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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Folder: Taiwan Arms Sales Vol. II 1982 (1 of ~~7~~
Box 90385 *RAC* Box 10 ¹³)

Date: 7/31/00
Jespersion - F99-056/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Richard Armitage to Asst. Sec. of State Holdridge, re: Taiwan Arms Sales, 2 p. <i>R 9/5/02 NLSF99-056/1 #60</i>	5/20/82	P1/F1
2. Paper	Attached to Item #1, 2 p. <i>R 9/5/02 NLSF99-056/1 #61</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
3. Cable	#210135Z May 82, 2 p. <i>R 11/29/05 M03-1443 #1</i>	5/21/82	P1/F1
4. Cable	#210850Z May 82, 1 p. <i>R " " #2</i>	5/21/82	P1/F1
5. Memo	Donald Gregg to William Clark, re: Meeting with Senator Goldwater..., 1 p. <i>R " " #3</i>	5/24/82	P1/F1
6. Notes	re: Meeting with Senator Goldwater, 1 p. <i>PART " " #4</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
7. Cable	#191353Z May 82, 2 p. <i>R " " #5</i>	5/19/82	P1/F1
8. Message	Reagan to President Chiang, 3 p. <i>D " " #6</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
9. Report	re: China (page 2 only), 1 p. <i>PART " " #7</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
10. Cable	no cable #, re: Views of Chinese..., 4 p. <i>D 3/29/01 F99-056/1 #69; D 11/29/05 M03-1443 #8</i>	5/19/82	P1/F1 <i>33</i>
11. Memo	Robert McFarlane to Gregg, re: Senator Goldwater's Forthcoming Travel to Taiwan, 2 p. <i>R 11/29/05 M03-1443 #9</i>	5/21/82	P1/F1
12. Memo	Alexander Haig to Reagan, re: Taiwan Arms Sales, 3 p. <i>R " " #10</i>	5/24/82	P1/F1
13. Talking Pts	for Ambassador Hummel to Vice Chairman Deng, 2 p. <i>D " " #11</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
14. Draft	Communicate re Taiwan Arms Sales, 3 p. <i>R " " #12</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
15. Draft	US Communicate, (notes on the back), 4 p. <i>R " " #13</i>	2/15/82	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

TAS



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MAY 20 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales - Packaging Options ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ If Pat Wen's call on me Monday is any indicator, Taiwan is losing patience with our lack of movement on the items promised to them last August. His immediate objective seemed to be an LOA for the F-104Gs but his more general theme was that the US had offered Taiwan lots of assurances but no equipment. I got the clear impression that Taiwan was considering a change in tactics, to go "on broadcast" if necessary to force some action on our part.

~~(S)~~ Recognizing that there is no certain way of keeping sales to Taiwan out of public view, it seems to us that the risk of publicity is less if we make some deliveries (below the 36(b) threshold) than it is if we delay. The last thing we should want is to have Taiwan venting its frustrations through vocal supporters in the press or in Congress. Another important reason for moving now is that timing is critical for some items, e.g., sale of the Sea CHAPARRAL missiles and extension of the F-5E/F coproduction line. We would not want caution to force an unmanageable backlog upon us.

~~(S)~~ We may already have made some public criticism inevitable by the delay in approving the STANDARD missiles. STANDARD launchers are now out of production. Restart costs prorated for only the 40 launchers wanted by Taiwan drive the unit cost to \$17.5 million and the total cost to \$700 million for 40 launchers, not including fire control equipment and target acquisition radar. It is almost inconceivable that Taiwan would buy at that price, and probably just as unlikely that it would remain silent about it. However, the volume and stridency of the response would be less if Taiwan were to receive this news in the context of ongoing deliveries, particularly if they included higher priority items like aircraft.

~~(S)~~ The attached paper takes an innovative approach to packaging LOAs so that individual sales remain below the \$50/14 million thresholds for Congressional notification. You would need to prepare Congress for this approach through consultations, but

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NLS F99-056/1#60
BY LOT NARA, DATE 9/5/02

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many of the divisions have a logic of their own. From our perspective, sale of the F-104s (those that can be transferred immediately) should go first, followed by either the Sea CHAPARRAL (if Spain joins in to make an economic order quantity) or the first tranche of SAR helicopters.

(C) If you see merit in this approach, my people will be happy to work with yours in putting together a workable game plan for near term sales to Taiwan.



R. L. Armitage
Deputy Assistant Secretary
East Asia and Pacific Affairs

~~SECRET~~

F/TF-104G Aircraft:

- (C) Estimated value: \$29.7 million. Covers sale of 39 F-104G's, 27 TF-104G's, and related spares and support equipment.
- (S) Transfer procedure:
 - Step 1 (ASAP): Obtain Taiwan's concurrence in proposed USG-FRG Memorandum of Agreement.
 - Step 2 (Jun 1982): Issue LOA for 13 F-104G's and 10 TF-104G's that can be made available to Taiwan immediately and for a pro-rata share of spares and support equipment (\$10,350,000).
 - Step 3 (Jun 1982): Immediately following LOA signature, conclude MOA with FRG.
 - Step 4 (Oct 1982): Issue LOA for 7 F-104G's and 5 TF-104Gs that will become available between November 1982 and January 1983, and for a pro-rata share of spares and support equipment (\$5,400,000).
 - Step 5 (Jan 1983): Issue LOA for 19 F-104G's and 12 TF-104Gs that will become available upon termination of the FRG training program in April 1983, and for a pro-rata share of spares and equipment (\$13,950,000).

Improved Sea CHAPARRAL Missiles

- (C) Estimated value: \$12-25.6 million for 120 missiles. This item is out of production. If an Economic Order Quantity (more than 500 missiles) can be obtained, the unit price will be approximately \$100,000; without an EOQ, it will be \$210,000.
- (C) Within the next 30-60 days, Spain is expected to decide whether or not to sign an LOA for 1,728 I-CHAPARRALS. The aggregate of a Spanish order and one for Taiwan would satisfy the manufacturer's EOQ requirement.
- (U) Option I (assuming EOQ is achieved): Congressional notification is not necessary because the total value of case is less than \$14 million.
- (S) Option II (assuming EOQ not achieved): Issue two separate LOAs for 60 missiles each. Each LOA for \$12,600,000.

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NLS F99-056/1#61

BY HOS NARA, DATE 9/5/02

SAR/VIP Helicopters

- ~~(S)~~ Estimated total value: \$115.7 million. Covers sale of 10 S-61D search and rescue helicopters, 2 S-61D VIP helicopters, spares, and support equipment.
 - 10 S-61D (SAR): \$79.0 million
 - 2 S-61D (VIP): \$15.2 million
 - Spares & Support \$21.5 million
- ~~(U)~~ The S-61D helicopter is not considered to be Major Defense Equipment (MDE); therefore, the threshold for Congressional notification is \$50 million.
- ~~(S)~~ Transfer procedure:
 - Step 1: Issue LOA for 3 S-61D search and rescue helicopters and the entire spares/support package (\$45.2 million). Concurrently, issue a Letter of Intent for procurement of long lead time items for the remaining helicopters.
 - Step 2: Issue LOA for 4 SAR and 2 VIP helicopters (\$46.8 million).
 - Step 3: Issue LOA for 3 remaining SAR helicopters (\$23.7 million).

M-113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers

- ~~(U)~~ Estimated total value: \$73,965,098. Covers sale of 357 M-113A1 APCs, spares, and support equipment.
- ~~(S)~~ Transfer procedure:
 - Step 1: Issue an LOA for 72 vehicles (\$12,863,495) and a support package of \$9,647,621. Have CCNAA sign a Letter of Intent for long lead items for the remaining vehicles.
 - Steps 2-5: Issue four additional LOAs, each for \$12,863,495 covering 72 vehicles.

Aircraft Supply Support Arrangement

- ~~(U)~~ Estimated value: \$80.0 million per year. Covers USAF-managed spare parts to support U.S. origin aircraft in Taiwan's inventory.
- ~~(S)~~ Transfer procedure: Issue LOAs semi-annually, each LOA for \$40.0 million.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9249 DTG: 210135Z MAY 82 PSN: 037346
EOB739 AN002772 TOR: 141/0310Z CSN: HCE597

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TO AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2209

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1546
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 5771

~~SECRET~~ STATE 139249

NODIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 5/20/02 (HOLDRIDGE, J. H.)
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, TW, CH
SUBJECT: HOLDRIDGE CONVERSATION WITH TSAI WEI-PING

REF: STATE 135570

1. ~~1.~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON MAY 19, AT AIT/W, JOHN HOLDRIDGE BRIEFED TSAI WEI-PING ON VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO BEIJING, USING TALKING POINTS AND FIRST Q/A IN REFTEL. IN ADDITION, THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WERE COVERED. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE BEFORE TSAI WAS AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CCK, AND TSAI'S COMMENTS MUST BE READ IN THE LIGHT OF HIS LACK OF AWARENESS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REASSURANCES.
3. TSAI EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT OUR PUBLICIZING THE THREE LETTERS, AND ABOUT OUR STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF BEIJING'S NINE-POINT REUNIFICATION PROPOSAL. HE RETURNED AGAIN AND AGAIN TO THESE POINTS. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CHIANG IS SUFFERING CRITICISM IN TAIWAN FOR HIS APPARENT FAILURE TO MANAGE THE U. S. CONNECTION; HIS "PRESTIGE AND CREDIBILITY ARE ON THE LINE."
4. WITH REGARD TO RELEASE OF THE THREE LETTERS, HOLDRIDGE EXPLAINED THAT WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT HANDED THE MAY 5 LETTER OVER TO WAN LI, IT WAS IN FULL VIEW OF THE TV CAMERAS AND CAMERAMEN. THE U. S. SIDE REALIZED THEN THAT, TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE SECRET AGREEMENTS, THEY WOULD HAVE TO RELEASE THE LETTER. AND, BECAUSE THE MAY 5 LETTER REFERRED TO THE TWO PREVIOUS LETTERS, THEY HAD TO BE RELEASED TOO.
5. WITH REGARD TO BEIJING'S NINE-POINT REUNIFICATION PROPOSAL, HOLDRIDGE SAID THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT OFFERS A PEACEFUL APPROACH TO A RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE, THE U. S. WELCOMES IT. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE U. S. ENDORSES ANY SPECIFIC ASPECT OF THE PROPOSAL. THE U. S. POSITION, WHICH HAS NEVER VARIED, IS

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NLS MU3-1443 #1

~~SECRET~~ BY NLI, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9249 DTG: 210135Z MAY 82 PSN: 037346

THAT A RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE IS A MATTER FOR THE CHINESE PEOPLE ALONE. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE AN INTEREST IN WHAT FORM THAT RESOLUTION MIGHT TAKE, ONLY THAT IT BE PEACEFUL. SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, THE U. S. POSITION HAS BEEN THAT IT SUPPORTS THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

6. TSAI REFERRED TO AN ITEM IN THE MAY 19 WASHINGTON POST, WHICH REPORTED THAT THE U. S HAS TOLD CHINA IT DOES NOT EXPECT TO SELL ARMS TO TAIWAN INDEFINITELY. HOLDRIDGE RELATED THIS STATEMENT TO THE CONTEXT OF U. S. INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE, GOING BACK TO THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, AND ADDED THAT EVERYTHING THE U. S. DOES MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE TRA. WE DON'T NECESSARILY CLAIM THE RIGHT TO SELL ARMS TO TAIWAN INDEFINITELY. (FYI: TSAI EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING THAT WE COULD NOT MAKE AN INDEFINITE COMMITMENT ON ARMS SALES, AND WAS IN FACT QUITE RELAXED ON THIS POINT. -- PROTECT) HOLDRIDGE REITERATED, AGAIN, THE U. S. POSITION THAT ANY RESOLUTION MUST BE PEACEFUL, BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

7. TSAI ASKED IF THE PRC KNOWS ABOUT SPECIFIC ARMS SALES NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. HOLDRIDGE RESPONDED THAT THEY DO NOT, AND THAT WE DO NOT DISCUSS FUTURE TAIWAN ARMS SALES WITH THEM. HOLDRIDGE SAID THAT THE MILITARY PLANNING MEETING COULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE OF COMMAND IN THE PM BUREAU, AND THE SCHEDULE MIGHT HAVE TO SLIP A COUPLE OF WEEKS.

8. TSAI ASKED IF THEY MAY PROCEED WITH OPENING THE BOSTON OFFICE. HOLDRIDGE REMINDED TSAI THAT WE HAD ALREADY TOLD THEM THEY MAY OPEN THE BOSTON OFFICE, AND THAT WE WILL NOT RENEGE ON THAT. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE DONE WITH NO PUBLICITY WHATSOEVER. TSAI SAID THEY WOULD DO WHAT THEY CAN TO AVOID PUBLICITY, BUT THAT THEY CANNOT CONTROL THE PRESS, ESPECIALLY THE NEW YORK CHINESE-LANGUAGE PRESS. (COMMENT: ON JUNE 3, AIT WILL SEND LETTERS TO THE GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE MAYOR OF BOSTON INFORMING THEM THAT CCNAA WILL BE OPENING AN OFFICE, AND REQUESTING THE USUAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. AIT/W WILL SEND COPIES OF THOSE LETTERS TO CCNAA/W, AND INFORM THEM THAT THEY MAY OPEN UP IN BOSTON AFTER JULY 1. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE FACT OF THE OPENING OF THE NEW OFFICE WILL BECOME KNOWN IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY AND WILL BE PICKED UP IN THE CHINESE-LANGUAGE PRESS SHORTLY THEREAFTER.)
HAIG
BT

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01
EOB757

BEIJING 6581
AN002774

DTG: 210850Z MAY 82
TOR: 141/0936Z

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~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 06581

NODIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 5/21/02 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, TW, CH
SUBJECT: HOLDRIDGE CONVERSATION WITH CAI WEIPING
REFS: (A) STATE 139249

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND BEFORE WE REPEATEDLY ASSURED THE CHINESE THAT WHILE OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE ONGOING, THERE WOULD BE NO NEW SURPRISES IN TERMS OF U.S. ACTIONS OR DECISIONS REGARDING TAIWAN. I BELIEVE THAT NEWS OF THE OPENING OF THE CCNAA OFFICE IN BOSTON WILL HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS IN BEIJING. SUCH AN ACTION AT THIS TIME COULD NEGATE THE IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE GENERATED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S RECENT VISIT.
3. THE CHINESE ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO ACCUSE US OF BAD FAITH AND EVEN THOSE IN THE LEADERSHIP MOST COMMITTED TO FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE TAIWAN PROBLEM, WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO REACT STRONGLY. AS SUGGESTED AT THE END OF PARA 8 IN REFTEL, NO MATTER HOW CCNAA ATTEMPTS TO AVOID PUBLICITY, THE FACT OF THE OPENING WILL BE RAPIDLY FEATURED NOT ONLY BY THE CHINESE LANGUAGE PRESS BUT OTHER MEDIA AS WELL.
4. IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO POSTPONE THE OPENING OF THE BOSTON OFFICE OF CCNAA, I URGE THE DEPARTMENT TO INFORM THE CHINESE OF THIS FORTHCOMING MOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS MAY MITIGATE THE REACTION SOMEWHAT. BUT IN ANY EVENT, I AM AFRAID WE CAN EXPECT SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS.
FREEMAN
BT

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NLS MO3-1443 #2

BY LDS, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Gregg~~

MEMORANDUM

3716

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 24, 1982

*Keep as a reference pls
in TIAS*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Goldwater on Taiwan-PRC Issue

At the end of a 35-minute meeting with Senator Goldwater this morning, he made the following comments:

- The Senator said he was "reassured" to learn that the Vice President's visit had been so useful, and that a Presidential message had been sent (orally) to Taiwan as a follow-up to the visit.
- The Senator said that he might say some things "that the Administration won't like" when he visits Taiwan, as his ties to Taiwan are a matter of 40 years of friendship. He was not specific on this score.
- He favors giving Taiwan an improved aircraft, although he does not see this as a "make or break" issue.

The Senator seemed somewhat ill at ease when I first arrived, but as I went over the Vice President's trip, stressing that we had not, and would not, set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan, he relaxed.

Intelligence reports were cited, indicating that the PRC did not feel that any concession on Taiwan arms sales had been made. The Senator was particularly pleased to see the President's oral message to President Chiang, and asked to keep a copy. I stressed that the Taiwanese had been very good about not publicizing such messages, and that it was important to continue that pattern.

The Senator stated flatly that he was a die-hard friend of Taiwan, and that "we all will be dead before the PRC amounts to anything." Within that frame of reference, which I could not hope to change, I think the visit was a useful one.

cc: Nancy Bearg Dyke

Good
Things will call
Goldwater -
[Signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on May 24, 2002

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS MD3-1443#3

BY WAT, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

National Security Council
The White House

Package # ~~543~~
3716

MAY 24 12:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	J	
Bud McFarlane	2	M	
Jacque Hill	3	J	
Judge Clark	4	J	F
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Points for Senator Goldwater

Australian and Japanese concerns re impact of US- PRC downgrade

Evaluation of visit from [REDACTED]

Reassuring msg sent to CCK via Jim Lilley from RR

We are close to a Zero-sum game

Press reaction to downgrading would be very strong. VP trip was a way of showing our sincere efforts to bridge the gap

Review of VP visit as I saw it

Huang Hua

Deng

Evoked PRC bottom line. Some flx on their part

Reassured PRC of RR view

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(e)
3.3(b)(1)

"Reassured"

"A/C not a make or break issue"

"Very very some things Admin don't like"

"matter of 40 years friendship, not just
diplomacy"

SIR Choppers
See Chopper minutes
Standard
APC'S

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 02 AIT TAIPEI 2720
EOB729 AN001934

DTG: 191353Z MAY 82 PSN: 035003
TOR: 139/1458Z CSN: HCE961

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~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 02720

NODIS
FOR ASST SECY HOLDRIDGE FROM DIRECTOR LILLEY
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/19/02 (LILLEY, JAMES R.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, TW, CH
SUBJECT: ~~S~~ MESSAGES TO TAIWAN LEADERS
REF: A) WASHDC 135570, B) WASHDC 135571

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I DELIVERED ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT CHIANG AT 1800 HOURS LOCAL MAY 19. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER FREDRICK CHIEN ACCOMPANIED ME BY DISCREET MEANS TO CCK'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE AND WAS THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT. IN AN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH CHIEN I USED THE TALKERS FOR THE HOLDRIDGE-TSAI CONVERSATION.

3. CCK, WITH WHOM I SPENT ABOUT ONE HOUR, EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE. HE COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN HAD BEEN VERY MUCH CONCERNED OVER VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S TRIP AND THE THREE PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS, HE HIMSELF WAS NEVER THAT WORRIED. HE HAD COMPLETE CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD NEVER DO ANYTHING PREJUDICIAL OR NOT PROFITABLE TO TAIWAN. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY TAIWAN SPOKESMEN, AND THE PUBLICITY GIVEN HIS OWN THREE POINTS OF LAST SATURDAY HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO CLARIFY TAIWAN'S POSITION AND TAKE CARE OF THE ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC AND THE MILITARY. HE OBSERVED THAT HIS THREE POINTS HAD BEEN MADE IN A CALM AND DISPASSIONATE MANNER.

4. CCK THEN WENT ON TO MAKE THESE OBSERVATIONS:
(1) HE HOPED PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS AWARE THAT THE OBJECT OF THE PRC'S NINE POINTS WAS TO GET THE U. S. TO STOP SELLING ARMS TO TAIWAN. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE U. S. DISASSOCIATE ITS TAIWAN ARMS SALES DECISIONS FROM PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
(2) TAIWAN WILL NEVER USE ARMS SOLD TO IT BY THE U. S. TO ATTACK THE PRC. THIS HAS BEEN SAID BEFORE, AND TAIWAN WILL STICK TO IT.
(3) TAIWAN IS SEEKING ARMS NOW FOR THE SAKE OF DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS IN THE FUTURE. WHAT IT HAS NOW IS ENOUGH FOR THE PRESENT; HOWEVER THE PRC IS FAR AHEAD OF TAIWAN IN QUANTITY OF ARMS AND TAIWAN MUST PLAN WELL AHEAD TO MAINTAIN

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NLS MO 3-1443#5

~~SECRET~~

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 AIT TAIPEI 2720

DTG: 191353Z MAY 82 PSN: 035003

THE NEEDED QUALITATIVE EDGE. BUT TAIWAN WILL NEVER MAKE REQUESTS BEYOND ITS ACTUAL NEEDS.

(4) U. S. ARMS SALES ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO TAIWAN'S STABILITY. STOPPING THEM WOULD DESTABILIZE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION AND SHATTER THE PUBLIC'S SPIRITS.

(5) CCK UNDERSTANDS THE CONCEPT OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT IMPROVEMENT OF U. S. RELATIONS WITH THE PRC IS NOT NECESSARILY HARMFUL TO TAIWAN. BUT BEWARE OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. THEY ARE NOT SO GOOD IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OR MILITARY AFFAIRS, BUT THEY ARE MOST SKILLFUL IN NEGOTIATIONS -- AS THE NATIONALISTS LEARNED TO THEIR SORROW IN DEALINGS GOING BACK TO 1921.

5. CCK APPEARED MENTALLY ALERT BUT PHYSICALLY FEEBLE, MOVING LITTLE AND WITH A SLOW SHUFFLE.

6. EARLIER THAT AFTERNOON FRED CHIEN WAS EFFUSIVELY AFFECTIONATE -- A TOTAL CHANGE OF MANNER FROM OUR LAST CONVERSATION CONCERNING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PLEASURE AT THE RENEWED REASSURANCES THAT THE U. S. WOULD NOT SET A DATE FOR ENDING ARMS SALES AND WOULD NOT PRESSURE TAIWAN TO NEGOTIATE.

7. CHIEN ASKED, HOWEVER, FOR CONFIRMATION THAT THE U. S. -TAIWAN MILITARY TALKS WERE STILL SCHEDULED FOR JUNE. AND HE EXPRESSED TWO CONTINUING CONCERNS, REFLECTED IN THESE QUESTIONS:

- (1) IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRC HAS THE U. S. AGREED TO ANY LIMITS ON THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF ARMS IT SELLS TAIWAN?
- (2) HOW LONG WILL THE CURRENT U. S. -PRC

TALKS ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN CONTINUE?

8. GUIDANCE FOR DEALING WITH CHIEN'S THREE QUESTIONS WILL BE APPRECIATED. FOR NOW, HOWEVER, I JUST WANT TO SAY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND THE TALKERS HAVE BEEN MOST TIMELY AND EXTREMELY HELPFUL FOR OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES HERE.

9. PLEASE PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE.
LILLEY
BT

NO
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NO
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NO
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TAS

2. CHINA: LIMITED ROOM TO MANEUVER ON US ARMS SALES

The Vice President's visit to China has not lessened Beijing's determination to halt US arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing has reiterated that it will downgrade relations with Washington if arms sales talks with the US break down, and has hinted that its limited shift toward improved relations with the USSR could go farther if the Taiwan issue is not resolved. Deng's hard-nosed approach may be paying political dividends at home; his associates have scored major gains since October.

* * *

Chinese leaders have told foreigners that the Vice President's visit was a success. [redacted] the Foreign Ministry has said privately that the visit offered China "nothing substantial." The report states that Beijing will consequently emphasize relations with the Third World, cease references to strategic cooperation with the US, and adopt a more "flexible and clever" posture with the Soviet Union. The report implies the Chinese could change these policies quickly if relations with the US improved.

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c)
3.3(b)(1)

China's willingness to downgrade relations with the US reflects its apparent disappointment with the benefits it has received from the normalization of relations. [redacted]

Beijing believes that the US has exaggerated the benefits its strategic relationship, technology transfers, and training of Chinese students provide China.

Since Deng played a personal role in normalization, he may feel especially disappointed. He may believe that China gave away too much in 1978 to resume diplomatic relations with the US and that it should retreat to its pre-normalization policies stressing its ties with the Third World and its demand for US concessions on Taiwan.

Coincidentally or not, Deng and his associates have scored major domestic successes during the period of China's opposition to US arms sales policy. Many of Deng's followers have entered key government and party positions since last October. Deng still needs to convene the 12th Party Congress to formalize party reform and elect a new politburo. He also wants to implement a new state constitution which will give him firmer control over the military. Unless Deng sees some way improved US-China relations will pay off for him at home, he may allow his government's tough stand on Taiwan to continue.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS MO3-1143 #7
By LDT, NARA, Date 11/29/05

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26 May
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1982

*J- PLS sent with
my memo of Clark
on Goldwater*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DON GREGG
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Senator Goldwater's Forthcoming
Travel to Taiwan

The Vice President called this morning to note Senator Goldwater's forthcoming travel to Taiwan and his conversation with the Senator which reflected the latter's concern over his perception of our "tilt" toward the PRC. He wants to provide Taiwan a strong reaffirmation of our support in behalf of the President and for that purpose, would like to hear a presentation of the history and status of our dialogue with the PRC in the past 16 months. I have since talked to the Senator and assured him, as did the Vice President, of the President's firm commitment to fulfillment of the Taiwan Relations Act and our pledges to the people of Taiwan. I also offered to arrange a meeting with the Judge to go over this matter.

He said that it did not need to be the Judge but that he would very much appreciate being brought up to date on where matters stand to reassure himself and ultimately the Taiwanese. He did mention in passing that he believed they needed a new aircraft.

Could you please contact the Senator's office and arrange to go meet with him on Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. (his preference). Please stress the President's absolute refusal to set a terminal date certain and to remain faithful to our commitments to the people of Taiwan. You should, as well, make it emphatically clear that the Vice President did not depart from these principles as you can attest.

With respect to the new aircraft, there will be no answer entirely satisfactory to him. Still you should point out that it was the entire intelligence community's position that Taiwan could not justify a need for a new aircraft and the President could scarcely ignore that. Still we are prepared to assure them continued production of the F-5E. You might also treat the F-104 matter.

He may ask for a letter from the President to carry. I would welcome your recommendation on that before the meeting. In some

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NLS MD 3-443#9

BY LBJ, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

respects it may be better to have a letter so that his oral interpretation of what you say does not create new policy and that there is a benchmark for the Taiwanese to read.

Please provide the Vice President, as well as Judge Clark, a debrief of your meeting.

cc: The Vice President
Judge Clark

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

TTS

02 MAY 24 11:35

May 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
From: Alexander M. Haig Jr. *(circled)*
Subject: Taiwan Arms Sales: Next Steps
Following Vice President's Visit

China's de facto ruler, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, has asked for something the US Government cannot give: a private assurance that the United States will gradually reduce and eventually cease arms sales to Taiwan "within a certain period of time." He wants you to do this privately, because he knows we will not do so publicly. We cannot comply, not only because it would violate the TRA--unless caveated so heavily the Chinese would surely reject it--but because we cannot deal with an issue of this nature on the basis of secret understandings.

Despite the Vice President's superb and successful effort to improve the atmosphere, the crisis in US-China relations therefore remains. In their treatment of the Vice President, and statements to him, particularly those by Deng, the Chinese have shown a strong desire to improve relations; but they continue to press us to accept, in principle, that arms sales must one day end, and they seem determined to push for this bottom line, even at the possible risk of a downgrading.

We will be under increasing pressure in the months ahead to proceed with a number of planned arms sales to Taiwan. Some, such as the extension of F-5E co-production, will require Congressional notification and attendant publicity. In the absence of a modus vivendi with China, the first sale to become known runs the risk of precipitating the downgrading we both seek to avoid. Deng has expressed a desire to settle the issue quickly, perhaps because his position is somewhat stronger now than a few months ago, but probably because he also knows we must soon sell to Taiwan. He, too, wants a modus vivendi first, so he will not feel compelled to trigger a downgrading when we do.

Given mutual recognition that time is short, if we move quickly and decisively to respond to Deng, we may be able to obtain an acceptable outcome. The key will lie in keeping him personally engaged--as he was in the final stage of the normalization negotiations--and in persuading him to accept something less than the definitive assurance he seeks. I recommend a two-track approach:

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BY ADJ, NARA, DATE 11/22/05

--That you authorize Ambassador Hummel to tell Deng directly, on your behalf, that you cannot provide a private assurance on ending arms sales, but the policy lines already established by both governments signalled in our communique drafts provide the elements of a settlement and indicate clearly the direction which we intend to take. You need to reiterate your firm intention to place a quantitative and qualitative ceiling on sales and gradually to reduce sales. This amounts only to affirming your intent to implement policies we have already offered to embody in a public document. Your statements would be premised on, but not directly linked to, a continued Chinese peaceful approach. A draft oral message from you to Deng to be presented by Hummel is attached.

--That you also authorize Hummel to continue informal talks with Foreign Ministry counterparts in search of a mutually acceptable communique. Should you and Deng reach a meeting of the minds in that particular channel, I believe, based on formulations the Chinese gave us May 8, we can quickly gain an acceptable communique. The attached draft communique draws on the Chinese proposals and suggestions Hummel has sent us. They do not go beyond the substance of formulations you have approved in the February 15 version (attached) and in the formulation given to the Chinese prior to the Vice President's visit.

The first three paragraphs of the new draft communique are identical to the first three paragraphs of the February 15 version. Our new fourth paragraph strengthens the Chinese statement of peaceful intentions. The fifth paragraph, by stating our understanding and appreciation of China's policy of peaceful resolution, provides, with the addition of "correspondingly" and "therefore" in the following sixth paragraph, the necessary linkage for the statements which you have already approved to limit and reduce gradually our arms sales to Taiwan. The seventh and eighth paragraphs are variations on our February 15 language and would cause us no problems whatsoever.

If we move quickly, before the good atmosphere created by the Vice President's visit is dissipated, this two-track approach could bring success. If not, we will have to do some hard thinking and may have to consider a tough, final message from you or me to Foreign Minister Huang, in New York during the UN Special Session on Disarmament in June.

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Recommendation

That you approve early presentations to Deng and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as outlined. If so, we will prepare instructions to Beijing for White House clearance.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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NEW DRAFT COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH TAIWAN ARMS
SALES ISSUE, BASED ON DRAFT TABLED BY THE US
ON FEBRUARY 15, 1982 AND FORMULATIONS SUGGESTED
BY THE CHINESE ON MAY 8, 1982

1. In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. The two sides agreed, within that context, that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized, and a rapid expansion of mutually beneficial strategic and bilateral relations occurred.

2. The question of US arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side reserved the right to raise the issue again, at a later time, following normalization. Recognizing that this issue could seriously hamper the development of US-China relations, the two sides have held further discussions, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding Sino-American relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern their relations and agree that they bear directly on the question of how to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution of US-China differences over the question of the United States' supply of arms to Taiwan.

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BY hjt, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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4. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. It states that the message to compatriots issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The nine-point proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort to seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and a national policy that will not change. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of the question of US arms sales to Taiwan.

5. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. The US government attaches great importance to its relations with China. It reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty or territorial integrity or pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan." The US government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue indicated in the nine-point proposal of September 30, 1981.

6. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. Correspondingly, the US government therefore states that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China. Similarly, the US government states that the United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and expects a gradual reduction in its arms sales, over a period of time, leading ultimately to a final settlement of this difficult issue.

KEY, PLD
JIM LILLEY

7. [NEW PARAGRAPH] Both governments recognize that the question of US arms sales to Taiwan is an issue rooted in history which should be finally settled, amicably, over a period of time, on the basis of the foregoing statements. Both governments pledge to make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to such a settlement.

8. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. The two governments agree that the continued development of US-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples, but is conducive to peace and stability in the world. Within the East Asia

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region, both sides believe that harmonious, cooperative and friendly relations between the two nations will contribute to an atmosphere in which further progress toward a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue can be registered by the Chinese people themselves. The two sides are determined to make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Chinese and American peoples and between the governments of the two countries.

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U.S. DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
(February 15, 1982)

1. In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. The two sides agreed, within that context, that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized, and a rapid expansion of mutually beneficial strategic and bilateral relations occurred.

2. The question of US arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side reserved the right to raise the issue again, at a later time, following normalization. Recognizing that this issue could seriously hamper the development of US-China relations, the two sides have held further discussions, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding Sino-American relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern their relations and agree that they bear directly on the question of how to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution of US-China differences over the question of the United States' supply of arms to Taiwan.

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BY h0J, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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4. The US Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty or territorial integrity or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The question of Taiwan is thus wholly an internal affair of the Chinese people. The United States' abiding concern is that the question of Taiwan be settled peacefully, by the Chinese people themselves.

5. On September 30, 1981, China put forward a Nine-Point proposal which is a major effort to seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. In discussing this peaceful proposal with the United States Government, the Chinese Government has declared that this peaceful approach has become its steadfast policy.

6. Under the foregoing circumstances, the United States Government states that, with regard to its arms sales to Taiwan, there should be no need to exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the levels supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.

7. On the contrary, the United States Government, also under the foregoing circumstances and with the expectation that there should be continued progress toward peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, anticipates that its sales of arms to Taiwan would gradually diminish, as military tensions in the Taiwan Strait area continue to abate, leading ultimately to a final settlement of this difficult issue.

8. Both sides recognize that the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan is an issue rooted in history, and both sides recognize that, in view of the importance of U.S.- China relations, it is an issue which should be resolved amicably. In this context, the Chinese Government states that more time should be allowed for the achievement of a thorough settlement of this issue. The Chinese Government expects the United States Government to

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make every effort to adopt measures to implement the above stated expectations, and pledges a strong corresponding effort to preserve the conditions under which this historical issue can be peacefully resolved.

9. The development of US-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples, but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are ready to make joint efforts for the continued development of the relations between the two countries.

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Scholarship
PAC play

Baker
This is law of land - We must
stick by it. Congress insists
on this.

Daig - This has a life of its own
Baker - will carry message - no
negotiations.

Daig TT together

NSSD-6
status questionable

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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, TW, CH, US
SUBJECT: MORE GOLDWATER PRESS COMMENTARY
REF: TAIPEI 2994

1. ALL PAPERS ON JUNE 3 CARRIED A CNA DISPATCH REPORTING SENATOR GOLDWATER'S MEETING WITH CHIANG CHING-KUO THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON. DURING THEIR ONE-HOUR "CORDIAL TALK," CHIANG PRAISED GOLDWATER'S ANTI-COMMUNIST STANCE AND "FAR-SIGHTED" VIEWS ON SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. GOLDWATER PLEDGED THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF TAIWAN'S 18 MILLION PEOPLE WILL NOT WAVER AND THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT THOSE WHO UPHOLD FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY. BOTH AGREED THAT CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS AS WELL AS THE SUPPLY OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT.

2. THE "INDEPENDENT EVENING POST" ON JUNE 2 CARRIED A COMMENTARY BY ITS REPORTER KENG JUNG-SHUI ENTITLED "GOLDWATER'S TEARS" (REFTEL), WHICH EXAMINES CRITICALLY THE USEFULNESS OF GOLDWATER'S SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN. THE FULL TEXT IS TRANSLATED BELOW.

3. BEGIN TEXT. SENATOR GOLDWATER SHED SINCERE AND TOUCHING TEARS OVER HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR TAIWAN AT PREMIER SUN'S DINNER LAST NIGHT. THOSE PRESENT AT THE DINNER WERE ALL MOVED. MANY PERSONS WHO WATCHED THE SCENE ON TV WERE ALSO MOVED. BUT I HAVE SOME OTHER IDEAS.
JUST AS PREMIER SUN SAID, THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN, WHO ARE PURSUING FREEDOM, ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO GOLDWATER FOR HIS HONORABLE FRIENDSHIP WHEN TAIWAN-US RELATIONS ARE FACING DIFFICULTIES. THE CHINESE PEOPLE APPRECIATE HIS FRIENDSHIP IN THIS TIME OF NEED. GOLDWATER VISITED TAIWAN WHEN THE LATE PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK PASSED AWAY AND WHEN TAIWAN-US DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE BROKEN. HE CAME TO TAIPEI AFTER REAGAN'S THREE LETTERS WERE MADE PUBLIC. THIS REALLY IS HONORABLE FRIENDSHIP. HIS TEARS LAST NIGHT PROVE FURTHER THAT HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR US IS FIRM AND NATURAL.

HOWEVER, THE TEARS OF AN INTERNATIONAL FRIEND MAY NOT NECESSARILY SAVE OUR COUNTRY. PRACTICAL POLITICS ARE ONE THING AND HONORABLE FRIENDSHIP ANOTHER. WHILE WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR GOLDWATER'S FRIENDSHIP, WE CANNOT NEGLECT THAT SENATOR BAKER IS IN BEIJING DISCUSSING WITH DENG XIAOPING THE POSSIBILITY OF REVISING THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. WE SHOULD TRY TO FIGURE OUT HOW MANY AMERICANS SUPPORT US AS ENTHUSIASTICALLY AS GOLDWATER AND HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE AS PRACTICAL AS BAKER. THE MAJORITY IS NOT ALWAYS RIGHT, BUT IN THE U.S., WHERE GREAT IMPORTANCE IS ATTACHED TO PUBLIC OPINION, THE OPINION OF A SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE MAY BE SACRIFICED OR NEGLECTED. THIS IS UNAVOIDABLE IN A DEMOCRACY.

IT IS QUITE IMPRACTICAL TO REST THE FUTURE OF THIS COUNTRY ON AN INTERNATIONAL FRIEND'S WARMTH AND CONCERN. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE VERY PASSIONATE BUT ALSO VERY PRACTICAL. A GENTLEMAN LIKE GOLDWATER IS VERY VALUABLE BUT VERY RARE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPECT GOLDWATER TO SAVE US, AND IT IS MORE ABSURD TO EXPECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SAVE US. AMERICANS ARE VERY PROUD TO SAY THAT THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR WAS AN "HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL" EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE INVOLVED IN THE WAR FOR 15 YEARS, SUFFERED SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS OF CASUALTIES, AND LOST SEVERAL TENS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS.

BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP AND U.S. ARMS SALES IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY DEFENSE OF TAIWAN. THIS SHOULD BE PART OF OUR MEASURES TO FIGHT FOR AN IMPROVED SITUATION, BUT NOT ALL. WE SHOULD DO OUR BEST BUT BE PREPARED FOR THE WORST. IF WE CAN STILL STAND FIRM ON THE DAY THE U.S. CUTS OFF ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN AND GOLDWATER DOES NOT SHED TEARS

FOR US ANYMORE, WE MAY BE PROUD TO SAY THAT THE CHINESE ARE A GREAT NATION AND THAT THE 18 MILLION PEOPLE ON TAIWAN CANNOT BE SOLD OUT. END TEXT. BROOKS
BT

Good line strong

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