NJC Bulletin
NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION
FEBRUARY 1986

INSIDE

Shcharansky Release: A Perspective

On February 11, Anatoly Shcharansky, human rights activist and campaigner for Soviet Jewish emigration, walked across the Glienicke bridge to freedom after eight years of detention in the Soviet Gulag. Shcharansky's release was the high point of a carefully orchestrated East-West exchange that has been hailed as one of the most concrete and dramatic results of the November Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting.

Although there has been conjecture as to precisely how the release came about, it is clear that the personal commitment and determination of both President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz were instrumental in the process. From the summit meeting in Geneva to lower level discussions, Shcharansky's case was raised at every opportunity by administration officials.

Political analysts agree that it was the Reagan administration's strong posture at Geneva, its commitment to a strong defense and unflagging determination to pursue development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which persuaded the Soviets to come to the negotiating table. The decision to release Shcharansky in the wake of the summit was made in the hope that such a gesture would soften the American position on bilateral issues such as trade and arms control.

Some, however, have adopted the Soviet interpretation of the events leading up to the release: that it was the warming of relations at Geneva which created a "climate" in which the swap could occur. According to this view, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union is linked to America's pliability on issues of concern to the Soviets. But what brought the Soviets to the table in the first place, and what, in the weeks following, persuaded them to release Shcharansky, was, in fact a tough U.S. stance and consistent public pressure.

Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, Mr. Shcharansky's U.S. attorney, maintains that his client's release was the product of an "eclectic diplomacy"—years filled with contacts and pressures from various quarters. Certainly, the efforts of Shcharansky's wife Avital and of the tireless Soviet Jewry activists were important. The letters, rallies and petitions provided constant pressure on Congress and on successive administrations to work for Shcharansky's freedom.

This public and diplomatic effort also had its impact on the Soviet Union. The relentless pressure from the West may have made a nuisance of Shcharansky, making his continued detention more costly to the Soviet image than his release.

It has also been suggested that the decision to allow Shcharansky to emigrate is part of the Soviet campaign to crush whatever remains of the refusenik movement in Russia. Ya'acov Gorodetsky, former leader of the Jewish cultural movement in Leningrad, announced that the Gorbachev regime was interested in releasing key Zionist dissidents in order to further weaken the movement by depriving it of leadership. Gorodetsky and Rabbi Eliahu Essas, another Jewish leader, were released just before Shcharansky, in early February.

Soviet policies of repression have lar-

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From AWACS to Jordan Arms

The Reagan administration's recent decision to postpone the sale of $1.1 billion-worth of arms to Jordan represents a singular victory for the Jewish community. It is a victory which contrasts sharply with the defeat suffered by the pro-Israel community in 1981 when it failed to prevent the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

The Jewish community failed in 1981 largely because it had neglected to develop working relationships with those outside the Democratic Party. In a Republican-controlled senate, GOP support was essential to block the sale. But without significant ties to the Jewish community, and under strong pressure from the administration, 41 of 53 Republican senators voted to provide AWACS to Saudi Arabia.

The AWACS defeat marked a turning point. Having failed to prevent a sale that threatened to undermine Israel's security, the Jewish community was compelled to re-think its political strategy. In doing so, the community came to recognize that in order to ensure the preservation of Israel's security, it had to foster broad bi-partisan support for Israel.

The decision to take a new approach

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CAPITAL Wire

ARAFAT INQUIRY URGED

In a letter to the Attorney General, Edwin Meese, forty-four senators have urged that the Justice Department give top priority to the investigation of PLO chairman, Yasir Arafat's involvement in the 1973 murder of U.S. ambassador to the Sudan, Cleo Noel, and his charge d'affairs George Moore. Documentary evidence, including a tape recording of a telephone conversation between Arafat and the terrorists holding the diplomats, reportedly exists showing that Arafat directly ordered the murder of the two men.

The letter, initiated by Senators Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), states that "these allegations, if substantiated, leave little doubt that a warrant for Arafat's arrest should be issued and a criminal indictment filed against him."

Among the signers of the letter are thirteen senators who comprise a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction in the matter. In addition to Sen. Grassley, these members include Senators Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), John East (R-NC), Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.), Arlen Specter (R-Penn.), Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), Joseph Biden (D-Del.), Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Paul Simon (D-Ill.)

HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP CITES SANDINISTA ABUSES

The London-based human rights monitoring group Amnesty International has released a report outlining a "...pattern of intimidation and harassment" of dissidents by Nicaragua's Marxist Sandinista government. The report's publication comes in the wake of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's announcement on October 15, 1985 of a new state of emergency which suspended virtually all civil liberties in his country. Its contents confirm White House assertions that the Sandinistas are escalating their attack on basic freedoms in Nicaragua.

According to the Amnesty report, the Nicaraguan government is guilty of arresting political, business and labor leaders, holding and interrogating them under harsh conditions. Detained in small cells, the report states, prisoners must endure the constant glare of an electric light bulb, threats of indefinite imprisonment and being awakened every ten minutes during the night. Using special powers under a state of emergency imposed in March 1982, the Interior Ministry's State Security Service routinely holds prisoners incommunicado in response to Nicaraguan rebel attacks. The report also noted a number of unsolved killings and disappearances of persons detained by Sandinista forces in 1981 and 1982.

Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States Carlos Tunnermann defended his government's detention policy. Tunnermann claimed that the prisoners "...were not arrested because they are civilian leaders but because they were helping to destabilize the country's economy, which is against the law, or preaching against the draft or cooperating with the counter-revolutionaries..."

LIBYA AIDS SANDINISTAS

According to a report in the London *Sunday Times*, Libya has provided a total of $400 million in aid to Nicaragua's Sandinista regime over the past four years. In addition, Libya has also supplied the Managua government with aircraft, arms, oil and military advisors, as well as civilian pilots to replace those who have left Nicaragua since the 1979 revolution.

Roman Catholic and human rights organizations also report that forty Libyans are currently working with Nicaragua's political police, advising them on "interrogation techniques." These organizations also report that Libyan advisors are stationed in army training camps near the war zones in Nicaragua, while a further forty Libyans are reported to be assisting the army in the Managua suburb of La Colonia las Colinas.

The strong Libyan-Nicaraguan connection has reportedly been strongly backed by the Sandinista Interior Minister, Tomas Borge. Borge, whose ties to radical Arabs have grown since he received training in PLO camps during the 1960s, praised the regime's ties to Libya during a 1984 trip to the Libyan capital, Tripoli, saying "Our relationship with Libya is eternal."

GENOCIDE TREATY RATIFIED

On February 11, the Genocide Convention Treaty was ratified by the Senate, thirty-seven years after it was first submitted. The treaty, which codifies genocide as an international crime, passed by an 83-11 margin.

Although the organized Jewish community has been urging the Senate to ratify the Convention for nearly four decades, these attempts repeatedly failed. In the end, it was a combination of President Reagan's support for the treaty and the efforts of leading Senate Republicans that achieved passage.

After the President called for ratification at an October 1984 convention of B'nai Brith, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Richard Lugar (R-IN) held hearings on the treaty. After months of negotiation, the committee endorsed the treaty, and it was brought to the floor for a final vote by the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Dole (R-KS).

Several senators who ultimately voted for the treaty did so in the face of considerable constituent opposition. Senators Mack Mattingly (R-GA), Don Nickles (R-OK), Paula Hawkins (R-FL), Jim Abdnor (R-SD), Mark Andrews (R-ND) all cast their votes in favor of ratification because of the treaty's symbolic importance as a human rights document, especially to the Jewish community.

SDI: IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL'S DEFENSE

In March of 1983, President Reagan formally announced a pioneering defensive strategy predicated on the notion that it is better to save lives than avenge them. The President's plan, the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI), was designed to replace the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, a dangerously obsolete doctrine of holding civilian population centers hostage to nuclear attack.

In Israel, a nation faced with the ultimate challenge of ensuring self-survival, the U.S. invitation to participate in SDI was met with great interest. After preliminary discussions, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin formally responded to the American invitation agreeing "in principle" to participate in the initial research and development phases of the SDI program.

The strategic, economic and political implications of Israeli involvement in SDI are significant. The most immediate benefit to Israel will be the development of missile interception technologies. The invitation sent to the allies specifically states that the program will "examine technologies with potential against shorter-range ballistic missiles."

The use of surface-to-surface missiles against major cities in the Iran-Iraq war has alerted the Israeli defense establishment to the urgent need for such technologies. Syria, Israel's foremost adversary, has already deployed highly accurate and lethal SS-21 missiles capable of reaching Israeli population centers, air bases, storage depots and other vital facilities. General Daniel O. Graham, founder and director of High Frontier, the organization from which many of the concepts for SDI arose, has noted these implications for Israeli defense planning. Obtaining defenses against the SS-21s, he said, "would enable Israel actually to defend itself...rather than simply deter attack by threat of retaliation."

While the threat of retaliation has served Israel well in the past, this option may no longer be effective in light of the changing realities of modern warfare and the increasingly fanatical character of Israel's enemies. Such threats are unlikely to deter enemies whose scant regard for human life is reflected in suicide bombings in Lebanon and the use of poison gas in the Gulf War. To guard against the growing ballistic missile threat, Israel must move beyond deterrence to develop a defense against missile attacks.

In a recent paper presented in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, W. Seth Carus, a military analyst for the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), called attention to Israel's growing vulnerability to missile attack. Carus pointed out that by 1990 Arab armies will possess large numbers of surface-to-surface missiles armed with sophisticated warheads. As the Arab inventory of SS-21 missiles grows, he noted, a missile attack on vital Israeli installations would leave the country dangerously vulnerable. Existing technologies alone, he added, would be insufficient to defend against such attacks, even if Israel knew of them in advance.

Dr. Robert O'Neil, director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, has also pointed out the inherent benefits of Israeli participation in SDI. O'Neil believes that Israel's involvement will allow her to remain abreast of the technologies central to a tactical missile defense.

Avram Schweitzer, a journalist with Israel's respected newspaper, *Ha'Aretz*, perhaps best describes the benefits of SDI interception technologies: "To be in on this kind of technology...could mean the purchase of peace for Israel, or more realistically, the imposition, by non-aggressive means, of a permanent state of non-belligerence along its borders."

Besides the utilization of missile interception technologies, Israel will also benefit in other ways from participation in SDI. Israel's industrial future will be greatly enhanced by being at the forefront of the SDI technological revolution. The program will provide jobs and revenue for the Israeli defense industry, as well as research funds for the country's scientific community. Spinoffs could provide similar boosts for the country's high-technology and consumer industries.

America will also benefit from Israeli involvement. Israel's high state of technological and scientific capability can be utilized in SDI research. The Israel Defense Forces demonstrated an unforeseen mastery over command, control, and communications (C3) by downing over 80 Syrian jet fighters with no losses during the recent Lebanon conflict. Their expertise in battle-tested technologies would immensely enhance development of weapon systems. In addition, the Israelis are known for their rapid turn around times from research and development to making weaponry operational. Israeli involvement can act as a catalyst, accelerating the pace of the entire SDI program.

Israel's acceptance of President Reagan's invitation to participate in SDI should yield invaluable dividends particularly in the critical area of development of ballistic missile interception technologies. Unable to match the quantitative advantage in weaponry of her numerous adversaries, Israel's involvement in SDI should enable her to maintain a qualitative edge necessary for survival.

Israel can only be part of this strategic, technological, economic and political revolution if SDI is funded and promoted by Congress. With the help of Israel's friends in America, SDI may prove to be the most important project ever undertaken by the two allies.



DOD photograph

A Soviet SS-21 battlefield support missile on a mobile launcher. Missiles of this type have been acquired by Syria and deployed against Israel.

Jordan Arms

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was strengthened by the growing realization that, with some encouragement, Republicans could become staunch allies. President Reagan's strong support, in particular, has encouraged the Jewish community to build closer ties with Republicans, based on mutual interest. The community has come to understand that the Republican Party's internationalist view of foreign policy, which favors support for America's democratic friends around the world, accommodates, quite naturally, strong support of Israel.

Under the Reagan administration, U.S.-Israel relations have never been better. The President and Republicans on Capitol Hill maintain that American passivity in foreign affairs encouraged Soviet expansionism and have seized foreign aid as an invaluable tool for combatting the Soviet threat. Thus, aid to Israel has increased from under $2 billion to over $4 billion, and has been converted from a combination of grants and loans to all grants. In addition, the strategic relationship between the two countries has been strengthened and a U.S.-Israel free trade area established.

With the emergence of groups such as the National Jewish Coalition which have been building strong relations with the GOP, Republicans are now playing a leading role in supporting Israel. This development has been reinforced by the growing number of pro-Israel political action committees (PACs). These groups have recognized the importance of generating support among candidates across the country, not only those in areas with large Jewish populations. Thus, they have built ties with Republicans from all parts of the country, helping to encourage their support for Israel. As these relationships have grown, so have PAC contributions to Republicans, further reinforcing good relations. According to a *Washington Post* survey, the ten largest of these PACs gave a total of $167,150 to Republicans as opposed to $139,450 to Democrats in the first six months of 1985.

The fact that Congress recently overwhelmingly rejected administration efforts to push through the Jordan arms package, attests to the success of the Jewish community's efforts to recruit Republican support. Last October, Congress passed a joint resolution which called for the Jordan arms sale to be delayed until March 1 unless there was a major breakthrough in the peace process. The resolution passed on a voice vote in the House and by 97-1 in the Senate. In the Senate, 28 Republicans co-sponsored the resolution, including Jesse Helms (R-NC), Steve Symms (R-ID), Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), Don Nickles (R-OK), Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.) and Frank Murkowski (R-AK)—senators who, on most matters, form a solid bloc of support for the administration.

The overwhelming coalition that the Jewish community built in opposition to the sale forced the White House to halt its efforts to push the arms package until Hussein took real steps to enter negotiations with Israel. Under the joint resolution, the administration would have been free to proceed with the sale after March 1. But in the face of solid bipartisan congressional opposition, the White House reached an agreement on January 30, promising not to go ahead with the sale if Congress would not put forward resolutions to block it.

Clearly, the recent victory testifies to a greater political sophistication on the part of the Jewish community. The lesson learned by the pro-Israel community since 1981—that it is crucially important for Jews to have a bipartisan influence on American politics—has been vindicated by the clear victory on Jordan arms. In the end, only by building relationships with Republicans as well as Democrats can Jews guarantee that their concerns are a factor in America's decision-making.

Shcharansky

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gely silenced open protest in Russia. Little remains of the wide-spread movement for human rights and religious freedom that was prevalent during the 1970s. Criminal trials, exile and harassment have driven underground whatever activity has not yet been extinguished.

In the final analysis, it is Moscow's perception of Soviet interests which determines who, as well as how many, shall be allowed to emigrate. And it was such a calculated consideration of Soviet interests which prompted the decision to free Shcharansky. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union is trying to replay its old message: "Look how nice we can be if you behave nicely toward us." And that old message is just as false as ever.

While presenting a moment of triumph, it is clear that Shcharansky's release does not signal a general relaxation of Soviet policy toward dissent and Jewish emigration. Just six days after Shcharansky was freed, seven young Jews were arrested in Leningrad and subjected to harassment and bullying for holding an informal Jewish gathering. Leningrad activists report that the raid was part of a general process of increased pressure on religious groups.

Letters written by Andrei Sakharov and smuggled out of Russia to the West provide fresh evidence of Soviet repression. Not unexpectedly, descriptions of the torture he and his wife Yelena Bonner experienced while isolated in the closed city of Gorky contrast sharply with official Soviet pronouncements that the two have been living in "normal conditions."

While Soviet officials claim that all Jews who want to quit the Soviet Union have done so, American Jewish activists report that 400,000 of some two million Jews living in the Soviet Union have applied to get permission to leave but have been refused.

Clearly, Shcharansky's release represents only a very small gesture on the part of the Soviets who would have us believe that they have reformed. Thus, while Jews everywhere celebrate Shcharansky's repatriation to Israel and his victory over repression, the Jewish community must not ease its efforts to secure the release of all those who wish to gain freedom. As the struggle is resumed, it should be remembered that the crucial factor in convincing the Soviets to release Shcharansky was American strength. Only by maintaining this strength and continuing to communicate our resolve can more substantial victories be won in the future.

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The Editor,
NJC Bulletin,
415 Second Street, NE, Suite 100,
Washington, DC 20002.

Campaign '86: Louisiana and Arizona

The pro-Israel community stands much to gain from the retirement of two Senate veterans, Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona and Russell Long, Democrat of Louisiana. While serving in the Senate, both Long and Goldwater have generally opposed military and economic aid packages to the State of Israel and have voted in favor of the sale of sophisticated weaponry to Saudi Arabia.

With the retirement of Long and Goldwater, GOP strategists are campaigning hard to win these two open seats as part of their national effort to retain Republican control of the Senate. The Republican candidates for the seats, both currently members of the House of Representatives, are Rep. John McCain of Arizona and Rep. W. Henson Moore of Louisiana. Both have established impressive records of support for Israel and have close and longstanding ties with the Jewish community.

John McCain: Clear Favorite in Arizona

In one of the most promising Senate races for the Republican Party, Arizona's John McCain is a highly-popular candidate with a strong lead in the polls. Well known as a decorated war hero, McCain spent five years as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam after being shot down during a mission over enemy territory. While in captivity he resisted torture and intimidation and refused to comply with his captors' demands that he denounce the United States.

McCain, who has visited Israel five times, serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he recently led the effort to block the administration's proposed arms sale to Jordan. McCain also spearheaded efforts among pro-defense conservatives for increased military aid and strategic cooperation with the State of Israel and played a critical role in assuring funding for the development of Israel's Lavi fighter aircraft.

Following the decision of the state's popular Democratic governor, Bruce Babbitt, not to seek election to the Senate, McCain's prospects have brightened. The announced Democratic candidate, Richard Kimball, trails McCain by thirty points in the polls. Kimball has sought to gain ground by attempting to generate opposition in the state to McCain's votes for critical items in the U.S. defense build-up, such as the MX missile, the B1 bomber, and funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Louisiana: Hopes for First GOP Senator

In Louisiana, Republican W. Henson Moore, a five-term congressman from Baton Rouge, is running for the Senate seat being vacated by Russell Long. Long, who was first elected in 1948, is one of the most senior members of the Senate.

Although Louisiana has consistently elected Democratic senators throughout its history, Moore's popularity has led Republicans to hope that this tradition will be broken in 1986. Moore has maintained a significant lead both in early polls and in fundraising. His opponent, Rep. John Breaux, of Crawley, Louisiana, is a six-term conservative Democrat representative from Louisiana's seventh congressional district.

Moore leads his opponent by nearly six-to-one in campaign fundraising. At the end of the January 30th filing period, Moore reported $1.9 million "cash on hand" compared to Breaux's $300,000. This factor is likely to be crucial: since both candidates lack high name recognition in the state, each must rely heavily on expensive paid-television exposure.

Perhaps the most difficult obstacle for Moore is the city of New Orleans, which accounts for a third of the state's electorate. The city contains a large proportion of Louisiana's black population, a group which has voted overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates in statewide races.

Moore also has to overcome the considerable power of the state's Democratic machine, an organization dominated by the personality, legacy and family of Huey Long, the most influential political figure in the state's history. However, Moore demonstrated his ability to win in the face of such opposition when he became the first Republican elected in his district since Reconstruction. Since then, he has proven himself an effective representative of the state's interests on the House Ways and Means Committee.

With the help of an increasingly effective state Republican organization, Moore has taken an early lead in the polls. New Orleans pollster, Edward Renwick, whose January, 1986 poll put Moore ahead by nearly two-to-one, stated, "no matter how you analyze the poll, there's no way you could turn Breaux into the leader." Breaux's poor showing may be due in part to his close ties to Louisiana's governor, Edwin Edwards, who is currently under federal indictment on charges of corruption.

The Louisiana race is unusual in that the election will be decided on September 27 as a result of state's open-primary system. Under this system, candidates from the two parties run in a primary against each other. If any candidate wins more than 50% of the vote, he becomes the only candidate in the November general election and thus is automatically elected. The Louisiana race, therefore, will serve as an important barometer of GOP prospects for the November elections.

Rep. John McCain.

Rep. Henson Moore.

Henson Moore has visited Israel and has built a strong record of support for Israel. He has been a consistently opponent of sophisticated arms sales to Arab states, opposing both the 1981 AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia and the recent proposed transfer of advanced weaponry to Jordan. Moreover, as a member of the Ways and Means Committee, he helped bring about the final passage and full implementation of a free trade area agreement between the United States and Israel.

U.S. Foreign Policy and American Jewry

During the 1970s, America watched with growing concern as the Soviet Union expanded its global influence unchallenged by the United States. The American people responded by calling for America to resume its leadership of the free world. American Jewry, however, continued to advocate policies that encourage Soviet expansion and today threaten the security and welfare of the State of Israel.

The evidence supporting a reassessment of American foreign policy was overwhelming. In Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola, forces backed by the Kremlin seized power, placing their nations firmly in the Soviet orbit. In Nicaragua, the Marxist Sandinistas began the process of creating a Soviet-style dictatorship in Central America. In Poland, the independent trade union, Solidarity, was suppressed, and in Afghanistan a massive Soviet force established a brutal occupation.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin was stifling dissent at home. Even as the Helsinki Accords on human rights were signed, the Kremlin continued its policies of repression. Shortly after, the independent group set up to monitor Soviet compliance with the Accords was mercilessly crushed, its leaders arrested and imprisoned.

Throughout, America remained weak and impotent. Proponents of neo-isolationism believed that the United States was largely responsible for many of the world's conflicts. Under President Carter, this view became enshrined in government policy: as the Soviet empire engulfed nation after nation, the United States sat back and watched.

The weakness demonstrated by the Carter administration in the face of Soviet expansion led revolutionary Iran to believe that it, too, could challenge U.S. power with impunity. This resulted in the Iranian hostage crisis and 444 days of American anguish and humiliation.

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a response to the impotence that had left America bereft of credibility in the eyes of the world. Americans overwhelmingly rejected neo-isolationism, and supported President Reagan's defense build-up and the U.S. intervention in Grenada. America understood how U.S. weakness had provoked Soviet aggression.

Americans came to recognize that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state which vigorously pursues policies of repression at home and expansion abroad. These policies, it became clear, pose a threat, not only to its own citizens, but to the entire world. The American people came to believe that only through policies that promote democracy, support U.S. allies and defend U.S. interests can Soviet designs be thwarted.

Jews must recognize that support for Israel can no longer be limited to pushing for foreign aid.

Jews, too, have become increasingly aware of the aggressive nature the Soviet Union as the Kremlin has relentlessly persecuted Soviet Jewry and aided radical Arab nations in their conflict with Israel. But unlike the American people at large, most Jews have failed to draw the conclusion that follows from this awareness: that the motivations behind the Soviet threat to Jewish interests are the same as those behind Soviet expansionism and repression around the globe.

Led by the Jewish establishment, American Jewry has resisted the policies that would strengthen U.S. interests in the face of Soviet expansion. Enthralled by the liberal movement which they helped nurture, many Jews continue—unquestioningly—to support the liberal neo-isolationism which advocates America's abdication of her responsibilities as leader of the free world. Were they to examine the implications of such an abdication, many would understand that such neo-isolationism endangers the interest the Jewish community has in keeping Israel secure.

Unless the United States is willing to project its power in defense of its allies and its global interests, Israel's security would be jeopardized. If the Soviets perceive a United States unwilling to protect its interests in Nicaragua—in America's own back yard—why would they believe that the United States would come to the aid of an Israel faced with a concerted, Soviet-backed Arab attack?

American Jews must recognize that their support for Israel can no longer be limited to pushing for foreign aid and opposing arms sales to Arab countries. For unless the United States demonstrates its willingness to defend its allies worldwide, Israel will be vulnerable. For the sake of Israel and of America, Jews must work to create and maintain a climate in which America's commitment to freedom is both strong and credible.

C.G.

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INSIDE

NJC Applauds U.S. Capture Of Terrorists

As the hijacking of the Achille Lauro ended, the world learned that PLO terrorists, under the leadership of the notorious Abu Abbas, had committed yet another crime against the free peoples of the world. With the murder of an elderly and infirm American Jew and the release of his murderers by the government of Egypt, the United States responded by capturing the terrorists through the restrained yet effective use of force.

After hearing of the American action, the National Jewish Coalition sent a telegram to President Reagan applauding the steps he had taken to bring the hijackers to justice. The NJC supports the forcing down of the EgyptAir jet and the administration's efforts to bring Abu Abbas to trial as invaluable contributions to the war against terrorism.

The Coalition's telegram read as shown below:

Western Union Mailgram

MAILGRAM SERVICE CENTER
MIDDLETOWN, VA. 22645
11AM

4-032863S284002 10/11/85 ICS IPMMTZZ CSO WHSB

1 202547701 MGM TDMT WASHINGTON DC 10-11 -311P EST

NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION
415 2 ST NE
WASHINGTON DC 20002

202547701 MGM TDMT WASHINGTON DC 10-11 -311P EST
ZIP

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION CONGRATULATES YOU ON THE LEADERSHIP AND RESOLVE YOU DEMONSTRATED IN CAPTURING THE TERRORISTS WHO MURDERED LEON KLINGHOFFER ON THE ACHILLE LAURO. THE COURAGE YOU SHOWED IN TAKING THIS ACTION BRINGS HOPE TO ALL WHO SEEK THE ERADICATION OF THE TERRORIST SCOURGE THAT THREATENS THE FREE WORLD.

WE FEEL SURE THAT YOUR ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO ACT DECISIVELY IN IDENTIFYING, TRACKING DOWN AND BRINGING TO JUSTICE THOSE WHOSE FANATICISM HAS LED THEM TO PLAN AND EXECUTE ACTS OF TERRORISM. ONLY BY SHOWING THE WORLD THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BOW TO THE FORCES OF VIOLENCE CAN TERRORISM BE DEFEATED.

THE NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION, AND THE ENTIRE JEWISH COMMUNITY, WILL CONTINUE TO STAND BY YOU IN ANY SUCH EFFORT YOU UNDERTAKE TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF TERROR.

15:10 EST

MGMCOMP

Black Community More Conservative Than Black Leaders

A recent survey published in *Public Opinion* magazine shows that the nation's black leaders are far more liberal on social issues than the black population as a whole. The survey was conducted by Linda Lichter, co-director of the Center for Media and Public Affairs.

Among the survey's findings:

- Sixty-eight percent of black leaders considered themselves liberals while only twenty-seven percent of the black population classified themselves in the same way.
- On the issue of affirmative action, blacks were asked whether or not minorities should receive preferential treatment to make up for past discrimination. Seventy-seven percent of the leaders said that they favored such treatment, while the same percentage of the black public said they opposed it!
- While seventy-four percent of the leaders said they had experienced job discrimination, sixty percent of the black public said they had not.
- Asked if blacks were making progress or slipping backwards, sixty-one percent of the black leaders said that they were slipping backwards; sixty-six percent of the black public said that they were advancing.

Such disparities are in evidence throughout the survey. Lichter points out that the survey is significant because it illustrates that the black community is not a "monolith". As Lichter observes, the apparent conservatism of the black public on social issues may make that community more "up for grabs politically" than either political party may realize.

The survey poses a difficult problem for the liberal black leadership. If they are truly to represent their community,

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CAPITAL Wire

JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE PROPOSED

On September 27 the Reagan administration notified Congress of its intent to sell a package of sophisticated weapons to Jordan. The package includes 40 advanced fighter aircraft (either the F-20 or F-16), 12 improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles, 300 AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles, 72 Stinger missiles and 32 Bradley M-3 tanks. The advanced nature of these ~~weapons would~~ constitute an additional threat to Israel's security, forcing Israel to make further sacrifices in order to defend herself.

Major congressional opposition to the sale has developed. A joint resolution of disapproval aimed at preventing the sale will be introduced shortly and requires a simple majority in both houses to pass. The president then has the authority to veto the resolution after which two-thirds of each body would be needed to override his veto and block the sale.

Congressional Republicans are playing a critical role in this debate. In the House, Reps. Vin Weber (R-MN), John McCain (R-AZ), and Mark Siljander (R-MI) are leading the opposition, joined by Democrats Dante Fascell, William Gray, Larry Smith and Mel Levine. John Heinz (R-Pa.), Robert Kasten (R-WI), Robert Packwood (R-OR), Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN), along with Edward Kennedy, Alan Cranston and Daniel Inouye are leading the opposition in the Senate.

SENATORS APPROVE KOZINSKI NOMINATION

On September 12, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to approve the nomination of Alex Kozinski to the Ninth Circuit U.S. Federal Court of Appeals based in Los Angeles. The committee vote cleared the final major hurdle to the nomination, which is now expected to be approved by the full Senate.

Mr. Kozinski presently serves as the Chief Judge of the U.S. Claims Court in Washington, D.C. On confirmation, Mr. Kozinski, at age 34, is expected to become the youngest Federal Appeals Court judge in ~~the country~~.

Judge Kozinski's appointment was vigorously opposed by the Institute for Policy Studies, a left-wing Washington "think tank." Rep. Pat Schroeder (D-Colo.) was also involved in the effort to halt confirmation of the Jewish immigrant from Romania.

However, Kozinski's nomination drew broad support from the legal profession. It was welcomed by Appeals Court judge, John P. Wiese, who describes Kozinski as "a superb intellect tied to an unbending commitment to excellence."

Involved in numerous Jewish philanthropic activities, Judge Kozinski also served as a volunteer attorney for the 1984 Reagan-Bush campaign.

ADMINISTRATION ACTS ON ISRAEL BONDS TAX

Assistant Treasury Secretary, Ronald A. Pearl~~man, recently alerted~~ the ~~Senate~~ and House tax committees of a 1984 tax law which could unintentionally impair the marketability of Israel Bonds. The new law places a tax on artificially low interest rates which would directly penalize holders of four percent Israel Bonds.

Israel Bonds serve to bolster the Israeli economy and are not viewed as a tax shelter. The new tax would inhibit the purchase of bonds and undermine the Israeli economic recovery.

As a result of the Administration's disclosure, Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) and Rep. Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.) sponsored legislation to exempt the bonds from tax penalities.

GOP LAWMAKERS OPPOSE TALKS WITH PLO

The National Jewish Coalition and Rep. John R. Miller (R-Wash.), produced and circulated an unprecedented congressional letter urging President Reagan not to abandon America's long-standing policy of prohibiting government officials from negotiating with PLO terrorists.

The letter, the first of its kind on the subject of negotiating with the PLO, was delivered to the White House on September 10. The letter called to the President's attention the recent surge of terrorist attacks planned by the PLO, and reiterated an American law which states that "no officer or employee of the United States . . . shall negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization."

Rep. Miller's initiative gained the broad support of House Republican leaders. Those signing the letter included key members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a majority of the newly elected Republican members of the House and the membership of the pro-Israel Conservative Opportunity Society.

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Breger Promoted: New Face At White House

President Reagan has chosen Marshall Breger, special assistant to the President "for liaison with the academic and Jewish community," to become chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States. In his new position, which carries with it a rank equal to that of an under-secretary, Breger will be responsible for making recommendations to improve the operations of other federal departments and agencies.

Mr. Breger has served in his current position since 1983. He was formerly a fellow at the Heritage Foundation and is on leave from the faculty of New York University's School of Law.

The Jewish community's new point of contact at the White House is Max Green. Mr. Green, who becomes Associate Director of Public Liaison, has responsibility for Middle East policy and Soviet Jewry, and for broader defense and foreign policy issues.

Mr. Green moves to the White House after serving as acting director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. During his tenure there, he worked closely with representatives of the major Jewish organizations and was responsible for reorganizing all 50 state advisory councils to the Commission. Prior to entering the federal government, he spent ten years with the United Federation of Teachers.

The Strategic Defense Initiative And Israel

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, (USA, Ret'd)

During the continuing debate over President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) opponents and advocates have focused their arguments either on the program's technical feasibility or on its implications for the U.S./Soviet strategic balance. Very little has been heard of the program's implications for "Third World" nations, including those in the Middle East.

This is unfortunate. For in the day-to-day conduct of international relations, the real importance of the nuclear balance—and the effect on that balance of U.S. ballistic missile defenses—is its effect on the ability of the super-powers to extend either domination or security in the Third World.

To understand this more fully, we must first understand why the Soviet Union attaches such great importance to the achievement and maintenance of strategic superiority. The Soviets tend not to view superiority at the strategic level as something to be used directly in a nuclear first strike against the U.S. Rather, they believe that Soviet nuclear superiority has the indirect effect of making the United States more circumspect with regard to such Soviet policies as support for "National Liberation Movements" in the Third World.

Behind this Soviet view lies the belief that an American attempt to stand in the way of the Soviets at low levels of conflict carries with it a risk that the conflict will escalate. Since the Soviets are strategically superior, they believe that they will be better able to cope with that escalation than will the Americans. The Soviets thus conclude that in order to avoid such an escalation, the Americans would avoid challenging Soviet policy in the first place.

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham is founder and director of High Frontier. He was an advisor to President Reagan during the 1976 and 1980 campaigns and has served as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and as Deputy Director of the CIA.

The possibility of another Arab-Israeli war similar to the 1973 Yom Kippur war illustrates how such a scenario might unfold. In the midst of that war the Soviets made several threatening gestures, including the airlifting of the headquarters of two airborne divisions to Damascus and the dispatch of several ships—possibly carrying radioactive cargos—to Egypt. The United States responded by raising its level of military alert. This American move, backed by U.S. strategic strength, convinced the Soviets to back down from their threat to Israel.

But this incident took place in 1973, when the United States still enjoyed rough parity with the Soviets in strategic systems. Since then, the Soviets have added thousands of new warheads to their inventory and have dramatically increased the capacity of their civil and air defenses. As a result, the Soviets may now possess the capacity to launch a first strike against U.S. land-based strategic forces and to survive the kind of uncoordinated response which might—or might not—follow.

Under these new conditions it is not at all clear that a U.S. military alert of the sort raised in 1973 would bring about Soviet compliance with American wishes. Instead, it might only bring about a similar Soviet alert. At that point an American President would have to decide whether the United States should fight a war which it did not choose, and might well lose, or whether to allow the destruction of an ally whose demise would be a serious blow to, but not necessarily the end of, the United States itself. Given this choice, the United States might well opt for the latter over the former. Moreover, this possibility increases with every day that Soviet offensive power and defensive capabilities continue to grow and the United States remains offensively inferior and naked to nuclear attack.

Should ballistic missile defenses of the sort envisaged by SDI be deployed to defend America, this situation would change. The United States would not have to fear intimidation at the hands of the Soviet Union's superior offensive forces, and its active and passive defenses. As a result, the United States would be far more able—and therefore far more willing—to act in defense of its allies and far more willing to stand in the way of Soviet policy when it threatens their security. To put it simply, a defended America is more likely to aid its allies than a vulnerable America!

Another reason why the SDI is of great value to U.S. allies such as Israel lies in the specific systems that the effort will produce. Not only Israel, but also our European and Pacific allies, live under the threat of Soviet or Soviet-supplied tactical ballistic missiles such as the SS-21, -22, and -23. These offensive weapons are especially threatening to

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Arab-Americans And Israel's Friends

Adina Weiner

During the September 1985 convention of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), two thousand delegates gathered to hear a discussion on the Middle East. The forum, however, was not a balanced debate on U.S.-Middle East policy nor was it devoted to furthering Arab-American rights in this country. Of thirteen panels, eight were blatantly hostile to Israel, to the special U.S.-Israel relationship and to the pro-Israel community.

One of the most well-attended and acrimonious panels was that dealing with "The Unholy Alliance: Right wing Evangelicals and the Arab-Israel Conflict." The evangelical/fundamentalist-Christian community represents one of the strongest pro-Israel constituent groups in this country. The strength and growth of this support has made the evangelicals the target of attack from anti-Israel forces in the United States.

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Adina Weiner is a research analyst with the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

Murray Friedman's "The Utopian Dilemma"

A Review By Rabbi Morton M. Kanter

Milton Himmelfarb, observing the political behavior of American Jews, has said that they have incomes like Episcopalians but vote like Puerto Ricans. The question of why American Jewry is the most liberal white group in America is examined by Murray Friedman in his recent book, *The Utopian Dilemma* (Ethics and Public Policy Center/Seth Press, P.O. Box 130, Bryn Mawr, PA, $7.95).

Jewish leaders in this country, both religious and secular, will welcome Dr. Friedman's essay. By providing a studied overview of the Jewish organizational approach to public policy since 1945, the essay lends insight into the present political attitudes of American Jewry.

Friedman's study makes it clear that liberals always have answers. For them, the solution is always easy: follow liberal ideology, no matter what results or how little good it does. For example, Friedman cites the strong support among the liberal-leaning Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC) for the liberalization of abortion and for government-aided abortions for poor women. Friedman relates the testimony of Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the UAHC, before a Senate subcommittee wherein he argued that a proposed "Human Life" bill "would impinge upon Jewish practice, thereby denying Jews the opportunity to apply their faith's moral standards."

Liberal opponents of the bill also objected to the use of history as a source of support for pro-life advocacy. Jews, in particular, felt a distaste for the "statements of some pro-life advocates who have likened abortion to the Holocaust."

Liberal supporters of abortion on demand use traditional Jewish sources and recent history to back their demands. Conservatives, too cite the same sources in opposing abortion, yet they frequently fail to examine the moral fall-out. Friedman correctly asks whether or not abortion should be available as a matter of convenience or as a form of birth control? He concludes: "[Liberal] Jewish groups seem to be approaching the issues from the viewpoint of Planned Parenthood . . . But Jewish groups are not Planned Parenthood . . . They were brought into existence to guard Jewish interests . . . and bring Jewish values to bear on public policy issues."

Friedman also points out that the Jewish conservative is stymied by semantics. Any re-examination of past policies is branded as a move to the "Right" and therefore considered as "reactionary." Too many Jews are too embarrassed to admit that they feel more comfortable with the politics of a conservative politician than with those of a liberal. They can only whisper, "We trust Reagan more than we trusted Carter, because he's not so ready to make concessions to the Russians just to make himself look good."

Recent surveys by the American Jewish Committee have indicated that a substantial number of American Jews have ceased practicing their religion and have only the most tenuous sense of religious identity. When this conclusion is coupled with the fact that "individual Jewish congregations are basically autonomous, and compliance with resolutions of central bodies . . . is voluntary," it should be clear that American Jews do not always follow historical precedent or adhere to social or Biblical laws. The politics of the conservative movement will draw increasing support from American Jews when it acknowledges that Jews act on the basis of their feelings, their tastes and their wills.

Rabbi Kanter served as Deputy Commissioner of Youth Development in the Ford administration and has led congregations in Ohio, New York and Michigan.

ADC

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The anti-Israel community's concern with the alliance between fundamentalist Christians and pro-Israel groups was explained by Rev. Donald Wagner, director of the Palestine Human Rights Campaign (PHRC). Noting that President Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger were fundamentalists, he commented that "this is serious business. It is shaping the political process . . . the foreign policy decisions of our country. And we must stand to counter it."

Three outspoken critics of Israel relayed their views on the coalition: Rev. Wagner; Khalid Bin Sayeed, political studies professor at Queen's University in Canada; and Rabbi Elmer Berger, founder of American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism. Cal Thomas, vice-president for communications for the Moral Majority presented the pro-Israel view.

Rabbi Berger condemned the fundamentalist Christian and Jewish coalition as "Mr. Falwell's moral majority blank check for the Zionist state" and "the so-called Jewish people." He accused Falwell of stifling debate over U.S.-Israel relations and of "inhibiting the right to free speech with totalitarian cant." Aside from attacking Falwell and other pro-Israel Christian leaders such as Pat Robertson and Jimmy Swaggert, Berger analyzed passages in the Old Testament which, according to his interpretation, show no justification for a Jewish state. Berger concluded that pro-Israel activists have "polluted Judaism" by "equating it with Zionism."

Professor Sayeed also turned to the Bible to discredit the concept of a Jewish homeland. Sayeed presented a scenario whereby Jews and Christians would "wage a war against all of Islam." In condemning Israel's supporters in the U.S., he said, "What kind of Israel are you supporting? . . . You think democracy will be built on neo-fascism . . . on this kind of racial intolerance?"

It was here that Sayeed inserted another popular theme of the conference—the "Israel-South Africa link." Sayeed spoke of a "link between Falwell, Kahane and South Africa" as an "inexorable"

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BLACKS . . .

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they must address the various disparities illustrated in the Lichter survey.

However, many black leaders, including NAACP Executive Director Benjamin L. Hooks and the Reverend Jesse Jackson, dismissed the survey's findings. But one NAACP official, spokeswoman Felicia Kessel, was more candid. Kessel summed up the implications of the survey by observing that "the black community as a whole is more conservative [than the black leadership]—not that we're happy with that, that's just the case."

College Republicans Adopt Strong Pro-Israel Platform

The College Republican National Committee, convening in Atlanta this past June, adopted a forceful statement in support of U.S./Israel relations as part of their platform. The NJC was represented in Atlanta—the first time a Jewish group has had an official presence at a CRNC convention.

The platform took note of Israel's war against the PLO, calling on the Jewish state "not to jeopardize its security by making territorial concessions to Arab dictatorships." The platform applauded President Reagan's statement that Israel is America's strategic asset in the Middle East. It noted, "as long as Israel is the only genuine democracy in the Middle East, Israel is the only lasting ally that America can have in the Middle East."

In Chicago, NJC field director A. Mark Neuman addressed the Young Republican National Federation convention participating in a forum with Reps. Andy Ireland of Florida and Steve Bartlett of Texas. The panel discussed the process of bringing non-traditional Republican constituencies into the Republican party.

The YRNF platform committee unanimously adopted a resolution offered by the NJC which "repudiates and completely disassociates itself from the people, organizations, publications and entities which promulgate the practice of any form of bigotry, racism, anti-semitism, or religious intolerance."

The YRNF resolution also "condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the introduction of such language into American politics during the 1984 Democratic presidential primary campaign. Neither the off-the-cuff slurs of the Rev. Jesse Jackson, nor the vicious racism and ugly bigotry of Louis Farrakhan and the Ku Klux Klan, have any place in our free and tolerant society."

GOP LAWMAKERS

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CONGRESSMEN OPPOSING TALKS WITH THE PLO

John R. Miller (R-Wash.)
Ben Blaz (R-Guam)
Mac Sweeny (R-TX)
H. James Saxton (R-NJ)
Robert J. Lagomarsino (R-CA)
Lynn Martin (R-IL)
H.W. Fawell (R-IL)
Jack Kemp (R-NY)
David Monson (R-UT)
Larry E. Craig (R-ID)
Howard Coble (R-NC)
Dean A. Gallo (R-NJ)
Sonny Callahan (R-AL)
F. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
Henry J. Hyde (R-IL)
Newt Gingrich (R-GA)
Bill Broomfield (R-MI)
Beau Boulter (R-TX)
Bill Thomas (R-CA)
Joe Barton (R-TX)
Joseph J. Dio Guardi (R-NY)
Fred J. Eckert (R-NY)
Vin Weber (R-Minn.)
Robert K. Dornan (R-CA)
Jim Lightfoot (R-IA)
Rod Chandler (R-WA)
Robert S. Walker (R-PA)
Ben Gilman (R-NY)
Jerry Lewis (R-CA)
W. Henson Moore (R-LA)
Ken Kramer (R-CO)
Bill Green (R-NY)
Bill Cobey (R-NC)
Tom Petri (R-WI)
Jim Kolbe (R-AZ)
Mark D. Siljander (R-MI)
John E. Grotberg (R-IL)
Tom Delay (R-TX)
Robert C. Smith (R-NH)
Marge Roukema (R-NJ)

SDI

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Israel which lies only a short distance from such potential missile bases as Damascus.

One of the first technologies likely to emerge from SDI research is that needed for anti-tactical ballistic missiles. These weapons would enable Israel actually to defend itself against this threat rather than simply to attempt to deter it by threat of retaliation. The ability to defend rather than simply deter with a promise of retaliation is especially important in the Middle East, populated as it is with a number of so-called "crazy states" whose leaders may not be deterred by threat of retaliation.

But the Israeli prime minister, Shimon Peres offered an additional reason why SDI is worthy of support. Speaking to the Israeli army magazine, *Bamahane,* Mr. Peres said: "Star Wars is not just another United States strategic move. It is a new dimension in the technological, scientific and strategic spheres . . . a departure from earth and a journey to a world with completely new conditions."

SDI offers new horizons to the United States and its allies. Its scientific promise alone would demand our commitment. But its importance to our security and to the security of the free world demands that we pursue it with full rigor—no matter what we may discover.

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The Editor,
NJC Bulletin,
415 Second Street, NE, Suite 100,
Washington, DC 20002.

ADC

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association and said that Falwell is "inviting racism of the worst kind."

Rev. Wagner personalized his speech by discussing his shift from being a pro-Zionist Christian to becoming an anti-Zionist Christian. Although Wagner professed empathy with the Jewish people's oppression throughout history, he pronounced that "the Holocaust is used on Christian guilt" by the Jews. It appears that Wagner has overcome his guilt: he is a leading anti-Israel activist and a supporter of the terrorist PLO.

Confronted by anti-Israel speakers and an audience which applauded speeches on "Jewish Nazism," Cal Thomas delivered a sound, articulate and informed account of his belief in the state of Israel and the special U.S.-Israel relationship. Undeterred by the audience's booing, hissing and heckling, Thomas spoke of the religious, humanitarian and strategic reasons for supporting Israel. He delved into the history of Israel's legal claim to statehood, argued for Israel's desire for peace through direct negotiations, and contrasted treatment of its Arab population with the treatment they receive in Arab countries. Throughout his speech, Cal Thomas reaffirmed his complete support for Israel and for the alliance between pro-Israel groups and fundamentalist Christians in America.

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Why Liberals Opposed Aid To Israel

On July 31, 1985, Congress gave final assent to the first foreign aid bill to be passed since 1981. This landmark legislation, which Rep. Dante B. Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called a "bipartisan measure ... vital to American interests abroad," represents a new congressional resolve to confront Soviet colonialism.

In an historic move, the $12.8 billion aid package included assistance to anti-communist guerrillas in Cambodia and Afghanistan, and $27 million in humanitarian aid to the freedom fighters resisting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The bill also repealed the Clark Amendment which had prohibited any U.S. aid to anti-communist guerrillas in Angola. This came as the Soviets escalated the battle against the Angolan democratic resistance, UNITA, complementing Cuban troops with Soviet tanks, planes and personnel.

The aid package also contained critical assistance for Israel, including $3 billion in military and economic assistance, plus an additional $1.5 billion in emergency economic aid. And, for the second year in a row, the Reagan Administration opted to convert the aid from a combination of grants and loans to all grants in order to ease Israel's debt burden.

The strong internationalist aspects of the bill indicate a trend in Congress away from the "blame America first" isolationism that has come to dominate foreign-policy thinking among liberal Democrats. Led by Republicans, Congress is now using foreign aid to uphold America's global security interests.

In 1984, Republicans played a pivotal role in passing legislation that provided important assistance for Israel and embattled El Salvador, supporting it 115-46. But liberal Democrats, unwilling to recognize the need for America to support her allies, opposed the bill. Despite its importance to Israel, House Democrats voted *against* the bill, 160-96, because it would have provided assistance to anti-communist guerrillas in Nicaragua. When given a choice between supporting Israel or retreating into isolationism, many liberals chose the latter.

This trend continued in 1985. In the Senate, 40 of the 48 Republicans voting supported the aid legislation. Many conservative Republicans, including Bill Armstrong, Phil Gramm, Charles Grassley, Mack Mattingly, Gordon Humphrey, Steve Symms and Jeremiah Denton, all demonstrated new support for foreign aid.

When given a choice between supporting Israel and retreating into isolationism, many liberals chose the latter.

In the House, the freshman members who represent emerging congressional attitudes, provided firm evidence that Republican support for foreign aid is strengthening as Democratic support weakens. While freshman Republicans supported the foreign aid bill 27-4—a ration of 7:1—support among new Democrats dwindled to less than 2:1.

Behind this growing Republican support lies the recognition that American passivity in foreign affairs encouraged Soviet expansionism. Congressional Republicans have seized foreign aid as an invaluable tool for combatting this Soviet threat.

In Congress, where Democrats once led the way in supporting Israel, it is now Republicans who direct attention to the threat that the United States, Israel and democracies everywhere face from the Soviet Union. In response, Republicans are supporting the cause of democracy world-wide by promoting foreign aid to Israel and other freedom-loving peoples as a moral obligation and an investment in our own security.

This year's foreign aid vote also demonstrated that many liberal Democrats are not willing to take the steps that will make America and Israel strong. Paradoxically, many, including Les AuCoin and Bruce A. Morrison, obtained Jewish campaign backing on the basis of their avowed support for the security of Israel. They, along with several Jewish congressmen, such as Sidney Yates, Barbara Boxer, Ted Weiss, and Anthony Beilenson—all liberal Democrats—abandoned Israel by voting against the foreign aid bill because it provides anti-communist forces with a few million dollars in U.S. assistance. In fact Rep. Boxer, eager to dampen Jewish criticism of her opposition to the bill, called a meeting of fifteen of her Jewish colleagues and urged them to vote against aid to Israel. Fortunately, most were as outraged at Boxer's suggestion as other Jews will be.

Friends of Israel must understand the importance of these votes for the future security of Israel and America. The Republicans have embraced policies that will ensure the freedom of Israel and America in the years to come. Their support for foreign aid represents a determined effort not to let liberals who "blame America first" dictate our foreign policy.

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AMERICA, ISRAEL & SDI

by Charles D. Brooks

Ed. Note: Mr. Brooks is Outreach Director for the National Jewish Coalition and Liaison Officer to the Jewish Community for High Frontier.

The arguments for the urgent necessity of deploying non-nuclear multi-tiered defensive weapon systems in an effort to prevent the spectre of a nuclear holocaust have been eloquently argued in public media by scholars, military experts and scientists on numerous occasions. The political, strategic, fiscal and moral case has and will continue to be made for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, few analyses have centered on how this historic reformulation of American defense policy will affect the 18 allies invited to participate in the project. In particular, one ally has more to gain and contribute than any other nation, Israel.

For Israel, the historical challenge has and will continue to be ensuring self-survival. The geopolitical nature of the Middle East and the xenophobic nature of fanatical Arabs sworn to the destruction of Israel necessitates a determined, but economically costly vigilance. There are terrorists who engage in suicide car bombings and nations who send 12-year-olds to battle and would no doubt use nuclear weapons at the earliest opportunity against Israel. It is illogical and dangerously naive to assume that retaliatory policy would serve as a deterrence if these nations or groups ever obtained nuclear weaponry.

The Threat

In 1981, when Israeli intelligence discovered that the Iraqis were on the verge of constructing nuclear weapons, they made a decision to launch a preemptive attack on The weapons producing facility. the world condemned the surgical strike, but less than two years later failed to condemn the Iraqis on their use of poison gas against Iran. What would have prevented the Iraqis from deploying nuclear weapons if the reactor had not been destroyed?

Already vastly outnumbered, Israel will have difficulty in future years maintaining the qualitative advantage over the Arabs. The Strategic Defense Initiative will help enable them to counter Arab procurement of sophisticated weaponry.

Israel is confronted with a far more immediate threat — Soviet installed SS21 missiles in Syria capable of delivering nuclear warheads at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Israel would have only minutes of reaction time and pay a total price if Syria were to equip the SS21s for a random strike. General Daniel Graham (USA, Ret.) a former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and a founder of High Frontier (the conceptual project from which SDI arose) has noted that one of the first technologies to emerge from SDI research may well be anti-tactical ballistic missiles. Such weapons could allow Israel to defend itself against Syria's Soviet supplied ballistic missiles without having to rely on the increasingly unreliable deterrent of retaliation.

Avram Schweitzer, an Israeli journalist with "Ha'Aretz" newspaper aptly described how Israeli defenses could benefit by being directly involved with the development of SDI technologies. "A system that can make out, identify, home-in-on, and destroy an object less than 100 feet long, moving at near Mach-1 speed at a distance of 10,000 miles, is essentially a system, the application of which could do to the foot soldier, the artillery piece, the tank or the helicopter what its space-progenitor is supposed to do to strategic missiles. To be in on this kind of technology...could mean the purchase of peace for Israel, or more realistically, the imposition, by non-aggressive means, of a permanent state of non-belligerence along its borders."

The Potential

Israel will derive more than national security benefits from its participation in SDI. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called SDI, "A new dimension in the technological, scientific and strategic spheres...It is like joining a new era. Imagine if Columbus had invited an Israeli to join his ship. I, for one, would have supported this invitation, no matter what he was going to discover."

Indeed, no one really is quite certain of what we will discover. America landed a man on the moon in less than seven years: 10 years earlier the feat was beyond the wildest imagination of all but an intrepid few. Israel's industrial future will be greatly enhanced by being at the forefront of this technological revolution. Technological spinoffs could lead to production of new computer systems, energy sources, communication devices, medicines and thousands of consumer products. Moreover, SDI will heap research funds upon the troubled universities and will revitalize the Israeli scientific community. Israeli defense-related industries will receive lucrative contracts and strategic and economic cooperation between Israel and the United States will be strengthened.

For the drained Israeli economy, SDI will mean new jobs and revenue. Chase Econometric Group revealed that for every billion dollars invested in space technology, over 800,000 new jobs are created, the inflation rate reduced by two percent, and the GNP increased by $23 billion. Tadiran, Inc., an Israeli military electronics corporation, has already had discussions with American SDI officials about potential contracts for future projects.

Israel's Capability

America would also be the recipient of numerous benefits from Israeli involvement in SDI, especially in the area of research and development. Israel is a stable ally that has already worked closely with the American military/industrial complex.

Israel's high state of technological and scientific capability can be utilized in SDI research. The IDF has demonstrated an unforseen mastery over command, control and communication (C3) by downing over 80 Syrian jet fighters with no losses during the Lebanon conflict. Their expertise in battle-tested technologies would immensely enhance development of weapon systems. In addition, because of the precarious nature of the Middle East, the Israelis cannot afford to have long research and development time spans before weaponry is operational. Israeli involvement can serve to catalyze the entire SDI program by accelerating the pace of the effort.

Furthermore, U.S. technological secrets are often safer with Israel than with our European allies. The Israeli intelligence services are so competent that former chief of Air Force Intelligence Gen. George F. Keegan (USAF, Ret.) has remarked that Israeli has been worth five CIAs to the U.S. because of its intelligence-gathering capability and transfer of data on the performance of Soviet weaponry. This has included the direct transfer of captured Soviet weapons.

SDI constitutes a revolution not only in defensive strategy, but moves into a new world of technology that may ameliorate many of the world's problems. In a nuclear world, it is not good enough to be morally right, America and Israel must also be strong. The Strategic Defense Initiative can help ensure that Jews will never have to endure another Holocaust and could lead to a world where close democratic allies can allocate their efforts to socio-economic endeavors instead of preparations for war and defense. For America and Israel, SDI is another giant leap for mankind.

DON'T GET PERS-ENGULFED AGAIN

Low oil prices are a boon today and a threat for tomorrow. Today, they induce increased economic activity and lower inflation. Tomorrow they will lead to increasing dependence on the vulnerable supplies from the Persian Gulf. The U.S. has five to ten years to prevent a replay of the oil- shocks of the 1970s.

The strategies are clear: adopt policies that will decrease U.S. imports and that will increase exploration and development of oil resources in those parts of the world both outside the Persian Gulf and where oil is less expensive and more plentiful than within the continental United States.

The difficulty is that these strategies have to work in an environment of low oil prices.

A ten dollar oil tariff would limit U.S. consumption and maintain U.S. production, thereby maintaining imports at approximately today's level of 4.5 million barrels per day. If an equivalent tax were placed on domestic production, U.S. production would decrease and imports would rise to approximately 7.5 million barrels per day. If there were no tariff and domestic oil sold at the current world price, imports in five to ten years are likely to increase to 12 million barrels per day.

In approximately the same time frame, world demand will increase to such a level as to consume OPEC's excess capacity to produce. Therefore, the U.S. may well find itself in the same position as in the 1970s, no excess capacity in the world, peak U.S. imports and OPEC in the catbird's seat - again.

In addition to the tariff, the U.S. could use its market power to aid countries with undeveloped resources - such as Mexico, Argentina, West Africa and Norway - to obtain the funds needed for drilling even in a weak oil market. Once assured of a portion of the U.S. market, developmental drilling can be financed. In this way, the U.S. could maintain the proliferation of international suppliers - outside of OPEC. Production in non-OPEC countries has led to the current oil glut.

At what level of imports is there an unwanted economic dependence on a dangerous part of the world? Previous oil shocks occurred at the 8-million barrel/day import level. A forward looking energy policy could prevent a recurrence of Pers-engulfment.

Inside This Issue

DEFENSE NEWS

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Charles D. Brooks

Israeli SDI Participation Benefits U.S. and Israel

In March 1983, President Reagan formally announced a pioneering defensive strategy predicated on the notion that it is better to save lives than avenge them. The president's plan, called the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI), was designed to replace the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a dangerously obsolete and immoral doctrine of holding civilian population centers hostage to nuclear attack.

In Israel, a nation faced with the ultimate challenge of ensuring self-survival, the president's vision and the invitation to U.S. allies to participate were met with great interest. After preliminary discussions, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin formally responded to the American invitation agreeing "in principle" to participate in the initial research and development phases of the SDI program.

The strategic, economic and political implications of Israeli involvement in SDI are significant. The most immediate benefit to Israel will be the development of missile interception technologies. The invitation sent to the allies specifically states that the program will "examine technologies with potential against shorter-range ballistic missiles," and antitactical missile technologies are likely to be among the first to be developed.

The use of surface-to-surface missiles against major cities in the Iran-Iraq war has alerted the Israeli defense establishment to the urgent need for such technologies. Syria, Israel's foremost adversary, has already deployed highly accurate and lethal SS-21 missiles capable of reaching Israeli population centers, air bases, storage depots and other vital facilities.

Gen. Dan Graham, USA (Ret.), founder and director of High Frontier, the organization from which many of the concepts for SDI arose, has noted these implications for Israeli defense planning. Obtaining defenses against SS-21s, he said, "would enable Israel actually to defend itself . . . rather than simply deter attack by threat of retaliation."

While the threat of retaliation has served Israel well in the past, this option may no longer be effective in light of the changing realities of modern warfare and the increasingly fanatical character of Israel's enemies. Such threats are unlikely to deter enemies whose scant regard for human life is reflected in suicide bombings in Lebanon and the use of poison gas in the Gulf war. To guard against the growing ballistic missile threat, Israel must move beyond deterrence to develop a defense against missile attacks if she is to survive.

In a paper presented in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, W. Seth Carus, a military analyst for the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), called attention to Israel's growing vulnerability to missile attack. Carus pointed out that by 1990 Arab armies will possess large numbers of surface-to-surface missiles armed with sophisticated warheads. As the Arab inventory of SS-21 missiles grows, he noted, a missile attack on vital Israeli installations would leave the country dangerously vulnerable. In addition, he wrote, existing technologies alone would be insufficient to defend against such attacks, even if Israel knew of them in advance.

Dr. Robert O'Neil, director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, has also pointed out the inherent benefits of Israeli

See BROOKS, Page 21

Charles Brooks is the outreach director for the National Jewish Coalition in Washington, D.C., and also serves as a liaison for High Frontier to the Jewish community. He was educated at DePauw University in Indiana, The Hague Academy of International Law and holds a master's in international relations from the University of Chicago.

Israeli Participation Will Enhance SDI Benefits

BROOKS, from Page 19

participation in SDI. O'Neil believes that Israel's involvement will allow Israel to remain abreast of the technologies central to a tactical missile defense.

Avram Schweitzer, a journalist with Israel's respected *Ha'Aretz* newspaper, perhaps best describes the benefits of SDI interception technologies:

"To be in on this kind of technology . . . could mean the purchase of peace for Israel, or more realistically, the imposition, by non-aggressive means, of a permanent state of non-belligerence along its borders."

Besides the utilization of missile interception technologies, Israel will also benefit in other ways from participation in SDI. Israel's industrial future will be greatly enhanced by being at the forefront of the SDI technological revolution while spinoffs could include new computer systems, energy sources, communication devices, medicines and consumer products. Research funds from SDI will help revitalize the universities and the Israeli scientific community.

SDI cooperation will be of critical importance to the Israel defense industrial base that will otherwise be subject to foreign aid cutbacks generated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction bill. In particular, SDI will provide jobs and revenues to defense-related industries who have already been forced to cut back on research and development activities because of lack of funds.

America will also benefit from Israeli involvement in SDI. Israel's high state of technological and scientific capability can be utilized in SDI research. The Israeli Defense Forces demonstrated an unforeseen mastery over command, control and communications by downing more than 80 Syrian jet fighters with no losses during the recent Lebanon conflict. Their expertise in battle-tested technologies would immensely enhance development of weapon systems. In addition, the Israelis are known for their rapid turn-around times from research and development to making weaponry operational. Israeli involvement can serve to catalyze the entire SDI program by accelerating the pace of the effort.

Israel's acceptance of Reagan's invitation to participate in SDI should yield invaluable dividends particularly in the critical area of development of ballistic missile interception technologies. Unable to match the quantitative advantage in weaponry accumulated by her numerous adversaries, Israel's involvement in SDI should enable her to maintain a qualitative edge necessary for survival.

Israel can only be part of this strategic, technological, economic and political revolution if SDI is funded and promoted by Congress. With the help of Israel's friends in America, SDI may prove to be the most important project ever undertaken by the two allies.

HIGHLIGHTS

Israel's SDI Role

will allow the Middle Eastern nation to develop missile interception technologies vital to its survival, says commentator Charles D. Brooks of the National Jewish Coalition in Washington, D.C. 19

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

28 Apr 86

MEMO FOR Max Green

Attached is a copy of the paper I prepared for AIPAC.

Pete Worden

PDJ Board

In 1983, President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to research means for defending against ballistic missiles. In the context of U.S. security this meant finding ways to stop a militarily significant percentage (probably more than 50%) of the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) which the Soviets might use to threaten the United States during a crisis. While there has been, and no doubt will continue to be intense public controversy over whether deployment of such defenses will enhance U.S. security and lead to a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union, there can be little doubt that a vigorous research and technology development program will proceed. Over the next decade it is likely that between $20-$40 billion will be spent on the SDI program.

Two SDI aspects warrent special note. First, President Reagan has stressed that strategic defenses must enhance the security of U.S. allies as well as that of the United States. Second, the President has directed that the SDI consider defenses against ballistric missiles of all ranges, not just those which directly threaten U.S. territory. In addition, the SDI has been structured to relate closely to work designed to develop effective air defenses. This paper addresses the relevance of the SDI to the defense of Israel. This relevance includes not only defensive possibilities against ballistic missile threats to Israel, but also the military applications of SDI technologies to other Israeli defense problems.

Ballistic missile defense systems have three main functional elements. First, the sensor element detects incoming missiles, identifies and tracks these targets, and determines when they have been destroyed. Second, the battle management system must compute target location and status, and direct the third element, weapons. to target destruction.

Ballistic missile defense systems are most effective if there are more than one defensive layers. Even if each single layer has limited effectiveness, multiple layers can combine to for high overall effectiveness. Moreover, countermeasures devised by an opponent to defeat the defenses are likely to be effective against only one of the layers. For the defense of the United States, the SDI envisions at least three independent layers. The first layer, the so-called boost phase, would stop missiles early in their flights while the main rocket engines are burning to thrust the missile toward its target. The next layer, referred to as the midcourse phase, would negate the missiles or warheads while they are coasting toward their targets. This coasting occurs in outer space for the long-range ICBMs and SLBMs, but is wholly within the atmosphere for shorter range missiles such as most of those threatening Israel. A final layer, the terminal phase, intercepts the attacking warhead in the final minute or so as it descends towards its target.

Current SDI analyses have identified system options for sensors, battle management and weapons in each phase. Sensors for

the boost-phase might be infrared (heat-seeking) devices placed on satellites deep in space. As many as 100 of these sensor satellites might ultimately exist. The same satellites could also carry redundant battle management and communications systems. These two elements would provide worldwide coverage of all missile launches. Weapons for the boost phase would proabably consist of thousands of small homing missiles carried on many hundreds of separate small satellites. These homing missiles, or "kinetic energy weapons" would attack missiles or warheads in space, destroying their targets by physically colliding with them in much the same manner as some air-to-air missiles do against hostile aircraft. Although this boost-phase system would work in midcourse as well for those missiles and warheads which travel outside the atmosphere in space, the SDI is pursuing another ground- and air-based system option for midcourse. For this concept the homing interceptors would be launched from the ground on small, relatively inexpensive rockets. Each rocket interceptor would resemble a surface-to-air missile weighing only a few thousand pounds and costing about $1 million apiece. An airborne system would carry infrared and possibly radar sensors, along with a battle management system. This airborne optical systems would acquire the warheads while they are hundreds to thousands of miles away from their targets and direct the ground-launched interceptor missiles to these targets. The final, terminal defense layer would operate wholly within the atmosphere relying on a sophisticated missile capable of hitting the incoming warhead in the final few miles before it reaches its target. The problem for

this missile is slightly more difficult than for a missile which would intercept its target outside the atmosphere because of the heating and stresses caused by the defensive rocket's high acceleration flight through the atmosphere. Moreover, this missile must react faster in order to perform its intercept in the minute or so it has available. These "endo-atmospheric" (inside the atmosphere) interceptors would also rely on the airborne optical sensor, but could also use a ground-based radar sensor. These radars, using new advances in micro-miniaturized electronics, could be small enough to fit on a tracked or wheeled vehicle.

The "strategic" system outlined above would have significant capability against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Although the shorter range missiles would only be vulnerable to the terminal layer, a second intercept layer could also be added in order to gain the benefit of a multi-layered defense against the "tactical" missiles. A "low-endoatmospheric" defense system could be added to underlay the "strategic" terminal system. This system would rely on a ground-launched interceptor resembling, or possibly even consisting of an upgrade to, current surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. Indeed, the Soviet Union is now deploying nationwide the SA-12 SAM. One version of the SA-12 has been tested against Soviet tactical ballistic missiles and the nationwide network of the SA-12s will give the Soviets substantial defense against such short- and intermediate- range ballistic missiles. These are also U.S. efforts underway to upgrade the PATRIOT SAM for use againt

tactical ballistic missiles. Within the SDI, a program is underway, and a number of preliminary tests already conducted on an advanced low-altitude non-nuclear defense interceptor. These systems could also rely on a small mobile radar or even airborne sensor and battle management system. Although, these systems would be even more effective if they had available long-range "strategic" tracking information from space- or air-based sensors.

Defense against shorter range missiles appears to be less stressing technically than defenses againt longer range missiles. Shorter-range missile, such as those threatening Israel, have flight times between 5-10 minutes, as opposed to the 15-30 minutes for those SLBMs and ICBMs threatening the United States. The shortened flight time reduces the time available for intercept. However, there are also several counteracting factors. Shorter range missile have much slower velocities than ICBMs. This allows a lower-performance defensive interceptor to be effective. Shorter range missiles also have much less "excess" payload. thus, there is little to spare weight for countermeasures, such as decoys, to confuse and exhaust the defense. Indeed, lightweight decoys will not work for the shortest range missiles which spend all of their time within the atmosphere. Air friction will quickly slow a lightweight decoy down relative to the heavy warhead, thus giving away that the decoy is not a real threat.

THREATS TO ISRAEL

The defense of Israel's air bases provides an example how defenses can help gaurantee Israel's security. Against Israel's approximately ten air-bases, her enemies could launch up to 200 surface-to-air missiles. About ten direct hits from these conventionally or chemically armed missiles would effectively knock out the base. The ten air bases currently run a high risk should a crisis situation escalate. This problem differs considerably in the face of defenses. If Israel had two layers of missile defense, each layer with 80% intercept effectiveness, the missile attackers would have to fire 500 missiles at each target base in order to destroy nine of the ten bases. Israel's enemies would need over 5000 missiles, an impossible number, to threaten the air bases they can readily destroy today with their 200 missiles. The missile defenses can thus provide a potent new dimension to Israel's security.

The types of missile defenses needed by Israel follow directly from the SDI program. The first layer of defense would use the same airborne sensor and battle management platform under development by the SDI for late midcourse and high-altitude endo-atmospheric intercept. This "Airborne Optical System" (AOS) might be an unmanned aircraft or a manned system similar to the current air defense AWACS planes. A single aircraft could cover all of Israel. A small number, therefore, could maintain continuous coverage of the nation. The interceptor missiles would stop thier

targets at altitude above 15,000 meters and can defend an area 100 kilometers or more across. Thus a few sites, each with 50-100 missiles would also protect the entire country.

Israel's second defensive layer could intercept attacking missiles at altitude between 5000-20,000 meters. This defense system would be a "point defense" best suited to individual high value targets such as an air base. Each site would get accurate tracking information from the airborne AOS. However, actual target tracking during intercept would be done by a small mobile radar currently under investigation by the SDI. An anti-tactical ballistic missile, under study by the SDI for use in NATO defenses, would perform the low altitude intercept. Since these defenses would protect only a small area, each site would probably require 10-20 missiles per site. Critical military sites in Israel number about 50, with some sites close enough so that several could be protected by a single interceptor facility. Thus a total of 30-40 independent defense sites would provide the second defenive layer.

Cost estimates for this two layer defensive system are somewhat uncertain. However, a rough estimate can be made based on the SDI cost goals. Table I summarizes these cost estimates.

In addition to the Israel-based system described above, a global U.S. strategic defense system would complement and strengthen the Israeli defenses. Space-based sensors planned by

the SDI to detect missile launchs world-wide, can provide accurate early warning and tracking information, enhancing the Israel-based defense system's response time and effectiveness. Moreover, should Israel's enemies acquire the long-range Soviet SS-12/22 intermediate-range missile (range approximately 1000 km) the U.S. strategic defense, probably based in space, could provide additional intercept layers since the SS-12/22 does spend a good portion of its flight time outside the atmosphere.

TABLE I

Possible Missile Defense System for Israel

LAYER I	NUMBER NEEDED	COST/UNIT	TOTAL COST $
AOS	4	$50 million	$200 million
Interceptor	400	$2 million	$800 million
LAYER II			
Radar	40	$20 million	$800 million
Interceptor	800	$1 million	$800 million
TOTAL COST			$2600 million

SDI technologies and systems could also enhance considerably Isreal's air defenses. The loang-range high-altitude airborne sensors might be capable of detecting aircraft at distances of up to 1000 kilometers - perhaps as soon as they become airborne. The low altitude interceptor missiles, as with the Soviet SA-12 interceptors, might have dual capabilities against missiles and

airplanes. The directed energy weapons part of SDI, particularly lasers which could be based on the ground or on airplanes, would have near-term applicability against aircraft. Indeed, the United States demonstrated in the early 1980s an airborne laser to shoot down air-to-air missiles. Because these directed energy weapons incorporate the most advanced technology, particular computer-controlled pointing and tracking, it will be a long time before the eastern-bloc countries and their allies will have similar capability.

SDI technologies represent a force-multiplier in every level of conventional conflict. Just as the United States cannot hope to field comparable numbers of troops as the Soviet Union and its allies, Israel must also rely on superior motivation and training and superior technology. However, as Israel's enemies improve their training and acquire advanced technical capabilities from the Soviet Union, the numerical advantages of the arab states becomes an increasingly severe threat. One way to preserve technological adantages is to incorporate technologies which even the Soviet Union does not have. These are precisely the technologies contained in the SDI battale management and communications research projects -- computers, advanced computer software, and sensors. The increasing use of ultra "smart" munitions, integrated battlefield data management, and real-time battlefield surveillance, can all combine to provide Israel's ground and air forces with a significant long-term advantage over their opponents. The very presence of such capabilities in

Israel's arsenal would present a strong deterrent to agression.

SUMMARY

SDI technologies and technical capabilities offer a significant security enhancement to Isreal. The increasing number of ballistic missile is the arab arsenals present a growing threat to Israel's vital facilities, air bases, troop concentrations, supply depots, and key industries. Moreover, these missiles are an ever present terrorist threat to Isreal's geographically concentrated population centers. Some of the systems being pursued in the SDI could counter directly the missile threat to Isreal. Conversely, the battle management, computer and sensor technologies under SDi development can provide Isreal's armed forces a decisive and continuing edge over the adversaries.

National

Israel & SDI

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Israeli participation in SDI expected to help both sides

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Israeli participation in the Reagan administration's Strategic Defensive Initiative will help both Israel and the program, but it isn't clear how the Middle East nation will fare in winning SDI contracts.

Participation in the multibillion-dollar research program would fulfill several Israeli goals. Its prime goal appears to be construction of a defense against Soviet SS-21 missiles stationed in Syria. Such a defense is one of the first technologies expected from the SDI program.

Participation also would keep Israel at the vanguard of warfighting technology and would help cement its alliance with the United States.

Of advantage to the United States is Israel's unparalleled research and development track record.

Calling SDI "a project of great interest to the future of the world and the Free World," Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, along with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, on May 6 signed an agreement outlining Israel's participation in the program.

Technologically, "we both can add to each other," said Emanuel A. Winston, a Chicago-based expert on Middle East affairs.

"Israel has the advantage of being involved in a very expensive type of research which they [Israel] might not otherwise be able to afford," Mr. Winston said. "They give as good as they get."

Small in number, but highly accurate, the Soviet SS-21 missiles in Syria could destroy Israeli military control centers and airfields almost without warning. No defense against them exists. Similar missiles threaten U.S. allies in Europe.

"It [SDI] simply eliminates what Israel needs most, which is quick response time," said Joyce Starr, director of Near East studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. She called the missiles "not only a high priority threat for Israel, but the highest priority threat."

Israeli officials believe that more advanced SS-23 missiles soon will be on their way to Syria, she said.

Miss Starr, who last month led a delegation of 24 U.S. contractors to Israel, a tiny nation surrounded by often-hostile Arab states, faces weapons arrayed against it that have been made in countries across the globe, Mr. Winston said.

"The mix of weapons systems is so extraordinary, Israel has to have ... almost a surrealistic approach to defense," he said.

Heavily dependent on technological experts, Israel excels in the development of lasers, computer software and propulsion systems. It outperforms the United States in such development technologies as remotely piloted vehicles.

Proponents of Israeli participation in SDI said it could serve to catalyze the program, to further U.S. aims and to bolster Israel's sagging economy.

"From the U.S. standpoint, it's good to have anybody support SDI," said skeptic Peter Stares, a Brookings Institution analyst. "From Israel's point of view, I'm not sure how much they can hope to gain from it.

"The Israelis see it more as a way of getting a handle on the technology in the U.S.," he said.

Observers say the Israeli decision is unlikely in itself to coax support from U.S. allies in Europe, where the SDI program remains controversial.

Great Britain and West Germany also have agreed to participate in SDI. Blessed with greater experience in handling the Pentagon and U.S. industry, they both may have an edge when it comes to bidding for lucrative research contracts and subcontracts.

The two countries "are more familiar with the players," Miss Starr said. "It's going to take a great deal of work and follow-up by the Israelis, if they're really serious ..."

"They [Israel] basically need to get their act together and get over here and start dealing with contractors," said Charles Fooks, spokesman for the conservative National Jewish Coalition.

"It'll be tough, of course said an Israeli Embassy spokesman. "But that's the name of the game."

There are other drawbacks.

"The most serious strategic implication for Israel of participation in SDI is its possible effect on Soviet global military planning in the future," Dore Gold, a researcher at Tel Aviv University's Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, wrote in a December 1985 paper. "Israel could become a significant Soviet nuclear target."

Said Miss Starr: "These long, long-term major question marks are important, but don't have enough weight to weigh in against the advantage of the short-range opportunities."

NEWS ANALYSIS

Israel in talks credited with paving the way for the SDI agreement, said Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres "was not politely supportive, he was openly and enthusiastically supportive" of the SDI concept.

"Whether they would have moved as quickly without the direct threat of the SS-21s and without Peres — I suspect that those were the two prime elements," she said.

Israel Signs Agreement For SDI Cooperation

Israel & SDI

Washington—U.S. and Israel last week signed a memorandum of understanding governing Israeli cooperation in research and development for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

The Israeli accord follows similar agreements with Great Britain and West Germany (AW&ST Mar. 31, p. 31; Dec. 16, 1985, p. 12).

"We are ready to cooperate with the U.S. in whatever field that we agree to work on together," Israeli defense minister Yitzhak Rabin said. "We know our limitations; therefore, we expect to do the things in this research and development program that will help our own problems along."

The memorandum and a supplementary letter provide for participation in SDI research by Israeli government laboratories, research establishments, companies, industries and other entities in Israel, to the mutual benefit of the U.S. and Israel, Defense deputy assistant secretary Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., said.

"The memorandum leaves open the possibility of Israeli participation in the funding as well as in the performance of contracts," Gaffney said. "There are arrangements within U.S. law that are quite clear on the terms and conditions under which such joint funding can take place."

Ballistic Defense

U.S. officials expect the cooperative arrangements to give participants a substantial improvement in defense against ballistic missiles. Israeli officials have indicated particular concern about the threat of attack with shorter-range ballistic missiles from nearby countries, Gaffney said, adding, "I expect that a consistent theme throughout the Israelis' efforts in connection with SDI will be trying to assess how the technologies they're working on will be relevant to their immediate security needs."

The U.S.-Israeli memorandum limits transfer to third countries of the technology developed under contracts. All three agreements include similar provisions on commercial use of the technology, patent rights and licensing, Gaffney said.

The U.S. will own the rights to technology developed under SDI contracts paid for by the U.S., an SDI official said. When the U.S. purchases technology funded and developed by Israel, the contract will define the rights transferred.

Israeli firms and research establishments are working on technologies with potential payoff for SDI in the near term; including space-based sensors, kinetic-kill vehicles, defense against tactical ballistic missiles and system architecture for regional defense against surface-to-surface missiles.

This research is being done by firms including Israel Aircraft Industries, ElOp electro-optical company, Tadiran, Soreq (the Israeli nuclear research center), Israel Military Industries, and academic centers including the Negev Institute, the Hebrew Institute and Technion.

U.S. officials are not negotiating with other countries regarding SDI participation, Gaffney said. Japan, discussed earlier as a possible participant, has not sought negotiations leading to an understanding, he said (AW&ST Jan. 20, p. 28). Failure to negotiate a government-to-government accord would force foreign firms to seek involvement through normal Defense Dept. procurement procedures, with attendant delays, he said.

Israeli officials believe that the U.S. armed services may be increasingly receptive to the idea of expanded bilateral cooperation in research and development in both SDI and more conventional defense projects. They believe that Israel has useful expertise to contribute, especially in using U.S. systems against Soviet equipment.

Israeli officials hope to generate cooperative efforts similar to those covered by a provision in the Fiscal 1986 defense authorization, providing $200 million for U.S. participation in cooperative research and development projects with NATO allies (AW&ST Apr. 7, p. 26; Mar. 17, p. 65; May 6, 1985, p. 24).

Israel is prepared to shoulder its share of the costs of research and development cooperation, they emphasize. "It's not to be a case of the U.S. paying and Israel doing the R&D," an Israeli official said.

Israeli subcontract work for U.S. prime defense contractors amounted to nearly $22 million in 1985 and $20.6 million in 1984, according to a Defense Dept. official.

The Israeli Embassy in Washington plans a June 10-11 seminar on bilateral cooperation in research and development, similar to a defense industry seminar held last year (AW&ST Apr. 29, 1985, p. 201). Maj. Gen. Uri Simhony, embassy defense and armed forces attache, is organizing the seminar for Israeli business executives and ministry of defense research and development officials to discuss opportunities for cooperation in SDI and other defense areas with U.S. defense and industry officials.

Delegation Organization

The Israeli official delegation is to be headed by Gen. Uzi Eilam, director of the ministry of defense directorate of research and development.

All major Israeli industries will be represented, including aerospace, electronics, electro-optics, and metals and materials, embassy officials said. The Israeli firms will include those with advanced capabilities and technology in warheads, sensors, missiles, armor and antiarmor, electronic warfare and intelligence applications.

"Our interests are in working on improvements in weapons systems, especially those used in Israel and those that would help in our threat environment," Col. Ehud Aviran, Israeli defense research and development attache, said.

There may be some parts of highly classified projects that are too sensitive for bilateral cooperation, but Israel is willing to accept compartmentalization of a program if it has applicable expertise or capabilities, Aviran said.

Cooperative research and development may be extremely complicated, with two governments and two sets of businesses involved, he said.

Embassy officials planning the seminar expect it to cover:

- U.S. official concerns and policy on bilateral cooperation, and suggestions regarding areas for cooperation, including possible projects, closed topics, regulations and procedures.
- Israeli government and industry's strengths and capabilities.
- Israeli suggestions regarding U.S. programs that offer potential areas of cooperation.
- Israeli government incentives for research and development investment. □

Lavi Thrust Test

London—Israel Aircraft Industries Lavi fighter aircraft prototype completed the first maximum thrust run of an installed engine last week, about a month ahead of schedule at the company's Lod, Israel, development center.

The fighter/attack aircraft is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney PW1120 turbofan engine, which is to be produced under license in Israel by Bet Shemesh Engines, Ltd.

Rollout of the aircraft is planned for the second half of July, and first flight is expected to be in September or October.

The company and the Israeli government have been pushing for an early first flight to counter criticism of the program both in Israel and the U.S., which is partially funding Lavi development (AW&ST Feb. 10, p. 32).

WEAPONS SYSTEMS

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Arms Control

MIDGETMAN: WHY WE NEED A SMALL MISSILE

Les Aspin

PROLOGUE: *Since the late 1970s the problem of how to modernize the nation's land-based missile force has dogged U.S. defense planners and become a subject of public debate. In 1983 President Reagan appointed the bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission) in an attempt to resolve the issue. The commission recommended that the United States deploy 100 MX missiles in currently existing Minuteman missile silos and develop new, small, mobile ICBMs—now called Midgetman missiles—that would each carry one warhead. The overriding justification offered for the new missile was that its mobility would enhance its chances of surviving a Soviet attack.*

While Midgetman initially garnered wide support, especially in Congress, it has recently become embroiled in controversy. The immediate issue is whether Midgetman as originally conceived (a small, mobile missile carrying only one warhead) is cost-effective, or whether Midgetman should be made bigger to carry more warheads. Larger issues seem to lurk in the background: Does the strategic defense initiative make mobile missiles unnecessary? Should Midgetman supplant the MX?

Les Aspin (D-Wisc.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and a leading congressional supporter of Midgetman, argues for the original, single-warhead version of the new missile. If Midgetman is made significantly larger so that it can carry more than one warhead, as some in Congress have suggested, Aspin says its most crucial characteristic—mobility—will be jeopardized. Aspin also believes that enlarging Midgetman will delay deployment, with worrisome affects on our national security.

Les Aspin, who was elected chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1985, received his Ph.D. in economics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1965. Before his election to Congress in 1970 Aspin served as an assistant to Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) and to the chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller. Previously, during service in the Army, Aspin worked in the Pentagon for Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

The increasing vulnerability of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force pervades U.S. national security policy. All current U.S. ICBMs—450 Minuteman IIs and 500 Minuteman IIIs—are deployed in silos, and the new MX missiles also are scheduled for silo deployment. However, silo deployment lets a potential attacker know precisely where U.S. ICBMs are located. Thus, even though the silos could be constructed to be quite resistant to nuclear explosions, the Soviets could improve the accuracy of their ICBMs to the point where—by aiming just two warheads at each U.S. ICBM—they could destroy all our land-based ICBMs.

This also means the Soviets could knock out almost all our silo-based ICBMs by using a relatively small portion of their ICBMs. For example, if they made no qualitative improvements in their current ICBM force, they could knock out 90 percent of the silo-based ICBM force the United States is likely to have in the mid-1990s just by using the 3,080 warheads on their SS-18 ICBMs. The SS-18s currently carry only 46 percent of the Soviet ICBM warheads. And if the Soviets made their SS-18s as accurate as we plan to make the MX, the situation would become far worse.

The vulnerability of our ICBM force could make a Soviet surprise attack attractive in a crisis, when political leaders become nervous and sometimes act out of desperation. If the Soviets decided to launch a first-strike attack against our ICBMs, they would get a high return—knocking out our ability to retaliate with ICBMs—for a low price: just a portion of their ICBM warheads. This vulnerability weakens deterrence, creates serious instability, and thus increases the likelihood of a nuclear war—the exact opposite of what we are seeking.

Defense experts have been aware of the threat to U.S. ICBMs for more than a decade, and the "window of vulnerability" has become a subject of public political debate. There has been no shortage of proposed remedies. Yet the problem remains because it has proved extremely difficult to find a solution that meets three essential, related criteria. First and most obviously, any proposed solution must make U.S. ICBMs more survivable. Second, it must do so at reasonable cost. Third, it must be capable of generating political support that can be sustained.

The most recent serious proposal for solving the missile vulnerability problem has been to deploy the Midgetman, a small, mobile ICBM. This article evaluates the Midgetman approach in two parts. The first part examines whether the Midgetman is capable, in principle, of meeting the three essential criteria. The second part analyzes the practical questions of where the Midgetman should be deployed and how it should be configured to best achieve its objectives.

To improve the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force, the Midgetman would rely on two techniques—mobility and hardness. Instead of silo basing, the Midgetman missile will be mounted on a vehicle—called a launcher—that can move across vast stretches of territory, thereby preventing the Soviets from knowing the vehicle's location. To destroy the Midgetman force, the Soviets would have to resort to barrage attacks, dumping many warheads spread out over the area where each Midgetman might be located. Thus, they would be forced to use many more warheads to attack the Midgetman force than they would in an attack on the U.S. silo-based force.

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Because mobility is a good way to enhance the ability of ICBMs to survive an attack, it may seem that the best approach would be simply to mount the Midgetman missile on a standard truck. Unfortunately, such a vehicle would be quite vulnerable to a nuclear explosion. A Soviet warhead could miss a standard truck by a lot and still destroy both the vehicle and the missile. Another approach would be to harden the vehicle; that is, make it more resistant to nuclear effects. Some recently developed technologies would make the Midgetman and its launcher resistant to nuclear blast effects. The vehicle will be kept from tipping over or sliding by being sealed to the ground, by having built-in vents that equalize pressure, and by having a low-drag triangular cross-section. The vehicle also will be hardened against radiation, thermal, and other effects from a nuclear detonation.

Hardening can make a dramatic improvement in survivability. For example, to destroy all the Midgetman missiles in a particular 125-square-mile area, the Soviets would need to use only a single one-megaton warhead if the missiles were carried on trucks. If the missiles were carried on hardened launchers, however, the Soviets would have to attack with more than 44 one-megaton warheads.

Figure 1 illustrates how a mobile, hardened Midgetman can help meet the first essential criterion—improving the overall survivability of the U.S. ICBM force. The illustration is based on the following assumptions:

- The Soviets attack with 1,500 SS-18 warheads (each with a 90 percent reliability and an accuracy of 0.14 nautical mile CEP[1]).
- The Midgetman force is dispersed over 8,000 square miles.
- All MX missiles are deployed in Minuteman silos hardened to resist blast at pressures of 2,000 pounds per square inch.

Figure 1: Survivability—MX versus Midgetman

Current Soviet ICBM accuracy[a]



[a]Soviet CEP .14 nautical mile.

Source: Les Aspin, "Midgetman: Sliding Shut the Window of Vulnerability," Feb. 10, 1986, p. 8, unpublished paper.

The first (left-hand) bar in Figure 1 shows that if the United States were not to deploy the Midgetman but put the currently approved 50 MX missiles in Minuteman silos and add them to the current 450 Minuteman IIs and 500 Minuteman IIIs, about 870 of our warheads would survive the Soviet attack. If, in addition to this force, the United States were to deploy 500 Midgetman missiles (the nominal number assumed by the Air Force), about 1,170 warheads would survive, as indicated by the second bar. For the sake of perspective, the third bar in Figure 1 displays what would happen if the United States were to deploy 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos but add no Midgetman missiles. The added 50 MX missiles would result in virtually no increase in the number of surviving warheads.

If we change the assumptions so that the Soviets improve the accuracy of their SS-18s to the level we estimate currently for our MX (CEP = 0.05 nautical mile), the results would be as shown in Figure 2. In all cases the survivability of our ICBM force would go down. (Better Soviet accuracy would not affect the Midgetman force but basically would wipe out the silo-based ICBMs.) However, the Midgetman would provide about nine times more surviving warheads than the MX-only approach.

Thus, the Soviets would be unable to destroy the Midgetman force without using a very high percentage, if not all, of their ICBM warheads. Even if they decided to attack, they would need to use somewhere between three and seventeen warheads to destroy one Midgetman. Charging the Soviets an exorbitant price would certainly discourage such an attack, to the benefit of deterrence and stability.

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Can the Midgetman meet the second essential criterion? That is, does it seem affordable? Undoubtedly, Midgetman will be expensive. For instance, the Air Force estimates the life cycle cost—to buy 500 Midgetman missiles and operate and support them for 10 years once fully deployed—to be about $44.5 billion (in 1982 constant dollars). Nevertheless, this large sum must be kept in perspective. For example, total expenditures on all strategic forces over the 10-year life cycle of the Midgetman would be approximately $840 billion.[2] Midgetman expenditures over the same period would be only about 5.3 percent of the total. This outlay would represent an acceptable defense-spending priority given that the Midgetman would make a significant contribution to our security.

Another way to put the Midgetman's cost in perspective is to compare it with the MX alternative. The classic way to do this is to determine whether the MX or the Midgetman provides a cheaper way to ensure that a given level of U.S. nuclear forces, measured in warheads, would survive a Soviet attack. If the Soviets attacked a 500-warhead Midgetman force (estimated cost: $44.5 billion) with 1,500 SS-18 warheads, standard calculations predict that 200 Midgetman warheads would survive.[3] To ensure that 200 MX warheads survived such a Soviet attack, the United States would need about 340 MX missiles deployed in superhard silos. However, the investment cost alone for 340 MX missiles in superhard silos would be $59 billion. If operating and support costs were added, the MX cost would be even higher. Thus, a force of MX missiles would cost more than a Midgetman force to achieve the same level of survivability.

Finally, it appears that the Midgetman also could meet the third essential criterion, that of political acceptance. The Midgetman was effectively the creation of a bipartisan body, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, led by Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (U.S. Air Force, retired). The Reagan administration accepted the commission's recommendation that the Midgetman be deployed, and the new missile has attracted support in Congress from liberals, moderates, and conservatives alike.

Figure 2: Survivability—MX versus Midgetman



[a]Soviet CEP .05 nautical mile.

Source: Les Aspin, "Midgetman: Sliding Shut the Window of Vulnerability," Feb. 10, 1986, p. 9, unpublished paper.

In theory, then, a mobile, hardened Midgetman seems a promising approach to improving the survivability of our ICBM force and thus to enhancing deterrence and stability. Nevertheless, important practical questions remain: Where should the Midgetman missiles be deployed? How should Midgetman be configured?

The Air Force is considering the following four main options for deploying the Midgetman:

1. *Continuous dispersal on government land.* Midgetman launchers would be dispersed in peacetime along roads on the periphery of some existing military bases (four to seven bases are being considered by the Air Force). This means that the Midgetman force would be dispersed over about 4,000 square miles in peacetime. In a crisis, though, the Midgetman launchers could move off the peripheral roads into the interior of these military reservations, thereby providing a total dispersal area of about 8,000 square miles. Upon warning of an enemy attack, the Midgetman launchers could disperse both toward the base and away from base. Using this government land deployment option, therefore, and given the warning time of 30 minutes we would probably have of a Soviet ICBM attack, the Midgetman launchers

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could be dispersed over approximately 18,000 square miles.

2. *Location at Minuteman sites.* Currently, there are 1,000 Minuteman silos dispersed throughout the central part of the United States. The Midgetman launchers would be parked on the same land now occupied by Minuteman silos, in a position that would not interfere with Minuteman operations. Upon a decision in a crisis to disperse, or upon warning of an incoming Soviet ICBM attack, the Midgetman launchers would travel from their peacetime Minuteman locations. Using this deployment option, Midgetman launchers could be dispersed over 30,000 square miles within the 30-minute warning period.

3. *Garrisons for Midgetman launchers.* The Midgetman launchers would be located at approximately 50 garrisons in peacetime. Upon a decision to disperse in crisis, or after warning of a Soviet ballistic missile attack, the launchers would move out of their peacetime garrisons and disperse throughout the region. Using this deployment option, the Midgetman launchers could be dispersed over 21,000 square miles within the 30-minute warning period.

4. *Continuous wide-area peacetime dispersal.* The Midgetman missiles would be loaded onto vehicles similar to commercial trucks and would travel the nation's public roads.

If each of these options is analyzed in terms of the three essential criteria of survivability, cost, and political feasibility, wide-area peacetime dispersal quickly drops out as a realistic alternative. Dispersal on public roads would require continuous contact between Midgetman and the general public. It seems highly unlikely that such an approach would be accepted by the public because of the widespread fear of nuclear accidents. Moreover, Midgetman missiles would be inviting targets for terrorists.

The other three basing options, which would isolate the Midgetman system from the general public in peacetime, would have a much better chance of gaining political support and would involve lower security costs.

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Figure 3: Costs of Midgetman basing options



It is useful to now look more closely at the costs and survivability of these three options (Figure 3).

Costs. Deploying the Midgetman at Minuteman sites would be the cheapest of the three options to buy and to operate, mainly because it could use already existing support facilities at Minuteman bases. Its life cycle cost would be $3.3 billion less than garrison basing and $5.5 billion less than dispersal on government land. For a similar reason, deployment at Minuteman fields would require the smallest number of new staff.

Basing the Midgetman on government land or at 50 garrisons would require roughly equal numbers of personnel. Overall, garrison basing would be slightly cheaper than dispersal on government land because the garrison option would involve a slower pace of peacetime operations (the Midgetman launchers would not have to be continuously on the move) and would probably draw more heavily on already existing military support structures.

Survivability. For a hardened Midgetman force, the key to survivability would be the extent to which the missiles could be dispersed before a Soviet attack. In general, the more territory the force could cover, the better. To evaluate the relative survivability of the three politically feasible deployment options, it is necessary to examine the performance of the Midgetman under a number of scenarios. The chart on the left in Figure 4 examines Midgetman survivability under the three options, assuming a typical Soviet attack using 1,500 SS-18 warheads. It is evident that the most important survivability factor for all three basing options is warning time. In the case of a "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attack, in which there would be no warning time, none of the Midgetman missiles would survive under any of the options. This is because such a Soviet attack could cover 4,800 squares miles, and under none of the basing options would missiles be dispersed beyond such an area. (The government-land-dispersal option would come fairly close, with the missiles being dispersed over 4,000 square miles in peacetime.) However, a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack is not a serious scenario. What is of greater concern is the possibility of an attack in time of crisis or war. As warning time increases, more and more Midgetman missiles would survive, although each deployment option performs slightly differently.

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Figure 4: Survivability for Midgetman basing options



Source: Les Aspin, "Midgetman: Sliding Shut the Window of Vulnerability," Feb. 10, 1986, p. 9, unpublished paper.

Using the government-land-dispersal option, significant numbers of Midgetman missiles would survive with only a few minutes of warning time; in fact, half the force would survive with as little as five minutes of warning time. This is because the Midgetman launchers would be widely dispersed to begin with under this option.

Using the Minuteman-site option, it would take ten minutes rather than five minutes for the Midgetman launchers to disperse enough to survive. However, once they started to disperse, their survivability would increase rapidly. Because the launchers would disperse from 500 different Minuteman sites, a lot of dispersal area would be covered quickly. At 15 minutes of warning time, though, the dispersal area of one Minuteman site would merge into the areas of adjacent sites. Past this point, therefore, dispersal area—and survivability—would grow at a slower rate.

Garrison basing would require more warning time than the other options to achieve any Midgetman survivability. Because dispersal would start from only 50 sites (versus 500 sites for Minuteman basing), it would take more time—at least 20 minutes—to get beyond the 4,800-square-mile area that would come under Soviet attack.

These differences in minutes are important because it is usually thought that the warning time will be 30 minutes for a Soviet ICBM attack and 15 minutes for a Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack. Dispersal on government land could give good survivability in both cases. Minuteman-site basing would provide good survivability against an ICBM attack but would leave only a small margin for error for an SLBM attack. Garrison basing would do well for an ICBM attack but might not work if the Soviets used SLBMs instead of SS-18s.

The chart on the right in Figure 4 (p. 43) illustrates what could happen if the Soviets decided to attack the Midgetman force using all their SS-18s, which carry 3,000 warheads. An all-out SS-18 attack would saturate 9,600 square miles. Using any of the three deployment options, it would take a while for the Midgetman launchers to disperse over an area larger than this threshold: 10 minutes for government-land dispersal, 15 minutes for Minuteman-site basing, and 25 minutes for garrison basing. As a result, the Midgetman force would have much more trouble surviving an all-out SS-18 attack than it would have with the 1,500-warhead attack discussed earlier. A number of factors should be kept in mind, however. In the most likely circumstances, the United States would have substantially more than 60 minutes of warning. In preparing for war, the Soviets would almost certainly improve the low peacetime readiness of their forces. Moving their strategic submarines out of port, putting their bombers on alert, and dispersing their mobile missiles would take hours if not days. These actions would give us warning time and would trigger dispersal of the Midgetman forces. In addition, the Soviets would not commit their entire SS-18 force just to attack a fraction of U.S. targets, especially because it would cost them at least six warheads to destroy one of our warheads.

To sum up, of the four main options under consideration for basing the Midgetman in peacetime, government-land dispersal and Minuteman-site basing are the leading candidates. Government-land dispersal has the advantage of continuous peacetime dispersal, thereby offering some hedge against short warning of a Soviet attack. The Minuteman-site option has a cost advantage, and it also makes public acceptance of Midgetman deployment easier. Garrison basing of the Midgetman seems less desirable because it is

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lems would arise. For example, the weight of the launcher could become too great for bridges in the dispersal area's road network. And the width of the launcher could reach a point preventing travel on standard public roads.

Although there are no precise thresholds for launcher weight and size, two benchmarks are worth considering. At about 200,000 pounds (the weight characteristic of a MIRVed Midgetman), bridges in typical deployment areas may need to be strengthened. Launchers for Midgetman missiles with MIRVs would be at least 14 feet wide, but preliminary Air Force analysis suggests that the width of typical roads in the Midgetman dispersal area is about the same width. Thus, placing MIRVs on Midgetman missiles could mean either a substantial increased expense to modify existing roads and bridges or a severe decrease in missile mobility.

Adding MIRVs could also decrease the Midgetman's mobility by limiting its ability to travel off roads. In theory, given enough horsepower and large enough wheels, a launcher of any weight can operate off roads. In practice, however, there clearly comes a point at which certain terrain characteristics, such as the presence and dimensions of creek beds, small hills, valleys, and trees, would bog down a monstrous Midgetman launcher. At exactly what launcher weight and size these practical considerations take hold is unclear. Air Force results to date appear inconclusive. If the Midgetman must stay on roads, the Soviets need only saturate the road network with nuclear weapons and ignore the vast areas in between.

Placing MIRVs on the Midgetman could also delay deployment. Table 2, drawn from a draft Air Force report on the Midgetman, shows that if the missile carries MIRVs, the date of its deployment (called its "Initial Operational Capability," or IOC), now set at 1992, could slip at least a year. The delay might be longer because both the Midgetman missile and launcher would need to be substantially redesigned.[5]

Although there is nothing sacrosanct about a 1992 deployment, ICBM vulnerability is a serious problem, and the sooner the Midgetman is deployed, the better. Moreover, deployment delays could cause political problems and eventually jeopardize the political feasibility of the Midgetman. Sticking by our planned deployment dates would show the Soviet Union that we are steadfast in our commitment to protect our security. A delay, therefore, would be a signal of weakness and lack of resolve. Delay also would encourage the Soviets to work on U.S. public opinion to turn short delays into long ones. It would give them an incentive to seek cuts in U.S. weapons through U.S. unilateral action instead of through mutual, negotiated arms control.

A 1992 deployment date also sends an important signal to our allies. We set an immovable date, 1983, for deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe. The allies resolutely stuck by their commitment to meet this date. We should be equally strong in holding up our end of the NATO security bargain by meeting our planned date for Midgetman deployment.

Finally, deploying the Midgetman on time would help in dealing with the U.S. public. Government flip-flopping over more than 30 basing modes for the MX missile contributed to the sour public reaction to that system. Failure to proceed with a steady plan for the Midgetman weakens public confidence that the U.S. government—Congress and the administration—

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Table 2: Midgetman weight/ payload and IOC date

Missile weight (thousand pounds)	Throw weight (pounds)	IOC date
30-33	1,000	1992
37-40	1,300	1992
45-49	1,600[a]	1993[b]
65-71	2,300[a]	1993[b]
75-82	2,800[a]	1993[b]

[a]Throw weight sufficient for MIRV option.
[b]Meeting IOC depends on rate of development and production of booster.

can take firm action. In sum, it would seem that the risks associated with putting MIRVs on the Midgetman exceed any potential gains.

To meet the challenges posed by the Soviet threat to our ICBMs, the United States needs a missile force that is survivable and affordable and that will be supported by the public. This force should consist of 500 Midgetman missiles, each carrying a single warhead, deployed on mobile launchers at Minuteman sites or dispersed on government land. ■

NOTES:

1. Circular error probable (CEP) is a measure of the accuracy of a missile warhead. If a warhead is aimed at a particular target, the warhead's CEP is the radius of an imaginary circle that could be drawn around the target and within which the warhead would have a 50 percent probability of falling. The smaller the CEP, the more accurate the warhead.
2. Congressional Budget Office, *Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and Alternatives* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, 1983), 2. Adjustments for inflation based on Congressional Budget Office, *Budgeting for Defense Inflation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, 1986), 14.
3. Lou Finch, and Al Tinajero, *Cost to Attack: Measuring How Strategic Forces Affect U.S. Security* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1983), 31–37.
4. To understand this theoretical result, suppose that the United States dispersed 500 single-warhead Midgetman launchers over a 9,000-square-mile area. And suppose the Soviets attacked this force with 1,500 SS-18 warheads. Because each SS-18 could destroy all Midgetmen within a 3-square-mile area, a 1,500-warhead attack would cover a 4,500-square-mile area, and it would knock out about half of the Midgetman launchers. Obviously, knocking out 250 launchers, each carrying one warhead, means the Soviets would knock out 250 warheads.

   Suppose instead that the United States deployed the same number of warheads, 500, over a 9,000-square-mile area, but deployed two warheads on each launcher. In this case, there would be only 250 launchers spread out over the countryside. A Soviet attack by 1,500 SS-18s would again cover 4,500 square miles and knock out half the Midgetman launchers. The number of launchers surviving would be smaller, 125 versus 250, but as each launcher carried two warheads, the number of warheads surviving would be the same. The same principle holds for a Midgetman with three warheads, as long as the total number of Midgetman warheads, the size of the dispersal area, and the number of attacking warheads are held constant.
5. Once missile weight is increased enough to carry MIRVs (about 45,000 pounds or more), the missile diameter must increase so the missile will remain stable in flight. With such an increase, however, the hardened launcher must also be made larger and redesigned so it will not tip over when hit by a nuclear blast.

SOVIET THREAT

Problems of Communism MARCH/APRIL 1986 Pg. 72

Communist Fronts in 1985

Wallace Spaulding

THE BASIC functions performed by the major communist international front organizations during 1985 did not differ markedly from those performed for many years, although—as we shall see—there was a perceptible change in the face that these fronts attempted to present to the untutored observer. As with the counterpart organizations run by the Comintern between the wars, so today's front organizations exist to perform a basic task: to unite communists with persons of other political persuasions to support, and thereby lend strength and respectability to, Soviet foreign policy initiatives. The extent of Moscow's control is evidenced by the fronts' faithful adherence to the Soviet policy line, as well as by the nature of the member organizations that have withdrawn from the fronts over time (certain pro-Western groups after the cold war began, the Yugoslav affiliates following the Stalin-Tito break, and Chinese and Albanian representatives as the Sino-Soviet split developed).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is said to control these organizations through its International Department (ID),[1] presumably through those Soviet officials who serve as full-time members of the secretariat headquarters of the various fronts. This is the case for the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL). Judging by past history, it is possible to infer that it may be the Soviet vice-presidents who exercise this control function in three other major front organizations: the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW).[2]

In addition to Soviet control of each front through the ID and headquarters personnel, front activity appears to be coordinated by the WPC. This is a sensible arrangement, because the Soviets consider the "peace movement" to be the most important common action by "anti-imperialist" forces and the WPC to be the most important of the groups "based on common specific objectives of professional interests"—that is, of the front organizations.[3] A glance at the nearly 250 persons listed on the WPC's Presidential Committee reveals that they include, in addition to ID Deputy Chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, one or more of the top leaders of each of the other fronts just mentioned, except for the IADL (and the latter does have a representative in the approximately 1,500 members of the World Peace Council proper).[4]

Moscow may consider an additional two organizations to be priority front groups. The first is the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP), which—like the WFTU, WIDF, AAPSO, and WFDY, but none of the other international fronts—has two Presidential Committee members.[5] The other is the Havana-headquartered Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL), which has a

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[1] US House of Representatives, *The CIA and the Media*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 574

Colonel Spaulding, USAR (ret.) is a Washington-based observer of international communist affairs. The present article is a slightly revised version of Col. Spaulding's contribution to Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1986, *forthcoming from the Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.*

[2] See Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1981 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (hereafter, volumes in this series will be identified as *YICA* with the respective year of publication), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, p. 455.

[3] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, November 1972, p. 103, and No. 3, February 1974, p. 101; J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism* (Washington DC), November-December 1982, pp. 43–56

[4] See WPC, *List of Members, 1983–1986*, Helsinki, pp. 7–33, 167

[5] Ibid., p. 31

News/Voice

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Your/Voice

Guest Columnist

SDI ensures against strategic blackmail

By CHARLES BROOKS

In March of 1983, President Reagan formally announced a pioneering defensive strategy predicted on the notion that it is better to save lives than avenge them. The President's plan, called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was designed to replace the doctrine of mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a dangerously obsolete and immoral doctrine of making civilian population centers deliberately vulnerable to nuclear attack.

The SDI or High Frontier concept, popularized by General Dan Graham, a former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, calls for a variety of defensive non-nuclear interceptors to neutralize enemy missiles in flight. Recent tests conducted by the military including: a Homing Overlay experiment, Anti-satelite Test (ASAT) and deployment of a laser weapon proved that nuclear tipped missiles can be destroyed in space before they ever reach civilian population centers.

Though the downing of test missiles by SDI weapons systems confirmed that most of the technology needed to make the program operational is "off the shelf" and militarily practical, critics have attempted to divert attention from the feasibility of the program. Naysayers coined the term "Star Wars" in an effort to connote that SDI is a figment of science fiction. The Long range goals of the system do include integration of futuristic multi-tiered defenses incorporating lasers, particle beam weaponry, x-rays, electromagnetic rail guns and various other high-tech concepts. Although exotic sounding, many of these concepts are already surpassing the research and development stage and will soon be ready for operational testing.

HOW MUCH WOULD such a system cost? The High Frontier office estimates that a highly effective space defense could be built for approximately 85 billion per year over the next five years or a mere 1.5 percent of our current defense budget. Officials at Lockheed and other engineers involved in the Homing Overlay Experiment have confirmed these figures. Moreover, the economic return on technology spinoffs and R&D jobs could amount to billions, a factor often ignored by defense critics.

Critics of SDI have also tended to ignore the reality that the Soviet Union has been testing space-based weapon systems for over 10 years. In fact, the Soviets are far ahead of the U.S. in many components of SDI type weaponry. The authoritative Jane's Space Flight Directory recently disclosed that the Soviet Union, (who outspends the U.S. three to one on SDI research), will soon be placing proto-type laser weapons on space platforms. "Star Wars" technology has already arrived, and the real debate is: can America allow the Soviet Union to achieve strategic superiority in the next era weapon systems?

Military historians and defense analysts are universally aware that wars are started when one side calculates it can win. Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler was evidence that a nation can be a conqueror simply by being strong enough to dictate its terms to its adversary. SDI was conceived as an insurance policy to strengthen deterrence and to ensure that the Soviet Union and her allies will never be in a position to contemplate military victory or resort to blackmail because of strategic superiority.

IT HAS BEEN estimated that with SDI layered defense intact, 96 percent of Soviet missiles would be destroyed if the Soviets attempted a first strike attack on the U.S. The Soviets would never be in a position to launch such a surprise attack knowing they could not negate American retaliatory capability.

SDI is also an insurance policy against a more likely scenario. What would happen if the Soviets were to accidently launch missiles at the U.S. or one of our allies? Or what would happen if a madman like Khadaffy had a nuclear delivery capability? The answer is that without missile interceptors, the probable result would be millions of people killed with the strong possibility of an all-out nuclear conflict. With SDI in place, the missile or missiles would be disarmed in flight and be rendered harmless.

Clearly, any individual opposed to the horrors of nuclear war and interested in a future world of mutually assured survival rather than mutually assured destruction would be hard pressed not to support the President's Strategic Defense shield.

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National

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Israeli participation in SDI expected to help both sides

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Israeli participation in the Reagan administration's Strategic Defensive Initiative will help both Israel and the program, but it isn't clear how the Middle East nation will fare in winning SDI contracts.

Participation in the multibillion-dollar research program would fulfill several Israeli goals. Its prime goal appears to be construction of a defense against Soviet SS-21 missiles stationed in Syria. Such a defense is one of the first technologies expected from the SDI program.

Participation also would keep Israel at the vanguard of warfighting technology and would help cement its alliance with the United States.

Of advantage to the United States is Israel's unparalleled research and development track record.

Calling SDI "a project of great interest to the future of the world and the Free World," Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, along with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, on May 6 signed an agreement outlining Israel's participation in the program.

Technologically, "we both can add to each other," said Emanuel A. Winston, a Chicago-based expert on Middle East affairs.

"Israel has the advantage of being involved in a very expensive type of research which they [Israel] might not otherwise be able to afford," Mr. Winston said. "They give as good as they get."

Small in number, but highly accurate, the Soviet SS-21 missiles in Syria could destroy Israeli military control centers and airfields almost without warning. No defense against them exists. Similar missiles threaten U.S. allies in Europe.

"It [SDI] simply eliminates what Israel needs most, which is quick response time," said Joyce Starr, director of Near East studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. She called the missiles "not only a high priority threat for Israel, but the highest priority threat."

Israeli officials believe that more advanced SS-23 missiles soon will be on their way to Syria, she said.

Miss Starr, who last month led a delegation of 24 U.S. contractors to Israel, a tiny nation surrounded by often-hostile Arab states, faces weapons arrayed against it that have been made in countries across the globe, Mr. Winston said.

"The mix of weapons systems is so extraordinary, Israel has to have . . . almost a surrealistic approach to defense," he said.

Heavily dependent on technological experts, Israel excels in the development of lasers, computer software and propulsion systems. It out-performs the United States in such development technologies as remotely piloted vehicles.

Proponents of Israeli participation in SDI said it could serve to catalyze the program, to further U.S. aims and to bolster Israel's sagging economy.

"From the U.S. standpoint, it's good to have anybody support SDI," said skeptic Peter Stares, a Brookings Institution analyst. "From Israel's point of view, I'm not sure how much they can hope to gain from it.

"The Israelis see it more as a way of getting a handle on the technology in the U.S.," he said.

Observers say the Israeli decision is unlikely in itself to coax support from U.S. allies in Europe, where the SDI program remains controversial.

Great Britain and West Germany also have agreed to participate in SDI. Blessed with greater experience in handling the Pentagon and U.S. industry, they both may have an edge when it comes to bidding for lucrative research contracts and subcontracts.

The two countries "are more familiar with the players," Miss Starr said. "It's going to take a great deal of work and follow-up by the Israelis, if they're really serious . . ."

"They [Israel] basically need to get their act together and get over here and start dealing with contractors," said Charles Brooks, spokesman for the conservative National Jewish Coalition.

"It'll be tough, of course," said an Israeli Embassy spokesman. "But that's the name of the game."

There are other drawbacks.

"The most serious strategic implication for Israel of participation in SDI is its possible effect on Soviet global military planning in the future," Dore Gold, a researcher at Tel Aviv University's Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, wrote in a December 1985 paper. "Israel could become a significant Soviet nuclear target."

Said Miss Starr: "These long, long-term major question marks are important, but don't have enough weight to weigh in against taking advantage of the short range opportunities."

NEWS ANALYSIS

Israel in talks credited with paving the way for the SDI agreement, said Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres "was not politely supportive, he was openly and enthusiastically supportive" of the SDI concept.

"Whether they would have moved as quickly without the direct threat of the SS-21s and without Peres — I suspect that those were the two prime elements," she said.



U.S. Star Wars official urges Israel to join

By JOSHUA BRILLIANT

TEL AVIV. – Lieutenant-General James A. Abrahamson, head of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative or Star Wars programme, last week urged scientists here to take part in the project as it would help Israel's security, too.

Part of the Star Wars research will be devoted to ways of countering short-range ballistic missiles of the type the Soviet Union has supplied Syria, he explained.

Abrahamson made the appeal in an address to aeronautics experts at the 28th annual Icrael Conference on Aviation and Astronautics at the Tel Aviv Hilton.

At an earlier meeting with defence reporters at the U.S. Embassy, Abrahamson said: "Some of the technology that we will be investing in and conducting research on, and in the end developing... will also contribute to some of [Israel's] very pressing military needs. That is being able to counter and deal with short-range ballistic missile threats," particularly the Soviet-Made SS21, SS22, SS23 and possibly the Scud missiles.

Later at the aeronautics conference, Abrahamson said: "we want to tackle the threat to Israel right across the Syrian border, because we think that your ideas for tackling that threat will help not only the Middle Eastern theatre but can be applied to Europe." It could also help the U.S.

In some, but not all, cases, Abrahamson said, countering short-range low-flying missiles is easier than coping with the fast, high-altitude intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Some of the technology developed for Star Wars programme will be placed in space, he said, but it is "a false impression that it will all, someday, be in space." Surveillance systems will be located in space, as will some of the elements the U.S. will use to strike at the enemy's ICBMs after they are launched. But more money is being spent on research for projects "on the ground," Abrahamson stressed.

Thus the Israeli contribution could be in spheres that directly contribute to its own security.

The Israeli scientific community – including Israel Aircraft Industries, Rafael, the nuclear establishment and the Technion – have already come up with "some very good and advanced ideas," Abrahamson said.

James Abrahamson (Brutmann)

Twelve Israeli proposals are of "very great interest to us," Abrahamson said without disclosing what they were. However, he did say he was particularly interested in ideas on improving rail guns.

A rail gun accelerates a projectile on an electrical field, as opposed to the gun power or compressed gas used in ordinary weapons. As a result, the projectile shoots out at a higher speed. A small projectile flying at high speed could prove more deadly than a bigger, but slower, one.

Abrahamson said Israel had already presented an "absolutely unique idea in rail guns that produces tremendous power." Developing that idea could have wide-ranging effects, he said, noting that rail guns could be mounted on tanks.

He said Israel could also contribute in the fields of electronics, electronic countermeasures, lasers and holography.

In the past six months, the U.S. and Israel have discussed Star Wars projects without coming to an overall agreement on the programme. In contrast, Britain has concluded a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. on the matter.

"I don't believe we know yet some of the Israeli officials' final judgement on whether there should be a memorandum of understanding or what kind of format there should be for the contacts. But we're not waiting for that," he told the defence reporters.

No contracts, however, will be concluded during this visit.

Abrahamson said that he has a budget of $2.7b. for fiscal 1986 and that he hopes for $4.8b. next year. Because the U.S. aims to encourage competition in the programme, it will take time to conclude contracts.

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Israel & SDI

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE U.S.-ISRAEL

COOPERATION ON S.D.I.

March 26, 1985 — Secretary of Defense Weinberger issues letter of invitation for participation in the SDI to the NATO allies, Japan, Australia and Israel.

April 17, 1985 — In an interview in the Hebrew magazine "Bamahane", Prime Minister Shimon Peres lauds the American invitation for foreign involvement in the research effort - comparing the offer for participation to Columbus asking an Israeli to join his expedition to the New World.

August 15, 1985 — The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies at Tel Aviv University holds a one-day seminar on the SDI. Speakers include: Edward Teller, Hebrew University physicist Shaul Yatziv, Tel Aviv Univ. Prof. Micha Sharir, and Member of Knesset and physics professor Yuval Ne'eman.

August 19, 1985 — U.S. and Israeli officials conclude an agreement to apply SDI research to the area of cardiac medicine. The agreement was

reached between Edward Teller and Israeli Health Minister Mordechai Gur. The research was to be coordinated on the Israeli side by Prof. Dani Gur, a heart surgeon at Tel Hashomer Hospital.

December 1985 — A large delegation of Israeli industrialists arrives in the U.S. for two weeks of talks on SDI. The delegation is headed by Dr. Ben-Zion Naveh.

December 1985 — The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University issues a lengthy report encouraging Israeli participation in SDI. The report, "SDI: The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and the Implications of Israel's Participation" was prepared by Dore Gold.

January 30, 1986 — Representatives of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee testify before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces supporting research into tactical missile defenses.

February 18-23, 1986 — Director of the Strategic Defense Intiative Organization, General James Abrahamsom, visits Israel for high-level consultations

on Israel's potential contribution to the SDI program.

April 12-20, 1986 — A study mission headed by Joyce Starr of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University visits Israel for meetings with Government and private sector officials on U.S.-Israeli cooperation on SDI. 20 U.S. companies were represented at the meetings including: Boeing Aerospace, Grumman Corp., Martin Marietta and General Electric. Among the 16 Israeli companies participating in the discussions were IAI, Rafael, El-Op and some smaller firms. The first SDI contract was signed between an undisclosed U.S. firm and Ben Gurion University in Beersheba.

May 6, 1986 — In an official Pentagon ceremony, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sign an official Memorandum Of Understanding setting out the specifications for Israel's involvement in the SDI research effort.