

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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### **Collection:**

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Gregg, Donald P  
Collection: ~~LAUX, DAVID~~ Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Taiwan Arms Sales Vol. II 1982-~~(4 of 7)~~ (7 of 13)  
Box-90385 Page 2 ~~of 2~~ Box 10

Date: 8/1/00  
Jespersen F99-056/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18. Cable	Same text as item #17, 2 p. <i>PART. 11/30/05 MO3-1445 #13 (COPY)</i>	7/12/82	P1/F1
<del>19. Cable</del>	<del>#121429Z Jul 82, 1 p.</del>	<del>7/12/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>20. Memo</del>	<del>Gregg to Clark, re: Developing a China Strategy, 1 p.</del>	<del>7/12/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>21. Memo</del>	<del>Clark to Stoessel, re: Developing a China Strategy, 1p</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>22. Memo</del>	<del>Gregg to Clark, re: Initial Chinese Reaction to President Reagan's Messages, 1 p.</del>	<del>7/13/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
23. Cable	#130655Z Jul 82, 6 p. <i>PART. " " #17</i>	7/13/82	P1/F1
<del>24. Cable</del>	<del>#140125Z Jul 82, 1 p.</del>	<del>7/14/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>25. Cable</del>	<del>#140332Z Jul 82, 1 p.</del>	<del>7/14/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>26. Cable</del>	<del>#140818Z Jul 82, 1 p.</del>	<del>7/14/82</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
27. Cable	#140828Z Jul 82, 5 p. <i>D " " #22 D 5/24/06 F99-056/1, Bl 17 164</i>	7/14/82	P1/F1
28. Cable	#141243Z Jul 82, 4 p. <i>D " " #23 D " " #165</i>	7/14/82	P1/F1

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

1/15

PAGE 01 OF 02 AIT TAIPEI 3828  
EOB884 AN000352

DTG: 120817Z JUL 82 PSN: 000333  
TOR: 193/1704Z CSN: HCE246

DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 GREG-01 KIMM-01 SIGU-01 HELM-01  
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O 120817Z JUL 82 ZFF-4  
FM AIT TAIPEI

TO AIT WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 03828

NODIS  
FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM LILLEY  
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 7/12/02 (LILLEY, JAMES R.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR PDIP MPOL, TW CH US  
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES  
REF: (A) WASHDC 191704, (B) WASHDC 191698, (C) TAIPEI 3784

1. - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. PER REF A INSTRUCTIONS I HAVE TAKEN NO ACTION  
SETTING UP A MEETING WITH CHIANG CHING-KUO. I WILL  
AWAIT WORD FROM YOU ON THE TIMING OF HUMMEL'S MEET-  
ING WITH DENG. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE I WILL  
TRY TO SET UP A CONCURRENT MEETING WITH CCK.

3. REGARDING REF B, I HAVE THESE POINTS:

-- [REDACTED]

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

THE AUTHORITIES HERE UNDERSTAND THAT A DOWNGRADING  
COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN TENSION IN THE AREA  
WHICH COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON TAIWAN'S  
SECURITY. BUT THE IMPLICATION IN REF B MESSAGE IS  
THAT WE MIGHT TAKE IT OUT ON TAIWAN IF WE RUN INTO  
PROBLEMS WITH THE PRC. IF I AM ASKED TO EXPLAIN  
THIS POINT, I INTEND TO SAY THAT IT IS IN TAIWAN'S  
INTEREST THAT THEY DO NOTHING TO EXACERBATE A POSSIBLE  
DOWNTURN IN U. S. -PRC RELATIONS.

-- I DID REPORT IN REF C THAT CCK HAD INTENDED TO  
COME OUT WITH A HARD-LINE STATEMENT WHICH WOULD BE  
DESIGNED TO OFFSET PREMIER SUN'S JUNE 10 SPEECH  
ON REUNIFICATION. I AM CONCERNED THAT IF CCK DOES  
THIS AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE THEN THE PRC WOULD  
INSIST THAT OUR ARMS SALES POLICIES HAVE ONLY LED  
TO A MORE RECALCITRANT TAIWAN. FOR THIS REASON,  
I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I SEE CCK AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE TO TRY TO FORESTALL A HARD-LINE STATEMENT.  
IF A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IS ISSUED THEN WE CAN EXPECT  
A STREAM OF HARD-LINE STATEMENTS BUT THESE WILL BE  
AFTER THE FACT AND LESS DAMAGING.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MD3-1445 #13 (copy)

By LDI, NARA, Date 11/30/05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 AIT TAIPEI 3828

DTG: 120817Z JUL 82 PSN: 000333

4. IN THIS RESPECT, [REDACTED] HAS A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE HERE. IF HE SHOULD COME TO TAIPEI AFTER HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON HE COULD EXERCISE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON CCK BY COUNSELING HIM TO BE CAUTIOUS IN PLAYING UP ANY DOWN-TURNING IN U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, AND IN DRIVING HOME TO CCK THAT TAIWAN'S FLAT REJECTION OF THE PRC DOES NOT SELL INTERNATIONALLY.

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(h)(6)

5. THE ASSURANCES CONTAINED IN THE TALKING POINTS GO A LONG WAY IN MAKING A JOINT COMMUNIQUE MORE PALATABLE HERE. IF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT WORK, DO YOU PLAN TO ISSUE SOME KIND OF UNILATERAL STATEMENT ALONG THE GENERAL LINES EXPRESSED IN REF B?

6. ONE FINAL NOTE, DON PORTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOFTBALL FEDERATION WAS THE OBJECT OF A MINOR DEMONSTRATION OVER THE WEEKEND. A FEW DEMONSTRATORS, TOMATOES IN HAND AND WITH BANNERS, CONFRONTED HIM BECAUSE HE REFUSED TO PERMIT THE VISITING SOFTBALL TEAMS TO CARRY THE ROC PAPER FLAGS AT THE CLOSING CEREMONIES. IN VIEW OF THIS AND THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN DECEMBER, 1978 AT THE TIME OF THE CHRISTOPHER TRIP, WE COULD BE SUBJECTED TO SOME HARASSMENT IF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE GOES THROUGH.

7. I REQUEST THAT YOU INFORM ME IMMEDIATELY ON THE TIMING OF THE HUMMEL/DENG MEETING.

8. PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE TO BEIJING. LILLEY  
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 1727 DTG: 121429Z JUL 82 PSN: 000054  
EOB755 AN000237 TOR: 193/1330Z CSN: EHA562

DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 GREG-01 KIMM-01 SIGU-01 HELM-01  
/005 A3

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2676

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7824

~~SECRET~~ STATE 191727

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR HUMMEL FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 7/11/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)  
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW  
SUBJ TAIWAN ARMS SALES ISSUE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR  
AMBASSADOR'S TALK WITH DENG XIAOPING

REF: A) STATE 191699 B) BEIJING 09053

1. ~~3~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE WHITE HOUSE HAS APPROVED YOUR SUGGESTION IN REF  
(B) AND YOU SHOULD INCORPORATE YOUR PROPOSED CHANGE IN  
THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO DENG. HOWEVER, YOU WILL  
RECALL THAT DENG MADE A POINT OF EXPRESSING HIS INTEREST  
IN MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS CONVERSATION  
WITH SENATOR BAKER, WHO CONVEYED DENG'S COMMENTS TO THE  
PRESIDENT. YOU SHOULD, THEREFORE, ENSURE THAT REFERENCE TO  
DENG'S REMARKS TO BAKER ON THIS SUBJECT IS INCLUDED IN  
YOUR PRESENTATION. STOESSEL

BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MD3-1445 #14

BY 101, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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~~SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

SYSTEM II

TAS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 12, 1982

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*  
SUBJECT: Developing a China Strategy

With our China package now in Amb. Hummel's hands, we should move quickly to prepare to deal with the consequences of the PRC's reaction to that package, whether it be positive or negative.

I have already talked several times with State about the need to develop contingency planning to deal with either success or failure. They have already started to work, but I feel we should formalize our tasking of the Department.

RECOMMENDATION

OK    No

\_\_\_\_ That you send the attached memorandum to the Department of State.

Gaston Sigur concurs. *GS*

Attachment

Tab I      Memorandum for Your Signature to Acting Secretary of State

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M03-1445 #15

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review on July 12, 2002

~~SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

SYSTEM II

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR.  
The Acting Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Developing a China Strategy

With Ambassador Hummel poised to deliver the President's messages to the PRC leadership, we need to move rapidly to deal with the impact of the PRC's response to our demarche, whether it be positive or negative.

The Department of State is requested to develop a public affairs and legislative strategy for dealing with the following contingencies:

- If the PRC accepts our demarche, we will need to have developed a public position to take with the Taiwan leadership to assure them that their future remains secure. This public position, taken in conjunction with arms sales and other reassurances, will be vital to Taiwan's future psychological well-being.
- If we succeed, we will also need to work with leaders on Capitol Hill to explain the thinking behind our final demarche to the PRC and to give indications as to how we will be proceeding in our dealings with both Beijing and Taiwan.
- If our demarche to the PRC is rejected, we will need to construct a public affairs position, indicating that what we offered the PRC was a balanced and judicious effort to achieve a settlement. This explanation will need to be conveyed both domestically and to our allies.
- Finally, if the Chinese reject our offer, we will need to have a new strategic outline for dealing with the PRC, with our diplomatic relations downgraded.

It is requested that we have initial reactions to these questions by close of business on the 23rd of July.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review on July 12, 2002

~~SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

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NLS MO3-1445 #16

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

13 July 1982

INFORMATION

TO: William Clark

FROM: Don Gregg *DG*

SUBJECT: Initial Chinese Reaction to President Reagan's Messages

Amb. Hummel presented our proposal to the Chinese this morning, Peking time. Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping received the messages personally.

Deng's reaction was described by Hummel as "cautious and non-committal." Deng said that he felt that President Reagan's messages contained "certain positive elements", but that there was still "a considerable distance from the Chinese requirements." Deng then asked for more time to study the proposal.

Hummel states that he left the Chinese <sup>no</sup> in/doubt that this was our final proposal. He also says that, in other talks with Chinese officials, the need for a speedy response has been stressed by the Americans, and recognized by the PRC. Still, in his message this morning, Hummel expresses the hope that we can hold off until the end of August any moves toward Taiwan that the PRC might use to reject our offer. This request from Hummel adds more importance to State's planned efforts to see if the 29 July informal notification to Congress re the F-5E can be waived.

COMMENT: I think Hummel did a fine job in presenting our package, and Deng's reaction is about what I expected. I cannot predict what the PRC response will be, but we are still very much in the ball game.

RECOMMENDATION: You may wish to mention this to the President during your 9:30 meeting this morning.

~~SECRET~~*W. Huston Singer*

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NLS MD3-1445 #17BY LDI NARA, DATE 11/30/05



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING 9147  
EOB257 AN000629

DTG: 130655Z JUL 82 PSN: 001378  
TOR: 194/0908Z CSN: HCE474

DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 GREG-01 KIMM-01 SIGU-01 HELM-01  
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4838

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 09147

NODIS  
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 & 3 (7/13/02) HUMMEL, ARTHUR W., JR) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, TW, CH  
SUBJ: TAIWAN ARMS SALES: MEETING WITH DENG  
REF: STATE 191716

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET WITH VICE CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING FROM 10:00-11:00 A.M., JULY 135 1982. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FREEMAN, TAYLOR, TOMSEN, AND CHANG (INTERPRETER). ALSO PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE HAN XU, ZHU QIZHEN, ZHANG ZAI, ZHANG WENPU, SHI YANHUA (INTERPRETER), AND SEVERAL NOTETAKERS.

3. AS INSTRUCTED, I PREFACED THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE WITH SOME REMARKS OF MY OWN, REVIEWING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S CHINA POLICY INITIATIVES AND STRESSING THE PRESIDENT'S HOPE THAT HIS PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE THE MOST POSITIVE AND FORTHCOMING WE CAN MAKE AT THIS TIME, WOULD BE GIVEN PROMPT AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION. TEXT OF MY PRESENTATION SEPTEL.

4. AFTER PROVIDING DENG THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND READING TO HIM MY INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE, I SAID A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE NEW U. S. DRAFT OF THE TAIWAN PORTIONS OF THE PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE, AND GAVE THE VICE CHAIRMAN A COPY OF THE DRAFT. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW IF HE WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THE DRAFT AT THIS POINT OR DISCUSS IT FIRST WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. FOLLOWING IS HIS RESPONSE AND OUR SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE DURING THE MEETING:

DENG: SOME OTHER TIME. IT'S TOO LONG. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. WE APPROVE OF THE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES. AFTER LISTENING TO THE ORAL MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, I FEEL THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN IT. OF COURSE, THERE IS STILL A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM THE CHINESE REQUIREMENTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AFTER WE HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE AND THE DRAFT. AS TO THE QUESTION ITSELF, WE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT FOR TODAY. WE HAVE TO STUDY YOUR DRAFT AND GIVE YOU A RESPONSE. IT'S DIFFICULT FOR ME TO GIVE ANY RESPONSE NOW.

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU TWO QUESTIONS TODAY.

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MD3-1445 #18

By 105, NARA, Date 11/30/05

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

DTG: 130655Z JUL 82 PSN: 001378

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E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING 9147  
EOB258 AN000630

DTG: 130655Z JUL 82 PSN: 001380  
TOR: 194/0909Z CSN: HCE475

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O 130655Z JUL 82; 9"11-1  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4839

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIJING 09147

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HUMMEL: THANK YOU. WITH YOUR PERMISSION I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE SECOND POINT THAT YOU RAISED. I DO NOT THINK THAT YOUR DISCUSSION OF OUR RECORD OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IS ACCURATE. CONCERNING EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY, WE HAVE PLACED CHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE SAME LEVEL AS YUGOSLAVIA WHICH IS A FRIENDLY NON-ALLIED COUNTRY. DURING 1981, WE APPROVED 93 -- BY VALUE -- OR OVER 400 MILLION DOLLARS OF THE LICENSES THAT WERE REQUESTED.

WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN STEPS TO SPEED UP THE PROCESSING OF REQUESTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, AS YOU CORRECTLY POINTED OUT HAS BEEN TOO SLOW IN THE PAST.

MR. FREEMAN HAS REMINDED ME THAT WHILE CHINA HAS BEEN PLACED IN A CATEGORY COMPARABLE TO YUGOSLAVIA, IT IS ACTUALLY RECEIVING TREATMENT BETTER THAN YUGOSLAVIA. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE APPROVED VERY HIGH TECHNOLOGY ITEMS, PARTICULARLY IN THE COMPUTER FIELD.

IN MY UNDERSTANDING, THERE ARE NO DIFFERENCES ON RESTRICTIONS ON CHINESE STUDENTS AS COMPARED WITH STUDENTS FROM TAIWAN AND HONG KONG. THE RESTRICTIONS ARE APPLIED EQUALLY. THIS ALSO APPLIES TO STUDENTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL.

I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES LATER.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO NOTE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED VERY SEVERE RESTRICTIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR STUDENTS STUDYING IN CHINA.

DENG: [REDACTED]

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING 9147

DTG: 130655Z JUL 82 PSN: 001380

3. COMMENT:

THE CHINESE VERY LIKELY EXPECTED A REPLY THAT WOULD FALL CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF MEETING DENG'S REQUEST FOR A PRIVATE ASSURANCE ON TERMINATION OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. THUS DENG'S RESPONSE WAS, AS EXPECTED, CAUTIOUS AND NON-COMMITAL. HIS HISTORICAL POINTS AND HIS CRITICISM OF U.S. PRACTICE ON TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS AND CHINESE STUDENTS WERE CLEARLY FOR THE RECORD AND THE EARS OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE POLITBURO. HE WAS ALSO EXPLICITLY SIGNALING THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH US IF WE RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES ON THE TAIWAN ARMS SALES ISSUE. HIS REFERENCE IN THIS CONTEXT TO COOPERATION ON "ITEMS MOST BENEFICIAL TO THE U. S." AGREED TO UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION MAY HAVE BEEN A VEILED HINT THAT THIS PARTICULAR COOPERATION COULD COME TO AN END SHOULD WE FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE. BUT IF SO, IT WAS SUBTLY BROACHED.

4. NOTABLY, DENG DID NOT RAISE THE TRA, THE SUBJECT WHICH HAD DOMINATED HIS DISCUSSION WITH SENATOR BAKER. HUANG HUA WAS PRESUMABLY ENGAGED WITH THE VISITING GUINEAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AND AT THIS TIME I WOULD ATTACH NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO HIS ABSENCE. IN THE PLEASANTRIES BEFORE I MADE MY PRESENTATION, DENG EXPLAINED THAT HE (DENG) HAD ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT YESTERDAY AND THAT WAS WHY HE HAD ORIGINALLY ASKED HUANG TO RECEIVE ME, ADDING THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS VERY GOOD THAT HE WAS ABLE TO MEET ME PERSONALLY.  
BT

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING 9147  
EOB259 AN000631

DTG: 130655Z JUL 82 PSN: 001381  
TOR: 194/0911Z CSN: HCE476

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/005 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4840

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BEIJING 09147

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5. THE CHINESE ARETIN NO DOUBT THAT TODAY'S PRESENTATION REPRESENTS THE OUTER LIMITS OF OUR FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO COMPROMISE ON THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES OF LINKAGE AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF OUR ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. THIS POINT WAS STRESSED BY ME TODAY AND BY THE DCM TO ZHANG ZAI ON SUNDAY AT AN INFORMAL MEETING TO PROVIDE THE CHINESE WITH AN ADVANCE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. AT HIS MEETING WITH ZHANG, THE DCM ALSO STRESSED THE COMPLICATIONS THAT FURTHER DELAY IN REACHING AGREEMENT COULD ENTAIL. ALTHOUGH THE DCM DID NOT GO INTO SPECIFICS, ZHANG SAID HE COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR SPEED. PRESSED BY THE DCM, ZHANG ALSO SAID THAT HE REALIZED THAT THE U. S. WAS NOT COMMITTED TO ANY OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WE HAD MADE FOR LIMITING AND REDUCING TAIWAN ARMS UNTIL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. THE REFERENCE TO THIS POINT IN MY PRESENTATION TODAY WILL THUS BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD.

6. I EXPECT DENG WILL NOW SEEK A POLITICAL DECISION BY THE LEADERSHIP ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE WORDING WE PROPOSED AS MEETING THEIR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ON THE KEY ISSUES. OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WE WILL BE IN TOUCH INFORMALLY WITH OUR MFA COLLEAGUES AT THE WORKING LEVELS AND ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SOME PRELIMINARY FEEL FOR THE CHINESE REACTION.

7. EVEN ASSUMING THE BEST -- THAT WE ARE ENTERING THE LAST STAGE OF OUR TALKS INVOLVING IRONING OUT THE MORE MINOR DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST IN THE TAIWAN PORTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE AND WORKING OUT THE STRATEGIC PORTION OF THE DOCUMENT -- SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS. IN VIEW OF THE DELICATE STAGE WE ARE NOW IN HERE, I WOULD LIKE TO URGE THAT ANY STEPS RELATED TO TAIWAN

BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THE END OF AUGUST. THIS WAS THE TIMEFRAME USED IN JIM LILLEY'S DISCUSSION WITH CCK REGARDING THE CONCLUSION OF OUR TALKS HERE. IT WOULD BE A GREAT TRAGEDY IF WE WERE INDEED IN THE FINAL STAGES OF WRAPPING UP THE TALKS ONLY TO BE UNNECESSARILY DIVERTED OR DERAILED BY PREMATURE PUBLICITY REGARDING THESE PENDING MOVES.

8. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT PROVIDE ME WITH BRIEFING MATERIAL TO FOLLOW UP MY REMARKS TO DENG ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND RESTRICTIONS

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

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PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING 9147

DTG: 130655Z JUL 82 PSN: 001381

ON CHINESE STUDENTS IN THE U.S. AN UPDATED VERSION OF  
AS HOLDRIDGE'S PRESENTATION TO ZHAO ZIYANG DURING THE  
VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WOULD BE USEFUL IN RESPECT TO  
THE FORMER.

9. DENG SEEMED IN GOOD HEALTH.

BT

END COMMENT. HUMMEL

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

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EXDIS, FOR LILLEY  
E.O. 12065: GDS 07/13/88 (SHOESMITH, T. P.)  
TAGS: PEPR, TW, CH, US  
SUBJECT: JOHN CHANG'S TWO POSITIONS

REF: TAIPEI 03862  
- AIPEI 03862

1. (A - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DAVID DEAN INFORMED CCNAA'S DR. TSAI WEI-PING JULY 13 THAT WE CONSIDERED JOHN CHANG'S CONCURRENT ROLE AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF CCNAA A DIRECT VIOLATION-OF AGREEMENT THAT CCNAA WOULD BE AN ORGANIZATION OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND ITS PERSONNEL WOULD BE NON-ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL. DR. TSAI WAS REMINDED THAT WE HAD RAISED THIS SAME OBJECTION ON TWO EARLIER OCCASIONS WITH HIM. DEAN STATED THAT WE ALSO OBJECT TO ANY CCNAA PERSONNEL HOLDING CONCURRENT JOBS IN MOFA.

3. DR. TSAI SAID HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT JOHN CHANG SHOULD NOT HOLD CONCURRENT JOBS IN CCN ND MOFA. HE SAID HE WOULD SEND A TELEGRAM TO TAIPEI IMMEDIATELY REPORTING OUR STRONG OBJECTIONS.

4. REQUEST YOU FOLLOW UP HIS OBJECTION WITH RAYMOND HOO AND ASK FOR SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER.

STOESSEL  
BT

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BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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NODIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/14/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W.) OR-M  
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW  
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY  
- TRANSFER ISSUES ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS  
REF: BEIJING 09147

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DENG XIAOPING'S REMARKS TO ME YESTERDAY (REFTEL) ON THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. TO LIVE UP TO CHINESE EXPECTATIONS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SEEM ON REFLECTION TO DESERVE MORE ATTENTION THAN I GAVE THEM IN MY INITIAL COMMENT ON OUR MEETING.
3. I BELIEVE THAT UNDERLYING DENG'S REMARKS ARE INVIDIOUS COMPARISONS THAT ARE BEING DRAWN WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP HERE BETWEEN THE BENEFITS TO CHINESE MODERNIZATION CHINA DERIVED FROM ITS FIVE TO SEVEN YEARS OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE 1950'S, AND THE ALLEGED LACK OF SUCH BENEFITS FROM ITS THREE AND A HALF YEARS OF "NORMALIZED" RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. (THE SOVIETS FINANCED 150 MAJOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS AND ENGAGED IN HIGHLY VISIBLE TRANSFERS OF MILITARY PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY. U.S. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND INVESTMENT HAVE BEEN MODEST, PIECEMEAL, SEEMINGLY GRUDGING, AND -- IN CHINA'S INCREASINGLY DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM -- PARTIALLY INVISIBLE TO THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP.) IF SUCH COMPARISONS ARE BEING MADE, AS MUCH EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THEY ARE, THEN THE ISSUE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MAY BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DEBATE OVER CHINA'S APPROPRIATE STRATEGIC POSTURE AS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. DENG'S POINTED COMPARISON WITH TAIWAN'S RELATIVELY UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO U.S. TECHNOLOGY SUGGESTS A FURTHER COMPLICATION IN THE DEBATE.
4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I RECOMMEND THAT I BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTION, WITH QUANTITATIVE DATA AND EXAMPLES, OF ADVANCED U.S. TECHNOLOGY THAT HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE PRC SINCE NORMALIZATION. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT THE RECORD OF HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES SINCE NORMALIZATION BE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR PERFORMANCE HAS FALLEN SHORT OF OUR PROMISES, AND TO LAY THE BASIS FOR APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION. HUMMEL BT

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NLS MO3-1445 #20

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/30/05

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E.O. 12065: GDS 7/14/88 (IFSHIN, STANLEY R.)  
TAGS: PEPR, TW, CH, US  
SUBJECT: FM CHU SAYS US BRIEFED TAIWAN MAY 19

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOREIGN MINISTER CHU FU-SUNG ADDRESSED THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT SEMINAR IN TAIPEI ON JULY 13. THE OFFICIAL CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY STORY MERELY REPORTS THAT HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL NOT CHANGE ITS POLICY OF CONTINUING TO SELL DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO TAIWAN. MANY OF THE LOCAL CHINESE-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS, HOWEVER, QUOTE HIM AS SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES BRIEFED TAIWAN BOTH IN TAIPEI AND WASHINGTON ON MAY 19, AND GAVE ASSURANCES AT THAT TIME THAT THE U. S. POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN REMAINS UNCHANGED.

3. THE LOCAL UPI STAFFER HERE HAS ALREADY CONTACTED US SEEKING CONFIRMATION AND DETAILS. HE ALSO ASKED IF THE BRIEFING HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CCK REFERRED TO BY SENATOR GOLDWATER. THE AIT SPOKESMAN HAS DECLINED TO COMMENT. LILLEY  
BT

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