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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: LAUX, DAVID N.: Files

Archivist: mjd

FOIA ID: F98-054

File Folder: ~~US Relations -~~
Taiwan Arms Sales - Indigenous Fighter Aircraft (10)
RAC Box 90856 32 (13)

Date: 10/28/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	William Clark to the President re: status report, 1p R 11/16/01 F98-054 #114	nd	P1/F1
2. memo	L. Paul Bremer to Clark re: status report, 2p R 11/16/05 M 03-1455 #25	2/26/82	P1/F1
3. memo	Clark to the President re: status report [annotated], 1p R 11/16/01 F98-054 #116	nd	P1/F1
4. memo	Donald Greg to Clark re: testimony, 1p R ~ ~ #117	1/28/82	P1/F1
5. talking points	re: session with SFRC [annotated], 11p	nd	P1/F1
6. memo	Richard Childress to Clark re: Arms Sales to Taiwan, 1p R 11/16/01 F98-054 #119	1/12/82	P1/F1
7. memo	Alexander Haig to Clark re: Aircraft decision, 4p R 12/06/05 M 03-1455 #27	1/9/82	P1/F1
8. talking points	re: meeting with congressional leadership, 3p	nd	P1/F1
9. talking points	re: meeting with Tsia Wei-ping, 2p	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~SECRET~~

1064 Add-on

HW

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 26, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *RG*

SUBJECT: Status Report on Arms Sales to Taiwan

In response to the President's question of February 24, State has prepared a short memorandum summarizing the current status of our arms sales to Taiwan. I believe that the President should see this memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

☒ — That you sign the attached memorandum (Tab I) which comments on and transmits State's report (Tab A).

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature to the President
 A State's Status Report dated 2/26/82
Tab I Previous correspondence

cc: Norman Bailey
 Bob Kimmitt

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By mh NARA, Date 10/27/09

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Review on February 26, 2002

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~~SECRET~~

1064
VIA LDX

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Request for Status Report on Arms Sales to Taiwan

It is requested that your appropriate office prepare a report summarizing the current status of arms sales to Taiwan including:

- Notifications to Congress;
- The "bridging" action on spare parts;
- Other recent reassurances given Taiwan concerning downstream requests.

This report is requested by close of business, February 25, 1982.

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MSN NARA, Date 11/27/95

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 24, 1988

~~SECRET~~

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1064

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE WHEELER

FROM: DONALD GREGG *Dg*

SUBJECT: Request to State

I called over to State the request you passed along for an update on the status of Congressional notification re arms for Taiwan. State has started to work but says they cannot respond to a telephonic request (per Bremer) and thus needs a formal request. Such a memorandum is attached.

Recommendation

That you sign and forward the memorandum to State at Tab I.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By m3n NARA, Date 10/27/91

cc: China Office

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 24, 1988

~~SECRET~~

DESC HOLDRIDGE TESTIMONY ON THE FX DECISION

KEYWORDS TAIWAN ARMS SALES

DOCDATE 820128

RCVDATE 820128

STATUS C

IACTION FOR INFORMATION

IACTOFF CLARK

INFO CHINA OFFICE

UPDATES 820203 NOTED BY CLARK

SOURCES GREGG BREMER

ADDON GREGG STATE

PERSONS HOLDRIDGE, JOHN

FILE/OC PA

STAFF/OFF GREGG

END OF DOCUMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MW

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 28, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *Dg*

SUBJECT: John Holdridge's Testimony on the FX Decision

John Holdridge called me this morning, and passed along the following points re his testimony on the Taiwan arms sales decision before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today:

- There was no specific dissent expressed about the decision not to sell the F-5G to Taiwan.

- The decision to delay formal notification to Congress of the spare parts sales was also accepted.

- Congressional ire was aroused by the fact that the decision had been made without fully consulting with the Congress in advance.

- Senators Percy and Glenn were particularly vocal on this point.

- Holdridge assuaged Percy somewhat by assuring him that some of his concerns, sent by cable from Europe, had been used in the talks in Peking. Holdridge assured the Senators that only extreme circumstances had forced us to act as quickly as we did, and that Congress would be fully briefed about future decisions relating to this matter.

- Senator Helms expressed general dissatisfaction with what had been done, but voiced no specific criticisms. He indicated that he might like to meet with Holdridge in a separate session.

Holdridge's view is that the White House is most likely to receive complaints about procedure, rather than substance. If this is true, we will have gotten over one hurdle with surprising ease. John Holdridge must have handled his testimony extremely well.

cc: China Office

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on January 28, 1988

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NLS F98-054 #117
BY CH, NARA, DATE 11/16/01

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~~SECRET~~

ID 8200479

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM GREGG

RECEIVED 28 JAN 82 20

DOCDATE 28 JAN 82

TO CLARK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

10/28/96

KEYWORDS: TAIWAN

ARMS SALES

HALDRIDGE, JOHN

SUBJECT: HOLDRIDGE TESTIMONY ON THE FX DECISION

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

CHINA OFFICE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

2/3 noted my Clark DG

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

DESC RPT ON TALK W/ WANG OF PRC EMBASSY RE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN
KEYWORDS TAIWAN ARMS SALES CHINA P R
DOCDATE 820112
RCVDATE 820112
STATUS C
IACTION FOR INFORMATION
IACTOFF CLARK
INFO GREGG KIMMITT
UPDATES 820120 NOTED BY CLARK
SOURCES CHILDRESS
ADDON CHILDRESS
PERSONS WANG SHU MING
FILE/OC PA
STAFF/OFF CHILDRESS

END OF DOCUMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0154
[Signature]

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 12, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD CHILDRESS *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Arms Sales to Taiwan

I spoke today with Mr. Wang Shu Ming, Assistant Military Attache, PRC, concerning an invitation to lunch he had extended. During the conversation, I asked if he was reassured by the recent news. Without hesitation he said, "Yes, yes, very good." The tone of his voice registered obvious sincerity.

We could read what we want to hear from this, but knowing Wang for three years, I am relatively confident that he would not react this way if he was not experiencing a genuine feeling of relief.

cc: Don Gregg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on January 12, 1988
Classified by R. Childress

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-054 #119
BY CAS NARA, DATE 11/16/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DESC PRESS GUIDANCE ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN
KEYWORDS TAIWAN ARMS SALES MEDIA
DOCDATE 820110
RCVDATE 820111
STATUS C
IACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK
IACTOFF GREGG
COMMENT KIMMITT SHOEMAKER
INFO CHINA OFFICE
UPDATES 820113 CLOSE PER CLARK OFFICE
SOURCES BREMER BREMER BREMER
ADDON STATE STATE
FILE/OC PA
STAFF/OFF CHINA OFFICE

END OF DOCUMENT

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8200550



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

nsc 0111

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Arms Sales to Taiwan

Attached is the revised, consolidated press guidance to be used at the State Department noon press briefing Monday.

- The guidance will be revised again Monday morning.
- The White House and Department of Defense should refer all press questions to the State Department.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By msm NARA, Date 10/27/99

Attachments:
As stated.

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DRAFT
(REVISED SUNDAY
1/10/82)

TAIWAN: ARMS SALES DECISION

1. Q. Does this decision by the President represent a change in policy toward Taiwan by the Administration?

A. OUR POLICY ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN IS UNCHANGED AND HAS BEEN STATED MANY TIMES. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO PROVIDE TAIWAN ITEMS NECESSARY FOR SELF DEFENSE. WE ANTICIPATE FURTHER STEPS OF THIS SORT.

2. Q. What sort of steps? Is the F-X aircraft ruled out indefinitely?

A. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TAIWAN DOES NOT NEED AN AIRCRAFT OF THAT NATURE. I HAVE NO FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS TO MAKE ON WHAT ITEMS WE MIGHT IN THE FUTURE AUTHORIZE FOR TRANSFER TO TAIWAN.

3. Q. When did the President actually make this decision?

A. HE MADE THE DECISION OVER THE WEEKEND.

4. Q. When was Taipei informed of this decision?

A. THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES WERE INFORMED SUNDAY EVENING EST BY AIT THROUGH CCNAA.

5. Q. What was Taipei's reaction?

A. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD LET TAIPEI SPEAK FOR ITSELF.

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By mn NARA, Date 10/27/96

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~~SECRET~~

6. Q. When was Beijing informed of this decision?
- A. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE, WHO IS NOW IN BEIJING, HAS CONVEYED THIS DECISION TO THE CHINESE SUNDAY EVENING (EST).
7. Q. What was Beijing's reaction?
- A. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD LET BEIJING SPEAK FOR ITSELF.
8. Q. Why is Assistant Secretary Holdridge now in Beijing?
- A. AS HOLDRIDGE WENT TO BEIJING THIS WEEKEND TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN, AMONG THEM THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.
9. Q. Is AS Holdridge discussing the Polish crisis with China?
- A. HIS DISCUSSIONS WILL COVER A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE SITUATION IN EAST EUROPE.
10. Q. What was the sequence of notification of this decision to Taipei and Beijing?
- A. NOTIFICATION WAS ROUGHLY SIMULTANEOUS.
11. Q. Were there any consultations with the Congress prior to the President's decision not to sell F-X aircraft to Taiwan?
- A. YES, THERE WERE. SEVERAL KEY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WERE CONSULTED PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By msn NARA, Date 10/27/96

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12. Q. When did these consultations take place?

A. WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.

13. Q. Have our allies and other interested governments been informed about this decision?

A. THOSE ALLIES AND OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE IN THE PAST EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION WERE INFORMED THIS MORNING OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.

14. Q. WERE THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS UNITED IN THEIR ADVICE TO HIM ON THIS QUESTION?

A. THIS DECISION REFLECTS A BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG THE FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE STUDY, REVIEW AND DISCUSSION.

15. Q. Did the President's decision cover any military items other than aircraft?

A. NO.

16. Q. Is there a quid pro quo being offered on Taiwan arms sales for Chinese support on Poland?

A. THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE IS ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN THESE TWO ISSUES IS UNFOUNDED.

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~~SECRET~~

17. Q. Can you be more specific about when the President made this decision?

A. HE MADE THE DECISION SUNDAY AFTERNOON, WHILE AT CAMP DAVID.

18. Q. When did AS Holdridge learn of the decision?

A. SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

19. Q. How did the Congressmen who were consulted react to the decision?

A. (ANSWER TO BE PREPARED MONDAY MORNING)

20. Q. Was Senator Helms consulted?

A. No.

21. Q. What are we asking the Chinese to do regarding the Polish situation?

A. WE ARE INFORMING THEM OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, EXPLAINING THE ACTIONS WE ARE TAKING, AND ASKING THEIR VIEWS. OBVIOUSLY, WE WELCOME SUPPORT FROM ALL COUNTRIES IN SEEKING A RESOLUTION OF THE POLISH SITUATION. I HAVE NOTHING MORE SPECIFIC FOR YOU ON THIS SUBJECT.

22. Q. Who suggested that AS Holdridge go to Beijing? Why now?

A. THE U.S. SIDE SUGGESTED THE MEETING. GIVEN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IT SEEMED PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES AT AN AUTHORITATIVE LEVEL.

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23. Q. What do you mean "continue" discussions?

A. THE TALKS ARE A CONTINUATION OF PAST DISCUSSIONS, SUCH AS THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PREMIER ZHAO AT CANCUN.

24. Q. Wasn't the trip scheduled to convey the arms sales decision?

A. NO. AT THE TIME THE TRIP WAS LAID ON NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE,

25. Q. Will AS Holdridge discuss the broader issue of arms sales to Taiwan?

A. YES, IN GENERAL TERMS. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THESE ARE "DISCUSSIONS," NOT "NEGOTIATIONS" (WE WILL MAKE OUR OWN DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE.)

26. Q. If China objects strongly to the decision, will the USG review the decision?

A. THE DECISION WAS BASED ON A CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF TAIWAN'S DEFENSE NEEDS, IN CONFORMITY WITH OUR LONG STANDING POLICY FOR DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE. (ON BACKGROUND: I WOULD STEER YOU AWAY FROM SPECULATION THAT THE DECISION MIGHT BE MODIFIED.)

27. Q. Will the Middle East situation be raised in Beijing?

A. I DO NOT HAVE AN AGENDA FOR YOU, BUT CERTAINLY THAT ISSUE COULD BE RAISED.

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~~SECRET~~

28. Q. Who accompanied AS Holdridge? Why did they go?

A. THE OFFICIALS TAKING PART IN THE TALKS ARE:

ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
BUREAU OF POLITICO MILITARY AFFAIRS

RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

JOHN R. DAVIS, JR.
DIRECTOR FOR EASTERN EUROPE
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (DOS)

WILLIAM ROPE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS (DOS)

THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY ARE THOSE CONSIDERED MOST
LIKELY TO BE COVERED IN THE TALKS.

29. Q. Will AS Holdridge be stopping off in other countries?

A. HE HAS NO PLANS TO DO SO AT THE MOMENT.

30. Q. Can you confirm that Japan was among the interested
countries notified of the decision? Was Moscow notified?

A. JAPAN WAS NOTIFIED. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT. I AM
NOT PREPARED TO IDENTIFY OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WERE NOTIFIED.

31. Q. How long will AS Holdridge remain in Beijing?

A. A FEW DAYS.

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~~SECRET~~

32. Q. What is the status of the U.S./PRC Consular Treaty?

A. CHINA COMPLETED ITS APPROVAL PROCESS IN DECEMBER. FROM OUR SIDE, IT WAS RATIFIED BY THE SENATE IN DECEMBER AND SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT LAST WEEK. WE EXPECT THE TREATY DOCUMENTS TO BE EXCHANGED THIS WEEK.

33. Q. Can you define "foreseeable future" in the public statement?

A. I AM NOT PREPARED TO GO BEYOND THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN THE STATEMENT.

34. Q. Has the President made any recent decisions on arms sales to Taiwan, other than the aircraft decision?

A. I HAVE NOTHING TO ANNOUNCE. AS I SAID IN THE STATEMENT, WE ANTICIPATE FURTHER STEPS TO SELL ITEMS NECESSARY FOR SELF DEFENSE.

35. Q. What is the status of CCNAA's request for additional offices in the U.S.?

A. I HAVE NOTHING FOR YOU ON THAT.

36. Q. What is the status of the Premier Zhao visit; the Liu Hua-ching visit?

A. I HAVE NOTHING NEW FOR YOU. AS YOU KNOW PREMIER ZHAO HAS ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION, BUT THE VISIT HAS NOT BEEN SCHEDULED.

Drafted: EA/C:SHallford
1/10/82 x23600

Clear : EA/TShoesmith
EA/P:JMenard
EA/RA/TC:DFerguson
S/S:LPBremer

~~SECRET~~

DESC GAME PLAN FOR REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT DECISION
KEYWORDS TAIWAN ARMS SALES CHINA P R
DOCDATE 820109
RCVDATE 820427
STATUS C
IACTION NOTED BY CLARK
SOURCES HAIG, A
ADDON STATE
FILE/OC PA
STAFF/OFF NONE

END OF DOCUMENT

~~SECRET~~ /SENSITIVE


nsc 0186

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1982

22 APR 27 23:48
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

82 JAN 9 AIO: 14

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Game Plan For Replacement Aircraft Decision

SUMMARY

This memorandum presents a game plan for managing a replacement aircraft decision, should the President conclude that now is the time to decide the issue. It is predicated on the assumption that we would want to make notifications in Taipei and Beijing simultaneously, at 9:30 a.m. on Monday morning, January 11, 1981, which is 8:30 p.m. on Sunday January 10, Washington time. Our public announcement would be at Monday's noon State Department briefing.

There are five essential elements in this plan:

- 1) Congressional consultation, some of which would precede a decision and some of which would follow it.
- 2) Notification to Taiwan, which would be done simultaneously, in Washington and Taipei.
- 3) Notification to Beijing.
- 4) Notification of interested allies.
- 5) Statement to the press.

DISCUSSION

To the maximum extent possible, all people would be given the following simple message: that the US has decided not to provide an advanced replacement aircraft to Taiwan, since thorough study of the issue, over many months, by the US military and national security establishment, led us to the conclusion that no need for such an aircraft exists, or is expected to exist for the foreseeable future.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
RDS 1, 3 - 1/7/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

103-1455 #27

BY

US

NARA, DATE

12/6/05

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

We would indicate that implicit in this decision is an expectation that Taiwan would be permitted to replace aircraft in its inventory, as they wear out, with comparable types or with F-5Es co-produced on Taiwan; but we would not engage in discussion of details, indicating that they had yet to be precisely determined.

Congressional Consultation

I have discussed our plan with Chuck Percy and he agrees that we should make the following contacts with key Senators and Congressmen to seek their views before a decision is reached (talking points at Tab A):

<u>Senate</u>	<u>Person Calling</u>
Byrd	Secretary
Baker/Laxalt (travelling together)	Secretary

<u>House</u>	<u>Person Calling</u>
O'Neill	Secretary
Wright	Stoessel
Zablocki	Secretary
Michel	Stoessel

Calls to these people would be set in motion Saturday.

The following should be informed after the decision, as soon as possible after the opening of business Monday morning, January 11 (talking points to be prepared).

<u>Senate</u>	<u>Person Calling</u>
✓Goldwater	Clark
Pell	Stoessel
Glenn	Shoesmith
✓Helms	Clark
Cranston	Shoesmith
Thurmond	Weinberger
Tower	Weinberger
✓Hayakawa	Clark

SECRET/SENSITIVE

<u>House</u>	<u>Person Calling</u>
Broomfield	Stoessel
Solarz	Shoesmith
Pritchard	Drischler
Dornan	Drischler
Derwinski	Stoessel
Leach	Shoesmith
Hyde	Shoesmith

Informing Taiwan

Taipei would receive two notifications, both timed for 9:30 a.m. Monday morning, Taipei/Beijing time (they are the same), which is 8:30 p.m. Sunday Washington time. The notifications would be as follows:

In Taipei: James Lilley, head of AIT Taipei, would notify his counterpart, delivering an oral message from President Reagan to Chiang Ching-kuo. He would also tell him of the decision to go ahead with opening the Boston CCNAA office (talking points at Tab B).

In Washington: Acting Assistant Secretary Tom Shoesmith accompanied by David Dean, head of AIT Washington, would deliver the same message to Dr. Ts'ai Wei-p'ing, head of Taiwan's office here.

Informing Beijing

John Holdridge would begin talks with the Chinese at 9:30 a.m., Beijing/Taipei time (8:30 p.m. Sunday Washington time), and would pass the information in the course of his opening presentation.

Informing Interested Allies

I would also have Walt Stoessel call in the Ambassadors from countries interested in the F-X decision because of its potential impact on US-China relations. This should be done at 11 a.m. on Monday morning, which would be just prior to our public announcement.

Public Announcement

At the noon briefing, Monday, the State Department press spokesman would make a brief announcement and respond to questions, along the lines outlined above. We would ask the White House and DOD to follow this guidance, and to avoid addressing details or peripheral issues (a brief draft statement is at Tab C.).

Attachments:

Tab A - Talking Points for Congressional Leadership

Tab B - Talking Points for Taiwan

Tab C - Monday Press Statement

C

A



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B



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