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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Gregg, Donald P. Files

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File Folder: Taiwan Arms Sales Vol. II 1982 (7 of 7) (12 of 13)

Date: 8/2/00

Box 90385 Page 2 RAC Box 10

Jespersen F99-056/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. Cable	Copy of Item #15 (w/ diff. annotations), 4 p. D 12/8/05 MD3-1447 #16	7/18/82	P1/F1
17. Memo	Gregg, Sigur to Clark, re: Negotiating with the Chinese, 1 p. R " " #17	7/21/82	P1/F1
18. Memo	Clark to Reagan, re: Further Negotiations with the Chinese, 2 p. R " " #18	n.d.	P1/F1
19. Memo	Copy of Item #4, (w/out notes), 3 p. D " " #4 (copy)	7/21/82	P1/F1
20. Message	Copy of Item #5, 1 p. R " " #5 (copy)	n.d.	P1/F1
21. Communique	US Draft of July 14, 1982, 2 p. R " " #19	7/14/82	P1/F1
22. Communique	Chinese Counterdraft of July 17, 1982, 2 p. R " " #20	7/22/82	P1/F1
23. Cable	no cable #, re: Taiwan Arms Sales., 9 p. D " " #21 D 5/24/06 F99-056/1 #224	7/20/82	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90543

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 21, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: *DS* DONALD GREGG AND GASTON SIGUR *JS*

SUBJECT: Negotiating with the Chinese

We have both read Secretary Shultz's memorandum to the President and his instruction cable to Ambassador Hummel. We find both papers to be sound pieces of work, and have no major changes to offer. The PRC tactic seems clear. While they have dropped their demand for a specific end to Taiwan arms sales, they are now seeking to cut all linkage between what they do toward Taiwan, and our promise to slowly reduce our arms sales to Taiwan. We must preserve this linkage. The major question now is whether this linkage can be preserved in a joint communique or whether we would be better served to issue independent statements addressing the same issues. Our judgment is that Ambassador Hummel should seek to negotiate an acceptable joint communique while maintaining the fallback position of separate statements.

Gaston and I both sense a different "feel" to these documents. They have a more confident tone, and US interests, as well as those of Taiwan, are more clearly and assertively stated.

Attached is a short memorandum from you to the President, making the key points and recommending that the attached cable to Hummel be approved and that a slightly amended message of reassurance be sent to Chiang Ching-kuo.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

_____ That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President
_____ at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
 A State Memorandum with oral message to CCK
 B Instruction cable to Amb. Hummel

cc: Gaston Sigur

DECLASSIFIED

NLS ML3-1447#17

~~SECRET~~

Review on July 21, 2002

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/8/05

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~SYSTEM II
90543

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M63-1447#18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 12/8/05

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Further Negotiations with the Chinese

Issue

How to conduct final negotiations with the PRC, holding the gains we have made, and preserving our principles.

Facts

Secretary Shultz has put his stamp on the two papers which have come from State today (Tabs A and B). He recognizes that we have scored a major gain as the PRC has dropped its demand for an end to Taiwan arms sales by a date certain. He also recognizes that there is hard bargaining ahead if we are to defeat the current PRC tactic of trying to "de-link" their policy toward Taiwan, whether peaceful or violent, from our stated policy of gradually decreasing arms sales to Taiwan. These two issues must be linked if there is to be a meaningful joint communique.

Discussion

State has prepared a nine-page cable of instructions to Amb. Hummel (Tab B). This cable makes clear that Hummel must:

- keep linkage between our policy of arms sales and what the PRC does re Taiwan.
- not agree to "consult" with the PRC in advance about Taiwan arms sales.
- seek to reinsert in the joint communique a paragraph stating the strategic interests that we share with the PRC.

In his covering memorandum to you (Tab A), Secretary Shultz also suggests that an oral message of reassurance be sent to Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang is appreciative of being kept advised of events in Peking, but is also nervous about the prospect of a joint communique, which he may feel will infringe on Taiwan's interests. To strengthen the oral message to Chiang, I suggest the insertion of an addition point, to be the penultimate point in the message:

- Please be assured, that whether or not we issue a joint communique with the PRC (a matter still being negotiated) the interests of Taiwan will be kept clearly in mind. We shall not agree to any joint statement that would limit our ability to respond to Taiwan's defense needs, should a change in the current peaceful trend take place.

~~SECRET~~

Review on July 21, 2002

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~~SECRET~~

Recommendations

OK No

- ____ 1. That the cable of instructions to Amb. Hummel be approved.
- ____ 2. That the oral message to Chiang, as amended above, be approved.

Attachments

Tab A State Memorandum with oral message to CCK
Tab B Instruction cable to Amb. Hummel

Prepared By:
Donald Gregg

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 90543
SYSTI

82 JUL 21 P 11:05

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>GRUBB</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

[Handwritten marks and scribbles in the comments section]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

ORAL MESSAGE TO CHIANG CHING-KUO

-- I appreciate the thoughts and sentiments conveyed in your message of July 16, and would like to assure you that your concerns have received, and will continue to receive, my close personal attention.

-- Let me also reassure you that I have consistently held as an unyielding principle my concern for the well-being of the people of Taiwan and my determination to carry out the Taiwan Relations Act.

-- My concerns in these regards are fixed principles from which I shall never waver.

-- Nor shall I waver from the program of assurances and specific actions outlined to you in my message of July 14. These are inviolate. Regardless of the outcome of our discussions with the PRC, we will continue to initiate in August the necessary procedures to supply you with replacement aircraft as envisaged in my decision of last January. In addition, we are awaiting word from your side on the timing of the military review conference to discuss Taiwan's future defense requirements.

-- Please accept again my best wishes for the continued health and well-being of yourself and your people.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M03-1447 #5 (copy)

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/8/05

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M03-1447#19BY LOT 12/08/05

US DRAFT OF JULY 14, 1982

1. In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. The two sides agreed, within that context, that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized, and a rapid expansion of mutually beneficial strategic and bilateral relations occurred.

2. The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side reserved the right to raise the issue again, at a later time, following normalization. Recognizing that this issue could seriously hamper the development of United States-China relations, the two sides have held further discussions, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding Sino-American relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern their relations and agree that they bear directly on the question of how to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution of United States-China differences over the question of the United States' supply of arms to Taiwan.

4. The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. It states that the message to compatriots issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The nine-point proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort to seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and a national policy that will not change. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan.

5. The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China. It reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty or territorial integrity or pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan."

6. The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue as indicated in the nine-point proposal of September 30, 1981.

7. Therefore, the United States Government states that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.

8. Similarly, the United States Government states that the United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and expects a gradual reduction in its arms sales, over a period of time, leading ultimately to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States Government acknowledges the Chinese principle regarding elimination of this issue over a period of time.

9. Both governments recognize that the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan is an issue rooted in history which should be finally settled, amicably, over a period of time, on the basis of the foregoing statements. Both governments pledge to make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to such a settlement.

10. The two governments agree that the continued development of United States-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples, but is conducive to peace and stability in the world. Within the East Asia region, both sides believe that harmonious, cooperative and friendly relations between the two nations will contribute to an atmosphere in which further progress toward a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue can be registered by the Chinese people themselves. The two sides are determined to make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Chinese and American peoples and between the governments of the two countries.

NLRR MD3-1447 #20BY 103, NARA, DATE 12/08/05

CHINESE COUNTERDRAFT OF JULY 17, 1982

Note: Chinese modifications to our draft of July 14 are underlined, and major deletions from our draft are bracketed

1. In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America, the United States recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. The two sides agreed that within that context, the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between China and the United States were normalized [and a rapid expansion of mutually beneficial strategic and bilateral relations occurred].

2. The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again, [at a later time,] following normalization. The two sides recognized that this issue would seriously hamper the development of Sino-US relations. The two sides have held further discussions, during and since the meetings between Premier Zhao Ziyang and President Reagan and between Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. in October 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding Sino-American relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that Sino-US differences over the question of United States' supply of arms to Taiwan should be settled in accordance with these principles.

4. The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. It states that the message to compatriots issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The nine-point proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question [and a national policy that will not change]. The new

situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan. The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue as indicated in the nine-point proposal of September 30, 1981.

5. The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China. It reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty or territorial integrity or pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan."

6. [Therefore] The United States Government states that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.

7. [Similarly] The United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and that it will gradually reduce its arms sales to Taiwan, leading to a final resolution over a period of time. In so stating, the United States Government acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the total settlement of this issue.

8. Considering that the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan is an issue left over by history and that it should be finally settled, [amicably,] over a period of time on the basis of the foregoing statements, both governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the settlement of this issue and will keep in touch with each other on this matter.

9. The two governments agree that the continued development of Sino-US relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples, but is conducive to peace and stability in the world. [Within the East Asia region, both sides believe that harmonious, cooperative and friendly relations between the two nations will contribute to an atmosphere in which further progress toward a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue can be registered by the Chinese people themselves.] The two sides are determined to make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Chinese and American peoples and between the governments of the two countries.

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