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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: LAUX, DAVID N.: Files

File Folder: Taiwan/Arms Sales – Indigenous Fighter Aircraft (2)
RAC Box 90856-32

Archivist: mid FOIA ID: F98-054 Date: 10/28/1999

DOCUMENT : NO. & TYPE :	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
. memo	Laux to Robert McFarlane re: technology assistance, 5p PACT 17/6/05 M03-1453 #//	5/31/85	P1/F1
2. memo	Laux to John Poindexter re: technology assistance, 4p	4/26/85	P1/F1
3. chart	re: LWDF development, 2p	5/30/85	P1/F1
-memo	McFarlane to the President re: Response to Sen. Goldwater, 1p	5/25/85	<del>P1/F</del> 1
memo	Laux to McFarlane re: response to Sen. Goldwater, 1p	5/23/85	P1/F1
6. charts	re: LWDF program status, 29p  D 9/5/02 NLSF98-054 #29 D 12/1/05 M05	5/22/85	PHR F4 6
7. charts	re: LWDF program status, 29p	5/17/85	/
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#### RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]. P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Lisa Jones

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### **Emergency Supplies List & Locations**

See APPENDIX C for the Emergency Supplies List. Click here for a local copy of the form.

Emergency supplies can be found:

Basement – Supplies are within the Telephone Room at the bottom of Elevator 3 and some are in the open area outside the telephone room.

LG-Supplies are at the front end of the LG Stack Area by Elevator 3. Some supplies are around the elevator shaft by Stairwell #3.

Object Storage – Supplies are kept at the north end of the stacks farthest away from the offices.

6/14/2012



MEMORANDUM

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CAUX

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ACTION

May 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

DAVID N. LAUX DL

SUBJECT:

Technology Assistance for Taiwan's Indigenous

Fighter Aircraft

The purpose of this memo is to provide you background on the above subject and to suggest that you raise it in a low key way with Secretary Shultz on Monday, June 3, 1985.

I wrote Admiral Poindexter an earlier memo on this subject (Tab A) which I recommend you read for more detailed background. John suggested I re-write it after checking into possible alternative sources of supply of some of the equipment for the plane. While I have explored some possible alternatives, the rapid pace of other developments has led John, Gaston and myself to conclude that raising the issue with Shultz as soon as possible should be the next tactical move. This memo is cast in that light.

Background. About four years ago, Taiwan embarked on a program to produce their own indigenous fighter aircraft. When the sale of a U.S. FX fighter aircraft was turned down in early 1982, the Taiwan program took on more momentum. They decided that if they were not going to be able to purchase advanced aircraft from us, and probably not from other suppliers (such as Israel) too, they needed to insure against the day their existing inventory would become decrepit or obsolete. We have encouraged them in this philosophy, not only in aircraft, but other equipment, to ease our own problem of living up to the terms of the Taiwan Arms Sales Communique.

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Problem. Defense) now estimate that the balance of airpower in the Taiwan straits will change and the earlier superiority of Taiwan's aircraft and pilots will begin to be seriously degraded at least two years earlier than previously estimated because of the increasing obsolescence of Taiwan's aircraft and the PRC programs underway to upgrade their F-7's and F-8's. In sum, some time around 1990, or perhaps earlier, Taiwan's position will begin to slip. Because of the long lead times involved, it is essential to make decisions now if Taiwan is to have its own aircraft by the early 1990's which will enable them to keep pace with PRC improvements.

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The other alternative — a plane produced by Taiwan — appears to be the most desirable option. The airframe is entirely of indigenous design. The engine was approved for sale to Taiwan in early 1982, before the August 17, 1982 Taiwan Arms Sale Communique. The matter at issue is U.S. approval for 8 pieces of equipment for the plane, or provision of data, mostly involving the fighter's instrumentation. These licenses do need to be approved by State's Political Military Bureau, but Congress does not need to be notified for any of the sales involved because they fall below the guidelines for Congressional notification requirements.

These items are:

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	POSSIBLE VENDOR
RADAR (GD-53)	- To provide target range, speed & angle data for fire control system.	<ul><li>l. Westinghouse Elec</li><li>Tric Co.</li><li>Elec. Sys. Div.</li></ul>
	<ul> <li>To provide fixed cali- bration capability in navigation</li> </ul>	- 2. General Elec. Co. Aircraft Equip. Armament & Elec. System. Dept.
FLC ACTUATORS	<ul> <li>To provide surface control for flaperon horizontal stabilizer &amp; rudder system</li> </ul>	1. Moog Inc., Aero- space Control Div.
DFLCC	- To provide A/C digital FLT control	<ol> <li>Lear Siegler, Inc. Astronics Div.</li> </ol>
AVIONICS DATA	<ul> <li>Provide baseline documentation &amp; OFP for system being developed</li> </ul>	1. G.D.
LANDING GEAR	- For A/C take off & Landing	1. Menasco Inc.
IADC (Integrated Air Data Computer)	<ul> <li>To provide air data for FLC &amp; avionics System</li> <li>Triplex Digital Channel</li> </ul>	l. United Tech Hamilton Standard

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RATE SENSOR UNITS & ACCELEROMETERS

 To provide A/C response information for FLT control systems

1. Bendix

DFCSDT

 For A/C handling quality simulation, OFP & DFLCC. Validation & verification tool

 Lear Siegler Inc.

Based on our encouragement, Taiwan has already invested some half a billion dollars (of a total \$5 billion) involved in this indigenous fighter program, created an organization of some 2,000 people to develop it, and put in 4 years of effort. The current delays on licenses are costing Taiwan \$1 million per day, according to Taiwanese representatives.

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For more than a year we have been convening periodically under Gaston Sigur's leadership a small group of the key decision makers on our military relations with both Taiwan and the PRC. The group consists of Lt. Gen. Jack Chain - Director of State's Political Military Bureau, Paul Wolfowitz- Asst. Secretary of State for EA and Pacific Affairs and his principal Deputy, Bill Brown (now replaced by Jim Lilley), Asst. Sec. of Defense for ISA, Richard Armitage and his Deputy for East Asia, Jim Kelly, plus Gaston and myself. This group has met every 3 to 6 weeks and has reached a remarkable consensus on what our military relationship should be with both Taiwan and the PRC.

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We believe it is important to make a decision in principle as soon as possible to move forward with the support of Taiwan's program and to make clear our intent to approve the necessary licenses involved. This should be done quickly before the issue leaks and becomes a story, and before General Chain departs on June 19 for a new assignment.

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In sum, we think we have made a fair and objective analysis of this issue and the pros and cons of proceeding with the necessary license approvals. We conclude that this program has been on the right track, and it is important to get it back onto a lower level, routine approval basis as soon as possible, without controversy and without leaks. We believe the President's own view would clearly be in favor of this and that he would be significantly disturbed if he knew the extent of the delays that have already taken place. The recommendation of the entire Sigur Group is to proceed with the approval of the 8 items listed in Tab B (not quite the same as those listed above) because these are the ones on which Taiwan needs a decision soonest.

Gaston Sigur concurs. CHILDRES CONCURS

List of equipment

#### Recommendation

Tab B

That you raise this in a low-key way with Secretary Shultz on Monday with a view to encouraging his approval of these 8 licenses by mid-June, and that you suggest the issue be discussed at the next appropriate Shultz-Weinberger-McFarlane breakfast.

	Approve	Disapprove
Attachme	nts:	
Tab A	Laux Letter to Poindexter	•

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#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To: Admiral Poindexter

From: David Laux

Cap Weinberger was briefed on this issue by Rich Armitage a few days ago and he concurs in our recommendations. George Shultz is to be briefed Saturday, April 27, by Armacost, Paul Wolfowitz and Jack Chain. Either Shultz or Weinberger may raise it with Bud or you in the near future.

#### **MEMORANDUM**

# SEGRET

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

April 26, 1985

## ENFORMATION ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

DAVID N. LAUX

SUBJECT:

Technology Assistance for Taiwan's

Indigenous Fighter Aircraft

The purpose of this memo is to provide you and Bud background on the above subject, since it may be raised by Secretary Shultz or Secretary Weinberger with Bud or you in the near future.

Background. About four years ago, Taiwan embarked on a program to produce their own indigenous fighter aircraft. When the sale of a U.S. FX fighter aircraft was turned down in early 1982, the Taiwan program took on more momentum. They decided that if they were not going to be able to purchase advanced aircraft from us, and probably not from other suppliers (such as Israel) too, they needed to insure against the day their existing inventory would become decrepit or obsolete. We have encouraged them in this philosophy, not only in aircraft, but other equipment, to ease our own problem of living up to the terms of the Taiwan Arms Sales Communique.

The Problem. At present, Taiwan has an inventory of about 400 fighter aircraft, as opposed to the PRC's 5,000. Taiwan's inventory is made up of something over 200 F-5E's and F-5F's, and another 200 of old F-100's, F-104's, and F-5A's and B's. Attrition from age will remove about half of these latter planes from Taiwan's inventory before 1990, and the F-5E co-production line is scheduled to end this year. Extending the co-production line won't particularly help the problem because the F-5E will be an obsolete aircraft in the 1990's. Some improvements to the F-5E's and F's can and will be made, but this is a temporary measure.

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In sum, Taiwan needs a new fighter aircraft by the early 1990's if it is to retain its relative power balance in the air with respect to the PRC. They have essentially three options: a) obtain it from the U.S.: b) obtain it from other sources (e.g. Israel), or c) build it themselves.

if the U.S. 1s to adhere to the Taiwan Relations Act, the question needs to be addressed. Under certain circumstances it might be possible, in the 1990's, to sell them the F-20 as the only available replacement for F-5E's which by then will no longer be produced -- just as we sold them C-130-'s last year to replace the technologically inferior predecessor C-119's which were no longer being produced.

Alternative sources of fighter aircraft, such as Israel, Sweden or France, do not appear to be feasible. We have concluded, therefore, that the best policy option is to encourage Taiwan to produce its own aircraft, and assist them with technology transfer, where this is needed.

The Aircraft. The plane Taiwan is planning to produce, like any aircraft, has three major parts: the airframe, the engines, and the instrumentation. The airframe is entirely of indigenous design and will not resemble any U.S. aircraft. The plane is twin-engined, and the powerplant will be the Garret 1042 engine, which was approved for sale to Taiwan in early 1982, before the August 17, 1982 Taiwan Arms Sale Communique. The two engines will provide about 16,700 pounds of thrust with afterburner, which is more than the F-5E's single engine of 10,000 pounds, but less then the single 18,000 pound thrust of the F-104 engine or the F-20's two engine total of 18,000 pounds.

Instrumentation. U.S. assistance in the plane's instrumentation is the issue under discussion, primarily the radar system, a flight data computer, digital flight control system, etc. and some guidance in the integration of these systems — i.e., how best to fit them into the aircraft. The most important instrumentation package is the radar. What is proposed is the 6-D-53 radar system manufactured by Westinghouse, with a look-down, shoot-down capability. The F-5E does not have this capability, and the system would be less capable than that of the F-16, but about the same as that of the F-20.

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Licensing. Decisions on the licenses for the radar and other equipment need to be made now even though the equipment will be delivered largely well in the future over a period of time extending into the early 1990's. This is because Taiwan needs to know specifically what equipment they can put in the plane before they can finish the design of the airframe, and they are at a point where they cannot proceed without this information. The licenses do need to be approved by the Political Military Bureau of the State Department, but Congress does not need to be notified for any of the sales involved because they fall below the guidelines on Congressional notification requirements. If the licences are approved and things proceed normally, Taiwan should have a prototype aircraft in two to four years and be in series production in 7 to 10 years.

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we have responded to PRC protests by making clear our firm position that we are acting in accordance with our understanding of the undertakings we made in the communiques. We have made clear that we are determined to live up to those undertakings and, at the same time, see nothing to be gained by detailed discussions of each individual weapon. (Our position has been that we will inform the Chinese about important new weapon systems, but that we will not consult with them about the sales.)

Taiwan will not have a prototype aircraft in the air for several years. In the interim, US involvement would be limited to assistance from US vendors and to US Government licensing of avionics and related electronic subsystems, none of which is notifiable.

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If the licences are approved and things proceed normally, Taiwan should have a prototype aircraft in two to four years and be in series production in 7 to 10 years.

Status. A small interagency group, including Gaston Sigur and myself, met on April 17 with Under Secretary of State
Mike Armacost to go over with him the reasoning behind our recommendation. Armacost felt the issue should be discussed between Secretaries Shultz, Weinberger and Bud McFarlane. Rich Armitage has since discussed the issue with Secretary Weinberger, who supports our recommendation to assist Taiwan in this program. Armacost intends to brief Secretary Shultz on the issue on Saturday, April 27, and it is possible that Weinberger or Shultz will discuss it with Bud in the near future. I should add that Ambassador Hummel supports the recommendation to assist Taiwan in this program.

Gaston Figur and Dick Childress concur.

#### Recommendation:

That you brief Bud on this issue and urge him to support the recommendation to proceed with licensing the sale of the necessary technology to Taiwan to support this program.

Approve Disapprove

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
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Laux

THE WHITE HOUSE

washington

May 29, 1985



Dear Barry:

In asking me to reconsider selling the F-20 to Taiwan, you invited me to give you a frank answer. I think you know my position on this: Taiwan still does not need an F-20, in part due to the coproduction of the F-5E that we extended in 1982.

At the same time, I completely agree that we need to help our friends. In fact, we have tried to provide Taiwan with what it needs for an adequate self-defense, and Taiwan's defense needs are under close and virtually continuous review. If you would like to be updated on the arrangements we have made to support Taiwan's defense needs, the Department of State is prepared to provide you with a classified briefing.

Regarding the Republic of Korea, Northrop has a marketing license for the F-20 and has made a very attractive offer to Korea. The decision now rests with the Koreans. In addition, Korea has purchased the F-16C/D and will begin taking delivery next year. And, as you probably know, some Southeast Asian nations also are studying the possibility of purchasing the F-20.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Barry Goldwater United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

# THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 29, 1985

#### Dear Barry:

In asking me to reconsider selling the F-20 to Taiwan, you invited me to give you a frank answer. I think you know my position on this: Taiwan still does not need an F-20, in part due to the coproduction of the F-5E that we extended in 1982.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Barry Goldwater United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

**MEMORANDUM** 

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

Received 55

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Response to Senator Goldwater's Letter to You re F-20 Fighters for Taiwan and South Korea

#### Issue

How to reply to Senator Goldwater's letter to you re F-20 fighters for Taiwan and South Korea.

#### Facts

Senator Goldwater has written you (Tab B) suggesting the time has come to look into the possibility of selling the F-20 fighter to Taiwan and South Korea.

#### Discussion

State prepared an initial draft reply which has been reworked by the NSC, Defense, State and the speechwriters. The final result is at Tab A. It has been carefully constructed to balance the various elements at stake in managing our relationship with both the PRC and the people of Taiwan, without going into any details which might cause us problems on either side of the Straits, if publicized.

#### Recommendation

OK NO

That you sign the letter to Senator Goldwater at Tab A.

#### Attachments

Tab A

Letter to Senator Goldwater

Tab B

Goldwater's incoming letter

Prepared by: David N. Laux

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR

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BY CAL, NARA, DATE 5/30/2

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

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TAGTICAL WARPARE, CHARMAN
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMUNICATIONS, CHARMAN
AVIATION
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE

Indiam affairs Small Business

May 6, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


The time has come again, and I must tell you this issue will continue to arise until we reach some agreement on it. I feel that we must look into the possibility of selling more capable weapons to Taiwan and, perhaps, South Korea.

I am referring to the F-20 aircraft. Every effort in the world is being made to force this system down the throats of our flying commands and we just can't accommodate. It is a good airplane. Our allies need it and if you would just act to remove the restrictions on Taiwan, I think they would buy 200 or so.

Please give this some thought and please don't send a form letter back to me saying that it will receive serious consideration. If you want to tell me no just tell me/no, but we better start being nice to the friends we have left in this world, and I can't think of a better place to start than with Taiwan.

With respect,

Barry Goldwater





ACTION

May 23, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

DAVID N. LAUX

SUBJECT:

Response to Senator Goldwater's Letter to the President re F-20 Fighters for Taiwan and South Korea

Senator Barry Goldwater has written to the President (Tab B) suggesting the time has come to look into the possibility of selling the F-20 fighter to Taiwan and South Korea. We sent the letter to State to prepare a draft reply, which is at Tab II. We have reworked State's draft somewhat and cleared the revision with State, Defense, and the speechwriters, and the final result is at Tab A.

Our reply has been carefully constructed to balance all the elements at stake in managing our relationship with both the PRC and the people of Taiwan, without going into any details which might cause us problems on either side of the Straits, if publicized.

Gaston Sigur and Chris Lehman concur.

#### Recommendation

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I, recommending he sign the letter to Barry Goldwater at Tab A.

Approve 1

Disapprove

Attachments


Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Letter for Senator Goldwater

Tab B Incoming letter from the Senator

Tab II State Department draft reply

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR



Dear Barry:

In asking me to reconsider selling the F-20 to Taiwan, you invited me to give you a frank answer. I think that you know my position on this: Taiwan still does not need an F-20, in part due to the coproduction of the F-5E that we extended in 1982.

At the same time, I completely agree that we need to help our friends. In fact, we have tried to provide Taiwan with what it needs for an adequate self-defense, and Taiwan's defense needs are under close and virtually continuous review. If you would like to be updated on the arrangements we have made to support Taiwan's defense needs, the Department of State would be delighted to provide a classified briefing.

As for the Republic of Korea, Northrop has a marketing license for the F-20 and has made Korea a very attractive offer. The decision now is for the Koreans to make. In addition, Korea has purchased the F-16C/D and will begin taking delivery next year.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable
Barry Goldwater,
United States Senate.

Dear Barry:

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In asking me to reconsider selling the F-20 to Taiwan, you invited me to give you a frank answer. I think that you know my position on this: Taiwan still does not need an F-20, in part due to the coproduction of the F-5E that we extended in 1982.

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Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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REFERRAL

DATE: 29 MAY 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GOLDWATER, BARRY

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 29 MAY 85

KEYWORDS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE CO

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SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM GOLDWATER RE SALE F-20 AIRCRAFT TAIWAIN

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REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 31 MAY 85

COMMENTS:

FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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