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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name GREGG, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/15/2007

File Folder TAIWAN - FX SALE (12/17/81-01/18/1982)

FOIA

F99-056

Box Number 10

JESPERSEN

28

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
36127	MEMO	WILLIAM CASEY TO JAMES NANCE RE CHINA <i>PAR 2/21/2023 M910 #36127</i>	1	12/18/1981	B1	B3
36128	REPORT	RE CHINA/TAIWAN <i>PAR 2/21/2023 M910 #36128</i>	6	12/16/1981	B1	B3
36129	MEMO	DONALD GREGG TO WILLIAM CLARK THRU NANCE RE TAIWAN	1	1/6/1982	B1	
36130	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE TAIWAN (ATTACHMENT TO 36129)	2	ND	B1	
36131	MEMO	CASEY TO NANCE RE TAIWAN (SAME TEXT AS 36127) <i>PAR 2/21/2023 M910 #36131</i>	1	12/18/1981	B1	B3
36132	REPORT	RE CHINA/TAIWAN (SAME TEXT AS 36128) <i>PAR 2/21/2023 M910 #36132</i>	6	12/16/1981	B1	B3
36133	MEMO	HAIG ET AL TO THE PRESIDENT RE DECISION <i>D 2/21/2023 M910 #36133</i>	2	ND	B1	

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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36134	MEMO	GREGG TO CLARK THRU NANCE RE FINAL THOUGHTS <i>R 2/21/2023 M910 #36134</i>	1	1/7/1982	B1
36135	LETTER	CHIANG CHING-KUO TO PRESIDENT REAGAN	1	1/13/1982	B1

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D.C. 20505

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18 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: China and the Question of US Arms
Sales to Taiwan

Attached is the paper requested by Dick Allen on
16 November on the aftermath of the Premier Zhao and Huang
Hua meetings.

William J. Casey
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

cc:
The Secretary of State

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NLRR M91D #36127

BY *kw* NARA DATE *2/21/2023*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

16 December 1981

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM

CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

Judgments

China is determined to gain US agreement to open conversations on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan--a step long sought by Beijing. China considers that the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait and its program for peaceful reunification provide the basis for insisting that the US reduce and subsequently end arms sales to Taiwan. In requesting talks with the US, at a minimum Beijing will seek some sort of acknowledgement, however vague, that sales will cease at some point in the future. If it achieves this objective, China may well show some flexibility in the short term on the nature and scale of arms sales to Taiwan, although it will not agree to significant enhancement of the F-5E's capabilities. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The new Chinese demands presented by Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the end of October resulted from:

- a growing Chinese concern over US intentions toward Taiwan;
- a fear that the US would shortly sell an advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan;
- a feeling that past efforts to influence US policy toward Taipei had failed and that a dramatic step was needed to engage US attention; and
- uneasiness over US policies elsewhere, particularly in terms of US initiatives to open arms talks with the USSR. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] China External Affairs Division,
Office of East Asian Analysis, National Foreign Assessment
Center, in response to a request from [REDACTED]

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NLRR M91D #36128

BY RH NARA DATE 2/12/23

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9 3.5(c)

To the best of our knowledge, Deng is the architect of China's current approach to the US. It is possible that pressures from Deng's political opponents played a role in the formulation of Huang Hua's demands, but it is more likely that Deng approved this stance to preempt his rivals and to forestall other domestic criticisms. [redacted]

3.5(c)

Background: Taiwan a Growing Issue

Beginning last winter the Chinese made several efforts to engage the Administration in talks on the question of US arms sales to Taiwan. Since August 1980, moreover, Chinese attacks on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) have at times included the demand that the TRA be rescinded. More important, China appears to consider that its actions since 1978 to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait as well as its program of peaceful reunification should be paralleled by US reductions in arms sales to Taiwan within a specified period of time. Chinese concern over US failure to respond in this manner intensified after the visit of Secretary Haig to Beijing in June and led to an oral demarche on 4 July to the US Embassy in Beijing which warned that a "strong reaction" and "grave consequences" would follow US arms sales to Taiwan. [redacted]

3.5(c)

Despite their stridency, Chinese denunciations of American arms sales to Taiwan in 1980 and 1981 lacked specific warnings of the consequences of such sales. Into the summer of 1981, in fact, Chinese leaders continued to state [redacted] that their patience was not unlimited in this matter--a suggestion that Beijing was indeed willing to tolerate continued sales as long as they were not too large and did not include advanced weapons. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.5(c)

Recent Shifts

This situation began to change with the Foreign Ministry's oral demarche of 9 September to the US Embassy in Beijing that a specific consequence (retrogression of relations) would follow a specific US action (the sale of the FX). This demarche followed published reports of an imminent US decision on the sale of the FX to Taiwan. [redacted] it also took place against a backdrop which included Chinese uncertainty about US foreign policy overall and a growing sentiment within the Chinese government in favor of a strong stand on US arms sales to Taiwan. By early October the Chinese apparently were convinced that the US was about to agree to substantial qualitative improvements for Taiwan's air force, a conviction which seems to have produced the decision to challenge the US on the question of arms sales to Taiwan. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

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In reaching this decision, the Chinese also weighed other factors central to their relationship with the United States. The Chinese voiced concern several times in 1981 over the

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constancy of American policy and have claimed to be uncertain about US intentions, particularly toward the Soviet Union. Beijing has questioned US attitudes toward the Soviet Union since the removal of the grain embargo last spring and is clearly uneasy about US objectives in negotiating arms control agreements with Moscow. In recent months, Beijing has also increasingly criticized US policies in the Third World and taken steps to dissociate itself from the US in these areas. Finally, Chinese statements at and following their Sixth Plenum in June on the need to preserve independence in dealings with "stronger and richer" countries reflect a determination to assert Chinese autonomy and to preserve national interests in relations with the US. [redacted]

3.5(c)

Having decided that it had to engage the US at the highest levels on a matter of principle, Beijing may also have determined that it could carry off this effort successfully. A [redacted]

[redacted] Huang Hua's demands in Washington at the end of October cited "the very difficult internal and external situation" faced by the US. Chinese propaganda, moreover, for months has been skeptical that the Administration can achieve its domestic and foreign goals. China may well have believed these judgments and concluded that its value to the US as a strategic partner gave it some basis for hope that it could gain acceptance of the principles of joint discussions on limiting arms sales to Taiwan. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.5(c)

What Does China Really Want?

Several Chinese leaders, including Deng, insisted to former Vice President Mondale's delegation in November that there is little or no room for maneuver in their position. Huang Hua's presentation in Washington excluded the possibility of Chinese flexibility, and Chinese propaganda has made an implicit but clear connection between US arms sales to Taiwan and a retrogression in relations. [redacted]

3.5(c)

China, nevertheless, appears to have asked for more than it expected the US to grant. In demanding the almost immediate opening of talks on the reduction and termination of arms sales to Taiwan and in insisting that the US not transfer any weapons to Taipei while these matters were being discussed, China almost certainly left itself room for accommodation if the US were to meet its basic needs. [redacted]

3.5(c)

The historical record suggests that China's main objective now, along with blocking the sale of advanced aircraft to Taiwan, is to induce the US to enter into the talks it has attempted to initiate for nearly a year on US arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese have made clear that they will not compromise on the question of talks or on their other long-held position that US arms sales to Taiwan cannot exceed the qualitative and quantitative levels maintained by the Carter Administration. [redacted]

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Beijing is unlikely to agree to talks that are not specifically directed at achieving agreement on a final termination of US arms sales. This demand appears to be central to Beijing's position, although the Chinese probably will not insist on highly specific terms of reference for these discussions. At the outset of the talks, the Chinese also are unlikely to insist that the US clearly and unequivocally declare its intention to work out a deadline for Taiwan arms sales and would probably seek only a vaguely worded statement from the US. []

3.5(c)

The Chinese will almost certainly press hard for a US guarantee that arms sales to Taiwan will cease within a specified time. The great emphasis given the Nine Point Proposal for reunification with Taiwan in discussions with US officials, moreover, suggests that China will use the reunification initiative as a lever to gain US acquiescence in this point. By describing the prospects for results from the Nine Point Proposal over a term of five years and more, however, the Chinese may be implying that they recognize a linkage between the period needed to gradually terminate arms sales and their self-proclaimed schedule for progress in PRC-Taiwan reunification. []

3.5(c)

The Chinese would probably consider that their basic demands had been adequately met by a US agreement to discuss the question of arms sales to Taiwan and a subsequent statement, however vague, on the desirability of ceasing these sales at some future point. Having gained this, China would then seek a firm statement of US intention to end these sales. China, moreover, would maintain relations at their current level while these talks progressed. That is, China would not move forward on such matters as the Liu Huaqing visit to discuss US-China arms sales, but would not put a chill on current contacts. []

3.5(c)

The Chinese are likely to react harshly to any arms sales to Taiwan before these talks begin or during their initial stages, as Ambassador Chai warned in his demarche of 15 December, but not necessarily by reducing the level of diplomatic representation. They might well respond by recalling Ambassador Chai for an extended period and by ending substantive contacts on all but the most essential matters in order to warn the US of the sensitivity of any and all arms sales to Taiwan. []

3.5(c)

There is no evidence to suggest that Beijing wants relations with the US to deteriorate. China appears in fact to want to preserve and strengthen its ties with the US and undoubtedly hopes that some accommodation can be reached. []

3.5(c)

China's response to arms sales to Taiwan following the satisfaction of its two basic demands and during the subsequent talks would probably be determined by the quantitative and qualitative levels of US sales to Taiwan. Any sales that exceed the levels of those of the Carter Administration, particularly those of advanced aircraft, would be bitterly protested and would

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12 3.5(c)

probably lead to a retrogression of relations.* Spare parts for existing systems and the continuation of the F-5E coproduction line would evoke strong Chinese protests but probably would not cause talks to break down or relations to deteriorate.

3.5(c)

[redacted] China will be satisfied with arms sales that do not exceed the level maintained prior to the normalization of relations. It is possible that China will prove to be this flexible, but the intensity and force of Huang Hua's presentations suggest that Beijing will not be so accommodating, particularly on the questions of opening talks and obtaining a US statement of intentions.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

The Domestic Factor

For some time now the Chinese have stated privately that the Taiwan issue is tightly bound up with the domestic political situation in China and that the leadership could fall on this issue. Such Chinese statements, including those made to Vice President Mondale's party, have a strongly self-serving character (as do Chinese complaints about the failure of the US to live up to its word on various agreements) and are not subject to verification. We consider that the judgments reached when we last addressed this question remain valid, although note should be taken of some spontaneous patriotic demonstrations that occurred in November. While demonstrations can be manipulated, spontaneous occurrences and the messages that are carried by them must be taken into account by the leadership. These demonstrations appear to have heightened somewhat Deng's concern about internal order and perhaps about the regime's ability to contain any popular reaction to a setback on the sensitive Taiwan issue.**

3.5(c)

Despite the assertions of a Chinese diplomat in November that a group of party "elders" forced Deng to accede to the harsh demands made by Huang Hua in October, we consider that whatever role Deng played in the domestic politics in this question was

3.3(b)(1)
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13 3.5(c)

preemptive rather than reactive. That is, Deng may have decided to confront the US on the matter of arms sales to Taiwan in order to deny his opponents this issue before it came to a head in Beijing. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Apart from the assertions of Chinese officials, there is currently no direct evidence that the Taiwan question has become a major issue of factional contention in Beijing. It is also unlikely that Deng would have allowed opposition to build up on this issue to the point that he could be forced by his opponents to reverse himself. Deng, by all appearances is fully in accord with China's current demands. If Deng sensed that US-China relations were becoming a political liability, it is much more probable that he would move against the US before his opponents could move against him. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

To the best of our knowledge, the leadership is in accord on the Taiwan issue, including over the tactics to be used with the US. There are groups in China--especially within the scientific and technical establishment--with a vested interest in the preservation and improvement of US-China relations. These groups and individuals, however, are of only limited political consequence in China; it is doubtful that they could exert substantial influence in a debate on Taiwan policy--an issue that is unique in its historical sensitivity and central to China's national interests. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)



Handwritten text, possibly a signature or date, located in the lower left corner of the page. The text is faint and difficult to decipher.

6587

Allen

RECEIVED

81 DEC 18 P 2:43

Return to
Gregg

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

Comments:

8137678

December 23, 1981

Dear Mr. Patterson:

This is to acknowledge and thank you for your letter to the President of December 8, cosigned by eleven of your colleagues, reiterating your serious interest in the issue of providing advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

We appreciate receiving your views and suggestions in this matter. Please be assured that I have transmitted your correspondence to the President's foreign policy staff to ensure a prompt and careful review of the concerns you have underscored with respect to this important issue.

With cordial regard, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Jerry M. Patterson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: w/copy of incoming, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response
(with copy to Max L. Friedersdorf)

MLF:CMP:Ljm-6

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT WILL RETAIN ORIGINAL INCOMING

8137678

VIC FAZIO
4TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE
APPROPRIATIONS



1421 LONGWORTH HOUSE
OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5716

SPECIAL PHONE FOR THE
HEARING IMPAIRED
TTY-202-225-1904

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

052340

December 8, 1981

Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On August 3, 1981 a number of us wrote on the issue of providing advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. To date you have neither acted on this important issue nor provided us with more than an interim response.

We can understand legitimate concerns about America's relationship with the People's Republic of China. Each of us agrees that a proper US-PRC relationship appears to be in the best long term strategic interests of our country. But a proper relationship must be built on mutuality of trust and respect; with due regard for the rights and obligations of the other party. And our commitments to Taiwan, as memorialized in the Taiwan Relations Act and publically supported by you, are a matter of record.

Clearly we must have due regard for the PRC's concerns, and insure that only defensive weapons are provided Taiwan. However, as pointed out in our previous letter to you, the F-5G is just such a weapon. While it would modernize Taiwan's existing F-5 series of aircraft, it would do so only in a manner that improves Taiwan's air defense capabilities. We do not believe that the sale of F-5G fighters to Taiwan could seriously damage the growing rapport between the US and PRC. To the contrary, the honoring of our commitment to Taiwan is bound to have a salutary long-range effect on our relationship with the PRC. It will also be a clear signal to the international community that the U.S. will not allow any third parties to determine the relationship between our nation and any other.

PLEASE RESPOND TO:

823 MARIN STREET, ROOM 8
VALLEJO, CALIFORNIA 94590
(707) 552-0720

2740 FULTON AVENUE, SUITE 100
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95821
(916) 484-4174

117 WEST MAIN STREET
WOODLAND, CALIFORNIA 95695
(916) 666-5521

931 LIVE OAK BOULEVARD, #8
YUBA CITY, CALIFORNIA 95991
(916) 674-2500

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH 100% RECYCLED PAPER

Mr. Ronald Reagan
Page 2

We urge you, Mr. President, to immediately approve the sale of the F-5G
to Taiwan.

Sincerely,

Mr. Jerry M. Patterson

Mr. Julian C. Dixon

Robert F. Matsui

Bob

Robert F. Matsui

Paul

Gus Hawkins

GUS HAWKINS

Ed

Edward R. Roybal

EDWARD R. ROYBAL

Mr.

Glenn M. Anderson

GLENN M. ANDERSON

Mr. Vic Fazio

VIC FAZIO DANIELSON

George

George E. Danielson

GEORGE E. DANIELSON

Norm

Norman Y. Mineta

NORMAN Y. MINETA

Tony

Tony Coelho

TONY COELHO

George E. Brown

Mr.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEBRUARY 3 1982

Dear Mr. Fazio:

I have been asked by the President to respond to your letter of December 8, cosigned by eleven of your colleagues, requesting a favorable decision to provide advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan, specifically the F5-G.

Your views, and the views of your colleagues, were taken into consideration during the intervening weeks. However, as you know, the President decided on January 10 that no sale of an advanced fighter aircraft would be approved because there is no military need for such an aircraft. This decision was based upon an exhaustive study in which the Departments of State and Defense and other national security elements unanimously concluded that Taiwan's defense needs could be adequately met as needs arise and for the foreseeable future by replacing aging aircraft already in Taiwan's inventory with comparable aircraft and by extension of the F-5E co-production line in Taiwan. No specific decisions have been taken on the precise levels, mix, and quantities to be involved in deciding the replacement aircraft issue.

The above decision regarding replacement fighter aircraft for Taiwan is consistent with long-standing U.S. Government policy to provide such defense articles as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Administration has already taken steps to sell Taiwan items necessary for self-defense, and we anticipate further steps of this sort.

Sincerely,

Alvin Paul Drischler
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

The Honorable
Vic Fazio,
House of Representatives.

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LAUX, DAVID: FILES

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

36130 MEMO

2

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B1

CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE TAIWAN
(ATTACHMENT TO 36129)

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Washington, D.C. 20505

EO
13526
3.5(c)

18 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: China and the Question of US Arms
Sales to Taiwan

Attached is the paper requested by Dick Allen on
16 November on the aftermath of the Premier Zhao and Huang
Hua meetings.

William J. Casey
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

cc:
The Secretary of State

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NLRR MID # 36131
BY *EW* NARA DATE *2/21/2023*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

16 December 1981

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs:
EO 13526 3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM

CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

Judgments

China is determined to gain US agreement to open conversations on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan--a step long sought by Beijing. China considers that the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait and its program for peaceful reunification provide the basis for insisting that the US reduce and subsequently end arms sales to Taiwan. In requesting talks with the US, at a minimum Beijing will seek some sort of acknowledgement, however vague, that sales will cease at some point in the future. If it achieves this objective, China may well show some flexibility in the short term on the nature and scale of arms sales to Taiwan, although it will not agree to significant enhancement of the F-5E's capabilities. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The new Chinese demands presented by Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the end of October resulted from:

- a growing Chinese concern over US intentions toward Taiwan;
- a fear that the US would shortly sell an advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan;
- a feeling that past efforts to influence US policy toward Taipei had failed and that a dramatic step was needed to engage US attention; and
- uneasiness over US policies elsewhere, particularly in terms of US initiatives to open arms talks with the USSR. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] China External Affairs Division,
Office of East Asian Analysis, National Foreign Assessment
Center, in response to a request from [REDACTED]

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NLRR M91D #36132

BY [REDACTED] NARA DATE 2/21/2023

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3.5(c)

To the best of our knowledge, Deng is the architect of China's current approach to the US. It is possible that pressures from Deng's political opponents played a role in the formulation of Huang Hua's demands, but it is more likely that Deng approved this stance to preempt his rivals and to forestall other domestic criticisms. []

3.5(c)

Background: Taiwan a Growing Issue

Beginning last winter the Chinese made several efforts to engage the Administration in talks on the question of US arms sales to Taiwan. Since August 1980, moreover, Chinese attacks on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) have at times included the demand that the TRA be rescinded. More important, China appears to consider that its actions since 1978 to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait as well as its program of peaceful reunification should be paralleled by US reductions in arms sales to Taiwan within a specified period of time. Chinese concern over US failure to respond in this manner intensified after the visit of Secretary Haig to Beijing in June and led to an oral demarche on 4 July to the US Embassy in Beijing which warned that a "strong reaction" and "grave consequences" would follow US arms sales to Taiwan. []

3.5(c)

Despite their stridency, Chinese denunciations of American arms sales to Taiwan in 1980 and 1981 lacked specific warnings of the consequences of such sales. Into the summer of 1981, in fact, Chinese leaders continued to state [] that their patience was not unlimited in this matter--a suggestion that Beijing was indeed willing to tolerate continued sales as long as they were not too large and did not include advanced weapons. []

3.3(b)(1)

3.5(c)

Recent Shifts

This situation began to change with the Foreign Ministry's oral demarche of 9 September to the US Embassy in Beijing that a specific consequence (retrogression of relations) would follow a specific US action (the sale of the FX). This demarche followed published reports of an imminent US decision on the sale of the FX to Taiwan. [] it also took place against a backdrop which included Chinese uncertainty about US foreign policy overall and a growing sentiment within the Chinese government in favor of a strong stand on US arms sales to Taiwan. By early October the Chinese apparently were convinced that the US was about to agree to substantial qualitative improvements for Taiwan's air force, a conviction which seems to have produced the decision to challenge the US on the question of arms sales to Taiwan. []

3.3(b)(1)

3.5(c)

In reaching this decision, the Chinese also weighed other factors central to their relationship with the United States. The Chinese voiced concern several times in 1981 over the

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constancy of American policy and have claimed to be uncertain about US intentions, particularly toward the Soviet Union. Beijing has questioned US attitudes toward the Soviet Union since the removal of the grain embargo last spring and is clearly uneasy about US objectives in negotiating arms control agreements with Moscow. In recent months, Beijing has also increasingly criticized US policies in the Third World and taken steps to dissociate itself from the US in these areas. Finally, Chinese statements at and following their Sixth Plenum in June on the need to preserve independence in dealings with "stronger and richer" countries reflect a determination to assert Chinese autonomy and to preserve national interests in relations with the US. [redacted]

3.5(c)

Having decided that it had to engage the US at the highest levels on a matter of principle, Beijing may also have determined that it could carry off this effort successfully. A [redacted]

[redacted] Huang Hua's demands in Washington at the end of October cited "the very difficult internal and external situation" faced by the US. Chinese propaganda, moreover, for months has been skeptical that the Administration can achieve its domestic and foreign goals. China may well have believed these judgments and concluded that its value to the US as a strategic partner gave it some basis for hope that it could gain acceptance of the principles of joint discussions on limiting arms sales to Taiwan. [redacted]

3.5(c)

3.3(b)(1)

3.5(c)

What Does China Really Want?

Several Chinese leaders, including Deng, insisted to former Vice President Mondale's delegation in November that there is little or no room for maneuver in their position. Huang Hua's presentation in Washington excluded the possibility of Chinese flexibility, and Chinese propaganda has made an implicit but clear connection between US arms sales to Taiwan and a retrogression in relations. [redacted]

3.5(c)

China, nevertheless, appears to have asked for more than it expected the US to grant. In demanding the almost immediate opening of talks on the reduction and termination of arms sales to Taiwan and in insisting that the US not transfer any weapons to Taipei while these matters were being discussed, China almost certainly left itself room for accommodation if the US were to meet its basic needs. [redacted]

3.5(c)

The historical record suggests that China's main objective now, along with blocking the sale of advanced aircraft to Taiwan, is to induce the US to enter into the talks it has attempted to initiate for nearly a year on US arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese have made clear that they will not compromise on the question of talks or on their other long-held position that US arms sales to Taiwan cannot exceed the qualitative and quantitative levels maintained by the Carter Administration. [redacted]

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

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~~SECRET~~

3.5(c)

Beijing is unlikely to agree to talks that are not specifically directed at achieving agreement on a final termination of US arms sales. This demand appears to be central to Beijing's position, although the Chinese probably will not insist on highly specific terms of reference for these discussions. At the outset of the talks, the Chinese also are unlikely to insist that the US clearly and unequivocally declare its intention to work out a deadline for Taiwan arms sales and would probably seek only a vaguely worded statement from the US. []

3.5(c)

The Chinese will almost certainly press hard for a US guarantee that arms sales to Taiwan will cease within a specified time. The great emphasis given the Nine Point Proposal for reunification with Taiwan in discussions with US officials, moreover, suggests that China will use the reunification initiative as a lever to gain US acquiescence in this point. By describing the prospects for results from the Nine Point Proposal over a term of five years and more, however, the Chinese may be implying that they recognize a linkage between the period needed to gradually terminate arms sales and their self-proclaimed schedule for progress in PRC-Taiwan reunification. []

3.5(c)

The Chinese would probably consider that their basic demands had been adequately met by a US agreement to discuss the question of arms sales to Taiwan and a subsequent statement, however vague, on the desirability of ceasing these sales at some future point. Having gained this, China would then seek a firm statement of US intention to end these sales. China, moreover, would maintain relations at their current level while these talks progressed. That is, China would not move forward on such matters as the Liu Huaqing visit to discuss US-China arms sales, but would not put a chill on current contacts. []

3.5(c)

The Chinese are likely to react harshly to any arms sales to Taiwan before these talks begin or during their initial stages, as Ambassador Chai warned in his demarche of 15 December, but not necessarily by reducing the level of diplomatic representation. They might well respond by recalling Ambassador Chai for an extended period and by ending substantive contacts on all but the most essential matters in order to warn the US of the sensitivity of any and all arms sales to Taiwan. []

3.5(c)

There is no evidence to suggest that Beijing wants relations with the US to deteriorate. China appears in fact to want to preserve and strengthen its ties with the US and undoubtedly hopes that some accommodation can be reached. []

3.5(c)

China's response to arms sales to Taiwan following the satisfaction of its two basic demands and during the subsequent talks would probably be determined by the quantitative and qualitative levels of US sales to Taiwan. Any sales that exceed the levels of those of the Carter Administration, particularly those of advanced aircraft, would be bitterly protested and would

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3.5(c)

probably lead to a retrogression of relations.* Spare parts for existing systems and the continuation of the F-5E coproduction line would evoke strong Chinese protests but probably would not cause talks to break down or relations to deteriorate.

3.5(c)

China will be satisfied with arms sales that do not exceed the level maintained prior to the normalization of relations. It is possible that China will prove to be this flexible, but the intensity and force of Huang Hua's presentations suggest that Beijing will not be so accommodating, particularly on the questions of opening talks and obtaining a US statement of intentions.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

The Domestic Factor

For some time now the Chinese have stated privately that the Taiwan issue is tightly bound up with the domestic political situation in China and that the leadership could fall on this issue. Such Chinese statements, including those made to Vice President Mondale's party, have a strongly self-serving character (as do Chinese complaints about the failure of the US to live up to its word on various agreements) and are not subject to verification. We consider that the judgments reached when we last addressed this question remain valid, although note should be taken of some spontaneous patriotic demonstrations that occurred in November. While demonstrations can be manipulated, spontaneous occurrences and the messages that are carried by them must be taken into account by the leadership. These demonstrations appear to have heightened somewhat Deng's concern about internal order and perhaps about the regime's ability to contain any popular reaction to a setback on the sensitive Taiwan issue.**

3.5(c)

Despite the assertions of a Chinese diplomat in November that a group of party "elders" forced Deng to accede to the harsh demands made by Huang Hua in October, we consider that whatever role Deng played in the domestic politics in this question was

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

preemptive rather than reactive. That is, Deng may have decided to confront the US on the matter of arms sales to Taiwan in order to deny his opponents this issue before it came to a head in Beijing. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Apart from the assertions of Chinese officials, there is currently no direct evidence that the Taiwan question has become a major issue of factional contention in Beijing. It is also unlikely that Deng would have allowed opposition to build up on this issue to the point that he could be forced by his opponents to reverse himself. Deng, by all appearances is fully in accord with China's current demands. If Deng sensed that US-China relations were becoming a political liability, it is much more probable that he would move against the US before his opponents could move against him. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

To the best of our knowledge, the leadership is in accord on the Taiwan issue, including over the tactics to be used with the US. There are groups in China--especially within the scientific and technical establishment--with a vested interest in the preservation and improvement of US-China relations. These groups and individuals, however, are of only limited political consequence in China; it is doubtful that they could exert substantial influence in a debate on Taiwan policy--an issue that is unique in its historical sensitivity and central to China's national interests. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)



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36133	MEMO HAIG ET AL TO THE PRESIDENT RE DECISION	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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36134

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MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 7, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM CLARK

VIA: BUD NANCE

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Final Thoughts on the Taiwan Arms Sales Meeting

I have been in touch with State, Defense and CIA and everyone seems to be more or less on the same wave length regarding this afternoon's meeting. State's paper tracks well with what I sent to you yesterday.

My residual concern centers on how today's decisions are conveyed to the Chinese, to the Taiwanese and to the US public. I think we are headed toward the correct decision, but we must realize that it will not be fully satisfactory to any of the parties directly concerned. Unless great care is taken regarding the manner in which we convey these decisions, we may lose the benefits which might otherwise result.

- In talking to the Chinese, the emphasis must be placed on our decision not to sell an FX. Having stressed that point, the Chinese need to be told that we will continue to sell to Taiwan aircraft already in their inventory and other defensive equipment.

- In talking to the Taiwanese, more stress can be placed on what we are doing (F-5E coproduction, transfer of 104G's and sale of other equipment previously promised to the Taiwan Government). Taiwan must keep these decisions confidential as any publicity could make the Germans reluctant to sell their 104G's to us for subsequent transfer to Taiwan. Publicity re our intention to sell Standard missiles and Sea Chaparral could cause an extremely negative Chinese reaction.

- Our public announcement should also be as muted as possible, stressing our intention to continue delivery to Taiwan of aircraft already in its inventory. The press will quickly dig out the full decision, but the manner in which our choices are publicized will have great impact in both Taipei and Peking.

The bottom line is that if we try to please Taipei's constituents by publicly accentuating the positive aspects of our decision, we may provoke a strongly counterproductive reaction from Peking.

cc: Bob Kimmitt
China Office

~~SECRET~~

Review on January 7, 2001

NLRR M91D #36134

BY *REV*TE *2/21/2023*

January 11, 1982

Dear Guy:

This is to acknowledge and thank you for your letter to the President of December 28, in which you endorse the views previously expressed by your colleagues calling for an early decision to provide modern defensive fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

Your views in this matter are very much appreciated, and you may be assured that I have communicated your statement to the appropriate White House officials. Please know that your thoughts on this issue will receive every consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Guy Vander Jagt
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

KMD:CMF:sew III A16

cc: w/copy of inc, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT Response
(with copy to Ken Duberstein)

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT WILL RETAIN ORIGINAL INCOMING

GUY VANDER JAGT
9TH DISTRICT, MICHIGAN

2409 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-3511

COMMITTEE:
WAYS AND MEANS

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
JAMES M. SPARLING, JR.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

December 28, 1981

DISTRICT OFFICES:
ROOSEVELT PARK
950 WEST NORTON AVENUE
MUSKEGON, MICHIGAN 49441
(616) 733-3131
31 WEST 8TH STREET
HOLLAND, MICHIGAN 49423
(616) 396-3848

054100
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

It is my understanding you recently received a letter signed by a number of Members of Congress supportive of an early decision to provide modern defensive fighter aircraft to the Republic of China on Taiwan. I wanted to be a cosigner of that letter but, unfortunately, was out of the city at the time it was sent to you. Consequently, this communication is submitted in support of that request.

To reiterate their request, I join in expressing the hope that a favorable announcement of the question of fighters to the Republic of China on Taiwan will soon be made.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,



Guy Vander Jagt
Member of Congress

GVJ:rg

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36135 LETTER

1 1/13/1982 B1

CHIANG CHING-KUO TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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北美事務協調委員會駐美國辦事處
Coordination Council for North American Affairs
Office in U.S.A.
5161 River Road, Washington, D.C. 20016

February 2, 1982

Dear Mr. Dean:

Under instructions of President Chiang Ching-kuo, I send you herewith a letter addressed by him to President Reagan. It will be very much appreciated if you will kindly transmit it to its high destination.

Sincerely,



Tsai Wei-ping
Representative

Mr. David Dean
Chairman of the Board
and Managing Director
American Institute in Taiwan
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, VA 22209

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 18, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction to the Taiwan Arms Sale

Attached is a memorandum from you to Jerry Bremer (Tab I), asking State to come up with talking points to deal with interested Congressmen. I will inform Judge Clark, in a subsequent memorandum, of the tack we have taken.

Bob Kimmitt concurs. Chris Shoemaker concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to Bremer at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for AJL Signature to Bremer

Tab II Incoming Request from Ken Duberstein dated 1/13/82

cc: Bob Kimmitt
Chris Shoemaker
China Office

*Taiwan
FX**CHINA OFFICE*



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Congress and the Taiwan Arms Sales Decision

When Congress reconvenes on January 25, the White House expects a series of inquiries on the recent Taiwan arms sales decision. To deal with these queries in the most effective manner, we believe that a series of talking points should be developed, drawing on the experience of John Holdridge and his team, as they conveyed the decision to Peking. Special attention should be given to the manner in which the decision to continue co-production of the F-5E is conveyed, as this is a matter of great sensitivity in Peking.

We request that these talking points arrive at the White House by opening of business on January 25.

Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Don buss for
action.

jr

1/14/82

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # _____

13

82 - A10:40

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	_____	_____
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COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

0218

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO: Bill Clark

FROM: Ken Duberstein *Ken D.*

SUBJECT: Congressional response to
Taiwan Aircraft decision

Attached is a listing of Senate and House members who have written the President, or our office, advocating the sale of aircraft to Taiwan. We anticipate many of them contacting us when Congress reconvenes on the 25th.

A fact sheet on our decision and/or a briefing for interested members might be useful in dampening their concern about the decision.

Your thoughts, please.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1982

TO: KEN DUBERSTEIN
FROM: PAM TURNER *pt*
SUBJECT: Sale of Advanced Fighter Aircraft to Taiwan

Following is a list of the Senators who co-signed Senator Strom Thurmond's letter to the President urging a favorable decision on the sale of advanced American fighter aircraft to Taiwan. I have also added Senator Helms' name, since I know this is an issue of major concern to him. I will be checking further with the Foreign Relations Committee to see if they have any additional information.

Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina)

Senator Jennings Randolph (D-West Virginia)

Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-New Hampshire)

Senator John East (R-North Carolina)

Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nevada)

Senator Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)

Senator Don Nickles (R-Oklahoma)

Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa)

Senator David Boren (D-Oklahoma)

Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas)

Senator Dan Quayle (R-Indiana)

Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona)

Senator Mack Mattingly (R-Georgia)

Senator Paula Hawkins (R-Florida)

Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming)

Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-Alabama)

Senator James McClure (R-Idaho)

Senator S. I. Hayakawa (R-California)

Senator Warren Rudman (R-New Hampshire)

Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 12, 1982

FOR: KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN

THRU: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. 

FROM: JOHN H. DRESSENDORFER 

SUBJECT: Congressional Response to Taiwan Aircraft Decision

Though there has been considerable Congressional interest and correspondence advocating the sale of aircraft to Taiwan, no calls have been received on the matter subsequent to this morning's story.

The following Members have written in support of the sale of aircraft:

Ken Kramer
Robert Livingston
Edward Derwinski
Jim Jeffries
John Rousselot
Richard T. Schulze
Gerald Solomon
Robert Davis
Joe Skeen
George C. Wortley
Gene Taylor
Vic Fazio
Anthony Beilenson
Tony Coelho
Norman Mineta
George Danielson
Robert Matsui
Augustus Hawkins
Julian Dixon
Mervyn Dymally
Jerry Patterson
Leon Panetta

Robert Badham
Bobbi Fiedler
David Dreier
Bob Lagomarsino
Jerry Lewis
William Thomas
Gene Chappie
Bill Lowery
Wayne Grisham
Clair Burgener
Duncan Hunter
Daniel Lungren
Bill Dannemeyer
Norman Shumway
Don Clausen
Charles Pashayan, Jr.
Barry Goldwater, Jr.
Carlos Moorhead
Robert Daniel
George O'Brien
Philip Crane
Daniel Crane

Jim Dunn
Floyd Spence
Tom Corcoran
Carroll Campbell
Newt Gingrich
Mickey Edwards
L. A. Bafalis
John Hiler
William Dickinson
Marjorie Holt
John Ashbrook
Albert Smith
Jim Courter
Dan Marriott
John LeBoutillier
Dan Coats
Hank Brown
Raymond McGrath
Frank Wolf
Arlan Stangeland
Jack Kemp
Edward Roybal
Glenn Anderson
George E. Brown, Jr.
Trent Lott

Jack Fields
William Clinger, Jr.
John Porter
John T. Myers
John Erlenborn
Robert Dornan
Don Ritter
Tom Hagedorn
John Napier
George Hansen
Ed Bethune
Robert Walker
David Staton
Eldon Rudd
Thomas Bliley, Jr.
James Collins
James Nelligan
Guy VanderJagt
Dan Daniel