, Defense and Armed Forces Attache of the Embassy of Israel will speak at the gathering.

Our Philadelphia members have already seen the splendid article written about JINSA in the *Jewish Exponent* by Ian Blynn. I hope other Jewish papers will pick up the idea that their readership is interested in what we're doing to make the US and Israel more secure.

While continuing work on speaking and fundraising schedules, I am putting the finishing touches on a JINSA tour to US/NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Berlin and Heidelberg. Thus far, the response to this pilot program has been enthusiastic on both sides of the Atlantic, but a few details have yet to be worked out before we make a public announcement.

Going to Israel?

Join the Third JINSA Trip to Israel
27 April — 6 May 1985

This unique trip is concerned with Israel's defense and security. Hosted by the Israel Defense Forces, JINSA members will visit military installations, defense and high technology industries and meet with the military and civilian leaders responsible for Israel's security. Several retired American flag officers will be with us, helping to relate US and Israeli security measures to the evolving process of strategic cooperation.

- Visit the Merkava tank factory; the Golan heights; Israel Aircraft Industries; the West Bank; the Northern Command.
- Meet the Minister of Defense; the Chief of Staff; the Director General of the Ministry of Defense; Commanders in the field; leaders of industry.

Cost: $2,000.00 per person/double occupancy
Space limited: reserve today 202-347-5425

NOT THE USUAL TOUR!

JINSA Plans Tour of NATO

1-9 June 1985

Brussels, Berlin, Heidelberg

These are the cities JINSA members will visit on a tour of major US military headquarters in Europe, includding the one responsible for contingency plans affecting Israel.

Highlights include NATO briefings and a visit to General Rogers' HQ in Brussels; a reception hosted by the US Berlin commander; visits to the US and Israeli Embassies in Bonn; briefings at the HQ of the US Army and US Air Forces, Europe, and side trips to sites of Jewish cultural interest.

Maximum 20 participants
Cost: $3,000.00 per person/single occupancy, deluxe hotels
Call to reserve: 202-347-5425

Our Readers Write...

Dear Friends:

The enclosed article from the Israeli weekly Newsview may interest members of JINSA. Of course, it merely confirms what we Americans already knew—that our servicemen are the world's finest, and that Israelis would open their hearts and homes to them. Still, it's pleasant reading.

I do hope the article reaches Pentagon officials. Bad news gets around, but what about the good?

I look forward to receiving JINSA newsletters. They continue to demonstrate how easy—and natural—it is to be both a loyal American and an advocate for a strong Israel.

Sincerely,

Maxine L. Wolf

Stars & Stripes in Haifa
(excerpted from Newsview)

("The Americans) are such gentlemen. Not only the officers, but also the simple sailors—those young boys," remarks Gila Gerzon, longtime Haifa resident and director of the new USO Center.

"They so appreciate what you do for them. They wrote thank-you letters even before they left the port. They fell in love here with the place and with the people. And the proof of what kind of men they are, even the oung ones, is that they didn't want only to receive from us. They wanted also to give."

Gerzon spoke about four sailors who went to a school for emotionally handicapped children "just to play with them. To make tricks and entertain them for the whole afternoon. Not just one time. They went back three times. And some of the pilots went to a regular school to sit and talk with the children there. Others went to the children's cancer ward at Rambam Hospital with gifts and entertainers."

Captain Phillip R. Olson, commanding officer of the Mississippi commented, "I had been there before so I told the men to get out and meet the people. If you stay in a bar you might as well be in any other country. I told them to use the buses and at least find out that there's something here besides a taxi ride to another bar."

Commander Edward Simmons of the Eisenhower said he wanted his sailors "out of the bars and seeing the country. Considering that the average of our personnel is 19, maybe that didn't seem reasonable, but I think we succeeded."

Another officer, who asked to remain anonymous, explained "an important difference between Haifa and other places is that this is the only port where we're allowed to wear our uniforms in port. In other countries there is fear of terrorist attacks."

"Every day, 400 or 500 men came to us at the USO, commented Gerzon. "They came for information or just to talk. I was surprised how many wanted to know about agriculture or about high technology in Israel. Some wanted to hear the Haifa Symphony Orchestra. We gave a lot of information, maps and free tickets."

The USO, which is not a US government agency, is funded by private contributions. It maintains canteen and other services in the US and in most countries where large numbers of American soldiers or sailors are found. Its facilities are usually operated by volunteers.

Ambassador Kampelman

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, recently named by President Reagan as the US head of the Geneva delegation to the arms control talks, had served previously as US representative to the Madrid Conference on the Helsinki Final Act. While in that position, he was interviewed by JINSA Chairman of the Board Herbert A. Fierst.

Ambassador Kampelman was, until his current appointment, a member of the JINSA Board of Advisors.

Herbert Fierst: You have lived in so many differnt worlds—those of diplomacy, law, politics, Jewish affairs. You were practicing law, enjoying life in many other activities, when you were asked by President Carter to assume perhaps the most difficult assignment of many years—to negotiate with the Soviet Union in what is commonly referred to as the Madrid Conference. What led you to accept that kind of difficult assignment?

We must be relentless in letting them know, even if it appears confrontational, that there is a price to pay when they don't live up to their international responsibilities.

Ambassador Kampelman: You've mentioned many activities in which I've engaged, but there's one common theme through all of them: the theme of democracy, human dignity and human rights. And that is so thoroughly consistent with our Jewish values—which are, after all, based on the concept of human dignity, human brotherhood. All of the things I did were an opportunity to try to do something about it—not the least we can do with our lives.

It was not difficult to accept the appointment of President Carter that I go to Madrid to deal with the Soviets. There is no more important issue in the world than our relationship with the Soviets.

The Soviet Union is really the greatest threat to world peace and to our values. Yet we ned to get along with them. We need to find a formula for peace with dignity. We've got to have the patience to deal with it.

HF: Were there times you were so frustrated at the inability to come up with something concrete that you wanted to say, "Let someone else deal with it."?

MK: No there were not. The level of frustration depends a little bit on the level of expectations, and I had rather realistic expectations about this.

When you're dealing in a negotiation, one of the results that you want is an agreement. But, as a lawyer, I understood full well that the agreement was not the most important thing. The process—the dialogue, the exchange of concerns—was, in my view, equally important.

There is another issue that has to be understood in our dealings with the Soviet Union: there is a competition for the hearts and minds of billions of people taking place. It is competition between forces of freedom and democracy, or human brotherhood—represented by religious values and political values—which we represent; and forces of totalitarianism and oppression, which, I think, is characteristic of the Soviet regime.

In that competition, a meeting or a dialogue can be very useful to expound upon the nature of the Soviet Union.

HF: Don't you have really two problems: the problem of impact on the Russians, and impact on those who are being persecuted?

MK: There is a third impact: on European and Western public opinion. Because the Soviet Union is constantly engaged in this battle and spends hundreds of millions of dollars to influence the peoples of Europe and all over the world, we must make certain the peoples of Europe don't forget about these human values. It is the issue of our fight for human values that is the uppermost ingredient distinguishing freedom from totalitarianism.

HF: Do you think that you made some real progress?

MK: I think we did.

HF: Soviet treatment of its Jewish community has not improved. What impact do the various activities of the American Jewish and non-Jewish communities have? Is the net effect positive?

MK: I think so. I hope so. But obviously, I don't know so.

When you're dealing with the Soviet Union, you're dealing with a tight, thought-controlled society, governed by dictators who operate in secrecy. But I am convinced that we must continue to express our displeasure with the behavior they are engaged in, which violates their legal obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, for example.

If we don't raise these issues, what we are in effect saying to the Soviets is, "You can violate these agreements and we won't talk about it." What incentive is there then for them to understand that we are concerned about it?

We must be patient. But we must be relentless in letting them know, even if it appears argumentative and confrontational, that there is a price to pay when they don't live up to their international responsibilities.

One final word about the Soviet Union. I am convinced that what the Soviets respect and understand is American military strength. It is very important for the US to have that military strength as a deterrent, to persuade the Soviet Union not to engage in adventures. Because if they engage in adventures, they won't reach their objectives.

HF: Changing subjects abruptly, how do you visualize the relationship between the US and Israel?

MK: I think a close relationship is in the best interest of America. It is America's destiny and mission in the world to strengthen the democraeies. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, and it should be strengthened. We have an obligation. We cannot live on an island.



Ambassador Max M. Kampelman

And it is a religious obligation as well. If you think of it from the point of view of Judaism, what is the essence of the Jewish message? The Lord our God, the Lord is One. This is the essence of human brotherhood, the essence of democracy. I have no problem at all in identifying America's interest with the interest of any democrcy in the world.

We also have particular national security problems in the Middle East, involving energy. The Soviets have their eye on that energy source. Israel is our friend there. I am very pleased to see strategic agreements furthered between the two countries.'

The Soviet Union must not think it can gain anything as a result of adventurism, just as the Arabs have to learn.

I don't think we have to apologize in the slightest.

HF: Quite a few very good hearted American Jews, very supportive of Israel, will do anything at all to give them military, economic, moral aid, but tend to draw the line there. When the same is asked for the United States, they seem to feel that there is something which is leading in the wrong direction. Do you see any conflict there?

MK: It is understandable. The Jewish people are a peaceloving people.

But Israel learned a lesson, which I think Jews all over the world accept now. You want peace, but when you are surrounded by people who are out to destroy you—Israel is surrounded by 20 hostile states—you need an army. And having that strength, maybe you can avoid the war, and have the peace.

We must also understand that the same is true of the United States. We must be peaceloving, but if we are going to avoid war, we must be strong enough to serve as a deterrent force. The Soviet Union must not think it can gain anything as a result of military adventurism, just as the Arabs have to learn that there is a very important military force that an stop them if they become irresponsible.

That's why I believe in a strong defense force. For Israel. For the United States. That's the best hope for peace. Look, we've had the longest period of peace in Europe in modern times—really since the Roman times. Why? Because the Western countries, the free countries, have NATO, a military force.

I would far prefer to live in a world in which we don't need any of this. But until such time as we can be certain we live in such a world, that the other side is not committed to violence, we must have it. And I say this is the best way for us to head toward this understanding for peace.

No society in the history of the world has been as friendly, as receptive, as open to the Jewish community as the Americn society. It must be defended. We have to be proud of it, and I think it's a good thing for us to be patriotic about it...we are better off today, we are freer today, we have more opportunities today than we have ever had. That's why I urge that we keep America strong and develop this great partnership with Israel.

The Editors of "Security Affairs" welcome your comments and suggestions.

Theatre for American Technology

by
Emanual A. Winston

Ed Note: Mr. Winston is a Chicago businessman, Board Member of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, and contributing Editor to Israel Today.

The importance of American and Israeli strategic cooperation cannot be overstated in terms of national security interests. Yet, there is nother aspect of the allied relationship that is often overlooked; the micro-economics of Israel as a theatre for American technology.

America's armament industry has immensely benefited from the successful utilization by the Israel Defense Forces of sophisticated weaponry. The magnificent fighting skill and showcasing of American equipment increased the export sales potential of that weaponry by billions of dollars in the world market. The effect of Israel's military reputation established by 35 years of combat experience serves as the best testament to the selection and capability of weapon systems, most of which are of American design. In a highly competitive export market, being able to refer to the Israeli example is a very strong advantage over other merchants. Since foreign military sales are almost 2.5 times as profitable as military sales to the U.S. government, this "selling" factor reaps big dividends. The capital accumulated from these sales in turn reduces research and development costs for our government, hence the American taxpayer. The economic ramifications are evident in that each billion dollars worth of foreign arms sales translates into jobs for American industry, (the claim often made is approx. 42,000-52,000 jobs). Based on 1980 data, defense firms such as General Dynamics, Northrop, Raytheon, FMC and Harsco had 25% of their contracts in foreign sales. (*Defense & Foreign Affairs*, March 1983). Thus, the employment benefit of defense and export sales are substantial and the reduced costs to the American government by extending production runs and spreading development outlays has strong positive economic ramifications.



The direct effect of Israeli battle performance for American sales was best evidenced by the Operation Peace For Galilee. In a span of a short time, the Israelis demolished more than 20 SAM missile sites, over 90 Syrian MIGs were shot down (including MIG-23s) and over 500 enemy tanks were destroyed (including the new T-72, backbone of the Soviet arsenal). American-made planes played a vital role in the Israeli effort. Most notably, the F15 and F16 saw extensive action. One Israeli F15 was claimed to have shot down more than 20 Soviet-made MIGs in Lebanon. In addition, the Hughs 5000MD Defender combat helicopter proved a great asset for the Israelis in mountain warfare, destroying large numbers of Syrian tanks, as did a second anti-tank helicopter, the Bell AH-1S Huey Cobra. After the Israelis purchased advanced helicopter gunships, several other countries immediately followed suit (the Jordanians, South Koreans, Kenyans decided to go with the American gunship rather than the British, French and German models). This trend was also evidenced with the Japanese purchase of the Gruman E2C Hawkeye early warning plane which followed Israel's suit. Moreover, after the Israeli display of EC mastery in the skies, several other countries have placed orders with the American manufacturer. James Philbin, the E-2C program director at Gruman Aerospace corporation said Israeli air victories generated prospects from China, Korea, Singapore, Spain, Australia and others. He commented in the September 20, 1982 *Business Week* that because of the Israelis, "The foreign sales potential looks like 30 to 40 airplanes over the next five years." The Chairman of Loral Corporation also confirmed the importance for American manufacturers of Israeli "combat proven" technology when he stated that: "The fact that Israel has selected our Rapport III (EW protection system) for their F-16s is probably the best sales tool we have." The showcase of the F-16 in combat no doubt will also prove highly beneficial in selling the plane to foreign countries over the French Mirage 2000. It should be noted that four powers, the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union account for approximately 80% of total arms sales.

The failure of Russian weaponry to thwart the IDF disappointed several Soviet arms clients. Since arms sales are a means of promoting political influence and provide a steady flow of hard currency, the implications of American weapons superiority may have a direct impact on American power projection capabilities, ergo national security interests. The Israeli contribution to this aspect of American active defense is perhaps the most important and overlooked development of bilateral strategic cooperation. Israeli destruction of Soviet-built anti-aircraft missiles, their ease in destroying the Soviet T-72 tank and the downing of a MIG-25 Foxbat has caused the Soviets and the entire Warsaw Pact to question the viability of their own military hardware, tactics and strategy. The Israelis not only confronted Soviet weaponry, but were forced to engage Western technologies; the lessons of their successful combat will provide invaluable intelligence data to U.S. defense planners and save billions research and development costs, a major advantage for the U.S. that her Soviet adversary cannot claim. Professor Steven L. Spiegel sums up the Israeli asset in real terms: "The facts speak for themselves. Israel is a unique and impressive ally. It influences political developments in its own area, causes the Soviets embarrassment and military lessons which can be learned only from combat experience, provides intelligence on the region, and saves U.S. defense costs through innovations and modifications of U.S. weaponry...if Israeli experiences were worth only 2% of the annual U.S. defense budget, that would amount to over $4 billion." (*Commentary*, June 1983)

The relationship between the American and Israeli defense industries is becoming increasingly developed in almost every area. Almost every Israeli corporation utilizes parts and equipment that were manufactured in the United States. Moreover, Israel has made extensive rennovations on American technologies by adapting the lessons of combat experience. Thus, millions are saved in testing time and the development of armaments are galvanized through Israeli innovation passed on to America. Many of the licenses for weapon features are in turn sold to American corporations for mass production. The bottom line is that Israeli modifications coupled with cedible experience in destroying the best in Soviet technologies has enhanced the performance of American weaponry, reduced development time and taxpayer costs, thereby contributing to the readiness of U.S. Armed Forces in a period when budget cuts have severely reduced their functional capabilities.

For military planners, Israeli intervention in Lebanon conveyed that the American ally has approached mastering the overall electronic battlefield capability that will dictate the strategem for all future conflicts. The prospects of future American-Israeli strategic cooperation will significantly strengthen the defense industrial base of both nations. Joint development projects employing Israeli battlefield innovtion and American production capabilities should be the trend of the futre. Teamwork between trusted allies will serve as a catalyst for upgrading the Western world's power projection ability reducing the intimidation factor of the Soviet threat. Indeed, Israel has been a theatre for American weapons technology and defense industrial growth. The microeconomic elements of this relationship should not be treated lightly. No other ally has contributed so greatly to American defense in so many different modes: intelligence, research and development, combat readiness, expansion of defense industrial base, export competitiveness and strategic deterrence.

A reliable democratic partner is more than an asset in a Western alliance plagued often by apathy, isolationism and laziness. America should be thankful for the "Israel advantage."

Are Defenses Provocative?

By Francis P. Hoeber

This is the second in a series of articles on the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative).

Under the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, defense is provocative, hence "destabilizing." Defenses threaten to deny the other side the capacity for an "Assured Destruction" retaliation attack. They imply that their possessor is preparing for a first strike. If the United States is the defender, then under Soviet doctrine, it might preempt.

This assumption, as we said in the last issue of *Security Affairs*, was the basis of the ABM Treaty of 1972. But as we also noted, Soviet actions, in both strategic offensive forces (SOF) and strategic defensive forces (SDF), have confirmed that the Soviets reject MAD and have made it obsolete—if it ever was credible that the United States would implement a retaliatory strike. For what purpose? On what moral grounds? Though suicidal? What Soviet response?

The Possibility of Provocation

Given that MAD is obsolete, and noting the new U.S. "warfighting" doctrine of PD-59 and supporting directives in both the Carter and Reagan administrations, the question of U.S. defense provoking the Soviet Union remains a haunting one. It is the principal argument of the opponents of the SDI. The opponents also argue that the SDI, with its emphasis on space-based, post-boost intercept and an sufficiently "leak-proof" defense "making the ballistic missile obsolete," in the dramatic but not literal sense of the President's own words, is a dubious and dangerous goal. But the same argument was made in the 1969-70 debate on the Nike-X ABM: "It won't work, and besides it's provocative." The critics may believe it won't work, and the U.S. government may also, but the Soviets may think either that it will work or that the Americans will think so and thus will feel safe in making a first strike and thus that the Soviets must preempt. This argument cannot be ignored. It must be answered by proponents of the SDI.

The United States has...moral, constitutional, and practical imperatives for pursuing SDI R&D now.

The Fletcher Study

SDI supporters can make several arguments in rebuttal. First, it is unlikely that a system on which the government were willing to spend billions for R&D, and perhaps even hundreds of billions for procurement, would be likely to "work" or "not work." Rather, the question is, to what degree will it work? The 1983 Defense Technology Study (the "Fletcher Study"), following the President's March 1983 "Star Wars" speech that kicked off the U.S. renewed interst in SDI, suggested the use of a "layered defense," say, boost-phase, post-boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal (perhaps both exo- and endoatmospheric) intercepts. (See Figure 1.)

If there were just four layers, and each were 90% effective, then the system would be 99.99% effective: one in 10,000 attackers would get through. Penetration, or leakage rate = $(1-P_k)n$, where P_k is the probability of kill of each layer and n is the number of layers. Thus, for P_k = .9 and n = 4, leakage = .0001—a better than "Ivory Soap" defense.

Even 80% effectiveness lets only 16 per 10,000 weapons penetrate and 50% 63 per 10,000. It is often argued that 63 bombs would destroy 63 U.S. cities (which is not true if one includes, say, the 10 largest cities), but the attacker could not expect that the 63 random penetrators would land on cities. Surely the above numbers would give the Soviet attack planner low confidence in his attack and, one must presume, zero-chance of selling it to the Soviet Politburo, Defense Council, and Communist Party Chairman. Even a 50 or 60% overall defense—perhaps more likely—would create doubt and enhance deterrence.

War Uncertainties

The low-penetration calculations for the layered defense seem to remove the uncertainty of war, something never before accomplished in the history of warfare. Surely, the Soviets would seek countermeasures, and the U.S. counter-countermeasures. The defenses would need to be defended. The counter-measure—counter-counter-measure game never ends. The above effectiveness calculations may not hold up in the friction of battle. And the numbers themselves are "expected values": they would have variations about them, technically called variance. An estimate for the effectiveness of a given layer or a total defense might be .5 or .9, but "95% confidence in the estimates" might mean *between*, say, .3 and .7 instead of .5, and .75 and .95 instead of .9. Most important of all, no one would really know, especially in the "friction of war." Accumulating all the unknowns, the U.S. planner would hardly have the confidence that would leave him free to exercise a first strike without fear of consequences. He could only hope for the best performance of his defenses, both in pereeptions, to increase deterrence, and in actuality, to limit damage to his country if deterrence failed.

If there were just four layers and each were 90% effective...one in 10,000 attackers would get through.

The SDI Case

There are other reasons for the proponents of SDI to push their case.

There are strong moral and constitutional arguments for providing for the common defense. There is also the practical "defense imperative," argued in last month's article, of protecting forces, government, people, and economic assets; this imperative is inherent in the shift from MAD to a warfighting doctrine for both deterrence and damage-limiting/survival, if deterence fails.

There is also a compelling need to hedge against the Soviets getting there first. The Soviets already almost have a strategic defense: air defense,civil defenses, ASATs, ASW (anti-submarine warfare); only missing is a missile defense. We know that the Soviets (1) are spending more than this country on R&D for BMD, against the success of which we should at least hedge, and (2) are violating the ABM Treaty, perhaps "creeping out" instead of planning to break out. If the ABM Treaty is to American arms controllers the "crown jewel" of arms control, perhaps BMD will prove the crown jewel of Soviet SDF, completing the dominance of the SOF/SDF posture over the U.S. SOF- only. Can the United States contemplate with equanimity the possibility of a dominant Soviet Union that it could not fight but only appease?

The United States has, then, moral, constitutional, and practical imperatives for pursuing SDI R&D now, and, unless conditions change radically, for procurement and deployment decisions, when R&D is not "completed" but has pointed the way toward practicable first-generation systems.

Intercept Modes

There is one peculiarity of the SDI, including as it does the space-based boost-phase intercept layer. This layer is a concept considered in the 1960s, but abandoned as impractical and too costly. New technologies appear to have made such a defense potentially feasible for the early 21st century, and some say even in the 1990s.

The first advantage of boost-phase intercept is its "leverage" in killing boosters before their threat multiplies to multiple targets of MIRVed warheads plus possible decoys and other "pen aids" (penetration aids), such as chaff. Added to this is the advantage of attacking over enemy territory, not one's own, and of detonating enemy warheads there, if they should be "salvage fused" (fused to detonate upon contact by an attacking weapon), in space rather than the atmosphere.

Note also that accidental, or mistaken, booster intercepts need not start a war. They would do no damage on the ground. Indemnity could even be paid for destroyed boosters and payloads. Moreover, single tests, and manned or scientific launches, could be announced in advance, to minimize the risks of mistakes. And there could be a "threshold" established: some modest number of launches below which the defender would not fire.

A unique quality of a boost-phase intercept is that it interdicts launches, not just weapons—RVs or warheads. Thus, it could also shoot down ASAT launchers (but not beams), in self-defense. It could also attack enemy satellite launchers putting enemy space-based intercept battle stations in orbit. (See Figure 2.) The country that wins the race to gt the first boost-phase interceptor could play "king of the hill," in an effort to assure its monopoly. If the race were close, the

(Continued on page 7)



Figure 1. Typical ballistic missile trajectory phases.

Defenses *(Continued from page 6)*

first few defense battle stations could shoot down the enemy's before it was prepared to stop massive ICBM launches. (Whether they—the United States, primarily—would do so is of course another question.) Hence, there nced not be a "window of opportunity" for a preemptive, or really a preventive, launch by the enemy.

Space-based Defense on Both Sides?

It has been suggested that there could be a two-sided "all-up" defense, with both sides getting into space at the same time. This would seem to usher in an era of defense dominance, surely a more comfortable world than one of offense-only. However, if, as expected by many experts, the space-based systems are some form of directed-energy weapons (DEW—lasers or particle beams), they would be "speed-of-light" weapons and could shoot at each other as well as at slow-rising boosters. Even kinetic-energy weapons (KEW) might do this. In short, an ABM would also be an ASAT. This fact could create a dangerously hair-trigger Mexican stand-off. Not only "eyeball-to-eyeball" but also "weapon-to-weapon," who would blink and who would pull the trigger?

Frightening as this prospect is, one should examine how it could come about. There appear to be three ways:

1) *By mutual agreement,* as implied by the President's suggestion that stability might be enhanced if the United States offered the Soviets technological cooperation so that both sides were freed from the threat of nuclear annihilation. But the Soviets might be ahead technologically in at least some areas, and in any event they have historically avoided any open dependence on the United States (turning down both the Baruch and Marshall Plans). Moreover, agreement by either side to create such a hair-trigger situation strains credulity;

2) *By sheer coincidence,* which also strains credulity when one considers the technological decision-making and deployment complexities that would have to lead to virtually identical outcomes; or

3) *By tacit agreement,* as in the mutual restraint in the first years of satellites—a situation potentially now breaking down. Indeed, this analogy is hardly perfect. When the first satellites were deployed, neither side could shoot them down (and when they could, both sides may have perceived a vested interest in keeping them in sanctuary). The U.S. unilaterally cancelled programs for ASATs in both 1963 and 1972. The Soviets showed no such restraint in the one-sided U-2 case, when surveillance was by high-altitude aircraft, not satellites.

That the Soviets have not actively exploited their current ASAT system may simply reflect the poor performance of their current system; moreover, they appear to be attempting to use it for diplomatic pressure to estop a potentially more effective U.S. system. In any event, the odds appear too great that the first side to get a partial boost-phase ABM system in place might feel obligated, if not compelled, to use it to coerce the other.

While on balance we reject the "defense is provocative" argument, we do not say that there are no risks. As long as conflict exists, there will be risks of war. As long as life exists, there will be risks of death. Are we not obligated to do what we can to prevent the Soviets from achieving dominance by the strategic defense route? Soviet dominance would mean a stable world, from their point of view, but one morally, politically, and constitutionally unacceptable to the United States.

A two-sided defense dominance has its attractions, but its hair-trigger nature might create an awesome and unacceptable new balance of terror.

An attempt to use the U.S. remaining technological superiority, if it succeeds and lasts long enough, to achieve U.S. dominance may prove the least unpleasant way to preserve the freedoms of the United States, the West, and Western civilization.

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

Figure 2. Multiple uses of space-based defense (SBD). Note that this diagram is conceptual only; there would be many satellites in orbit; and it is not drawn to scale.

NEWSLETTER

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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Proxies *(Continued from page 1)*

the Soviet Union without implicating the latter.

Although in 1983 there emerged personal enmity between Arafat and Khomeini, it seems to have had little or no effect on cooperation between Palestinian forces allied to the USSR and the Iranians. Most of the bodyguards of Iranian leaders are still Palestinian, and Palestinians are still heavily involved in imposing internal security and training various Shiite national liberation movements in the Persian Gulf.

Currently, Iran is dependent on the Soviet Union and its allies for support in the Iran-Iraq war, maintaining internal security and for economic activity including export of most of its oil and gas. Elements of the PLO still provide vital services to the government of Iran. Thus, the recent visit of the Prime Minister of Iran Mossavi to Nicaragua and Cuba, and his promises of economic support, cannot be considered unilateral actions. The visit and its aftermath are a service provided by Iran to the Soviet Union.

Pulling it Together

The emerging disinformation campaign in Nicaragua is to create suddenly political conditions which will lull the US into unilateral steps detrimental to its security, making attainment of Soviet goals easier. A Soviet plan would call for a highly visible step which would force the US into accepting an unfavorable political settlement. Built along known Soviet principles, a disinformation campaign could include:

1) Cuba a) announcing withdrawal of its troops (not counting those "naturalized" in Nicaragua), and financial suport from Nicaragua, b) accepting Contadora, or any other plan calling for withdrawal of the US from the region. The Soviets might even guarantee stoppage of arms shipments from Eastern Europe.

2) The US forced to accept the political solution, stopping military and financial assistance to its regional allies, and withdrwing military personnel from Central America.

3) Iran, ostensibly vehemently anti-Soviet, taking over the economic and logistical support of Nicaragua and subversive activities in Latin America, while PLO, Iranian SAVAMA experts and "naturalized" ex-Cubans continue training activities in Nicaragua.

4) In all likelihood, the Soviets would retain their personnel in Nicaragua because of the global-politicai ramifications to superpower relations of such a move.

5) While Soviet capabilities in Central Ameriea continue to improve, the US would negotiate itself out of direct presence in a strategically significant region near its own borders.

Conclusion

The plan outlined above was constructed by matching recent events in Central America with the known structure of Soviet disinformation plans and the known Soviet goals in the region. The key to the success of this, or any other, disinformation plan is the "active and willing cooperation" of the victim—the US.

Watching the current outcry in the US about the possibility of a "new Vietnam" in Central America, the Soviets believe the US still lacks the resolve to act firmly in its own interest. Grenada, they believe, was more a reaction to a too-visible Communist presence than an indication of new US resolve. However, the mere possibility that the US will secure a friendly Central American worries them. Thus, they hope, and believe, a disinformation campaign will result in the US signing a binding agreement effectively neutralizing its ability to protect its own vital interests in the Western Hemisphere.

NEWSBRIEFS

SPORTS OR FOOD?: At the same time that the international community has been involved in massive efforts to relieve the starvation of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia have announced a new sports agreement for 1985-1986. The Ethiopian Sports Commission is "planning to carry out a large amount of work to improve the conditions for the population to go in for various sports and to attend physical training classes." The accord specifically calls for Soviet assistance in establishing aerobics programs in the African country.

SOVIETS EXERCISE IN CARIB: The Soviet Union held sea exercises in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean last month. The group of warships, which included two guided-missile frigates, a guided-missile destroyer, an oiler and a diesel submarine, was held under constant American surveillance once it arrived in Cuba late December. However, the US did not mount any "special" surveillance efforts, unlike the Soviets who sent 150 planes to trail an American aircraft carrier group that sailed through the Sea of Japan, off the eastern shores of the Soviet Union, in November.

CARRINGTON SUPPORTS SDI: Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, has come out in support of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. While on a trip to Canada, Lord Carrington said that it would be "the height of imprudence" for the US to stop research on a ballistic missile defense system, since "the Americans are absolutely sure that the Soviet Union has been doing research on a strategic defense initiative of their own."

NAVY INVESTIGATES MINI-SUB: The Navy has begun to look for a possible contractor to design a proposed remotely piloted mini-submarine. The sub, which will weigh in at less than 4 tons and cruise at speeds up to 15 knots 9 feet below sea level, will carry a secret 150-pound electronic payload, presumably for detection of Soviet submarines or anti-submarine wapons. These specifications would make the mini-sub the smallest but fastest submersible in the Navy fleet. Other requirements for the boat include the ability to dive and surface for up to 30 hours, to loiter at low speed or even to drift, and to automatically restart the engine at a predetermined time.

GREECE BARS MODERNIZATION OF ARMS: Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's Socialist government has announced that it will not allow the US to update, modernize or replace nuclear weapons in Greece, which were installed in 1959. The US had requested permission to conduct routine maintenance work and construction at the sites as well as tests to determine the continued usefulness of the stored weapons; such permission had been granted during previous conservative governments. Papandreou has been advocating the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the entire Balkan region since his campaign and election in 1981.

UK JOINS SPACE PROJECT: Great Britain has declared its willingness to participate in the United States' plan to launch a permanent space station in 1992. Although the commitment will only be on a step-by-step basis, Prime Minister Thatcher has agreed to the first stage—a feasibility study which will cost approximately $55.5 million. Thatcher's government will also recommend to the other members of the 11-nation European Space Agency that they join the project; France and West Germany, already active in the European agency, are expected to support the American station.

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

GEORGE P. SHULTZ (Secretary of State, in a speech to the American Society for Industrial Security, announcing the formation of a joint venture between the State Department and American corporations to combat terrorism): "Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents...is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken...Since we, the democracies, are the most vulnerable, and our strategic interests are the most at stake, we must act together in the face of common danger...[The Overseas Security Advisory Council's] goal is to establish a continuing liaison between officials in both the public and the private sector in charge of security matters; to provide for regular exchanges of information on developments in the security field; and to recommend plans for greater operational coordination between the Government and the private sector overseas." (February)

SHIMON PERES (Prime Minister of Israel): "Frankly, I wish [the Egyptian-Israeli relations] could go a little bit further than it does. You see some Israelis can say, rightly, 'Look, the Arabs want land for peace.' In the case of Egypt, 99.999 percent of the land was returned, and many Israelis are asking, 'Did we get 99.999 percent of peace?' The Arab side must see the way people are looking at it here. We took some unilateral decisions in the domain of Arab-Israeli relations: the withdrawal from Lebanon, the change in the policy of settlements, the changes in the West Bank and Gaza, the open invitation to King Hussein and the readiness expressed in so many ways to really improve our relations with Egypt. Now it must be a mutual effort, and I can't say that I am satisfied with the mutuality of the effort." (February)

ARAB SOCIALIST BA'TH PARTY (as quoted from the Regional Congress Statement issued in Damascus, concerning its recommendations vis a vis relations with the PLO): "Extending all means of support for the Palestinian revolution's factions to continue the revolution's struggle against the Zionist enemy. Strengthening the armed struggle course, and rejecting the serious deviation of the PLO's right wing which has obstructed the PLO's national and militant role and turned it into a bridge to be used by the conspirators to liquidate the question...The congress also denounces the Amman divisionist meeting [PNC conference] and considers its results contradictory to the Palestinian people's rights and aspirations. It also condemns the campaign of delusion, distortion, and slander that the Palestinian right wing launched against Syria and its armed forces." (January)

GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe): "Those who indicate that FOFA [Follow-On Forces Attack] is designed to enable NATO to adopt a "no first use" option are wrong. Certainly, we seek to improve our conventional...capability to the maximum allowable level dictated by our deterrent strategy, the level which will provide us a reasonable prospect of frustrating a conventional attack. This in turn will reduce—but not eliminate—our reliance upon a possible nuclear response. We have no intention of suggesting that we do away with NATO's option to be the first to use nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons have not been negotiated out of existence, NATO must retain an adequate and appropriate spectrum of nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes. With our nuclear weapons in place, the Soviets cannot rely on a relatively cheap and predictable conventional victory. The price of an attack on Western Europe must remain the possibility of triggering an incalculable chain of nuclear escalation. This incalculability, this uncertainty, has been and will remain a vital component of NATO's deterrence." (January)

ADOLFO CALERO (Director of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front [FDN]): "What's the sense of fighting a war to sustain yourself? We're sustaining ourselves to see if we get real support. We need US support, that's for sure. Anybody would be crazy to think we can fight the Soviet Union with out US support.

"And that's what we're doing, we're fighting the Soviet Union almost as Afghanistan is doing, as Angola is doing, with the additional benefit that we are fighting for democracy, for what is considered American or Western democracy, which is something the Khmer Rouge are not fighting for in their fight against Vietnam.

"The Afghans, they have no democracy there. But they are good people because they are fighting the Soviets. And we who are fighting for democracy, we are fighting Soviet surrogates, we don't get support." (January)

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SECURITY AFFAIRS

Kemp Honored by JINSA
Kirkpatrick Joins Board of Advisors

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1985

I am pleased to send warm greetings to all those gathered for the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs Dinner in Washington. I particularly want to commend you for your choice of Congressman Jack Kemp as your honoree. Jack is unshakable in his commitment to the security of both the State of Israel and the United States, and I am proud to join in congratulating him.

JINSA plays an important part in America's long and rewarding friendship with Israel: its commitment to our policy of strategic strength for both the United States and Israel has contributed significantly to our close working relationship with the Israeli Government.

I am proud to have this opportunity to salute JINSA and Representative Kemp. You all have my best wishes.

Ronald Reagan

(L. to r.) Saul I. Stern, JINSA President; Morris J. Amitay, V.P.; Rep. Jack Kemp, holding the Distinguished Service Award; Sonny Golden, V.P.; and Herbert A. Fierst, Chairman of the Board.

JINSA V.P. Elliot H. Cole reads the message from President Reagan.

Professor Robert Jastrow provided the keynote address.

Congressman Jack Kemp was the third recipient of the JINSA Distinguished Service Award at the JINSA Annual Meeting and Dinner in Washington on 31 March.

The award was presented in recognition of Kemp's outstanding devotion to freedom and democracy, and for his steadfast support of a strong United States defense policy and a strong and secure Israel. In a program highlighted by a message from President Reagan (see text) and keynoted by Dartmouth Professor Robert Jastrow, Kemp told the assembled, "Strength never caused wars; weakness causes wars. And, just as Israel cannot be strong without a strong United States, so America cannot be strong without a strong Israel."

In his address, Dr. Jastrow stressed the importance of the MX and Pershing missile systems and their value—not as bargaining chips in US-Soviet arms negotiations, but as defenders of America's deterrent capability. "We need a full and comprehensive program if we are to successfully create a deterrent."

He spoke of the "smart rocks" technology, in which non-nuclear, computerized missiles seek and destroy incoming enemy warheads. This technology exists in a proven form, he said, and called upon the President and Congress to further appropriate funds for its development and expansion.

Kirkpatrick, Silber, Perlmutter & Ledeen

Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Boston University President John R. Silber, ADL National Director Nathan Perlmutter, and writer Dr. Michael Ledeen joined the JINSA Board of Advisors during the Annual Meeting that afternoon. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, a previous JINSA Distinguished Service Award recipient, has had a long association with JINSA and was featured speaker at a Washington area meeting in December.

The Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs is proud to announce the election of the following members to the Board of Directors:

Allen Dickerman, Boston
Rabbi Joshua O. Haberman, Washington
Emanuel Kandel, Washington
William Maughan, Washington
Joy Midman, Washington
Steven Sklar, Baltimore
Gordon Zacks, Columbus

EDITORIALS

Far From Grace

As we go to press, President Reagan's itinerary in Europe includes a ceremony in a German war cemetery where Nazi soldiers lie buried, but omits any recognition of Nazi victims.

As we welcome ADL national executive Nathan Perlmutter to our Board of Advisors, we quote his reaction, "His visit to the cemetery... is an act of grace because it is good to express friendship to a former enemy. But the asymmetry of doing that while choosing not to visit the graves of that enemy's victims is insensitive, and is not a healing act."

Yarmulkas in the Military

Some things should not be decided by a court of law. The issue of whether Jewish members of the Armed Forces should be allowed to wear yarmulkas while in uniform is one of them. Such a case is now under review.

Someone should have asked the question, "Should the right to wear a yarmulka be OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED in military regulations?" The answer would have been that the interests of all parties are best served by avoiding a formal policy statement. The issue should have been stopped there.

Presently, no specific policy exists concerning the wearing of yarmulkas. This means that servicemembers can usually practice their religious beliefs without interference, provided a certain willingness to accommodate service custom and local conditions. Few Jews, in fact, desire to wear a yarmulka as part of the uniform. And most, thought not all commanders are willing to overlook what are surely minor infractions of regulations concerning appearance. On balance, the existing policy of no policy seems to have worked fairly well.

Unfortunately, it appears that stage has passed. Lawyers for one side are insisting upon a positive policy to allow yarmulkas, while lawyers for the other insist upon an exclusionary policy. Attempts at compromise based upon limited acceptability are unlikely to succeed, since an Orthodox Jew is unlikely to accept a compromise that leaves him bareheaded. The possibility of compromise is further reduced by taking the issue out of the services and putting it into court.

The spark of possible compromise was nearly extinguished when certain members of Congress suddenly jumped on the bandwagon, almost ensuring continuing trouble. The "yarmulka issue" seems to be one where those with little sympathy for the real security requirements of the U.S. feel they must take a public stand. Without attempting to analyze their motives, it is clear that their input only adds fuel to the fire.

JINSA believes that those who desire to wear a yarmulka while serving their country should be permitted to do so, but not because any secular court says so.

The court would be wise to refuse to rule and send this one back to the services where it belongs.

The Power (Arrogance) of the Press

There are two special kinds of arrogance often displayed by the media: that they are entitled to go anywhere to cover any story regardless of the consequences; and that they can publish any story regardless of the consequences.

Case #1: Being where they should not be. Two Lebanese nationals working for CBS television were killed in the south by Israeli soldiers in the midst of ongoing guerrilla warfare. The Israelis had made it clear that southern Lebanon was a zone of guerrilla operation, in which they could not guarantee the safety of their own soldiers, let alone that of journalists; that journalists were not welcome precisely because they could not be protected; that journalists who ignored the warning risked their own lives. Yet the journalists came.

The press in Lebanon had known perfectly well since 1982 that the Israelis had moved into Lebanon so carefully that little damage was done to areas outside the direct line of fire. Despite media reportage of "carpetbombing", "overkill", "blitzkrieg", and "Dresden", reporters knew—because they saw—that the Israelis had, generally, hit what they meant to hit and missed what they meant to miss. There was no wanton destruction, no mass killing of noncombatants.

Therefore, the journalists believed they were safe, despite the change in circumstances: from one in which the Israelis were largely unopposed by the people in the towns and villages; to one of guerrilla warfare, where local terrorists borrowed the old PLO habit of hiding behind everyone—women, children, the elderly and journalists.

The ease with which journalists covered the 1982 fighting added to their belief that, somehow, this was a war in which journalists do not die. This is arrogance.

The obverse belief, that if reporters were killed it must be because the Israelis meant to kill them, surfaced after this latest incident. Further, the reasoning continued, the Israelis would have wanted to do it because the journalists were exposing something terrible—Israelis withdrawing. Believing their reports were so important to Israel that the army would kill to suppress them betrays their professional egocentrism. The journalists became the news they covered.

The fact that CBS officials later retracted the gist of their accusations against Israel in no way changes the principles of what came before—one can only hope THEY will be more careful in the next, similar situation, wherever it arises.

Case #2: Prematurely revealing what should not be revealed. In Sudan, the US government authorized the airlift of Ethiopian Jews to Israel on US military aircraft.

This was, in effect, the second phase of Operation Moses—the Israeli operation to bring Ethiopian Jews to Israel. The first phase had been closed down when a carefully constructed conspiracy of silence between Israel, Ethiopia, Sudan, Belgium and the United States was blown apart by various charitable organizations and the press, including reporters on a Jewish newspaper.

Although it was clear from the outset that publicity would endanger the program—the journalists wrote and the editors published—not because they wanted to expose something evil (for which there might be justification), but simply because they wanted a juicy story. This is, at the least, arogance. Those less charitably inclined would call it cruelty.

The second phase involved a similar conspiracy of silence, between the US, Sudan, and Israel. This time, the LA Times syndicate wrote the story, acknowledging that as many as 10,000 Ethiopian Jews remain to be rescued—thus helping to ensure that they cannot be. This, too, is arrogance as well as irresponsibility, given the well known need for secrecy in such an operation. Again, not an expose of wrongdoing, just someone's opinion of a hot story.

As in the case of southern Lebanon, the journalists believed that the fact that they were in a particular place at a particular time is news. The fact that they had a story to tell became more important than the story's content. This is arrogance.

Journalists often hide behind "the public's need to know", or "the public's right to know", when, in fact, their concern is to sell newspapers. The question is often one of timing. Unfortunately, in the case of Ethiopian Jews, they told the public far more than it needed to know, long before there was a need to know anything.

Journalists, including editors, could eminently well serve their public, if they would ask two simple questions each time they are asked not to do something in the name of security (their own, or that of others) or humaneness: 1) what will be gained if I am right and they are wrong; and 2) what will be lost if they are right and I am wrong?

In many cases, the only thing to be gained is prominence (notoriety) and a chance to thumb one's nose at the authorities or the competition. To do it for that is surely arrogance. In many cases, if they are wrong, lives will be lost—theirs or those of unsuspecting others. To fail to consider this is just as surely arrogance.

NEWSLETTER

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

Soviet Proxies in Central America: Part II

Yossef Bodansky

The recent visit of the Iranian Prime Minister to Nicaragua and Cuba raised the issue not only of Soviet and proxy involvement in Central America, but of the role of Central America in Soviet grand strategy. The visit was a component of a continuous process in which the Soviet Union pursues specific objectives in the Western Hemisphere in order to strengthen its global military position.

Currently, the Soviets perceive the subversion of Latin America to be critical to its ability to win total victory in a non-nuclear initial period of war in Central Europe, causing the collapse of the West. For example, an escalation of the level of insurgency in Central America could tie up the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), and prevent its deployment to confront direct Soviet military intervention in the Middle East.

History

After their failure to establish strategic bases in Cuba in 1962, the Soviets did not expect tangible gains from their military activity in the Western Hemisphere—appearing to believe that rapid intensification of their efforts would be counterproductive. Major involvement by the US in Vietnam was the main restraining factor: a power that went to such lengths to contain Communist expansion in a remote corner of Southeast Asia surely would be ferocious in its own back yard.

The pursuit and killing of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967, and the alleged CIA involvement in the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile in 1973 were perceived by the Soviets as indicators of US resolve in the region. In fact, until the late 1970s, the very existance of Cuba as a Communist state in the Western Hemisphere was considered a major Soviet accomplishment.

The US withdrawal from Vietnam and the emergence of the post-Vietnam lack of resolve, and particularly the self-exposure and self-destruction of US intelligence, were examined cautiously by the Soviets. They could not comprehend the events—a senior KGB officer who defected in 1976 would not believe the CIA hearings were not a component of a major strategic disinformation campaign.

However, once convinced, the Soviets were quick to act. By the late 1970s, there was a major change in their approach to military activities in the Third World. No longer was their goal simply to support "anti-imperialist" activities, but to establish and secure loyal, cooperative, preferably marxist-leninist regimes. The Soviets believed that the global correlation of forces had tilted irrevocably in their favor.

In a meeting with the Grenadian Chief of Staff in Moscow (10 March 1983), Marshal SU Nep. V. Ogarkov outlined the Soviet perception of events in Central America:

> The Marshal said that over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada and a serious battle going on in El Salvador. The Marshal of the Soviet Union then stressed that the US imperialists would try to prevent progress, but that there were no prospects for imperialism to turn back history.
>
> (Report of the Embassy of Grenada in the USSR/Captured Document)

Ogarkov was to write later, in "Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil", "An important factor in the struggle for the prevention of war and for peaceful coexistance is the national liberation movement and the enhanced role of the Nonaligned Movement."

"Peaceful coexistance" was defined by Boris Ponomarev in December 1969, as:

> A necessary element of the strategy of the international proletariat in the period of transition from Capitalism to Socialism. The principle of peaceful coexistance cannot extend to the class struggle within the Capitalist countries, to the ideological struggle, and to the struggle of the oppressed peoples against their enslavers.

Soviet Strategy

The prime goal of Soviet military operations in the Western Hemisphere is to support and facilitate their victory in the Eastern Hemisphere (particularly in Central Europe) under optimal conditions. They believe that the US constitutes a major challenge to their grand design and their preferred form of war in Central Europe (non-nuclear) in two respects:

- Prevention of surprise. The US has the best intelligence-gathering establishment in the West. An alert and vigilant US can detect Soviet preparations and either actively restrain the Soviets entirely, or alert the other NATO members to actively and effectively resist.

- Escalation of the war beyond the initial period. The Soviets define the initial period of war as the time between the surprise attack and the ability of the defender to mobilize and move to the counteroffensive. The Soviets believe timely arrival of US reinforcements might slow the initial Soviet offensive. A protracted war will be decided by the production capabilities of the two sides, and the Soviets have no illusions as to US superiority.

The pragmatic Soviets do not expect their activities in Central America to have a drastic impact on the global warfighting capability of the US. The Soviets are trying to achieve a series of challenges that will prevent ACCURATE American comprehension of a threat, and TIMELY reaction to it. A growing subversive activity in the American backyard will always be a top priority of any US administration. The cumulative effect of such an insurgency would be to increase the attention paid to Central America at the expense of other theaters.

Central America's Role

The most important "contribution" of Central America is the preoccupation of the American ruling elite, particularly the President. Discussing Vietnam, the Soviets point to the magnitude of the attention paid by the prime decision makers in the US to the conduct of the fighting, and their preoccupation with the micro-management of the war.

The Soviets believe escalating insurgency in Central America would have a telling effect on the ability of the US to intervene militarily elsewhere. American leaders would be reluctant to commit forces and assets from the Continental U.S. to other parts of the world (such as the Near East) as long as there existed the possibility that they might be needed to contain a sudden flareup of violence near the US itself.

Thus, the mere existance of an escalating subversion in Central America is sufficient to tie up the attention of the command and major forces of the US as a precaution.

In other words, the Soviets know that the most expedient method of ensuring that the RDJTF will not be committed to contain their advance in the Near East, or even their direct intervention in an Arab-Israeli War, as well as to ensure that there is no massive resupply of Israel in case of a major war in the Middle East, is to confront the US with a direct challenge that will outweigh any other consideration of the use of US forces and assets.

Resupplying Europe

The Soviets believe that the isolation of Europe from reinforcements and logistical support from the US is as important as the defeat of NATO forces in Europe. The introduction of sophisticated munitions capable of causing substantial attrition to Soviet forces makes the strategic isolation of the European theater even more crucial, because it is possible that the combination of attrition in the Soviet forces with the arrival of US reinforcements could change the balance of forces in Europe and contain a Soviet offensive.

Examining the WWII Battle of the Atlantic, the Soviets point to the concentration of losses of commercial vessels in the Caribbean Basin and off the US coast. Soviet ability to deliver sudden strikes on local lines of communication, which are well defined and saturated with lucrative targets even in peacetime, would create initial confusion and delay the commitment of US reserves to Europe. The very existance of a major and direct threat to the US coast might influence the magnitude of allocation of US Navy assets to portions of the Atlantic, at least in the critical early stages of the war. The prime goal of the Soviets would be to achieve maximum confusion and delay in US activities with a minimum commitment of Soviet forces and assets.

Any substantial subversion of the US war effort would result in prolonging the initial period of war in Europe. In order to achieve maximum effect in such an initial strike, the Soviets would need a diversified net of bases and installations, so a relatively large number of weapon systems (particularly bombers and submarines) could deploy simultaneously. The use of locally available forces and weapons (with Soviet crews) of friends and allies should not be ruled out either.

Hence the importance of Central America.

The Soviets do not expect their activities in Central America to have a drastic impact...(but) the cumulative effect of such an insurgency would be to increase the attention paid...at the expense of other theatres.

Should Arms Control Stop the Strategic Defense Initiative?

Francis P. Hoeber

Ed. Note: This is the third in a series of articles on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The first dealt with the demise of the declaratory policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in favor of a US warfighting capability that might, in time, include the comprehensive defenses of the SDI. The second considered whether the SDI would be "provocative" and dangerous. Before further articles discussing how the SDI might be carried out, we ask now whether arms control should (and could) avoid the need for an SDI.

The Soviets, in 1983, walked out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks in Europe, and refused to agree to a date for resuming Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). However, they came back to the table after President Reagan's reelection in 1984, using their concerns with negotiating on "space"—anti-satellite systems (ASATs) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—in part as a face-saving device.

They have insisted on the urgency of a treaty to dismantle and end testing of ASATs. Their slogan "We must demilitarize space rather than start a new arms race in space" has received considerable sympathy (and repetition) in the U.S.

Before considering the Soviet suggestions, one is tempted to ask why space is so much more valuable than our precious, fragile, and vulnerable "Spaceship Earth", which is where we happen to live. One might borrow a line from Jonathan Swift and make "A Modest Proposal": That it be made mandatory that any nuclear weapons MUST be exploded on the ground or in the atmosphere—thus, leaving space pristine.

The terrestrial side benefits of the Modest Proposal could include: population control; urban renewal; a reversion to MAD; operational tests of nuclear weapons and doctrine, and even of the nuclear winter hypothesis; and other contributions now unforseeable.

Alternatively, one might consider detonating all nuclear arsenals in space. This might direct toward the Earth energy equivalent in order of magnitude of the solar energy deposited on the Earth in one second! In short, the energy of all nuclear weapons—which would not in practice be detonated in one second—would be virtually lost in the vastness of space. Satellites would also be lost, but they would no longer be needed for command-control of retaliation if all weapons had been fired and they could be replaced far more rapidly than the cities, factories, and people that would be destroyed by earthly detonations.

Those of less cynical bent might note that space is already "militarized". The Soviets have operational ASATs and both sides have surveillance satellites that collect intelligence, seek to verify compliance with arms control agreements, and give early warning of the launch of ballistic missiles. There are also radars that probe into space for the same warning purpose. ICBMs, and most SLBMs and INF, are designed to traverse space on their way to their targets. The Soviets have even complained that use of the Space Shuttle in April 1984 for repairing a US saellite was a demonstration of an ASAT (conjuring up a PAC-MAN image, taking a captured satellite home as booty).

The Soviet proposal appears to have two objectives:

1) To stop or slow the US SDI, lest we achieve a significant technological and even deployment lead over the Soviets;

2) To stop the US ASAT development program, which is much more sophisticated than the existing Soviet system.

The first aim seems more important to them for several reasons. The Soviets might relatively quickly catch up with US ASAT technology, with a new imitative system or by taking advantage of the great SS-9 throw-weight (about five tons) to substitute a new, even MIRVed, ASAT payload. Moreover, the United States puts more reliance on satellites than the Soviets, although we launch fewer (mainly because ours have longer lifetimes) with the perverse effect that the Soviets maintain a greater and more rapid replacement capability. and finally, as pointed out in the preceeding article, the key space-borne SDI weapons would have an inherent ASAT (and DSAT, or satellite defense, which might also be called an anti-ASAT) capability, so that objective 1) would subsume objective 2).

We come back, then, to the main question: Should we cooperate in a search for an agreement to outlaw SDI?

The question here is really one of future ballistic missile defense (BMD). The SDI is much broader, covering all strategic defense, but the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has chosen to focus first on the most difficult, least understood aspect of strategic defense, the new potential technologies for ballistic missile defense (BMD). The United States has already effectively conceded an advantage in strategic defenses—e.g., in air defenses and civil defenses—mainly (and perhaps misguidedly) because the ballistic missile is regarded as the primary threat.

After the ABM Treaty, our government stated that air defense did not seem very useful without defense against ballistic missiles. If the Soviets should break out of the ABM Treaty with a great advantage in lead-time, and perhaps even in technology, we shall have conceded an overwhelming advantage in strategic defenses and almost certainly in the overall strategic balance. This would not necessarily lead to Soviet preemptive attack or preventive war, but it would surely increase their freedom of action and strengthen their capability for diplomatic coercion.

The SDI Program (SDIP) is still an R&D program, which is permitted under the ABM Treaty. As such, it is a hedge against Soviet technological progress and potential Treaty break-out. It would be a crime to forgo such a hedge unless an arms control agreement could conceivably prevent, enforceably, Soviet continued R&D in the field—which it could not. If it could, we would come back to the question of the desirability of defense, per se, as a way out of reliance on MAD, which is demonstrably bankrupt and already has been abandoned in *declaratory* US policy.

If the Soviets should break out of the ABM Treaty with a great advantage in lead time...we shall have conceded an overwhelming advantage in strategic defenses, and almost certainly in the overall strategic balance.

Soviet Violations

On 10 October 1984, the President sent to the Speaker of the House an unclassified summary of findings on Soviet noncompliance with a number of arms control agreements, based on a classified report by his General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. In the covering letter, the President said he was sending the full report, with its extensive classified intelligence, to the two Congressional Select Committees on Intelligence. On 1 February 1985, the President sent a report on additional violations.

Official recognition of Soviet noncompliance has at long last confirmed the state of the Emperor's verification suit. Verification is of scant use unless compliance can be enforced. Although no one wants to go to war to enforce it, no one should want to ignore noncompliance. Alternatives in between must continue to be sought. Publicity is one possibility. It is said to have been effective in halting Soviet and proxy use of micotoxins since 1983 (though many contend that the Soviets may have learned, for now, what they wanted from the "field tests"). A better drafting of agreements, with fewer compromises of wording, might help by reducing the number of cases in which "ambiguity" provides a rebuttal. Effective sanctions, ones we would apply, might be found. The matching of Soviet violations—difficult in domestic politics—might work, despite our one-sided national allergy to "arms races". A greater US determination to renegotiate periodically, as provided for in the ABM Treaty, would be desirable. New solutions must be continuously sought.

Verification is of scant use unless compliance can be enforced. No one wants to go to war to enforce it (but) no one should ignore (it).

The Antarctic Treaty has not yet been violated. When it was signed...no one thought it prohibited anything worthwhile.

Treaties Observed

Some arms control—and other—treaties are observed. The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the "Limited Test Ban Treaty") has obvious mutual interest, primarily in preventing fallout (although the Soviets did break the preceding test moratorium in 1961, when it advantageous to them). The Antarctic Treaty has not yet been violated. When it was signed in 1959, no one thought it prohibited anything worthwhile. More recent realization of both military and resource potentials of the territory, even possible military uses such as under-ice basing of ICBMs, may yet lead to eventual violation or abrogation. (In the 1982 Falklands War, Argentina may have had in mind, inter alia, expanding its Antarctic claims).

Some peace treaties involving operational limitations and "confidence building measures" (CBMs) may be observed in peacetime—their purpose—but are not expected to be relied upon in war. The list could go on. Those who are optimistic about treaties would do well to read *The Treaty Trap* by Laurence W. Beilenson, a colleague of Ronald Reagan when he was negotiating labor agreements for the Screen Actors' Guild (agreements enforceable by US courts—an option not open in the anarchy of nations). The book was published in 1969, before SALT, and the author commented that, "The evidence on disarmament treaties is meager." But he added, "Where interest joined strength, however, breach resulted...In short, disarmementy treaties have been unreliable and ineffective..." (pp. 200-201).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it would appear that, despite the long history of treaty-breaking for perceived self-interest, there is a political imperative in the Western world to seek agreements to tame the beasts of war. There is little choice but to pursue arms control—and compliance. But we must insist that defensive measures are good, not bad. We must also insist on

(Continued on page 5)

From Russia with Foot-Faults

By Ron Steele

The 1985 Davis Cup will mark the return of the Soviet Union to the World Group draw. The Soviets qualified by defeating Israel 3-2 in a dramatic series played late last fall in the Soviet city of Donetsk. Ron Steele, the Australian-born national team coach of Israel, shared his thoughts on the historic event with "World Tennis" readers. Here is his exclusive report, reprinted with permission.

From the beginning, the Davis Cup match between Israel and the Soviet Union was more than just a tennis event. I saw this when Israel applied for 14 visas and the Russians said they would allow only six people into the country because they don't have diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Russians had precedent on their side, they said. China awarded only six visas to South Korea for a previous Davis Cup match, and since South Korea had not objected at the time, the Russians felt they could cut some of our team leaders and trainers who might assist with the preparation. But Israel objected very strongly to the cutback, and a lot of dialogue ensued between the countries and the International Tennis Federation. The parties finally agreed on eight visas; in retrospect, I'm not sure the Russians weren't trying to cut out foreigners like myself and Allen Fox—an American—who had been an advisor to the team, because they didn't want anybody from outside commenting.

Besides myself, the Israeli delegation in Donetsk consisted of four players (Shlomo Glickstein, Shahar Perkiss, Amos Mansdorf and Eylon Sinai); the captain, Joseph Stabholz; a masseur, Michel Portal; and the president of the federation, David Harnik.

The Israeli players had heard all sorts of stories about what might happen in a match against the Russians. They were not nervous, but they were apprehensive.

Interestingly, the hotel we stayed at was very nice; we dined in a high-ceilinged banquet room with pink curtains, silver and crystal on the table and a four-course meal every day. What the players could not have known was how well they would have to play to win—one of the intangibles in any Davis Cup tie.

Originally, the series was to have started on a Friday. But Friday was the first day of Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year, so Israel requested a change in dates. The Russians said no, Israel appealed to the ITF, and the ITF upheld our request and telexed their decision to the Russians.

There was no synagogue in Donetsk. So the team just held a small ceremony at the hotel on Rosh Hashana eve.

We obviously had a lot of KGB people with us, as much for our safety as for watching what we did. They were there to protect us and also to make sure we didn't step out of line. But some things even the KGB couldn't control.

One night, for example, Michel Portal brought a Soviet Jew to our room. Eylon Sinai gave the man a beautiful religious shawl, or *tallit*. Apparently Sinai's brothers send some shawls each year as presents to Jews inside the Soviet Union.

Just talking with our Soviet visitor was an education for the team. The man told us how he had wanted to go to Israel, had applied as far back as 1978, was still waiting, "and they are not going to let me go," he said sadly. Joseph Stabholz talked to him in Polish, and the man answered in English.

We didn't have a great deal of contact with anyone outside the official party and didn't fraternize with the Soviet team. We didn't even sit down to a meal with them. The only time we were together was at the opening ceremony on the court: we presented them with flags. They didn't present us with flags, they didn't fly our national flags, they didn't play our national anthem. This attitude was against Davis Cup protocol, but we didn't make a fuss.

We did make a fuss about their officiating. We had been prewarned by the Austrians, who had played the Soviets in the preceding match, about how terrible Soviet officials were on foot-faulting. I had instructed my players, who had been training in Austria, to stand three inches behind the baseline and serve from there. They did this, in the opening two singles, but it didn't hold up because the Russians were still calling foot-faults. Lots of them.

Fortunately, Patrick Flodrops, the French referee, did a fantastic job. The way he handled the situation, he could be a diplomat.

The spectators were actually quite good. If a Soviet player lobbed a ball back, the crowd would start cheering before our player had a chance to put the ball away. It was a little disconcerting and they had to be warned by the referee, but it was done in very good humor.

The big problem was the blatant foot-faulting calls by the linesmen. It became a joke because the chair umpire finally began overruling the foot-fault judge. By the third day of the competition, the referee just took the foot-fault judge away from the match and had the chair umpire call all foot-faults. Then the officials started calling "lets" on our serves, another move to distract our concentration.

There were numerous overrules. By my count, there were 25 recorded overrules—not counting some the umpire didn't overrule but could have. On a clay court, that's an enormous amount because every ball has a mark.

The opening singles were split. We took the doubles, winning in five sets after being two sets down. There was a great feeling of elation on the team after the doubles, and I was even more elated when I received news from Israel that my pregnant wife, Elana, had given birth to a baby boy.

Shlomo went into the fourth match against Andrei Chesnokov knowing he had to win because we weren't sure Perkiss could beat Alexander Zverev in the final match. Shlomo knew the game plan but was so tight he couldn't relax and lost the first set 6-0 and was down in the second before getting his courage together and winning 9-7. He dominated the third, and Chesnokov looked totally exhausted.

We went to the dressing room for 10 minutes. When they started again, Chesnokov, who is only 18, played good tennis. The mental strain on Shlomo from the opening singles and doubles—four hours each day—was just too much. Ironically, Shlomo has been the lion of Israel, who probably plays much better for Israel in Davis Cup than he does for himself. This time was just a fraction beyond even his capabilities.

In the decisive Perkiss-Zverev match, the match looked over in the second set when Zverev twisted his ankle and went down. Zverev laid there for about eight or 10 minutes, but we didn't want to apply the three-minute injury rule. They finally poured some type of local anesthetic on his foot, and kept pouring it into his sock on the changeovers, and he courageously won the second set.

Perkiss took a 5-3 lead in the third but let it slip to 6-all, when darkness halted play. The next day, Zverev broke an 8-all and took the fourth set 6-4, and the series was over.

We didn't lose the match because of any cheating. We should have overcome that. Our players were not good enough to overcome what the Russians threw at us, and the Russians played very well. But we had nothing to be ashamed of; in fact, Israel's program will be even stronger in 1985 because of the experience.

S.D.I. *(Continued from page 4)*

negotiating on strategic offensive forces and on compliance issues. Unconstrained offensive forces in the face of limited or prohibited defenses are neither safe nor rational.

It appears to the writer that the United States has no alternative but to continue to explore the SDI potential and that of a balanced offense/defense arms control regime. It must hang tight on BMD R&D, the real Soviet price in the Geneva negotiations. It must also continue to monitor Soviet treaty compliance, as well as R&D progress and measures with potential for ABM Treaty breakout. Finally, it must proceed with what it perceives as militarily-sensible national security programs (admittedly difficult on which to reach consensus), unless and until we can achieve arms control agreements that are equitable and serve US security interests, and are also verifiable and enforceable.

These are not satisfying conclusions. But this remains a world of conflict among, and within, nations. There will be no satisfying answers to security questions until the coming of the millennium. Until then, matters of strategic defense, arms control, and national security will remain controversial and uncertain. Indeed, personal security and survival has always been, and remains, uncertain from day to day. The fact that personal security has multiplied in recent centuries gives some of us the courage to go on seeking to enhance US security and survival even in the nuclear age.

NEWSBRIEFS

LIBYAN PURCHASES: According to a Greek newspaper, Libya will purchase $1 billion worth of weapons from Greece, including firearms, "Artemis" antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, rifles, ammunition, and exercise rockets. News of the sale follows negotiations between Libyan defense ministry officials and Greek defense and industry personnel.

DECLINE IN N. IRELAND VIOLENCE: As of 26 December 1984, Northern Ireland had recorded the lowest level of violence in 14 years. The decline is attributed by Irish officials to the inability of the IRA to get recruits, arms and money. Furthermore, the Sinn Fein—the political party attached to the IRA—appears to have peaked in popularity and begun a decline.

LIBYAN SALES, NICARAGUAN PURCHASES: Under the terms of a $15 million deal reported in Managua, Nicaragua will pay for Libyan oil with cotton, sesame, coffee and banana exports.

US GAINS FROM ISRAELI DATA: According to a Pentagon study, Israel provided the US with some $50 billion worth of technological data from captured Soviet military equipment. Israeli Ambassador Meir Rosenne said Israel saved America "many years of research and billions of dollars" by sharing equipment captured from Arab armies.

SALVADORAN IMPROVEMENTS: The Salvadoran government has cleared the use of a second aerial gunship, following evaluation of troop efficiency with the first AC47, put into service in January. Following protests by Salvadoran and US human rights organizations, the State Department delayed permission for the second gunship until it was determined that the heavy firepower would not cause increased civilian casualties.

THE COST OF WITHDRAWAL: The Israel Defense Forces estimate that the three stage withdrawal from Lebanon will cost approximately $240 million. The money does not appear in the 1985/86 defense budget.

SALVADORAN MARCHERS: In late March, 1,000 women of the Crusade for Peace and Work, associated with the Nationalist Republican Alliance Party, marched through the capital of El Salvador, demanding US intervention in the country's civil war to crush the guerrillas. The march was a departure from the group's previous policy of opposing US presence in El Salvador.

TYPEWRITER BUGS: The Soviet Union bugged typewriters in the US Embassy in Moscow so that Soviet officials could read sensitive documents before they were seen by the appropriate officials. According to news sources, the bugs were revealed by a tip from another country whose embassy had been similarly wired. It is estimated that the bugs have been in place for at least one year, and perhaps as long as 7 years.

SALE: EGYPT TO IRAQ: According to Israeli sources, Egypt sold $2 billion worth of Soviet weapons to Iraq, including planes, tanks and heavy artillery. The US, according to the reports, supported the sale, as did Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi army is almost totally equipped with Soviet arms.

What They Are Saying

KAMAL HASSAN ALI (Egyptian Prime Minister, regarding Egypt's role in Jordanian/PLO talks): We are not doublecrossing you. We are not working behind your backs...I know there are hawks in Israel, too...but I would like to appeal to them and say this: New steps toward peace are happening now, and they could be acceptable to both Israel and the PLO. I cannot now go into detail...but I would like to repeat that I believe you will be able to accept the agreement.

DR. BUTRUS GHALI (Egyptian Foreign Minister): We in Egypt also have our "Gush Emunim". It grieves me to state that you Israelis merely supplied it with more ammunition by your conduct, particularly through the war in Lebanon.

M. GEN. ORI OR (Commander of the IDF Northern Command): I feel more disrespect and pity than disgust. Why? Because I know that they will continue to kill each other for many years after we withdraw from Lebanon. People want me to admire the view in Lebanon, but I am not impressed by the view, because the real view of a country is the human element, and therefore I am not impressed by the beautiful mountains and trees. If an 8-year-old Lebanese boy kills all the birds in the trees, what kind of view can this be? And this is Lebanon.

URI LUBRANI (Coordinator of Israeli government activities in Lebanon): The time has come to look reality in the face..it is not that pleasant, but it is not that terrible. Syria enjoys Soviet support and it feels freer to use methods that we do not want and cannot use in Lebanon.

(Asked if Syria would harass Israel's northern border, he continued) All I have to do when I get up in the morning and contemplate what is happening in Lebanon is to think: What do they think about us? If I think as a Syrian, then I see no reason why they should leave us alone.

HERBERT STEIN (former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors): Anyone who says that the deficit cannot be reduced without cutting defense should be understood to be saying one of two things:

1) "I don't want to cut the deficit without cutting defense", or

2) "Although I would be willing to cut the deficit without cutting defense, there are other people whose assent is required, who are less well informed or public-spirited than I am, and they don't want to cut the deficit without cutting defense." (That is what is meant by saying that it is "politically" impossible to do so.)

RONALD REAGAN: (Responding to a CBS correspondent's question on the killing of two cameramen in Lebanon by IDF Forces) Your own news program tonight showed an awful lot of gunfire with very sophisticated weapons, including grenade launchers and they were obviously being used by civilians—at least by people in civilian uniforms. They weren't Israelis. This is one of the things that happens in this kind of warfare there you're not fighting another country's army.

RELATED:

H.D.S. GREENWAY (Boston Globe Associate Editor): From the point of view of the Israeli tanker, think of it for a moment. You are frightened, terrified that somebody is going to come at you with a car bomb or something mounted on their shoulder so it looks like an RPG. So you shoot.

The cameraman holds his camera exactly the same way an RPG man holds his rocket.

KEYES BEECH (retired correspondent, previously with the Chicago Daily News and LA Times): In a war like that one, I don't see any rules at all. Even in the best of circumstances, there's always a risk covering a war but, in a situation like that I don't think you could blame them (the Israelis) unless there is some clear evidence that they were after the two Lebanese working for CBS.

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JINSA
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SECURITY AFFAIRS

Editorial

BRAVO!!!

Our admiration for US determination to catch and try the murderers of a US citizen is unqualified. Our esteem for the US Navy and its ability to perform so skillfully in service of the defense of our people is likewise unqualified. We believe our feelings are widely shared, even by some who have not been all that supportive of our military.

It takes a great deal to bring Americans to the end of our enormous store of patience, but the Palestinian terrorists have worked at it exceptionally hard for a long time. There is relief in knowing that you know who the bad guys are, and that your government knows it too.

We are pleased, too, by the refusal of Greece and Tunisia to allow the terrorists' plane to land. They have, it appears, learned it is not in their interest to accommodate terrorists.

Those are the simple feelings.

But there are some feelings more complicated and sobering. Italy, a NATO country, a longtime friend, a country able to face hard choices about domestic terrorism has behaved in a way that is immoral and illegal. The government of Italy broke the US-Italian extradition treaty and smuggled a terrorist out of the country to escape justice. Italian Prime Minister Craxi's protestation that Abu Abbas had a diplomatic passport is meaningless. As is the new warrant for Abbas's arrest.

Egypt, the US hope for Arab moderation, pro-Westernism and peace with Israel, did more than avert its eyes as the Palestinian terrorists left their country. Is Egypt so threatened by internal dissent that Mubarak had to demand a formal apology from the US for our interception of their plane carrying terrorists they had released? President Mubarak lied but he feels wronged because we caught him in the lie. It is, apparently, our job not to embarrass him, not his to tell the truth. Egypt does not deserve an apology for our actions, and will not get one.

One couldn't expect much of Yugoslavia.

While the Administration considers how to express displeasure with people we believed shared some of our most basic assumptions about life, liberty and terrorism, we must remember that most people don't.

Italy was behaving true to form: it has long been an Italian policy to fight only one group of terrorists—the Red Brigade. (This, of course, ignores the well-known fact that the Red Brigade and many other terrorist groups are intimately linked.) Italian governments have assumed that if they were nice to other terrorists, other terrorists would leave them alone. They saw no reason to change their policy in the recent confrontation. Perhaps they will have learned something.

None of this, however, should keep us from pursuing justice. Nor should it dampen our enthusiasm for having found that we are not powerless (although clearly we cannot work in a vacuum) and that it feels good to exercise our power in a moral, legal, ethical and effective way.

Bravo!!!

NEWSBRIEFS

TESTING ISRAELI GUNS: The US Marine Corps has decided to test a 60mm Israeli cannon for use on a new armored vehicle. A Belgian 90mm gun is also being tested. Israel Military Industries and Mecar of Belgium beat out French and British companies for the testing contract. The eventual winner of the competition will supply guns for the Marines' planned purchase of 758 light armored vehicles (LAVs) ranging from those used for command and control to those equipped with anti-tank and air defense missiles.

US FUNDING SOVIET BUILDUP??: According to a CIA report released by the Pentagon, Soviet acquisitions (legal and illegal) over the past ten years of US technology have resulted in gains for the Soviet military establishment. Among the Soviet weapons systems that use technology obtained from the West are fire control radar on the MiG-29 jet fighter; space-based chemical laser weapons; a new torpedo for Soviet subs; and microelectronics and computers. (See related item below)

(Continued on page 6)

Correction

In last month's News Briefs column, we incorrectly stated the percentage of South Africa's exports which go to Israel. The correct figure is one half of one percent.

NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM: WILL THE WEST BE FOOLED AGAIN?

R.K. Squire

Ed Note: Mr. Squire has served with both the DOD and DOE offices of International Security Affairs (Arms Control) and was a Special Advisor to the Ambassador, U.S. Comprehensive Test Ban (negotiation) Mission during the Carter Administration.

When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced a Soviet "moratorium" on nuclear testing many in the West with long memories felt a sense of deja vu, for it seemed that the world was to be subjected to a replay of the events leading up to the 3 year moratorium in 1958 and to the subsequent Soviet breakout. Even The Washington Post, hardly a hotbed of nuclear testing enthusiasts, noted that "The Soviets gave unilateral moratoriums an unforgettably bad name by breaking, with a huge bang, theirs of 1958-61."

But, the larger question, the answer to which resonates with ominous overtones for the West, is how a ban on the testing of nuclear warheads, rather than a ban on the building of nuclear weapons, ever came to be seen as a desirable arms control objective by the U.S. An inquiry into this question offers sobering insights into Soviet "arms control" strategies and Western political vulnerabilities.

Originally, the testing of nuclear warheads was not seen as an issue worth even passing mention in the efforts to control nuclear weapons and to defuse the growing international tensions of the immediate post World War II period. The U.S. Baruch Plan did not single out testing for any special concern; what was at issue was the elimination of nuclear weapons as instruments of war. The Soviet Union apparently embraced a similar view at the time; when they launched their world-wide "peace offensive" in March, 1950, it was to "Ban the Bomb," not to ban tests.

After years of frustration and stalemate on arms control, the U.S. attempted a new approach. In March, 1955 President Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen as "Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament." This action—unprecedented in world history and rare even today among governments of the world—raised disarmament policy to cabinet status. The move was intended, among other things, to show U.S. interst in reaching an accord on the control of nuclear weapons; President Eisenhower's bold action was hailed by the world.

Mr. Stassen quickly gathered an outstanding staff which created a set of guiding principles on which specific arms control policies should be based. At the head of the list were the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the development of concrete measures to guard against surprise attack. On the whole, the White House disarmament staff under Stassen's direction did an extraordinary job, for the recommendations made at that time—way back in the '50s—are just as valid today. In April, 1956, Mr. Stassen presented these U.S. concepts for a comprehensive arms control program to the London Disarmament Conference.

> *Originally, the testing of nuclear weapons was not seen as...worth even passing mention in the efforts to control nuclear weapons.*

But a year earlier the Soviets had officially tabled at the Bandung Conference a proposal for ending nuclear weapons tests. The concept had immense international appeal, for much of the world had developed an inordinate fear of fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests. At the Geneva Summit Conference in July, 1955, Soviet Premier Bulganin had repeated the call for a test ban. In London in 1956, the Soviets greatly stepped up the pressure for a test ban and succeeded in turning the attention of the London Disarmament Conference away from the American proposals. Mr. Stassen struggled with the Soviet opposition to the U.S. initiatives and with the Soviet's adamant, single-minded approach to the complex issues of the Conference.

After a year of fruitless negotiations in London, Mr. Stassen returned to Washington in May, 1957 for a series of conferences culminating in a meeting with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. After that meeting Mr. Dulles announced that the President had decided that the linkage between the nuclear-test issue and a cutoff on weapon production and other U.S. disarmament propositions could be loosened. The U.S. would also, Dulles said, take up the Soviet "offer" of a temporary suspension of nuclear tests.

The U.S. policy of opposition to a nuclear test ban, separate from other disarmament measures, had been overturned.

The outcome is well known. From that day in May, 1957 to August, 1961, the U.S. became increasingly absorbed with the concept of a test ban as an arms control measure and with the mechanics of a formal negotiation of a test ban with the Soviet Union. Those in the West, and there were many, who warned that there was little or no relationship between a test ban and arms control were ignored; the emotional appeal of a test ban was too powerful a siren call for the democracies to resist. Of course in the end the West got neither a test ban nor arms control.

(Continued on page 6)

EDITORIALS

GORBACHEV IN PARIS

When Mikhail Gorbachev hired the Soviet equivalent of J. Walter Thompson to manage his publicity, he appeared to have hit on a good thing: Westerners, being accustomed to political campaigns, would see his campaign Western-style. The reviews are in on his trip to Paris, and they are mixed. But the West did better than expected.

The Gorbachev show had some style and grace. Mrs. Gorbachev was notably more attractive than her predecessors. Unfortunately, some "analysts" thought that had something to do with arms control. French President Mitterand was able to make the distinction and was admirably firm in his determination not to have France used as a wedge between Europe and the US. He flatly refused Soviet-French negotiations on nuclear weapons. He even swallowed his distaste for SDI and refused to condemn it for the benefit of Gorbachev's image. Others, including some in the media, appear to be following Mitterand's lead.

While campaigning is certainly new to Soviets, and while Soviets might find themselves impressed that their leader can eat with grace in the Palace of Versaille, Westerners have seen many, many campaigns. We have become just a little bit cynical when style and substance don't match.

And, in this case, they don't match because the "new Soviet man" was offering mainly old proposals. Gorbachev announced "50-50" as a goal for strategic arms reductions, but continued to call anything that can hit the Soviet Union "strategic"—including our medium-range missiles in Europe. He announced his old desire to negotiate separately with France and Britain, dividing us from our allies by more than an ocean. Britain declined, joining France. Gorbachev's insistence on stopping SDI is only a new incarnation of the old Soviet desire to stop anything the US appears to be doing well.

(That is not to say that he didn't say anything new. He did. He said, with a straight face, that if there is a country in which Jews fare better than they do in the USSR, he doesn't know what country that is. A large demonstration of Frenchmen turned out to tell him.)

Whether the Soviet proposals can form the basis of serious arms control negotiations remains to be seen. Congenital optimism makes us hope so, but experience and history make us skeptical. For the moment, it is enough to say that the Gorbachev show was seen for what it is—an attempt to push style over substance—and that he seems to have failed.

And that is good news, as we go to the summit, as much for what it says about us as for what it says about him.

WHO DID WHAT TO WHOM AND WHO PAYS THE BILL?

Ahwaz Liberation Front
Al Sa'iqa
Anti-Imperialist Fighters for a Free Palestine
Arab Revolutionary Movement
Black June Organization
Black September Organization
Eagles of the Palestine Revolution
Fatah
Free Nasserite Revolutionaries
Justice for Palestine Organization
Marabitun Movement
Organization for the Vengeance of the Martyrs of Sabra and Shatilla
Organization of Avengers of Palestinian Youth
Palestine Front Against Qatar
Palestine Liberation Front
Palestine Liberation Organization
Palestinian Revolutionary Armed Forces
People's League of Free Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The above are only some of the Palestinian terrorist organizations which have claimed responsibility or been blamed for specific attacks. The US State Department, which maintains a more complete list, qualifies the names by saying:

> Certain of the claims of responsibility are probably false. Some of the names may be fictional ones invented by organizations not wishing to accept responsibility for particular actions or by criminals or psychotics for their own purposes. In some cases the group names listed may be merely different English versions of the same group names. In other cases, organizations may have claimed credit (or have been blamed) for actions they did not take.

Let us now consider Yasser Arafat's disclaimer that the pirates of the Achille Lauro and murderers of a US citizen were "not from the PLO". Assume even that they came from one of the other organizations on the list. How, then, can Arafat claim the PLO as the only legitimate respresentative of the Palestinian people? Apparently, the Palestinian people have more representatives than they could possibly know what to do with.

If Arafat is taken at his word (a risky proposition at best), the authority of the PLO in any possible negotiation with Jordan, with the US and certainly with Israel, dwindles to miniscule dimensions. The only reason we might ever have had to hold discussions with the PLO was to end the cycle of terrorist violence. Arafat clearly cannot, even if he should want to, and so his bargaining chip is gone.

ISRAEL'S RAID REVISITED

The Administration should go back and reassess its reaction to the Israeli retaliatory raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia.

When President Reagan spoke last summer about US retaliation, he said it depended on the confluence of several elements: positive identification of the terrorists; identification of the group to which they belonged; an appropriate target to hit; and certainty of little or no collateral damage, including, of course, no casualties among the innocent. Only then, he said, would retaliation be acceptable.

Critics immediately charged that by setting the standards high, the President had ensured that they could not be met. No so. He simply ensured that proportionate retaliation would not be easily confused with indiscriminate retribution.

Israel's raid on PLO headquarters met all the criteria. It was retaliation, not retribution. It was sure. It was almost surgical. And the President's first reaction (which one suspects was his real one) was that Israel had acted properly in defense of the security of her citizens.

Unfortunately, every US reaction after the first retreated from the position articulated by the President. The legitimacy of retaliation as self-defense was questioned by anonymous worrywarts at the Pentagon. A statement deploring all violence regardless of source came from the Secretary of State, although it is determined to blur the distinction between victims and aggressors. (See "Security Affairs" Aug/Sept.) Sympathy for the destruction in Tunisia came from almost everywhere, though there has been little sympathy for the Israelis murdered around the world.

And, finally, there was the cowardly American abstention at the UN. And our allies were worse. We abstained. They had the nerve to defend the harboring of terrorits—an immoral position which encourages only more terrorism.

We should have affirmed then, not later, that countries harboring people committing terrorist acts are not immune to the effects of retaliation. This affirmation shouldn't have waited for our interception of the Egyptian airplane holding terrorists. Although we had encouraged Tunisia to take members of the PLO as refugees, we did not expect or encourage them to permit terrorist acts from their territory.

The fact is, terrorists don't happen to have their headquarters and training camps in Western countries (except maybe Italy)—although they may have operatives there. The TWA hijackers didn't happen to take the plane to Kansas City. They didn't happen to negotiate from Chicago. They didn't happen to melt into the scenery in New Orleans. They hide where it is hard to catch them and where they believe no democratic government will go after them. They especially don't hide in the Soviet Union. In fact, they don't live in any country with an infrastrueture strong enough to stop them—if that country wants to.

We have proven that the US can and will go after terrorists—that it will be harder and harder to hide from us. We have said now that there can be no haven for terrorists. We are right and we are on the record. Will we go back and admit that our partner in this fight, Israel, did no more or less than we are willing to do?

Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

I was filled with great emotion when I read the latest article regarding my comrades stationed around the European and Mediterranean areas.

Needless to say I was a bit disappointed to see that the only two Rabbis in uniform in the Pacific, (not by name, but at least by presence) were not acknowledged.

I realize that it was merely an oversight and am sure that in the future some device will be conceived to correct this unfortunate error.

I am also writing to inform you that your newsletter is given great respect by the members of the Seventh Fleet PAO. When I am done reading it my friends over there eagerly await its receipt in our guard mail service.

I know that the news you print gives them a glimpse into nonpropagandist material. Please don't flag in your constant vigilance. I look forward to every edition of the newsletter.

Respectfully,
Jonathan A. Panitz
LT, CHCC, USNR

IS THERE A STRATEGIC VALUE IN ARMING HUSSEIN?

Making arms sale policy is difficult. The US has numerous interests in the Middle East to balance, and more than one objective: Although there will be no further action on arms sales to Jordan until at least 1 March 1986, the interregnum would be will spent examining issues in the absence of pressure. We should consider whether there is any common objective among the US, Israel and Jordan. There is: preventing the realization of Syrian aspirations to control "Greater Syria"; territory which includes Lebanon, Jordan and northern Israel.

President Assad has made no secret of his belief that Israel, Jordan and Lebanon should have no "artificial" borders, and that all should be ruled form Damascus. Frustration of his plan should be seen as the common element in US policy toward the three potential "victim" countries.

It is absurd to speak of using Jordanian military capability to protect Israel from a Soviet presence.

In a carefully worded article in The New York Times, the Administration's policy concerning Jordan and arms was revealed to contain some of that understanding, but also some basic misconceptions. The major points deserve to be looked at. More than a single arms sale proposal rests on these understandings.

1) "Every step Jordan takes toward peace with Israel will virtually guarantee greater tension with Syria. Here is a cycle of violence for which Jordan has no diplomatic antidote—only the deterrence of its armed force."

Jordan has no diplomatic antidote for its problems with Israel either—inviting the Soviets to a conference, clinging to the PLO and refusing to negotiate directly with Israel are not likely to bring peace to the region any time soon.

It is true that tension will heighten. However, the Administration admits that Syria's first moves against Jordan involve terrorism which has already begun. And Improved I-HAWK surface to air-missiles will not do a thing to stop it. Why has the US not discussed counterinsurgency and counterterrorist training, and internal security measures?

2) "The Jordanian Air Force probably could not hold off a Syrian attack for more than a few days...Syria's air power would operate with relative ease."

A) the Jordanians wouldn't have to; and b) the Syrians wouldn't be allowed to. It is not likely that Syria would lead into Jordan with its air force. And, in any event, Syrian planes off the ground in attack formation would be considered a prima facie threat to Israel. They would be dealt with by the IAF as such. The idea that Israel would let the Syrian Air Force operate "with ease" anywhere near the Israeli border is naive.

Furthermore, Syria has a wealth of tanks, and some ability in tank warfare—as Israel admits following engagements in the Bekka Valley. It would be more appropriate to consider arming Jordan against the tank threat: anti-tank missiles, including TOWs (which Israel used with success). More appropriate, more to the point and probably less than threatening to Israel.

If HAWKs are deemed essential, why do away with the eminently successful 1977 compromise to set them in cement as the new sale proposes to do? At that time, the HAWKs were placed around Amman and vital military areas to form a point defense. This time, rather than supplying mobile HAWKs, they could be mounted in northern Jordan. They would still not address the real threat to Jordanian security (terrorism and tanks), but they would pose a lesser threat to Israel.

3) Giving Jordan sophisticated air defense would spare Israel "The Hobson's choice of either intervening in a war between Arabs or standing by as its Soviet-armed enemies took control of its longest frontier".

For the reason stated above, there is no Hobson's choice. Israel intervened in Jordan's Civil War in 1970 to the extent necessary to prevent Syria from taking advantage of the chaos. And Israel would do so again.

It is, furthermore, absurd, to speak of using Jordanian military capability to protect Israel from a Soviet presence. One might more reasonably admit that the security of Jordan rests upon the military capability of Israel and proceed from there.

And why does the Administration not do that? First, because of the understandable political delicacy involved. But also because the Administration operates under a series of political and historical misconceptions. One might, by now expect not to have to deal in such depth with history, but someone hasn't been paying attention. For example:

4) "The absence of any redress for the political aspirations of the Palestinian people has been one factor underlying its (Jordan's) 37 years of armed hostility toward Israel."

This ignores at least two facts. First, that most of the Palestinian refugees were created by Arab leaders telling Arab residents of the Mandate area to flee until Arab victory over the Jews. Those Arabs who remain in Israel are citizens. Those who remain stateless after 37 years do so because of Arab belligerency in the face of the UN creation of Israel. This was followed by Arab intransigence.

Second, Jordan had "redress" for Palestinian aspirations from 1948, when Jordan annexed the West Bank in the face of near-unanimous world opposition (only Britain and Pakistan recognized the annexation), until 1967 when King Hussein lost it in a war he was warned to stay out of.

5) "The King has put forward his peace initiative precisely so that this time bomb (spreading the cycle of violence to Palestinians in Jordan) will no longer threaten the existence of his nation."

The existence of his nation is threatened by two factors (aside from Syria) that would not disappear even in the event of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank: 1) The PLO has declared Jordan as bastard a state as Israel and plans to make it part of "Palestine"; and 2) the demographic composition of Jordan do not favor the Bedouin King.

6) "Israel's frontier with Jordan...has been quiet for 15 years. Jordan, a frequent terrorist target, has steadfastly kept its territory from being used as a staging ground for terrorist attacks against (Israel)."

True, of course, but why? The 15 years are those since Black September. Hussein's success in throwing out the PLO was bloody, and came only with Israeli assistance in keeping Syria at bay.

It was costly to remove the PLO from between Jordan and Israel, but in its absence, quiet prevails.

Furthermore, the PLO left Jordan for Lebanon. The previously quiet Israel-Lebanon border came the only available opening for PLO terrorist attacks into Israel.

It should be clearer than ever today that where the PLO goes, terrorism and other trouble follows. The governments of Syria, Egypt and Jordan know it is in their interest to keep terrorists from infiltrating into Israel, and so they cooperate.

In sum, the Administration knows how to make a good case for the importance of King Hussein (something that was never in doubt). The Administration can make a fair case for addressing Jordan's security concerns even though the proposed solution is inappropriate. But thus far, there has been no case made for the confluence of US, Jordanian and Israeli interests which surely exists.

Our own interests are best served by explicity recognizing that Israel, Jordan and Lebanon are natural allies against Syria. The US cannot now arm Lebanon. We should arm Jordan and Israel in a mutually complementary manner—one which minimizes the threat they pose to each other.

King Hussein might well be offended by a presumed affront to his political stature, but the US has deeper concerns. It is about time US interests were expressed in armes sales.

NEWSLETTER

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

As We Go to Press

The Nunn-Goldwater report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change,* has just been released. The 645-page bipartison staff study, launched in 1982 by Senators John Tower and Henry Jackson, is of major importance. JINSA will be presenting relevant selections and expert commentary on the report in coming months.

SDI AND ISRAEL: OPPORTUNITIES AND QUESTIONS ARISE

by Emanuel A. Winston

Ed. Note: Mr. Windston is a trustee of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and is a contributing editor to Israel Today.

America is throwing a $25 billion party and Israel has been invited. The question is, "Will she come, and will she arrive in time for the main course?"

The "party" is the Strategic Defense Initiative—a scientific initiative planned to answer the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles. It is a defensive program which, with bolts of energy traveling through space, is designed to destroy missiles as they leave their launch pad.

It is anticipated that the results of this almost new field of research and development will hurl our scientific knowledge forward with blinding speed. The space research programs of the recent past provided the world with new knowledge in working materials, medicine, communications, and more. This knowledge was put to use in profitable conventional industry. With SDI research, technologies such as laser surgery for the eye are expected to improve; plastics will replace expensive metal; ceramics will out-perform metals and plastics; computer and communications fields will continue to grow exponentially.

With SDI research, technologies such as laser surgery...are expected to improve; plastics will replace expensive metal; ceramics will out-perform metals and plastics; computer and communications fields will...grow exponentially.

All of these current and future technical advances will be very important for Israel in the next 15-20 years, IF she keeps pace with the world leaders.

Most knowledgeable Israelis have already answered the question, "Will Israel participate?". What presently confronts Israeli industry, the military and the government is, "How?".

What can Israel do to ensure its full participation and profit from the contracts to be awarded to the winners of competitive bidding? How will the US benefit from Israeli expertise? How will Israel benefit from future profits which will come from the technological spin-offs that can be expected in so many fields?

There remain even more questions to be asked and requests to be made, if Israel is to participate as a full-fledged partner with America in SDI.

For example, does the mere fact of Israel's cooperation provide the US with benefits? Will Congress be more disposed to pass the required budget if Israel is part of the program? Will Israel's friends in Congress see the benefits not only in terms of US defense requirements, but also warmly approve of the close working relationship that will result from this long-term project? In a word, will the appropriation requests be more likely to pass (without substantial cuts) if Israel's name is in the bill?

If so, will Israel benefit in proportion to a dual role?

Paying the Bills

It must be recognized that in the US, Europe and Japan, there are facilities which have very expensive, in-place, well-equipped research laboratories. R&D facilities exist in private industry and in well-financed science-based universities. Will Israel be able to compete on tender (bid) offers against these well-financed giants?

When Israeli industry bids, it will often have to include the capital outlay for purchase of this basic equipment, in addition to the cost of the actual work done. Will the US take this into consideration when the bids are issued? Perhaps Israel's participation in the Administration's request to Congress will act as a counter-balance or as an offset from the beginning. If not, what consideration, if any, can Israel to receive? Has the government of Israel made any such requests?

Certainly Israel can expect to see small contracts awarded without bids at the discretion of the program's US directors. These contracts are not to be disregarded, because, although they may be small in comparison to the total available, defense contractors and industries will welcome them warmly. However, will they receive merely token contracts, while the more lucrative contracts are placed elsewhere?

Significant contracts have already been awarded in the US, prior to the official start-up of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization operation. For instance, "Aviation Week and Space Technology" (9/2/85) lists 22 US companies which had been awarded a total of $408,958,000 as of April 1984.

(Israel has) much to offer, but can't be disorganized or expected to sell (its) hard-won expertise cheap.

Bids on Specifications

There is another area in which Israel must work to get a fair share of available contracts. Often when a new contract is to be let, and there are no standing plans or specifications, a leading contractor or expert is called in to assist in developing these parameters. The participating contractor has certain initial advantages by establishing specifications (Mil-Specs), which fit his capabilities and equipment. Once these Mil-Specs are established, all other competing bidders must use them as the basis for their tender (bid). Even if there are later financial changes allowed, the initial bid must be made according to the bid specs.

In certain areas, Israel may be able to bid competitively (as in communications), but in other areas she would clearly do better if she participated in creating the specs. Is Israel prepared?

It can be assumed that sophisticated manufacturers in the US, Europe and Japan have been maneuvering for some time to ensure themselves as large a share of the contracts as possible. It can also be assumed that various lobbyists have been employed in Washington to line up political support for their clients. Has Israel acted fast enough in this arena? Or are Israelis arguing the merits of SDI among themselves while smart, enterprising corporations have already secured preferred positions?

In "Newsweek" (6/17/85), it was clearly stated that private industry in European countries has been going around their governments to evade official footdragging and indecision. The science and military-based industries recognize that if they wait for their governments to negotiate or establish policy through normal, political bureaucracy, they will lose business. In some cases, governments have even encouraged industries to circumvent the internal political difficulties.

The Benefits

Israel's science and military knowledge is quite advanced and can be of incalculable value to the SDI program. In fact, in many areas they are years ahead of the West and the East. They have much to offer, but can't be disorganized or be expected to sell their hard-won expertise cheap.

In fact, the opposite is true, Israel must map a strategy for full participation in SDI. And further, must decide what, aside from money, there is to be gained by participating. If Israel is to supply technological expertise to the program, she must also walk away with new technology. Areas of SDI research in which Israel does not directly participate must be open to her. Minimally, her scientists should be allowed to share in the R&D originating in Israel and observe the assembly in the US of the final products to which they have contributed components. These points must be raised early.

In August, there was an international conference on SDI in Israel, where Dr. Edward Teller, the "father" of the hydrogen bomb and leader in SDI decision-making, spoke of the merits of SDI for America, the world, and for Israel's science and industry.

Dr. Teller was brought to Israel by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS). The Director of IASPS, Professor Robert J. Lowenberg, initiated this conference for the purpose of asking Dr. Teller, who favors Israel's participation, some of the questions voiced in this article. A follow-up, public SDI conference is planned by IASPS for late November, and will focus on business opportunities for Israel and the advancement of science into the year 2000.

RABBIS AMONG WARRIOR PART IV

by Albert W. Bloom

STUTTGART, West Germany—Chaplain Kenneth J. Leinwand, 33, is married to pretty Bracha (Blessing), an Israeli of Kurdistani descent (third of nine children). The ex-Floridian calls Jerusalem "home". He keeps a Koran in his Hebrew library for Muslims, and remarks, "I have more freedom, Jewishly, in the Army than in any other form of the rabbinate."

Chaplain Leinwand is an example of the bright and many-faceted people who are in the U.S. military chaplaincy overseas, "Rabbis among Warriors" in the "new" Army, Navy, Air Force.

About Chaplain Leinwand and others like him, Brig. Gen. Richard G. Cardillo, 52, of East Orange, N.J. and Denver, chief of staff of the U.S. Seventh Corps, remarks:.

"A good commander turns to his chaplains for moral advice."

General's Operations Cover Most of Germany

Gen. Cardillo's area covers "half-to-two-thirds of Germany". The general is a Catholic of Italian descent who "made it" in an America of opportunity. He notes:

"We are dealing with a new Army of young people; youngsters who often for the first time are away from home. They are freer, their parental bonds are gone. They are eager to explore and exchange ideas. Their philosophical ideas are still forming. And one of the first things they change is their attitude toward religion."

Gen. Cardillo is a vigorous man with an erect military bearing even when sitting comfortably. As he spoke to us, he was dressed in camouflage uniform. His jet black hair was flecked with a touch of gray, attesting to his heavy responsibilities as commander for in this North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) post.

"We don't want to sell our people church or synagogue. But our first job is to minister to the young. Once we do get to our men and their families, we want to encourage them to be part of their own religious environment.

"I don't have enough chaplains, Jewish or Catholic."

We Are All Success Oriented

"The difficult thing is that we are all success-oriented. We are interested in success with the soldier and with his family—and they are younger these days. Attendance at religious services in the military overseas is based on the family, but there are only a few teenagers in attendance, and often only about two percent are the soldiers themselves.

"We fail somewhere. Chaplains of all faiths have a heavy duty. It is difficult anywhere today (let alone far from home) to take an 18-to-20-year-old man or woman and in 18-20 months make a drastic change in his or her whole attitude toward life. But we do it. We focus on success."

Chaplains of Christian faiths often express surprise that even though Jews are few and scattered over the varied command units, they seem to gravitate to their Jewish religious and social institutions in groups disproportionate to their numbers.

One Jewish soldier remarked to us: "We are pretty isolated over here. I don't see another Jewish person during the whole week."

RABBIS AMONG WARRIORS IV:
Cold autumn rain falls as Chaplain Kenneth J. Leinwand (left with dark stripe on trousers) leads prayer at gravestone unveiling in Stuttgart, West Germany. German Jewish community feels a "closeness" to the chaplain and he is frequently asked to officiate on such occasions.
Photo by Albert W. Bloom

Chaplain Leinwand observed that "Jewish identity often seems more important to these soldiers than their religious practices."

Chaplain Leinwand Runs Open House Study Groups

While there are not enough little children to have a religious school at the Stuttgart base, Chaplain Leinwand holds "open house" and study groups in his home for children, youth and adults. his wife Bracha is the "religious studies coordinator". He also provides individuals with self-study texts, compliments of JWB's Commission on Jewish Chaplaincy.

Here again, "lay leaders" are needed to keep a Jewish continuity going in remote stations where the chaplain rarely can visit.

Chaplain Leinwand is also administrative funding officer for the chaplains under the jurisdiction of Col. Chandler P. Robbins II, 49, deputy commanding officer, Stuttgart.

"Chaplains are as important as surgeons to the Army," said Col. Robbins. "The chaplaincy is as American as motherhood and apple pie. We could not imagine our military services without our chaplains and their help."

The Stuttgart Military Community is "like a large American city within a German city...we are scattered all over the map," said Col. Robbins, gesturing to a chart on his wall.

"We support 30,000 soldiers, their dependents, and civilian employees in the Stuttgart Military Community, along with the logistical services. The needs of the American population here go very deep, very broad, regardless of religious denomination.

"We've Got to Worry About Americans 24 Hours a Day"

"We have got to worry about our American community 24 hours a day, including families with family problems. This is different from life in the U.S.A. We also have German law to worry about, since 'status of forces' agreements regulate relationships between Americans and Germans in the host country."

In fact, most German Jews do not feel or consider themselves West Germans, though they hold West German passports. The legacy of the recent past, Hitler's murderous legacy, is present, even when people put on their social-blinders.

Therefore, the Stuttgart Jewish community feels a closeness in many respects to American Jewish Chaplain Leinwand. When the local civilian rabbi of the "Stuttgart Gemeinde" community was absent on a day we were there, Chaplain Leinwand was summoned to officiate at an unveiling of a gravestone in the Jewish cemetery. He went routinely, as did we, despite the cold fall rain. The mourner's kaddish mingled with the thunders above.

Hardly a word was spoken between the two communities of mourners. The raindrops hid the tears in a cemetery where there was a gap of a generation on the gravestone markers!

In central Stuttgart, the Jewish community has a rebuilt, new (1951) "Gemeinde Centrum," with two synagogues, a school, a library, a kosher restaurant, a mikvah (ritualarium), and communal offices, guarded by sophisticated electronic security services, a precaution against Arab terrorists.

Dinner at Kosher Restaurant With Leaders

Leaders of the Gemeinde waited dinner for us at the kosher restaurant. They were Roman and Lote Mandelbaum, he of Crakow, she a Stuttgart native. How did she survive the Nazis? "I was not Jewish then," she smiled. After the war, she converted to Judaism, married, and became a leader in the community. Roman is an engineer. Arno Fern, a textile manufacturer, who was born in Nuremberg, was with us, too.

They estimate there are about 700 Jews in the Stuttgart area, about 420 in the city itself—with as many as 200 more "unregistered" for a variety of reasons, including social and psychological "escapism."

The future? "I am not sure that there is a 'future' for Jews in Germany," Mandelbaum insists. "People come back to die."

"Some are afraid of anti-Semitism, still." Why do they come? Some because it is more "natural" for them, despite the painful memories; some to qualify for their pensions, which they can only receive if they reside in the country; still others are Jewish refugees from Nazi-shattered, post-war Eastern Europe, now Soviet occupied.

The chaplain, a graduate of Hebrew Union College and the University of Manitoba, has been in the Army for seven and a half years.

Chaplain Leinwand's parents have come from Israel, where they had retired, to live near their son in West Germany. Sidney Leinwand is a volunteer lay leader inn Heilbronn. He also teaches science in a junior high school; Florence Leinwand, the chaplain's mother, is the registrar of the City College of Chicago branch connected with the U.S. military overseas.

Chaplain Feels Strongly About His Roles

Chaplain Leinwand views his roles as:

"1. Opportunity for every Jewish person in the military to express his or her Jewish identity.

"2. The best image of Jews and Judaism within the Army.

"3. Education to non-Jews about Judaism and joining in dialogue between Jews, Christians and other non-Jews.

"4. A patriotic expression of the ideal of religious freedom in America by service in the military."

He urges more Jewish youngsters to join the military and those who are eligible, the chaplaincy, for unique Jewish service.

One of his duties as chaplain is educational coordinator of religious teachers of various faiths in the U.S. military. We met them, all bright young American wives and mothers.

Now these U.S. civilian teachers are planning with Chaplain Leinwand to visit the Holy Land, a pilgrimage which he will lead to Jerusalem, a place Chaplain Leinwand calls "home."

NEWSBRIEFS

(Continued from page 1)

SAUDIS STILL WANT F15s: According to Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz, Saudi Defense Minister, Saudi Arabia wants to add 48 more F15s to the 60 they already have. This would be in addition to the 132 Tornado aircraft they plan to acquire from Britain.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA: A 1983 CIA report cited publically for the first time this year indicates that Syria has "probably the most advanced chemical warfare capability in the Arab world" with the possible exception of Egypt. The CIA said Syria had (in 1983) no production facility for chemical weapons, but did not need any since the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were supplying chemicals in sufficient amounts.

SOVIET SDI: A CIA study indicates that the Soviet Union, even as they try to halt the US SDI research program, has been pursuing laser, particle beam and microwave weapons based in space. They have been doing such research since the 1960s and, according to one estimate, have been putting three to five times the effort into their program as the US has in our own.

IRAN'S NAVY: The Iranian navy held major exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has threatened to blockade if oil exports from the Persian Gulf are completely stopped by Iraq. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated in 1984 that Iran had about 15 major attack craft in service.

10,000 COPPERHEADS: The 10,000th Copperhead laser-guided missile was recently produced for the US Army. The Army plans to purchase 31,000 missiles and, in addition, it can be fired from all US and NATO standard 155 mm artillery pieces. The Copperhead has had a 93% success rate in random testing over the past two years.

FRENCH PLANES TO IRAQ: France plans to sell 24 F-1 Mirage combat planes to Iraq in a deal worth about $482 million. France is Iraq's major supplier in its war against Iran. At the same time, the US is selling Iraq 45 American-made 20-seat helicopters originally destined for Iran. A State Department official said the Iraqis had assured the administration that the helicopters were not being purchased for military purposes.

SOVIET—OMANI RELATIONS: Oman, one of the strongest US allies in the Arab world, established relations with the Soviet Union, in a move which appeared to take the US by surprise. The Soviets have been critical of Oman in the past—calling the sultan a puppet of the West—but have been moving aggressively to improve ties with a number of countries in the region. Kuwait has agreed to purchase Soviet arms, and there are feelers between the Soviets and Israel.

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WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER (Secretary of Defense): It's a bit baffling to find a debate raging about the morality of a strategic defensive research program, such as SDI. In the actual conduct of war, moral issues do play an important, sometimes decisive role--at least in those nations that believe in the existence of things beyond the merely material. And it is surely proper that the strategic, technical, and political aspects of SDI, or any defense system, be subject to vigorous debate. But does it not strike you as odd that the very idea of defending oneself, and defending one's notion of the good should cause an ethical dilemma?

SOL LINOWITZ (Special Representative of President Carter to the Middle East): "We (the US ambassadors from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia) met in a special, secured office, a large group clustered in a small area under a plastic 'bubble' that guaranteed against eavesdropping. The meeting lasted more than two hours, and it was very unpleasant.

The ambassadors, other than those to Egypt and Israel, made is clear that they regarded the peace between those countries and the autonomy negotiations as a wrongheaded sideshow that was distracting attention from the real drama and was in itself probably harmful. The heart of the Israeli-Arab dispute, they insisted, was the Palestinian problem, and both the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab states had decided that the only 'legitimate' spokesman for the people involved was the PLO.

"Finally...I told the ambassadors that, if they wished, I was willing to...tell the President that they believed that his mission to the Middle East was a foolish mistake."

Linowitz quoted Menachem Begin in reference to Begin's reaction to the Reagan Peace Plan. Begin said, "I got upset. I was off on a vacation, my first in years, I got a call from the US ambassador, that he must see me immediately. I said, 'Sam, I'm on vacation.' But he drove here, he handed me this large plan about which we had never been consulted, it said many things they had never said to us before. I asked him to delay so I could consult with my cabinet, but he told me the president was afraid of a leak and was going to announce it the next day. So I rejected it...The time will come to look at it again."

VERNON WALTERS (UN Ambassador to the United Nations): Calling Israel a "steadfast ally", Walters added, "I am proud to work with out Israeli friends in the UN" and denounced the "hypocrisy" of frequent anti-Israeli resolutions "at a time when so many are dying...in places like Afghanistan and Cambodia and in the war between Iran and Iraq. Yet the UN...which spends too much time attacking Israel, cannot even bring itself to refer to the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan or the Vietnamese occupiers of Cambodia by name."

RICHARD PERLE (Assistant Secretary of Defense, concerning Soviet behavior in arms control negotiations): "The Soviets not only have not been proposing (anything constructive), they've walked out of the talks. When they came back to the talks, they had only one proposal which was that we should halt our research on defenses and then they might talk about reductions. Now they've begun to talk about reductions. I think they've defined them in a self-serving way, and we will have to get down to the business in Geneva of cutting through the elements of their proposal that are obviously not serious."

MORATORIUM

(Continued from page 1)

The moratorium was shattered on August 30, 1961—in the middle of the ongoing comprehensive test ban negotiations—when Moscow radio suddenly announced the renewal of Soviet testing. The test series that began in the Soviet Union two days later was the largest and most comprehensive the world has ever experienced. It was obvious to all who had had any experience with such tests that the Soviets had been preparing their program for a long time, perhaps for the entire 3-year period while "negotiating" a test ban with the West. By this one stroke, the Soviet Union caught up and perhaps even surpassed the U.S. in nuclear weaponry.

President Kennedy reacted with surprise and anger at the perfidious Soviet action and vowed never to be so deceived again; "Fool me once, it's your fault; fool me twice, it's mine."

Those American arms control negotiators now at Geneva, subject to the endless repetition of Soviet attacks on the SDI program and possibly lured by the not-so-subtle hints that, once the U.S. gives way on SDI, U.S. arms control objectives will be met, could gain valuable insight from a study of the history of the London Disarmament Conference. There the student can discover how the Soviet Union used the test ban concept and vague promises of future concessions to defeat the real arms control measures and how the Soviets created a huge advantage for themselves out of Western vulnerability to world public opinion.

Will we, in 1985, be wise enough to avoid being fooled again in the same way? Will the West resist the blandishment—sweetened by a moratorium—of a "test ban" as an arms control device? Will the Soviet manipulation of the West in the '50s at the London Disarmament Conference be remembered by the U.S. in time to help this nation resist the Soviet propaganda in Geneva about the SDI? Will the U.S. reduce or cancel SDI while the U.S.S.R. continues its own programs on strategic and tactical defenses and while it accelerates the expansion of its already massive nuclear offensive force? We can only hold our breath and hope.

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USEFUL IDIOTS?

The Role of U.S. Public Opinion in Soviet and Soviet-Proxy Foreign Policy

by Dr. Elie Krakowski

Ed. Note: Dr. Krakowski is Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

No one likes to be referred to as a "useful idiot", a term initially used by Lenin to describe non-Communists who, often naively and innocently, advanced Communist views and policies. The recent revelation of a Sandinista plan for a major disinformation campaign in the U.S., relying on the apparent existence of many such "useful idiots," has contributed to a resurgence of sorts for the term.

Behind the controversy surrounding aid to the Nicaraguan resistance is the systematic attempt at manipulation of democratic opinion, and in particular, U.S. public opinion by Moscow and its proxies. What perhaps has not been sufficiently emphasized has been the manner in which the explicit appeal to U.S. opinion is couched and what it reveals about Communist assessments of that opinion.

The Soviet leadership has long accorded American public opinion a place of importance in its policy determinations. In the last decades that significance has increased measurably. Today, not only Moscow but its surrogates and proxies give what could be described as a central role to that opinion. Why has American opinion become apparently so significant to Communist calculations, and what have been the techniques of, and underlying assumptions behind, this courting of public opinion?

Among the reasons for the increased relevance two should be mentioned briefly as particularly important: the impact of the communications revolution, and the role of war in the nuclear age. The former has contributed to a dramatic increase in public participation in politics, magnifying the role of perceptions as constraints upon government (especially democratic) action. The suicidal character of nuclear, or for that matter of massive conventional, war has enhanced the importance of lower levels of conflict and magnified the significance of perceptions and images as elements of influence.

Moscow has understood this for some time and has taken full advantage of the openness of democratic societies. It has been able to exploit its access, both direct and indirect, to these societies and their press without having to worry commensurately about penetration of its own, closed system.

Vietnam and Watergate

U.S. public opinion became particularly attractive for Soviet and Soviet proxy leaders with the Vietnam and Watergate experiences. These served respectively to introduce a reluctance toward external commitments, and to increase public cynicism for, and distrust of, their own government and elected officials. Rather than fading away with time, these sentiments have persisted, bringing with them institutionalized divisiveness and political paralysis. Congressional involvement in the formulation, implementation and regulation of foreign and defense policy has made the U.S. legislature, if not the ONLY target, then one of the primary foci of such Soviet and Soviet proxy attention.

Although Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega has taken a great deal of economic aid from Western countries (including $118 million from the U.S.) and made many promises concerning human rights, his association with rulers such as Libya's Muammar Khaddafi is more than 15 years old.

Of late, the attempt to influence — in fact it is more often to paralyze or blunt initiatives designed to thwart Communist policies and objectives — the character and direction of the "public debate" has become a rather open exercise. Moscow and the Marxist-Leninist Angolans have been reported trying to hire public relations firms to improve their image and represent their "interests" in Washington. The ability to find enough "useful idiots" to penetrate, influence, or to divide public opinion sufficiently to paralyze action, would yield for Moscow and its surrogates results they could not otherwise obtain, or which would be more risky and difficult to achieve.

The openness the Soviets exhibit in the pursuit of their strategy is itself revealing.

Moscow and its proxies publicly acknowledge the fact that they are trying to "win the hearts and minds" of publics. More than that, the Soviets and their proxies are usually more than candid about both their ultimate objectives and their shorter term goals. Moscow has always been explicit about its belief in the eventual triumph of Communism, and has periodically issued its own "report card" on the progress achieved. The Soviets frequently claim that the "correlation of forces" has shifted decisively in favor of the "Socialist camp," and assert the "irreversibility" of the "revolutionary process." The intent is to generate an image of the Soviet Union as strong and invincible, and of Communism as unstoppable. It is therefore in Moscow's interest — and not only for domestic purposes — that these objectives be explicitly formulated. Even if such declarations of intent are not taken seriously, the intended impact upon the collective Western psyche is achieved subliminally as it feeds on, or engenders a desire to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union.

Peace Offensives

Underlying the entire Soviet approach to the openly proclaimed "peace offensives", to the courting of public opinion, is Moscow's attempt to create an image of itself and its allies as champions of peace, and the U.S. of war and aggression. In so clearly announcing that they seek to win hearts and minds, the Soviets are in fact attempting to convince people that they are doing something their own governments are not — paying attention to them and giving them the importance they deserve but are not getting from their own (Western) leaders. This technique is designed to sow further distrust of their governments by their own people.

The objective is not so much to create friends as to influence people. And that influencing is done more through in-

(Continued on page 5)

SEN. BOSCHWITZ TO BE HONORED AT JINSA's 10th ANNIVERSARY

Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will receive the Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award at a JINSA dinner on 20 April.

This year's Annual Dinner and Board Meeting celebrate JINSA's 10th anniversary as the only Jewish organization whose primary function is to analyze U.S. defense and security policy and to promote strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel.

The business meeting will begin at 3:30 pm at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel in Washington. At 5:00 a panel of political and military analysts will discuss the role of Israel and NATO in the Mediterranean region. The dinner will begin with a reception at 7:00 pm.

All members are welcome to attend any of the events. For information and ticket prices, please call the JINSA office. 202/347-5425.

EDITORIALS

THE U.S. AND PALESTINIAN MODERATES

It is time for the United States to stop protecting Yasser Arafat and the PLO. It is time to state clearly and unequivocally that no branch of the PLO is, or will be, an acceptable negotiating partner in any future peace talks. It is time to assert that U.S. interests are best protected by direct Israeli-Jordanian peace talks, in the company of a Palestinian delegation that does not include the PLO in any form.

After we make the above declarations, we should stick by them in a way we have been unable to do in the past.

Consider our "PLO policy." We have clearly stated our commitment not to deal with the PLO until certain stringent conditions are met. Most recently, in fact, some Administration officials were saying publicly that negotiating with the PLO would not be in the U.S. interest - ABOVE AND BEYOND any commitment we might have made to Israel. At the same time, however, others were out trying to tempt Arafat, on the grounds that the U.S. needed to be "certain" of where he stood.

The anomaly is an old one. It led to the U.S. arranging the rescue of Arafat (and his fighters with their weapons) from Beirut during Operation Peace for Galilee. We arranged his rescue from Tripoli, Lebanon in 1983 (where he had no business being, since it was a violation of the terms he accepted during the rescue from Beirut). We came terribly close to condemning Israel for a retaliatory raid on Arafat's headquarters in Tunis.

Politically, we have made numerous clandestine overtures to Arafat, "to test his willingness to change." We watched King Hussein and our British allies try to find a modus operandi for an official PLO-British Foreign Ministry meeting. Following the collapse of that effort, the U.S. apparently jumped in again with a "deal": for the PLO to accept U.N. Resolution 242 and 338 and renounce terrorism in exchange for U.S. acquiescence to an invitation for the PLO to an international conference.

It was risky for the U.S. Without a commitment from Israel to accept the deal, it could have been scuttled from either end. Fortunately, the PLO behaved true to form.

The assassination of Nablus mayor Zafer el-Masri simply accentuates the present ambiguity in our policy toward possible future leaders on the West Bank. We claim to want to see them lead, but we are unable or unwilling to help leaders emerge and survive. This is due, at least in part, to the dual messages we are sending about the PLO.

King Hussein has said Yasser Arafat is not a man of his word. If we aligned with the King's position (which looks very much like Israel's assessment of Arafat's ability to change his political spots) it would help to define U.S. interests and would be a step toward new realism in U.S. Middle East policy.

But it will be a step over a precipice if we are not prepared to protect and encourage new, moderate leadership among the Palestinians. We can't simply stand here, in total safety, and ask, "OK, who wants to follow el-Masri?" Because whoever tries is likely to follow him to the bitter end. A dead end.

The situation on the West Bank is so much different from that in the Philippines that one cannot expect a Corazon Aquino to emerge and fire the imagination and loyalty of West Bankers. The U.S. has far less influence in the Middle East and cannot demand supervised elections as we did in the Philippines. Among our limited options, however, should be the ability to define and state our interests and to stop protecting the PLO.

NOT YET

Congress's firmness in the face of a possible arms sale to Jordan, and the Administration's wisdom in backing off from an unwinnable fight, seem to have had a salutory effect on King Hussein. In an uncharacteristically unambiguous move, Hussein disassociated himself from the obstructionist policies of Yasser Arafat - at least for the time being. He further declined to assign even peripheral blame to the U.S. or Israel; and set the stage for offering at least limited political alternatives to West Bank Palestinians.

So far, so good. At the same time, however, he has stirred the cauldron of Middle East passions. The resulting changes in the political political and military alliances among the Arabs may be good for "the peace process", and they may not. So, before gushing about Hussein's "boldness" and proposing to reinstate the sale of offensive weapons (which are NOT the weapons he really needs for the defense of Jordan - see "Security Affairs" Feb. 86), we must recognize that ridding himself of this chief obstructionist is still several steps away from direct Jordanian-Israeli negotiations - even in an international forum. Hussein may be on the right track, but he hasn't met Congress's conditions and he hasn't met JINSA's.

1) What prompted Hussein to go this far appears to be a real fear of losing U.S. military support. He (and his army and air force, keys to keeping him in power) really prefer our equipment, our money, our training and our lack of political interference. (On the other side of the world, the same preferences seem to have deeply influenced the Philippine military.) We may not be loved, but we are wanted.

2) There is some likelihood that the Jordan-Arafat split will help advance the Jordan-Syrian rapprochement, since Syria backs an anti-Arafat PLO faction. That wouldn't necessarily bad for the U.S. or Israel IF it meant Jordan could induee Syria to move closer to negotiations. Since Syria can play a spoiler's role in any settlement arrangement to which it is not a party, some Syrian participation or acquiescence is essential.

And it may work. Jordan split from the PLO because Arafat was reneging on a deal to come to the table when Jordan was ready. Therefore, it is unlikely that Jordan would warm up to Syria in order to become LESS amenable to negotiations.

But then again, it is Syria that poses a military threat to Jordan, not the other way around. Hussein's leverage over Assad is unclear. Unless the Saudis, who bankroll Hussein AND Assad, weigh in on the Jordanian side. Which might work unless the Soviets then weigh in on the Syrian side.

And, then again, the Jordan-Arafat split may send Arafat back to mend fences with Assad, forming a new sort of "rejectionist front".

3) Hussein issued a challenge to the West Bank Palestinians: to begin to make autonomous political choices. The people ostensibly ean choose the PLO, choose Hussein or come up with "something else". If they fall in behind Hussein in large enough numbers, the Palestinian presence needed to have serious peace talks will have arisen.

But what if they choose the pro-Arafat PLO (and sentiment is running high)? Hussein loses.

What if they choose the Abu-Musa faction of the PLO? Hussein wins only if his accommodation with Syria brings everyone to the table with some flexibility. That is hard to envision. Even if Syria agrees to negotiate, Assad is unlikely to be the least bit flexible. Hussein loses.

What if there is such factionalization that no clear West Bank leadership emerges? This has already led to an assassination such as followed Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. At that time, radicals killed many West Bankers who proposed to follow Sadat into negotiations with Israel. Hussein loses.

What if the assassination of Zafer el-Masri is enough to keep any debate at all from emerging? Everyone loses.

4) Events in the Middle East are tremendously convoluted and it often takes months for the full effect of political decisions to be felt. What if Israel's Prime Minister Peres has to hand over power to Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir before all of the above machinations take place? Are we back to the beginning? (This is, of course, the least likely to cause the collapse of chances for a settlement if there is an Arab side prepared to negotiate seriously. However, the change in Israel's government does have an effect on U.S.-Israeli relations, which will, in turn, have a ripple effect on the region.)

Thus, while the King has said and done something that places him more closely in line with U.S. policy as regards participation of Palestinians in any future peace talks, it is too early to open the champagne, or the arsenal.

GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS: A POTENTIAL DISASTER FOR DEFENSE; AT BEST, A MIXED BLESSING FOR THE COUNTRY

by Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

Ed. Note: Mr. Sullivan is a national security consultant. He previously served in the Defense Department as Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis.

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Balanced Budget Act asserts that the will of the Congress is to eliminate the federal "on-budget" deficit by 1991. (Social Security is now considered to be "off budget", is funded by a separate tax, and currently operates with a small surplus.) GRH thus implies that the people of the U.S. are "entitled" to a continuously declining, automatically controlled (if necessary) deficit between now and then.

GRH is moot on whether the balanced budget is to be achieved by spending cuts or revenue (tax) increases. However, GRH is very specific on how any excess deficit ("overhang") is to be eliminated each year: with a few exceptions or limits (primarily Medicare), the excess outlays are to be cut exactly evenly between defense and non-defense (regardless of their relative size). Within each half, the cuts are to be taken evenly among all the thousands of line items submitted in the federal budget.

That overhang depends on the state of the Congressional appropriation process on the 15th of August each year, and on the resulting best estimate of the next year's deficit. Estimates of revenues and outlays are to be made by both Congress (CBO) and the Executive Branch (OMB) — and averaged! If the Congress has failed to act on the new appropriations (as has become habitual), prior year funding levels become the baseline.

This approach to fiscal integrity illustrates both the strength and the weakness of the American government. Congress takes on its really tongh constitutional responsibilities only in occasional intemperate spurts. It then forges some crudely simple solution, and automates it so the legislators will not have to face repeatedly it consequences — and its lobbyists. Most "entitlement" programs (not subject to the annual Congressional budget process) contain the same awkward inefficiencies — as a result of automatic coverage, automatic payments, automatic cost of living adjustments (COLAs), and the like.

Assuming that the national mood really favors increased federal fiscal constraint, then GRH represents a potential disaster for Defense, and at best a mixed blessing for the country. Barring tax increases, Defense will take very deep and somewhat disproportionate cuts, although the distribution of these cuts may well be better than the Pentagon would make for itself. For the country, a permanent zero-deficit goal is assuredly too stringent, although our current borrowing is clearly excessive. There are major deficiencies in cutting Defense this way:

(1) As with all such regulation, there will be a tendency to "game" the solution. Most serious, if the Congress simply never again acts on a Defense bill, defense spending will soon drop to below the lowest level proposed by President Carter. Congress could also inflate non-defense spending, and automatically get half of the increase from defense.

(2) Defense funds for capital investment (weapons, equipment and facilities) take several years to spend out. Disproportionately large appropriation cuts therefore have to be offered up to achieve relatively small first-year outlay reductions. The remaining our-year savings will then have to be split evenly with non-defense. Hence, to save $10 in procurement in FY87, the Navy might well cancel construction of a $110 ship: the subsequent-years "savings" of $100 would accrue half to defense and half to non-defense — if the overhang persists.

(3) These reductions compound over time. Hence although the cuts in 1987 and 1988 might be tolerable, by 1990 they will be devastating because the new year's cuts pile on top of the outyear impact of the earlier cuts. By 1991, Defense outlays could be well below 5% of GNP, whereas Reagan was originally shooting for 8% — some 60% higher.

(4) Even in the near year, Defense cuts that are not planned well ahead of time often cannot be realized within the first fiscal year without very excessive disruption. For instance, the Pentagon cannot dismiss a soldier on the first of the new year and realize more than about half of his that-year costs, due to separation and redistribution costs. Should they dismiss two, then, to save the costs of one?

Congress takes on its really tough consitutional responsibilities only in occasional intemperate spurts. It then forges some crudely simple solution.

However, if the Pentagon can resist "political budgetting", then the near-year impact of GRH may not be all bad:

(1) Taking cuts evenly across the defense operating and investment accounts would assure downshifting to a more balanced, smaller active military force, rather than perpetuating one that is too large (in people) to be kept well-trained, modernized, or ready to sustain combat. That smaller force could eliminate some divisions, ships, and air wings or place them in the reserves, or it could preserve existing force structure and either reduce peacetime manning levels, or make the units smaller by putting some of their equipment in war reserve status.

(2) Smaller or less active U.S. worldwide forces could stimulate our allies to accept a fairer share of the military burden themselves — thereby transferring the "Reagan build-up" to where it belongs. This would bring allied security responsibilities more in line with their relative human and material wealth — and more in line with their view of the real threats to the West.

(3) Equal cuts within Defense line items assure that the "sacred cows" take their cuts along with the workhorses. Defense has never been able to define its "real" priorities — this GRH approach would simply stretch all programs about equally.

(4) The basic objective of the GRH is to improve our national financial well-being. This should have inevitable spinoff for total Western alliance prosperity. Such political and economic prosperity could well do more to strengthen our alliance — and to prevent its piecemeal intimidation by Soviet sabre-rattling — than the accrual of substantially greater military capabilities.

On the other hand, to the extent that GRH fails to contribute to national and Western prosperity, then it becomes counterproductive and yet another misguided entitlement. GRH seems to be partially misguided on at least three grounds:

There is no real advantage to a zero-defict: There is certainly no realistic economic basis for eliminating the federal debt itself. In total, Americans "owe themselves" about ten trillion dollars: 2 trillion in mortgages; 3 trillion in corporate stocks and bonds; half a trillion each in consumer credit and state & local bonds; 2 trillion in bank loans and trade credits; and 2 trillion in federal debt. Borrowing — at least in moderation — clearly contributes to national and international health and growth. The federal debt even now accounts for only about 20% of that total borrowing.

Clearly, then, the basic issue is not the existence of the debt, but whether, and how fast, it should reasonably grow (i.e., the annual deficit). This needs to be pegged to our national capability and willingness to pay the "carrying charges". The deficit is important because it not only increases the "principal" of the loan, but also impacts on the interest charges.

No fixed deficit level is appropriate — zero or otherwise. Our ability to conveniently service the federal debt depends not only on the size of the debt and the interest rates charged, but on the rate at which that debt is being "devalued" by both inflation (which makes the principal shrink) and national growth (which improves our ability to pay). Until recently, the level of tolerance for servicing the federal debt stayed between 2.0 and 2.5% of GNP. Unfortunately, servicing the debt has now grown to over 5% of GNP. As a result, temporary constraint (3-5 years) is required to bring down this excessive "overhang".

No fixed deficit control solution is right: The current deficit problem has

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AND THE DEFENSE OF ISRAEL

by Emanuel Karbeling

Ed. Note: Mr. Karbeling is a frequent contributor to "Security Affairs".

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) is rapidly becoming a common phrase in the American political vocabulary. Is it an idea whose time has come — the golden answer to the nation's deficit problem? Or is it a concept fraught with danger — one that could endanger the role of the United States as a world power and the leader of free nations? Finally, what will Gramm-Rudman-Hollings mean to Israel and the commitment of the Unied States to provide defense support for Israel?

Certain effects of GRH legislation are already clear. The act forces cuts of $11.7 billion in Fiscal Year 1986 - the fiscal year that began in October 1985 and continues through the end of September 1986. For example, the cost of living allowance (COLA) increase that was due Federal retirees has been cancelled, although the Congressional action mandating that allowance had already gone into effect.

Other cuts include reductions in Foreign Aid.

Israel was scheduled to receive $3 billion from the United States in FY86. Of that amount, $1.2 billion was to be received in military assistance in the form of weapons and equipment needed by the Israeli armed forces.

The economic aid portion constitutes a cash transfer from the U.S. to Israel to offset the balance of payment problems caused by the defense burden Israel carries for itself and for the nations of the West. In other words, the economic aid portion covers repayment of debts incurred by Israel. Ninety-five percent of those debts stem from loans Israel undertakes to finance defense expenditures.

The military assistance segment of the FY86 aid package from the United States is to be received by Israel throughout the year in the form of weapons and other defense support items, payment-in-kind materiel that has largely not yet been delivered.

Returning the Money

It was the economic aid portion that the U.S. turned over to Israel in October 1985, before the beginning of the fund cuts mandated by GRH legislation. Since the money had already been received, Israel was effectively protected from any economic aid cuts for FY86.

Other nations scheduled to receive foreign aid allotments, however, had not yet received their funds. According to one Washington source, these other aid recipients would have had to suffer 6-7% cuts in their scheduled aid to make up for the funds that had already been turned over to Israel. Some nations whose assistance funds were to be reduced began to blame Israel for the loss.

Israeli officials then announced that Israel would return $51.7 million of the aid it had already received. "The Washington Jewish Week" hailed the announcement as a "watershed in the U.S.-Israel aid relationship."

In an article in late January, Senator Robert Kasten, Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee wrote, "Israel's action was one of true friendship."

Rep. David Obey, Chairman of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee and a known critic of foreign aid to Israel, noted that the action revealed a sensitivity on Israel's part to the additional pressure being placed on the United States budget.

Other favorable comments were reported from Indiana Senator Ruchard Lugar,

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DOING OUR HOMEWORK

by Norman Gelman and Shoshana Bryen

Ed. Note: Mr. Gelman is a member of the JINSA Board of Directors. Ms. Bryen is JINSA's Executive Director.

The Reagan Administration has succeeded in facilitating the removal of dictators in Haiti and the Philippines with a gratifying minimum of bloodshed. And thus far, U.S. relations with the successor government in both countries seem to be on a satisfactory course. Meanwhile, the Administration has also chalked up impressive, though less spectacular successes in Guatemala and Honduras where recent elections have confirmed a trend toward moderation and democracy.

Have President Reagan and the State Department suddenly discovered a diplomatic formula for dealing with ne'tlesome allies that can be successfully applied to future situations? We'd like to think so, but the answer is almost certainly not.

Over the past 40 years, under many different administrations, the U.S. has repeatedly sought to perform the same trick: to help countries move from authoritarian to democratic governments. We have had occasional successes. We have experienced some disasterous failures.

Generally, our interference - or moral suasion, if you prefer - has brought more complaints than plaudits, not only from the target governments, but from other countries and, homegrown, from critics in Congress and the media.

The usual accusation from the left is that we stick too long with dictators who are eventually bound to fall. The habitual charge of the right is that we are too eager, in our fastidiousness about "so-called" human rights, to undermine friendly governments without considering the consequences.

Our attempts to create more favorable political situations began immediately after World War II when the Soviets and the U.S. struggled over the fate of Greece, Yugoslavia and other countries at the borders between East and West Europe. The pattern of political intervention has continued ever since - under Democrats and Republicans. Under hard-line anti-Communists and advocates of detente.

The Spectrum

Consider, just since 1960: Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Iran, Nicaragua, Korea, Taiwan, Lebanon, Chile, Aden, El Salvador, Argentina, Jamaica, Honduras, Guatemala, Grenada, Uganda, Mozambique and the Philippines. Literally and figuratively, they are "all over the map". U.S. (and in some cases British) experience produces no clear formula for inducing less-than democratic governments to change without chaos.

Based on those experiences, it is difficult to project the future of the Philippines, let alone Haiti, Lebanon, South Africa, Aden and Sudan, where changes are occurring or appear imminent.

Continuing along a line of time and geography, and consider the countries of the Middle East - all of which (save Egypt) are ruled by some sort of dictatorship, all of which are ripe for some sort of violent revolution - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, Syria, The Emirates, Iran and Iraq. Moving along the Mediterranean littoral, across North Africa, consider Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Moroceo.

It is entirely possible, in many of those places, that radical, Soviet-oriented governments will replace conservative, dictatorial governments. In no place would the Soviets have to do more than capitalize on existing trends and rivalries.

What have we attempted?

The Choices

1) Isolation: In Cuba, the U.S. first endorsed Batista's ouster, then tried to reverse the Castro revolution when it became clear that it was violently anti-American. After the Bay of Pigs disaster, a strategy of isolation actually worked fairly well, with most of Latin America joining the anti-Cuban boycott. However, the Soviets took up the slack (as they do to this day with enormous subsidies), leading many countries (and now U.S. critics) to accuse the U.S. of "driving Castro into the Soviets' arms", literally.

2) Direct intervention: In Vietnam, the goal was to use American advisors, and then troops, to provide a shield for the improvement ("uncorruption" was the voguish word) of ostensibly democratic institutions that were set in place by anti-Communist dictators. That operation failed.

In Lebanon, we tried direct intervention with little success (1958) and less success (1983).

In Grenada and the Dominican Republic, however, direct intervention in fact restored democratic institutions to the people. They were, of course, closer by and there were no indigenous forces to resist U.S. power.

3) Power-sharing between adversaries: Our disengagement from Vietnam was preceeded by such an arrangement, as was the British disengagement from Rhodesia and Aden (South Yemen), and most of the peace attempts in Lebanon. Power sharing is also being attempted in Northern Ireland, under a somewhat different set of conditions. However, in no case that we know of, has the sharing arrangement produced lasting peace.

4) Withdrawing support from the dictator and encouraging the other side: In Nicaragua, we (along with the OAS) eventually engineered the downfall of Anastasio Somoza and welcomed the Sandinista revolution with over $100 million in economic aid in the first 18 months. Critics have charged that we should have intervened earlier against Somoza. On the other hand, our willingness to depose Somoza added to our reputation as "unreliable" among certain Latin American countries.In any event, the Soviets and their allies had been there well ahead of us and we were unable to redeem the revolution for the West.

5) Simple withdrawal of support for the government: In Iran we cut off the Shah but, at least overtly, we had nothing to do with the revolution. (Later, of course, we encouraged Israel to supply parts to the Iranian air force, etc.) In Uganda, we withdrew from Idi Amin, but didn't aid any of the multiple revolutionary groups.

In Haiti, we "encouraged" Duvalier to leave the country, but there was no clear support for his opposition until he left. Our options for the future in Haiti will obviously include help for those who opposed Duvalier.

6) Pressure for elections: In El Salvador, direct U.S. pressure did produce fair elections - several of them, in fact. In Honduras and Guatemala, fair elections have been held and the transition to democratic government appears to be working. In the Philippines, direct U.S. pressure forced elections, the voters had a clear choice, but their choice was subverted, and we then withdrew support for Marcos.

7) Continued support for pro-Western dictatorships: In South Korea and Taiwan, dictatorial governments have, with U.S. support, provided a high standard of living for the population. There are prospects for peaceful change "some day", although the transition could prove difficult. Those governments appear very nervous about events in the Philippines.

In Chile, the dictatorship has not helped the people economically and has been extremely repressive with little prospect for peaceful change. The same was true until February in the Philippines, which inspired charges that we were sticking too long with unsavory dictators.

8) Supporting leftist governments in hopes they will change: In Mozambique, and as events unfold in Sudan, we are giving aid to the government, helping it stay ahead of rebels. To a certain extent, we entertained similar ideas in Ethiopia, where we hoped food aid would result in better U.S.-Ethiopian relations - to no avail.

In Jamaica, however, during the strongly leftist Socialist and blatantly anti-American rule of Michael Manley, we continued our aid program and were "rewarded" with the election of Edward Siaga - pro-American and pro-capitalist.

In Nicaragua, as mentioned earlier, we supplied economic assistance during the first 18 months of the Sandinista government, while the government was becoming more repressive and leftist.

9) Aid to rebels without concomitant pressure on the government they hope to overthrow: In Angola and Cambodia, the results are not in yet. In Afghanistan, we have provided the rebels only enough aid to continue to fight, not enough to win.

10) Limited aid to rebels with concomitant pressure on the government: Cuba in early 1961; a big loss. Nicaragua after 1983; the signs are not encouraging.

The Future

What emerges from this catalogue is an utter lack of pattern among countries. Each series of choices has produced successes and failures (except power sharing, which has been a total failure, and half-way aid to rebels). The successes appear closely related to U.S. pragmatism and perseverance accompanied by good intelligence on the ground. (It can be argued that the fall of Nicaragua and Iran were largely the result of poor planning based on poor intelligence.)

Where does this leave us? It is necessary to conclude that at times those who claim we are too slow to pressure or abandon dictatorial allies may have been right; and at times those who say we are too eager to undermine a reliable ally may have also been right.

If the past offers a useful guide, it is that we must understand that "managing" the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is extremely tricky. And that the ability of the U.S. to influence the outcome is limited. And that timing and deft-handling of any U.S. intervention is crucial. And that there is no substitute for high quality intelligence and pragmatic judgments - and luck.

IDIOTS

(Continued from page 1)

timidating words and deeds than through peaceful-sounding formulations. The "peace-loving" track, however, provides a way station to surrender. Persistent Soviet pressures, intimidation, and violent actions confront the West with a choice: acquiescence or resistence to Soviet demands. The "peace-loving" track provides an apparent way out: one can choose to fixate on Soviet words and promises of good things to come. This clearly is meant to play on known democratic desires for peace and for simply being left alone. Moscow's evident contempt for the very people it seeks to cajole does not differ from the pointed sentiments expressed by Lenin in his phrase "useful idiots".

Afghanistan

The strong parallelism in Soviet and Soviet proxy contempt for, and approach to, their audiences is perhaps most clearly visible in the context of some of the current regional conflicts. Of these the case of Afghanistan is the most blatant. The magnitude of the Soviet big lie — the discrepancy between Soviet acts of genocide and "peace-loving" sounds — is more obvious in Afghanistan than anywhere else.

The Soviet technique, paralleled fairly closely by its proxies in other regional conflicts, has been to blame the very existence of the issue on the U.S. or the West collectively, and then to insist that a Soviet troop withdrawal is up to the U.S. The immutable Soviet position has been that cessation of outside support for the Afghan resistance precede any consideration of Soviet troop withdrawal.

Moscow is in fact saying that withdrawal will occur only after the resistance has been eliminated. In other words, Soviet troops might be removed when there is no longer any reason for their being there. Although they have frequently reiterated this, the Soviets are still attempting to make the outside world believe that they have a genuine desire to withdraw. This attempt at deception, visible most recently in Gorbachev's declarations at the Communist Party Congress, aims to focus public attention on so-called withdrawal timetables, on the possibility of obtaining a withdrawal if only some SMALL concessions are made. Moscow does not necessarily expect the U.S. to fall for this. However, mere discussion of such proposals, of the possibility of a deal over the heads of the Mujahidin, sends tremors through the ranks of the latter and increases distrust of American motives and reliability. Soviet objectives are thereby advanced as well.

Cuba in Angola

Cuba has taken a similar approach in Angola. Castro has stated that he would be willing to consider a PARTIAL withdrawal of the Cuban troops propping up the Marxist-Leninist regime in exchange for total South African withdrawal from Namibia, and complete cessation of external support for the Angolan resistance led by Savimbi. Here too the message is that all is the fault of the "imperialists," that should they agree to give up, "progress" on the issue, and on improving East-West relations, is possible.

Much of Soviet and Cuban activity these days is aimed at encouraging doubt, divisiveness, and political paralysis within the United States about possible American commitment to these causes. To the degree that Moscow can induce the U.S. to believe that "progress" is possible through negotiations alone, that in the meantime nothing should be done (i.e. helping those in need) to endanger such negotiations, it is successfully blunting moves toward such a commitment. And democracies, once disinterested, do not easily recommit. This is true with regard to Afghanistan, to Angola, as well as Nicaragua.

Nicaragua

The Sandinista approach to the ongoing conflict within Nicaragua illustrates in a slightly different vein the overall approach to American public opinion and Congress. In Nicaragua, as in Grenada earlier, the Sandinistas have been keenly aware of the dangers of proceeding too quickly and too openly toward their goals of a Marxist-Leninist system tightly and openly aligned with the Soviet bloc. Yet public statements of objectives have not been absent. A Sandinista document of 1979 referred to the foreign policy of the "Revolution" as based on the principles of "revolutionary internationalism." Illustrative also is Thomas Borge's statement that the Sandinista revolution "goes beyond our border." The objective of obliterating democracy — another shared goal with the Soviets — has also been clearly stated by Sandinista National Directorate member Carlos Nunez in September 1983: "the electoral process must basically be aimed at achieving an electoral model and elections that will BREAK COMPLETELY with the concepts or understanding of democracy that prevail in the various Latin American, European, or North American countries."

In view of the open courting of the American public and Congress one might have expected a different approach than that ultimately followed by the Nicaraguan leadership. Some five days before House rejection of aid to the Nicaraguan resistance in April 1985, "Ortega had promised Senators Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and John Kerry (D-Mass) that he would respect fundamental liberties and make other conciliatory gestures if the Congress were to reject new military aid to the Contras" (Associated Press, April 30, 1985). Three Days after the House vote denying such military aid to the Nicaraguan resistance, Ortega was in Moscow. This "contemptuous nose-thumbing," as Representative Thomas S. Foley termed it, was repeated when Ortega, just before his appearance at the United Nations to make the case for the Sandinistas, imposed a state of emergency and deprived Nicaraguans of additional freedoms and rights.

These Soviet, and Soviet proxy attempts to exploit and divide American public opinion can succeed, like hypnosis, only if the subject is willing. Karl Marx's observation regarding nineteenth century Russian imperialism applies equally well, if not better, to twentieth century Soviet imperialism: "The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing."

DEFENSE

(Continued from page 3)

clearly been caused by President Reagan's recommended (and Congressionally-accepted) program to reduce revenues without reducing expenditures. Some leaders are thus using the deficit (and the cost to service it) as a club to force lower federal spending, while others would prefer higher revenues of some sort. The President's spending threshhold appears considerably lower than that of many of his countrymen — and almost all of his allies.

It seems patently clear that two things must be done:

(1) Some new sources of revenue on a permanent basis are required to eliminate the "structural imbalance" between Federal "on-budget" receipts of less than 14% of GNP, while continuing outlays of more than 19% of GNP. Revenue sources which discourage bad spending habits but encourage good financial habits (savings, capital investment, etc.) — and which do not disfavor the poor — seem most appropriate. Import and/or consumption taxes on energy; "sin taxes" on tobacco, alcohol, (and drugs!); "luxury taxes" on excess consumption ($60,000 cars) and borrowing (mortgage caps); "corporate waste" taxes on unfriendly take-overs; these and many others could be used to raise revenues by up to 1-2% of GNP without greatly infringing on personal/family finances.

(2) A temporary surcharge for the next several years would probably be appropriate to bring the debt servicing costs back down to some acceptable permanent level. This surcharge probably needs to be on the order of 2% of GNP in the near timeframe, dropping off to zero within five subsequent years. There should be a clear distinction between this temporary surcharge and the permanent additional source of federal income discussed above. Nevertheless, the types of sources might be roughly the same: clearly they need to be "excess consumption" taxes rather than "earning disincentive" taxes.

GRH may change the shape of our armed forces.

GRH is likely to go down in history as a somewhat flawed — but sorely overdue — first step towards restoring long-term fiscal responsibility in the U.S. By association, it might eventually even cut down somewhat on the extravagantly socialistic spending of some of our traditional allies. Thoughtful people would do well to support and improve this process — even if a few temporary "lumps" are taken by the defense sector during the transition. It must be modified, however, before it runs its five-year course, and that modification must inescapably include some permanent revenue increases (perhaps as outlined above) — or very seriously, and permanently, curtail our future national security posture.

ISRAEL

(Continued from page 3)

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; New Hampshire Senator Warren Rudman, one of the authors of the GRH legislation; Hawaii Senator Daniel Innouye; Reps. Jack Kemp, Harry Reid and Sidney Yates.

The Effects

Israel demonstrated good faith as a bulwark of Western defense and as a responsible member of the family of free nations, by recognizing the relationship between economic and military security. But what will be the impact of this action - and GRH - on the immediate defense requirements of Israel and on planning for long-range security?

Before consideration of this question, it should be made clear that Israel has already suffered a 20% cut in defense funding. That reduction, imposed by the Israeli government, has been in effect for over a year.

Colonel Ehud Aviran, Research and Development Attache to the Israeli Embassy, pointed out that one would really need to go to Israel and talk with the soldier in the field, the scientist in the laboratory and the man or woman in the street to get a sound assessment of the effect of that reduced funding on readiness, on morale and on the sense of security felt by the average Israeli citizen. The psychological result will only show in time.

In the practical sense, the reduction means there will be fewer weapons and weapon systems available for training. Maintenance procedures will take longer. Food and clothing and other basic military items are in more limited supply and will need to be more carefully used.

Research and development impact is another, and potentially more serious, matter. The soldier in the field does not know what improved weapons or improved fighting techniques he will not find available. Scientists and skilled technicians find themselves in a tenuous position.

When there is an over-capacity of skilled research and development personnel in Israel, and a cutback in money for research projects, there is generally not another comparable employer in Israel. Without work, and with desirable skills, these people are likely to leave Israel for the United States, and find employment in defense industries here. Their skills, and their ability to plan for an increasingly "high-tech" future, are then lost to Israel.

The Future

GRH and the emphasis it places on limiting costs also holds potential for increased cooperative research and production between Israel and the United States.

As a result of the cost constraints mandated by GRH, competition for the development and production of the most cost effective weapons and weapons systems could be increased. Israel may be able to bid on more projects and find new markets for some of its known developed items (NDIs) that may still be in early R&D stages for potential U.S. suppliers.

A new effort is underway to develop cooperative R&D projects with the Department of Defense and American defense industries. At a conference scheduled for May 1986, Israeli, DoD and industry representatives will outline their needs and examine ways in which they can help one another meet those needs most effectively.

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation and its potential impact on the defense requirements of Israel remain an open question. Israeli and American defense experts agree, however, that the defense of their nations and the defense interests of the free world must not be placed at risk while the question is being answered.

NEWS BRIEFS

POLL ON MIDEAST: In a recent poll, Americans were asked which of the countries or groups in the Mideast were reasonable and working for a just peace settlement in the region. The result was Israel 72%, Egypt 69%, Jordan 55%, Saudi Arabia 51%, Syria 30%, and the PLO 10%.

ARAB ARMS IMPORTS: A recently released U.S. government study shows that in 1983 (the last year for which figures are available) six Arab states received 40% of the world's weapons imports. They were Iraq ($5 billion), Saudi Arabia ($3 billion), Libya ($1.9 billion), Egypt and Syria ($1.7 billion each) and Jordan ($1.1 billion). Israel imported $370 million worth of arms that year.

U.S. FIGHTERS TO GREECE: The U.S. and Greece signed an agreement that opens the way for the sale of 40 F-16 fighter planes to Greece. The sale has been pending for some time, however, it awaited an agreement providing for both governments to prevent unauthorized dissemination of military information. There had been some concern in the U.S. about Greece's ability to protect advanced technology from Soviet agents.

PENTAGON SEIZES IRANIAN GEAR FROM STORAGE: The Pentagon seized "missile testing equipment" owned by Iran from a storage facility in Virginia. The equipment is part of a $5-10 million inventory that includes F-14 jet fighter spare parts bought by the late Shah. A State Department official said the equipment is embargoed because the U.S. permits no hardware to be shipped to Iran or Iraq, and denied that the material was "stolen." "They were taken by the Department of Defense to a classified warehouse and a receipt was left behind. There wasn't any theft involved whatsoever."

SALES TO CHINA? The U.S. is close to an agreement to sell China radar and other equipment to modernize Chinese fighter planes. If the deal is concluded, it will be the largest sale of American military hardware to China since it was authorized to buy such materiel in 1984. Officials say it could be hundreds of millions of dollars.

FRENCH BATTLE TANK: The new French battle tank is designed to operate in nuclear and chemical warfare environments in the 21st century, according to French officials. The tank is due to enter service in 1991, and is planned to have unrivaled firepower, mobility and protection from the latest generation of antitank weapons.

PAKISTANI ELECTION RALLY: An estimated 70,000 people rallied in the capital of Punjab province in late January in the largest political meeting since President Zia ul-Haq ended 8 1/2 years of martial law in Pakistan in December. The rally was organized by an 11-party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, which must decide whether its parties should register with the government's election commission. Registration binds the parties not to criticize the military and to adhere to Islam.

SOVIET AGENTS AT GREENHAM COMMON: The authoritative Jane's Defense Weekly has charged that Soviet-trained agents infiltrated the women's group protesting U.S. nuclear missiles at Greenham Common, England. Jane's cited information from Soviet defectors that agents have been among the women at all times since the missiles' deployment in December 1983, and they are rotated regularly.

LOSING PILOTS, AGAIN: The U.S. Air Force and Navy are fast losing experienced pilots in a manpower drain attributed largely to stepped-up hiring by commercial lines. The Air Force's retention rate dipped to 59%, the worst since 1981.

RELATED: The Army has become the first branch of the armed forces since 1981 not to meet its quarterly recruiting goal.

BUT IT IS WORSE IN EAST GERMANY: East Germany has set up cardboard soldiers meant to deceive and frighten would-be escapers from East to West Germany, according to the West German Interior Ministry. The mock soldiers are posted in watchtowers close to the actual border. Despite that, the border is still heavily guarded.

ISRAELI POLL ON LEBANON: A poll commissioned by an Israeli newspaper shows that 48.8% of Israelis regard the Lebanon war as a failure, 16.7% regard it as a success, and 26.3% said the war was "neither a success nor a failure." A majority of 68.8% believe that, despite katyusha attacks on sites in northern Israel, Israel should not go into Lebanon again.

ISRAEL IN COCOM? According to an Israeli newspaper, Israel and the U.S. have been conducting negotiations to control direct and indirect exports of sensitive technological items to Eastern Bloc countries. There was a further suggestion that the U.S. might try to incorporate Israel into COCOM, the NATO committee which supervises exports from the West to the East. Israel would be only the second non-NATO country in COCOM (after Japan).

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

SHIMON PERES (Prime Minister of Israel, commenting on his trip to Europe): I must say I was pleasantly surprised by the warmth shown to me in the friendliness, the openness, and the effort to make this trip a positive one. The Spanish Prime Minister came to The Hague especially to meet me and to give substance to the renewed relations with Israel. The British cancelled their participation in the Arab boycott. The Germans established a joint fund for research and development with. . .The Dutch took it upon themselves to handle the matters of the EEC and the Soviet Union. . .The media made great efforts to show Israel's positions in a positive light.

(Concerning Arab terrorism): If (Palestinians) are in search of a solution for themselves, they have to take their destiny in their own hands. Terror is painful for Israel, but terror is catastrophic for Arab and Palestinian life. They have terrorized Arab leadership; they have violated Arab conscience; they have frozen Arab opportunity.

YASSER ARAFAT (concerning the U.S. position in peace talks): Regrettably, the United States is still confused in its stand, despite international efforts and other Arab efforts that are attempting with us to make the United States understand better the Middle East question and the Palestinian question and make it deviate from its total bias in favor of the Israeli view.

MOSHE ARENS (commenting on King Hussein's repudiation of Yasser Arafat): I am sure many Israelis cannot restrain a smile when they hear King Hussein talk about the Jordanian nation and the relationship between the Jordanian nation and the Palestinian nation, and most Israelis might ask themselves a rhetorical question: How long has a Jordanian nation existed, for 2,000 years, 1,000 years, 500 years, 50 years? We know there is no such thing as a Jordanian nation and King Hussein; maybe that is part of his problem.

ILIAS FRAYJ (Mayor of Bethlehem, commenting on King Hussein's speech): I immediately supported King Hussein's speech because he was clear and frank. The King based what he said on facts. My opinion is known. I have always said that the military solution does not exist and our Arab situation shows this. There is a political solution only, and the political solution would be under the umbrella of an international conference based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. There would be no harm at all in accepting these two resolutions.

HAFEZ ASSAD (President of Syria, commenting on Arab leaders who do not follow his approach to Middle East politics): Where is (deposed Sudanese president Jafar) Numayri, the Falasha merchant, who sold his people and nation for money and acted as a broker to smuggle Falasha Jews to Palestine? Where is Al-Sadat, who sold Egypt and its decisionmaking? He signed the document of submission and submissively and obediently handed it over to the Zionist diehards so they could make Egypt a Zionist protectorate. There is no Numayri now. . .There is no Al-Sadat now.

COMING NEXT MONTH

- From Central Asia to Afghanistan
- Moral Equivalence
- Reforming through Reorganization
- Rabbis Among Warriors

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AMERICA, ISRAEL & SDI

by Charles D. Brooks

Ed. Note: Mr. Brooks is Outreach Director for the National Jewish Coalition and Liaison Officer to the Jewish Community for High Frontier.

The arguments for the urgent necessity of deploying non-nuclear multi-tiered defensive weapon systems in an effort to prevent the spectre of a nuclear holocaust have been eloquently argued in public media by scholars, military experts and scientists on numerous occasions. The political, strategic, fiscal and moral case has and will continue to be made for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, few analyses have centered on how this historic reformulation of American defense policy will affect the 18 allies invited to participate in the project. In particular, one ally has more to gain and contribute than any other nation, Israel.

For Israel, the historical challenge has and will continue to be ensuring self-survival. The geopolitical nature of the Middle East and the xenophobic nature of fanatical Arabs sworn to the destruction of Israel necessitates a determined, but economically costly vigilance. There are terrorists who engage in suicide car bombings and nations who send 12-year-olds to battle and would no doubt use nuclear weapons at the earliest opportunity against Israel. It is illogical and dangerously naive to assume that retaliatory policy would serve as a deterrence if these nations or groups ever obtained nuclear weaponry.

The Threat

In 1981, when Israeli intelligence discovered that the Iraqis were on the verge of constructing nuclear weapons, they made a decision to launch a preemptive attack on The weapons producing facility. the world condemned the surgical strike, but less than two years later failed to condemn the Iraqis on their use of poison gas against Iran. What would have prevented the Iraqis from deploying nuclear weapons if the reactor had not been destroyed?

Already vastly outnumbered, Israel will have difficulty in future years maintaining the qualitative advantage over the Arabs. The Strategic Defense Initiative will help enable them to counter Arab procurement of sophisticated weaponry.

Israel is confronted with a far more immediate threat — Soviet installed SS21 missiles in Syria capable of delivering nuclear warheads at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Israel would have only minutes of reaction time and pay a total price if Syria were to equip the SS21s for a random strike. General Daniel Graham (USA, Ret.) a former Direetor of the Defense Intelligenee Agency and a founder of High Frontier (the conceptual project from which SDI arose) has noted that one of the first technologies to emerge from SDI research may well be anti-tactical ballistic missiles. Such weapons could allow Israel to defend itself against Syria's Soviet supplied ballistic missiles without having to rely on the increasingly unreliable deterrent of retaliation.

Avram Schweitzer, an Israeli journalist with "Ha'Aretz" newspaper aptly described how Israeli defenses could benefit by being directly involved with the development of SDI technologies. "A system that can make out, identify, home-in-on, and destroy an object less than 100 feet long, moving at near Mach-1 speed at a distance of 10,000 miles, is essentially a system, the application of which could do to the foot soldier, the artillery piece, the tank or the helicopter what its space-progenitor is supposed to do to strategic missiles. To be in on this kind of technology...could mean the purchase of peace for Israel, or more realistically, the imposition, by non-aggressive means, of a permanent state of non-belligerence along its borders."

The Potential

Israel will derive more than national security benefits from its participation in SDI. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called SDI, "A new dimension in the technological, scientific and strategic spheres...It is like joining a new era. Imagine if Columbus had invited an Israeli to join his ship. I, for one, would have supported this invitation, no matter what he was going to discover."

Indeed, no one really is quite certain of what we will discover. America landed a man on the moon in less than seven years: 10 years earlier the feat was beyond the wildest imagination of all but an intrepid few. Israel's industrial future will be greatly enhanced by being at the forefront of this technological revolution. Technological spinoffs could lead to production of new computer systems, energy sources, communication devices, medicines and thousands of consumer products. Moreover, SDI will heap research funds upon the troubled universities and will revitalize the Israeli scientific community. Israeli defense-related industries will receive lucrative contracts and strategic and economic cooperation between Israel and the United States will be strengthened.

For the drained Israeli economy, SDI will mean new jobs and revenue. Chase Econometric Group revealed that for every billion dollars invested in space technology, over 800,000 new jobs are created, the inflation rate reduced by two percent, and the GNP increased by $23 billion. Tadiran, Inc., an Israeli military electronics corporation, has already had discussions with American SDI officials about potential contracts for future projects.

Israel's Capability

America would also be the recipient of numerous benefits from Israeli involvement in SDI, especially in the area of research and development. Israel is a stable ally that has already worked closely with the American military/industrial complex.

Israel's high state of technological and scientific capability can be utilized in SDI research. The IDF has demonstrated an unforseen mastery over command, control and communication (C3) by downing over 80 Syrian jet fighters with no losses during the Lebanon conflict. Their expertise in battle-tested technologies would immensely enhance development of weapon systems. In addition, because of the precarious nature of the Middle East, the Israelis cannot afford to have long research and development time spans before weaponry is operational. Israeli involvement can serve to catalyze the entire SDI program by accelerating the pace of the effort.

Furthermore, U.S. technological secrets are often safer with Israel than with our European allies. The Israeli intelligence services are so competent that former chief of Air Force Intelligence Gen. George F. Keegan (USAF, Ret.) has remarked that Israeli has been worth five CIAs to the U.S. because of its intelligence-gathering capability and transfer of data on the performance of Soviet weaponry. This has included the direct transfer of captured Soviet weapons.

SDI constitutes a revolution not only in defensive strategy, but moves into a new world of technology that may ameliorate many of the world's problems. In a nuclear world, it is not good enough to be morally right, America and Israel must also be strong. The Strategic Defense Initiative can help ensure that Jews will never have to endure another Holocaust and could lead to a world where close democratic allies can allocate their efforts to socio-economic endeavors instead of preparations for war and defense. For America and Israel, SDI is another giant leap for mankind.

DON'T GET PERS-ENGULFED AGAIN

Low oil prices are a boon today and a threat for tomorrow. Today, they induce increased economic activity and lower inflation. Tomorrow they will lead to increasing dependence on the vulnerable supplies from the Persian Gulf. The U.S. has five to ten years to prevent a replay of the oil- shocks of the 1970s.

The strategies are clear: adopt policies that will decrease U.S. imports and that will increase exploration and development of oil resources in those parts of the world both outside the Persian Gulf and where oil is less expensive and more plentiful than within the continental United States.

The difficulty is that these strategies have to work in an environment of low oil prices.

A ten dollar oil tariff would limit U.S. consumption and maintain U.S. production, thereby maintaining imports at approximately today's level of 4.5 million barrels per day. If an equivalent tax were placed on domestic production, U.S. production would decrease and imports would rise to approximately 7.5 million barrels per day. If there were no tariff and domestic oil sold at the current world price, imports in five to ten years are likely to increase to 12 million barrels per day.

In approximately the same time frame, world demand will increase to such a level as to consume OPEC's excess capacity to produce. Therefore, the U.S. may well find itself in the same position as in the 1970s, no excess capacity in the world, peak U.S. imports and OPEC in the catbird's seat - again.

In addition to the tariff, the U.S. could use its market power to aid countries with undeveloped resources - such as Mexico, Argentina, West Africa and Norway - to obtain the funds needed for drilling even in a weak oil market. Once assured of a portion of the U.S. market, developmental drilling can be financed. In this way, the U.S. could maintain the proliferation of international suppliers - outside of OPEC. Production in non-OPEC countries has led to the current oil glut.

At what level of imports is there an unwanted economic dependence on a dangerous part of the world? Previous oil shocks occurred at the 8-million barrel/day import level. A forward looking energy policy could prevent a recurrence of Pers-engulfment.

Inside This Issue

EDITORIALS

Getting our Money's Worth in Foreign Policy

There was a time - it now seems long ago - when key elements of U.S. foreign policy were privately hammered out by the President and leading members of Congress. Privacy (though depriving the public of the clash of ideas through debate) was essential to prevent all parties from becoming hostage to statements made for public consumption. Later public discussion then became largely a process of educating the public. The result was a bipartisan foreign policy and a single voice for the U.S. government.

However, with the diffusion of leadership in Congress, foreign policy is more often an adversarial process whereby the President has to try to muscle programs through a hostile and polemical Congress. All too often, the chief question on controversial issues now is, "How much political capital will the President have to expend to get what he wants?" and "Is it worth that much fighting about?"

The result is an ineffective foreign policy policy in the area concerned.

Two recent examples of this unhealthy approach were the fights between Congress and the President over Contra aid and arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Neither side distinguished itself by statesmanship.

Unasked were the questions, "What is it that the President hopes to achieve in this area of foreign policy?" and, "Is this particular action reasonably likely to help us get there?"

Applied to Nicaragua, the questions should have been, "What is the preferred outcome from the U.S. point of view?" and "Will the provision of $100 million to the Contras help us get there?"

1) If the threat from communist Nicaragua is as grave as the President and some Contra aid supporters claimed, their preferred outcome could only be the dissolution of the Sandinista government. In that case, a total of $100 million to the Contras is unlikely to achieve the intended result.

2) If there was, during the debate, still hope for the Contadora process, as opponents of aid claimed, their preferred outcome in Nicaragua is an opening of the regime to democratic principles and respect for human rights. While the Contra aid would certainly not be appropriate under those circumstances, there is no evidence that such a preferred outcome is possible. There was a time, after all, when the U.S. was the chief supplier of economic assistance to the Sandinista government. But even then, the Sandinistas were becoming more and more repressive.

3) Perhaps the most reasonable outcome the U.S. can expect is to continue to harass the Sandinistas, and keep our further options open. Part of the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista revolution is its internationalist character, and its commitment to worldwide revolution. This is what helps to unite the Sandinistas, the PLO, Libya, Bulgaria and North Korea. It is in our interest to make it difficult for them to export their revolution and to subvert their neighbors. It is a reasonable part of U.S. support for El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and others to keep the Sandinistas busy at home. The Contras are a logical way to achieve this result and $100 million is not too much to spend to do it.

In the case of arms sales to Arab countries, beginning with the 1978 F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, the argument has been that the Arabs need to see the U.S. as a reliable supplier and "evenhanded" in order to bring them into the "peace process". In effect, we could buy them in by selling them weapons. But invert the equation and ask how many U.S. arms it would take to purchase Saudi loyalty. The answer would be, "More than we have to sell."

But if buying Arab loyalty with weapons is not reasonable U.S. policy, should we stop selling them weapons completely? Presumably not, as there are other, more realistic reasons to sell some weapons at some times: we do not want to see the fall of the Saudi Royal family; we do not want the oil fields in radical hands; we do want the Saudis (and others) to defend themselves in the event of an Iranian attack; we don't want to use U.S. troops except as a last resort.

Far better cases for certain arms sales to Saudi Arabia can be made than the ones that have been put forth. But the realistic arguments would not have included sanctioning F-15s, conformal fuel tanks or bomb racks. Stingers would be included only under circumstances where their end use could be assured — and that can't be done.

Continuing to sell relatively indiscriminately under faulty assumptions will lead to pouring endless arms down a bottomless pit in hopes of achieving something that cannot be reasonably expected.

Consider Egypt. Since the Camp David Accords, the U.S. has been the chief supplier of weapons to Egypt. For this, we appear to have expected a certain quid pro quo - continued peace with Israel and political support when needed. By holding joint military exereises with Egypt as well, we appear to have assumed a certain level of military support. This is not a reasonable assumption.

As in the case of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. should have expected that Egyptian loyalty could not be bought with U.S. weapons. However, it appears that the U.S. on several occasions asked Egypt to join a U.S.-led expedition against Libya based on the joint exercises we have held in the past. The Egyptians declined because, as President Mubarak has stated often, Egypt will not attack any Arab country that has not attacked Egypt. That includes Libya.

What was the policy consideration that led the U.S. into these expensive joint exercises with Egypt in the first place? What had we hoped to achieve for our effort? If the exercises are solely to protect Egypt from an attack against Egyptian soil and Egyptian interests, we are getting very little. If they are to call a joint force into action to protect joint U.S.-Egyptian interests, the Egyptians failed their first real test. If they are only to be used when the two parties agree on the nature of the threat and the nature of the enemy, we may be pouring a lot of money down a hole. We might want to renegotiate our options.

In all three cases, losing sight of what we hope and plan to achieve has led us to skip too quickly over the part of the foreign policy debate that asks what we are getting for what we are giving away.

Yarmulkas in the Military: Part II

In an editorial a year ago, JINSA argued that the U.S. Supreme Court ought to refrain from deciding whether military personnel who desire to wear a yarmulka while on duty should be permitted to do so. The issue should be left to the armed forces, we felt, and military authorities ought to recognize that the wearing of yarmulkas as a matter of religious faith poses no threat to discipline.

The Snpreme Court has, in the case of Orthodox Jewish Air Force Captain Simcha Goldman, sustained the priority of the military dress code over the right of the individual. While we had hoped they would not choose to rule at all, the way in which the Court majority articulated its decision — and the grounds on which the minority dissented — are both reassuring.

In effect, the Supreme Court ruled that permitting Jews to wear yarmulkas might result in discriminating IN FAVOR of Judaism as compared to other minority religions which also have distinctive requirements as to clothing or personal appearance.

The dissenting and concurring arguments are well summarized by Justice Brennan for the minority and Justice Stevens for the majority. Justice Brennan wrote:

> Although turbans, saffron robes and dreadlocks are not before us in this case, and must each be evaluated against the reasons a service branch offers for prohibiting personnel from wearing them while in uniform, a reviewing court could legitimately give deference to dress and grooming rules that have a REASONABLE basis in, for example, functional utility, health and safety considerations and the goal of a polished, professional appearance.

Justice Stevens wrote:

> The interest in uniformity, however, has a dimension that is of still greater importance for me. It is the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious faiths. The very strength of Captain Goldman's claim creates the danger that a similar claim on behalf of a Sikh or a Rastafarian might readily be dismissed. For the difference between a turban or a dreadlock on the one hand, and a yarmulka on the other, is not merely a difference in "appearance" - it is also the difference between a Sikh or a Rastafarian on the one hand, and an Orthodox Jew on the other.
>
> The Air Force has no business drawing distinctions between such persons when it is enforcing commands of universal application.

Jews are likely to receive this decision with mixed feelings — we do. It is extremely difficult to see how a yarmulka harms military discipline and easy, on the other hand, to apply the additional criteria Justice Brennan proposes. However, those rules would likely be perceived on all sides as distinguishing between mainline and fringe religions. For those of us who have been uncomfortable through the years with the "this is a Christian country" pronouncements that leave Jews on the outside, the prospect of being included in a "Judeo-Christian" majority that leaves others on the outside cannot be philosophically pleasing.

Moreover, even the majority opinion does not ban yarmulkas outright. The Court left room for the sort of informal compromise that had long governed the issue on military installations, and that we hope will continue to prevail.

Efforts to solve the problem by legislation will, we fear, be more divisive than constructive. Good will and pragmatic common sense by all concerned will yield better results in the long run. A fresh attempt to resolve this type of problem is called for by all branches of the military service.

The Oil Glut is Not Forever

by Lawrence Goldmuntz

Ed Note: Dr. Goldmuntz is a consultant in energy affairs and a member of the JINSA Board of Advisors.

At what level of oil imports is there a threat to the nation's economy and security? Is the level 4, 8, or 12 million barrels/day? Or is there no threat at any level? If there is deemed to be a threat at some level, what is it and what precautions should the Federal government adopt? In order to address these issues, consider the following background facts:

1. U.S. oil resources are being depleted more rapidly than those in the rest of the world. The U.S. reserve to production ratio is the lowest among significant producers. There are 1.2 wells/sq. mi. of sedimentary basin in the U.S., while only 0.02 well/sq. mi. of basin in the rest of the world.

2. Lower oil prices decrease exploitable U.S. resources and the incentive to discover and develop new resources. This will be reflected in decreased production during the next decade. Domestic exploration and development budgets have been cut at least 50%.

3. Lower oil prices increase U.S. consumption. This will be reflected more rapidly than the decrease in production. Utilities have stand-by generating capacity that could consume 2-million barrels/day.

4. Lower prices decrease incentives to develop foreign resources, leaving those significant producers with low production to reserve ratios — the Persian Gulf countries — as the most important producers. This will occur toward the end of the next decade.

5. Lower prices increase world consumption and will absorb OPEC's excess capacity before the end of the decade.

Applying long-term (5-10 year) production and consumption elasticities to decreases in oil prices from $28/barrel, one can predict the following:

1. At the price of $20/barrel, there is a possible 190% increase in imports to 9.3 million barrels/day.

2. At the price of $15/barrel, U.S. imports could increase 250% over present levels. This equals 12-million barrels/day.

3. At the same time, demand on OPEC production will increase by 9-million barrels/day if the world oil price settles at $20/barrel and will increase to 13-million barrels/day if the the oil price settles at $15/barrel. This will consume OPEC's present excess capacity.

This is the traditional double whammy made famous in the 1970s: U.S. production decreases, while increased world consumption tightens available world supply. The U.S. — and many others — then became dependent on the Persian Gulf. Mexico and Canada will not be able to supply the projected huge increase in U.S. needs. Furthermore, Mexico follows OPEC's pricing and production policies, Canada follows OPEC's pricing policies. So OPEC, being the supplier of last resort, will set prices. The oil shock of 1979 is estimated by the International Energy Agency to have cost the GNPs of OECD countries one trillion dollars in one year — as well as substantial unemployment and inflation. The future shock of 1995 could be worse.

This scenario is a threat to our national security and, at the very least, to the economic well-being of the country. The U.S. government does have a responsibility to alleviate this future shock. Free market economists will argue that if oil prices increase toward the end of the next decade, then the world energy infrastructure will react — as it has in the past. However, the lag time of such reactions is longer than the reaction time of market prices. It takes ten years to turn over the automotive fleet or build a coal or nuclear plant. Certainly a problem of this magnitude can be anticipated and, thereby, handled with less stress. Our trading partners in the OECD criticize us for being the largest oil importer with the lowest prices to our consumers.

At the price of $15/barrel, U.S. imports increase 250% over todays levels. This equals 12-million barrels/day . . . At the same time, demand on OPEC production . . . will increase to 13-million barrels/day.

What must the U.S. do over the next decade? Decrease oil consumption, maintain oil production, and promote the development of additional international oil resources.

There are a number of alternatives to meet each objective.

Import Taxes

One could decrease consumption by regulation, such as prescribing automotive fuel economy, the setting of thermostats, limiting the use of oil in utilities and industrial plants, etc. Or, one could increase the cost of oil by excise taxes on gasoline, fuel oil, and diesel or by an oil import tax. One could promote production by providing all sorts of tax incentives to oil drillers. Or broad incentives could be provided by imposing an oil import tax. The experience of the last few years recommends against detailed regulations and tax incentives, and suggests that objectives in the national interest be achieved by broad financial measures. A tax on gasoline influences less than 50% of oil-product consumption, and does not affect oil consumption in some sectors of the economy where there is substantial elasticity, such as utilities, industry and rail and river transportation.

With respect to utilities, one should keep in mind that they have oil-fueled generators on stand-by of sufficient capacity to use two-million barrels/day of oil. Utilities may not complete coal and nuclear plants if they can buy oil at $15/barrel, and furthermore, may elect to meet demand growth with these stand-by plants. So when analysts are skeptical about price elasticity — quipping that residents will not rip insulation out of their homes — it is appropriate to keep in mind some of the other elements of elasticity, such as utility stand-by capacity.

The development of additional international oil resources, in the face of temporarily declining prices, can be achieved by using U.S. market power.

Federal Help

For example, the Secretary of the Department of Energy could be entitled to allocate U.S. imports of petroleum in the national interest. His authority could extend up to some limit of total present and projected U.S. imports — perhaps 25% — and up to some limit in time, perhaps 20 years and at prices that reflect, hopefully, some concession with respect to world prices at U.S. ports based on the length of the contract, the proximity of the country to the U.S., and the relative economic status of the nation involved.

The Secretary of Energy could have the authority not only to enter into these long-term contracts with appropriate suppliers, he could have the authority to "lay off" his purchases on those companies that import oil. His leverage in this regard could derive from an authority that enables him to require oil importers to accept a pro-rata portion of his long-term purchases for their own imports before they could be allowed to import from other sources.

An advantage of such long-term Federal purchase agreements with an exporting country is that they are fungible instruments. A nation can finance oil field developments, ugrading facilities and pipelines with the commercial international banking community using the long-term purchase order of the U.S. government as the basis for loans. Thus, it is not necessary for the U.S. government to advance funds to underdeveloped countries for them to exploit their resources; the existence of long-term U.S. purchase orders should facilitate international loans to those countries with potential oil resources. This arrangement has the advantage of broadening the credit or investment in an underdeveloped country from a single company or country to the international banking community. A violation of the agreement becomes a more serious matter to the offender.

SPR

What role should the Strategic Petroleum Reserve play to help this threat to U.S. security? At a 500 or even 750 million barrel level, the SPR can be important to relieve a temporary interruption of supply or can be used for a short period of time to counter cartel-induced price hikes. It should be used as both an economic and strategic resource. It is not useful to counter the 300-billion barrel resource of the Middle East when that is deployed against the oil importing nations for a long period of time. Over a long time period only domestic conservation, fuel switching and continuing proliferation of international oil resource development are useful.

Does the economy need the boost provided by lower oil costs and would an oil import tariff damage the economy? The tariff can be made revenue neutral by decreasing some other regressive tax proportionally, for example, the Social Security tax. The geographical impacts of the oil tariff cannot and should not be alleviated. It is important for New England to utilize Canadian gas and hydropower and local coal and nuclear electric plants. Perhaps New England could follow the Swedish example and use coal-based district heating systems to lower their consumption of fuel oil.

Windfall Profits

Should the U.S. tax away the "windfall" profit s that domestic producers would experience if an import tax were enacted? This depends on the level of imports that is deemed a threat to the economy and national security. If the "windfall" is taxed away, domestic production, at a $15/barrel price level in a 5-10 year time frame, is likely to decrease by approximately 3-million barrels/day and imports are likely to increase by this amount from whatever level of imports is achieved by the import tax. The "Windfall" improves the nation's security by a substantial amount, particularly in a time frame when OPEC has no unused capacity. It is probably not in the security interest of the U.S. to tax away "windfall" profits.

No nation should be exempted from the tariff. It is a national security tariff not a bar to free trade. Our neighbors will supply as much oil as they now do — our security concern is that imports should not double. Mexico could make up some income by exporting gas — which they once refused to do even though the price was more than double today's price; Mexico could increase its oil production; Mexico could use its oil in the U.S. strategic reserve as collateral for their bank loans, thus loweing the interest rate on their loans.

In the long term the U.S. should develop a strategy that would induce conservation and fuel switching at the lowest cost to the U.S. consumer. It would seem that some combination of an oil import tax and Federal policies to stimulate proliferation of international oil production, would be helpful to forestall the next oil shock. The oil import tax should be maintained until such time as considerable fuel switching had occurred. With further fuel switching and conservation in the utility, transportation and heating sectors, it should be possible to reduce domestic oil consumption to approximately two-thirds of the present 15-million barrel/day level. Without an oil import tax and some Federal stimulation of additional oil development, OPEC is likely to be back in the saddle just when U.S. imports peak. Not only will the U.S. consumer suffer once again, but U.S. national security will be gravely impaired.

FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO AFGHANISTAN

by Yossef Bodansky

Ed. Note: Mr. Bodansky is a frequent contributor to "Security Affairs".

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is directly evolved from the age-old Russian drive toward Central Asia and the warm water of the Indian Ocean. This relentless advance into Asia emerged from the struggle of the Slavic population for fertile land, and has become the focal point of Russian (and Soviet) expansionism. Russians (and Soviets) have historically perceived their advance into Central Asia as the only means by which their land-based military might could translate into strategic gains short of a major confrontation in Europe. Since the mid-1820s, the Russians have believed that the European Powers would acquiesce to the occupation of a Central Asian country because such a country would not be worthy fighting over. This is a major determining factor in Soviet Afghan policy.

Even prior to that, Muslim Turks and Russians had been in contact for a thousand, mostly hostle, years. As a bitter legacy of the Mongol invasion, the Great Russians have always perceived their struggle with the Turkic population of Central Asia in terms of "KTO-KOGO" (who gets whom), in which struggle there can be no compromises, or even pauses. The legacy of the "Tatar Yoke" constitutes a second major impetus for Soviet policy in Central Asia, including Afghanistan.

The Baluchi Revolt

The Soviets compare their position in Afghanistan to the suppression of the Basmachi revolt in the Soviet Union, revealing the Soviet understanding of, and expectations from, their current military operations in Afghanistan. The Basmachi revolt is divided into three stages, the most dangerous of which started soon after the 1917 Revolution, when Central Asian nationalities sought to assert their independence from Russian colonialism. Enver Pasha, a Turkish general committed to pan-Turkism, ceased cooperating with the Soviets and assumed leadership of the Basmachi forces. Special detachments of the Central Asia CHEKA (CHON) assassinated Enver Pasha in August 1922, starting the second stage of the revolt.

The rebels still enjoyed strong military forces and major engagements took place over the next decade. However, the Soviets believed that in the absence of credible leadership capable of uniting the Basmachi, it was only a question of time before they were fractured and submitted to Soviet control. Indeed, in the wake of a series of raids on Basmachi sanctuaries in northern Afghanistan in 1929-30, external support to the Basmachi ceased, and the revolt subsided within a year.

A very few zealots continued to conduct small-scale and infrequent skirmishes until the massive exiles of the late 1940s.

Afghanistan Today

The Soviets point out that the Afghan resistance today does not have capable leadership and that it is widely split among diversified organizations. Therefore, they believe, it is only a question of time before it collapses. They compare the current situation in the more volatile parts of Afghanistan to that of the Basmachi revolt in the mid-1920s, and compare other parts of Afghanistan to Central Asia in the late-1930s. The Soviets acknowledge that clashes with resistance will likely continue for the forseeable future. However, from an historical point of view, the fate of the resistance has already been decided, and it is doomed. Combat operations in Afghanistan might influence the time and price of suppressing the resistance, but not the outcome.

While suppressing the Basmachi revolt, the Soviet Armed Forces chose for long periods not to enter areas of Central Asia, leaving them to the control of the Basmachi. The areas were strategically insignificant and armed penetration would have cost the Soviets high casualties without changing the rate of suppression. Such a policy is currently pursued in Afghanistan.

Where the Soviets Are

The Soviets claim 25% of the history, concede that the resistance controls 10%, and define the rest (65%) as no-mansland, reflecting the situation fairly accurately. Since midl 980, the Soviets have been able to do whatever they wanted in Afghanistan, provided they were willing to pay the price. Professor Rabbani, the leader of Jamiat-i-Islami, admitted that "the Soviets feel comfortable in Afghanistan". At the height of their routine military operations, only 15% of Soviet troops in Afghanistan were committed to fighting the resistance. Currently, as a result of growing emphasis on special operations and improvement in the performance of the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) Armed Forces, an even smaller number of Soviet troops (about 5%) is actually involved in conducting combat operations.

The Afghan resistance is incapable of inflicting substantial damage on Soviet strategic assets and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Soviet casualty ratio, from, all causes, is below the casualty ratio caused during exercises and routine activities of the most active Soviet Fronts (The Far East Military District and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany). In other words, the Soviet casualty ratio is acceptable to Soviet authorities.

Soviet Goals

Russian/Soviet military strategy has been the rapid consolidation of control over local strategic objectives, and only then, beginning the long and gradual submission of the local Muslim population. The Russians have always adhered to the Kazakh proverb: "It takes 50 years to remold a people," and Soviet activities in Afghanistan clearly indicate that their goals and priorities have not changed.

On the basis of accumulated Russian/Soviet experience since the early 18th century, preconditions for the occupation of Muslim territories and the suppression of local insurrection and resistance are threefold:

1. destruction of the local leadership, and especially its ability to achieve unity;
2. erosion of the population base through destruction of the local social and economic infrastructure; and
3. effective isolation of the region.

The primary Soviet goals in Afghanistan are maintaining a secure power-projection strategic infrastructure, a safe "show-case" Kabul, and preventing escalation of resistance activities from Pakistan. Since Russian military strategy has been formulated to deny assets to the enemy rather than to control the entire territory and pacify the population - in Afghanistan, the Soviets have been doing well.

The Soviets claim to control 25% of Afghan territory, say the resistance controls 10%, with the remaining 65% a noman's land.

Since 1978, there have been three major Soviet decision making events in which their Afghan policy was determined. In the spring of 1978, the Soviets recognized Afghanistan as a Socialist State and extended the Brezhnev Doctrine to it. (Once a Soviet-type client state, always a Soviet-type client state.) Consequently, the Soviets had to escalate their involvement, leading to the Invasion of 1979. In the spring of 1980, the Soviets realized their forces would be in Afghanistan indefinitely, and decided the object of their deployment would be to further Soviet strategic and global interests. This determined the nature and organization of the Soviet deployment. In the winter of 1983-1984, the Soviets recognized the intensity of Afghanistan's traditional Muslim society, and that insurrection might become a threat to the stability of the Muslim population of the USSR. This has determined the nature and ferocity of the current campaign against the resistance. These perceptions of Afghanistan are the key to understanding the Soviet approach to Afghanistan and to Central and South-West Asia as a whole.

The Afghan People

The Soviets believe the Afghan population did not undergo that monumental event that can transform nationalities from one status to another - a Revolution. The Afghan nationalities perceive and define their identity in accordance with similar expressions of everyday life religion, language and cultural behavior. This makes it very difficult to establish a Socialist State within the boundaries of present-day Afghanistan. Furthermore, the nationalities of northern Afghanistan have more in common with their brethern north of the Amu-Daraya (in the Soviet Union) than with those south of the Hindu-Kush (Southern Afghanistan).

This has led to an intense campaign of "Sovietization" in the northern provinces of Afghanistan; a "creeping annexation" to the Soviet Union. The Soviets emphasize that the boundaries of ethnic territories correspond to the communication potential of the society at each stage of its social and economic history. It is those boundaries that count, for them, not tribal "artificial borders". Consequently, they believe that long-range stability will be achieved only in the wake of a "regional solution". What does that entail? Large-scale changes in the map of Central Asia.

Redrawing the Map

By September 1985, the Soviets had escalated their campaign to and foment exacerbate nationalist sentiments, focusing on the most turbulent nationalities of the region: Baluchis, Pushtuns and Nuristanis. Their tribal territories were divided among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran by the colonial superpowers, and their self-identity and culture have been suppressed (at times with extreme violence) since independence in the course of "nation building" efforts.

After decades of covert exacerbation of these nationalities, the Soviets have made them the primary objective of the DRA regional policy. As with other successful Russian activities with Muslim nationalities and ethnic groups over the last 200 years, this campaign is based on indiginous rifts exacerbated for Soviet gain. In a series of fierce speeches in the Assembly of Border Tribes, Afghan president Babrak Karmal called for the revival of a unified and autonomous Baluchistan, Pushtunistan and Nuristan. He emphasized that "The unity of Pushtuns and Baluchis is also the guarantor of freedom, progress, unification and national maturity for the Pushtuns and Baluchis." This unity, of course, would require the dismemberment of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and portions of Iran. There has been a very favorable reaction to the DRA initiative among wide segments of the three nationalities. In mid-November a series of tribal uprisings in Pushtunistan culminated a month later in a major clash with the Pakistani Army and the closing of the Khyber Pass.

Military Policy

Long-term Soviet regional should not be confused with military policy to address specific challenges in Afghanistan. The Soviet military strategy is designed to facilitate the eventual attainment of the long-term strategy.

The Soviet approach to the Afghan resistance is identical to the classic solutions

(Continued on page 6)

YES THERE IS A "MORAL EQUIVALENCE" BUT NOT NECESSARILY WHERE YOU THINK

by Jim Guirard, Jr.

Ed. Note: Mr. Guirard is a governmental affairs consultant and a frequent contributor to "Security Affairs".

The Reagan administration is much concerned about people who speak and act as though there were a "moral equivalence" between the United States and the Soviet Union. The President, Secretary of State George Schultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger have all addressed the subject in recent months.

Unfortunately, their worry is not farfetched. Last year, when the question *"Do you or do you not hold that the USSR and the United States are morally equivalent?"* was put to the Oxford (England) Student Union, the "nays" carried by only a slender margin.

The same would probably result from a poll of the leadership of certain radicalized churches, certain university faculties and certain elements of the media in this country — those who former US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has labeled the "Blame America First" crowd.

In fact, one prominent journalist refused last year even to participate in a conference co-sponsored by the state Department and the Shavano Institute, because he did not wish to lend his presence to a debate whose conclusion might be that such a moral equivalence did NOT exist between the US and the USSR.

In the minds and pronouncements of such people, the American and Soviet armed forces are equally militaristic and warmongering. Our nuclear stockpiles are equally threatening. The CIA and KGB are equally sinister. The American liberation of Grenada is equated to the Soviet so-called "liberation" of Afghanistan. Any evil the Soviets do, America is alleged to have done as bad, or worse.

More than a few of these strange people go even one step farther. They speak of President Reagan as a "fascist" and of Fidel Castro as a "progressive leader" — which suggests that Castroite tyranny is morally SUPERIOR to American multiparty democracy.

Even the language of politics has turned to value-free terms -- the "superpowers," the "East-West conflict", Such labels imply that there is minimal moral distinction betwe en the defenders and the repressors of human rights and civil liberties in the world. Virtually forgotten are such powerful phrases as President John F. Kennedy used repeatedly to make the proper distinction — "the Free World versus the Communist World". Kennedy knew (and cared) what the Berlin Wall was all about. He knew (and cared) about what Fidel Castro had in mind for Central and Latin America.

Of course, there is a powerful moral equivalence afoot in the world of geopolitics. But it most certainly is not between communist tyranny and civil-libertarian democracy. It is between the mirror-image tyrannies of the "ultra-left" (Leninis m, Stalinism, Castroism) and the "ultra-right" (Nazism, fascism).

Many prominent liberal-intellectuals would (and do!) strongly protest the drawing of an equation between communism and faseism. Some have even branded President Reagan as evil for having dared to call the Soviet Empire "evil". Such people prefer to take comfort in the naive notion that the rulers of the Empire (Gorbachev, Castro, Mengistu, Qaddafi, Ortega, et al) really do go around promoting "liberation" and "social justice" and "people's democracy" in the world.

But there are other, more objective experts who have drawn precisely such an equation between the so-called "extremes" of the imagined left-right "political spectrum". Here is a sampling of their conclusions as to where the real moral equivalence in today's world lies:

SUSAN SONTAG (liberal-intellectual author and literary critic): "Not only is fascism (and overt military rule) the probable destiny of all communist societies — especially when their populations are moved to revolt — but communism is itself a variant, the most successful variant, of fascism."

ADOLF HITLER (National Socialist dictator of Germany): "The petit bourgeois Social Democrat and trade union boss will never make a National Socialist, but the communist always will...There is more that unites us than divides us from Bolshevism...above all the genuine revolutionary spirit."

SENATOR DANIEL MOYNIHAN (Democratic Senator from New York): "The most brutal totalitarian regimes in the world call themselves 'liberation movements'...Yuri Andropov is 'a terrorist in a system sustained by terror'."

JOSEPH SOBRAN (conservative columnist): "On the subject of communism, history has spoken in a shrill monotone. Never mind the ideology: communism is as communism does. Like every other system, it deserves to be judged on its record, not its promises. That record is bloodier even than Nazism's."

ANDREI SAKHAROV (Russian dissident and Nobel Peace Prize winner, to Soviet officials at 1978 trial of fellow dissident Anatoly Scharansky): "You are not humans. You are fascists. Hear me, a member of the Academy of Sciences. You are FASCISTS."

BERNARD-HENRI LEVY (French intellectual of the "New Philosophers" movement): "I am the bastard child of an unholy union between fascism and Stalinism...The only revolution I know, the one which may grant notoriety to this century, is the Nazi plague and red fascism."

PROF. A. JAMES GREGOR (author of The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics, Princeton Univ. Press, 1974): "...faseist and communist regimes are subspecies of one and the same species...In substance, whatever distinctions there are between 'fascist' and 'communist' movements in terms of ideological commitments — they are singularly superficial."

HARRY S. TRUMAN (Former President of the United States): "There is no difference in totalitarian or police states, call them what you will: Nazi, fascist, communist or Argentine Republics."

There are, indeed, many "moral equivalents" in the world of international politics. But these are AMONG the various democratic systems, on the one hand, and AMONG the various despotisms, on the other.

Hitler and Stalin demonstrate the point to perfection. Following their infamous Friendship Pact of 1939-41 (which had been preceded by several years of secret collaboration) those two socialist monsters came to blows not because they were different but because they were inherently the same. The moral equivalence they shared was the brutal AMORALITY of tyrants bent on world domination. Finally, they fought each other to the death for the same reasons mad dogs or Mafia bosses do — for power, for total control.

As Susan Sontag has observed, "Communism is it self a variant, the most successful variant, of fascism." The sooner true liberals and true progressives recognize this fact, the sooner they will cease holding hands with the Gestapo-left.

REFORMING THROUGH REORGANIZATION:

SOLUTIONS TO MILITARY PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS

by Rep. Jim Courter (R-NJ)

America's defense procurement problems have made our noble military institutions the objects of scorn and ridicule. Tongue-in-cheek television commericals depict unscrupulous supply officers substituting inexpensive beer for the high-priced variety and absconding with the difference; editorial cartoonists render the Secretary of Defense laboring under the yoke of a $700 toilet seat. Fat-cat contractors and bloated bureaucrats are now among our dominant national stereotypes.

Unfortunately, all stereotypes have at their core a kernel of truth. We do face a grave crisis in confidence in our military procurement system, but in order to restore credibility, the system must undergo fundamental changes, not merely cosmetic cover-ups. And in order to make these changes, we must recognize that all three major elements of the "Military-Industrial Congressional Complex"--The Pentagon, the defense contractors and the Congress—contribute their fair share to procurement abuses.

Most reform efforts have been focused upon the defense industry, but the Pentagon and the Congress are sorely in need of reform, as well. Much of the Pentagon procurement activity ($15 billion per year) is conducted by the Defense Logistics Agency, a 50,000-man omnibus buying bureaucracy which was responsible for the $700 toilet seat and other overpriced spare parts.

The DLA was originally created to buy items like cornflakes and horseblankets which all the military services needed. That was 20 years ago. Now, 70% of DLA's purchases are made for only one service. What's more, three-fourths of DLA's annual budget goes to pay personnel costs, and the Agency is headed by a high ranking military officer who is not accountable to any elected officials. Now you begin to see where some of our military procurement abuses arise. The DLA, quite simply, should be abolished.

The other major source of concern is the Congress itself. Forty Congressional Committees and Subcommittees oversee the Pentagon, holding hundreds of hearings, demanding countless reports, and making thousands of requests. Every Pentagon procurement decision, from the momentous to the mundane, is exhaustively scrutinized by the Congress. Recently, when Defense Secretary Weinberger pleaded for some relief from this oversight burden, he was told to prepare four more reports on precisely how much and what kind of relief he was seeking. Congress, quite simply, must curb its appetite for "over-oversight" and put its bloated Committee structure on a strict diet.

The slowly grinding operations of the "MilitaryCon gressional Complex" serve toconfirm what is knownin Washington as Augustine's Law of Propagation and Misery: "If a sufficient number of management layers are superimposed on top of each other, it can be assured that disaster is not left to chance."

Rep. Jim Courter

In this era of tight Federal budgets and a burgeoning Soviet military threat, America's defenses can ill afford any more disasters. The streamlining of our Pentagon and Congressional defense bureaucracies will help ensure that we once again receive the greatest possible "bang for the buck."

AFGHAN (Continued from page 4)

to Central Asian problems over the last 150 years. The most interesting modern development is the Soviet realization of the futility of a socialist solution. They have confronted the Muslim Afghan realities, and have proven their willing to adopt and pursue not only classic Russian goals and aspirations, but also classic Russian socio-military solutions. The Soviets are devastatingly effective against the Afghan resistance, and in 1985-86, are closer than ever to total victory.

The Soviets define the following military preconditions as the keys to success in suppressing a Muslim insurgency:

1. deep intelligence penetration and manipulation of the hostile population;

2. deep raiding capabilities and the ability to conduct surgical strikes against priority objectives; and

3. the ability to rapidly inflict massive collateral damage on the civilian infrastructure to erode popular support for the resistance.

Russian/Soviet conduct of military operations in Central Asia since the emergence of their modern Armed Forces (at the end of the 18th century) can be divided into three major periods. The formulation of the operational art took place between the 1780s and 1916. The integration of mechanization (aircraft, armoured-cars and chemical weapons) into the operational art took place between 1917 and 1945. In 1980, the Soviets introducted flexible and automated troop-control and autonomous small unit combat operations into their operational art and tactics - in other words, the growth of counterinsurgency warfare. The most significant development in the Soviet operational art has been the complete integration of the troop-control of the combined arms subunits with a diversified array of weapons, resulting in their growing sophistication and effectiveness.

The goal of these operations is to put the subversive organization constantly on the defensive through a series of devastating surprise strikes on its very deep sanctuaries. Such operations have three key requirements:

1) operational flexibility and autonomy in the small unit;

2) the availability of superior and flexible fire power (including chemical weapons); and

3) a complete intelligence picture.

Soviet Successes

The moment the Soviets succeeded in integrating these three elements, the Afghan resistance started to suffer serious defeats.

As mentioned above, Soviet forces in Afghanistan do not attempt to pacify areas in which they encounter resistance. When a village is known to be cooperating with the resistance, the Soviets use special forces to destroy the entire village so as not to give away intelligence assets, and to demonstrate to the resistance that Soviet special forces can get them everywhere - and by surprise.

The Soviets have made a special effort to penetrate the most conservative, traditional sectors of the population, and compile an accurate picture of the situation of the resistance at any given moment. They also rely on their excellent intelligence penetration of the resistance to conduct deep raids into their sanctuaries. Raids are usually conducted to seize newly arrived weapons and supplies before they are disseminated, and to capture or assassinate resistance commanders. The most significant special operations are these conducted by SPETSNAZ 3-man teams in the deep rear of the enemy. There are also quite a few cases where a resistance commander, who was a KhAD agent, deliberately led his force into a devastatingly effective Soviet DRA ambush.

History shows that the turning point in the Russian/Soviet struggle for the control of Muslim territories has been when they succeeded in isolating the population and severing external support to the local resistance. Soviet special operations have brought the population to the breaking point, while logistical hardships prevent the effective dissemination of aid to the resistance, resulting in their virtual isolation.

Together, these two trends constitute the key to Soviet success. If they continue, Afghanistan can be written off by the West and the Soviets will be encouraged to continue their persistant advance toward warm waters and toward the Near East.

The Soviet Union is winning in Afghanistan. On the other hand, escalation of the struggle in Afghanistan is bound to have long term influence on the Soviet Empire. Although the decision to pursue regional rather than socialist solutions led Soviets to be more pragmatic and effective, it has also exposed the Soviet Muslim population to outside influence and subversion, because northern Afghanistan is now closer to the USSR. The Central Asian population has learned that a Socialist Revolution can be reversed in favor of nationalist, tribal policies.

The tenets of Islam have been the source of the commitment and ferocity of the resistance to Soviet occupation in Central Asia and Afghanistan. However, the same adherance has been the prime reason for the inability of the resistance to effectively confront the Soviet forces, ultimately leading to its collapse and the subjugation of the Muslim population by the USSR. The Soviets are correct when they identify the current situation in Afghanistan as a component of a historical process leading to a regional solution. The West cannot alter historical realities. Western countries should understand and capitalize on historical developments to help bring about favourable results for the entire region.

NEWSBRIEFS

THE VERDICT ON GENERAL 'UMAR: ON 30 MARCH, THE STATE SECURITY COURT OF SUDAN SENTENCED GENERAL 'UMAR MUHAMMAD AL-TAYYIB TO 20 YEARS IN PRISON. In the March issue of "Security Affairs", JINSA presented the case of General 'Umar, who was the Sudanese connection to the rescue of Ethiopian Jews. Although the trial focused almost entirely on the General's role in Operation Moses, nowhere was it mentioned in the sentence. It appears that General 'Umar received 10 years for "Article 136/misuse of authority", and 10 years for "Article 136-84/incitement".

The next day, the official Sudanese news agency SUNA carried a commentary reading in part, "The United States expressed its displeasure with the Khartoum trials that revealed its complicity with the previous dictatorial regime in transferring the Falasha Jews to Israel...The trials revealed aggressive U.S. plots which eventually serve U.S. monopoly interests and the Israeli enemy."

Another Sudanese paper notes, "The U.S. stand is not surprising. The United States, a superpower, continues to topple the Nicaraguan Government by mining ports and allocating millions of dollars to topple the government of that country."

BRITS STILL TRAINING LIBYAN PILOTS: The British Oxford Air Training School has continued to train three Libyan civilian pilots, even after one student's voice was picked up by the BBC in a Tripoli Radio broadcast saying, "The Revolutionary Force at Oxford Aerodrome, Britain...prepared to become suicide squads against America and its arrogance."

The Oxford Training School is less than five minutes flying from the U.S. F-III nuclear air base at Upper Heyford, and near several other major U.S. bases. Colin Beckwith, principal of the school said, "I am satisfied our Libyans are not a danger to anybody."

SOVIETS NEAR ISRAEL: According to a U.S. source, the Israeli Defense Ministry reported two Soviet destroyers and a Russian spy ship were positioned some 30-80 miles off the Israeli coast during the U.S.-Libyan confrontation. In addition, since January the Soviets have had their Mediterranean flagship patrolling along the coast of Libya.

Yuval Ne'eman, former chief of planning for the IDF, said the Soviets "are monitoring all Israeli signals, every (international) telephone conversation...and certainly messages going in and out of the country are being 'captured' by the (Soviet) spy ship which has enough electronic equipment to 'capture' even most (telephone) conversations within Israel itself."

FRENCH WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT: Withdrawal of the 45-member ceasefire observer force came two weeks after the kidnappers of four Frenchmen demanded the withdrawal.

STINGERS TO AFGHANS & ANGOLANS: The Reagan Administration has decided to ship Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to anticommunist rebels in Afghanistan and Angola. Previously, the rebels had only been supplied with recycled weapons that could not he traced to the U.S., according to one source.

YELLOW RAIN CONFIRMED: A Canadian research team is prepared to release the most conclusive proof to date that yellow rain is a man-made weapon. The study, conducted by the Ottawa-based Defense Research Establishment, found positive yellow-rain sampled from an attack site and what appears to be part of a weapon.

LIBYAN SQUADRON IN GEORGIA: A squadron of Libyan C-130s, purchased 13 years ago, is still sitting on a field at the Lockheed Georgia plant. The Libyans contracted for the planes in 1973, and paid for them, but when they were ready, the State Department embargoed them. Lockheed applies annually for a license to ship the planes to Libya, but is annually denied. A Lockheed spokesman said, "Libya apparently doesn't blame Lockheed for the no-show, or at least it isn't making a fuss. We haven't talked to those people since '78 or '79", although Libya paid $42 million for the planes.

DRYDOCKING SUBS? The Administration is apparently considering drydocking two Poseidon nuclear submarines rather than having them dismantled in May as required by the SALT II treaty. This would be the first action under what the Administration has proposed as "proportional responses" to Soviet violations of SALT II and other arms-control agreements.

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