SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

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The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations on the maps are not necessarily authoritative.

The illustrations of Soviet strategic defense facilities and systems included in this publication are derived from various U.S. sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible.

Preface

In March 1983, President Reagan presented a dramatic new vision of a world in which we would no longer have to depend on nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear conflict. He presented that vision, and that challenge, in this way:

> What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the President announced that night, marks the first, essential step toward the realization of his ultimate goal. The SDI is a research program, designed to examine the promise of effective defenses against ballistic missiles based on new and emerging technologies. If such defenses prove feasible, they would provide for a more stable and secure method of preventing war in the future, through the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses which threaten no one.

The Strategic Defense Initiative has been the subject of much discussion within the United States and allied countries since its initiation. Such exchanges are essential in our free societies and can only help ensure that the vision behind the research program can be achieved. There has been comparatively little public discussion, however, about the trend in Soviet defensive as well as offensive forces which provides the essential backdrop to the SDI. Indeed, the Soviet Union has intentionally tried to mislead the public about its strategic defense activities.

As this publication documents, Soviet efforts in most phases of strategic defense have long been far more extensive than those of the United States. The USSR has major passive defense programs, designed to protect important assets from attack. It also has extensive active defense systems, which utilize weapons systems to protect national territory, military forces, or key assets. Soviet developments in the area of active defenses fall into three major categories: air defense; ballistic missile defense based on current technologies; and research and development on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.

Important recent Soviet activities in strategic defenses include:

- Upgrading and expansion of the world's only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system around Moscow;
- Construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty;
- Extensive research into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles including laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons;
- Maintenance of the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system;
- Modernization of their strategic air defense forces; and
- Improvements in their passive defenses by maintaining deep bunkers and blast shelters for key personnel, and enhancing the survivability of some offensive systems through mobility and hardening.

The following pages examine in detail Soviet programs in defenses against ballistic missiles, air defense, and passive defense. A summary of key Soviet offensive

force developments is presented in the annex to this document, since those are critical to an understanding of the impact of Soviet strategic defense programs. Soviet offensive forces are designed to be able to limit severely U.S. and allied capability to retaliate against attack. Soviet defensive systems in turn are designed to prevent those retaliatory forces which did survive an attack from destroying Soviet targets.

Given the long-term trend in Soviet offensive and defensive force developments, the United States must act in three main areas to maintain security and stability both in near term and in the future.

First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear forces in order to ensure the essential military balance in the near term, and to provide the incentives necessary for the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions.

Second, we must act now to start constructing a more reliable strategic order for the long term by examining the potential for future effective defenses against ballistic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a prudent and necessary response to the ongoing extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ABM capability beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. The overriding importance of the Strategic Defense Initiative, however, is the promise it offers of moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence in the future and of providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union to agree to progressively deeper negotiated reduction in offensive nuclear arms.

The third approach is one of negotiation and diplomacy. We are even now looking forward to a transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. Toward those ends, we are endeavoring at the negotiations in Geneva to achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between offensive and defensive forces and the possibility of a future transition to a more defense-reliant deterrence.

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

Introduction

In the late 1960s, given the state of defensive technology at the time, the United States came to believe that deterrence could best be assured if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly beyond any potential gains. That concept called for a reduction by both the Soviet Union and the United States in their strategic defensive forces, the maintenance of a balance between the two sides' offensive nuclear forces, and negotiated nuclear arms reductions which would maintain the balance at progressively lower levels.

In accordance with those principles, the United States exercised great restraint in offensive nuclear arms and at the same time dramatically lowered its defensive forces. Thus, we removed most of our defenses against Soviet bombers; decided to maintain a severely limited civil defense program; ratified the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed strict limits on U.S. and Soviet defenses against ballistic missiles; and then deactivated the one ABM site which we were allowed under that Treaty. The basic idea that stability and deterrence would be maintained if each side had roughly equal capability to retaliate against attack also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process of the 1970s.

The Soviet Union, however, failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that the United States hoped for when the SALT process began. The USSR has consistently refused to accept meaningful and verifiable negotiated reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have greatly expanded and modernized their offensive nuclear forces and invested an approximately equal sum in strategic defenses. The USSR has an extensive, multifaceted operational strategic defensive network which dwarfs that of the United States as well as an active research and development program in both traditional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory — precisely what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.

Soviet offensive and defensive force developments pose a serious challenge to the West. If left unchecked and unanswered, they would undermine our ability to retaliate effectively in case of Soviet attack. The situation would be even more severe if the Soviet Union were to have a monopoly on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles in addition to its sizable offensive and defensive forces. In that case, the USSR might come to believe that it could launch a nuclear attack against the United States or our allies without fear of effective retaliation. At the very least, it might see a realistic chance of successful nuclear blackmail.





Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense



The Moscow ballistic missile defenses identified in map at right include the Pushkino ABM radar, above, GALOSH anti-ballistic missile interceptors, top left, and new silo-based high-acceleration interceptors, top right.

Moscow. Each complex consisted of TRY ADD tracking and guidance radars and GALOSH interceptors (nuclear-armed, ground-based missiles designed to intercept warheads in space shortly before they reenter the Earth's atmosphere).

When completed, the modernized Moscow ABM system will be a two-layer defense composed of: silo-based, long-range, modified GALOSH interceptors; silo-based, high-acceleration interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The new system will have the 100 ABM

Ballistic Missile Early Warning, Target-Tracking, and Battle Management



launchers permitted by the ABM Treaty and could be fully operational by 1987.

The Soviet system for detection and tracking of ballistic missile attack consists of a launch-detection satellite network, over-the-horizon radars, and a series of large phased-array radars.

The current launch-detection satellite network can provide about 30 minutes warning of any U.S. ICBM launch and determine the general origin of the missile. Two over-the-horizon radars directed at the U.S. ICBM fields also could give 30 minutes warning.

The next operational layer of ballistic missile detection consists of 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars at six locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite and over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide target-tracking data in support of anti-ballistic missile forces.



The 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars, at left, at six locations on the periphery of the USSR provide warning and target-tracking data in support of the Soviet ABM system. The DOG HOUSE radar, at right, provides battle management for the anti-ballistic missile interceptors around Moscow.

The Soviets are now constructing a network of six new large phased-array radars that can track more ballistic missiles with greater accuracy than the existing HEN HOUSE network. Five of these radars duplicate or supplement the coverage of the HEN HOUSE network, but with greatly enhanced capability. The sixth, under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, closes the final gap in the Soviet early warning radar coverage against ballistic missile attack. Together, the six new large phased-array radars form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest Soviet Union, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the southwest.

The United States is now constructing new ballistic missile early warning radars, known as PAVE PAWS, that are located on the periphery of our territory and oriented outward. Both the U.S. and the USSR, in signing the ABM Treaty, recognized the need for ballistic missile early warning radars. At the same time, they recognized that ballistic missile early warning radars can detect and track warheads at great distances and therefore have a significant anti-ballistic missile potential. Such an ABM capability would play an important role in a nationwide ABM defense, which the Treaty was designed to prevent. As a result, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed that future ballistic missile early warning radars must be located on a nation's periphery and oriented outward. In that way, the desirable and legitimate goal of early warning could be advanced while minimizing the danger that an effective nationwide battle management network could result.

The Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, including ballistic missile early warning, and violates the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is not located within a 150-kilometer radius of the national capital (Moscow) as required of ABM radars, nor is it located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and pointed outward as required for early warning radars. It is 3,700 kilometers from Moscow and is situated some 750 kilometers from the nearest border — Mongolia. Moreover, it is oriented not toward that border, but across approximately 4,000 kilometers of Soviet territory to the northeast.

The Soviet Union has claimed that the Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for space tracking, rather than ballistic missile early warning, and therefore does not violate the ABM Treaty. Its design, however, is not optimized for a space-tracking role, and the radar would, in any event, contribute little to the existing Soviet

space tracking network. Indeed, the design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of other radars that are known — and acknowledged by the Soviets — to be for ballistic missile detection and tracking, including ballistic missile early warning. Finally, it



The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation and capability of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk.



The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Pechora. The design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of the Pechora radar. Unlike the Pechora radar, however, the Krasnoyarsk radar does not meet the ABM Treaty requirement that early warning radars be located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and be oriented outward.

closes the last remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection coverage. The Krasnoyarsk radar, therefore, is being constructed in direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

The growing Soviet network of large phased-array ballistic missile detection and tracking radars, of which the Krasnoyarsk radar is a part, is of particular concern when linked with other Soviet ABM efforts. Such radars take years to construct; their existence might allow the Soviet Union to move rather quickly to construct a nationwide ABM defense if it chooses to do so. The Soviets are also developing components of a new ABM system which apparently are designed to allow them to construct individual ABM sites in a matter of months, rather than the years that are required for more traditional ABM systems. Soviet activities in this regard potentially violate the ABM Treaty's prohibition on the development of a mobile land-based ABM system or components. We estimate that by using these components, the Soviets could undertake rapidly-paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses of Moscow and defend key targets in the western USSR and east of the Urals by the early 1990s.

In addition, the Soviets have probably violated the prohibition on testing surface-to-air missile (SAM) components in an ABM mode by conducting tests involving the use of SAM air defense radars in ABM-related testing activities. Moreover, the SA-10 and SA-X-12 SAM systems may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles.

Taken together, all of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related activities are more significant — and more ominous — than any one considered individually. Cumulatively, they suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

Advanced Technologies for Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

In the late 1960s, in line with its long-standing emphasis on strategic defense, the Soviet Union initiated a substantial research program into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles. That program covers many of the same technologies involved in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, but represents a far greater investment of plant space, capital, and manpower.

Laser Weapons

The USSR's laser program is much larger than U.S. efforts and involves over 10,000 scientists and engineers and more than a half dozen major research and development facilities and test ranges. Much of this research takes place at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where the Soviets also conduct traditional ABM research. Facilities there are estimated to include several air defense lasers, a laser that



The directed-energy R&D site at Sary Shagan proving ground includes ground-based lasers that could be used in an antisatellite role today and possibly a ballistic missile defense role in the future.

may be capable of damaging some components of satellites in orbit, and a laser that could be used in feasibility testing for ballistic missile defense applications. A laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet effort would cost roughly $1 billion per year in the U.S.

The Soviets are conducting research in three types of gas lasers considered promising for weapons applications: the gas-dynamic laser; the electric discharge laser; and the chemical laser. Soviet achievements in this area, in terms of output power, have been impressive. The Soviets are also aware of the military potential of visible and very short wave-length lasers. They are investigating excimer, free-electron, and x-ray lasers, and have been developing argon-ion lasers for over a decade.

The Soviets appear generally capable of supplying the prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary components needed for most laser and other directed-energy weapons. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic generator which produces over 15 megawatts of electrical power — a device that has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack their targets. Thus, they produced a 1.2-meter segmented mirror for an astrophysical telescope in 1978 and claimed that this was a prototype for a 25-meter mirror that would be constructed in the future. A large mirror is considered necessary for a space-based laser weapon.

Unlike the U.S., the USSR has now progressed in some cases beyond technology research. It already has ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites, and could have prototype space-based antisatellite laser weapons by the end of the decade. The Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s, and could begin testing components for a large-scale deployment system in the early 1990s.

The remaining difficulties in fielding an oper-

Soviet ABM/Space Defense Programs



Soviet programs for ABM and Space Defense, which include advanced technologies and space based weapons, were in place prior to the 1972 ABM Treaty and have continued to expand in scope and size. During the same time period, U.S. ABM/Space Defense research has been limited in scope as well as the level of effort in terms of resources invested.

*Potential capability of the Moscow ABM system.

ational system will require still more development time. An operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be deployed until the late 1990s, or after the year 2000. If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets may deploy operational space-based antisatellite lasers in the 1990s, and might be able to deploy space-based laser systems for defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000.

Particle Beam Weapons

Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been involved in research to explore the feasibility of space-based weapons that would use particle beams. We estimate that they may be able to test a prototype particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the electronics of satellites in the 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy satellites could follow later. A weapon capable of physically destroying missile boosters or



The USSR's operational antisatellite interceptor is launched from the Tyuratam Space Complex, where two launch pads and storage for additional interceptors and launch vehicles are available.



The Soviet orbital antisatellite (ASAT) weapon is operational and designed to destroy space targets with a multi-pellet blast.

warheads probably would require several additional years of research and development.

It is still uncertain whether ground-based charged particle-beam weapons are feasible — that is, whether the beam will propagate in the atmosphere. A space-based neutral particle beam weapon, however, would not be affected by the atmosphere or by the earth's magnetic field.

Soviet efforts in particle beams, and particularly on ion sources and radio frequency quadrupole accelerators for particle beams, are very impressive. In fact, much of the U.S. understanding as to how particle beams could be made into practical defensive weapons is based on Soviet work conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Radio Frequency Weapons

The USSR has conducted research in the use of strong radio frequency signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets could test a ground-based radio frequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the 1990s.

Kinetic Energy Weapons

The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic en-

ergy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. In the 1960s, the USSR developed an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 25 kilometers per second in air and over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum.

Long-range, space-based kinetic-energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid-1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near-term a short-range, space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in guidance and control systems probably are adequate for effective kinetic energy weapons for use against some objects in space.

Computer and Sensor Technology

Advanced weapons programs — including potential advanced defenses against ballistic missiles — are also dependent on remote sensor and computer technologies which are currently more highly developed in the West than in the Soviet Union. The Soviets are therefore devoting considerable resources to improving their abilities and expertise in these technologies. An important part of that effort involves an increasing exploitation of open and clandestine access to Western technology. For example, the Soviets have long been engaged in a well-funded effort to purchase U.S. high-technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and sensors illegally through third parties.

Antisatellite Developments

The USSR has had for more than a dozen years the world's only operational antisatellite system, a co-orbital device which enters into the same orbit as its target satellite and, when it gets close enough, destroys the satellite by exploding a conventional warhead. In addition, the nuclear-armed GALOSH ABM interceptor deployed around Moscow may have ASAT capability, and Soviet ground-based lasers could possibly damage some sensors on some U.S. satellites.

Furthermore, as noted earlier, the Soviets are engaged in research and, in some cases development, of weapons which ultimately may serve as ballistic missile defense systems, but probably will first provide antisatellite capabilities.

Air Defense

Although the United States began dismantling most of its defenses against Soviet bombers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has continued to invest enormous resources in a wide array of strategic air defense weapon systems. Taken together, the Soviet strategic air defense network is a potent and increasingly capable force which would attempt to limit the retaliatory capability of our strategic bombers and cruise missiles.

The Soviets have deployed numerous strategic air defense systems with excellent capabilities against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes. They are now in the midst of a major program to improve their capabilities against aircraft and cruise missiles that fly at low altitudes. That effort includes partial integration of strategic and tactical air defenses, the upgrading of early warning and surveillance capabilities, the deployment of more efficient data transmission systems, and the development and initial deployment of new aircraft, associated air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.

Soviet Territorial Air Defense



Currently, the Soviets have nearly 12,000 SAM launchers at over 1,200 sites, 10,000 air defense radars, and more than 1,200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An additional 2,800 interceptors assigned to Soviet Air Forces (SAF) could also be employed in strategic defense missions. In contrast, the U.S. has approximately 300 interceptor aircraft based in the U.S. dedicated to strategic defense, 118 strategic air defense warning radars, and no operational strategic surface-to-air missile launchers. These figures do not include tactical air defenses deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.



The new Il-76/MAINSTAY aircraft is illustrated as configured for its Airborne Warning and Control Systems mission.

The newest Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft, the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, has a look-down/shoot-down and multiple-target engagement capability. More than 85 FOXHOUNDS are now operationally deployed at several locations from the Arkhangelsk area in the northwestern USSR to the Far East Military District. Two new fighter interceptors, the Su-27/FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM, also have look-down/shoot-down capabilities and are designed to be highly maneuverable





The surface-to-air missiles of the SA-X-12 air defense system are designed to counter high-performance aircraft, will also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles, and may have a potential against some strategic ballistic missiles as well.

and upgrading of the SA-5 to enhance its capability to work in conjunction with low-altitude systems like the SA-10 are probable.

The SA-10 can defend against low-altitude targets with small radar cross-sections, like cruise missiles. The first SA-10 site was operational in 1980. Over 60 sites are now operational and work is progressing on at least another 30. More than half these sites are located near Moscow; this emphasis on Moscow and the patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites suggest a first priority on terminal defense of command and control, military, and key industrial complexes.

In keeping with their drive toward mobility as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets are developing a mobile version of the SA-10 which could become operational late this year. This mobile version could be used to support Soviet theater forces and to permit periodic changes in the location of SA-10 sites within the USSR so as to counter U.S. retaliatory forces more effectively.

The Soviets are also flight-testing another important mobile SAM system, the SA-X-12, which is able to intercept aircraft at all altitudes, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles as well. This is a serious development because these systems are expected to be deployed widely through-

out the Soviet Union in the 1980s. They could, if properly supported, add a significant point-target defense coverage to a nationwide Soviet ABM deployment.

Passive Defenses

Soviet military doctrine calls for passive defenses to act in conjunction with active forces to ensure the wartime survival and continuity of Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, military command and control units, war-related industrial production and services, the essential work force, and as much of the general population as possible. The U.S. passive defense effort is far smaller and more limited; it is no way comparable to the comprehensive Soviet program.

Physical hardening of military assets to make them more resistant to attack is an important passive defense technique. The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities, and key command and control centers to an unprecedented degree. Much of today's U.S. retaliatory force would be ineffective against those hardened targets. To maintain effective deterrence, the United States must be able credibly to threaten prompt retaliation against the full spectrum of Soviet targets, including those which have been greatly hardened.

Soviet leaders and managers at all levels of the government and Communist Party are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from urban centers — in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities. This comprehensive and redundant system, patterned after a similar system for the Soviet Armed Forces, provides hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000 key party and government personnel throughout the USSR.

Elaborate plans have also been made for the full mobilization of the national economy in support of a war effort. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Redundant industrial facilities are in active production. Industrial and other economic facilities have been equipped with blast shelters for the work force, and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment. By planning for the survival of the essential work force, the Soviets hope to reconstitute vital production programs using those industrial components that could be redirected or salvaged after an attack.

In addition, the USSR has greatly emphasized mobility as a means of enhancing the survivability of military assets. The SS-20 and SS-25, for example, are mobile. Rail-mobile deployment of the SS-X-24 is expected before the end of the decade. The Soviets are also developing an extensive network of mobile command, control, and communications facilities.

Soviet Statements on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

These extensive Soviet activities in strategic defense, combined with the large Soviet buildup in offensive forces over the past two decades, have been eroding the retaliatory capabilities of U.S. strategic forces on which deterrence has long rested. If the USSR in the future were unilaterally to add an effective advanced defense against ballistic missiles to its offensive and other defensive forces, it would pose a very serious new threat to U.S. and allied security.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is designed to counter the trend in the Soviets' favor. It is thus not unexpected that Soviet reactions to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative have been strongly negative. Through an intensive, worldwide propaganda campaign, the USSR evidently hopes that it can dissuade the United States from pursuing this research program, thereby preserving the possibility of a Soviet monopoly in effective defenses against ballistic missiles — a monopoly that could give the USSR the uncontested damage-limiting first-strike capability that it has long sought.

Thus, Soviet statements on the SDI must be seen in light of the extensive, long-term growth in Soviet offensive and defensive forces and of their major research effort to develop advanced weapons for defense against ballistic missiles. They should also be viewed in light of comparable Soviet propaganda campaigns on other issues. The USSR engaged in a major propaganda effort in the late 1970s and early 1980s to preserve its monopoly in longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has adopted many of the same tactics to prevent the United States from acquiring an operational ASAT system to balance its own.

On April 22, 1983, a month after the President's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, a published letter signed by more than 200 senior Soviet scientists denouncing the initiative appeared in the New York Times. It is interesting and instructive to note that a number of the signatories have been instrumental in the development of both traditional and advanced ballistic missile defensive systems: Petr D. Grushin, Vladimir S. Semenikhin, Fedor V. Bunkin, Yevgeniy P. Velikhov, Vsevolod S. Avduyevskiy, Aleksandr M. Prokhorov, and Nikolay G. Basov. Velikhov, for example, was for several years the director of the Institute of Atomic Energy laboratories at Troitsk,

Dr. Y.P. Velikhov has been a central figure in the development of the USSR's high energy laser weapons. As Chairman of the committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War, Dr. Velikhov is also the leading Soviet scientific spokesman against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

where lasers for strategic and tactical applications are being developed. Avduyevskiy has long been involved with strategic weapons research and now has responsibility for a number of projects concerned with the military use of space, including a space-based laser weapon. Other signatories have spent their careers developing strategic offensive weapons and other military systems: Vladimir N. Chelomey, Valentin P. Glushko, Aleksandr D. Nadiradze, and Viktor P. Makeyev in ICBMs and SLBMs; Oleg K. Antonov and Aleksandr S. Yakovlev in military aircraft; Nikolay Isanin in nuclear submarines; Yuliy B. Khariton in the Soviet military nuclear energy program; and Martin I. Kabachnik in chemical warfare.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative offers the possibility of a better, more stable deterrence based increasingly on defenses that are survivable, militarily effective, and cost-effective relative to offensive forces. If our research shows that such defenses against ballistic missiles are feasible, they would allow us to move from deterrence based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation, toward enhanced deterrence characterized by greater reliance on defensive capabilities that threaten no one. The Strategic Defense Initiative is also a prudent and necessary response to the very active Soviet efforts in offensive and defensive forces. It responds directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ABM capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. It also provides insurance against an eventual Soviet attempt to deploy an effective advanced system for defense against ballistic missiles unilaterally.

SDI research complements our efforts to achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in nuclear forces. In the near term, we are seeking reductions of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces, and discussing defensive and space arms, in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations which opened in Geneva in March 1985. The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed that there is a fundamental relationship between offensive and defensive systems and that neither can be considered in isolation.

In the longer term, if we were to deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles, such defenses could increase significantly the incentives for further negotiated deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces because they could reduce or eliminate the military utility of ballistic missiles. Such significant reductions would, in turn, serve to increase the effectiveness of defensive systems.

The SDI research program emphasizes advanced non-nuclear defensive technologies. It will provide to a future President and Congress, possibly in the early 1990s, the technical knowledge required for a decision on whether

to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. Extensive discussions with our allies would take place prior to any future decision to move beyond research to development and deployment.

Any future deployment would also be a matter for discussion and negotiation as appropriate with the Soviet Union, as provided in the ABM Treaty. Even now we are seeking to engage the Soviets at Geneva in a discussion of the relationship of offensive and defensive forces and of a possible future transition to greater reliance on defensive systems.

While we could not allow a Soviet veto over a decision which would have such a major impact on U.S. and allied security, it is our intention and hope that — if new defensive technologies prove feasible — we and the Soviets would be able both to move to a more defense-reliant balance. What we envision is thus just the opposite of an arms race or a search for military superiority. We seek instead an approach that would serve the security interests of the United States, our allies, the Soviet Union, and the world as a whole.

Annex

Offensive Forces

Soviet military doctrine and strategy call for superior offensive forces capable of executing a successful first strike. The Soviet buildup in offensive forces over the last two decades has been designed to move in that direction.

Soviet strategic offensive forces introduced since 1971 include:

- four new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — the SS-17, 18, 19, and 25. In addition, the USSR probably has deployed the SS-16 in violation of the SALT II Treaty;
- five new types of ballistic missile-carrying submarines;
- four new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs);
- five improved versions of existing SLBMs;
- long-range cruise missiles; and
- a new variant of the BEAR bomber carrying strategic air-launched cruise missiles.

That buildup is all the more striking when compared to the relative restraint exercised by the U.S. in its acquisition of nuclear weapons systems during the same period. The number of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile peaked in 1967. We had one-third more nuclear weapons then than we have now. Moreover, the total explosive power (measured in megatonnage) of our nuclear weapons was four times greater in 1960 than it is today.

Our latest B-52 bomber was built in 1962. Although we modernized the missiles our submarines carried with the POSEIDON C-3 in 1971 and TRIDENT I C-4 in 1979, we did not introduce a single new ballistic missile-carrying submarine from 1966 until 1981, when we began deploying the TRIDENT submarine at the rate of about one a year. In fact, our ballistic missile submarine force declined by one-fourth between 1966 and 1981, from 41 boats to 31. During the time we were decreasing the number of our SSBNs, the Soviet Union deployed 62 new ballistic missile-carrying submarines.

Similarly, the U.S. began deploying its newest ICBM, the MINUTEMAN III, fifteen years ago; today, we have fewer ICBMs than we did in 1967. By contrast, the Soviet Union has added about 800 ICBMs to its arsenal since that year. Of greatest concern for strategic stability has been the development and deployment of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. Since the late 1970s, the USSR has deployed more than 300 SS-18s, each twice as large as the U.S. PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying ten warheads, and 360 SS-19s, each approximately the size of the PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying six warheads. The Soviets already have enough hard-target-capable ICBM warheads today to attack all U.S. ICBM silos and launch control centers and will have a larger number of hard-target capable warheads in the future. (A weapon with hard-target capability has sufficient accuracy and yield to destroy targets that have been hardened to withstand the effects of a nuclear detonation.)

In addition to the rapid growth in its ICBM force, the Soviet Union is engaged in a major modernization and expansion of its strategic bomber and submarine forces. The bulk of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear warheads has traditionally been on ICBMs, while the U.S. has maintained a balanced force, with fewer than one-quarter of our strategic weapons on ICBMs. The growth in modern Soviet strategic offensive forces of all types is thus not only exacerbating the imbalance between U.S. and Soviet ICBMs, but also steadily eroding the traditional countervailing U.S. advantage in SLBMs and strategic bomber systems.

When the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms was signed in 1972, the USSR had roughly 2,300 strategic ballistic missile warheads, and the throw-weight of its ballistic missile force was about 3 million kilograms. (Throw-weight is a basic measure of ballistic missile destructive capability and potential.) By the time the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979, the Soviet strategic arsenal had more than doubled to roughly 5,500 strategic ballistic missile warheads with a ballistic missile throw-weight of about 4 million kilograms. Today, the Soviet Union has over 8,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads and a ballistic missile throw-weight of about 12 million kilograms.

Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that the USSR's offensive nuclear force buildup continues unabated, with a large number of new systems at or nearing deployment. For example, the Soviets are:

- continuing production of the BEAR H bombers which carry the AS-15 long-range



*Available information on the SS-16 is inconclusive, but indicates probable deployment

air-launched cruise missile. They are also developing a new strategic bomber, the BLACKJACK, which, when deployed before the end of the decade, will be larger than either the U.S. B-1B or B-52;

- completing development of the SS-X-24 and have announced deployment of the SS-25 ICBM. The SS-25 violates the SALT II agreement, since it is a prohibited second new type of ICBM;
- deploying two new classes of nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), the DELTA IV and the TYPHOON, and associated SLBMs. They are also testing a new sea-launched cruise missile, the SS-NX-21.

The combination of U.S. restraint and Soviet expansion and modernization of its strategic offensive forces means that U.S. forces are becoming increasingly obsolete. We are therefore modernizing our strategic nuclear forces to ensure the balance necessary for continued deterrence. That program includes development of the PEACEKEEPER/MX ICBM, a smaller single-warhead ICBM (popularly known as MIDGETMAN), the B-1B bomber, an advanced technology bomber, and the TRIDENT II SLBM. We are also deploying long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and TRIDENT SSBNs. Our strategic modernization program is essential not only for the military balance, but also to induce the Soviets to agree to nego-

tiated offensive force reductions which would enable us to maintain the balance at far lower levels of armaments.

The Soviet Union has also greatly expanded its nuclear forces of less-than-intercontinental range, which primarily threaten our friends and allies. The USSR has developed an entirely new generation of nuclear short-range ballistic missiles. Of gravest concern has been the creation and subsequent rapid expansion of the SS-20 longer-range intermediate-range missile force, which threatens our friends and allies in Europe and Asia. NATO had no equivalent systems when the USSR began to field this modern, mobile, highly accurate, triple-warhead missile. As of September 1985, the Soviets had deployed 441 SS-20s, with over 1,200 warheads. Not only is the SS-20 force continuing to grow, but the Soviets are also testing a modified version of the SS-20 which is expected to be even more accurate. In contrast, NATO plans to deploy 572 single-warhead PERSHING II and ground-launched cruise missiles and stands ready to reduce or reverse those deployments if we can reach an equitable, verifiable arms reduction agreement with the USSR.

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

February 12, 1986

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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb BK by H

SUBJECT: U.S. Public Dubious About Soviet Proposal to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

Summary

A late January CBS/NY Times poll provides the first soundings on public reaction to the recent Soviet proposal to "eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000." Twenty-five percent of Americans believed this was a "serious proposal," compared to 65 percent who felt it was "just propaganda."

CBS also found: (1) Despite this skepticism about the latest Soviet proposal, expectations that US and Soviet negotiators will eventually reach "real arms control agreements" have risen since the summit (from 32% optimistic vs 55% pessimistic shortly before the summit to 41% vs 47% in January), and (2) President Reagan retains a considerable, but diminished, lead over Gorbachev in public perceptions of their desire to achieve an arms control agreement (53% believe Reagan is willing to make "real concessions" to get an agreement vs 37% for Gorbachev).

End Summary

Majority Dubious About Latest Soviet Proposal

Surveys taken before the summit showed the American public has tended to view Soviet arms control proposals as designed more to "influence world opinion" than to achieve actual reductions in nuclear arms (see PA Memorandum of December 19, 1985). A CBS/NY Times poll, taken January 19-23, reveals skepticism about the latest Soviet proposal remains widespread:

> "The Soviet Union recently made an arms control proposal that calls for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Do you think this was a serious proposal or do you think it was just propaganda?"

	Jan 1986
Serious proposal	25%
Propaganda	65
Both (Volunteered)	3
Don't know	7

Doubts about this proposal may be heightened by its ambitious objective of seeking the "elimination of all nuclear weapons." A January 1985 Los Angeles Times survey showed that an agreement to "destroy all nuclear weapons" received much less support (57% in favor vs 37% opposed) than an agreement to mutually "freeze" or "reduce" the number of nuclear weapons (about 80% vs 15%).

Public More Optimistic About Getting US-Soviet Arms Control Accord

Prior to the summit, the public predominantly expected that the meeting would help reduce tensions between the US and USSR, but not lead to actual arms control agreements between the two powers. CBS' January poll shows that the public is now almost evenly divided about reaching an agreement:

"Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva for a summit meeting in November. Do you think that meeting will lead to real arms control agreements, or not?"

	Jan 19-23 1986	Nov 6-10 1985
Yes	41%	32%
No	47	55
Don't know	12	13

President Reagan Still Rated Above Gorbachev on Desire for Arms Control Agreement

A CBS/NY Times survey taken on the eve of the summit showed a much higher proportion of Americans believed President Reagan "really wants an arms control agreement" (75%) than believed Gorbachev wanted such an agreement (47%). CBS' late January poll asked somewhat differently-worded questions and found the President leads Gorbachev by a much smaller margin in terms of the public's perception of their willingness to "make real concessions" to achieve an agreement:

"Do you think Gorbachev (Reagan) wants an arms control agreement enough to make real concessions to the United States (Soviet Union) in order to get it, or not?"

	January 1986	
	Reagan	Gorbachev
Yes	53%	37%
No	37	49
Don't know	10	14

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PA/OAP:JWMartin

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

December 10, 1985

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: PA - George B. High, Acting

SUBJECT: Attitudes Toward SDI Substantially Influenced by How SDI is Defined

The considerable variation in support for SDI shown by different polls stems largely from differences in how SDI is described and in the trade-off options presented. Three polls taken shortly before the Geneva meeting are illustrative.

SDI versus Nuclear Arms Accord

Most Americans think reducing nuclear arms is more important than developing SDI. Support for SDI drops appreciably when it is described as impeding a nuclear arms accord. In early November, an ABC/Washington Post survey found a 55-38 percent majority favored the idea of "space-based weapons that could destroy nuclear missiles fired at the US." But, at the same time, a CBS/NY Times poll found a 53-33 percent majority preferred trying to "negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles" rather than developing SDI. A CBS poll taken shortly after the Geneva meeting showed that the preference for nuclear arms reduction over SDI development had not changed (see Table 1, attached).

Research vs Deployment of SDI

The public would sooner give up SDI deployment than SDI research for reductions in Soviet nuclear weapons. A Harris/Business Week poll taken in October found that, among the half of the public expressing an opinion, only 21 percent were willing to halt research for a "50 percent cut in Soviet long-range nuclear weapons." However, 53 percent were willing to trade off deployment for the weapons reduction (Table 2).

Extent of Coverage of SDI System

A far larger percentage of the public supports an SDI system that could protect the entire United States from any nuclear attack than one that protected only US missile sites and/or selected population centers. A national poll conducted in September by Marttila and Kiley, a Boston polling firm, found an 86-9 percent majority of Americans favored a "perfect" system that could protect the entire United States. On the other hand, a 50-44 percent plurality opposed "a system that could protect our missile sites...but could not guarantee the safety of many of our major cities" (Table 3).

Attachment: Tables.

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12/10/85 632-2257 W0130C

Table 1. Support for SDI vs Nuclear Arms Agreement

A. ABC/Washington Post (Nov. 10-13, 1985)

1. "Supporters say such weapons [space-based weapons that could destroy nuclear missiles fired at the United States by the Soviet Union or other countries] could guarantee protection of the United States from nuclear attack and are worth whatever they cost. Opponents say such weapons will increase the arms race, and cost many billions of dollars. How about you: Would you say you favor or oppose plans to develop such space-based weapons?"

Favor SDI	55%
Oppose	38
No Opinion	7

2. "In general, which would you say is more important: for the United States to develop space based weapons to defend against nuclear attack, or for the US and the Soviet Union to agree to a substantial reduction of nuclear arms by both countries?"

Which more important:	
Develop SDI	21%
Nuclear arms reduction	71
Both equally (Vol)	4
No opinion	4

B. CBS/NY Times

"If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do: Work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiating an arms control agreement, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?"

Which one select:	Nov 20, 1985	Nov 6-10, 1985
Develop SDI	31%	33%
Nuclear arms reduction	49	53
Don't know	20	14

Table 2. Research vs Deployment of SDI (Harris/Business Week, Oct. 23-27, 1985)

1. "Soviet leader Gorbachev has offered to cut Soviet long-range nuclear weapons by 50 percent if the US will stop research on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as the Star Wars plan. Do you think that's a fair trade, or that it is a bad idea, or don't you think you know enough to be sure?"

Among 47 percent who expressed an opinion:	
Fair trade	21%
Bad idea	79

2. "What if the US were able to continue research on Star Wars, but agreed not to actually deploy that space-based defense system in return for major Soviet reductions in long-range nuclear weapons? Do you think that's a fair trade-off, is it a bad idea, or don't you think you know enough to be sure?"

Among 51 percent who expressed an opinion:	
Fair trade-off	53%
Bad idea	47

Table 3. Support for SDI Systems Providing Different Levels of Coverage (Marttila and Kiley, Sept. 1985)

"The Reagan administration is now working on this program known as Star Wars. It will attempt to build a new defensive system in outer space that could shoot down nuclear missiles fired at the U.S. Since the program is currently only a research project, it is impossible to predict how complete a defense it will provide. I'm going to read a list of four possible Star Wars systems. For each one, please tell me if you would strongly support, support, oppose, or strongly oppose building each type of system." ("No opinion" responses are omitted)

	Strongly Support	Support	Oppose	Strongly Oppose
1. "A system that was perfect and would successfully defend against all incoming nuclear weapons"	58% (86%)	28%	5% (9%)	4%

	Strongly Support	Support		Oppose		Strongly Oppose
2. "A system that could protect our missile sites and some population centers, but could not guarantee the safety of many of our major cities."	12	(44)	32	34	(50)	16
3. "A system designed only to protect US missiles, key military bases, and Washington, DC, but not other areas."	5	(21)	16	39	(73)	34
4. "A system that can provide a complete defense against long-range nuclear missiles, but cannot defend against missiles fired from submarines or bombers."	8	(40)	32	34	(51)	17

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

October 23, 1985

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: PA - George B. High, Acting

SUBJECT: Public Attitudes Toward SDI: An Overview

A review of recent poll findings on the American public's attitudes toward the Strategic Defense Initiative reveals:

American Public Closely Divided on Developing SDI

1. Three polls on SDI taken last summer found the public is about evenly divided on whether to "develop" a "space-based star wars system to guard against a nuclear attack." The average result was about 45 percent in favor vs 45 percent opposed, in polls taken by Roper, ABC/Wash Post, Gallup/Newsweek.

2. The minority that can be deemed "attentive" is more supportive of SDI. Although four-fifths of the public claims to be familiar with the "star wars" proposal, only about one-fifth claims to have heard a "great deal" about it. A majority of this attentive group favors "building" SDI (52% in favor vs 35% opposed -- Roper 7/85).

3. Support for SDI is greater in the United States than it is among US allies. In July, Decision Making Information (headed by Richard Wirthlin) found more support for continuing "research" on SDI even if it meant "not getting a nuclear arms control agreement" with the USSR (51%) rather than using research on SDI as a "bargaining chip" in return for a nuclear arms control accord (47%). Comparable surveys in six NATO countries and Australia between February-June, however, found a plurality in each country preferred using SDI research as a bargaining chip (7-country average: 25% favored continuing SDI research vs 45% favored using SDI as a "bargaining chip" -- see Table attached).

Attitude Toward SDI Largely Personified with the President

4. Attitude toward President Reagan has been a stronger determinant of attitude toward SDI than party affiliation. Republicans predominantly favor SDI, while Democrats tend to be opposed. But Democrats who described themselves as "supporters" of the President were much more likely to favor SDI than Republicans who described themselves as "critics" of the President (Roper 3/85).

5. Males, conservatives, and those earning $25,000 or more annually were somewhat more supportive of SDI than females, liberals and those earning less than $15,000, respectively. However, these differences are not as large as the difference along party lines.

Attitudes Toward SDI Remain Soft

6. Recent polls show a large majority of Americans (about 80%) support the idea of building a "defensive system against nuclear missiles and bombers." But, the polls also show that support diminishes by about 30 percentage points when questions are raised about cost, effectiveness, the system employing nuclear weapons, and reduced chances of getting an arms control agreement. Support was even lower when the Harris poll, stressing the cost factor, asked respondents whether they favored or opposed "spending billions of dollars for the US to develop a laser-beam and particle-beam anti-nuclear missile defense system" (39% in favor vs 56% opposed, 3/85).

7. About one-fourth have firm opinion on each side of SDI issue:

a. Twenty-six percent said they would still favor developing "space-based weapons" to protect the US against nuclear attack even if the US had to "violate or abandon" its ABM treaty with the USSR (ABC/Wash Post, 7/85).

b. Twenty percent indicated they would favor using SDI research as a "bargaining chip" in negotiations even if the Soviet Union was known to be conducting "advanced research" similar to SDI (DMI, 7/85).

Public Rates Arguments For and Against SDI

8. Last July, Roper tested various arguments for and against "a space-based anti-missile defense system." He found the most convincing argument in favor of SDI was that it would deter the Soviets from attacking us. The argument that SDI would make the Soviets more amenable to an agreement on controlling nuclear arms had limited credibility.

9. The most convincing arguments against SDI were: (1) it would accelerate the nuclear arms race and (2) be very costly. The argument that development of SDI would increase the chance of a Soviet preemptive strike had low credibility.

10. Support for SDI seems to be weakened mainly by the arguments that SDI would be very costly and speed up the nuclear arms race. Nearly three-fifths of SDI supporters believed each of those arguments was "convincing."

11. Nuclear deterrence is viewed as a useful, but imperfect, way to maintain peace. A majority of the public believes the strategy of nuclear deterrence between the US and USSR has "helped to keep the peace in the world" (by 74 to 21 percent). But a majority also rejects the view that "having each side capable of blowing up the other isn't such a bad way to keep the peace" (41% agree vs 55% disagree -- Harris 3/85).

Attachment: Table.

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10/22/85 632-2257 W0103C

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SDI

Support for SDI in US and Allied Countries

Country	Preference: Continue Work on SDI	Preference: Use SDI as Bargaining Chip	No Opinion
U.S. (7/85)	51%	47%	2%
Britain (2/85)	32	47	21
W. Germany (2/85)	31	39	30
Belgium (2/85)	28	31	41
Netherlands (2/85)	18	46	36
Italy (2/85)	18	61	21
Denmark (2/85)	14	38	48
Australia (6/85)	32	47	21

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ORIGIN PM-10

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 DODE-00 NEA-07 ARA-00 EAP-00
PA-02 SIG-03 ACDA-12 USIE-00 /035 R
DRAFTED BY: PM/SNP:BMYRICK;PM/PD:RCARROLL
APPROVED BY: PM:JHAWES
PM/PD:RMANTEL USIA:MCOPSON
ACDA/PA:ASTREETER PA/OAP:JMARTIN
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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 049461

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON US NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY

1. IN THE CONTEXT OF ONGOING INTERAGENCY DISCUSSIONS, WE HAVE DEVELOPED ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS ON THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE, THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY AND THE SOVIET MORATORIUM. POSTS AND PAOS MAY DRAW ON THIS GUIDANCE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST COUNTRY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC.

SUMMARY BACKGROUND POINTS

2. NOW AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES MUST RELY UPON A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT. IN SUCH A SITUATION, WHERE BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES MUST RELY UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER AGGRESSION, NUCLEAR TESTING WILL CONTINUE TO BE REQUIRED.

A CTB, THEREFORE, IS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF ACHIEVING BROAD, DEEP AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS, SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, EXPANDED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, GREATER BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND AT A TIME WHEN A NUCLEAR DETERRENT IS NO LONGER AS ESSENTIAL AN ELEMENT AS CURRENTLY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

THE US HAS SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS RELATED TO NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS. SUCH DISCUSSION HAS USEFULLY TAKEN PLACE IN PAST YEARS AT THE MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE IN DISARMAMENT (CD) IN GENEVA, IN BOTH A TECHNICAL-LEVEL AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS AND IN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN WORKING GROUP. THE US CONTINUES TO SUPPORT CONSIDERATION OF MONITORING AND VERIFICATION ISSUES RELATED TO A CTB IN THESE TWO GROUPS AT THE CD.

OUR VERIFICATION PROBLEMS BECOME A MATTER OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN IN LIGHT OF THE PATTERN OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING VIOLATIONS OF THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY AND LIKELY VIOLATION OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TTBT.

THEREFORE, OUR PRIORITY GOAL IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING AREA IS TO SEEK EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND THE PNET, AND TO RESOLVE OUR COMPLIANCE CONCERN.

THE PRESIDENT HAS LONG ADVOCATED A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO ARRIVE AT THE IMPROVED MONITORING PROCEDURES NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF THESE TREATIES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN 1983, THE UNITED STATES UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN DISCUSSIONS ON VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS TO THE TTBT AND PNET.

MOREOVER, IN SEPTEMBER 1984, THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FIND A WAY FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO COME TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR TEST SITE AND FOR OURS TO GO TO THEIRS TO MEASURE DIRECTLY THE YIELDS OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

3. TALKING POINTS

US ARMS CONTROL POLICY

-- AT THEIR NOVEMBER MEETING IN GENEVA, THE PRESIDENT AND

GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLES THAT A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON AND MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT, AND THAT NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION WILL SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE OTHER. WHILE WE DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, THE PRESIDENT HAS COMMITTED US TO WORK HARD TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND BUILD A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP.

-- NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE ARMS CONTROL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. THAT ROLE WILL BE ONE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROMOTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN ESTABLISHING THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT HAS NOTED THAT, "ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICY, BEING AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF FOREIGN POLICY, MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AS A WHOLE."

-- CAREFUL STUDY LED US, OVER FOUR YEARS AGO, TO CONCLUDE THAT THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY, IN ITS CURRENT FORM, IS NOT EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE; RATIFICATION OF THIS TREATY BEFORE VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF THE TTBT.

-- SIMILARLY, THOROUGH EVALUATION HAS LED THE ADMINISTRATION TO REAFFIRM THAT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN REMAINS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES; AN OBJECTIVE WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ACHIEVING BROAD, DEEP AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS, SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, EXPANDED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, GREATER BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND AT A TIME WHEN A NUCLEAR DETERRENT IS NO LONGER AS ESSENTIAL AN ELEMENT AS CURRENTLY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. THE UNITED STATES IS CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN MOST OF THESE AREAS.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

-- NOW AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES MUST RELY UPON A

CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE-NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

.-- WHILE WE ARE ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAY ONE DAY MAKE US LESS DEPENDENT ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR OUR SECURITY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL

REMAIN FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE KEY ELEMENT OF OUR DETERRENT. IN SUCH A SITUATION, WHERE BOTH THE US AND OUR ALLIES RELY UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER AGGRESION, NUCLEAR TESTING WILL CONTINUE TO BE REQUIRED.

.-- DIRECTORS OF BOTH THE LOS ALAMOS AND LIVERMORE LABORATORIES ARE ON RECORD AS OPPOSING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN BECAUSE IN THEIR VIEW CONTINUED NUCLEAR TESTING IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THE RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY HAVE STATED THAT OUR DETERRENT DEPENDS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. IT IS THEIR JUDGMENT THAT WHILE NON-NUCLEAR TESTS SOMETIMES DETECT PROBLEMS WITH THE NUCLEAR COMPONENT OF WARHEADS, THE MOST SERIOUS STOCKPILE PROBLEMS ARE REVEALED AND SOLVED ONLY BY NUCLEAR TESTS. IN PARTICULAR, A SEEMINGLY MINOR MODIFICATION IN A WEAPON DESIGN COULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE CONFIDENCE IN PERFORMANCE UNLESS THE MODIFIED DESIGN COULD BE TESTED WITH A NUCLEAR YIELD.

.-- THE VERIFICATION OF A TEST BAN, REMAINS A MAJOR PROBLEM. EXPERT TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS HAS INDICTED THAT, EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES DISCUSSED (BUT NOT FULLY AGREED) IN THE CTB TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD STILL BE SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO DETECT, IDENTIFY AND ATTRIBUTE A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF CLANDESTINE TESTING.

.- A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, THEREFORE, CONTINUES TO BE A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF ADMINISTRATION ARMS CONTROL POLICY, IN THE CONTEXT OF ACHIEVING BROAD, DEEP AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS, SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, EXPANDED CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, GREATER BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND AT A TIME WHEN A NUCLEAR DETERRENT IS NO LONGER AS ESSENTIAL AN ELEMENT AS CURRENTLY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. THE UNITED STATES IS CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN MOST OF THESE AREAS.

.-- THE US HAS SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS RELATED TO NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS. SUCH DISCUSSION HAS USEFULLY TAKEN PLACE IN PAST YEARS AT THE MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) IN GENEVA, IN BOTH A TECHNICAL-LEVEL AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS AND IN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN WORKING GROUP. THE US CONTINUES TO SUPPORT CONSIDERATION OF MONITORING AND VERIFICATION ISSUES RELATED TO A CTB IN THESE TWO GROUPS AT THE CD.

.-- BECAUSE OF SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE NATIONAL

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A CTB IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING PROBLEMS RELATED TO DETERRENCE, VERIFICATION, AND COMPLIANCE THE U.S. HAS NOT RESUMED THE TRILATERAL CTB TALKS SINCE THEY RECESSED IN 1980.

.-- MOREOVER, THE GENEVA ROUNDS ARE ALREADY THE MOST COMPLEX ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE EVER ATTEMPTED. THE ADDITION OF A CTBT ELEMENT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A FURTHER COMPLICATING FACTOR AND WOULD LIKELY FURTHER DELAY PROGRESS ON OUR PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

.-- THE US AND USSR SIGNED THE TTBT PROHIBITING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS IN 1974 AND THE COMPANION PNET IN 1976. ALTHOUGH THE US IS NOT SEEKING RATIFICATION OF THESE TREATIES BECAUSE OF VERIFICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS, BOTH THE US AND THE USSR HAVE STATED THAT THEY WOULD OBSERVE THE 150 KT THRESHOLD OF THESE TREATIES.

.-- THE UNITED STATES PLACES ITS HIGHEST PRIORITY IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING AREA ON IMPROVED VERIFICATION OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET). EVEN IF WE WERE TO RATIFY THE TREATIES AND IMPLEMENT THEIR VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE RESOLVED, NOTWITHSTANDING SOVIET CONTENTIONS TO THE CONTRARY.

.-- MOREOVER, IN SEPTEMBER 1984, THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FIND A WAY FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO COME TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR TEST SITE AND FOR OURS TO GO TO THEIRS TO MEASURE DIRECTLY THE YIELDS OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

.-- IN JULY, 1985 THE PRESIDENT INVITED SOVIET EXPERTS TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR TEST SITE TO MEASURE THE YIELD OF A U.S. NUCLEAR TEST WITH ANY INSTRUMENTATION DEVICES THEY DEEM NECESSARY. THERE WERE NO CONDITIONS OR REQUIREMENTS FOR A RECIPROCAL VISIT. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR NATIONS REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING. WE REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL ACCEPT THIS UNCONDITIONAL INVITATION IN THE SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL WITH WHICH IT WAS TENDERED.

.-- THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OFFERS AN AREA WHERE THE SOVIETS CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY TAKE ARMS CONTROL SERIOUSLY, AND THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS IS ESSENTIAL. THE UNITED STATES MUST STAND BY ITS STANDARD OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY; ANYTHING LESS WOULD UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO DEMAND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IN THE TEST BAN AND OTHER AREAS, AS WELL AS BEING A DISSERVICE TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TTBT.

.-- TTBT OFFERS ONLY AN EXCHANGE OF DATA WHICH, WHILE APPEARING EXTENSIVE, CONTAINS NOT A SINGLE MEANINGFUL ELEMENT THAT CAN BE INDEPENDENTLY VALIDATED BY THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS NO ABILITY FOR US TO INDEPENDENTLY MEASURE ANY OF THE IMPORTANT PARAMETERS UPON WHICH OUR ESTIMATES OF SOVIET YIELD ARE BASED.

.-- SIMILARLY, THE VERIFICATION MEASURES OF THE PNET PROTOCOL WOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE TTBT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS.

. .- THE PNET VERIFICATION MEASURES WOULD NOT APPLY TO NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST SITES.

. .- THE PNET PROVISION FOR MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION IS OPERATIVE ONLY IN VERY RESTRICTED CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THE TREATY HAD BEEN RATIFIED, THOSE CONDITIONS (E.G., GROUP EXPLOSIONS WITH AN AGGREGATE YIELD OVER 150 KT) WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MET TO DATE, AND WE WOULD NOT HAVE EXERCISED THIS PROVISION.

.-- WE HAVE HAD TO CONCLUDE THAT IT IS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE VIOLATED THEIR LEGAL OBLIGATION WITH RESPECT TO THE TTBT AND VIOLATED THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

(LTBT). (THE LTBT PROHIBITS NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER. IT ALSO PROHIBITS VENTING OF RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE STATE UNDER WHOSE JURISDICTION OR CONTROL SUCH EXPLOSIONS IS CONDUCTED.) AS REPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT IN 1984 AND 1985, IN THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED REPORTS ON SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, WHILE AMBIGUITIES IN THE PATTERN OF SOVIET TESTING AND VERIFICATION UNCERTAINTIES CONTINUE TO EXIST, EVIDENCE AVAILABLE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING ACTIVITIES FOR A NUMBER OF TESTS CONSTITUTE A LIKELY VIOLATION OF THE 150 KILOTON LIMIT.

SOVIET MORATORIUM

.-- A NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION IS UNACCEPTABLE.

.-- PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S WORDS IN 1962 WHEN THE SOVIETS BROKE THE EARLIER (IN THAT CASE JOINT) TESTING MORATORIUM EXPRESSED THIS CONCERN VERY ELOQUENTLY:

WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW ABOUT BROKEN NEGOTIATIONS, SECRET PREPARATIONS, AND THE ADVANTAGES GAINED FROM A LONG TEST SERIES NEVER TO OFFER AGAIN AN UNINSPECTED MORATORIUM. SOME MAY URGE US TO TRY IT AGAIN, KEEPING OUR PREPARATIONS TO TEST IN A CONSTANT STATE OF READINESS. BUT IN ACTUAL PRACTICE, PARTICULARLY IN A SOCIETY OF FREE CHOICE, WE CANNOT KEEP TOP FLIGHT SCIENTISTS CONCENTRATING ON THE PREPARATION OF AN EXPERIMENT WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT TAKE PLACE ON AN UNCERTAIN DATE IN THE UNDEFINED FUTURE. NOR CAN LARGE TECHNICAL LABORATORIES BE KEPT FULLY ALERT ON A STANDBY BASIS WAITING FOR SOME OTHER NATION TO BREAK AN AGREEMENT. THIS IS NOT MERELY DIFFICULT OR INCONVENIENT -- WE HAVE EXPLORED THIS ALTERNATIVE THOROUGHLY AND FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE OF EXECUTION."

.-- A NUCLEAR-TESTING MORATORIUM, SUCH AS THAT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS, IS AN INVITATION TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN WITHOUT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. MORATORIA ARE NEVER ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTES FOR NEGOTIATED, EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. FURTHER, THE REASONS FOR REJECTING A MORATORIUM ARE IDENTICAL TO THOSE FOR REJECTING THE NEGOTIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AT THIS TIME.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

.-- THE ROLE OF HIGH-YIELD WARHEADS IN SOVIET MILITARY PLANNING PROVIDE THE USSR WITH THE INCENTIVE TO TEST ABOVE THE 150-KILOTON TTBT LIMIT. THE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE US DETERMINATION OF SOVIET TEST YIELDS PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY. HOWEVER, THE US IS UNABLE TO EVALUATE THE DEGREE OF ANY SUCH EXPLOITATION. UNILATERAL AND ASYMMETRIC OBSERVANCE OF ANY ARMS CONTROL MEASURE BY THE US COULD LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR THE USSR.

.-- THE SEISMIC TECHNIQUES WE USE TO ESTIMATE THE YIELDS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS ARE TOO INACCURATE TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

. .- THERE ALSO ARE LARGE, UNACCEPTABLE UNCERTAINTIES IN OUR ESTIMATES OF SOVIET TEST YIELDS.

.-- VERIFICATION MEASURES IN THE TTBT PROTOCOL WOULD BE OF LITTLE HELP. SINCE THE GEOPHYSICAL AND YIELD-CALIBRATION DATA TO BE EXCHANGED UPON RATIFICATION CANNOT BE AUTHENTICATED, THE SOVIETS COULD INTENTIONALLY BIAS OUR YIELD ESTIMATES.

. .- WE WOULD HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT THEY GAVE US DATA FOR ALL GEOPHYSICALLY DISTINCT TESTING AREAS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE COULD BE SOME UNREPORTED AREA WITHIN THEIR TEST SITES KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS BUT UNKNOWN TO US WITH GEOPHYSICAL PROPERTIES THAT MADE HIGH-YIELD TESTS APPEAR TO BE UNDER 150 KILOTONS TO THE SEISMIC OBSERVER BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SOVIET UNION.

.-- VERIFICATION OF A CTB MUST ADDRESS MONITORING IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS, NOT JUST UNDERGROUND. THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO SUPPORT ACTIVE RESEARCH IN THIS FIELD IN KEEPING WITH ITS CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR A CTB AS A LONG-TERM GOAL OF US ARMS CONTROL POLICY. HOWEVER, THE US DOES NOT NOW HAVE THE MEANS TO EFFECTIVELY VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH A CTB.

.-- IT WAS DISCOVERED DURING THE 1958-61 TEST MORATORIUM THAT, EVEN IN A 3-YEAR PERIOD, THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL LOSS OF EXPERTISE IN THE US WEAPONS LABORATORIES AS A RESULT OF THE DEPARTURE OF KEY PERSONNEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN A CADRE OF SCIENTISTS WHICH CONDUCTED THE 40-TEST SERIES WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS TERMINATED THE MORATORIUM.

.-- OUR VERIFICATION CONCERNS CANNOT BE SATISFIED BY APPENDING THEM TO REQUESTS TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT ON TREATY RATIFICATION. THEY CAN ONLY BE SATISFIED BY AN HONEST EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL VIEWS WITH THE SOVIETS, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY PROPOSED, ON HOW VERIFICATION CAN BE IMPROVED AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION WITH THEM ABUT THE MEANS WHICH WILL PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. RATIFICATION WITHOUT SUCH VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS WOULD PROVIDE NO GUARANTEE OF THEIR SUBSEQUENT ADOPTION. MOREOVER, ATTACHING US VERIFICATION CONCERNS OR UNILATERAL CONDITIONS TO THE TWIN ACCORDS PRIOR TO RATIFICATION COULD EVOKE SOVIET CHARGES OF BAD FAITH. WE WANT TO FIX THE TREATY BEFORE, NOT AFTER WE RATIFY. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL ONLY FUEL FUTURE ACRIMONY.

THE PRESIDENT TOOK A FURTHER STEP LAST JULY AND EXTENDED AN UNCONDITIONAL INVITATION TO SOVIET EXPERTS TO COME TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR TEST SITE TO MEASURE THE YIELD OF A U.S. NUCLEAR TEST WITH ANY INSTRUMENTATION DEVICES THEY DEEMED NECESSARY. THIS INITIATIVE WAS DESIGNED WITH THE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT SET IN MOTION A PROCESS THAT COULD INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR NATIONS REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING.

WE REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL ACCEPT THIS UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL INVITATION IN THE SPIRIT OF GOODWILL WITH WHICH IT HAS BEEN TENDERED.

WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET MORATORIUM PROPOSAL, AS WE HAVE STATED MANY TIMES PREVIOUSLY, THE U.S. HAS LEARNED THROUGH EXPERIENCE THAT MORATORIA CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO ENHANCE SECURITY DESIRED. THE SOVIET UNION BROKE A NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM A QUARTER OF A CENTURY AGO WITH THE MOST INTENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST SERIES IN HISTORY -- 40 TO 50 EXPLOSIONS OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS.

WE MADE CLEAR WHEN THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED THEIR MORATORIUM THE REASONS FOR OUR NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATION POLICY AS WELL AS FOR CONTINUING THE U.S. TESTING PROGRAM. NUCLEAR TESTING IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DETERRENT AS WELL AS THE RELIABILITY, SAFETY, AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE U.S. ARSENAL.

.-- THE UNITED STATES LONG AGO DETERMINED THAT OUR INTERESTS CANNOT BE SERVED BY PARTICIPATION IN AN INEFFECTIVELY INSPECTED NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM. THIS JUDGMENT IS SOUNDLY BASED ON HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, MOST ACUTELY WHEN THE SOVIETS BROKE THE PREVIOUS 1958-1961 NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM BY CONDUCTING 40 TO 50 TESTS IN A TWO-MONTH PERIOD.

.- WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE STRIVING TO STRENGTHEN AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY WHICH THE ENTIRE WORLD DESIRES. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY. IN SEEKING DEEP REDUCTIONS WE WILL DEMAND EQUALITY AND REQUIRE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IN ANY RESULTANT TREATY. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR US EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUCH REDUCTIONS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL AND WE BELIEVE SUCH SUPPORT IS NOT LOST ON THE SOVIETS. ARMACOST

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Following is an address by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, before the Overseas Writers Association, Washington, D.C., March 7, 1985.

No issue is of greater importance to mankind today than strategic stability. A world awaits, with asperity, the reconvening of nuclear arms control negotiations on March 12. The Soviet Union has returned to the bargaining table, and we welcome them back. Ahead of us stretches a difficult path. The United States seeks equitable and verifiable agreements which significantly reduce the size of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. We hope the Soviet Union will join us in a constructive search for necessary solutions to our differences.

A Historical Perspective

These differences are profound. To see this best, it is useful to take a historical perspective. We live in a world of change. As in social and scientific areas, the strategic picture too has changed greatly since the early 1970s when the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty was signed. Certain hopes and assumptions underlying that treaty, and the accompanying SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] Interim Agreement, have been altered substantially.

One of these underlying assumptions was that the two agreements would lead to real reductions in offensive nuclear systems. That didn't happen. In negotiations, the Soviet Union has consistently refused to accept meaningful and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. SALT II did no more than set caps on already high levels of strategic arms. It is clear now that the Soviet Union never intended to settle for the rough equivalence of offensive strategic forces foreshadowed in the SALT I agreements.

Since SALT I was signed, the Soviet Union has deployed eight new strategic ballistic missiles, five new ballistic missile submarine classes, and a new strategic bomber. In comparison, the United States has fielded only one new missile system, one submarine class, and has delayed deployment of the B–1 bomber. This buildup by the Soviet Union has altered the balance between opposing forces so necessary to maintaining stable deterrence. We are very concerned about the qualities of new Soviet ballistic missile systems. In time of crisis, these weapons are the most destabilizing; they are swift, carry a big payload, are mobile, and are accurate. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union is acquiring a survivable, first-strike capability which will be far less easy to deter.

The second assumption was that there would be mutual restraints on strategic defense. This was based on the hope that the Soviets would come to accept, in doctrine and in practice, that this mutual vulnerability to each other's offensive nuclear forces was in our common interest. This innocent expectation did not materialize either. While the United States stopped deployment of

strategic defenses, the Soviet Union continued to develop and deploy successive generations of antiballistic missiles, tracking radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. In fact, spending on strategic defense has been equal to or greater than that on strategic offense. They have deployed around Moscow the world's only ballistic missile defensive system. Soviet research and development of more advanced technologies, including sophisticated directed energy weapons, proceeded throughout the 1970s into the mid-1980s at a pace far in excess of our own efforts. Furthermore, along with already deployed phased-array radars, construction continues on one in central Siberia apparently capable of battle management, in clear violation of the ABM Treaty. They have constructed numerous hardened leadership bunkers and continue expansion of their extensive network of civil defense. Altogether, these efforts increase the possibility of sudden Soviet abandonment of the ABM Treaty and rapid nationwide expansion of their antiballistic defenses.

We could say that a third assumption, not surprisingly, was an expectation in the West that these and other arms control agreements would be fully observed. Here, too, we have been disappointed. The Soviet record on compliance overall is, at best, disappointing. And it is particularly disturbing in the strategic area, where they have committed serious violations of both offensive and defensive agreements. Although we have pursued resolution of these violations with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, we have received little satisfaction to date.

There is one more change I would like to mention. The assumptions made by the American negotiators in 1972 also had a technological premise. It was not feasible then to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles. But technology does not stand still. Just as we have observed the qualitative advance in strategic offensive arms, new breakthroughs in the past few years offer the promise that a militarily sound and cost-effective defense may be possible.

The Pattern Since 1972

The pattern since 1972 is clear and disturbing. Soviet actions have disproved our assumptions and thwarted real arms reductions. The balances between offensive forces, which have for years maintained deterrence between the nuclear powers, are being upset by the Soviet Union. Restraint on our part since SALT I in the deployment of offensive strategic weapons has gone unmatched by the Soviets. Instead, they have continued to increase the size, mobility, and accuracy of their offensive nuclear arsenals.

No less alarming, in both size and scope, is their investment in strategic defense over the last 20 years. As they develop antiballistic missiles capable of being moved and widely deployed in relatively little time, we must ask, for what purpose? When they harden an expanding system of command and control, we must ask the question, why? As they shield their leadership, harden their missile silos, and spend vast sums on civil defense, we must ask, to what end? The West simply has not posed a growing threat that would warrant such Soviet actions. But faced with Soviet unwillingness to date to agree to mutual, verifiable reductions in offensive arsenals, the West has no choice. We have to examine restoring the balance and alternative means for preserving a stable deterrence. We face three interrelated options in our efforts to restore and maintain the balance.

First, we can attempt, through negotiations, to get the Soviets to reduce offensive systems to equal levels. This will be our priority task in Geneva. But, if the past is any guide, our job will be difficult. We are prepared to be open, flexible, and constructive and will work diligently with the Soviet Union to negotiate effective, verifiable arms reductions. Remember, though, it will take two to make these negotiations work.

Second, we can try to reverse the trends by simply attempting to match the Soviet activity and maintain an offensive nuclear balance. In the short run, we certainly have to restore and maintain that balance until other options are available. Our strategic modernization program and NATO's LRINF [longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces] missile modernization programs do this.

Finally, we can devote our energies to see if there is a better way to provide for the security of both the United States and our allies by strengthening deterrence through greater reliance on defensive systems—systems that threaten no one.

We will pursue all three options in the necessary and appropriate ways.

- We will press on in pursuit of equitable and verifiable arms reductions. But this must be a two-way street, and it will take time.
- We will maintain the nuclear balance until other alternatives are available. Peacekeeper and the NATO LRINF modernization program are essential in this regard.
- Finally, we must explore the growing potential of the new defensive technologies.

The Need to Explore Strategic Defenses

Let me concentrate on the need to explore strategic defenses, and give you three concrete arguments why we have made the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) a central point of our defense programs.

The first argument revolves around deterrence. We have ignored one basic fact about a world in which there are no defenses. Without defenses, it is extremely easy for an attacker to plan his first strike. Once an attacker launches his ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], he knows, within a certain range, just what damage he will do . because there is nothing to interfere with his attack. He can plan and calculate just what forces he needs to destroy the forces on the other side. If he has the money and the inclination, he can then buy those forces. It is basically an engineering problem. Well, the Soviets have done their calculations, and they have had the time and money to buy their forces.

But when you introduce defenses, even defenses that are less than perfect, the problem is entirely different. An attacker will not be able to launch a missile and destroy a target. He has no real idea of whether his attack plan will work or, if he succeeds partially, which targets he will miss because he cannot know how good our defenses will be. The defender will also be uncertain. But he is not deciding whether to attack. With defenses, suddenly what was an engineering problem becomes a much tougher, more expensive military problem. Even defenses that are imperfect strengthen deterrence because they create enormous headaches and uncertainties for anyone contemplating an attack. That is a good thing to do.

The second point involves saving lives. Very bluntly, we can deter an attack by defeating that attack or by threatening to kill enemy civilians in retaliation. There is no question in my mind that it is far better to be able to defeat the attack and thus deter it from occurring in the first place. SDI, for the

reasons I have just discussed, can help us make that judgment; without defenses, we must continue to rely on retaliation in order to deter a nuclear attack.

Many of those who oppose SDI advocate reliance on assured destruction in order to keep the peace. Let me point out something about assured destruction. There has been much discussion about nuclear winter recently. While there are many uncertainties, one thing is clear. Nuclear winter is most likely to be caused by the smoke and dust from burning cities that have been attacked by nuclear weapons. Everything in our Administration's strategic weapons policy, including SDI, is designed to move us away from that kind of attack. Those who disagree with us and who continue to support the discredited policy of assured destruction must face the following fact: the kind of war that could occur if their policies were adopted is precisely the kind of war most likely to cause nuclear winter.

Finally, I would like to address a problem less massive but perhaps more urgent than deterring a Soviet attack. Our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation have had a good deal of success. Certainly there are fewer countries today with nuclear weapons than anyone would have predicted 20 years ago. But many countries continue to seek nuclear weapons. We know that many of them also seek ballistic missile technology. We will not reduce our nonproliferation work. But I believe it is an act of simple prudence to investigate defenses that could defeat limited nuclear attacks or accidental nuclear attacks.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

For these reasons, President Reagan has asked this nation to undertake a program of vigorous research, the Strategic Defense Initiative. It will focus on advanced defensive technologies with the aim of finding ways to provide a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies. Our efforts will be in full compliance with the ABM Treaty.

In practical terms, a strategic defensive option must be cost effective. That is, it must be cheaper and easier to add defensive capability than offensive capability. Otherwise, there would be incentive to expand the offensive arms we seek to reduce. In addition, any defensive system must be survivable in the face of attack or else it could invite an effort to overwhelm it regardless of cost. The goal of strategic stability demands such high performance standards.

In our relations with other nations, strategic defensive options must satisfy not only our own security concerns but also those of our allies and the Soviet Union. The United States is actively consulting our allies to respond to their concerns and questions regarding SDI. Since this is a research program, their thoughts are essential as we examine the capabilities and set performance criteria for the defensive technology. Further, no step away from an offensive deterrent structure which has so effectively kept the peace in Europe can or will ignore the voice of our allies. Our own national survival depends on our allies' security from attack and safety from all wars.

In the new negotiations in Geneva and in other talks, we hope to develop with the Soviet Union mutual understanding of each other's security concerns. The United States does not seek superiority. This is difficult for the Soviet Union to comprehend since they judge us by their own ambitions. But, the facts of history are clear in this regard. No nation in history has acted so responsibly while possessing so superior a position in weaponry as the United States after World War II, when we were the only nation with nuclear arms. We are ready, if the technology proves feasible and cost effective, to consider integration of defensive systems into the mix of forces of both sides. This would be in the context of a cooperative, balanced, and verifiable environment that reflects a balance of offensive and defensive forces in ways that reduce existing nuclear arsenals while enhancing security and stability. If our research proves the feasibility of the concepts, a negotiated transition period of many years with assurance of stability and security throughout will be essential.

Finally, there are at least four myths about SDI which I wish to dispel.

- The first myth is that the United States is attempting to "militarize space." This is a Soviet propaganda line, and it is grievously misleading. Activities in space generally fall into three categories: commercial, scientific, and military. Orbiting overhead are over 800 Soviet satellites, compared to some 400 satellites of the West. That is a ratio of 2 to 1, and unlike in the West, the vast majority of Soviet satellites are military. These military satellites travel overhead in a space the Soviets threaten with the only antisatellite weapons now in existence. Further, it was the Soviet Union which first developed, in 1957, the ICBMs which travel through space and which now carry far more warheads in total than U.S. systems. What space is there left which the Soviet Union has not already militarized? Space has long been used for military purposes. When the Soviet Union speaks of "preventing the militarization of space" and of an ASAT [antisatellite weapon] moratorium, they are being extremely disingenuous by ignoring 15 years of their determined effort in this domain.
- The next myth is that the United States is upsetting an agreed philosophy of "mutual assured destruction," upon which strategic stability allegedly rests. I hope I have exploded that myth already today by describing the destabilizing march of the Soviet strategic buildup and the ever-expanding shielding of their forces and leadership from "assured destruction." A U.S.-Soviet comparison of the investment in so-called passive defense of the shielding of populations and economic base from nuclear attack is simply not possible. So large is the Soviet effort and so minimal is our own that the ratio approaches absurdity. Their civil defense preparations are enormous. Our own small efforts show we in the West have great difficulty even conceiving of life after a nuclear war.
- Third, the Soviet Union contends that SDI will be destabilizing. Their stated apprehension over the demise of a stable deterrent is ironic. The United States is heavily involved in diplomatic and private consultations as it ponders the accelerating developments in strategic defense which hold promise for strengthening deterrence in the future. As I stated earlier, strategic defensive options must also strengthen stability, or they will not be considered. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continues to develop and deploy a new generation of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and expand their already considerable defensive capabilities. They have consulted with no one and feel they should answer to no one, as they further upset a stable balance in pursuit of their own internal needs.
- The last myth is that the Strategic Defense Initiative will complicate the arms control process. The truth is that it was the Strategic Defense Initiative, combined with the demonstrated resolve of the Western allies to modernize their strategic deterrent, which brought the

Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. There is mounting evidence that defensive technologies offer real hope of reducing the need for offensive nuclear arsenals in the future. To engage in talks aimed at controlling arms without discussing what may prove to be the best tool to aid the effort is to trivialize the whole process. President Reagan is committed to serious and substantive progress in reducing the size of existing nuclear arsenals and enhancing security and stability. His acceptance of the moral challenge to explore all means available to achieve this end is essential.

To close, let me say once again that the Strategic Defense Initiative is a prudent and moral response to continuing Soviet actions which threaten world stability and security. SDI is a research program wholly within the limits of the ABM Treaty. This research is designed to explore the feasibility of strategic defense, given new technologies now available to the defense community. SDI seeks answers to those questions that peaceful nations must ask. If we are to keep the balance which guarantees peace, we can do no less. ■

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Following is an address by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, before the Overseas Writers Association, Washington, D.C., March 7, 1985.

No issue is of greater importance to mankind today than strategic stability. A world awaits, with asperity, the reconvening of nuclear arms control negotiations on March 12. The Soviet Union has returned to the bargaining table, and we welcome them back. Ahead of us stretches a difficult path. The United States seeks equitable and verifiable agreements which significantly reduce the size of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. We hope the Soviet Union will join us in a constructive search for necessary solutions to our differences.

A Historical Perspective

These differences are profound. To see this best, it is useful to take a historical perspective. We live in a world of change. As in social and scientific areas, the strategic picture too has changed greatly since the early 1970s when the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty was signed. Certain hopes and assumptions underlying that treaty, and the accompanying SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] Interim Agreement, have been altered substantially.

One of these underlying assumptions was that the two agreements would lead to real reductions in offensive nuclear systems. That didn't happen. In negotiations, the Soviet Union has consistently refused to accept meaningful and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. SALT II did no more than set caps on already high levels of strategic arms. It is clear now that the Soviet Union never intended to settle for the rough equivalence of offensive strategic forces foreshadowed in the SALT I agreements.

Since SALT I was signed, the Soviet Union has deployed eight new strategic ballistic missiles, five new ballistic missile submarine classes, and a new strategic bomber. In comparison, the United States has fielded only one new missile system, one submarine class, and has delayed deployment of the B-1 bomber. This buildup by the Soviet Union has altered the balance between opposing forces so necessary to maintaining stable deterrence. We are very concerned about the qualities of new Soviet ballistic missile systems. In time of crisis, these weapons are the most destabilizing; they are swift, carry a big payload, are mobile, and are accurate. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union is acquiring a survivable, first-strike capability which will be far less easy to deter.

The second assumption was that there would be mutual restraints on strategic defense. This was based on the hope that the Soviets would come to accept, in doctrine and in practice, that this mutual vulnerability to each other's offensive nuclear forces was in our common interest. This innocent expectation did not materialize either. While the United States stopped deployment of

strategic defenses, the Soviet Union continued to develop and deploy successive generations of antiballistic missiles, tracking radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. In fact, spending on strategic defense has been equal to or greater than that on strategic offense. They have deployed around Moscow the world's only ballistic missile defensive system. Soviet research and development of more advanced technologies, including sophisticated directed energy weapons, proceeded throughout the 1970s into the mid-1980s at a pace far in excess of our own efforts. Furthermore, along with already deployed phased-array radars, construction continues on one in central Siberia apparently capable of battle management, in clear violation of the ABM Treaty. They have constructed numerous hardened leadership bunkers and continue expansion of their extensive network of civil defense. Altogether, these efforts increase the possibility of sudden Soviet abandonment of the ABM Treaty and rapid nationwide expansion of their antiballistic defenses.

We could say that a third assumption, not surprisingly, was an expectation in the West that these and other arms control agreements would be fully observed. Here, too, we have been disappointed. The Soviet record on compliance overall is, at best, disappointing. And it is particularly disturbing in the strategic area, where they have committed serious violations of both offensive and defensive agreements. Although we have pursued resolution of these violations with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, we have received little satisfaction to date.

There is one more change I would like to mention. The assumptions made by the American negotiators in 1972 also had a technological premise. It was not feasible then to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles. But technology does not stand still. Just as we have observed the qualitative advance in strategic offensive arms, new breakthroughs in the past few years offer the promise that a militarily sound and cost-effective defense may be possible.

The Pattern Since 1972

The pattern since 1972 is clear and disturbing. Soviet actions have disproved our assumptions and thwarted real arms reductions. The balances between offensive forces, which have for years maintained deterrence between the nuclear powers, are being upset by the Soviet Union. Restraint on our part since SALT I in the deployment of offensive strategic weapons has gone unmatched by the Soviets. Instead, they have continued to increase the size, mobility, and accuracy of their offensive nuclear arsenals.

No less alarming, in both size and scope, is their investment in strategic defense over the last 20 years. As they develop antiballistic missiles capable of being moved and widely deployed in relatively little time, we must ask, for what purpose? When they harden an expanding system of command and control, we must ask the question, why? As they shield their leadership, harden their missile silos, and spend vast sums on civil defense, we must ask, to what end? The West simply has not posed a growing threat that would warrant such Soviet actions. But faced with Soviet unwillingness to date to agree to mutual, verifiable reductions in offensive arsenals, the West has no choice. We have to examine restoring the balance and alternative means for preserving a stable deterrence. We face three interrelated options in our efforts to restore and maintain the balance.

First, we can attempt, through negotiations, to get the Soviets to reduce offensive systems to equal levels. This will be our priority task in Geneva. But, if the past is any guide, our job will be difficult. We are prepared to be open, flexible, and constructive and will work diligently with the Soviet Union to negotiate effective, verifiable arms reductions. Remember, though, it will take two to make these negotiations work.

Second, we can try to reverse the trends by simply attempting to match the Soviet activity and maintain an offensive nuclear balance. In the short run, we certainly have to restore and maintain that balance until other options are available. Our strategic modernization program and NATO's LRINF [longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces] missile modernization programs do this.

Finally, we can devote our energies to see if there is a better way to provide for the security of both the United States and our allies by strengthening deterrence through greater reliance on defensive systems—systems that threaten no one.

We will pursue all three options in the necessary and appropriate ways.

- We will press on in pursuit of equitable and verifiable arms reductions. But this must be a two-way street, and it will take time.
- We will maintain the nuclear balance until other alternatives are available. Peacekeeper and the NATO LRINF modernization program are essential in this regard.
- Finally, we must explore the growing potential of the new defensive technologies.

The Need to Explore Strategic Defenses

Let me concentrate on the need to explore strategic defenses, and give you three concrete arguments why we have made the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) a central point of our defense programs.

The first argument revolves around deterrence. We have ignored one basic fact about a world in which there are no defenses. Without defenses, it is extremely easy for an attacker to plan his first strike. Once an attacker launches his ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], he knows, within a certain range, just what damage he will do because there is nothing to interfere with his attack. He can plan and calculate just what forces he needs to destroy the forces on the other side. If he has the money and the inclination, he can then buy those forces. It is basically an engineering problem. Well, the Soviets have done their calculations, and they have had the time and money to buy their forces.

But when you introduce defenses, even defenses that are less than perfect, the problem is entirely different. An attacker will not be able to launch a missile and destroy a target. He has no real idea of whether his attack plan will work or, if he succeeds partially, which targets he will miss because he cannot know how good our defenses will be. The defender will also be uncertain. But he is not deciding whether to attack. With defenses, suddenly what was an engineering problem becomes a much tougher, more expensive military problem. Even defenses that are imperfect strengthen deterrence because they create enormous headaches and uncertainties for anyone contemplating an attack. That is a good thing to do.

The second point involves saving lives. Very bluntly, we can deter an attack by defeating that attack or by threatening to kill enemy civilians in retaliation. There is no question in my mind that it is far better to be able to defeat the attack and thus deter it from occurring in the first place. SDI, for the

reasons I have just discussed, can help us make that judgment; without defenses, we must continue to rely on retaliation in order to deter a nuclear attack.

Many of those who oppose SDI advocate reliance on assured destruction in order to keep the peace. Let me point out something about assured destruction. There has been much discussion about nuclear winter recently. While there are many uncertainties, one thing is clear. Nuclear winter is most likely to be caused by the smoke and dust from burning cities that have been attacked by nuclear weapons. Everything in our Administration's strategic weapons policy, including SDI, is designed to move us away from that kind of attack. Those who disagree with us and who continue to support the discredited policy of assured destruction must face the following fact: the kind of war that could occur if their policies were adopted is precisely the kind of war most likely to cause nuclear winter.

Finally, I would like to address a problem less massive but perhaps more urgent than deterring a Soviet attack. Our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation have had a good deal of success. Certainly there are fewer countries today with nuclear weapons than anyone would have predicted 20 years ago. But many countries continue to seek nuclear weapons. We know that many of them also seek ballistic missile technology. We will not reduce our nonproliferation work. But I believe it is an act of simple prudence to investigate defenses that could defeat limited nuclear attacks or accidental nuclear attacks.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

For these reasons, President Reagan has asked this nation to undertake a program of vigorous research, the Strategic Defense Initiative. It will focus on advanced defensive technologies with the aim of finding ways to provide a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies. Our efforts will be in full compliance with the ABM Treaty.

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In our relations with other nations, strategic defensive options must satisfy not only our own security concerns but also those of our allies and the Soviet Union. The United States is actively consulting our allies to respond to their concerns and questions regarding SDI. Since this is a research program, their thoughts are essential as we examine the capabilities and set performance criteria for the defensive technology. Further, no step away from an offensive deterrent structure which has so effectively kept the peace in Europe can or will ignore the voice of our allies. Our own national survival depends on our allies' security from attack and safety from all wars.

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