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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name GREGG, DONALD: FILES

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CAS 5/15/2007

File Folder TAIWAN - FX SALE (APRIL 1981-JUNE 1981)

FOIA

F99-056

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24

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
36083	MEMO	MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION RE TAIWAN <i>R 10/19/2018 M909/1</i>	3	4/14/1981	B1
36084	MEMO	JIM LILLEY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE TAIWAN	1	5/21/1981	B1
36085	REPORT	RE TAIWAN (INCLUDES CHART)	7	5/14/1981	B1 B3
36086	STATEMENT	BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS RE TAIWAN <i>D 2/17/2023 M909 #36086</i>	15	6/2/1981	B1 B2 B3
36087	MEMO	GREGG TO ALLEN RE LETTER <i>R 10/19/2018 M909/1</i>	1	6/19/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN -

1700 N. Moore St.
17th Floor
Arlington, Virginia 22209
(703) 525-8474

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 14, 1981

SUBJECT: Taiwan Presses for FX Decision

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Konsin C. Shah, Representative
Coordination Council for North American Affairs
Mr. S. K. Hu, Deputy Representative
Coordination Council for North American Affairs
Mr. Peter Chang, Deputy Representative
Coordination Council for North American Affairs
Mr. David Dean, Chairman of the Board
American Institute in Taiwan

COPIES TO: EA - Ambassador John H. Holdridge
EA - Mr. Michael H. Armacost
EA/C - Mr. Charles W. Freeman
EA/RA/TC - Mr. Donald Ferguson

Konsin Shah and his two deputies called at AIT's Washington office April 14 at 11:00 a.m. Konsin Shah raised the FX, the Taiwan Purchasing Mission, Governor Yu Kuo-hau's visit, the Privileges and Immunities Agreement (sales and gasoline tax exemption) and the recent ITC decision on footwear from Taiwan. He also asked for a farewell meeting with Assistant Secretary Holdridge on April 28.

Konsin's main purpose in calling was to discuss two alternative proposals concerning the FX. He asked if some senior military from Taipei could come to Washington to be briefed on the P&R data for the F-5G and the F16-79 and to discuss other FMS matters. Their visit would be kept secret and they would be briefed on the FX by the U.S. Air Force without the knowledge of the concerned aircraft companies or the public. Alternatively, Taipei could decide, on the basis of information now on hand, about the FX and initiate a specific FMS request from CCNAA (Pat Wen) to AIT/W. Their purpose would be to skip the P&R procedures and put their FX selection on record. He said

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GDS 4/14/87 (Dean, David) OR/M

AIT/W: DDean: hn: 4/14/81

BY RW DATE 10/19/18

TAIWAN
FX 36083

REF: M909 # 36083

~~SECRET~~

2

that the FX, more than any of the other FMS sales, was important to Taiwan for psychological reasons, to reassure the public and to increase confidence and stability on Taiwan. Konsin asked which of the two procedures I would recommend. I suggested that it would be wise to delay a decision on either alternative in order to give the administration more time to develop guidelines and procedures and its position on military sales. I also said however that I would consult with others and be back in touch with him.

Konsin then raised the question of the five U.S. Navy ship transfers which the previous administration had approved but the present administration had withdrawn the enabling legislation from Congress. (This is accurate, the Navy withdrew proposed legislation on an oiler, a floating dry dock, a hydrographic survey ship and two patrol vessels pending an overall policy review.) I told Konsin I would check on the status of this legislation.

We then discussed Governor Yu Kuo-hua's visit. Konsin was clearly pleased by the arrangements for the luncheon on May 14 with Secretary Regan. He raised the Purchasing Mission and asked why its leader, Benjamin Lu, could not call on government officials in their offices. He said that this was merely a continuation of the previous administration's policies. I discussed the luncheon we were giving for the Trade Mission and Assistant Secretary Morris, the reception we were co-hosting with Bill Morell, and calls we had arranged for private members of the Mission at Agriculture.

Konsin then asked about the status of the sales tax exemption cards and I told him we were checking with the D.C., Virginia and Maryland governments to see if our agreed-upon cards would be acceptable. He asked if, pending the issuance of the cards, we could send letters to some gasoline companies stating the CCNAA office (as distinct from individuals) was exempt from tax on gasoline. I said I would look into this possibility.

Konsin then raised the ITC's decision to continue limiting the importation of Taiwan footwear into the U.S. while at the same time removing restrictions on imports of South Korean footwear. He claimed this was discriminatory and was contrary to our constant reassurances that in textiles,

~~SECRET~~

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3

TV's, etc. we would not discriminate against Taiwan. He said he would send me a letter about this subject.

In closing he asked for a farewell meeting with John Holdridge on April 28. He plans to leave the United States on May 7 or 8. Tsai Wei-ping will arrive a few days later.

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36084 MEMO

1 5/21/1981 B1

JIM LILLEY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE TAIWAN

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36085	REPORT RE TAIWAN (INCLUDES CHART)	7	5/14/1981	B1 B3

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36086	STATEMENT BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS RE TAIWAN	15	6/2/1981	B1 B2 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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3955

June 19, 1981

Dear Mr. Kramer:

This is to acknowledge and thank you for the June 4 letter which you and Congressman Robert Livingston cosigned to the President requesting that he give favorable consideration to approving the sale of "FX" aircraft to Taiwan.

We certainly appreciated hearing from you on this matter, and you may be assured that your comments and recommendation have been transmitted to the President's national security advisers for careful study. I am confident that your views will receive close and prompt attention.

With cordial regard, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President.

The Honorable Ken Kramer
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MLF:CMF:jm-II-50B

cc: w/copy of incoming, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response by State. (Please forward copy of response to Charlie Ponticelli, WH Legis. Affairs.)

WHITE HOUSE RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL INCOMING

KEN KRAMER
5TH DISTRICT, COLORADO



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COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO 80909
(303) 632-8555

275 UNION EXCHANGE
8933 EAST UNION AVENUE
ENGLEWOOD, COLORADO 80110
(303) 779-6900

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
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WASHINGTON OFFICE:
114 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4422

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

June 4, 1981

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

027813

Dear Mr. President:

In view of the increasing age of the aircraft of our friend and ally, Taiwan, and of the need to modernize its air force, we would like to request that you give favorable consideration to approving the sale of "FX" aircraft to Taiwan.

As you know, right now the F-5E aircraft used by Taiwan do not match the speed and service ceiling of the MIG 21, which is the most widely exported of all military aircraft in the world and which is produced by the People's Republic of China, among others. More sophisticated aircraft are also entering the PRC forces.

Under these circumstances, we feel that the sale of either of the current "FX" candidates, either the "derated" F-16 or the F-5G, can only be characterized as "defensive" in nature. Thus, allowing the sale of either plane to Taiwan, in our opinion, is required under Section 3 (a) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."

In light of more advanced U.S. and Soviet aircraft, an "FX" sale to Taiwan would not jeopardize any other nation and is necessary to upgrade the aging air defense capabilities of Taiwan.

In addition, the question is not merely one of air defense, but of honor, of keeping our word as a nation. Our allies around the world, particularly those in Asia, will be watching to see if we do in fact honor our commitments, as expressed by Congress and signed into law.

So we would like to urge a favorable and early decision on the sale of fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Robert Livingston

Ken Kramer

KK:lm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3635

36087

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

NLR #36087
BY *RW* 10/19/18

SUBJECT: Letter on US Relations with the PRC and Taiwan
from Solarz & Company

At 1100 today I received a letter to the President from Stephen Solarz, dealing with US relations with Taiwan and the PRC. The letter is signed by all members of Solarz's Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The letter makes three points:

- The Committee opposes the sale of the FX or any other combat aircraft to Taiwan, at this time. Instead they recommend coproduction of F5Es.
- The Committee supports the sale of non-lethal equipment and dual use technology to Peking, but recommends that any arms sales relationship be approached with the greatest caution.
- The Committee advocates repeal of those restrictions on the economic and commercial relationship between the PRC and the US that were previously enacted. They sound supportive of Administration efforts to review existing restrictions with a view to their being repealed.

Ed Friedman, the staffer who sent the letter to me, indicates that it will become public by Sunday at the latest. You should know about the letter for this reason, if for no other.

RECOMMENDATIONS

When the letter becomes public that the White House state that we have received it and that it is under study.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- That any reply to Solarz be handled in a few days, after the impact of Secretary Haig's trip has been more fully assessed.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

FYI: The Committee is sending a copy of this letter to the Department of State.

Attachment

✓ Tab A Solarz, etal memo to The President, dated June 18, 1981
cc: J. Lilley

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on June 19, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CHIEF OF STAFF

Congress of the United States Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

18 June 1981

The Honorable
Ronald Reagan
President
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

For the last few months your Administration has been actively reviewing our strategic relationship to the People's Republic of China and our arms sales policy toward Taiwan.

During this period of time, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, on which we all serve, has conducted an extensive series of hearings on our policy toward both the PRC and Taiwan. Now that Secretary of State Haig has completed his conversations in Peking, and the Administration is presumably about to decide how best to resolve the complex and controversial issues that confront us in that part of the world, we thought this would be an opportune moment to share with you some of the conclusions we reached -- on a bipartisan basis -- during the course of our own consideration of the policy choices available to us.

First, insofar as Taiwan is concerned, we want to reaffirm our belief as expressed in the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future of Taiwan should be "determined by peaceful means" and our conviction that the U.S. should continue "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character."

We do not believe, however, that the Taiwan Relations Act obligates us to sell Taiwan whatever military equipment it wants. According to the explicit terms of this carefully crafted legislation, the decision about the quantity and quality of arms we provide Taiwan is to be made solely on the basis of a joint Presidential and Congressional determination of Taiwan's actual "defensive needs."

After the most careful consideration of the military threat to Taiwan, and the relative balance of power between the PRC and Taiwan, during which we had a particularly useful hearing in executive session by the leading analysts of these precise questions from the intelligence community, we have come to the conclusion that it would be a mistake to sell the FX, or any other advanced combat aircraft to Taiwan, at this time.

From a military point of view, every one of the witnesses who testified before our Committee agreed that military tensions in the Taiwan Straits were at an all-time low. There was also a clear consensus that the PRC had no present or immediately foreseeable intention of trying to resolve the Taiwan problem by force and that, even if it did decide to utilize a military option as a way of bringing Taiwan under its control, it currently lacks the capacity to do so. All were agreed that, given the amphibious deficiencies of the Chinese armed forces, there would be ample warning time in the event the PRC commenced an effort to provide itself with the kind of sea-lift capacity they would need to effectively invade and invest Taiwan.

Furthermore, even in terms of the air balance itself, the F5E, which is the current mainstay of the Taiwanese air force, is technically superior to any of the combat aircraft in the PRC air force. And, even if we were to upgrade the Taiwanese air force by selling them the FX, the chances are that the PRC would still be able to achieve air superiority given the enormous quantitative advantages they have, assuming they were prepared to accept the enormous losses that would inevitably be inflicted upon them. To the extent that the Taiwanese do have a substantial number of planes in their present inventory that will soon become obsolete, we can and should extend our coproduction agreement with Taiwan for the F5E's which they already have, thereby enabling them to replace the planes they will be retiring without introducing a new generation of military aircraft into the region. In short, Mr. President, it seems to us that, from a purely military perspective, the FX is neither needed or necessary for the defense of Taiwan at this time.

The sale of the FX to Taiwan, under existing circumstances, would seem to make even less sense politically than it does militarily. Given the enormous strategic significance of our relationship with the PRC, and the extent to which the success of normalization has itself been a major factor behind the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Straits, it seems to us unwise to unnecessarily provoke the PRC in such a fashion. No one can say for sure what the precise consequences of such a sale would be for our relationship with the PRC, but there is a very real possibility that it could be significantly adverse, and that the prospects for further progress in our relationship with the PRC would be substantially diminished. If this were to happen, and no one can be confident it wouldn't, it would not only hamper our ability to counter Soviet expansionism, but would also reduce the incentives which the PRC currently has to refrain from the use of force as a way of resolving the Taiwan problem.

Second, insofar as our military relationship with the PRC is concerned, we support the present policy of making available non-lethal equipment and dual use technology on a selected basis to Peking. As Secretary Haig recently indicated when he was in the PRC, our two nations do have parallel and important interests in countering the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union.

We would recommend, however, that any arms sales relationship with the PRC be approached with the greatest caution. In view of the limitations on the PRC's foreign exchange and the magnitude of their military needs, a decision to sell Peking either lethal American weaponry, or the technology to produce it, would do relatively little to significantly enhance the military capacities of the PRC's armed forces, but might well be seen as particularly provocative by the Soviet Union. It would also be a source of real concern to our friends in the region. At a time when we still have not abandoned all hope of reaching constructive accommodations with Moscow on a whole series of issues, particularly with respect to arms reduction and control, and at a time when the Polish situation is still unresolved, we should be especially cautious, keeping in mind that once we start down the path of assisting the modernization of the Chinese military, it will be very difficult to back off. In the event a decision should be made to sell any particular weapons systems to the PRC, we should at the very least insure that it is defensive in character and poses no offensive threat to friends or allies in the region.

Some people suggest that if we were to sell weapons to Peking then it would accept our sale of the FX to Taiwan. There is no evidence to back-up that suggestion. We therefore have weighed the issue of arms sales to Peking and the FX to Taiwan on the merits in the light of our national interest.

Finally, in an effort to advance the process of normalization between the U.S. and the PRC, we believe we should repeal those restrictions on the economic and commercial relationship between our two countries, that were enacted at a time when we were distant and hostile rather than close and friendly, and which no longer reflect the emerging realities of the relationship between us. We understand that the Administration is now reviewing these restrictions and we look forward to receiving your recommendations in this regard. For our own part, we are prepared to move expeditiously toward the legislative elimination of those prohibitions which unnecessarily restrict the further development of a more constructive and enduring relationship between us.

The above conclusions, which we wanted to share with you, represent our judgment on how best to keep the peace in the Taiwan Straits region, to further our growing economic relationship with the PRC, and to build a politically sound basis for further strategic cooperation with China for our common effort to cope with and counter Soviet military aggression.


Sincerely,





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

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MEMBER OF CONGRESS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

JIM LILLEY *W*

SUBJECT:

Letter from American Council for Free Asia

At Tab I is a proposed response to Gary Jarmin, National Director, who sent you the results of a poll the ACFA conducted of the U.S. Senate concerning the Administration's proposal to sell the FX to Taiwan. (Mr. Jarmin estimates approximately 65 senators in favor of the sale.)

Mr. Jarmin also lectures somewhat on the definition of detente and warns us against allowing ourselves to be "intimidated" by Peking.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at Tab I, thanking Mr. Jarmin for his letter.

Approved _____

As amended _____

Attachments

Tab I - Ltr to Jarmin

II - Incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Jarmin:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 24th, enclosing the results of the ACFA Senate poll on U.S. sale of the FX to Taiwan.

You can be sure that this Administration will pay the closest attention to Taiwan's defense needs and will act only after the most careful and objective study. I can also assure you that the decision will be made by the United States in our own national interests.

I also appreciate your advice on US-PRC relations, and have shared your letter with my staff.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Gary L. Jarmin
National Director
American Council for Free Asia
418 C Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

ACFA American Council for Free Asia

June 24, 1981

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Eugene Delgaudio, Jr.

Prof. Donald J. Devine

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Senator Donald Lukens

Prof. Ben Lyle

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Hon. William E. Simon

Sam Slom

Steven Some

Prof. Eliseo Vivas

Charles W. Wiley

Mr. Richard Allen
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Allen:

Once again ACFA has conducted a Senate poll the results of which I hope will prove of value to the Administration (copy enclosed). Should you want more detailed results, please don't hesitate to give me a call.

To briefly summarize the poll, my hard count of Senators in favor of selling the FX is approximately 59. I have also identified several others who would most likely vote accordingly, therefore, bringing the total closer to 65 or more.

I should also add that this poll was taken without any consultation with the R.O.C. government. In fact, they were not too pleased with me releasing this information to the press after I notified them of such upon completion of the poll.

Obviously, I had to make a political judgement call which hopefully will produce the desired results.

Finally, I should add that we hope the Administration will not allow itself into being intimidated or blackmailed by Peking. It has always been my firm belief that strengthening the Communist Chinese will only speed up the process of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. It is an historic fact that detente is only possible among equals, not when one side is substantially inferior to the other. When it is to Peking's advantage to have detente with the Soviets they will do so, regardless of what the U.S. does.

Well, forgive me for starting to sound a little preachy. It has all been said before and there is no use in being redundant. Don't hesitate to call if we at ACFA can be of any service.

Best Wishes,

GARY L. JARMIN

National Director

GLJ/jf