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Aircraft (3 of 15)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: LAUX, DAVID N.: Files

Archivist: mjd

FOIA ID: F98-054

File Folder: Taiwan ~~US Relations~~ Arms Sales - Indigenous Fighter Aircraft (2)
Box 90856 RAL Box 32 (3)

Date: 10/28/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re: Taiwan, 75p 12/6/05 M03-1453 #1 AND NLSF98-054 #15	8/1/85	PMF1
2. memo	Gen. Welch to Assistant Secretary re: F-5E/F Upgrade Potential, 1p R, 6/30/00 NLSF98-054 #16	5/31/85	P1/F1
3. draft paper	re: Taiwan IDF [annotated], 5p PART 12/6/05 M03-1453 #2	nd	P1/F1
4. note	Poindexter to McFarlane re: meeting, 2p D ~ #3	nd	P1/F1 P5
5. memo	David Laux to Robert McFarlane re: technology assistance [annotated], 5p PART 12/6/05 M03-1453 #4	5/31/85	P1/F1
6. memo	Laux to John Poindexter re: Technology assistance, 4p PART ~ #5	4/26/85	P1/F1
7. table	re: LWDF development, 2p D ~ #6 AND NLSF98-054 #20	5/30/85	P1/F1
8. summary	re: Judge Clark's meeting with President Chiang, 3p D 11/16/01 F98-054 #21 D 12/6/05 M03-1455 #7	nd	P1/F1
9. note	to Poindexter re: draft paper, 2p PART 12/6/05 M03-1455 #8	6/1/-	P1/F1 P5
10. draft paper	re: IDF, 5p PART 12/6/05 M03-1453 #9	nd	P1/F1
11. charts	re: LWDF Development, 17 p D ~ #10	5/30/85	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

31 MAY 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: F-5E/F Upgrade Potential (U) (OASD/ISA Memo I-22516/85) -
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S/NE) The following information is provided in response to your request concerning growth potential and upgrade limitations of the F-5E/F aircraft possessed by Taiwan. F-5E/F upgrades offer potential for some marginal overall increase in combat capability as follows:

a. (U) Engines. There is no current effort to upgrade existing engines due to the small size of the J85 engine bay. Northrop's approach has pointed toward the single engine concept (a la the F-20), however, this approach requires major airframe design modifications.

b. (S) Avionics. Some avionics upgrades can be made-- increased range radar, look down/shoot down technology (APG-69 from Emerson Electronics is specifically designed for F-5 upgrade). These radar advancements will not fully develop F-5E air-to-air combat capability unless integrated with long range weapons. The heads up display (HUD) and improved inertial navigation system (INS) could substantially improve air-to-surface accuracy. While these upgrades enhance avionics capability, they also place increased demands on aircraft electrical and cooling systems, thereby restricting the total number of upgrades that can be incorporated with the existing power plant.

c. (S/NE) Armament. Taiwan has been approved for release of the AIM-9P-4 infrared air-to-air missile (AAM). Past studies showed that mounting the AIM-7 Sparrow AAM (radar) on the F-5E/F is possible but the radar is not compatible and AIM-7 carriage reduced the F-5E performance to that of the F-5A. There is little additional armament assistance possible unless the USG were to approve release of the AIM-9L or AIM-9M. However, release of these munitions seems unlikely.

d. (U) Flight Controls. There are no known Northrop or other development efforts to update the F-5E/F flight control system or increase aircraft maneuverability. Possible areas for upgrade are to increase wing area and to add leading edge flaps as in the F-20.


LARRY D. WELCH, General, USAF
Vice Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-054 #16
BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/30/00

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Classified by Multiple Sources

SUMMARY

The Issue is whether to authorize approval of licenses for commercial sale of avionics and systems integration for Taiwan's Indigenous Fighter Development *which is the next step in our support for this program.* The decision we face is not a critical one but an incremented one.

Military Aspect

- Air attack will remain a threat to Taiwan over the next 20-30 years. PRC retains option to use force.
- Taiwan's existing fighter inventory is aging and will attrite in the early 1990s. PRC capability should improve by 1990.
- Improvements to Taiwan's F-5E are limited and are unlikely to preserve balance.
- Taiwan on its own has developed an Indigenous fighter which could meet its needs in the 1990s but this requires some U.S. support in sale of key components
- In January 1982, we turned down the sale of U.S. *FX* fighters to Taiwan. The current decision is different because we are now merely dealing with U.S. components for a Taiwan Indigenous fighter..

DECLASSIFIED IN PART / RELEASED
NLS MD3-1453 #2
By MS, NARA, Date 12/6/05

U.S. Policy:

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-- The President has stated the Communique is consistent with the TRA and he interprets the Communique as allowing the U.S. to preserve a balance between the PRC and Taiwan.

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The Fighter (IDF)

-- IDF capabilities are tailored for interception -- its range is less than the F-5E and the F-20.

-- U.S. avionics are necessary but they will be commercially sold and because of low cost will not

require Congressional notification.

-- Taiwan has developed its own fighter with a major commitment of manpower, money and resources. It will build the fighter in Taiwan. This project was well advanced before it came to our notice.

-- U.S. encouraged Taiwan in its efforts to build its own fighter and provided a critique of the design.

-- This fighter has received some publicity but Taiwan has protected news of U.S. involvement.

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PRC & Taiwan Reactions:

-- PRC reactions could range from modest as has been the case recently, or intense as was the case with the FX in 1981-82. Most judge the reactions to be manageable. If ~~deterioration~~ ^{deterioration} occurred in our

relations with the PRC, this decision would not be the ~~same~~ ^{CAUSE} but could be ^a part of the process.

-- There was no PRC reaction to Taiwan's development of an indigenous trainer/attack aircraft with U.S. assistance.

-- If the avionics sale is refused by us, Taiwan could claim U.S. was not fulfilling its obligations under the TRA and launch a campaign in Congress and the media which would embarrass the Administration. This could also adversely affect US-PRC military cooperation. [REDACTED]

1.4(d)
-- Taiwan's long term reaction to the approval could be an increase in confidence in its defensive capability. Taiwan needs to operate from stability and strength in widening its modus vivendi with the PRC, a ^{ongoing} process we have [not discouraged] (welcomed?)

1.4(d)
-- Finally, our arguments on sale of avionics are credible and our position defensible. [REDACTED]

Decision Needed Now:

Decision

Taiwan views IDF as critical to its security in 1990s and has sought a decision on avionics since the end of 1984. Licenses need to be approved to meet optimistic schedule. Go/No Go time is now if prototype is to be launched in 1987-88 and production achieved in early 1990s. Taiwan cannot proceed without avionics approval.

The current impasse has been created by us and the longer it lasts, the greater the chances are of a distorted leak by Americans which could cause the kind of adverse PRC reactions we have tried to avoid in carefully developing this program.

WANG #6568B11.10006

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II 90589

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CAV X

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

May 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

DAVID N. LAUX *DL*

SUBJECT:

Technology Assistance for Taiwan's Indigenous Fighter Aircraft

The purpose of this memo is to provide you background on the above subject and to suggest that you raise it in a low key way with Secretary Shultz on Monday, June 3, 1985.

I wrote Admiral Poindexter an earlier memo on this subject (Tab A) which I recommend you read for more detailed background. John suggested I re-write it after checking into possible alternative sources of supply of some of the equipment for the plane. While I have explored some possible alternatives, the rapid pace of other developments has led John, Gaston and myself to conclude that raising the issue with Shultz as soon as possible should be the next tactical move. This memo is cast in that light.

Background. About four years ago, Taiwan embarked on a program to produce their own indigenous fighter aircraft. When the sale of a U.S. FX fighter aircraft was turned down in early 1982, the Taiwan program took on more momentum. They decided that if they were not going to be able to purchase advanced aircraft from us, and probably not from other suppliers (such as Israel) too, they needed to insure against the day their existing inventory would become decrepit or obsolete. We have encouraged them in this philosophy, not only in aircraft, but other equipment, to ease our own problem of living up to the terms of the Taiwan Arms Sales Communique.

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Problem. [REDACTED] Defense) now estimate that the balance of airpower in the Taiwan straits will change and the earlier superiority of Taiwan's aircraft and pilots will begin to be seriously degraded at least two years earlier than previously estimated because of the increasing obsolescence of Taiwan's aircraft and the PRC programs underway to upgrade their F-7's and F-8's. In sum, some time around 1990, or perhaps earlier, Taiwan's position will begin to slip. Because of the long lead times involved, it is essential to make decisions now if Taiwan is to have its own aircraft by the early 1990's which will enable them to keep pace with PRC improvements. [REDACTED]

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS 003-1453 #4

By *CU*, NARA, Date *12/6/05*

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These items are:

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RATE SENSOR
UNITS &
ACCELEROMETERS

- To provide A/C response
information for FLT control
systems

1. Bendix

DFCSDT

- For A/C handling quality
simulation, OFF & DFLCC.
Validation & verification
tool

1. Lear Siegler
Inc.

Based on our encouragement, Taiwan has already invested some half a billion dollars (of a total \$5 billion) involved in this indigenous fighter program, created an organization of some 2,000 people to develop it, and put in 4 years of effort. The current delays on licenses are costing Taiwan \$1 million per day, according to Taiwanese representatives.

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Our program of support had been proceeding smoothly until about six months ago. Since then, several decisions on key components for the fighter have been held up.

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For more than a year we have been convening periodically under Gaston Sigur's leadership a small group of the key decision makers on our military relations with both Taiwan and the PRC. The group consists of Lt. Gen. Jack Chain - Director of State's Political Military Bureau, Paul Wolfowitz- Asst. Secretary of State for EA and Pacific Affairs and his principal Deputy, Bill Brown (now replaced by Jim Lilley), Asst. Sec. of Defense for ISA, Richard Armitage and his Deputy for East Asia, Jim Kelly, plus Gaston and myself. This group has met every 3 to 6 weeks and has reached a remarkable consensus on what our military relationship should be with both Taiwan and the PRC.

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The Taiwan Arms Sales Communique is ambiguous with respect to technology transfer. We believe the sale of technology involved in our support of the indigenous fighter aircraft program is not only legal, but that it is not a violation of the Arms Sales Communique. Moreover, we believe that if we do not approve the licenses involved, we will face a severe reaction from Taiwan and from Taiwan's close supporters in Congress which will make our whole policy toward the PRC and Taiwan the subject of public controversy and rhetoric from which we have so successfully removed it the past three years, all of which would be politically damaging to the President.

We believe it is important to make a decision in principle as soon as possible to move forward with the support of Taiwan's program and to make clear our intent to approve the necessary licenses involved. This should be done quickly before the issue leaks and becomes a story, and before General Chain departs on June 19 for a new assignment.

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In sum, we think we have made a fair and objective analysis of this issue and the pros and cons of proceeding with the necessary license approvals. We conclude that this program has been on the right track, and it is important to get it back onto a lower level, routine approval basis as soon as possible, without controversy and without leaks. We believe the President's own view would clearly be in favor of this and that he would be significantly disturbed if he knew the extent of the delays that have already taken place. The recommendation of the entire Sigur Group is to proceed with the approval of the 8 items listed in Tab B (not quite the same as those listed above) because these are the ones on which Taiwan needs a decision soonest.

Gaston Sigur concurs. *CHILDREN CONSUME*

Recommendation

That you raise this in a low-key way with Secretary Shultz on Monday with a view to encouraging his approval of these 8 licenses by mid-June, and that you suggest the issue be discussed at the next appropriate Shultz-Weinberger-McFarlane breakfast.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A Laux Letter to Poindexter

Tab B List of equipment

Action completed.

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based on
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preference.
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TAB A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To: Admiral Poindexter

From: David Laux 

Cap Weinberger was briefed on this issue by Rich Armitage a few days ago and he concurs in our recommendations. George Shultz is to be briefed Saturday, April 27, by Armacost, Paul Wolfowitz and Jack Chain. Either Shultz or Weinberger may raise it with Bud or you in the near future.

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SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS 400416

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 26, 1985

INFORMATION ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

DAVID N. LAUX *DL*

SUBJECT:

Technology Assistance for Taiwan's
Indigenous Fighter Aircraft

The purpose of this memo is to provide you and Bud background on the above subject, since it may be raised by Secretary Shultz or Secretary Weinberger with Bud or you in the near future.

Background. About four years ago, Taiwan embarked on a program to produce their own indigenous fighter aircraft. When the sale of a U.S. FX fighter aircraft was turned down in early 1982, the Taiwan program took on more momentum. They decided that if they were not going to be able to purchase advanced aircraft from us, and probably not from other suppliers (such as Israel) too, they needed to insure against the day their existing inventory would become decrepit or obsolete. We have encouraged them in this philosophy, not only in aircraft, but other equipment, to ease our own problem of living up to the terms of the Taiwan Arms Sales Communique.

The Problem. At present, Taiwan has an inventory of about 400 fighter aircraft, as opposed to the PRC's 5,000. Taiwan's inventory is made up of something over 200 F-5E's and F-5F's, and another 200 of old F-100's, F-104's, and F-5A's and B's. Attrition from age will remove about half of these latter planes from Taiwan's inventory before 1990, and the F-5E co-production line is scheduled to end this year. Extending the co-production line won't particularly help the problem because the F-5E will be an obsolete aircraft in the 1990's. Some improvements to the F-5E's and F's can and will be made, but this is a temporary measure.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS *MO3-1453 #5*
By *CU*, NARA, Date *12/4/05*

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In sum, Taiwan needs a new fighter aircraft by the early 1990's if it is to retain its relative power balance in the air with respect to the PRC. They have essentially three options: a) obtain it from the U.S.; b) obtain it from other sources (e.g. Israel), or c) build it themselves.

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if the U.S. is to adhere to the Taiwan Relations Act, the question needs to be addressed. Under certain circumstances it might be possible, in the 1990's, to sell them the F-20 as the only available replacement for F-5E's which by then will no longer be produced -- just as we sold them C-130's last year to replace the technologically inferior predecessor C-119's which were no longer being produced.

1.4d
Alternative sources of fighter aircraft, such as Israel, Sweden or France, do not appear to be feasible. We have concluded, therefore, that the best policy option is to encourage Taiwan to produce its own aircraft, and assist them with technology transfer, where this is needed.

The Aircraft. The plane Taiwan is planning to produce, like any aircraft, has three major parts: the airframe, the engines, and the instrumentation. The airframe is entirely of indigenous design and will not resemble any U.S. aircraft. The plane is twin-engined, and the powerplant will be the Garret 1042 engine, which was approved for sale to Taiwan in early 1982, before the August 17, 1982 Taiwan Arms Sale Communique. The two engines will provide about 16,700 pounds of thrust with afterburner, which is more than the F-5E's single engine of 10,000 pounds, but less than the single 18,000 pound thrust of the F-104 engine or the F-20's two engine total of 18,000 pounds.

Instrumentation. U.S. assistance in the plane's instrumentation is the issue under discussion, primarily the radar system, a flight data computer, digital flight control system, etc. and some guidance in the integration of these systems -- i.e., how best to fit them into the aircraft. The most important instrumentation package is the radar. What is proposed is the 6-D-53 radar system manufactured by Westinghouse, with a look-down, shoot-down capability. The F-5E does not have this capability, and the system would be less capable than that of the F-16, but about the same as that of the F-20.

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PRC Reaction. In our view, the way we handle US involvement in the program will affect whether and how the PRC may react. Our response to any such reaction should be designed to reduce the duration and sharpness of the exchange.

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TAB B

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

7-8
2-11

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2-11 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

June 1

12:55 P.M.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

John,

This is the
brief paper that
Paul Welford and
Tim Liddy and I
worked over in Honolulu.

It is not typed up
final yet, but will be
next week - The points
made in it are, we
believe, the essential ones
for Bush to look at before
over

DECLASSIFIED IN PART 1/20/05
NLS MW3 - 1453 78
By CH 12/6/05

Dave's paper on the subject -

John

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SUMMARY

The Issue is whether to authorize approval of licenses for commercial sale of avionics and systems integration for Taiwan's Indigenous Fighter Development *which is the next step in our support for this program.* The decision we face is not a critical one but an incremented one.

Military Aspect

- Air attack will remain a threat to Taiwan over the next 20-30 years. PRC retains option to use force.
 - Taiwan's existing fighter inventory is aging and will attrite in the early 1990s. PRC capability should improve by 1990.
-
- Improvements to Taiwan's F-5E are limited and are unlikely to preserve balance.
 - Taiwan on its own has developed an Indigenous fighter which could meet its needs in the 1990s but this requires some U.S. support in sale of key components.
 - In January 1982, we turned down the sale of U.S. FX fighters to Taiwan. The current decision is different because we are now merely dealing with U.S. components for a Taiwan Indigenous fighter.

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NLS 003-7453 HQ

By 12/6/05

U.S. Policy:

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The Fighter (IDF)

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-- U.S. avionics are necessary but they will be commercially sold and because of low cost will not

require Congressional notification.

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-- U.S. encouraged Taiwan in its efforts to build its own fighter and provided a critique of the design.

-- This fighter has received some publicity but Taiwan has protected news of U.S. involvement.

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PRC & Taiwan Reactions:

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relations with the PRC, this decision would not be the ~~case~~ ^{CAUSE} but could be ^a part of the process.

-- There was no PRC reaction to Taiwan's development of an indigenous trainer/attack aircraft with U.S. assistance.

-- If the avionics sale is refused by us, Taiwan could claim U.S. was not fulfilling its obligations under the TRA and launch a campaign in Congress and the media which would embarrass the Administration. This could also adversely affect US-PRC military cooperation. [REDACTED]

1.4d
-- Taiwan's long term reaction to the approval could be an increase in confidence in its defensive capability. Taiwan needs to operate from stability and strength in widening its ~~modus~~ ^{ing} vivendi with the PRC, a process we have ~~[not discouraged]~~ (welcomed)

1.4d
-- Finally, our arguments on sale of avionics are credible and our position defensible. [REDACTED]

Decision Needed Now:

Decision

Taiwan views IDF as critical to its security in 1990s and has sought a decision on avionics since the end of 1984. Licenses need to be approved to meet optimistic schedule. Go/No Go time is now if prototype is to be launched in 1987-88 and production achieved in early 1990s. Taiwan cannot proceed without avionics approval.

The current impasse has been created by us and the longer it lasts, the greater the chances are of a distorted leak by Americans which could cause the kind of adverse PRC reactions we have tried to avoid in carefully developing this program.

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