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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH DUBERSTEIN

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Congressional Response to Taiwan Aircraft Decision

Your point is well taken--I am sure that we will receive Congressional inquiries starting next week. My staff has been in touch with John Holdridge, who just returned from the PRC. We have tasked Holdridge and the State Department to come up with talking points to be used in dealing with Congressional inquiries.

As you probably know, Holdridge himself is due to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 28. He may also testify before a House committee. His testimony should, I believe, be helpful in explaining the decision.

We will pass along State's talking points to you as soon as we receive them. They have been requested for opening of business on January 25.

*Spencer**RC**File
Ans Sales to Taiwan*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # 0218

02 27

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u><i>JC</i></u>
BUD NANCE	<u>✓</u>	<u><i>Bud</i></u>
JOHN POINDEXTER	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
JACQUE HILL	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
JUDGE CLARK	<u>✓</u>	<u><i>J</i></u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u><i>JC</i></u>

SIGNED

DISTRIBUTION

CY TO VP	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO BAKER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO DEEVER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 19, 1982

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction to Taiwan Arms Sale

Ken Duberstein's point is a good one--we should be prepared for Congressional inquiries on the Taiwan arms sale decision.

I talked with John Holdridge yesterday and pursuant to that conversation we have sent a tasker to State asking for talking points to be delivered at the White House by opening of business on the 25th.

Attached at Tab I is a short memorandum from you to Duberstein informing him of this decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to Duberstein at Tab I.

Approve *WPC* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for WPC Signature to Duberstein ____
Tab II Previous Correspondence

cc: Bob Kimmitt
Chris Shoemaker
China Office

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


January 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Congress and the Taiwan Arms Sales Decision

When Congress reconvenes on January 25, the White House expects a series of inquiries on the recent Taiwan arms sales decision. To deal with these queries in the most effective manner, we believe that a series of talking points should be developed, drawing on the experience of John Holdridge and his team, as they conveyed the decision to Peking. Special attention should be given to the manner in which the decision to continue co-production of the F-5E is conveyed, as this is a matter of great sensitivity in Peking.

We request that these talking points arrive at the White House by opening of business on January 25.


Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

THE WHITE HOUSE

0218

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO: Bill Clark
FROM: Ken Duberstein *Ken D.*
SUBJECT: Congressional response to
Taiwan Aircraft decision

Attached is a listing of Senate and House members who have written the President, or our office, advocating the sale of aircraft to Taiwan. We anticipate many of them contacting us when Congress reconvenes on the 25th.

A fact sheet on our decision and/or a briefing for interested members might be useful in dampening their concern about the decision.

Your thoughts, please.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1982

TO: KEN DUBERSTEIN
FROM: PAM TURNER *pt*
SUBJECT: Sale of Advanced Fighter Aircraft to Taiwan

Following is a list of the Senators who co-signed Senator Strom Thurmond's letter to the President urging a favorable decision on the sale of advanced American fighter aircraft to Taiwan. I have also added Senator Helms' name, since I know this is an issue of major concern to him. I will be checking further with the Foreign Relations Committee to see if they have any additional information.

Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina)

Senator Jennings Randolph (D-West Virginia)

Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-New Hampshire)

Senator John East (R-North Carolina)

Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nevada)

Senator Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)

Senator Don Nickles (R-Oklahoma)

Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa)

Senator David Boren (D-Oklahoma)

Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas)

Senator Dan Quayle (R-Indiana)

Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona)

Senator Mack Mattingly (R-Georgia)

Senator Paula Hawkins (R-Florida)

Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming)

Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-Alabama)

Senator James McClure (R-Idaho)

Senator S. I. Hayakawa (R-California)

Senator Warren Rudman (R-New Hampshire)


Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 12, 1982

FOR: KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
THRU: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. 
FROM: JOHN H. DRESSENDORFER 
SUBJECT: Congressional Response to Taiwan Aircraft Decision

Though there has been considerable Congressional interest and correspondence advocating the sale of aircraft to Taiwan, no calls have been received on the matter subsequent to this morning's story.

The following Members have written in support of the sale of aircraft:

Ken Kramer
Robert Livingston
Edward Derwinski
Jim Jeffries
John Rousselot
Richard T. Schulze
Gerald Solomon
Robert Davis
Joe Skeen
George C. Wortley
Gene Taylor
Vic Fazio
Anthony Beilenson
Tony Coelho
Norman Mineta
George Danielson
Robert Matsui
Augustus Hawkins
Julian Dixon
Mervyn Dymally
Jerry Patterson
Leon Panetta

Robert Badham
Bobbi Fiedler
David Dreier
Bob Lagomarsino
Jerry Lewis
William Thomas
Gene Chappie
Bill Lowery
Wayne Grisham
Clair Burgener
Duncan Hunter
Daniel Lungren
Bill Dannemeyer
Norman Shumway
Don Clausen
Charles Pashayan, Jr.
Barry Goldwater, Jr.
Carlos Moorhead
Robert Daniel
George O'Brien
Philip Crane
Daniel Crane

Jim Dunn
Floyd Spence
Tom Corcoran
Carroll Campbell
Newt Gingrich
Mickey Edwards
L. A. Bafalis
John Hiler
William Dickinson
Marjorie Holt
John Ashbrook
Albert Smith
Jim Courter
Dan Marriott
John LeBoutillier
Dan Coats
Hank Brown
Raymond McGrath
Frank Wolf
Arlan Stangeland
Jack Kemp
Edward Roybal
Glenn Anderson
George E. Brown, Jr.
Trent Lott

Jack Fields
William Clinger, Jr.
John Porter
John T. Myers
John Erlenborn
Robert Dornan
Don Ritter
Tom Hagedorn
John Napier
George Hansen
Ed Bethune
Robert Walker
David Staton
Eldon Rudd
Thomas Bliley, Jr.
James Collins
James Nelligan
Guy VanderJagt
Dan Daniel

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 18, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction to the Taiwan Arms Sale

Attached is a memorandum from you to Jerry Bremer (Tab I), asking State to come up with talking points to deal with interested Congressmen. I will inform Judge Clark, in a subsequent memorandum, of the tack we have taken.

Bob Kimmitt concurs. Chris Shoemaker concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to Bremer at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for AJL Signature to Bremer
Tab II Incoming Request from Ken Duberstein dated 1/13/82

cc: Bob Kimmitt
Chris Shoemaker
China Office

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Don buss for
action.

jr

1/14/82

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # _____

FILED

82 APR 10 1940

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	_____	_____
BUD NANCE	_____	_____
JOHN POINDEXTER	_____	_____
JACQUE HILL	_____	_____
JUDGE CLARK	_____	_____
JANET COLSON	_____	_____

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CY TO MEESE	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO DEEVER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
OTHER	_____		

COMMENTS

Memo to Don Gregg

S: Taiwan Decision at the Hill

From Hill sources, here is my best reading at present.

GOLDWATER - upset, but not likely to make any major trouble ^{in Congress}. ~~in Congress~~ Potential for problems exist

while in Taiwan as he will likely ~~be~~ ~~for~~ feel compelled to make a public statement on issue.

Helms-East - Obviously very upset, but cannot carry a lot of people because of their reputation for knee-jerk reactions.

TOWER - Long time supporter of Taiwan, but recognizes elements that went into decision. Not likely to make trouble.

PERCIVAL - Very upset over lack of consultation. Had promise from Hsiang that was broken.

General: Some want to goot to strengthen TRA (Percival's staff). Carl Ford has told them it would not be productive.

Glenn. Probably focus on long-term implications of decision. He and others feel some basic policy changes were made off the record

(Harris' letters) and they are likely to dig
deeply on meeting.

Holdings hearings will be uncomfortable as
might Harris. If we go in that we
can't discuss, likely to be very strong reaction.

Substantive decision less important than
implications for policy given lack of consultation.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/25/82

Jim Baker would appreciate it if the appropriate member of your staff would draft a response to the attached letter from Ray Cline.

Thank you for your assistance.

KATHERINE J. CAMALIER
Office of James A. Baker III
456-6797

File
Ans. Salu to Trainor

R.F.

December 31, 1981

The Honorable James Baker
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20500

1/14 How handle?
Bill Clark to draft.
-Answer f JAB -

RAY S.
CLINE

Dear Jim:

The political vibrations in Washington reaching me these days indicate an impending decision on China policy that I am sure is a basic strategic mistake and a damaging political blow to the credibility of the President. I hope I am wrong, but I feel obliged out of loyalty to the President to urge you to consider my views on the far-reaching consequences of the sale of FX aircraft to Taiwan.

Three key principles are at stake:

- a. supporting old friends and allies, among whom the people of Taiwan are outstanding performers;
- b. opposing expansion of Communist political control of important territory and population, whether it be Soviet Communist or Chinese Communist expansion;
- c. carrying out the President's personal pledge and commitment in the Taiwan Relations Act to provide "sufficient" arms for the defense of Taiwan because the law of the land passed by Congress requires it.

Peking's claim to rule the eighteen million anti-Communist Chinese on the island of Taiwan and the Taipei authorities' request for modern defensive arms raise an issue--self determination of peoples--as important as the freedom of the Afghans and the Poles. Six Presidents of the United States refused to concede the Chinese Communists' right to take Taiwan by force. Even President Carter agreed to sell Taiwan defensive arms.

We cannot now compromise our moral or political principles to cut down the diplomatic noise from the People's Republic of China (PRC), which certainly needs American support in resisting Soviet pressures as much as or more than the United States needs anything from the PRC.

Our foreign affairs bureaucrats are plainly operating on the assumption that the United States and the PRC have a common strategic purpose. Frankly I doubt this very much, as the hostility of the very same leaders now dominant in Peking showed during the Korean and Vietnam wars. While the PRC wants to use our strength at present to counter Soviet

pressures on itself, Chinese Communist interests and their politico-economic system do not have much in common with American policies in many areas. If the PRC meant to be entirely helpful strategically, Peking would now be cooperating with us on the Polish problem rather than frenetically blowing up the Taiwan issue to crisis proportions. PRC leaders probably think we will give in because we are busy with other matters. All the out-of-work Democrats recently in Peking may have encouraged them to think so.

My impression is that the Cabinet Departments are thinking of trying to avoid Peking's displeasure through a compromise offer of an untested so-called "enhanced" present-day fighter for Taiwan rather than a new, truly modern FX aircraft, which Taiwan needs and Jimmy Carter himself offered to sell.

In these circumstances a decision against selling the FX (F-5G or F-16, or both) would be seen in Asia and elsewhere as a decided tilt to Peking, giving the PRC in effect a veto over American policy on Taiwan.

Such a tilt will handicap our cooperation with Japan and the Southeast Asia nations. It also suggests our geopolitical line of containment against the Soviet Union extends into the midst of the Asian mainland--to the remote Sino-Soviet border--a most unwise strategic commitment. Our strategy in Asia ought to aim basically at maintaining an alliance with the seafaring and free enterprise trading nations of the West Pacific, among which Taiwan occupies a key geographic and economic position.

Peking has consistently objected to provision of any arms of any kind for Taiwan, denying the Taipei government's right to exist as a sovereign political entity. The PRC protest thus for their own domestic political reasons, involving conflicts over leadership and economic policy.

The FX aircraft decision is symbolically of great, long-range strategic import. Because I have spent forty years watching American policy on China repeatedly go disastrously wrong through insufficient attention and insight, and because of my enthusiastic support of President Reagan, I feel compelled to take the liberty of bringing this matter to your attention. We should sell the FX to Taiwan.

Cordially,

Ray S. Cline

Ray S. Cline

CC: The Honorable Edwin Meese
CC: The Honorable David Gergen



S/S 8201758

XR-8201145

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

NSC-218

January 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Guidance on Inquiries regarding Taiwan
FX Decision

As requested, the attached series of questions and answers has been prepared for use in answering inquiries on the recent decision not to sell an advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

as stated

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING TAIWAN F-X DECISION

Q. Why did you submit to PRC pressures and refuse to sell advanced aircraft to Taiwan?

A. Let me make clear that while no decision affecting our national security can be made in a vacuum, our decision on this difficult issue was not made in response to pressure. It was made solely on the basis of our judgment of Taiwan's defense needs, and was taken only after the most careful study of the actual military situation facing Taiwan. It was the unanimous recommendation of all concerned US government agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State and other national security agencies, that there is no military need for advanced aircraft.

Q. Can you tell us some of the factors bearing on this conclusion?

A. I am not prepared to go into detail on that. The matter was studied thoroughly, from every angle, over many, many months. The conclusion was unanimous on the part of the entire national security establishment, including the Departments of Defense and State and the intelligence community.

Q. How many F-5Es and other aircraft will you now be providing to Taiwan? Will there be a limit to the new co-production run you will now be authorizing.

A. As we made clear last week, this was a decision not to provide advanced aircraft. There will of course have to be replacements for aircraft in the Taiwan inventory which are ending their service life, but the precise details of that will be decided later, at an appropriate time. As for whether there will be limits, we are talking about replacements. That speaks for itself.

Q. Why did you make your decision now.

A. In part this was a logical time to make this decision, after completing our studies of the issue in the fall and taking the time to absorb all the complexities. In addition, however, once we knew what our decision should be, we wanted to move quickly to preclude the possibility of a rupture in our relations with China at a time of increased danger to world peace brought on by Soviet-backed repression in Poland.

Q. What was the Chinese reaction?

A. Assistant Secretary Holdridge informed his Chinese counterparts in Beijing last week. He had useful, constructive talks, on this and broader international issues; but I am not going to get into the details. (For Congressional inquiries: Assistant Secretary Holdridge has been talking to Congressmen about his trip since his return and is scheduled to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session on the 28th.)

Q. It is clear that China still opposes any US arms sales to Taiwan and is angered by our so-called "unilateral" statements and decisions on these issues. How are you going to bridge our continuing differences with China on this issue?

A. Again, I do not want to comment on details of private talks. I can say, however, that we will continue discussions with Beijing on this and other bilateral and world issues. I am hopeful we will now find ways to overcome our difficulties of recent months, and resume constructive advancement of our strategic relations with Beijing.

Q. What about Taiwan? How are they taking your decision?

A. I understand the reaction has been calm. I would refer you to the statement issued by the State Department last week, which expressed the President's full, personal interest. There should be no cause for worry or concern in Taipei.

Q. Haven't you violated at least the spirit, if not the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act with this decision?

A. No. The decision we reached was based on thorough study by all concerned US government agencies, in a manner entirely consistent with our internal legislation on this subject.

Q. Didn't you seek to go around the Congress by deciding this issue when the Senators and Representatives were out of session?

A. Absolutely not. We felt the timing had become critical, because we faced a rupture in relations with China at the same time Soviet involvement in Poland was intensifying. We went to special lengths to make sure that the Congressional leaders, whether overseas or out of Washington, were consulted as closely as possible before the final decision.

Q. Can you tell us where things will go with Beijing or Taipei now that this decision has been taken?

A. I do not think it will help to speculate about this. We are still discussing this and other bilateral and international issues with Beijing. Our policy on arms sales to Taiwan remains unchanged. As was stated in the State Department announcement of the decision, we have already made sales of certain items to meet Taiwan's defense needs and expect to make further decisions of this sort.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Tamara Tms

Leszonski to Clark
Memo dtd 23 Jan
re - - -



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

File
Ans Sales to Taiwan

JANUARY 28 1982

Dear Mr. Vander Jagt:

I have been asked by the President to respond to your letter of December 28, 1981, in which you request a favorable decision to provide modern defensive fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

Your views, and the views of your colleagues who shared your opinion, were taken into consideration in the decision-making process. However, as you know, the President decided on January 10 that no sale of an advanced fighter aircraft would be approved because there is no military need for such an aircraft. This decision was based upon an exhaustive study in which the Departments of State and Defense and other national security elements unanimously concluded that Taiwan's defense needs could be adequately met as needs arise and for the foreseeable future by replacing aging aircraft already in Taiwan's inventory with comparable aircraft and by extension of the F5-E coproduction line in Taiwan. No specific decisions have been taken on the precise levels, mix, and quantities to be involved in deciding the replacement aircraft issue.

The above decision regarding replacement fighters for Taiwan is consistent with long-standing U.S. Government policy to provide such defense articles as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Administration has already taken steps to sell Taiwan items necessary for self-defense, and we anticipate further steps of this sort.

Sincerely,

Alvin Paul Drischler
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

The Honorable
Guy Vander Jagt,
House of Representatives.

ID 8200246
244

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PAGE D01

REFERRAL

DATE: 16 JAN 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

8201011

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: VANDER JAGT

DATE:

KEYWORDS: TAIWAN

FMS

CO

SUBJ:

REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY

DUE DATE: 27 JAN 82

COMMENTS:

Donna Smoore
FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO CHINA OFFICE

GREGG

KIMMITT

F

O DM C

SHOEMAKER

Received in S/S-I
110 TQ:474.4.641

054158

ID #

F0003-02

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

8/1/12 130

Name of Correspondent:

Guy Vander Jagt

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes:

(A)

(B)

(C)

Subject:

Supporter an early decision to provide modern
defensive fighter aircraft to the Republic of China on
Taiwan.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
LA Frie		ORIGINATOR	8/1/12 130	KD	A	8/2/11
NSC		Referral Note:	8/10/11 3			1 1
		Referral Note:				1 1
		Referral Note:				1 1
		Referral Note:				1 1

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

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Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOP).

Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.

Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

January 11, 1982

8201011

Dear Guy:

This is to acknowledge and thank you for your letter to the President of December 28, in which you endorse the views previously expressed by your colleagues calling for an early decision to provide modern defensive fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

Your views in this matter are very much appreciated, and you may be assured that I have communicated your statement to the appropriate White House officials. Please know that your thoughts on this issue will receive every consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Guy Vander Jagt
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

KMD:CMF:sew III A16

cc: w/copy of inc, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT Response
(with copy to Ken Duberstein)

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT WILL RETAIN ORIGINAL INCOMING

GUY VANDER JAGT
9TH DISTRICT, MICHIGAN

2409 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-3511

COMMITTEE
WAYS AND MEANS

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
JAMES M. SPARLING, JR.

8201011

DISTRICT OFFICES:
ROOSEVELT PARK
950 WEST NORTON AVENUE
MUSKEGON, MICHIGAN 49441
(616) 733-3131

31 WEST 8TH STREET
HOLLAND, MICHIGAN 49423
(616) 396-3849

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

December 28, 1981

05613

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

It is my understanding you recently received a letter signed by a number of Members of Congress supportive of an early decision to provide modern defensive fighter aircraft to the Republic of China on Taiwan. I wanted to be a cosigner of that letter but, unfortunately, was out of the city at the time it was sent to you. Consequently, this communication is submitted in support of that request.

To reiterate their request, I join in expressing the hope that a favorable announcement of the question of fighters to the Republic of China on Taiwan will soon be made.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,



Guy Vander Jagt
Member of Congress


GVJ:rg

8202110

XR-8201758-8201145

NSC-218

0532

File
Ans Sales to
Taiwan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FROM:

(Officer name)

(Class symbol)

(Extension)

(Date)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

REVISED GUIDANCE ON INQUIRIES January 28, 1982

DECISION.

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Recd. No.

NSC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK

MEMORANDUM TO THE WHITE HOUSE

345-3044

3762

Subject: Revised Guidance on Inquiries Regarding Taiwan
FX Decision

Attached is a revised series of questions and answers prepared for use in answering inquiries on the recent decision not to sell an advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This material replaces our memorandum of January 27 on the same subject.

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

S/S Officer:

R. H. H. H.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING TAIWAN F-X DECISION

Q. Why did you submit to PRC pressures and refuse to sell advanced aircraft to Taiwan?

A. Let me make clear that while no decision affecting our national security can be made in a vacuum, our decision on this difficult issue was not made in response to pressure. It was made solely on the basis of our judgment of Taiwan's defense needs, and was taken only after the most careful study of the actual military situation facing Taiwan. It was the unanimous recommendation of all concerned US government agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State and other national security agencies, that there is no military need for advanced aircraft.

Q. Can you tell us some of the factors bearing on this conclusion?

A. I am not prepared to go into detail on that. The matter was studied thoroughly, from every angle, over many, many months. The conclusion was unanimous on the part of the entire national security establishment, including the Departments of Defense and State and the intelligence community.

Q. How many F-5Es and other aircraft will you now be providing to Taiwan? Will there be a limit to the new co-production run you will now be authorizing.

A. As we made clear last week, this was a decision not to provide advanced aircraft. There will of course have to be replacements for aircraft in the Taiwan inventory which are ending their service life, but the precise details of that will be decided later, at an appropriate time. As for whether there will be limits, we are talking about replacements. That speaks for itself.

Q. Why did you make your decision now.

A. A number of factors came together to make this the logical time to take this decision. Our studies of the replacement aircraft issue, in particular those concerning Taiwan's military needs had been completed in the fall, and follow-up studies had been concluded by the end of the year. The various concerned departments and agencies within the national security establishment had had time to absorb all the complexities.

At the same time, there was a clear need to decide the issue, one way or another, because of its likely impact on US-China relations and our concern that this vital strategic relationship not be jeopardized at a time of increased danger to world peace caused by Soviet-backed repression in Poland. This provided an added note of urgency, though it did not alter the nature of the decision, which was based on the most careful, and thorough assessment of genuine needs.

Q. What was the Chinese reaction?

A. Assistant Secretary Holdridge informed his Chinese counterparts in Beijing last week. He had useful, constructive talks, on this and broader international issues; but I am not going to get into the details. (For Congressional inquiries: Assistant Secretary Holdridge has been talking to Congressmen about his trip since his return and is scheduled to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session on the 28th.)

Q. It is clear that China still opposes any US arms sales to Taiwan and is angered by our so-called "unilateral" statements and decisions on these issues. How are you going to bridge our continuing differences with China on this issue?

A. Again, I do not want to comment on details of private talks. I can say, however, that we will continue discussions with Beijing on this and other bilateral and world issues. I am hopeful we will now find ways to overcome our difficulties of recent months, and resume constructive advancement of our strategic relations with Beijing.

Q. What about Taiwan? How are they taking your decision?

A. I understand the reaction has been calm. I would refer you to the statement issued by the State Department last week, which expressed the President's full, personal interest. There should be no cause for worry or concern in Taipei.

Q. Haven't you violated at least the spirit, if not the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act with this decision?

A. No. The decision we reached was based on thorough study by all concerned US government agencies, in a manner entirely consistent with our internal legislation on this subject.

Q. Can you tell us where things will go with Beijing or Taipei now that this decision has been taken?

A. I do not think it will help to speculate about this. We are still discussing this and other bilateral and international issues with Beijing. Our policy on arms sales to Taiwan remains unchanged. As was stated in the State Department announcement of the decision, we have already made sales of certain items to meet Taiwan's defense needs and expect to make further decisions of this sort.

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

82 JAN 28 P 4: 30
82 JAN 28 P 4:30

DATE/TIME TRANSMITTED

S/S # 8202110

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ No. Pages 4

FROM: RSmith S/S-I 23836 7241
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION REVISED GUIDANCE ON INQUIRIES REGARDING TAIWAN FX
DECISION.

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Michael O. Wheeler</u>	<u>395-3044</u>	<u>376A</u>
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FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: R. Weist
S/S-I

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 28, 1982

*File
Arms Sales - Taiwan*ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales Talkers for Use with
Congressmen

State has prepared the attached material for use with Congressmen making inquiries on the Taiwan arms sale.

This is a rather poor product from State. In addition to being three days late, the tone of the Q & A format is more appropriate for use with newsmen than with Congressmen, the problem with the PRC is overstated (there was never a danger of a rupture) and I feel that some additional input will be necessary to deal with anything other than a pro forma Congressional inquiry. Accordingly, in the attached memorandum to Ken Duberstein I have put a line suggesting that he coordinate any responses on the subject with me.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to Ken Duberstein (Tab I) to which the State material is attached (Tab A).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for WPC Signature
A State Material

cc: Bob Kimmitt
~~Chris Shoemaker~~
China Office



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH DUBERSTEIN

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Taiwan Arms Sales Talkers for Use with
Congressmen

Here is material prepared by the Department of State for use in dealing with Congressional inquiries on the Taiwan arms sale decision.

This material may not be adequate in dealing with some Congressional inquiries. Donald Gregg of the NSC Staff can provide additional input. I request that any responses to Congressional inquiries be coordinated with him. His telephone number is 395-4682.

Attachment

Tab A Material from State Department



DEPARTMENT OF STATE NSC-218

Washington, D.C. 20520



January 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Guidance on Inquiries regarding Taiwan
FX Decision

As requested, the attached series of questions and answers has been prepared for use in answering inquiries on the recent decision not to sell an advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer III".

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

as stated

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING TAIWAN F-X DECISION

Q. Why did you submit to PRC pressures and refuse to sell advanced aircraft to Taiwan?

A. Let me make clear that while no decision affecting our national security can be made in a vacuum, our decision on this difficult issue was not made in response to pressure. It was made solely on the basis of our judgment of Taiwan's defense needs, and was taken only after the most careful study of the actual military situation facing Taiwan. It was the unanimous recommendation of all concerned US government agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State and other national security agencies, that there is no military need for advanced aircraft.

Q. Can you tell us some of the factors bearing on this conclusion?

A. I am not prepared to go into detail on that. The matter was studied thoroughly, from every angle, over many, many months. The conclusion was unanimous on the part of the entire national security establishment, including the Departments of Defense and State and the intelligence community.

Q. How many F-5Es and other aircraft will you now be providing to Taiwan? Will there be a limit to the new co-production run you will now be authorizing.

A. As we made clear last week, this was a decision not to provide advanced aircraft. There will of course have to be replacements for aircraft in the Taiwan inventory which are ending their service life, but the precise details of that will be decided later, at an appropriate time. As for whether there will be limits, we are talking about replacements. That speaks for itself.

Q. Why did you make your decision now.

A. In part this was a logical time to make this decision, after completing our studies of the issue in the fall and taking the time to absorb all the complexities. In addition, however, once we knew what our decision should be, we wanted to move quickly to preclude the possibility of a rupture in our relations with China at a time of increased danger to world peace brought on by Soviet-backed repression in Poland.

Q. What was the Chinese reaction?

A. Assistant Secretary Holdridge informed his Chinese counterparts in Beijing last week. He had useful, constructive talks, on this and broader international issues; but I am not going to get into the details. (For Congressional inquiries: Assistant Secretary Holdridge has been talking to Congressmen about his trip since his return and is scheduled to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session on the 28th.)

Q. It is clear that China still opposes any US arms sales to Taiwan and is angered by our so-called "unilateral" statements and decisions on these issues. How are you going to bridge our continuing differences with China on this issue?

A. Again, I do not want to comment on details of private talks. I can say, however, that we will continue discussions with Beijing on this and other bilateral and world issues. I am hopeful we will now find ways to overcome our difficulties of recent months, and resume constructive advancement of our strategic relations with Beijing.

Q. What about Taiwan? How are they taking your decision?

A. I understand the reaction has been calm. I would refer you to the statement issued by the State Department last week, which expressed the President's full, personal interest. There should be no cause for worry or concern in Taipei.

Q. Haven't you violated at least the spirit, if not the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act with this decision?

A. No. The decision we reached was based on thorough study by all concerned US government agencies, in a manner entirely consistent with our internal legislation on this subject.

Q. Didn't you seek to go around the Congress by deciding this issue when the Senators and Representatives were out of session?

A. Absolutely not. We felt the timing had become critical, because we faced a rupture in relations with China at the same time Soviet involvement in Poland was intensifying. We went to special lengths to make sure that the Congressional leaders, whether overseas or out of Washington, were consulted as closely as possible before the final decision.

Q. Can you tell us where things will go with Beijing or Taipei now that this decision has been taken?

A. I do not think it will help to speculate about this. We are still discussing this and other bilateral and international issues with Beijing. Our policy on arms sales to Taiwan remains unchanged. As was stated in the State Department announcement of the decision, we have already made sales of certain items to meet Taiwan's defense needs and expect to make further decisions of this sort.

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0418

*File
Ans Sales-Training*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 29, 1982

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT:

Contingency Press Guidance on the Deferral
of Taiwan's Spare Parts Notification

State expects press queries today on our decision to delay formal notification to Congress of our intention to sell spare parts to Taiwan. This is a potentially tough issue for a press spokesman to handle, and I think this guidance is about as good as we could hope for. Alan Romberg, the State spokesman, is a China specialist and has proven to be particularly adept in fielding questions of this sort. I have talked with Bill Rope, the PRC Country Director at State, about this guidance.

I have no problem with the line being taken and do not believe that any action from the NSC is necessary.

Bob Kimmitt concurs; Chris Shoemaker not available.

Attachments

Tab I State paper dated January 28, 1982

cc: Jerry O'Leary
Bob Kimmitt
✓ Chris Shoemaker
China Office

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By US NARA, Date 12/13/07

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Review on January 29, 2002

~~SECRET~~





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Add-on 418
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82 JAN 29 P11: 01

January 28, 1982

STATE DEPT
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Contingency Press Guidance on the Deferral
of Taiwan Spare Parts Nofitication?

Attached is a copy of a contingency press guidance prepared by the Department for use as necessary by our spokesman in addressing questions by the press at the Department's January 29 press briefing. Please advise us in the event you have any difficulties with the attached material.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By AL NARA, Date 12/13/02

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RDS-1 1/28/02

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CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS/ANSWERS ON SPARE PARTS DEFERRAL

Q. Are you conducting negotiations with the Chinese on our arms sales to Taiwan?

A. Differences over US arms sales to Taiwan are a long-standing issue with the PRC, and they have been included in discussions on a recurring basis since Secretary Haig's trip to China last June. For example, in addition to diplomatic exchanges, the issue was discussed with Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Huang here in October, and by Assistant Secretary Holdridge in Beijing in January. At the conclusion of Holdridge's visit it was announced that discussions on a wide range of bilateral and international issues would continue in Beijing and in Washington. This would clearly include the question of Taiwan arms sales.

Q. Does this signify a change in our policy on arms sales to Taiwan?

A. No. US policy on this has not changed. It has been stated many times, and I do not need to reiterate it today.

Q. When will the discussions end?

A. I have no further comments on this subject.

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CW NARA, Date 2/13/07

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Q. Have you sent forward your formal notification for the sale of spare parts to Taiwan?

A. Not yet. This is a routine transaction which has been in the works for over four months. No weapons of any kind are included and there is no immediate need for the parts involved. (On background: We expect to be sending formal notification to the Congress covering this transfer, but not during the next few weeks.)

Q. What does this signify? You've sent the informal notification already, why are you delaying the formal notification?

A. (On background) As I have indicated, this is something that can be deferred for the moment, without in any way interrupting the normal flow of spare parts to Taiwan or impairing their capabilities. We expect the subject of Taiwan arms sales to be a key issue in the next few weeks as we engage in further exchanges with the Chinese following Assistant Secretary Holdridge's visit. We have told the Chinese, that for the moment, we will not proceed with Congressional notification of the spare parts package. We also have no plans to take additional steps, such as formal Congressional notification of other arms sales to Taiwan, which might exacerbate this sensitive issue while it is being discussed.

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Q. Are you saying that you aren't sending the spare parts forward because the Chinese asked you not to or because you made some sort of a commitment to Beijing?

A. (On background) I am saying that, since the visit of Vice Premier Huang Hua late last October, we have been discussing the issue of Taiwan arms sales in follow-up diplomatic exchanges with the Chinese. Ambassador Holdridge's trip this month was part of those exchanges. We expect them to be concluded soon. We have indicated to the Chinese that for the time being we will not make further announcements of new sales to Taiwan. Let me emphasize here one point--we do not, I repeat not, expect these exchanges to go on much longer--a few additional weeks at the most.

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Q: Did the Chinese ask you to delay notification?

A: (On background) We made the decision in order to provide a better atmosphere while we are engaged in further exchanges with the Chinese. The need to create a better atmosphere was self-evident. I have nothing further to say on this.

Q. What if they do last more than a few weeks?

A. (On background) I would not want to speculate precisely other than to say that our fundamental policy on this issue is unchanged; and we intend to carry it out. With regard to the spare parts, for example, we have no intention of permitting an interruption in supply. We will, therefore, take whatever steps are required, including ones such as public notification, when that becomes necessary.

Q. Does this mean you are negotiating limits on US arms sales to Taiwan, or negotiating some formula?

A. (On background) I would steer you away from that. This is a difficult issue, involving principled positions on both sides. It is something which both sides can discuss, and discussions are going on.

Q. What do you expect to be the result then?

A. (On background) We hope to put this problem behind us. This is not easy, and I am not prepared to speculate.

Q: What are our principles?

A: (On background) This Administration has made our principles abundantly clear; they were enunciated at the time of normalization, and they are embodied in our legislation. I don't need to repeat them now, but of course they involve the continued supply of arms to Taiwan.

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Q: I understand your spare parts package has been reduced from \$97 million to \$60 million. Is that so?

A. I will not comment on the specific value of the package for Taiwan about which we informally notified the Congress in December. (On background) It did consist of two parts, one a drawing right for future delivery of spare parts to Taiwan; the second part was not equipment, but covered certain overhead costs charged as part of a supply arrangement going back many years. Pursuant to a change in the law in December the overhead costs component will not be formally notified to the Congress.

Q. When will the "overhead" portion be transacted?

A. (On background) This involves a payment, for overhead costs, not for delivery of any parts, equipment or material. The payment will occur in the normal course of events.

Q. Can you give us more detail on that?

A. No. Not even on background.

Q. If the \$37 million is only an "overhead" payment, what is the \$60 million package?

A. (On background) The spare parts package covers spare parts for equipment already in Taiwan's inventory. Of course, only spare parts, not weapons, are involved.

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Q. What is the new legislation to which you referred?

A. The change in our Congressional notification requirement is due to December changes in the Export Control Act. (If asked: Congressional notification of arms transfers of this type is now required only for sales over \$50 million; the previous level was \$25 million).

Q. Did you inform the PRC of this notification deferral?

A. (On background) We have told the Chinese that for the moment, we will not proceed with formal Congressional notification of spare parts, nor do we intend to move forward with other arms sales to Taiwan, which might exacerbate this sensitive issue while it is being discussed. I think it should be clear from all I've said today, however, that we are contemplating only a very brief period of further delay.

Q. Have you informed Taiwan? Have you informed the Congress?

A. (On background) Taiwan was informed this week through AIT. We began informing key Congressmen earlier this week and are continuing our discussions with them .

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