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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Gregg, Donald P. : Files

Collection: LAUX, DAVID. Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Taiwan Arms Sales Vol. II 1982 (4 of 7) (6 of 13)

Date: 8/1/00

Box 90385 RAC Box 10

Jespersen F99-056/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Donald Gregg to Admiral Murphy, Nancy Bearg Dyke, re: Taiwan Arms Sales, 1 p. R 4/20/01 F99-056/1 #138	7/9/82	P1/F1
2. Memo	Gregg to William Clark, re: Taiwan Arms Sales, 1 p. PART. 11/30/05 M03-1445 #1	7/8/82	P1/F1
3. Memo	Same as item #1, with notations, 1 p. R 4/20/01 F99-056/1 #140	7/9/82	P1/F1
4. Memo	Same as Item #2, 1 p. PART. 11/30/05 M03-1445 #1 (COPY)	7/8/82	P1/F1
5. Memo	Robert McFarlane to Walter Stoessel, re: Negotiations with the FRC on Taiwan Arms Sales 2p R " " #2	7/9/82	P1/F1
6. Letter	Reagan to Vice Chairman Deng, 1 p. R " " #3	7/9/82	P1/F1
7. Cable	#090426Z Jul 82, 1 p. R " " #4	7/9/82	P1/F1
8. Cable	#090530Z Jul 82, 1 p. R " " #5	7/9/82	P1/F1
9. Cable	#100005Z Jul 82, 1 p. R " " #6	7/10/82	P1/F1
10. Cable	#102340Z Jul 82, 4 p. D " " #7 D 5/24/06 F99-056/1 #147	7/10/82	P1/F1
11. Cable	#102352Z Jul 82, 7 p. PART. " " #8	7/10/82	P1/F1
12. Cable	No cable #, re: Taiwan Arms Sales (same text as #10), 5 p. D. " " #7 (COPY) D 5/24/06 F99-056/1 #149	7/10/82	P1/F1
13. Cable	#111517Z Jul 82, 1 p. R " " #9	7/11/82	P1/F1
14. Cable	#112049Z Jul 82, 1 p. R " " #10	7/11/82	P1/F1
15. Cable	#120231Z Jul 82, 1 p. R " " #11	7/12/82	P1/F1
16. Cable	#120352Z Jul 82, 1 p. R " " #12	7/12/82	P1/F1
17. Cable	#120817Z Jul 82, 3 p. PART. " " #13	7/12/82	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~SECRET~~

TAS


MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 9, 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL MURPHY
NANCY BEARG DYKE

FROM: DONALD GREGG 
SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales

I have been in close touch with Dave Gries, the able National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from CIA. We have discussed the China package at great length, seeking to find language which may be appealing to the Chinese but which also stays within our own limitations.

Yesterday, Dave came up with the formulation spelled out in the attached memorandum. I sent it to Judge Clark, it was accepted, and is now part of our final package. I feel we have done about as well as we can do and am very grateful to Dave for making this suggestion, which I think improves our package considerably.

Attachment

Tab I Gregg Memo to Judge Clark dated 7/8/82 (#4824)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-056/1 #138

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/20/01

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Review on July 9, 2002

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~~SECRET~~

4824

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 8, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DON GREGG *dg*
SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales

The Chinese are more likely to accept the draft communique the President has authorized Ambassador Hummel to table in Beijing if the communique acknowledges (but does not give U.S. support to) Chinese principles on the Taiwan arms sales issue. The verb acknowledges was used in the Shanghai Communique to bridge an impasse over Chinese insistence that the United States affirm Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communique it was stated that "the U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China." This was reformulated in the Normalization Communique as the U.S. "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." (Underlining added).

I propose a similar use of acknowledges to show the Chinese that we are aware of their principle on arms sales [REDACTED]

Accordingly, I propose the addition of one sentence at the end of paragraph 8 in the draft communique as follows:

"Similarly, the United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan. It expects a gradual reduction of its arms sales, over a period of time, leading ultimately to a final resolution. In so stating, the U.S. Government acknowledges the Chinese principle regarding elimination of this issue over a period of time."

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E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS M03-1445#1

~~SECRET~~

Review on 7/8/88

By *LM*, NARA, Date *11/30/05*

~~SECRET~~

TKS

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Don Gregg-

F41

Gaston Nancy
~~EG~~ F41

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 9, 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL MURPHY
NANCY BEARG DYKE
FROM: DONALD GREGG *dg*
SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales

Don
strongly concur
GB
7-11

I have been in close touch with Dave Gries, the able National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from CIA. We have discussed the China package at great length, seeking to find language which may be appealing to the Chinese but which also stays within our own limitations.

Yesterday, Dave came up with the formulation spelled out in the attached memorandum. I sent it to Judge Clark, it was accepted, and is now part of our final package. I feel we have done about as well as we can do and am very grateful to Dave for making this suggestion, which I think improves our package considerably.

Attachment

Tab I Gregg Memo to Judge Clark dated 7/8/82 (#4824)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-056/1 #140

BY CLS, NARA, DATE 4/20/01

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Review on July 9, 2002

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~~SECRET~~

4824

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 8, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

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SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales

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E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS M03-1445#1 (copy)

~~SECRET~~

Review on 7/8/88

By *LM*, NARA, Date *11/30/05*

~~SECRET~~

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~~SENSITIVE~~

SYSTEM II

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WASHINGTON

July 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR.

The Acting Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Negotiations with the PRC on Taiwan Arms Sales

The President has read the June 29 memorandum from the Secretary of State.

He has approved the proposed program of reassurances and sales to Taiwan.

He does not approve the option which involves affirming the "ultimate objective" of ending arms sales to Taiwan.

He approves the sending of an oral message to Deng, as amended below:

- The fourth paragraph on the first page is limited to its first sentence.
- The second paragraph on page 2 is modified to read:
"I am convinced that the elements to resolving the Taiwan arms question lie in the United States policy direction clearly signalled in draft proposals we have given your government and in the historic proposals your government has made to your countrymen on Taiwan over the past few years."
- The third paragraph on page two is eliminated.
- The last paragraph on page 2 and the first paragraph on page 3 are combined to read as follows:
"We have made clear to your government, through our proposals, that the United States will not seek to pursue a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, nor to sell arms to Taiwan indefinitely. Moreover should you have any doubt regarding our future intentions, I can assure you that we have no intention to exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the levels supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries; and I can tell you with equal certainty that the United States fully expects gradually to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Review on July 9, 2002

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

1003-1445#2

BY

WJS

NARA, DATE 11/30/05

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

2

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-- The second (optional) paragraph on page 3 is eliminated.

In addition:

- Ambassador Hummel should make clear to the PRC that if our final offer is rejected we will not be bound to abide by what we have offered during our negotiations. He should also informally state that, in the face of a PRC rejection of our good-faith offer, pressures for increased arms sales to Taiwan would be certain to arise.
- As a final point, Ambassador Hummel should state that if our offer is accepted, we would be pleased to exchange reciprocal visits with the People's Republic. We would suggest that Secretary Shultz visit the PRC within the next three months, and that we would hope to have Premier Zhao Ziyang visit the United States in the near future.

Paragraph 8 of the draft communique is to be modified by the addition of the following sentence at the end of the paragraph: "In so stating, the United States Government acknowledges the Chinese principle regarding elimination of this issue over a period of time."

The President has also decided to send the attached letter to Vice Chairman Deng.

It is requested that Ambassador Hummel take action with regard to these messages as soon as possible.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Letter to Deng

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 9, 1982

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

I regret that my travel to Europe, and the crisis in the Middle East have delayed my response to your message, which Vice President Bush conveyed to me upon his return from Beijing. The Vice President is most appreciative of the traditional Chinese hospitality which he enjoyed during his stay in your country, and I add my thanks to his. We both believe that the Vice President's visit was most useful in terms of the frank discussions that were held, and the deepened respect and understanding that resulted from those talks.

The issues confronting us have been much on my mind over the past weeks. The question of arms sales to Taiwan is, as you pointed out, difficult because it is an historic one. The question is also complex because we, and our countries, believe in principles, holding them in high esteem. The United States Government, and I personally, understand and respect the principles of the People's Republic of China with regard to the question of arms sales to Taiwan. In the same spirit, I hope that you can understand and respect the principles to which I believe I must adhere.

Ambassador Hummel will be discussing our position in greater detail. I hope very much that his talks with you will be successful, for I believe deeply that strengthened relations between our two countries will benefit our two great peoples, and will do much to further the causes of peace and progress in the world.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Vice Chairman of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the
People's Republic of China
Beijing

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MD3-1445 #3

BY ASJ, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 9407 DTG: 090426Z JUL 82 PSN: 053255
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TO AMEMBASSY GABORONE NIACT IMMEDIATE 8501

~~SECRET~~ STATE 189407

NODIS
FOR SENATOR HAYAKAWA
FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION HARARE DTD JUL 9.
QUOTE: ~~SECRET~~ STATE 189407
NODIS
FROM JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE TO SENATOR HAYAKAWA EYES ONLY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07/08/02 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H.)
TAGS: CH, TW, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE CHINESE ON ARMS SALES TO
TAIWAN

THE DEPT IS SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR HUMMEL IN
BEIJING TO CONVEY OUR POSITION ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN TO
THE CHINESE. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT THE POSITION WHICH
WILL BE EXPRESSED TO THE CHINESE WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH
THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND WILL NOT INDICATE AN END TO
US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. HUMMEL'S MESSAGE TO THE CHINESE
WILL BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR POSITION AS OUTLINED IN THE
THREE LETTERS THE PRESIDENT SENT TO THE CHINESE AND THEN
STRESSED TO THEM THROUGH THE VICE PRESIDENT DURING HIS
VISIT TO CHINA IN MAY. STOESSSEL UNQUOTE STOESSSEL
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M03-1445 #4

BY hds, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 9458 DTG: 090530Z JUL 82 PSN: 053256
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DE RUEHC #9458 1900533
O 090530Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL CASABLANCA NIACT IMMEDIATE 9324

~~SECRET~~ STATE 189458

NODIS
FROM JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE TO CONGRESSMAN WM. DICKINSON EYES ONLY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07/08/02 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H.)
TAGS: CH, TW, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE CHINESE ON ARMS SALES TO
TAIWAN

FOLLOWING MESSAGE SHOULD BE PASSED TO CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM L. DICKINSON WHO IS CURRENTLY STAYING AT THE HOTEL RIAD SALAM (TEL. 367922) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGIN TEXT: THE DEPT IS SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR HUMMEL IN BEIJING TO CONVEY OUR POSITION ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN TO THE CHINESE. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT THE POSITION WHICH WILL BE EXPRESSED TO THE CHINESE WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND WILL NOT INDICATE AN END TO US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. HUMMEL'S MESSAGE TO THE CHINESE WILL BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR POSITION AS OUTLINED IN THE THREE LETTERS THE PRESIDENT SENT TO THE CHINESE AND THEN STRESSED TO THEM THROUGH THE VICE PRESIDENT DURING HIS VISIT TO CHINA IN MAY. END TEXT. STOESEL
BT

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NLS MD3-1455 #5

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 BEIJING 9053 DTG: 100005Z JUL 82 PSN: 056132
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O 000005Z JUL 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4762

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 09053

NODIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 7/11/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W., JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: REQUEST AMENDMENT IN INSTRUCTIONS FOR
AMBASSADOR'S TALK WITH DENG XIAOPING
REF: STATE 191699

1. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO ADD ONE SENTENCE TO THE ORAL
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO DENG XIAOPING. ADDITION
WOULD COME AT END OF PENULTIMATE TICK MARK IN PARA 11
REFTEL, AFTER STATEMENT PROPOSING THAT U.S. SECRETARY
OF STATE VISIT CHINA AND THAT WE HOPE PREMIER ZHAO
ZIYANG WOULD ACCEPT OUR INVITATION TO VISIT THE U.S. IN
THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. ADDITION WOULD BE QUOTE I APPRECIATE YOUR STATEMENT
TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH THAT YOU WOULD WELCOME A MEETING
WITH ME; I WOULD ALSO WELCOME SUCH A MEETING AND HOPE
THAT IT CAN BE ARRANGED UNQUOTE.

3. IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO ADD SUCH A STATEMENT,
BECAUSE DENG MADE A POINT OF WELCOMING A MEETING WITH
THE PRESIDENT, SO OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE COULD BE
TAKEN AS INATTENTION OR EVEN A REBUFF TO DENG. HUMMEL
BT

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NLS M03-1455#16

BY LDJ, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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PAGE 01 OF 07 SECSTATE WASHDC 1699 DTG: 102342Z JUL 82 PSN: 056130
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TKS

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1699 1920005
O 102342Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 191699

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR HUMMEL FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/29/02
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALE ISSUE: FINAL STEPS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE ISSUES, AND CAREFUL CONSULTATION WITH HIS CLOSEST FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED OUR COURSE WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN ARMS SALES AND HIS RESPONSE TO THE MESSAGE CONVEYED TO HIM BY DENG XIAOPING DURING VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S MAY VISIT TO CHINA. YOU WILL NOTE THAT IN HIS ORAL MESSAGE TO DENG, THE PRESIDENT STATES THAT HE HAS ANSWERED "WITHIN THE MAXIMUM LIMITS OF FLEXIBILITY AVAILABLE" TO HIM.

3. BEGIN FYI: THE PRESIDENT ALSO HAS DECIDED THAT WE WILL PROCEED WITH A SERIES OF SALES TO TAIWAN THIS SUMMER. THIS WILL INCLUDE A NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS FOR THE SALE (THROUGH CO-PRODUCTION OF 60 F-5ES TO TAIWAN, WHICH COULD GO FORWARD AS EARLY AS JULY 29 UNLESS THE INFORMAL NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE TO CONGRESS WERE WAIVED. WE ARE CURRENTLY PLANNING TO SEEK A WAIVER). AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME WE WILL PROCEED WITH OUR PLAN TO SELL USED F-104G AIRCRAFT WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.

[REDACTED] AND INITIATION OF A SEVEN MILLION DOLLAR GARRETT CORPORATION-TAIWAN JOINT STUDY WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE A NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS BUT COULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO A 200 MILLION DOLLAR AGREEMENT TO CO-PRODUCE, ON TAIWAN, JET ENGINES SUITABLE FOR LIGHT COMBAT AIRCRAFT.

4. THESE PLANNED SALES ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE DRAFT US-CHINA COMMUNIQUE NOW ON THE TABLE, INCLUDING ITS PROVISION FOR GRADUAL FUTURE REDUCTIONS. THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT THESE SALES TO TAIWAN WILL GO FORWARD ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE SCHEDULE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A COMMUNIQUE. A MAJOR CONSIDERATION IS THAT A DELAY IN CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF THE F-5E PACKAGE WOULD RISK A COSTLY AND UNACCEPTABLE BREAK IN TAIWAN'S F-5E CO-PRODUCTION LINE NEXT SUMMER. END FYI

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS M03-1445#8

By LOT, NARA, Date 11/30/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 07 SECSTATE WASHDC 1699

DTG: 102342Z JUL 82 PSN: 056130

5. IT IS THUS ESSENTIAL, THAT WE EXERT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME OF OUR COMMUNIQUE DISCUSSIONS WITH BEIJING, BASED ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS. WE BELIEVE OUR BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS LIES IN DEALING DIRECTLY WITH DENG, SINCE ONLY DENG IS LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE COMMAND DECISIONS NECESSARY TO MOVE THE CHINESE OFF THOSE POSITIONS WHICH WE CANNOT MEET AND ON WHICH BEIJING HAS SO FAR SHOWN LITTLE FLEXIBILITY. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH DENG TO DELIVER A WRITTEN AND AN ORAL MESSAGE (PARAS 10 AND 11 BELOW) CONVEYING THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPLY TO DENG AND TO PRESENT, TO DENG, A NEW PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE; PARA 12 BELOW.

6. IN CONVEYING THESE MESSAGES AND OUR NEW DRAFT, YOU SHOULD REVIEW WITH DENG THE IMPORTANT STEPS THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN TO MAKE CLEAR THE HIGH VALUE WHICH HE AND HIS ADMINISTRATION PLACE ON STRONG US-CHINA RELATIONS. YOU SHOULD STRESS THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG HOPE THAT THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED SOON; YOU SHOULD ALSO STRESS OUR BELIEF THAT THE SUM TOTAL OF US ACTIONS IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE OVER THE PAST YEAR MAKES CLEAR THAT THE WAY IS OPEN TO A FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE, THROUGH THE CONTINUATION OF PRESENT TRENDS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE US POLICIES PERSONALLY AFFIRMED BY OUR PRESIDENT AND EMBODIED IN OUR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

7. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT, IN CONSULTATION WITH HIS CLOSEST ADVISORS AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, GAVE THE MOST SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THIS CRUCIAL

QUESTION; AND IN HIS RESPONSE TO DENG HE HAS SOUGHT TO BE AS EXPLICIT AS HE CAN, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF HIS FLEXIBILITY IN ADDRESSING A VERY DIFFICULT, HISTORICAL ISSUE. THIS IS, AS ALL SUCH DOCUMENTS MUST INEVITABLY BE, A COMPROMISE APPROACH--ONE WHICH GOES AS FAR AS WE CAN GO AT THIS TIME.

8. FINALLY, YOU SHOULD CITE THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG DESIRE TO RESUME A PATTERN OF HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES SOON AS EVIDENCE THAT OUR LEADERSHIP IS FULLY PREPARED TO JOIN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN A MAJOR EFFORT TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN BILATERAL AND STRATEGIC TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH A COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH WE WILL PUBLICLY PLACE LIMITS ON OUR FUTURE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN AND WILL MAKE CLEAR OUR INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT PROGRESSIVE REDUCTIONS, LOOKING TO A FINAL RESOLUTION, DEMONSTRATES HOW SERIOUS WE ARE IN SEEKING TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM. IT ALSO REFLECTS THE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE WE ATTACH TO THE PEACEFUL APPROACH BEIJING HAS TAKEN TO THE TAIWAN ISSUE SINCE NORMALIZATION. YOU SHOULD URGE DENG TO GIVE OUR PROPOSAL PROMPT AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION, IN RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT IT PROVIDES THE BEST--AND THE ONLY FEASIBLE--BASIS FOR SETTING THIS ISSUE ASIDE AND RESUMING THE ADVANCE OF US-CHINA RELATIONS.

9. IN THE COURSE OF A PRESENTATION TO DENG ALONG THE FOREGOING LINES, AND IN ADDITION TO ANY COMMENTS YOU THINK WOULD ACCENTUATE THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF OUR PROPOSAL, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO DENG OR HIS SUBORDINATES THAT IF OUR FINAL OFFER IS REJECTED WE WILL NOT BE BOUND TO ABIDE BY WHAT WE HAVE OFFERED DURING OUR NEGOTIATIONS. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORMALLY STATE THAT, IN THE FACE OF A PRC REJECTION OF OUR GOOD-FAITH OFFER,

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PRESSURES FOR INCREASED ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WOULD BE CERTAIN TO ARISE.

10. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO DENG, WHICH YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO HIM AT THE OUTSET OF YOUR MEETING. A SIGNED COPY WILL BE SENT BY POUCH.

JULY 9, 1982

DEAR MR. VICE CHAIRMAN:

I REGRET THAT MY TRAVEL TO EUROPE, AND THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE DELAYED MY RESPONSE TO YOUR MESSAGE, WHICH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH CONVEYED TO ME UPON HIS RETURN FROM BEIJING. THE VICE PRESIDENT IS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE HOSPITALITY WHICH HE ENJOYED DURING HIS STAY IN YOUR COUNTRY, AND I ADD MY THANKS TO HIS. WE BOTH BELIEVE THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WAS MOST USEFUL IN TERMS OF THE FRANK DISCUSSIONS THAT WERE HELD, AND THE DEEPENED RESPECT AND UNDERSTANDING THAT RESULTED FROM THOSE TALKS.

THE ISSUES CONFRONTING US HAVE BEEN MUCH ON MY MIND OVER THE PAST WEEKS. THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN - IS, AS YOU POINTED OUT, DIFFICULT BECAUSE IT IS AN HISTORIC ONE. THE QUESTION IS ALSO COMPLEX BECAUSE WE, AND OUR COUNTRIES, BELIEVE IN PRINCIPLES, HOLDING THEM IN HIGH ESTEEM. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND I PERSONALLY, UNDERSTAND AND RESPECT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IN THE SAME SPIRIT, I HOPE THAT YOU CAN UNDERSTAND AND RESPECT THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH I BELIEVE I MUST ADHERE.

AMBASSADOR HUMMEL WILL BE DISCUSSING OUR POSITION IN GREATER DETAIL. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT HIS TALKS WITH YOU WILL BE SUCCESSFUL, FOR I BELIEVE DEEPLY THAT STRENGTHENED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BENEFIT OUR TWO GREAT PEOPLES, AND WILL DO MUCH TO FURTHER THE CAUSES OF PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE WORLD.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

HIS EXCELLENCY
DENG XIAOPING
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
BEIJING

11. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO DENG, WHICH YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO HIM AFTER GIVING HIM THE LETTER:

--I HAVE FULLY DISCUSSED WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HIS TRIP AND MEETINGS WITH YOU AND OTHER LEADERS IN CHINA. I APPRECIATE THE POSITIVE APPROACH THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT TOOK TO HIS VISIT AND BELIEVE IT SERVED ITS VITAL

PURPOSE OF IMPROVING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN US WHILE MAKING CLEAR THE INTENTIONS OF THE U. S. WITH REGARD TO CHINA AND THE TAIWAN QUESTION.

--SENATOR BAKER'S TRIP HAS MADE A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING OUR DIALOGUE. I HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE

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DTG: 102342Z JUL 82 PSN: 056130

CONGRESS IN CONSIDERING OUR APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS OVER THE QUESTION OF U. S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

--AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL THOUGHT, I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR HUMMEL TO CONVEY MY RESPONSE TO THE MESSAGE YOU ADDRESSED TO ME THROUGH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH. THIS RESPONSE REFLECTS THE GENUINE AND STRONG DESIRE OF MY ADMINISTRATION, AS WELL AS MY OWN PERSONAL DESIRE, TO BUILD AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA AND TO ADVANCE THE IMPORTANT WORK BEGUN BY PRESIDENT NIXON, CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER ZHOU TEN YEARS AGO, WHICH HAS BEEN CARRIED FORWARD SUCCESSFULLY OVER THE PAST DECADE. I KNOW YOU DEEPLY SHARE THIS DESIRE WITH ME, AS YOU INDICATED IN YOUR TALK WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH.

--MY RESPONSE ACCORDS WITH THE ABIDING CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES, ROOTED IN HISTORY, THAT ANY RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE BE PEACEFUL, BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

--YOUR REQUEST FOR A PRIVATE ASSURANCE FROM ME THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE AND FINALLY TERMINATE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WITHIN A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME PRESENTS ME WITH AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT DILEMMA. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME OR MY GOVERNMENT TO GIVE ASSURANCES IN PRIVATE THAT WOULD EXCEED, OR SUBSTANTIALLY DEViate FROM, WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SAY IN PUBLIC. IN TURN, I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE ASSURANCES WE CANNOT ASK YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE.

--I SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF OUR TWO GREAT COUNTRIES RUN TOGETHER. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO PUT AN END TO A DIFFICULT AND REGRETTABLE PERIOD OF TENSION, SO THAT WE MAY ADVANCE THE NATURAL GROWTH OF CLOSE AND STRONG TIES BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES. THERE IS MUCH THAT WE CAN DO IN COMMON TO CONFRONT THE CHALLENGES OF THIS CENTURY AND PREPARE FOR THOSE OF THE NEXT.

--I AM CONVINCED THAT THE ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL TO

RESOLVING THE TAIWAN ARMS QUESTION LIE IN THE UNITED STATES POLICY DIRECTION CLEARLY SIGNALLED IN DRAFT PROPOSALS WE HAVE GIVEN YOUR GOVERNMENT AND IN THE HISTORIC PROPOSALS YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS MADE TO YOUR COUNTRYMEN ON TAIWAN OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS.

--WE SEE NO ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE PROCESS OF SETTLING THE TAIWAN ISSUE AND CONSIDER THIS A MATTER BETWEEN THE CHINESE PARTIES CONCERNED. NEVERTHELESS, WE CONSIDER THE PROCLAMATIONS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO BE AN IMPORTANT MANIFESTATION OF CHINESE INTENT TO PURSUE AN ENDURING POLICY OF PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE, AND WE HAVE WELCOMED THIS.

--THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WERE CONVEYED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT ON MY INSTRUCTION ON JANUARY 11, 1982, AND THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PRESENTED SINCE, HAVE REFLECTED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE NEW SITUATION CREATED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS. THEY CONSTITUTE A SINCERE EFFORT TO INITIATE A PROCESS THAT WOULD GRADUALLY, AND ULTIMATELY, REMOVE THIS ISSUE AS A POINT OF CONTENTION BETWEEN US.

--WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO YOUR GOVERNMENT, THROUGH OUR PROPOSALS, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT SEEK TO PURSUE A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, NOR TO SELL ARMS TO TAIWAN INDEFINITELY. MOREOVER SHOULD YOU HAVE

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ANY DOUBT REGARDING OUR FUTURE INTENTIONS, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO EXCEED, EITHER IN QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE TERMS, THE LEVELS SUPPLIED IN RECENT YEARS, SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES; AND I CAN TELL YOU WITH EQUAL CERTAINTY THAT THE UNITED STATES FULLY EXPECTS GRADUALLY TO REDUCE ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

--MY DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT THIS POLICY IS FIRM. CLEARLY, THIS COURSE SHOULD LEAD US, OVER TIME, TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE.

--YOUR PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS AS STRONGLY AS DO OURS. I BELIEVE THE APPROACH I HAVE OUTLINED IS APPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION.

--I HAVE ANSWERED YOU WITHIN THE MAXIMUM LIMITS OF FLEXIBILITY AVAILABLE TO ME; AND, WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, I HAVE INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR HUMMEL TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMUNIQUE, AND I HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM TO PRESENT A NEW U. S. DRAFT.

--IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED, WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO EXCHANGE RECIPROCAL HIGH-LEVEL VISITS. I WOULD PROPOSE TO SEND THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE TO BEIJING AND WOULD HOPE THAT PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG WOULD ACCEPT OUR STANDING INVITATION FOR A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

--I HOPE WE CAN NOW MOVE RAPIDLY TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES AND RESUME THE ADVANCE OF -U. S. -CHINA RELATIONS.

12. THE TEXT OF OUR NEW DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD PRESENT TO DENG IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING YOUR PRESENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER-AND ORAL MESSAGE, IS PRESENTED BELOW. IT IS VERY SIMILAR TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE YOU SAW DURING YOUR MAY CONSULTATIONS. HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL SENTENCE AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE TEXT WHICH WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE CHINESE. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST TIME THE CHINESE SIDE HAS SEEN THIS DRAFT, WHICH INCORPORATES SOME OF THE WORDING AND IDEAS CONVEYED BY THE CHINESE DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. IN PRESENTING IT, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT IT IS SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED FROM OUR EARLIER DRAFTS AND THAT WE HAVE TRIED, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR FLEXIBILITY, TO EMBODY THE MOST RECENT CHINESE SUGGESTIONS.

BEGIN TEXT 1. IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, -ON JANUARY 1, 1979, ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, AND IT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHINESE POSITION THAT TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA. THE TWO SIDES AGREED, WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND OTHER UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN. ON THIS BASIS, RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES WERE NORMALIZED, AND A RAPID EXPANSION OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL STRATEGIC AND BILATERAL RELATIONS OCCURRED.

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2. THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WAS NOT SETTLED IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE TWO SIDES HELD DIFFERING POSITIONS, AND THE CHINESE

SIDE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN, AT A LATER TIME, FOLLOWING NORMALIZATION. RECOGNIZING THAT THIS ISSUE COULD SERIOUSLY HAMPER THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS, THE TWO SIDES HAVE HELD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, DURING AND SINCE THE MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN AND PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG AND BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., AND VICE PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA IN OCTOBER, 1981.

3. RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS CONSTITUTE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE CONFIRMED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 28, 1972, AND REAFFIRMED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH CAME INTO EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 1979. BOTH SIDES EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES CONTINUE TO GOVERN THEIR RELATIONS AND AGREE THAT THEY BEAR DIRECTLY ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO SEEK A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF UNITED STATES-CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER THE QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES' SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN.

4. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REITERATES THAT THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN IS CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. IT STATES THAT THE MESSAGE TO COMPATRIOTS ISSUED BY CHINA ON JANUARY 1, 1979, PROMULGATED A FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF STRIVING FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE MOTHERLAND. THE NINE-POINT PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY CHINA ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1981 REPRESENTED A FURTHER MAJOR EFFORT TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND A NATIONAL POLICY THAT WILL NOT CHANGE. THE NEW SITUATION WHICH HAS EMERGED WITH REGARD TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION ALSO PROVIDES FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

5. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA. IT REITERATES THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF INFRINGING ON CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR PURSUING A POLICY OF "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA ONE TAIWAN."

6. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS AND APPRECIATES THE CHINESE POLICY OF SEEKING A PEACEFUL

RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE AS INDICATED IN THE NINE-POINT PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1981.

7. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATES THAT ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL NOT EXCEED, EITHER IN QUALITATIVE OR IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, THE LEVEL OF THOSE SUPPLIED IN RECENT YEARS, SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

8. SIMILARLY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATES THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SEEK TO CARRY OUT A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN AND EXPECTS A GRADUAL REDUCTION IN ITS ARMS SALES, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, LEADING ULTIMATELY TO A FINAL RESOLUTION. IN SO

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STATING, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THE CHINESE PRINCIPLE REGARDING ELIMINATION OF THIS ISSUE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

9. BOTH GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZE THAT THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN IS AN ISSUE ROOTED IN HISTORY WHICH SHOULD BE FINALLY SETTLED, AMICABLY, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING STATEMENTS. BOTH GOVERNMENTS PLEDGE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ADOPT MEASURES AND CREATE CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT.

10. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES, BUT IS CONDUCTIVE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD. WITHIN THE EAST ASIA REGION, BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THAT HARMONIOUS, COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE CAN BE REGISTERED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES. THE TWO SIDES ARE DETERMINED TO MAKE STRONG, JOINT EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES AND BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. END TEXT.

STOESSEL
BT

~~SECRET~~

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STAFF C/O

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Bill Clarke

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O : Original

7/10/82

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this package.

ITP

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S/S #

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SITUATION ROOM

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on Saturday

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FROM: S/S K Shirley 28448
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Taiwan Arms Sales

TO: (Agency)

NSC

DELIVER TO:

Kr Mr Mike Wheeler

Extension

Room No.

395-3440

FOR:

CLEARANCE ☒

INFORMATION ☐

PER REQUEST ☐

COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

URGENT clearances
by 7/10

S/S Officer:

K Shirley

W. Johnson

crosshatch

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE
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PAGE 01
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BEIJING 9054
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4763

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 09054

NODIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 7/11/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W., JR.) OR-M
HAGS: PDIH, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALE ISSUE: FINAL STEPS
REF: STATE 191699

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED BY MFA THAT I SHOULD DELIVER MY INSTRUCTED MESSAGES NOT TO DENG XIAOPING BUT TO STATE COUNCILLOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA AT 3:00 P.M. LOCAL TOMORROW. ACCORDING TO MFA HUANG HUA "HAS BEEN ENTRUSTED BY DENG XIAOPING" TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGES.

3. THIS COMES AFTER SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS THAT I AND DCM FREEMAN HAVE HAD TODAY WITH MFA WHICH FIRST PRODUCED PRC OFFER FOR ME TO MEET WITH VICE MINISTER HANXU, WHICH I REJECTED. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED STRONGLY THAT I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT MAIN ELEMENTS OF MY INSTRUCTIONS (LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO DENG, ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO DENG, AND NEW DRAFT TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE) SHOULD BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO DENG. I HAVE ALSO HAD DCM DELIVER TO MFA "ADVANCE TEXT" OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHOSE TEXT CLEARLY ENVISAGES MY DIRECT DISCUSSION WITH DENG.

4. I DO NOT KNOW THE REASON FOR THIS PRC DECISION. I HAVE RESPONDED EQUIVOCALLY TO THE LATEST MFA MESSAGE THAT I SHOULD MEET HUANG HUA, SAYING THAT OF COURSE I WOULD MEET HIM AT THE APPOINTED TIME, BUT THAT I WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER MY MESSAGES SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO HIM SINCE I HAVE BEEN TOLD TO DELIVER THEM TO DENG.

5. IN LIGHT OF THE PRC STATEMENT THAT DENG HAS ENTRUSTED HUANG TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGES, I THINK IT MAY NOT BE USEFUL TO INSIST FURTHER ON SEEING DENG. UNLESS TOLD OTHERWISE I PLAN TO CARRY OUT MY INSTRUCTIONS DURING THE DISCUSSION WITH HUANG HUA TOMORROW. HUMMEL
BT

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NLS MD3-1455 #9

BY LM, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 1716 DTG: 112049Z JUL 82 PSN: 056583
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE 2675

~~SECRET~~ STATE 191716

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR HUMMEL FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 7/11/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALE ISSUE: FINAL STEPS
REF: BEIJING 09054

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, OUR EFFORT TO KEEP DENG DIRECTLY AND PERSONALLY ENGAGED IS A BASIC ELEMENT OF OUR STRATEGY TO OBTAIN A PROMPT RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE RELUCTANT TO ACQUIESCE IN THE PROPOSAL THAT YOU DELIVER THE MESSAGES TO HUANG HUA. YOU SHOULD, THEREFORE, INFORM MFA THAT AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON, YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RENEW OUR REQUEST THAT YOU BE ABLE TO MEET WITH DENG. IN ADDITION TO STRESSING THE URGENCY OF RESUMING DISCUSSIONS, YOU SHOULD REITERATE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGES ARE IN RESPONSE TO VIEWS EXPRESSED PERSONALLY BY DENG TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND CONVEYED DIRECTLY BY HIM TO THE PRESIDENT. YOU SHOULD NOTE OUR VIEW THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CONSIDER IT MOST APPROPRIATE THAT YOU BE ABLE TO CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO DENG.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE MAY HAVE TO YIELD ON THIS POINT BUT GIVEN ITS IMPORTANCE WE DO NOT WISH TO DO SO WITHOUT IMPRESSING ON THE CHINESE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE REGARD IT. PLEASE REPORT THE RESULTS OF YOUR DEMARCHE IMMEDIATELY. STOESSEL
BT

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NLS MD3-1455#10

BY LDJ, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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PAGE 01
EOB828

BEIJING 9055
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4765

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 09055

NODIS
FOR UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM HUMMEL
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 7/12/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W. JR) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES: FINAL STEPS
REF: STATE 191716

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTTEL INSTRUCTIONS, I SOUGHT AND WAS GRANTED A NINE-THIRTY A.M. BEIJING TIME MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAN XU. I RELATED TO HAN IN SOME DETAIL THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS THAT GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WE FELT IT MOST APPROPRIATE THAT THEY BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO VICE CHAIRMAN DENG. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IN HIS LETTER TO DENG, THE PRESIDENT HAD ASSUMED THAT I WOULD BE DELIVERING HIS ORAL MESSAGE PERSONALLY TO THE VICE CHAIRMAN. FINALLY I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD WANT TO SHOW THAT THEY HAD MADE MAXIMUM EFFORTS BY EXCHANGE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE, AND MY BELIEF THAT A CHINESE REFUSAL OF CONTACT WITH DENG MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED LATER ON.

3. HAN SAID HE WOULD CONVEY OUR REQUESTS BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT ON IT.

4. THE MEETING WITH FONMIN HUANG HUA IS STILL SCHEDULED FOR 3:00 P.M. LOCAL, ABOUT FOUR HOURS FROM NOW. I HOPE, BUT CANNOT BE SURE, THAT BEFORE THAT TIME I WILL RECEIVE THE PRC'S RESPONSE TO OUR LATEST RECLAMA ON MY SEEING DENG INSTEAD. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT DURING THE HUANG MEETING HE WILL REPLY WITH A TURNDOWN ON MY SEEING DENG. I NEED CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS -- WHETHER IN THE EVENT OF PRC INSISTENCE THAT I SHOULD DELIVER MY INSTRUCTED MESSAGES TO HUANG, I SHOULD PROCEED TO DO SO, OR WHETHER I SHOULD ASK FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE HUANG MEETING WHILE WASHINGTON CONSIDERS THE MATTER FURTHER. REFTTEL IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. PLEASE ADVISE BY NIACT. HUMMEL
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MD3-1445 #11

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01
EOB829

BEIJING 9061
AN000321

DTG: 120352Z JUL 82 PSN: 000227
TOR: 193/1550Z CSN: HCE205

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4768

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 09061

NODIS
FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM HUMMEL
E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 7/12/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W.,) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, CH, TW
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DENG
REF: BEIJING 9055
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLED AT 11:10 AM FOLLOWING
THE AMBASSADOR'S 09:30 AM MEETING WITH HAN XU TO
INFORM US THAT THE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
HUANG HUA SCHEDULED FOR 3:00 PM TODAY HAS BEEN
CANCELLED. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY INVITED THE
AMBASSADOR TO MEET WITH DENG XIAOPING AT 10:00
AM TOMORROW, JULY 13. HUMMEL
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M03-1455 #12

BY L01, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 AIT TAIPEI 3828
SIT941

DTG: 120817Z JUL 82 PSN: 000333
TOR: 193/1704Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT GREG /008
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

OP IMMED
UTS7649
DE RUEHIN #3828 1930818
O 120817Z JUL 82 ZFF-4
FM AIT TAIPEI

TO AIT WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 03828

NODIS
FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM LILLEY
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/12/02 (LILLEY, JAMES R.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR PDIP MPOL, TW CH US
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES
REF: (A) WASHDC 191704, (B) WASHDC 191698, (C) TAIPEI 3784

1. ~~(A)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. PER REF A INSTRUCTIONS I HAVE TAKEN NO ACTION
SETTING UP A MEETING WITH CHIANG CHING-KUO. I WILL
AWAIT WORD FROM YOU ON THE TIMING OF HUMMEL'S MEET-
ING WITH DENG. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE I WILL
TRY TO SET UP A CONCURRENT MEETING WITH CCK.

3. REGARDING REF B, I HAVE THESE POINTS:

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MD3-1445 #13

By LOS, NARA, Date 11/30/05

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE AUTHORITIES HERE UNDERSTAND THAT A DOWNGRADING
COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN TENSION IN THE AREA
WHICH COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON TAIWAN'S
SECURITY. BUT THE IMPLICATION IN REF B MESSAGE IS
THAT WE MIGHT TAKE IT OUT ON TAIWAN IF WE RUN INTO
PROBLEMS WITH THE PRC. IF I AM ASKED TO EXPLAIN
THIS POINT, I INTEND TO SAY THAT IT IS IN TAIWAN'S
INTEREST THAT THEY DO NOTHING TO EXACERBATE A POSSIBLE
DOWNTURN IN U.S.-PRC RELATIONS.

-- I DID REPORT IN REF C THAT CCK HAD INTENDED TO
COME OUT WITH A HARD-LINE STATEMENT WHICH WOULD BE
DESIGNED TO OFFSET PREMIER SUN'S JUNE 10 SPEECH
ON REUNIFICATION. I AM CONCERNED THAT IF CCK DOES
THIS AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE THEN THE PRC WOULD
INSIST THAT OUR ARMS SALES POLICIES HAVE ONLY LED
TO A MORE RECALCITRANT TAIWAN. FOR THIS REASON,
I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I SEE CCK AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE TO TRY TO FORESTALL A HARD-LINE STATEMENT.
IF A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IS ISSUED THEN WE CAN EXPECT
A STREAM OF HARD-LINE STATEMENTS BUT THESE WILL BE
AFTER THE FACT AND LESS DAMAGING.

4. IN THIS RESPECT, [REDACTED] HAS A
GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE HERE. IF HE SHOULD COME
TO TAIPEI AFTER HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON HE COULD
EXERCISE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON CCK BY COUNSEL-
LING HIM TO BE CAUTIOUS IN PLAYING UP ANY DOWN-
TURNING IN U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, AND, IN DRIVING HOME
TO CCK THAT TAIWAN'S FLAT REJECTION OF THE PRC DOES

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 AIT TAIPEI 3828

DTG: 120817Z JUL 82 PSN: 000333

NOT SELL INTERNATIONALLY.

5. THE ASSURANCES CONTAINED IN THE TALKING POINTS GO A LONG WAY IN MAKING A JOINT COMMUNIQUE MORE PALATABLE HERE. IF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT WORK, DO YOU PLAN TO ISSUE SOME KIND OF UNILATERAL STATEMENT ALONG THE GENERAL LINES EXPRESSED IN REF B>

6. ONE FINAL NOTE, DON PORTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOFTBALL FEDERATION WAS THE OBJECT OF A MINOR DEMONSTRATION OVER THE WEEKEND. A FEW DEMONSTRATORS, TOMATOES IN HAND AND WITH BANNERS, CONFRONTED HIM BECAUSE HE REFUSED TO PERMIT THE VISITING SOFTBALL TEAMS TO CARRY THE ROC PAPER FLAGS AT THE CLOSING CEREMONIES. IN VIEW OF THIS AND THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN DECEMBER, 1978 AT THE TIME OF THE CHRISTOPHER TRIP, WE COULD BE SUBJECTED TO SOME HARASSMENT IF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE GOES THROUGH.

7. I REQUEST THAT YOU INFORM ME IMMEDIATELY ON THE TIMING OF THE HUMMEL/DENG MEETING.

8. PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE TO BEIJING. LILLEY
BT

~~SECRET~~