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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Gregg, Donald P.; Files
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Folder: Taiwan Arms Sales Vol. II 1982 (2 of 7)
Box 90385 RAC Box 10 (3 of 13)

Date: 7/31/00
Jespersion - F99-056/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	No cable number, re: William Clark's Meeting with Tsai Wei-Ping, 3 p. D 11/29/05 103-1442 #1 D 5/24/06 F99-056/1 #89	6/16/82	P1/F1
2. Cable	#180457Z Jun 82, 2 p. D " " #2 D " " #90	6/18/82	P1/F1
3. Memo	Donald Gregg to William Clark, re: Status of the PRC/Taiwan Arms Sales Package, 1 p. R " " #3	6/21/82	P1/F1
4. Memo	Michael Wheeler to L. Paul Bremer, 1 p. R " " #4	6/7/82	P1/F1
5. Memo	Gregg to Clark, re: PRC-Taiwan Update, 2 p. R " " #5	6/3/82	P1/F1
6. Memo	Gregg to Clark, re: China-Taiwan - The Arms Sales Issue, 1 p. " " #6	6/1/82	P1/F1
7. Cable	#011002Z Jun 82, 1 p. Part " " #7	6/1/82	P1/F1
8. Memo	Gregg to Clark, re: State's May 24 Package on Taiwan Arms Sales, 2 p. R " " #8	5/24/82	P1/F1
9. Memo	Clark to Alexander Haig, re: Taiwan Arms Sales, 1 p. R " " #9	n.d.	P1/F1
10. Memo	Haig to Reagan, re: Taiwan Arms Sales: Next Steps Following Vice President's Visit, 3 p. Part " " #10 PART 5/24/06 F99-056 #98	5/24/82	P1/F1
11. Message	Reagan to Vice Chairman Deng, 2 p. D " " #11	n.d.	P1/F1
12. Draft	Communique, 3 p. R " " #12	n.d.	P1/F1
13. Draft	Communique (US Draft), 3 p. R " " #13	2/15/82	P1/F1
14. Memo	Gregg to Clark, re: Estimated Taiwan Reaction, 1 p. R " " #14	5/26/82	P1/F1
15. Memo	Bremer to Clark, re: Reaction in Taiwan, 1 p. R " " #15	5/26/82	P1/F1
16. Cable	#210703Z Jun 81, 1 p. R " " #16	6/21/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Jks

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/17

Don Gregg:

A representative from Barnett (~~Paul Arnold~~) visited me on June 17.

A copy of his talking paper for discussions at State is attached.

He is aware of the status of the China paper from his discussions at State..

Barnett is concerned that Taipei may fall of the engine deal^(if/now) if it is not given go ahead very soon (~ July).

Bob Lilen

David Dean has told Barnett to hang in there.

STATE DEPARTMENT

TFE 1042 1042 PROGRAM GARRETT/AIDC STATUS 16 June 82

1. Garrett and AIDC now working on pre-start program aimed at keeping ROC funding attached.
2. Garrett engineering team now residing at AIDC Taichung, pre-start program will end late August.
3. Pre-start program cannot be repeated nor do other delaying tactics seem feasible.
4. ROC Government and military recently assured by Senator Goldwater that the Administration would not abandon Taiwan either in defense or commercially.
5. Many preparations for any program to follow pre-start effort require three months and AIDC can see that these actions are not in progress.
6. ROC is therefore pressing ever more strongly for information on U.S. Government approval status and clarification of Administration intention.
7. Garrett team leaves for AIDC Taiwan on Friday, 18 June.
8. Top ROC government assistance offered by AIDC.
9. Has approval recommendation memo promised 4 June reached Haig?
10. What are implications of 'package ^{China} ROC deal' approval by Reagan?

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 18, 1982

TO: NANCY BEARG DYKE

FROM: DON GREGG

This is a helpful message
which I think the Vice
President should see.

Attachment

~~SECRET~~ ✓

NON-LOG

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 21, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *RG*
SUBJECT: Status of the PRC/Taiwan Arms Sales Package

State's package, dealing with the Taiwan arms sales issue, has been on Secretary Haig's desk for about ten days. Much has been going on in the world, and the Secretary has not yet had an opportunity to read and endorse the package.

Working levels at State share my concern that not too much time elapse before we get going on this crucial issue. Repeated calls to Haig's office by Shoemith and Holdridge have not budged the package.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

_____ During one of your conversations with Secretary Haig, I suggest you mention our desire to start dealing with the Taiwan arms sales issue expeditiously.

*I have mentioned several times -
Don do so again -
Wm*

RCM HAS SE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 103-1442 #3

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 21, 2002

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3806 Add-on

TAS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

June 7, 1982

Gregg
Jan

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: PRC-Taiwan -- The Arms Sale Issue

Pursuant to discussions held with Assistant Secretary Holdridge on June 1, State is requested to revise its May 24th and 26th submissions, incorporating both concepts into one scenario. The aim of the consolidated paper will be to present a two-track approach to the problem of Taiwan arms sales, indicating clearly what we intend to do in Beijing as well as our best estimates as to how such approaches would be received in Taiwan.

We request that this scenario be ready for White House consideration immediately after the conclusion of the European trip.

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

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NLS M03-1442 #4

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/29/15

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Review on June 4, 2002

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PAGES 2

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DACOM # 52

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DEX #

DTG 051244Z Jun 82

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. RADM JOHN POINDEXTER/THE SITUATUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. CHARLES TYSON FOR JUDGE CLARK/PALACE

2. JUN 05/250Z Jun 82

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

PALACE: NOT URGENT, DELIVER WHEN ABLE.

TKS, WHSR

82 JUN 5 09:09

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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CLASSIFICATION

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3806 Add-on

Mu

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 4, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Tasking State to Construct a PRC-Taiwan Scenario

The attached memorandum (Tab II), which I sent you yesterday, gives the current state of play at State. I have been informed, however, that Secretariat will not allow State to respond officially until a formal tasker arrives.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

RCM — That you authorize the sending of the attached memorandum (Tab I) to Bremer from Wheeler by checking the OK box.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Wheeler Signature to Bremer
Tab II Gregg Memorandum dated 6/3/82 (#3806)

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 4, 2002

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *dlb* NARA, Date *7/31/00*

~~SECRET~~

BY CAE NARA, DATE 11/29/15~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3806

mw

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 3, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: PRC-Taiwan Update

Goldwater Speech in Japan. Senator Goldwater's 2 June speech in Taipei was full of praise for our friends on Taiwan, full of criticism of the People's Republic, and well larded with negative references to the Department of State. Tom Shoesmith emerged as the chief villain. This is ironic as Shoesmith is markedly better balanced on the Taiwan-PRC issue than are several of his colleagues. I do not think that the speech should cause too many problems in Beijing. The Senator spoke positively of the President and his judgment. He also referred in an upbeat way to some of the talks he had in Washington with Administration officials which had served to "persuade me that they are not blind to the basic realities of the Asia/Pacific region."

Meeting at State to Discuss a China-Taiwan Scenario. On 2 June I met at State with Holdridge, Shoesmith, Ferguson and Hallford (of the Department). Also present were Rich Armitage from the Pentagon, David Dean from AIT and Jim Lilley, visiting from Taipei. I stressed the need to develop a scenario which would take into account not only the impact of our planned moves in Beijing, but also their impact in Taiwan. As a result of this meeting, the following steps will be taken:

- Talking points will be drafted and cleared for Jim Lilley to take back to Taiwan, stressing our intention to move ahead with the F5E coproduction agreement and our intention to seek a Memo of Understanding from the West Germans which will expedite the sale of the F104s. We will also offer Taiwan a military meeting in the USA in early July where their military requirements will be reviewed and updated. This package should be a strong and concrete reassurance to Taiwan.
- The 24 May package, outlining a new approach to Beijing, will be redrafted. This new version will include Jim Lilley's estimate of how a joint communique, based on such an approach, would be received in Taipei.
- State will seek approval to sell the Garrett engine to Taiwan.
- A sustained effort will be made to keep Jim Lilley in the communications loop so that he will be able to evaluate and comment on each of our subsequent moves.

It was agreed that Congressional notification of the F5E coproduction agreement will have to be made in late August. We have until then to

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Review on June 3, 2002

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

work out an agreement with the PRC. All who attended the meeting yesterday appeared to agree that our current approach gives us the best chance to achieve this goal.

I have spoken at length to Jim Lilley today and he shares my feeling that with care we can reach an agreement. His main concern is that he be made privy to the main items of correspondence, and I assured him I would do my best to see that this takes place.

cc: Bob Kimmitt
Dick Childress

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

3671 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL June 1, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: China-Taiwan--The Arms Sales Issue

The current state of play is as follows:

- Senator Baker is in China, has had a friendly talk with Deng Xiaoping and feels that it would be a good idea if the President were to visit the PRC. Deng is sensitive on the TRA but Baker apparently impressed him with its legal status. (Tab I)
- Senator Goldwater, in Taipei, has fired his opening shots. He has caused something of a problem by gratuitously referring to the President's recent message to President Chiang. He is also starting to criticize the Department of State. This will reach full pitch on Wednesday when he speaks to the local Chamber of Commerce. (Tab II)
- Here in Washington, State still awaits a reaction to their most recent packages (Tabs III and IV). The time is growing close where we will need to send another package of arms for Taiwan forward and with our agreement with the Chinese still not achieved, the PRC may be forced to make a symbolic act of downgrading relations.
- I have asked State to convene a meeting tomorrow, June 2, at which Jim Lilley, David Dean, Tom Shoesmith, John Holdridge, Bill Rope and I will discuss our China policy problem, bringing into focus the sensitivities in both Taipei and Beijing. I have been urging State for the last ten days to work out a coordinated scenario, showing in a step by step fashion how they would intend to reach agreement with Beijing and at the same time maintain credibility in Taipei. The approach thus far has been to try to satisfy Beijing first and worry about Taipei later. I have told them that I do not think this will fly and will keep saying that at our meeting tomorrow.

Any comments or guidance you have from the President would be helpful and an oral tasker to State asking for this scenario would also be helpful. If anything significant comes of our June 2 meeting, I will forward a short report.

Attachments

Tab I Cable - Beijing 7049
Tab II Cable - AIT Taipei 2951 & Cable - AIT Taipei 2952
Tab III Gregg Memo to WPC dated 5/24/82 (#3671)
Tab IV Gregg Memo to WPC dated 5/26/82 (#3683)

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Review on June 1, 2002

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NLS

1003-1442 #6
BY *CIS*, NARA, DATE *11/29/05*

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PAGE, 01.
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WHSR COMMENT: TO GREGG FOR ACTION

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NODIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR
THE PRESIDENT FROM SENATOR BAKER
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/1/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, HOWARD)
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DENG XIAOPING

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING MY ONE-HOUR PLUS MEETING THIS MORNING
JUNE 1 WITH DENG XIAOPING, THE CHAIRMAN WAS
EXTREMELY CORDIAL, BUT AS EXPECTED HE WAS TOUGH
ON THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN. DENG, I BELIEVE, IS GENUINELY
ANXIOUS TO HAVE A GOOD RELATIONSHIP AND WANTS TO
BUILD ON THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE TO DATE. I AM
CONVINCED HOWEVER THAT THE TAIWAN QUESTION IS REAL
AND WILL NOT BE RESOLVED BY PLACATIVE STATEMENTS.

3. THE ARMS SALES ISSUE, AT LEAST JUDGING FROM
DENG'S PRESENTATION, MAY RECEDE IN IMPORTANCE IF
CAREFULLY HANDLED.

[REDACTED] I REPLIED THAT
YOU ARE COMMITTED TO IMPLEMENTING THE ACT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE NORMALIZATION COMMUNIQUE, THAT THE ACT HAS
WORKED WELL SO FAR, THAT I WOULD NOT PROPOSE THAT IT
BE CHANGED AT THIS POINT, BUT THAT I WOULD WELCOME
FROM HIM A SPECIFICATION OF THOSE ASPECTS OF THE ACT
HE FINDS OBJECTIONABLE. DENG DID NOT RESPOND.

5. AT AN EARLY POINT IN THE DISCUSSION, DENG EXPRESSED
THE HOPE TO MEET WITH YOU. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION,
HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD LIKE ME TO CONVEY THAT
HOPE TO YOU AND I AM CONVINCED THAT HE MADE THE
PROPOSAL PURPOSEFULLY AND WITH SERIOUS INTENT.

6. DENG'S REACTION TO SENATOR GOLDWATER'S VISIT
TO TAIPEI WAS NOT AS STRONG AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN
EXPECTED. INSTEAD, HE ELABORATED AT SOME LENGTH
ON THE DESIRABILITY OF THE SENATOR'S
VISITING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. I BELIEVE THIS WAS
ALSO A SERIOUS SUGGESTION AND I WILL PURSUE IT
WITH THE SENATOR UPON MY RETURN. HUMMEL
BT

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NLS M03-1442 #7

By CIS, NARA, Date 11/29/05

~~SECRET~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 AIT TAIPEI 2951 DTG: 291646Z MAY 82 PSN: 049986
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~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 02951~~

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, HOWARD), PEPR, CH, TW, US

SUBJECT: SENATOR GOLDWATER'S ARRIVAL PRESS CONFERENCE

1. SENATOR GOLDWATER'S PLANE TOUCHED DOWN AT CHIANG KAI-SHEK AIRPORT AT 2040 HOURS. FOLLOWING INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY VARIOUS HOST GROUPS THE SENATOR EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT BEING IN TAIWAN AND ACCEPTED QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS. BELOW IS A VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THE SENATOR'S REMARKS AND THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

SEN. GOLDWATER: WELL, I JUST WANT TO THANK ALL OF YOU -
- FOR THE WELCOME; THIS IS JUST LIKE
- COMING HOME FOR ALL OF US, GENERAL AND
- MRS. QUINN (INTRODUCED AS SENATOR
- GOLDWATER'S MILITARY ADVISER), MY WIFE
- PEGGY AND I, AND WE HAVE ONE OF THE
- QUINN CHILDREN, DONNA, WITH US, AND
- ONE OF OUR CHILDREN, MICHAEL, AND HIS
- WIFE WITH US. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING
- PARTICULAR TO SAY, SO IF THERE'S
- ANYTHING YOU'D LIKE TO TALK ABOUT--
- I JUST WOKE UP AND I HOPE I'M SHARP.
- SO WHEN THE EASTMAN PEOPLE HERE (REFER-
- ENCE TO PHOTOGRAPHERS), YOU CAN GO
- AHEAD.

Q. SENATOR, DO YOU CARRY ANY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THIS COUNTRY?

A. WELL, IT'S MERELY A REITERATION TO YOUR LEADER REPEATEDLY SAID TO US IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE UNITED STATES PEOPLE THAT HE WILL NEVER GO BACK ON HIS PROMISES TO TAIWAN, AND WHILE I KNOW THAT YOU PEOPLE HAVE REASON TO BE A LITTLE NERVOUS, RELATIVE TO THOSE PROMISES, I HOPE I CAN DISPEL THOSE WORRIES, BUT I WILL HAVE TO ADD AND I WILL SAY IN MY REMARKS THIS COMING WEEK FOR THE CHAMBER THAT THERE ARE TIMES THAT I THINK THAT THERE ARE MEMBERS OF OUR STATE DEPARTMENT (SENATOR WAS INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT)--NOT THE SECRETARY OF STATE--WHO DON'T EXACTLY COOPERATE COMPLETELY WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRES. NOW WE HOPE WE CAN GET ALL OF THAT CLEARED UP AND THAT'S THE MAIN PURPOSE OF MY VISIT THIS TRIP--TO BRING THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRES, PROMISES, AND HIS WORDS TO THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN, AND AT THE SAME

TIME TO TRY TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE'D BETTER GET OUR TEAM IN THE UNITED STATES A LITTLE BIT BETTER LINED UP.

- Q. SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, DO YOU THINK THAT MR. REAGAN IS GRADUALLY ACCEPTING THE IDEA THAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO NORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES?
- A. NO, I DON'T THINK HE IS. I'M NOT SAYING BY THAT THAT THERE AREN'T PEOPLE IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND PEOPLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AS I'VE JUST SAID, WHO THINK DIFFERENTLY AND WOULD LIKE THE PRESIDENT IN THE ATTEMPT TO NORMALIZE--IF THAT'S THE WORD--RELATIONS TO FOREGO OUR PROMISES TO TAIWAN. I KNOW THE PRESIDENT WELL ENOUGH--I THINK I KNOW HIM BETTER AND LONGER THAN ANY MAN IN WASHINGTON--ON THIS ISSUE HE'S NOT LYING. OTHERS MAY BE, BUT NOT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
- Q. SIR, WE HAVE FEARS HERE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT STOP ARMS SALES. WHAT'S YOUR COMMENT?
- A. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, AND I SERVE ON THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, THAT NO INDICATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS EVEN THINKING ABOUT STOPPING SALES OF ARMS TO TAIWAN. NOW I'M NOT SAYING THAT THERE AREN'T PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON WHO WOULD LIKE TO DO THAT. I HOPE THAT THIS VISIT WILL BEGIN TO POINT THESE PEOPLE OUT, AND WE CAN MAKE THEM BUBBLE UP TO THE TOP, AND THEN WE CAN KNOCK THEM OFF OR MOVE THEM OVER.
- Q. SIR, DO YOU BRING ANY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT CHIANG CHING-KUO?
- A. NOT ANY MORE THAN HE SENT YOUR LEADER I THINK JUST A FEW DAYS AGO AND I BELIEVE THAT THAT MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED. WITHOUT KNOWING ANY MORE ABOUT IT I

WOULDN'T BE PRIVILEGED TO DISCUSS IT. I'VE SAID

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By clw NARA, Date 7/31/00

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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ESSENTIALLY WHAT'S IN THAT MESSAGE.

- Q. SIR, SOME PEOPLE SUGGEST THAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA SHOULD HAVE A BETTER PEACE PROPOSAL INSTEAD OF JUST REFUSING TO TALK WITH COMMUNIST CHINA. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THAT?
- A. I THINK THAT ANYTHING THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAVE TO SAY IS BETTER THAN ANYTHING THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC HAVE TO SAY.
- Q. SIR, DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTION ABOUT HOW THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA SHOULD DO TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ROC AND THE UNITED STATES?
- A. I HAVEN'T BEEN TO WHAT YOU CALL THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA SINCE THE DAYS OF WORLD WAR II. AND I DON'T INTEND TO GO THERE. I HAVE NO FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT THEY MIGHT THINK; I HAVE TO RELY ON REPORTS AND I HAD A LONG DISCUSSION WITH VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH JUST THREE DAYS AGO AND I BELIEVE THE VICE PRESIDENT WHEN HE TOLD--OR TELLS ME--THAT HE DID NOTHING IN HIS DISCUSSION OVER THERE BUT REITERATE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT GOING TO GO BACK ON HIS PROMISES TO THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN. I REPEAT THERE ARE PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON WHO WOULD LIKE HIM TO DO THAT, BUT HE HAS NO INTENTIONS OF DOING IT.
- Q. SIR, IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD REVISE OR EVEN ABROGATE THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT IN THE NEAR FUTURE?
- A. THAT ACT--WHILE I DIDN'T LIKE IT; I DIDN'T THINK IT WENT STRONG ENOUGH OR FAR ENOUGH--IT HAS PROVEN TO BE A VERY GOOD PIECE OF LEGISLATION, AND THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCUSSION THAT I'VE HEARD FROM ANY SINGLE PERSON SUGGESTING THAT WE ABROGATE THAT. I'D LIKE TO SEE IT MADE STRONGER FRANKLY. I MIGHT REMIND YOU THAT WE STILL HAVE, I BELIEVE, 28 TREATIES WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND WE HAVE NO INTENTIONS OF ABROGATING THOSE TREATIES AS PRESIDENT CARTER SO UNWISELY ABROGATED THE ONE MAIN TREATY.
- Q. SIR, CAN YOU TELL US YOUR SCHEDULE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS? ARE YOU GOING TO MEET OUR PRESIDENT AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS?
- A. YES, I'LL MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS. I DON'T HAVE THE LIST RIGHT WITH

ME OR IN MY HEAD, BUT THEY'LL BE THERE.

- Q. MR. SENATOR, DO YOU THINK IT'S A CLEVER OR WISE MEASURE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EXPRESS HIS (INAUDIBLE) TO WELCOME THE NINE POINTS--PROPOSALS--OF MARSHALL YE JIANYING OF COMMUNIST CHINA OF THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE?
- A. I'M NOT A VERY GOOD ONE TO ASK THAT--OR ANY QUESTION LIKE THAT--OF BECAUSE I DON'T HAVE--I HAVE NO RESPECT FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND LESS RESPECT FOR THEIR WORD. I'VE SAID THIS TIME AND AGAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. I DON'T THINK ANY OF US WILL BE ALIVE, INCLUDING ALL OF YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN, WHEN MAINLAND CHINA OR RED CHINA BECOMES A VIABLE, STRONG ADDITION TO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS. I DON'T BELIEVE THEY CAN EVER MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON THE MAINLAND UNTIL THEY COMPLETELY DO AWAY WITH COMMUNISM AND TAKE UP THE FREEDOM THAT YOU PEOPLE HAVE HERE.
- Q. SIR, SINCE THE PRESIDENT TOOK OFFICE, HAVE YOU FELT THAT THE VOICE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS SUPPORTING THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS BECOME WEAKER?
- A. NO, I DON'T THINK IT'S BECOME WEAKER; I'M CONSTANTLY CRITICAL OF MY COLLEAGUES IN THE CONGRESS WHO WILL VISIT PEKING AND NOT VISIT TAIPEI. UNFORTUNATELY FOR MY COUNTRY THE EYES OF FOREIGN POLICY ARE STILL TURNED MORE ON EUROPE THAN THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND FRANKLY I THINK EUROPE IS ALMOST A DECADENT HAS-BEEN PART OF THE WORLD, AND WE SHOULD BE PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO THE PACIFIC--THE HEART OF OUR FUTURE AND YOUR FUTURE. I THINK IT UNDERSTANDABLE IF YOU PEOPLE GET THE FEELING THAT MAYBE THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE CONGRESS WHO DON'T LOOK AT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH ALL THE KINDNESS THAT THEY SHOULD, BUT I'VE HEARD--OH, SENATOR KENNEDY GETS

BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01
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~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 TAIPEI 02951
-- OFF ONCE IN AWHILE, BUT WE DON'T PAY MUCH ATTENTION
-- TO HIM.

2. FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THE QUESTION AND ANSWERS,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
INVITED THE PRESS TO ATTEND WEDNESDAY'S LUNCHEON AT WHICH
SENATOR GOLDWATER WILL SPEAK. BROOKS
BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01
EOB254

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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, CH, TW, US, OVIP (BAKER, HOWARD)
SUBJECT: FOLLOWUP TO GOLDWATER NEWS CONFERENCE
REF: TAIPEI 2951

1. SUMMARY. THE LOCAL MEDIA VARIOUSLY REPORT THAT TAIWAN AUTHORITIES EITHER HAVE DENIED OR REFUSED TO CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CHIANG CHING-KUO. AN UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER OF THE GOLDWATER PARTY ALSO IS SAID TO HAVE DENIED A MESSAGE'S EXISTENCE. END SUMMARY.
2. ACCORDING TO A UPI STORY DATED TAIPEI, AND CARRIED IN THE LOCAL PRESS MAY 31, RANKING OFFICIALS IN TAIPEI, WHO ASKED THAT THEIR NAMES NOT BE USED, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE GOLDWATER ARRIVAL NEWS CONFERENCE, DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND CHIANG CHING-KUO. THE UPI STORY GOES ON TO SAY THAT A MEMBER OF GOLDWATER'S PARTY SAID THAT THE SENATOR WAS TALKING ABOUT HIS OWN MESSAGE TO PEOPLE IN TAIWAN, AND WAS NOT REFERRING TO A MESSAGE FROM REAGAN TO CHIANG.
3. THE STORY QUOTES "DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS" IN TAIPEI AS SAYING THAT THE OFFICIALS COULD HAVE BEEN TRYING TO COVER UP THE EXISTENCE OF A "LETTER" FOR FEAR SUCH CORRESPONDENCE WOULD INVITE VIOLENT REACTION FROM BEIJING.
4. THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "CHINA POST" AND SEVERAL CHINESE-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS HERE HAVE USED THE UPI STORY IN WHICH THE UNIDENTIFIED OFFICIALS ARE QUOTED AS DENYING (FOUREN) THE EXISTENCE OF THE REAGAN-CHIANG COMMUNICATION. THE CHINESE-LANGUAGE "CHINA TIMES," HOWEVER, USES ITS OWN STORY IN WHICH IT SAYS A MESSAGE CLEARLY WAS SENT BUT QUOTES OFFICIALS AS BEING UNWILLING TO CONFIRM (BU YUAN ZHENGSHI) THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMMUNICATION. THE "CHINA TIMES" STORY DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THE PURPORTED MESSAGE IS WRITTEN OR ORAL OR WHETHER IT MAY HAVE BEEN PASSED VIA A JAMES LILLEY TO VICE FOREIGN MINISTER FRED CHIEN CHANNEL OR VIA A JOHN HOLDRIDGE TO TSAI WEI-PING CHANNEL. BROOKS
BT

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dh NARA, Date 7/31/00

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III

BY AS, NARA, DATE 11/29/05
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 24, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *Dg*

SUBJECT: State's May 24 Package on Taiwan Arms Sales

I have read and reflected upon State's May 24 package. The thing that jumps out at me is that there is no consideration spelled out in the paper of how the new points in Hummel's oral presentation and paragraphs 4 through 8 of the new joint communique would play in Taipei.

I specifically raised this issue with Jim Lilley, who happens to be here in town. He stated that Taiwan in essence has no place to turn but to the United States and that if we feel we must do it, Taiwan could be made to live with this formulation. His view, however, was that the psychological effect on Taiwan would be grave, that morale would be depressed and that the unity which the KMT leadership has imposed on the country would be dangerously weakened.

Lilley also acknowledged the need to avoid a downgrading of US-PRC relations and generally regretted the negotiating pattern, going back to the first days of the Reagan Administration, which had placed us in our current difficult position.

My own feeling is that we are just about at the point where we need to make a tough choice and our options are:

- To seek to settle the Taiwan arms issue on a basis which the PRC will accept (this will go over very badly in Taiwan and cause the President considerable problems from the Right here in the US).
- To refuse to make any further concessions to the PRC and be prepared to face a downgrading of US-PRC relations when our next Congressional notification goes forward (this would cause considerable dismay in the other countries of Asia, and would be labeled as a diplomatic setback by the US press).

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

That you send this paper back to State asking them for an assessment of the impact of their recommended course of action on Taiwan and for an assessment of the cost of diplomatic downgrading if we refuse to make further concessions. A memorandum outlining these questions is attached hereto (Tab I). I recommend that you sign it.

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Review on May 24 2002

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Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature to Haig
Tab II Memorandum from Haig to the President dated 5/24/82

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales

I believe that your May 24th paper contains a package which might satisfy the People's Republic of China, at least for now. What I find lacking in the paper is any assessment of how these concessions would be received in Taiwan.

I believe we are close to the point where we have to make a difficult choice, either choosing to press ahead with a solution palatable to the People's Republic of China or standing firm, making no further concessions and probably dealing with a downgrading of US-PRC relations when our next tranche of arms sales go forward. I would appreciate on a priority basis a paper from State assessing the pluses and minuses of these two options so that the President can deal more clearly with this problem as a whole.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

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Derivative C1 By State

Review on May 24, 2002

Extended by State Memo dated 5/24/82

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BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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NLS M03-1442 #10
By CS, NARA, Date 11/29/05THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONSENSITIVE

May 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

From: Alexander M. Haig Jr. (C)

Subject: Taiwan Arms Sales: Next Steps
Following Vice President's Visit

China's de facto ruler, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, has asked for something the US Government cannot give: a private assurance that the United States will gradually reduce and eventually cease arms sales to Taiwan "within a certain period of time."

[REDACTED] We cannot comply, not only because it would violate the TRA--unless caveated so heavily the Chinese would surely reject it--but because we cannot deal with an issue of this nature [REDACTED]

1.4d

Despite the Vice President's superb and successful effort to improve the atmosphere, the crisis in US-China relations therefore remains. In their treatment of the Vice President, and statements to him, particularly those by Deng, the Chinese have shown a strong desire to improve relations; but they continue to press us to accept, in principle, that arms sales must one day end, and they seem determined to push for this bottom line, even at the possible risk of a downgrading.

We will be under increasing pressure in the months ahead to proceed with a number of planned arms sales to Taiwan. Some, such as the extension of F-5E co-production, will require Congressional notification and attendant publicity. In the absence of a modus vivendi with China, the first sale to become known runs the risk of precipitating the downgrading we both seek to avoid. Deng has expressed a desire to settle the issue quickly, perhaps because his position is somewhat stronger now than a few months ago, but probably because he also knows we must soon sell to Taiwan. He, too, wants a modus vivendi first, so he will not feel compelled to trigger a downgrading when we do.

Given mutual recognition that time is short, if we move quickly and decisively to respond to Deng, we may be able to obtain an acceptable outcome. The key will lie in keeping him personally engaged--as he was in the final stage of the normalization negotiations--and in persuading him to accept something less than the definitive assurance he seeks. I recommend a two-track approach:

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--That you authorize Ambassador Hummel to tell Deng directly, on your behalf, that you cannot provide [REDACTED] assurance on ending arms sales, but the policy lines already established by both governments signalled in our communique drafts provide the elements of a settlement and indicate clearly the direction which we intend to take. You need to reiterate your firm intention to place a quantitative and qualitative ceiling on sales and gradually to reduce sales. This amounts only to affirming your intent to implement policies we have already offered to embody in a public document. Your statements would be premised on, but not directly linked to, a continued Chinese peaceful approach. A draft oral message from you to Deng to be presented by Hummel is attached. 1.4d

--That you also authorize Hummel to continue informal talks with Foreign Ministry counterparts in search of a mutually acceptable communique. Should you and Deng reach a meeting of the minds in that particular channel, I believe, based on formulations the Chinese gave us May 8, we can quickly gain an acceptable communique. The attached draft communique draws on the Chinese proposals and suggestions Hummel has sent us. They do not go beyond the substance of formulations you have approved in the February 15 version (attached) and in the formulation given to the Chinese prior to the Vice President's visit.

The first three paragraphs of the new draft communique are identical to the first three paragraphs of the February 15 version. Our new fourth paragraph strengthens the Chinese statement of peaceful intentions. The fifth paragraph, by stating our understanding and appreciation of China's policy of peaceful resolution, provides, with the addition of "correspondingly" and "therefore" in the following sixth paragraph, the necessary linkage for the statements which you have already approved to limit and reduce gradually our arms sales to Taiwan. The seventh and eighth paragraphs are variations on our February 15 language and would cause us no problems whatsoever.

If we move quickly, before the good atmosphere created by the Vice President's visit is dissipated, this two-track approach could bring success. If not, we will have to do some hard thinking and may have to consider a tough, final message from you or me to Foreign Minister Huang, in New York during the UN Special Session on Disarmament in June.

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Recommendation

That you approve early presentations to Deng and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as outlined. If so, we will prepare instructions to Beijing for White House clearance.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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NEW DRAFT COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH TAIWAN ARMS
SALES ISSUE, BASED ON DRAFT TABLED BY THE US
ON FEBRUARY 15, 1982 AND FORMULATIONS SUGGESTED
BY THE CHINESE ON MAY 8, 1982

1. In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. The two sides agreed, within that context, that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized, and a rapid expansion of mutually beneficial strategic and bilateral relations occurred.

2. The question of US arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side reserved the right to raise the issue again, at a later time, following normalization. Recognizing that this issue could seriously hamper the development of US-China relations, the two sides have held further discussions, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding Sino-American relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern their relations and agree that they bear directly on the question of how to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution of US-China differences over the question of the United States' supply of arms to Taiwan.

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BY CS NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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4. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. It states that the message to compatriots issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The nine-point proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort to seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and a national policy that will not change. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of the question of US arms sales to Taiwan.

5. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. The US government attaches great importance to its relations with China. It reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty or territorial integrity or pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan." The US government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue indicated in the nine-point proposal of September 30, 1981.

6. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. Correspondingly, the US government therefore states that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China. Similarly, the US government states that the United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and expects a gradual reduction in its arms sales, over a period of time, leading ultimately to a final settlement of this difficult issue.

7. [NEW PARAGRAPH] Both governments recognize that the question of US arms sales to Taiwan is an issue rooted in history which should be finally settled, amicably, over a period of time, on the basis of the foregoing statements. Both governments pledge to make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to such a settlement.

8. [NEW PARAGRAPH]. The two governments agree that the continued development of US-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples, but is conducive to peace and stability in the world. Within the East Asia

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region, both sides believe that harmonious, cooperative and friendly relations between the two nations will contribute to an atmosphere in which further progress toward a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue can be registered by the Chinese people themselves. The two sides are determined to make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Chinese and American peoples and between the governments of the two countries.

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U.S. DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
(February 15, 1982)

1. In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. The two sides agreed, within that context, that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized, and a rapid expansion of mutually beneficial strategic and bilateral relations occurred.

2. The question of US arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side reserved the right to raise the issue again, at a later time, following normalization. Recognizing that this issue could seriously hamper the development of US-China relations, the two sides have held further discussions, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding Sino-American relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern their relations and agree that they bear directly on the question of how to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution of US-China differences over the question of the United States' supply of arms to Taiwan.

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BY CL NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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4. The US Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty or territorial integrity or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The question of Taiwan is thus wholly an internal affair of the Chinese people. The United States' abiding concern is that the question of Taiwan be settled peacefully, by the Chinese people themselves.

5. On September 30, 1981, China put forward a Nine-Point proposal which is a major effort to seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. In discussing this peaceful proposal with the United States Government, the Chinese Government has declared that this peaceful approach has become its steadfast policy.

6. Under the foregoing circumstances, the United States Government states that, with regard to its arms sales to Taiwan, there should be no need to exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the levels supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.

7. On the contrary, the United States Government, also under the foregoing circumstances and with the expectation that there should be continued progress toward peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, anticipates that its sales of arms to Taiwan would gradually diminish, as military tensions in the Taiwan Strait area continue to abate, leading ultimately to a final settlement of this difficult issue.

8. Both sides recognize that the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan is an issue rooted in history, and both sides recognize that, in view of the importance of U.S.- China relations, it is an issue which should be resolved amicably. In this context, the Chinese Government states that more time should be allowed for the achievement of a thorough settlement of this issue. The Chinese Government expects the United States Government to

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make every effort to adopt measures to implement the above stated expectations, and pledges a strong corresponding effort to preserve the conditions under which this historical issue can be peacefully resolved.

9. The development of US-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples, but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are ready to make joint efforts for the continued development of the relations between the two countries.

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IV

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 26, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *dg*

SUBJECT: Estimated Taiwan Reaction to US-China Communique

State's memorandum is useful in that it reflects Jim Lilley's assessment of what it would take to sell in Taiwan a joint communique on Taiwan arms sales acceptable to the PRC.

What we now need to work out is a scenario which would embody the following elements:

- Getting the President's approval to new language for the communique as suggested in State's May 24 package.
- Deciding whether to check out this language in Taiwan before going to the PRC or going to the PRC first and then notifying Taiwan.
- The modalities of our notification to Taiwan are extremely important. They must be closely held and delivered at a high enough level to ensure a definitive reaction. Probably only President Chiang will do, but we must avoid giving Taiwan any veto power over our policy decisions.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

_____ That we task State to come up with a scenario embodying their suggested language for the joint communique with the PRC, and specific suggestions as to when and by whom our consultations with Taiwan would be conducted. My strong feeling is that only if we put these two parts of our effort together would we have a chance of moving forward in a concerted and sure-footed fashion.

COMMENT: Given the sensitivity of all this, you may wish to task State orally as you did in the previous instance.

Attachment

Tab I State Memorandum dated 5/26/82

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BY CLS NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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Review on May 26, 2002

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

May 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

02 MAY 26 P 2: 23

SUBJECT: Reaction in Taiwan in the Event of a
US-China Communique on Taiwan Arms Sales

Should the US and China agree on a communique, Taiwan's leadership will inevitably experience strong initial disappointment and--unless the ground is carefully prepared--will express considerable consternation and dismay.

It will thus be critical to give the Taiwan leadership, at the highest level, advance notice (days, not hours) of the document to which the US has agreed and to accompany that notice with strong and specific assurances of continued US support.

The elements of the assurances which President Chiang will need embody the following:

--A clear explanation that the US has made clear to the Chinese side that it will continue to uphold and carry out the TRA and that it considers the new US-PRC communique to be consistent with the TRA.

--A schedule, with precise dates, for USG action on all defense items which have been approved since the President's decision of August 25, 1981.

--The signing of a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) for at least one of the scheduled items within the first month after the joint communique is released.

--A public reiteration by the US government of its longstanding, abiding interest that any resolution of the Taiwan issue be peaceful, by the Chinese people themselves.

--A corresponding reiteration to the leadership on Taiwan that while the US will welcome any resolution of the Taiwan question that is peaceful, and voluntary on both sides, it will never press the Taiwan side to negotiate.

To the extent possible, it will be necessary that President Chiang be able to make the fact, and substance, of these assurances public, without revealing their precise content.

This memorandum incorporates the views of AIT Taipei Director Jim Lilley, who has just returned to Washington on consultation.

L. Paul Bremer, III

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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RDS-3 5/25/02

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NLS 1703-1442 #15

BY CU NARA, D TB 1/21/85

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EXDISN
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E. O. 12065: RDS-3 6/21/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W. JR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PDEV, PINT, TW, CH, JL
SUBJECT: (S) PREMIER SUN'S SPEECH ON REUNIFICATION --
~ SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. AND CHINA
REF: AIT TAIPEI 03375

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I VERY MUCH AGREE WITH AIT'S ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN REFTTEL. EACH TIME TAIPEI OR BEIJING MAKES A STATEMENT ON PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION THE OTHER ACCUSES IT OF PURELY TACTICAL MOTIVATIONS DIRECTED AT INFLUENCING FOREIGN, AND ESPECIALLY AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. BUT EACH TIME THE SUBJECT IS THOROUGHLY ADDRESSED, AS IT WAS IN SUN'S SPEECH, THE RESULT IS A PERCEPTIBLE, IF MINOR, NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO CHINESE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE. THIS PROCESS OF GLACIAL SHIFT IN ATTITUDES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT IS SLOWLY IMPROVING THE CLIMATE FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND IS ALSO REDUCING TENSIONS IN WAYS THAT SERVE U.S. INTERESTS.

3. I AGREE IN GENERAL THAT OUR POSTURE SHOULD BE ALONG THE GENERAL LINES INDICATED IN PARA 11: "TO ACKNOWLEDGE TO BOTH THE PRC AND TAIWAN THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE MOMENTUM ALREADY STARTED IN CONTACTS AND INDIRECT TRADE, LEAVING THE METHODS AND TIMING OF FURTHER STEPS TO THEM..." HOWEVER, IT SEEMS FROM HERE THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR ADVANCING BEYOND SIMPLE "ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE POSITIVE EFFECTS," BUT FALLING SHORT OF PRESSING EITHER SIDE, OR PLAYING A MEDIATORY OR EXHORTATIVE ROLE, NONE OF WHICH WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THUS I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD QUIETLY TELL TAIWAN, AS WE HAVE IN EFFECT TOLD THE PRC, THAT WE WELCOME SUCH MOVES AND THAT WE WOULD WELCOME OTHERS IN THE SAME DIRECTION. HUMMEL
BT

*PRC
State Put with
Rogant*

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NLS 003-1442 *16

BY CIS NARA, DATE 11/29/05

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