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SUMMARY

This paper outlines a Reagan policy toward the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. It advances four central propositions:

-- Communism is inherently expansionist: its expansionism will subside only when the system either collapses or at least is thoroughly reformed.

-- The Stalinist model on which Soviet communism is based, the linchpin of worldwide communism, confronts at present a profound crisis caused by a continuation of economic failures and difficulties ~~caused~~ created by overexpansion.

-- The ~~succession~~ OIS of Brezhnev and his Stalinist associates are likely to split into "conservative" and "reformist" factions, the latter of which will press for moderate economic and political democratization.

-- It is in the interest of the United States to promote the reformist tendencies in the USSR by a double-pronged strategy: assisting pro-reform forces inside the USSR and raising for the Soviet Union the costs of its imperialism elsewhere by a very determined strategy.

INTRODUCTION

Previous American Policies Toward the Soviet Union

Since 1917, United States policy toward the Soviet Union has passed through five major phases:

1. From 1917 to 1933 we officially ignored the Soviet regime in the belief that it was illegitimate and doomed to disappear.

2. In 1933, after the new regime had demonstrated its validity, we extended to it diplomatic recognition and engaged with it in a variety of relations which during World War II blossomed into a virtual alliance; it was our hope that this good relationship would carry into peacetime.

3. This hope was shattered by Stalin's post-war aggressiveness in reaction to which in 1948 we adopted a "containment" policy which posited that an unflagging effort to stop Communist expansion wherever it occurred would, in time, induce Moscow to give up aggression.

4. A combination of factors -- the shift in 1956 of Soviet strategy to "peaceful coexistence", the acquisition by Moscow of a nuclear arsenal, and the frustrations of the Vietnam war -- have caused us in the early 1970s to give up containment in favor of detente, a policy designed to bring the Soviet Union into the community of nations by means of various inducements, mainly economic in nature.

5. Repeated Soviet violations of the spirit and rules of detente caused this policy to become discredited in the United States; the invasion of Afghanistan drove the last nail into its coffin.

For all the dramatic swings that have characterized our policies toward the Soviet Union during the past six decades, they had one feature in common: all involved attempts to moderate the external behavior of the Soviet regime externally. This objective was pursued now by toughness and punishments, now by

gentleness and rewards. What has not been attempted so far is modification of the Soviet government's external behavior from within, that is, by encouraging and/or making common cause with forces and processes present inside the Soviet state that are inherently anti-expansionist and reform-minded. We have assumed, as it were, the political legitimacy of the Soviet elite, its right to speak and act on behalf of a people which, in fact, has never given them the license to do so. This state-to-state relationship has not worked to our advantage because our government is decentralized and constitutionally limited in its freedom of action, whereas the Soviet state is centralized and quite unrestrained either by constitutions or representative bodies. On the other hand, however, while the elected U.S. Government is solidly based on internal support, its adversary finds itself in a condition of permanent tension with its own citizenry. For this reason, it makes perfect strategic sense to exert maximum possible internal pressure on the Soviet regime, i.e., to supplement external deterrents with a major effort aimed at stimulating anti-expansionist, reformist forces inside the Communist bloc.

Premises of this Study

An effective United States policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc must meet several requirements:

-- It has to be in harmony with the aspirations and values of the American people, for only then can it obtain public support;

-- It must rest on a dispassionate assessment of the nature and trends of the Communist system rather than on mirror-imaging and wishful thinking;

-- It must be assertive and positive rather than reactive and negative, making best use of the strengths inherent in our society and exploiting vulnerabilities of the Communist one;

-- It must be designed as a long-term grand strategy rather than as a pragmatic short-term tactic.

PART ONE

THE SOVIET SYSTEM

CAUSES OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM

Russia has always been an exceptionally expansionist country. Its imperialism can be explained by two related causes:

-- It is a poor country: with its extreme northern location which makes for brief and unreliable agricultural seasons, vast distances, and remoteness from the main international trade routes, it has never been able to support a population of great density, as a consequence of which ~~the~~ its natural population growth has driven it to colonize and conquer neighboring lands;

-- The Soviet ruling elite can claim no other justification for its dictatorial authority and privileges than (a) the alleged threat of "capitalist encirclement" and (b) the "historic mission" of communism: its psychological base of support, therefore, rests on xenophobic nationalism which impels it to engage in an unceasing forward movement.

Poverty and dictatorial authority stimulate expansion while expansion perpetuates poverty and dictatorship inasmuch as expansion requires immense expenditures on the military which could be more productively invested in agriculture and industry and engenders unremitting foreign policy tensions. Unless and until this vicious circle is broken, Russia will be its own worst enemy and a constant menace to the rest of the world. There thus exists an intimate relationship between the internal condition of the Soviet Union -- its economy and its political system -- and its foreign policy. It is not possible effectively to cope with the latter while ignoring the former.

Expansionism is inherent to the communist system as it was to National Socialism and Fascism, with both of which it shares in common deep historic roots. A communist system committed in

stability is a contradiction in terms, because to accept the international status quo would be tantamount to rejecting the principle of class struggle as well as undercutting the legitimacy of communist governments in their own domain. International stability will be attained only if and when the communist system as embodied by the Soviet Union either collapses or is so profoundly reformed that it remains communist only in name (as has happened in Poland and may happen in China). Of themselves, neither a "hard line" stance by the West ("containment") nor a "soft line" ("detente") can deter the imperialist thrust of the Soviet Union. This fact has been amply demonstrated by the experience of the past 35 years during which both methods had been tried. In the final analysis, the principal source of international instability and the risk of war lies in Russian communism and its internal contradictions.

THE SOVIET UNION AS A STALINIST STATE

The Soviet system today can best be characterized as a bureaucratically administered state capitalism, whose principal objective is the preservation of the authority and privileged status of a relatively small ruling elite. This elite may be defined as consisting of some 300,000 individuals whose names appear on the so-called basic nomenklatura lists, from which are drawn all appointees to executive positions in the country's party, state, economic, military, and propaganda apparatus. "Each of these 300,000" writes a German expert, "has won the right to be a lifelong co-proprietor of the Soviet Union. It is as if 300,000 shares of different face value were distributed, giving their holders title to the monopoly that runs the Soviet Union."* Institutionally, the Soviet state represents a throwback to the late medieval Russian state in that now as then the ruling class of Russia has a monopoly on political decisions as well as on the country's labor and economic resources.

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* Günther Wagenlehner, Wem gehört die Sowjetunion (Köln, 1980), p. 12.

The system as it now stands was put in place half a century ago by Stalin. The group presently ruling the Soviet Union consists of older men all of whom have made their careers under Stalin and owe their survival to complete identification with Stalin. Despite their use of radical socialist slogans they are among the world's most conservative elitists, unable to conceive of acceptable alternatives to the status quo and frightened of any change especially one that would make for greater democracy. They have a natural affinity for power brokers abroad: dictators, millionaire industrialists and bankers. Their greatest fear is of trade unionists, democratic socialists, small self-made businessmen, and independent intellectuals.

The essential elements of the Stalinist system may be subsumed under four headings:

-- Politically, complete atomization of society, refusal to allow any free associations, repression of all dissent;
-- Economically, rigid centralization of decision-making and absence of meaningful incentives for superior performance;
-- Socially, inordinate privileges for the elite, egalitarianism for the masses;
-- Internationally, steady advance into the adversary's domain with concurrent isolation of one's own territory from external penetration.

This system and the policies associated with it have remained intact since Stalin's death, even if its most extreme manifestations (such as irrational terror and the striving for economic autarky) have been abandoned. Stalin's successors have not dared to tamper with their inheritance: they have only modified its uses. In terms of laws, institutions, and procedures the house that Stalin had built stands.

only a few years for this illusion to dissipate. Sooner or later, all communist societies become hopelessly mired in inefficiency and low productivity, which provides the population, at best, with a marginal existence, and often with less than that. There are three main reasons for this:

-- Administrative overcentralization: In their quest for total control of economic resources, the communists create a system under which quite unrealistic decision-making responsibilities for the entire economy are imposed on the central bureaucracy. Removed from direct contact with the producers and consumers, the central planning authorities must grope much of the time in the dark, setting targets that bear little relationship to reality and allocating capital and resources in an irrational manner.

-- Absence of adequate incentives: Because they dread pockets of independent wealth out of fear that they could ~~become~~ turn into/ centers of political opposition, communist governments insist on their citizenry (the small governing elite excepted) living on the same low but egalitarian living standard. A "flat income distribution", however, precludes rewards for superior economic performance. The mass of communist employees is assured of a living wage as long as they carry out their obligatory duties. There is no profit in doing more than required and therefore no incentive to improve productivity.

-- Stable prices for consumer goods (made possible by heavy subsidies) and guaranteed full employment make it virtually impossible to rationalize productivity: social objectives take precedence over economic requirements.

The combination of excessive centralization, inadequate incentives and high priority assigned to social goals is an obstacle to economic progress in all countries which adhere to the classic Stalinist model. Hence one can properly inquire whether this model, suitable as it may be for the forced industrialization of rural societies (albeit at a monstrous

Because those economic reforms which it finds politically palatable do not work, while those that work are politically unpalatable, the Soviet elite finds itself in a quandry. Its political and economic needs are increasingly at odds. The personal interests of the ruling elite -- the retention of its powers and privileges -- require (a) that the national economy remain strictly centralized, with all decisions the monopoly of the bureaucracy, and (b) that the population at large remain fully dependent for its livelihood on the government. From the economic point of view, however, this arrangement is becoming self-defeating. The Soviet economy has grown too large and complex to be efficiently managed from above by a central authority under a system which allows neither those charged with implementing policies nor the consumers (the "market") any say in decision-making. Furthermore, the regime's emphasis on mass egalitarianism and its dread of any productive wealth outside state control deprives the managers, workers and peasants of the kind of incentives they need to acquire a vested interest in raising outputs. The regime thus confronts the classic "revolutionary situation" postulated by Marx for societies in which the economic "base" and the political "superstructure" go out of phase. In democratic societies such an imbalance is precluded by unceasing partial adjustments to each other of economic and political forces; a totalitarian regime locks the two into a fixed relationship which becomes more difficult to adjust with each passing year. The negative effects of this situation are felt not only in the economic sphere but also in the political. In Stalinist societies there exists a striking absence of public spirit on the part of the population at large, and the governments are unable to appeal to what may be called patriotic sentiments. The ordinary citizen of such societies is so preoccupied with private interests that he feels little if any sense of communality with his government. Thus a survey of the youth of Leningrad,

conducted by Soviet sociologists in the 1960s, revealed that 38 percent were concerned exclusively with their private lives, 36 percent were totally indifferent, 23 percent had a main interest in education, and only 12 percent placed public participation as their main interest.*

POSSIBILITIES OF ECONOMIC REFORM

The problem which we have described is not new. In the past, whenever confronted with it, the Soviet elite has invariably given preference to its own "class" interests over those of the nation as a whole. So it was immediately after Stalin's death when voices were raised in favor of economic reform, only to be stilled. So it was also at the recently concluded 26th Party Congress of the CPSU which shunned questions about restructuring the economy. But it is doubtful whether such a conservative policy can be continued much longer. Economic pressures are building up in Communist countries both at the top (among economic planners) and below (among the consumers), and the day may not be far off when the same concern for political survival which hitherto has made for resistance to economic reform will push the communist elite to embrace it. What we see here is a recurrence of a phenomenon familiar from the history of other countries, whenever the dominant class, faced with challenges which it can no longer fend off, agrees to unpalatable concessions in order to survive. It is probable that as soon as the Brezhnev administration clears the stage an acrimonious economic debate will break out in the high echeleons of the party. The recurrent question heard for years at Communist party meetings -- "How do we raise productivity?" -- with its unmistakable political implications, is likely to divide the leadership into "conservative" and "reformist" factions.

* Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, No. 3, 1977.

A great deal hinges on the outcome of such a debate. Should the conservatives gain the upper hand, the Soviet Union will continue along the path of militarism and expansion, hoping to compensate for domestic economic failures with foreign conquests. Should the reformers win, the Soviet regime will turn inward and initiate changes which of necessity will entail greater popular participation in national life and inject certain inhibitions on the elite's waste of natural resources on militaristic and expansionist objectives. The Soviet threat will not disappear because it is inherent in the system and its ideology. Even so, it will be attenuated if the Soviet Union is administered by individuals who draw their inspiration from a patriotic vision of a Russia which is great by virtue of being a great, civilized nation rather than a jingoism which sees greatness in military conquest. And indeed, who can predict where economic liberalization, once implemented, will lead? The very considerations that make economic reform so distasteful to the Soviet elite, namely fear of losing a monopoly on political power, ought to make it attractive to us.

Polish events, 1980-1981

In this connection, the recent events in Poland acquire particular relevance. Poland has just undergone a revolution in the course of which both the foundation work and the superstructure of the totalitarian regime suffered an internal collapse. Political scientists have regarded such a development as a virtual impossibility. These events mark, therefore, a watershed in the history of communism regardless of whether or not Soviet forces invade Poland.

The original cause of the Polish turmoil were economic problems endemic to the system: low productivity, administrative overcentralization, inadequate incentives. These difficulties manifested themselves already around 1970 but the Polish Government saved itself, for the time being, from the necessity of reform by the device of massive borrowing from abroad. Unwilling to solve its problems by way of reform and yet afraid of the workers and intellectuals who defiantly organized themselves, the Polish Government temporized. In the summer of 1980, to avoid an open confrontation, it was finally compelled to recognize the existence of a trade union organization outside party control -- something that Communism has not tolerated since 1920.

But the process of decomposition did not stop here. The dissatisfaction soon spread into the ranks of the party itself, whose rank-and-file demanded a greater voice in decisions. With amazing speed the party apparatus, composed of three million members, disintegrated. In March 1981 the Party hierarchy had to agree to a thoroughgoing democratization of its apparatus, allowing for free elections of its functionaries.

Thus, in nine months, the entire social and political system of Communist Poland was profoundly shaken from within, without bloody riots, foreign intervention, or even a change in the forms of government. The system proved unexpectedly vulnerable to internal pressures.

In a sense, the post-Mao reforms in China may also be regarded as a revulsion against Marxism-Leninism by leaders who have concluded that it is unworkable. In the opinion of some Chinese specialists, the attacks on Mao are a disguised assault on the entire communist doctrine. If that is correct, the crisis of communism assumes even more urgent forms.

Conditions in Poland and the Soviet Union are admittedly quite different. Russia lacks a tradition of free associations, an independent peasantry, and a powerful church commanding the loyalty of the nation. Nor is there in the USSR, with its diverse ethnic composition, that spirit of nationalism which has given the people of Poland their sense of unity. There exists, therefore, little likelihood of a political upheaval in Russia on the Polish model. In the Soviet Union fundamental change is less likely to come from a mass movement initiated below than from a drastic reorientation of the government itself. Such has been the tradition of Russian history: major changes of the country's institutions and orientation have almost always come from above, from the state authorities.

Reform, however, especially of a fundamental kind, confronts the Soviet ruling elite with uncomfortable problems. Its de facto authority inside the country rests on a demonstrated ability to fend off any and all challenges. It must, therefore, always be, or, at the very least, appear to be omnipotent. The aversion of

2. THE POLITICAL CRISIS

The political crisis that confronts the Soviet leadership in the 1980s derives from the following causes:

-- The mainly silent but occasionally overtly expressed dissatisfaction of a sizable part of the population with a system that grants them no political rights and few economic or general human rights.
-- The resentment of the ethnic minorities of the USSR at being denied the right to natural self-determination and being subjected to Russian domination.
-- The costs and risks of imperial expansion which make the Soviet Union ever more vulnerable to overseas debacles.

Unlike the economic crisis, which is already at hand, the political crisis threatens the Soviet leadership only potentially. But, as the experience of Poland has shown, once the dams that ~~protect~~ safeguard/ the integrity of a communist regime develop cracks, the floodwaters of accumulated discontent rush forward, sweeping everything before them. In a totalitarian state, political crises do not mature: they explode.

Domestic dissent

Domestic dissent in the Russian regions of the USSR takes two forms, overt and passive or latent.

Overt dissent is much better known abroad because its spokesmen consciously appeal to foreign opinion. Involved in this movement are several thousand individuals. Two qualities distinguish overt dissent:

-- Its participants not only ~~seek~~ refuse/ to conceal their identity but, on the contrary, deliberately publicize it in order to demonstrate their defiance of the government as well as to prove that they seek no benefits for themselves;
-- Not content to have it improve by bits and pieces, they reject the communist system in its entirety.

Stalin, who had little faith in the pro-communist forces in those areas, preferred to concentrate first on building his domestic power base and later, after World War II, on direct challenges to the West. His successors, however, promptly reverted to the old Leninist strategy, making a determined effort to penetrate those non-Western regions which are important either for their strategic location or proximity to critical raw materials. This new policy was adopted in the conviction that in the age of nuclear weapons direct confrontations with the West were to be avoided in favor of indirect, flanking moves aimed at the military and economic foundations of Western societies.

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Government undertook an ambitious program of diplomatic and military alliances with Third World countries. At the same time it began to assemble an array of forward deployment forces centered on an ocean-going navy. Following the United States withdrawal from Vietnam and the passage of the Clark Amendment, Moscow threw all caution to the winds and, eager to seize all it could while the adversary was paralyzed, committed its own forces and those of its surrogates to diverse regions of Africa, Asia, and Central America. The global spread of Soviet influence during the past quarter of a century has been nothing short of phenomenal. There is hardly a region of strategic significance which is not directly or indirectly challenged by Soviet or pro-Soviet forces. It would be hard to find in history an imperialism pursued with comparable frenzy.

Whether this expansion has been profitable and given Moscow secure footholds overseas is another matter. In the past, successful imperialisms have tended to be pursued at a more measured pace and accompanied by economic and cultural penetration. Purely military imperialism, such as the Soviet one, has usually proven ephemeral. The Soviet Union lacks the economic wherewithal to attach its colonial dependencies overseas to its metropolis; nor does its culture have much appeal abroad. As a consequence, Soviet imperialism may be judged to be more extensive than profound, shallow-rooted rather solidly ensconced. It resembles more the

which appeal even to those who have no sympathy for communism or the Soviet Union but do care deeply about the future of mankind. Upon close analysis, each of these statements can be shown to rest on either logical or substantive fallacies. Before an effective policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union can be devised, it is imperative to break the mental habits which these ideas foster. There is little point in formulating elaborate game strategies as long as one accepts, even unconsciously, rules of the game designed by one's opponent to favor entirely his own side.

-- The United States should at once repudiate the principle and concept of "superpowers". The Soviet Union is a "superpower" only in the sense that it disposes of massive arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons. Economically and culturally it is a power of the second rank, compared to our ~~Allies~~ in Western Europe and Japan. Its leaders, nevertheless, insist on the status of a "superpower" and all the perquisites that it entails in order to maintain the myth of a "bipolar world" in which the only alternative to the Soviet version of peace and progress is reaction and war. This psychological trick promotes neutralism among pro-Western countries, unwilling to be dragged into "superpower" confrontations, and pro-communist tendencies among neutral powers. It further encourages the USSR to keep on building up its military, and especially nuclear, arsenals, since the vaster these are the greater its putative claim to the status of a peer of the United States. The Soviet Union should be treated as one of the world's great powers, no more and no less. All suggestions of a "special relationship" derived from Soviet nuclear might ought to be rejected out of hand.

-- The Soviet Union decidedly is not the "vanguard of history". Rather it is a misbegotten experiment based on nineteenth century ideas that bear little relationship to contemporary reality, and would long have been relegated to history books were it not for Soviet bayonets and tanks. Communism has

been unable to realize a single one of its stated objectives. Its symbol is the sealed frontier guarded by security personnel to ensure that no one departs. No nation has freely adopted communism; every nation on which it has been imposed has striven at the first opportunity to be rid of it. Communism is a prehistoric monster.

-- The so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" has no basis in international law and violates every international statement of principles signed by the USSR, including the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Under the terms of this "doctrine" the Soviet Union is in the position of a gambler who places his bets with the casino's money: no matter how much he loses, in the end he must come out ahead. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" therefore must be declared null and void. Every country in the world, communist and non-communist alike, is free to change its system at any time in accord with the desires of its people. The sanctity of the communist enclave will be respected to the same degree that the Soviet Union respects the status quo of the non-communist world.

-- There exist numerous alternatives to the dichotomy "detente-nuclear war", all of them preferable to either of these options. Nothing in history is "irreversible", least of all policies. We must never allow ourselves to be black-mailed by fear, including fear of nuclear war, for to reach this condition is to surrender beforehand. The highest ideal of man is freedom: to place bare survival above one's basic human rights is to fall into the mentality of slaves. Men who have placed their human dignity above all else have survived and founded great societies; those who have raised self-preservation to the the highest good have managed to hang on to life only at the sufferance of their superiors, often to perish in the end.

Human actions are guided largely by perceptions. The points made above should be insisted upon on every occasion so that perceptions, formed over decades under the influence of Soviet

propaganda will alter. To alter the psychological "rules of the game" set by Moscow is to clear the decks for the assertion of an effective American foreign policy.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

As previously stated, United States foreign policy should be:

-- In harmony with the spirit and values of the American people.
-- Positive rather than negative, assertive rather than reactive.

This means that we cannot allow a serious disparity to develop between the kind of social environment that the Reagan Administration fosters at home and the kind that it supports abroad. Not that the United States has either the right or the ability to impose democratic government and the market economy on other countries. It does, however, have the right as well as the ability to extend preferential treatment to countries whose political and economic systems are most in accord with its own.

Two arguments support this contention:

-- A world in which the majority of the nations would live under authoritarian regimes, whether of the right or left variety, would provide a most unwholesome environment for a democratic, free enterprise United States.
-- Countries which adopt authoritarian political and economic regimes are inherently incapable of managing their own affairs. To maintain themselves in power they either engage in aggression or rely on foreign handouts: sometimes they do both. Insofar as the United States desires international stability and bears much of the burden of supporting bankrupt planned economies, it has a keen interest in promoting the spread of democracy and free enterprise.

One should be under no illusion that authoritarian and communist or communist-leaning regimes and movements can be brought over to our side by political or economic concessions. As is true of the Soviet Union, the purpose of leftwing dictator-

liberty, and the same enthusiasm for reducing the role of government, which it is displaying with so much success at home. Clearly, it will be more difficult to assert these ideals abroad. But if the Reagan program proves successful in the United States its effects will inevitably spill abroad, setting in motion compatible forces.

It has been pointed out in Part One that the Soviet Union and its bloc will face in the coming decade a combination of economic and political crises, presaged by the recent events in Poland. Economic decline and nationalist sentiment among its subject peoples are likely severely to test the ability of Moscow to control its domain. The outbreak of these crises probably will cause deep divisions in the post-Brezhnev leadership, splitting it into "conservative" and "reformist" factions. The former will wish to retain the existing system intact on the grounds that any tampering with it will be perceived as a sign of weakness and thereby endanger the regime. The reformers will argue that keeping the system intact courts revolution, and that the country requires far-reaching changes. At issue will be two variants of nationalism, familiar from Russian history and represented in the dissident movement (p. ^ above).

20/

-- Xenophobic nationalism which asserts the primacy of the state and perceives greatness to lie in the might of the government, subjugation of alien peoples, and conquest of foreign lands;
-- Patriotic nationalism which asserts the primacy of the nation and perceives greatness to lie in a healthy and vigorous people.

Clearly, the former kind of nationalism leads to expansionism while the latter provides a more inward-oriented policy.

Many Westerners are under the impression that the government of the Soviet Union presently in power is controlled by "moderates" who need to be placated lest adventurous "hawks" replace them. In fact, the contrary is the case. It is the adventurous hawks

-- We ought to express open support for all overt dissenting groups save those of the extreme right; in particular, we should sympathize with the "patriotic" current of Russian nationalism, in and out of government, because its ideals are most compatible with our own.

-- We ought to express strong support for the cause of national self-determination for all ethnic groups under Russian domination, as we have done in the case of the other imperial powers. Our task is not to work for the "disintegration of the Soviet Union" (any more than it is to keep it intact), but we are committed to supporting the principle of national self-determination, so eloquently asserted by President Wilson.

-- We ought to back the strivings of Soviet workers and Soviet peasants to gain the right to form trade unions and acquire possession of the land, respectively.

Propaganda or ideological warfare

Almost every one agrees that propaganda, especially through short-wave broadcasts, is of the greatest importance. At the same time in every program of U.S. foreign policy this subject is treated as if in passing. If our analysis of the incipient crisis of the Soviet system is correct, a good case can be made that in the decade directly ahead propaganda will move to the forefront and become the single most effective instrument in our struggle to contain Soviet expansionism. As has been pointed out, it is only through a change in the system itself that the Soviet imperialist drive can be attenuated: and for this change to occur nothing is more important than an informed Soviet public. On this subject there is near unanimous agreement among Soviet dissenters.

-- Our propaganda should not seek to sell the United States and our way of life. This is unnecessary: Soviet citizens have already an exaggeratedly rosy view of our condition. Such an approach is also somewhat offensive, in that there is nothing they can do to acquire the benefits which we so attractively present to them.

One might also contemplate establishing a network of other foreign-broadcast stations transmitting to communist or ~~current~~ communist-occupied areas, such as a "Radio Free Cuba", and a "Radio Free Afghanistan".

Such an effort would require moving propaganda to the very forefront of our security efforts, and greatly increasing the budgets of the radio stations.

Imperial overextension

As noted, the Soviet Union is overextended in terms of imperial commitments and may find it difficult to maintain the momentum of its expansionism. To the extent that successful Soviet imperialism strengthens the regime's position at home, vis-a-vis its own population, unsuccessful imperialism has the reverse effect: it makes the communist regime appear vulnerable in the eyes of its subjects. Communist regimes maintain their authority principally by creating an aura of omnipotence and they cannot afford to have that aura dispelled by fiascoes abroad. This accounts for the well-known caution of the Soviet regime in imperialist ventures, as manifested in its preference for using surrogates. It also makes Soviet imperialism vulnerable. The USSR could not have weathered a domestic crisis comparable to that caused in the U.S. by the Vietnam war: a debacle of such dimensions would probably have produced a revolution in that country. This vulnerability offers us excellent opportunities in stemming the Soviet advance by a policy of cautious and indirect support of resistance to it.

It is morally incumbent on us as well as politically profitable for us to support in some way almost all groups that resist Soviet imperialism outside the Soviet Bloc, whether it be in Afghanistan, in Angola, or in Cambodia. Even if the actual transfer of arms may have to be carried out in a clandestine fashion, our political, economic, and moral support for such movements ought to be above board and well publicized. In such an endeavor cooperation with the People's Republic of China seems especially promising. The

hardly be challenged. What needs to be questioned, however, is what are the realistic chances of this objective being attained. Current public opinion polls taken in Western Europe show a disturbing pattern: a growing fear of the Soviet Union and a declining willingness to do anything about it. This contradiction may be due in large measure to the spreading conviction that the balance of power has shifted away from the United States. In the words of Raymond Aaron: "The Europeans recognize the danger of the Soviet buildup but they are pretending to disregard it because they are doubtful of the preset strength of the United States". To the extent that this explanation holds true, an improvement of U.S. military capabilities should contribute to the health of the alliance (a hypothesis confirmed by the fact that individual support for NATO among West Europeans is in direct proportion to their perception of U.S. military power). But there is still another cause of European neutralism, one not so easily remedied, and that has to do with the feeling that the conflict between the "superpowers" is no concern of Europe's, that Europe would do best to withdraw from that competition, and that the United States is interested in Europe exclusively as a forward base against its adversary. Many Europeans believe that the United States needs Europe more than Europe needs the United States, and for that reason ought to carry the main burden of Europe's defense.

Whatever the cause of European neutralism, public support for NATO in Europe seems steadily to erode. Where this process will stop, no one can tell. But prudence would require that in addition to joint action with our European and Japanese allies we consider the full range of unilateral measures which we might be required to take in the decade ahead should the unravelling of the Alliance continue.

SOME TACTICAL SUGGESTIONS

-- As a totalitarian regime which wants to control everything, a communist government likes to be on the offensive, inasmuch

as only the attacker can choose the time, place, and means of his action. Conversely, communist regimes are vulnerable to offensives launched against them by adversaries. For that reason the United States should always strive to place the Soviet Union on the defensive by taking all kinds of initiatives. In the diplomatic field, for example, it should bombard Moscow with whole arrays of proposals, forcing it to react instead of acting. Experience indicates that a communist regime when placed in this situation reacts slowly and confusedly, and in the process, becomes distracted from its intended aggressive moves.

-- For the same reason, the less communist leaders know about the personnel and intentions of the United States toward them, the better. Uncertainty sows confusion in their mind and ~~acts~~ serves as a further deterrent.

-- In our political pronouncements we should exercise great care not to fall into semantic traps set by the other side. The dangers inherent in the term "superpowers" has been mentioned above. One should not speak of "socialist countries" when one means "communist countries". Similar care should be employed when using such terms as "peace", "peaceful coexistence", and "detente".

-- One should avoid becoming chummy with Soviet officials; instead, one should assume decorous, grave, and distant airs. One should mistrust their private "confidences" especially if they are critical of their regime and indicate sympathy for the United States and its policies: this is a standard device to disarm suspicion and elicit genuine confidences from the other side.

-- One should never seek to influence communist leaders by appealing to the superior interests of humanity. They may feel such sentiments deep in their hearts but in their political dealings they invariably are realists or even cynics who assume the world is a place where dog eats dog. Humanitarian appeals strike them as a symptom of weakness and anxiety.

-- Tolstoy said that one should not approach a Russian peasant in a direct manner but instead get to the point in a round-about way so that he figures it out for himself. The same holds true of Soviet officials who are mostly descendants of these peasants.

-- Formal negotiations with the Soviet Union should be entrusted to professionals with long experience in such activity and without a personal or political stake in the outcome. They should preferably be career civil servants or military personnel rather than well-known public figures.

-- One should never try to bluff Russians but always be prepared to back one's warnings and threats with action: they are specialists at exposing bluffs and lose respect for those who perpetrate them.

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THE SOVIET UNION AS A STALINIST REGIME

It has been a premise of the liberal, "dovish" approach to the Soviet Union, that its present rulers are men of moderation who ~~must~~ should be helped to steer their country in the direction of detente because the ir alternative are militant hawks ~~who will push toward~~ eager for confrontations and willing to risk war. In ~~fact~~ reality the contrary proposition is much closer to the truth. The present Politbureau consists ~~exclusively~~ of older men ~~who~~ all of whom have made their political careers under Stalin, who owed their survival to identification with Stalinism, and who cannot conceive of another system but that which Stalin had ~~put in place fifty years ago~~ created. The rivals who stand in the wings ready to ~~take over~~ replace them are not hawks but doves, not rigid conservatives but pragmatic reformers. It should be a high priority of US foreign policy to discredit the ruling ~~hard-liners~~ and to create conditions under which their rivals can accede to power. Ultimately, the only effective way of blunting the Communist drive for global hegemony

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD PIPES

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY PD

SUBJECT: Policy Paper on the Soviet Union

As you indicated all our policies toward the USSR since its inception have been characterized by one salient feature - attempts to "moderate the external behavior of the Soviet regime, externally." Despite the wide range of operational methods with which we tried to implement this goal, our failure to do so is quite evident. While I fully concur with you in the identification of our existing malaise, I would advocate different alternative prescriptions.

There currently exists an ongoing debate on the causes of Soviet international behavior - ideological considerations and/or Russian national pysche. Curiously, both explanations attribute the thrust of Soviet international behavior to internal considerations.

It is undeniable that there exists an "intimate relationship between the internal condition of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy." It is also true that the Leninist rendition of Marxism provides a good justification for an expansionist global policy directed at the overthrow of an existing international system. Moreover, there are a number of Russian national traits which are seemingly capable of supporting aggressive policy. Yet, such traits are not limited to Russians and are ~~readily available in~~ present in other nations.

While there is a ~~always some~~ connection between domestic and foreign policies, it is logically incorrect to state in the absence of additional proof that there is a causal relationship between the two. That is, there is really no way of definitively proving or disproving that the Soviet domestic system is responsible for Soviet foreign policy. Yet, if Okum's law is correct, it is sufficient to point out that there exists a more rational and logical explanation of a phenomenon to dismiss all alternative explanations.

I contend that Soviet foreign policy can be sufficiently explained by the rational, realpolitik considerations which render any ideological or socio-cultural explanations simply ~~unnecessary~~ secondary. A drive to establish world hegemony has hardly been a unique phenomenon in world history. Nor has ~~the~~ Western tradition been immune to the aspirations of world domination. Only in the latter half of the 19th ~~century~~ century did the Western powers begin to renounce hegemonial aspirations. Hence, in historic terms a drive for world domination is hardly an aberration or an example of peculiar Russian "provincialism." Furthermore, the advent of the nuclear age has made the drive for world hegemony all the more natural for a rational state-actor.

The traditional state mission has always been to extend protection against external encroachments and guarantee a certain modicum of security to its subjects. Subsequently, throughout history there has always been a close nexus between the state of military

technology and the territorial size of the viable security unit. In the nuclear age the perpetual existance of adversaries guarantees a perpetual absolute insecurity. Hence, an accelerated drive for world domination is a natural path for a realpolitik-minded state.

Thus, the liberalization of the Soviet internal regime need not necessarily lead to a more palatable foreign policy. In fact, "reformists" in the Soviet elite can pursue policies fraught with greater dangers, than the so-called conservatives. (Compare certain policies of Stalin and Khrushchev which support the above contention.) It is not at all clear that given the "demands" of ideology, the Soviet leaders cannot afford to relax their imperialist drive for it would have painful domestic repercussions.

~~In all likelihood~~, The populace in the USSR is profoundly uninterested in the successes and failures of Soviet foreign policy with notable exceptions of certain domestically sensitive matters such as China and Eastern Europe. Hence, it is logical to suppose that the Soviet leaders are not about to change their foreign policy because they believed it to be correct and responsive to the international environment and because they cannot afford such a change.

In light of the above considerations, we should stop hoping to alter the basic framework of Soviet policy either externally or internally. Instead, we should concentrate on the direct approach of systematically reducing Soviet global strength, while bolstering our own defenses. We should inflict defeat after defeat on the USSR - turning it first from a global to a regional power, and eventually striving for a distintegration of the Soviet empire.

It is conceivable that in this process internal changes in the Soviet Union would foster a relaxation of its international stance. Yet, the prospects for it are uncertain and should not be the focus of our foreign policy. Thus, we should attribute far greater importance to the Soviet expulsion from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, than to encouraging the formation of the independent trade unions in the USSR. Even with ~~the~~ semi-free trade unions and relatively reduced military expenditures, the USSR is quite capable of presenting formidable challenges to our security. Still, all of this does not imply we should not engage in propaganda, as described in section II or should not encourage democratic reforms in the USSR. Rather, it means that our primary effort should be to pose a ruthless and direct challenge to Soviet power.

Soviet problem: expansion raises only technical, in-house questions of allocation; reform (rising living standards) raises internal questions of resource/capital allocation, hence democratization. Expansion easier for elite.

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Peoples' Republic of China

The importance of China as a counterpoise to Soviet power in Asia and as a force restraining Soviet imperialism is generally well recognized. In the medium term, China threatens the USSR with the possibility of having to fight a war on two fronts; in the long term, it confronts it with the prospect of a populous, industrious and hostile neighbor. Every geopolitical considerations speaks in favor of a coordination of US-Chinese foreign policies toward the Soviet Union.

At the same time one ought to disabuse oneself of the notion that China will serve the United States as a "card" against Moscow. The very notion that the world's largest and historically oldest nation will allow itself to be used as a pawn in "superpower" politics is naive and can only lead to disillusionment. Our relationship to China ought to be based on long-term common geopolitical interests. It is in our interest to promote the evolution of China toward a modern society linked economically and politically to the West, a society whose collaboration will be based less on a perception of an immediate Soviet threat and more on a sense of communality of interest. Such an evolution will threaten the Soviet Union less than the more provocative employment of the "China card" and thereby have a less inhibiting influence on the reformist currents in the USSR which are so valuable from the West's point of view.

Concretely this means that we should concentrate on economic assistance and to China in preference to arms transfers.

A REAGAN SOVIET POLICY

Richard Pipes
National Security Council

Draft

May, 1981

~~REAGAN SOVIET POLICY~~

SUMMARY

This paper outlines a Reagan policy toward the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. It advances four central propositions:

-- Communism is inherently expansionist: its expansionism will subside only when the system either collapses or is thoroughly reformed.

-- The Stalinist model on which Soviet communism, the linchpin of worldwide communism, is based, confronts profound crises caused by economic failures and overexpansion.

-- ~~After the departure of~~ Brezhnev and his ~~aggressive~~ Stalinist ~~apparatchiks~~, ~~the Soviet leadership will probably~~ split into "conservative" and "reformist" factions, the latter of which will press for ~~moderate~~ economic and political democratization.

-- It is in the interest of the United States to promote reformist tendencies in the USSR by assisting pro-reform forces ~~in~~ the USSR and by raising for the Soviet Union the costs of its imperialism.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION:

~~PREVIOUS AMRICAN POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION~~

Previous American Policies toward the Soviet Union

Since 1917, United States policy toward the Soviet Union has passed through five major phases:

1. From 1917 to 1933 we officially ignored the Soviet regime in the belief that it was illegitimate and doomed to disappear;

2. ~~When~~ In 1933, after the new regime had demonstrated its ~~durability~~ viability, ~~in 1933~~ we extended to it diplomatic recognition and ~~developed~~ engaged with it a variety of ~~bilateral~~ relations which during World War II blossomed into a virtual alliance; it was our hope that this good relationship would carry into peacetime;

3. This hope was ~~disappointed~~ shattered by Stalin's post-war aggressivness ~~after the conclusion of hostilities~~, whereupon in reaction we adopted a "containment" policy which ~~held~~ posited that ~~a relentless~~ an unflagging effort to stop Communist expansion wherever it occurred would, in time, ~~persuade~~ induce Moscow to give up aggression;

4. A combination of factors -- the shift in 1956 of Soviet strategy to "peaceful coexistence", the acquisition by Moscow of a nuclear arsenal, and the ~~disappointments in~~ frustrations of the Vietnam war -- have caused us in the early 1970's to give up containment in favor of detente, a policy ~~intended~~ designed to bring the Soviet Union into the community of nations by means of various inducements, mainly economic (in nature);

5. Repeated Soviet violations of the spirit and rules of detente, ~~led to~~ caused this policy to become discredited in the United States; the invasion of Afghanistan ~~was~~ drove the last nail ~~in~~ into its coffin.

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Intimate connection between internal & foreign policies of the regime: impossible to modify latter when former remains the same: may pursue clear, but objectives.

For all the dramatic swings that have characterized our policies toward the Soviet Union during the past six decades, they had one feature in common: all involved attempts to moderate the external behavior of the Soviet ~~government~~ regime externally. This objective was pursued ~~sometimes~~ now by toughness ~~or~~ and punishments, ~~sometimes~~ now by ~~kindness~~ generosity and rewards. What has not been attempted so far is modification of the Soviet government's external behavior from within, that is, by encouraging and/or making common cause with forces and processes present inside the Soviet state that are inherently anti-expansionist and reform-minded. We have assumed, as it were, the political legitimacy of the Soviet elite, its right to speak and act on behalf of a people which, in fact, has never given them the licence to do so. This state-to-state relationship has not worked to our advantage because our government is decentralized and constitutionally limited in its freedom of action, whereas the Soviet state is centralized and quite unrestrained either by constitutions or representative bodies. On the other hand, however, while the ~~duly~~ elected US government is solidly based on internal support, its adversary finds itself in a condition of permament tension with its own citizenry. For this reason, it makes perfect strategic sense to exert maximum possible internal pressure on the Soviet regime, i.e. to supplement external deterrents with a major effort aimed at stimulating anti-expansionist, reformist forces inside the Communist bloc. ~~How powerful these are and how vulnerable Communist regimes can be when confronted with them has been amply demonstrated by recent events in Poland.~~

SECRET

A REAGAN SOVIET POLICY

DRAFT

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INTRODUCTION

Premises of this study

An effective United States policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc must meet several requirements:

-- It has to be in harmony with the aspirations and values of the American people, for only then can it obtain public support;

-- It must rest on a dispassionate assessment of the nature and trends of the Communist system rather than on mirror-imaging and wishful thinking;

-- It must be assertive and positive rather than reactive and negative, making best use of the strengths inherent in our society and exploiting vulnerabilities of the Communist one;

-- It must be designed as a long-term grand strategy rather than as a pragmatic short-term tactic.

Our way of life is being directly challenged. In October 1917 the new rulers of Russia issued a declaration of war on democratic, free enterprise societies. They and their successors regard us as ~~relics of~~ leftovers from a bygone era, doomed to disappear. They will keep on pressing outward by any and all means until that ~~prediction is fulfilled~~ assessment comes true. This challenge can be met in three ways:

-- by gracefully capitulating in the hope that non-resistance will secure us tolerable terms;

-- by responding militarily, that is, by risking general war;

-- by frustrating our adversary's strategy and turning it against him.

SECRET

Clearly, the third response is the most ~~appropriate~~ attractive. Capitulation carried out in the name of "better red than dead" is not only dishonorable but unrealistic: as the Cambodian people have learned, going red does not guarantee staying alive. War, under modern conditions, is a most undesirable alternative, given the well-known destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. It is of necessity, therefore, that one must have recourse to an imaginative, realistic, sustainable counter-strategy which neutralizes the aggressive designs of ~~the~~ one's adversary.

This objective cannot be attained by military means alone. In the first post-World War II decade the United States ~~had~~ enjoyed a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons as well as superiority in the air and on the seas, and it still was not able to prevent a continuing Communist offensive against itself and its allies. Adequate military capability is a necessary but insufficient instrument of global policy. This paper takes it for granted that the United States will build up its military defenses to the point where it cannot be threatened with military blackmail: unless this is done, no effective foreign policy is possible ~~at all~~. Its ~~focus~~ attention will ~~be~~ center on the political, economic, and ideological ~~dimensions~~ aspects of the rivalry between West and East.

The paper consists of two parts. Part One discusses the nature of the Soviet system and the crisis which it faces owing to ~~a continuation of~~ economic failures and contradictions ~~caused~~ engendered by its imperialism. Part Two outlines the strategy and tactics for coping with the Communist threat. The argument ~~postulates~~ assumes

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that the ~~Communist system~~ Soviet Union is not unalterably set on its course but faces alternatives, some of which are more acceptable to the rest of the world than others, and that the West need not be a passive observer as these choices are made.

PART ONE

THE SOVIET SYSTEM

CAUSES OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM

Russia has always been ~~unusually~~ an exceptionally expansionist country. Its imperialism can be explained by two related causes:

-- It is a poor country: with its extreme northern location which makes for brief and unreliable agricultural seasons, vast distances, and remoteness from the main international trade routes, it has never been able to support a ~~heavy~~ population of great density, as a consequence of which the natural population growth has driven it to colonize and conquer neighboring lands;

-- The Soviet ruling elite can claim no other justification for its dictatorial authority and privileges than (a) the alleged threat of "capitalist encirclement" and (b) the "historic mission" of communism: its psychological base, therefore, rests on xenophobic nationalism ~~and its policy requires~~ which impels it to engage in an unceasing forward movement.

Poverty stimulates expansion while expansion perpetuates poverty and dictatorship inasmuch as expansion requires immense expenditures on the military which could be more productively invested in agriculture and industry and engenders unremitting foreign policy tensions. Unless and until this vicious circle is broken, Russia will be its own worst enemy and a constant menace to the rest of the world. There thus exists an intimate relationship between the internal condition of the Soviet Union -- its economy and its political system -- and its foreign policy. It is not possible effectively to cope with the latter while ignoring the former.

Expansionism is inherent to the communist system as it was to National Socialism and Fascism, with which it has deep historic roots in common. A communist system interested in stability is a contradiction in terms, because to accept the international status quo would be tantamount to rejecting the principle of class struggle as well as undercutting the legitimacy of communist governments in their own domain. International stability will be attained only if and when the communist system as embodied by the Soviet Union is either collapses or is profoundly reformed that it remains communist only in name (as was the case recently in Poland). Of themselves, neither a "hard line" stance by the West ("containment") nor a "soft line ("detente") can alter the imperialist thrust of the Soviet Union. This has been amply demonstrated by the experience of the past thirty five years when both methods have been tried. In the final analysis, the source of international instability and the risk of war lies in communism and its internal contradictions.

THE SOVIET UNION AS A STALINIST STATE

The Soviet system today can best be characterized as a bureaucratically administered state capitalism, whose principal objective is the preservation of the authority and privileged status of a relatively small ruling elite. This elite may be defined as consisting of some 300,000 individuals whose names appear on the so-called basic nomenklatura lists, from which are drawn all appointees to executive positions in the country's party, state, economic, military, and propaganda apparatus. "Each of these 300,000" writes a German expert, "has won the right to be a lifelong co-proprietor of the Soviet Union. It is as if 300,000 shares of different face value were distributed, giving their holders title to the monopoly that runs the Soviet Union."* Institutionally, the Soviet state represents a throwback to the late medieval Russian state in that now as then the ruling class of Russia has a monopoly on political decisions as well as on the country's labor and economic resources.

The system as it now stands was put in place half a century ago by Stalin. The group presently ruling the Soviet Union consists of older men all of whom have made their careers under Stalin and owe their survival to complete identification with Stalin. Despite their use of radical socialist slogans they are among the world's most conservative elitists, unable to conceive of acceptable alternatives to

* Günther Wagenlehner, Wem gehört die Sowjetunion (Köln, 1980), p. 12.

the status quo and frightened of any change especially one that would make for greater democracy. They have a natural affinity for power brokers abroad: dictators, millionaire industrialists and bankers. Their greatest fear is of trade unionists, democratic socialists, small self-made businessmen, and independent intellectuals.

The essential elements of the Stalinist system may be subsumed under four headings:

-- Politically, complete atomization of society, refusal to allow any free associations, repression of all dissent;

-- Economically, rigid centralization of decision-making and absence of meaningful incentives for superior performance;

-- Socially, inordinate privileges for the elite, egalitarianism for the masses;

-- Internationally, steady advance into the adversary's domain with concurrent isolation of one's own territory from external penetration.

This system and the policies associated with it have remained intact since Stalin's death, even if its most extreme manifestations (such as irrational terror and the striving for economic autarky) have been abandoned. Stalin's successors have not dared to tamper with their inheritance: they have only modified its uses. In terms of laws, institutions, and procedures the house that Stalin had built stands.

The question arises: for how much longer? Evidence accumulates that the Stalinist system no longer serves well its purpose, which is the preservation of the power and privileged status of the ruling elite, and may be due for a reassessment and possibly reform. The point is that to the extent that it develops internally and expands externally, the Stalinist system engenders contradictions which run counter to its stated objectives. Thus, the forced education instituted for the purpose of providing the state with adequate cadres of administrators, engineers, and skilled workers unavoidably yields also informed and inquisitive citizens who are no longer willing to be shut off from policy decisions. As the industrial economy matures, it can no longer be effectively managed by methods which worked when industrialization was first imposed on an agrarian society. Expansion brings with it the kinds of problems to which all empires are heir: heavy economic outlays for aid and defense of the dependencies, and nationalist resistance from the subjugated peoples.

The Stalinist system confronts a crisis: and because the Soviet Union today has such influence in the world and disposes of much military might, its crisis becomes also a global crisis. Whether the Soviet Union resolves its problems peacefully, by means of internal reform, or belligerently, by way of further expansion and conquest, is a matter of concern not only to its own subjects.

1. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Declining Productivity

The Achilles heel of every communist regime is its inability to ~~maintain~~ bring into being a rounded and productive economy. When they first come to power, communist regimes are able to create the illusion of improvement by distributing the wealth confiscated from the free economies which they have toppled, and by launching, using the same wealth, massive social programs. But it takes only a few years for this illusion to dissipate. Sooner or later, all communist societies become hopelessly mired in inefficiency and low productivity, which provides the population, at best, with a marginal existence, and often with less than that. There are three main reasons for this:

-- Administrative overcentralization: In their quest for total control of economic resources, the communists create a system under which quite unrealistic decision-making responsibilities for the entire economy are imposed on the central bureaucracy. Removed from direct contact with the producers and consumers, the central planning authorities must grope much of the time in the dark, setting targets that bear little relationship to reality and allocating capital and resources in an irrational manner.

-- Absence of adequate incentives: Because they dread pockets of independent wealth out of fear that they could become centers of political opposition, communist governments insist on their citizenry (the small governing elite excepted) living on the same low but egalitarian living standard. A "flat income distribution", however, precludes rewards for superior economic performance. The mass of communist employees is assured of a living wage as long as they carry out their obligatory duties. There is no profit in doing more than required and therefore no incentive to improve productivity.

-- Stable prices for consumer goods (made possible by heavy subsidies) and guaranteed full employment make it virtually impossible to rationalize productivity: social objectives take precedence over economic requirements.

The combination of excessive centralization, inadequate incentives and high priority assigned to social goals is an obstacle to economic progress in all countries which adhere to the classic Stalinist model. Hence one can ~~raise doubts~~ purely inquire whether this model, suitable as it may be for the forced industrialization of rural societies (albeit at a monstrous cost), makes any sense once that objective has been attained and the main issue is no longer capital investment but the efficient use of the productive facilities already available.

The crisis of Communist economies can be graphically illustrated by means of figures which indicate the declining rates of growth of their Gross National Product.

TABLE I

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF THE

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE SOVIET UNION

Years	Percent
1951 - 1960	5.8
1961 - 1970	5.1
1971 - 1975	3.8
1976 - 1980	2.8

TABLE II

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

OF THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

Years	Percent
1971 - 1975	4.8
1976 - 1978	3.7
1979	1.7
1980	0.5

The economic crisis affects both Soviet industry and Soviet agriculture.

Despite strenuous efforts over the past two decades to improve its performance, Soviet industry remains subbornly unproductive. A Soviet worker is estimated to require four times more time, raw material, and energy to produce a given item than his counterpart in free enterprise economies.

The Soviet leadership is so keenly aware of this problem that it has made a rise in labor productivity the centerpiece of the next Five Year Plan. The likelihood of this objective being attained, however, is low. Moscow's difficulty is

compounded by an anticipated decline in the pool of available labor. Both before and since the Revolution, Russia has compensated for endemic low individual productivity by drawing on its immense reserves of cheap rural labor. In the coming decade this solution will no longer be available. During the 1970s, the Soviet labor market has received annually between two and three million fresh workers. In the coming decade, owing to declining birth rates in the European regions of the country, that figure will decline to half a million.

The situation is worse yet in agriculture. The Soviet Union employs one-fourth of its working population on the land and yet it is unable to feed itself, and must import large quantities of foodstuffs (mainly animal feed) from abroad. The decline of productivity in agriculture is appalling: between 1971 and 1975, Soviet agriculture actually showed a negative rate of growth (-0.5 percent). In 1976-80 that figure rose but to a paltry 1.1 percent.

The problems here too are incentives. Under the system of collectivized agriculture, imposed by Stalin to ensure that his vastly enlarged industrial labor force was adequately fed, the Russian peasant has no reason to produce a surplus. The land does not belong to him, nor does the bulk of the product which must be sold to the state at artifically low prices. He has, however, every reason to concentrate on the minuscule private plots allotted to him by the state, the produce of which he is free to sell on the open market at prevailing prices. What the muzhik can accomplish when given the proper incentive can be seen from the fact that private plots, which comprise only three percent of the arable area of the USSR, account for 24 percent of the country's farm output, including 30 percent of the meat.

Analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency, surveying the mass of economic data at their disposal, conclude that the Soviet Government faces a "catalog of economic problems that could reach crisis proportions in the 1980's."*

Obstacles to Economic Reform

The problem of low productivity which plagues the Soviet economy can be resolved in one of two ways. One is progressively to automate manufacture so as to reduce dependence on scarce and inefficient human labor (presently over one-half of Soviet

* National Foreign Assessment Center, Soviet Debate Over Economic Management: A Party-Government Issue (PA81-10078; February 1981), p.iii.

industrial workers perform manual labor). The other is to reform the system by enhancing human performance. The latter entails decentralizing the industrial administration to make it more responsive to market forces and increasing rewards to managers, workers, and peasants to encourage greater efforts.

Of the two solutions, the Soviet leadership undoubtedly prefers the former, since it poses no threat to its power. It has been one of the cardinal aims of the Soviet detente policy to acquire from abroad large quantities of advanced technology for the purpose of raising productivity. Although in some sectors of the Soviet economy this policy has brought positive results, it has not raised overall productivity. Quite the contrary. Notwithstanding imports of high technology, "growth in output per man hour slowed by nearly one-half between the 1960's and the first half of the 1970's."* In agriculture, where individual labor is crucial, the effectiveness of mechanization is determined by the motivation of the peasant, and this, in turn, is decisively affected by incentives.

There remains, therefore, reform. But reform is dangerous:

-- Decentralizing economic decision-making entails some degree of loss of control over the economic base of the regime's power, placing it at the mercy of more spontaneous market forces;

-- Raising incentives produces social inequities which are unpopular with much of the population; it also allows centers of independent wealth to emerge which the Soviet leaders, educated as Marxists, believe must unavoidably turn into loci of independent political power.

*Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p.3.

-- Abandoning the goal of full employment and reducing substantially government subsidies for food, housing and transport would certainly cause dissatisfaction among the mass of the population which benefits from assured wages and low prices on necessities.

Because those economic reforms which it finds politically palatable do not work, while those that work are politically unpalatable, the Soviet elite finds itself in a quandary. Its political and economic needs are increasingly at odds. The personal interests of the ruling elite -- the retention of its powers and privileges -- require (a) that the national economy remain strictly centralized, with all decisions the monopoly of the bureaucracy, and b) that the population at large remain fully dependent for its livelihood on the government. From the economic point of view, however, this arrangement is becoming self-defeating. The Soviet economy has grown too large and complex to be efficiently managed from above by a central authority under a system which allows neither those charged with implementing policies nor the consumers (the "market") any say in decision-making. Furthermore, the regime's emphasis on mass eqalitarianism and its dread of any productive wealth outside state control deprives the managers, workers and peasants of the kind of incentives they need to acquire a vested interest in raising outputs. The regime thus confronts the classic "revolutionary situation" postulated by Marx for societies in which the economic "base" and the political "superstructure" go out of phase. In democratic societies such an imbalance is precluded by unceasing

partial adjustments to each other of economic and political forces; a totalitarian regime locks the two into a fixed relationship which becomes more difficult to adjust with each passing year. The negative effects of this situation are felt not only in the economic sphere but also in the political. In Stalinist societies there exists a striking absence of public spirit on the part of the population at large, and the governments are unable to appeal to what may be called patriotic sentiments. The ordinary citizen of such societies is so preoccupied with private interests that he feels little if any sense of communality with his government. Thus a survey of the youth of Leningrad, conducted by Soviet sociologists in the 1960s, revealed that 38 percent were concerned exclusively with their private lives, 36 percent were totally indifferent, 23 percent had a main interest in education, and only 12 percent placed public participation as their main interest (Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, No. 3, 1977).

POSSIBILITIES OF ECONOMIC REFORM

The problem which we have described is not new. In the past, whenever confronted with it, the Soviet elite has invariably given preference to its own "class" interests over those of the nation as a whole. So it was immediately after Stalin's death when voices were raised in favor of economic reform, only to be stilled. So it was also at the recently concluded 26th Party Congress of the CPSU which shunned questions about restructuring the economy. But it is doubtful whether such a conservative policy can be continued much longer. Economic pressures are

building up in Communist countries both at the top (among economic planners) and below (among the consumers), and the day may not be far off when the same concern for political survival which hitherto has made for resistance to economic reform will push the communist elite to embrace it. What we see here is a recurrence of a phenomenon familiar from the history of other countries, whenever the dominant class, faced with challenges which it can no longer fend off, agrees to unpalatable concessions in order to survive. It is probable that as soon as the Brezhnev administration clears the stage an acrimonious economic debate will break out in the high echeleons of the party. The recurrent question heard for years at Communist party meetings -- "How do we raise productivity?" -- with its unmistakable political implications, is likely to divide the leadership into "conservative" and "reformist" factions.

A great deal hinges on the outcome of such a debate. Should the conservatives gain the upper hand, the Soviet Union will continue along the path of militarism and expansion, hoping to compensate for domestic economic failures with foreign conquests. Should the reformers win, the Soviet regime will turn inward and initiate changes which of necessity will entail greater popular participation in national life and inject certain inhibitions on the elite's waste of natural resources on militaristic and expansionist objectives. The Soviet threat will no disappear because it is inherent in the system and its ideology. Even so, it will be attenuated if the Soviet Union is administered by

individuals who draw their inspiration from a patriotic vision of a Russia which is great by virtue of being a great, civilized nation rather than a jingoism which sees greatness in military conquest. And indeed, who can predict where economic liberalization, once implemented, will lead? The very considerations that make economic reform so distasteful to the Soviet elite, namely fear of losing a monopoly on political power, ought to make it attractive to us.

Polish events, 1980-1981

In this connection, the recent events in Poland acquire particular relevance. Poland has just undergone a revolution in the course of which both the foundation work and the superstructure of the totalitarian regime suffered an internal collapse. Political scientists have regarded such a development as a virtual impossibility. These events mark, therefore, a watershed in the history of communism regardless of whether or not Soviet forces invade Poland.

The original cause of the Polish turmoil were economic problems endemic to the system: low productivity, administrative overcentralization, inadequate incentives. These difficulties manifested themselves already around 1970 but the Polish Government saved itself, for the time being from the necessity of reform by the device of massive borrowing from abroad. Unwilling to solve its problems by way of reform and yet afraid of the workers and intellectuals who defiantly organized themselves, the Polish Government temporized. In the summer of 1980, to avoid an open confrontation, it was finally compelled to recognize the existence of a trade union organization outside party control -- something that Communism has not tolerated since 1920.

But the process of decomposition did not stop here. The dissatisfaction soon spread into the ranks of the party itself, whose rank-and-file demanded a greater voice in decisions. With amazing speed the party apparatus, composed of three million members, disintegrated. In March 1981 the Party hierarchy had

to agree to a thoroughgoing democratization of its apparatus, allowing for free elections of its functionaries.

Thus, in nine months, the entire social and political system of Communist Poland was profoundly shaken from within, without bloody riots, foreign intervention, or even a change in the forms

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In a sense, the post-Mao reforms in China may also be regarded as a revulsion against Marxism-Leninism by ~~national~~ leaders who have concluded that it is unworkable. In the opinion of some Chinese specialists, the attacks on Mao are a disguised assault on the entire communist doctrine. If that is correct, the crisis of communism assumes even more urgent forms.

the Polish model. ... likely to come from a mass movement initiated below than from a drastic reorientation of the government itself. Such has been the tradition of Russian history: major changes of the country's institutions and orientation have almost always come from above, from the state authorities.

Reform, however, especially of a fundamental kind confronts the Soviet ruling elite with uncomfortable problems. Its de facto authority inside the country rests on a demonstrated ability to fend off any and all challenges. It must, therefore, always be or at the very least appear to be omnipotent. The aversion of Russian governments throughout history to reform derives from the fear that the population at large might interpret reform as a concession to pressure and admission of weakness. For that reason, the preference of the Soviet leadership is ~~for~~ to have no reforms ~~whatever~~ at all. When failures compel it to tamper with the system, it likes to ~~do so by means of~~ confine itself to meaningless administrative reshuffles which do not affect the system's essentials. It will tackle reform in earnest only if convinced that the alternative is disaster. Then, however, it will strive to introduce changes likely to have little if any minimal effect on its own status, i.e., that will jeoparidze neither the party's power nor its authoritarian structure.

The Hungarian model or "goulash communism"

Can there be meaningful reform of the communist economy that would not jeopardize the authority or structure of the communist party? In an attempt to answer this question, the Soviet Government has initiated an interesting experiment in Hungary.

The New Economic Mechanism (NEM) was introduced into Hungary in 1968 with Moscow's blessing as a low-risk experiment that could be quickly aborted if it got out of hand and copied if successful. After a few years, Moscow seems to have developed doubts and pressured Hungary to restrain its zeal for reform. But in 1978 it changed its mind again and approved of even more far-reaching changes. At present, NEM is also being slowly introduced into Bulgaria, Moscow's most subservient client, which gives grounds for confidence that Moscow ~~likes~~ approves of the results of the experiment.

NEM points toward a mixed economy resembling the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced into Russia by Lenin in 1921, which kept the state control over the "commanding heights" of the economy, but turned over its lower peaks and valleys to the free operations of the market economy. Under NEM, the central authorities continue to set macroeconomic goals but leave this implementation on the macroeconomic level in large measure to local initiative. Industrial enterprises are required to realize not preordained plans -- a practice which is notoriously inefficient and wasteful -- but to show a profit. To enable them to do that, they are given authority to set their own pay scales and even to discharge inefficient workers. Prices are set not in order to realize "socially desirable" objectives but to reflect actual costs of production. Much of the profit thus realized remains in the enterprises, partly for reinvestment, partly for distribution among managers and workers. In agriculture, the role of the private sector has been greatly enhanced: for example, state farms have been allowed to enter into contracts with private farmers to have them raise cattle.

NEM has not appreciably improved Hungary's overall economic performance, as yet, at any rate. This has been ascribed in part to sabotage by entrenched bureaucratic interests, and in part to the absence of competition among the state enterprises. Even so, the reform has appreciably raised the country's living standards, which are the highest in the communist bloc. Food is available in abundance (some of it going for export) as are consumer goods of decent quality. Above all, NEM seems to have produced a degree of rapport between the regime and the population that gives the country an enviable record of political stability.

It is known that influential leaders in the Soviet Union favor the Hungarian reform and are not averse to importing some of its elements into their country. Among them are the late Aleksei Kosygin and Andrei Kirilenko, a leading contender for Brezhnev's mantle. Sympathetic Soviet observers are impressed not only by the abundance of consumer goods in Hungary, but also and above all by the high level of public spirit which the reform engenders and which is noticeable by its absence in the USSR and other countries that follow the Stalinist model. Thus Vladen Kuznetsov, a Soviet correspondent who has written much on Hungary, speaks with unconcealed admiration of the spirit that has come to animate this country since the introduction of the reform. He praises the remarkable honesty which Hungarian party officials, managers, and workers show in their dealings with each other. He is even more impressed by the influence which the reform has had on the country's ~~civic spirit~~ public mood. "The reform also had an effect that cannot be measured in purely statistical terms," he writes, by "[releasing] an enormous reserve of creative energy, enterprise and initiative..."* A reader cannot help but feel behind these words a wistful hope that something of the kind would befall the author's own country.**

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* "The main Asset," New Times (Moscow), No. 14, April 1978, pp. 21-22.

** In 1965 Yugoslavia has even more radically reformed its economic system by creating a regime that has been defined as "market socialism". It gives still greater power to enterprises than Hungary, and permits worker associations to participate in the formulation of economic plans and investment decisions. In September 1980 Poland has adopted a reform combining the Hungarian NEM and the worker's councils of Yugoslavia.

2. THE POLITICAL CRISIS

The political crisis that confronts the Soviet leadership in the 1980s derives from the following causes:

-- The mainly silent but occasionally overtly expressed dissatisfaction of a sizable part of the population ~~(especially of Russian ethnic background)~~ with a system that ~~gives~~ grants them no political rights and few economic or general human rights.

-- The resentment of the ethnic minorities of the USSR at being denied the right to natural self-determination and subjected to Russian domination.

-- The costs and risks of imperial expansion which make the Soviet Union ever more vulnerable to overseas debacles.

Unlike the economic crisis, which is already at hand, the political crisis threatens the Soviet leadership only potentially. But, as the experience of Poland has shown, once the dams that protect the integrity of a communist regime develop cracks, the floodwaters of accumulated discontent rush forward, sweeping everything before them. In a totalitarian state, political crises do not mature: they explode.

Domestic dissent

Domestic dissent in the Russian regions of the USSR takes two forms, overt and ~~silent~~ passive or latent.

Overt dissent is much better known abroad because its spokesmen consciously appeal to foreign opinion. Involved in this movement are several thousand individuals. Two qualities distinguish overt dissent:

-- Its participants not only ~~make no attempt~~ seek to conceal their identity but, on the contrary, deliberately publicize it in order ~~both~~ to demonstrate their defiance of the government as well as ~~and~~ to prove that they seek no benefits for themselves;

-- Not content to have it improve by bits and pieces, they reject the communist system in its entirety.

Overt dissenters constitute a small minority of the Russian population. But it would be a grevious error to judge their influence, actual or potential, in numerical terms: one only needs to recall that in February 1917 the Bolshevik party, which eight months later was to seize control of the country, numbered a mere 30,000 members. Behind each overt dissenter stand thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of ~~silent~~ passive dissenters whose dissatisfaction is with specific aspects of the communist system and who will certainly be heard from (as they were in Poland) the instant they perceive that central authority is weakening. The leaders of this movement are harassed and deported but the movement ~~goes on~~ survives as ever new individuals come to the fore to replace the victims of the KGB.

Overt dissent in the USSR consists of two principal currents:

-- A liberal and pro-Western one which aspires to individual freedoms, human rights, and social justice on the pattern of Western Social Democratic parties. Its spiritual leaders are Sakharov and Iurii Orlov.

-- A conservative, nationalist current which assails communism as a foreign ideology destructive of the Russian nation, and yearns with some nostalgia for the old regime. Its hero is Solzhenitsyn.

Overt dissent represents only the tip of the iceberg. Ultimately, much more widespread and, ultimately, more dangerous to the system is the silent and latent dissent which embraces virtually the entire population of the Soviet Union. Its participants feel dissatisfaction not so much with the whole Soviet system as with these specific features of that system which affect their particular interests or aspirations. The most powerful representatives of this group are industrial workers, and peasants, and ethnic minorities.

-- Industrial workers are dissatisfied with many things (such as poor housing, inadequate food supplies, and insufficient safety precautions) but most of all with their inability to form genuine labor unions able to defend their interests. In recent years attempts have been made to form independent trade unions in the USSR: the leaders of this movement have been persecuted with exceptional savagery. It is also known that there occurs sporadic strike activity in the Soviet Union, usually on economic grounds. Ruthless as the authorities are with would-be labor organizers, they seem anxious to placate workers who strike for better conditions.

-- Soviet peasants whether on collective or state farms will never be content until they regain title to their land and the right freely to dispose of its entire produce. The rural population of the USSR numbers today some 30 percent of the total, but its potential number is appreciably greater inasmuch as many of the urban inhabitants are refugees who had fled the villages in search of a better life and would probably return where they had come as soon as conditions in the countryside would substantially improved.

The nationalities

Although the Soviet Union has no overseas possessions in the strict sense of the word, it is for all practical purposes an empire -- indeed, the last of the great European empires. Moscow exercises sovereignty over all the foreign lands conquered and absorbed by the tsarist regime, as well as over additional territories which it has managed to acquire on its own. A good part of the population of the Soviet Union has neither ethnic nor cultural kinship with the dominant Russian nationality: this applies to the 45 million Muslim subjects, the Caucasian peoples and the three Baltic nations. The two major Slavic groups -- Ukrainians and Belorussians -- are ethnically and culturally ~~akin~~ related to the Russians but long historical experience as ~~part~~ subjects of Poland has differentiated them to the point where today few would question their claim to being full-fledged nationalities.

At present, Russians constitute ~~slightly over one-half of the population of their empire, which~~ are the single largest ethnic group in the USSR, roughly equal in numbers to all the other ethnic groups combined. This numerical preponderance gives them unchallenged status as ~~its ruling~~ the dominant nationality, ~~but~~ however, the ethnic balance is steadily tilting against them. Censuses reveal that Russian fertility is declining while that of the minorities is rising.* The ~~rise~~ increase holds particularly true of the Asian minorities, such as the Muslims of Central Asia, whose annual rate of population growth is four times that of the Russians. Should these trends continue -- and they give no sign of abating -- ~~by the end of the~~

* This phenomenon is in large part due to the widespread practice of abortions. U.S. demographers estimate that the average Russian woman undergoes during her lifetime between eight and 10 abortions (compared to an overall average of six for the USSR). Abortion is virtually unknown among Muslims and other oriental inhabitants of the Soviet Union.

~~coming decade~~ the Russians will soon constitute a minority in their own empire, and a sizeable minority of the younger generation which supplies the labor market and the armed forces. This prospect is very disturbing to some Russians, engendering among them a siege mentality which finds outlets in xenophobic nationalism and a demand for forced Russification of the other ethnic groups.

The so-called "nationality question" in the Soviet Union derives from the dissatisfaction of the nearly one-half of its non-Russian citizens with a regime that gives them virtually no say in the manner their regions are administered and their resources allocated. The intensity of minority nationalism varies from area to area, being determined by such considerations as numbers, population density, levels of education, historic traditions, and economic relations with the Russians and other ethnic groups in the region. As a rule, the sense of nationalism is strongest among those nationalities which have the least in common with the Russians linguistically and historically and/or possess the largest intelligentsia.

Like its tsarist predecessor, the Soviet Government seeks to neutralize minority nationalism by a policy of Russification, designed to mould minority youths into a single "Soviet nation", linked with each other and with the dominant nationality by Russian language and culture. An Estonian emigre paper in Sweden recently obtained and published a classified Soviet document detailing how this policy of Russification is to be implemented: it indicates an intense drive to impose familiarity with and use

of Russian on governmental and educational institutions of the republics, including even day-care centers and pre-schools.* These efforts have met with staunch resistance from the people affected. There are scattered reports of demonstrations against attempts of the central authorities to impose Russification.

The "nationality question" may be said to be under control at present, in the sense that the Soviet security organs are able to prevent nationalist sentiments in borderlands from assuming politically dangerous forms. However, in the longer run the prospects of Russifying the minorities and molding out of the diverse ethnic groups a single "Soviet" nationality ~~seem~~ appear doomed. There is no reason to expect that of all the empires forged by European nations history would grant the Russian Empire exemption from their common fate, which has been dissolution. Any major political crisis ~~in~~ that afflicts the Soviet Union is likely rapidly to lead to the separation of the borderlands from Russia and their transformation into sovereign states.

Third World expansion

Ever since the publication ~~in 1922~~ of Lenin's Imperialism, it has been a cardinal tenet of communist theory that "capitalist" states are most vulnerable in their colonial areas where, according to Lenin, they obtain the raw materials and the markets that enable them ~~for a time to postpone~~ to defer their inevitable collapse. The drive into the Third World was launched immediately after the October Revolution but it soon faltered for lack of serious

* Estniska Dagbladet (Stockholm), No. 84, December 13, 1980. The document in question is dated December 19, 1978.

support there. Stalin, who had little faith in the pro-communist forces in those areas, preferred to concentrate first on building his domestic power base and later, after World War II, on direct challenges to the West. His successors, however, promptly reverted to the old Leninist strategy, making a determined effort to penetrate those non-Western regions which are important either for their strategic location or proximity to critical raw materials. This new policy was adopted in the conviction that in the age of nuclear weapons direct confrontations with the West were to be avoided in favor of indirect, flanking moves aimed at the military and economic foundations of Western societies.

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Government undertook an ambitious program of diplomatic and military alliances with Third World countries. At the same time it began to assemble an array of forward deployment forces centered on an ocean-going navy. Following the United States withdrawal from Vietnam and the passage of the Clark Amendment, Moscow threw all caution to the winds and, eager to seize all it could while the adversary was paralyzed, committed its own forces and those of its surrogates to diverse regions of Africa, Asia, and Central America. The global spread of Soviet influence during the past quarter of a century has been nothing short of phenomenal. There is hardly a region of strategic significance which is not directly or indirectly challenged by Soviet or pro-Soviet forces. It would be hard to find in history an imperialism pursued with comparable frenzy.

Whether this expansion has been profitable and given Moscow secure footholds overseas is another matter. In the past, successful imperialisms have tended to be more measured and accompanied by economic and cultural penetration. Purely military imperialism, such as the Soviet one, has usually proven ephemeral. The Soviet Union lacks the economic wherewithal to attach its colonial dependencies overseas to its metropolis; nor does its culture have much appeal abroad. As a consequence, Soviet imperialism may be judged to be more extensive than profound, shallow-rooted rather solidly ensconced. It resembles more the spectacular but transient conquests of a Chenghis-khan or a Napoleon than the patiently constructed empires directed from ancient Rome or nineteenth-century London.

Soviet expansionism also imposes economic burdens which are entirely disproportionate to the returns and which the inefficient Soviet economy is ever less able to bear. The following citation aptly describes the peculiar dilemma of Soviet imperialism:

> Never in the past has the global involvement of Soviet power been equally extended. The triumph, however, has produced contradictory results. On the one hand, this worldwide expansion feeds the messianic zeal and the historic predestination of the Russian people. On the other hand, it oppresses Russia. In the past, imperial powers have come into being in order to make the metropolitan regions richer and more powerful as well as to push ever farther outward their security boundaries. In the case of the Soviet Union, by contrast, her global influence makes her ever poorer, because she is not able to keep up with her numerous strategic and economic commitments.*

Furthermore, expansion on such a scale has made the Soviet Union highly vulnerable to nationalist resistance among Third World countries where there is resentment of dependence on its largesse and of the often offensive behavior of its agents.

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* La Stampa (Turin) cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 24, 1981.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union can persevere much longer with the Stalinist political-economic model at home and the post-Stalinist model of expansion globally. Something will have to give. The successors of the present leadership, which ~~will~~ is bound to retire in the next few years, will have to make fundamental decisions affecting domestic and foreign policy. We shall now turn to a discussion of the United States strategy and tactics best calculated to help the new Soviet leadership make the kind of decisions likely to preserve both freedom and peace ~~in~~ around the world.