Carlos Garcia, President of the International Baseball Federation saw Human Rights violations every day he was in prison. Spent 1640 days of a 14 year sentence for speaking against government. International pressure and poor health got him out after 4 years.

A. Sandinista seizing of children for education in Cuba.

--, Glenn Garvin, "Nicaragua Refugees Flood Costa Rica," WashTimes, March 21, 1985, p. 1., Romero claimed that four families in the village were forced to turn over their children to be educated in Cuba. Other refugees supported these allegations. Fifteen year old Dennis Castro was solicited by the Sandinistas for a free education in Cuba.

B. Allegations of torture of religious figures

Fred Dicker, "Villagers' Catalog of Carnage," New York Post, March 15, 1985, p. 3. Reports from individuals of torture:

Bayardo Antonia Santeliz: 28 years old, evangelistic pastor from Leon. May 1982 I was at a religious meeting with four others. Tied to a pillar in house, doused w/gasoline. Three burned to death, he lived when fire burned through rope. Visibly scarred.

Fidellia Maradiaga Lopez: 51, Nurse. FSLN troops tied to a horse. Fired bullets, horse dragged boy off. Repeated a second time. (no word on fate of youth)

Rosendo Blandon Quinterro: 40, Was told that he could not work unless he joined Sandinistas. Peasants who resisted were killed. One of his friends was shot about 1000 feet from his home. Sandinistas would not allow burial of the body, which was left to rot. Blandon fled.

Sarita and Oscar Kellermann were at the synagogue in Managua when the Sandinistas fire-bombed it in 1979. FSLN took their money and businesses. Left in 1980. Graffiti on her home and synagogue said "Jews--out of Nicaragua" Kellermann stated that the PLO provided $12 million to the Sandinistas.

1ST DOCUMENT of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Public Papers of the Presidents

Bill of Rights Day; Human Rights Day and Week, 1983

Remarks on Signing Proclamation 5135.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1668

December 9, 1983

LENGTH: 1380 words

I thank you all for being here today to underscore our national recognition of human rights.

The degree of freedom in our country is something of which Americans are rightfully proud. Unlike many other countries which find their cohesion in cultural and social traditions, the citizens of our country find their unity and their heritage in the liberty that is shared by people with diverse cultural backgrounds.

When Americans think about the nature of human rights, we begin with what Abraham Lincoln called "the definition and axioms of free society contained in the Declaration of Independence." Well, that testament of liberty declares that all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights. To secure these rights, it states "governments are instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Well, those words reveal the meaning of human rights and our philosophy of liberty that is the essence of America.

Sometimes we in free countries forget the richness of that precious possession. Our human rights are respected, so our freedom is almost indivisible -- invisible, I should say. There are no walls, no troops or guns to prevent us from traveling. There are no guards at our churches or spies in our congregations. And there are no censors at the newspapers or universities.

People who live in tyranny, however, can see freedom much more clearly. It shines like a candle in the midst of darkness, and America's freedom shines through a world of stormy seas, giving hope to tens of millions of people for a better way of life.

As Americans, it's our responsibility to speak out against blatant affronts to human rights. Yes, we must and we will speak out against the incarceration of Soviet dissidents in psychiatric wards, against the barbaric persecution of the members of the Bahai faith in Iran, against the racial injustice of the apartheid system in South Africa, and against the persecution of the Catholic Church and the Solidarity labor movement in Poland.

Just a personal note of regret: It's particularly unfortunate that Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, who has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his valiant efforts to achieve peaceful reconciliation within Poland feels that he cannot leave his own country to accept that prize out of concern that he would not be permitted to return.

We cannot believe in human rights and ignore the activities of death squads in some Central American countries, the persecution of the churches and to the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua, and the resurgence of repression against national and religious groups in the Soviet Union, including Jews, Baptists, Lithuanian Catholics, Central Asian Moslems, and even members of the Russian Orthodox clergy.

We will, of course, maintain a strong defense, but an equally potent weapon against tyranny is to proclaim the truth. I think one of our great failings has been permitting leftist dictatorships to seize the initiative in the international debate. The adversaries of freedom allocate enormous resources to promote their brutal systems and propagate blatant lies. But we in the democracies, in comparison, have spent far too little to offer the world our message of democracy, human rights, and truth.

To turn this situation around, I've made supportive democracy a central goal of American foreign policy. And, specifically, to correct these communication gaps, we are significantly expanding the international broadcasting capabilities of the United States. We are strengthening operations of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and we're establishing Radio Marti to communicate directly with the Cuban people.

Saint John told us, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Well, in many countries people aren't even allowed to read the Bible. It is up to us to make sure the message of hope and salvation gets through.

You know -- I should have brought it with me, although maybe some of you have seen it -- but I have a little book, about that big, and about that thick, that contains a verse or two, printed in small type in that little thing, from the Bible. It was smuggled out of Russia and was finally delivered to me as an example of what they do just to try and cling to their faith and belief, that when someone has a Bible, they then take just a verse so that everyone can have at least some words -- a few words of the Scripture and in something that can be easily hidden. And that, when we think of our own freedom, makes it very evident.

I've done something else -- I have to interject here, although this is not an occasion for humor. But I've had a kind of a hobby lately of collecting by way of dissidents stories that are told behind some of those iron curtains and those iron walls by the people themselves, showing their own cynicism about the system under which they're forced to live. And one recently that I heard had to do with three dogs that were having a conversation: an American dog, a Polish dog, and a Russian dog. And the American dog was telling them about how, well, he barks and that in our country his master gives him some meat. And the Polish dog says, "What's meat?" [Laughter] And the Russian dog says, "What's bark?" [Laughter]

But seriously, all of us who live in freedom are linked in spirit with those brave men and women being persecuted for demanding their rights or struggling to establish democracy.

With us today in the front rows and on stage are a number of courageous individuals who've suffered for their belief in human rights and democracy. They come from countries which differ markedly from each other, and yet they're all heroes of the same cause. Their devotion to political and religious

liberties unites them as it unites all of us who are committed to the freedom of mankind.

I note with sadness and concern that one hero not with us today, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, is reported to be seriously ill. This good and courageous man has struggled for years on behalf of human rights, and he's now banished to the city of Gorki -- supposedly free; he just can't leave Gorki. It's my hope that in the name of humanity the Soviet authorities will permit this noble individual to live his life in freedom and dignity.

In honoring these heroes today, we proclaim our confidence that good and decent people will triumph over evil. Dictatorships can pass away. On the right we've seen it happen in recent years, in Spain, in Portugal, in Greece, in Argentina. On the left, totalitarian ideologies that brutalize human beings to rebuild mankind into that which it is not are destined to fail. Totalitarianism on the left, just like Nazism before it, will be disgarded by a disgusted humanity. Much depends on us, but we can be confident that the tide of history is indeed running on the side of freedom.

This month marks the anniversary of two milestones in mankind's journey to freedom. December 15th is the 192d anniversary of our Bill of Rights. And 35 years ago, recoiling from the horror and the destruction of World War II, on December 10th the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Those of us who went through that terrible conflict saw the Declaration as an important international standard, something that could help build a better world. Well, today we reaf-firm our commitment to the ideals expressed in the Declaration.

To commemorate these advances in freedom, I am declaring December 10th Human Rights Day, the week beginning December 10th as Human Rights Week, and December 15th Bill of Rights Day. Let this be a call to action for all Americans. We must rededicate ourselves to respect at home for those fundamental human rights which form the basis of our self-definition as a people and a nation. We must also assure those brave men and women struggling for democracy around the world that we will be true to ourselves by supporting our common cause.

I thank you very much. God bless all of you, and with that said, I will sign the declaration.

Note: The President spoke at 11:06 a.m. at the signing ceremony in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building.

2ND DOCUMENT of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Public Papers of the Presidents

Bill of Rights Day; Human Rights Day and Week, 1983

Proclamation 5135.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1670

December 9, 1983

LENGTH: 990 words

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

On December 15, 1791, our Founding Fathers rejoiced in the ratification of the first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the United States -- a Bill of Rights which has helped guarantee all Americans the liberty we so cherish.

One hundred and fifty-seven years later, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an effort aimed at securing basic human rights for the peoples of all nations.

Americans have long honored the gift of liberty. So it is with glad hearts and thankful minds that on Bill of Rights Day we recognize the special benefits of freedom bequeathed to posterity by the Founding Fathers. They had a high regard for the liberty of all humanity as reflected by Thomas Jefferson when he wrote in 1787, "A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth." In this century alone thousands of Americans have laid down their lives on distant battlefields on Europe, Asia, Africa, and in our Western Hemisphere itself in defense of the basic human rights.

When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, Americans hoped that the Jeffersonian vision was about to be realized at last. The Universal Declaration, it was believed, would embody the consensus of the international community in favor of human rights and individual liberty. And the United Nations, it was further thought, would serve as the instrument through which the observance of human rights by governments would be enforced by the international community.

Thirty-five years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration, it is clear that these hopes have been fulfilled only in part. Nevertheless, the Universal Declaration remains an international standard against which the human rights practices of all governments can be measured. Its principles have become the basis of a number of binding international covenants and conventions. At the United Nations, it has served to strengthen the arguments of those governments which are genuinely interested in promoting human rights.

Still, the fact remains that even as we celebrate Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day, human rights are frequently violated in many nations. In the Soviet Union, for example, brave men and women seeking to promote respect for human rights are often declared mentally ill by their government and incarcerated in psychiatric institutions. In Poland, the free trade-union movement Solidarity has been brutally suppressed by the regime. Throughout

Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, the rights of workers and other basic human rights as the freedom of speech, assembly, and religion and the right of self-determination are denied. This same tragic situation also occurs just 90 miles off our southern coast. In South Africa the apartheid system institutionalizes racial injustice, and in Iran the Bahai people are being persecuted because of their religion. And, in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, toxic weapons, the use of which is outlawed by international conventions, are being utilized by foreign occupation forces against brave peoples fighting for their freedom and independence.

As Americans recall these and other human rights violations, we should reflect on both the similarities and the differences between the Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both great human rights documents were adopted in the aftermath of a bitter war. Both envision a society where rulers and ruled are bound by the laws of the land and where government rests on the consent of the governed, is limited in its powers, and has as its principal purpose the protection of individual liberty.

Yet while the Bill of Rights was adopted by a Nation in which free institutions already flourished, many of the countries which adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lacked free institutions. Since human rights are the product of such institutions as a free press, free elections, free trade unions, and an independent judiciary, it is not surprising that formal adherence to the Universal Declaration by governments which suppress these institutions has resulted in no real human rights gains.

By posing as champions of human rights, many governments hope to disguise their own human rights abuse. It was with special pleasure that I noted the recognition offered by the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Walesa for his real efforts on behalf of human rights in a country where the government speaks only of the illusion of human rights.

Human rights can only be secured when government empowers its people, rather than itself, through the operation of free institutions. Because our Founding fathers understood this, we are blessed with a system of government which protects our human rights. Today, let us rededicate ourselves to respect these rights at home and to strive to make the words of the Universal Declaration a living reality for all mankind.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim December 10, 1983 as Human Rights Day and December 15, 1983, as Bill of Rights Day, and call upon all Americans to observe the week beginning December 10, 1983 as Human Rights Week. During this period, let each of us give special thought to the blessings we enjoy as a free people and renew our efforts to make the promise of our Bill of Rights a living reality for all Americans and, whenever possible, for all mankind.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 9th day of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eighth.
Ronald Reagan

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 4:56 p.m., December 9, 1983]

2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

The Associated Press

March 21, 1985, Thursday, PM cycle

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 82 words

DATELINE: PARIS

KEYWORD: Foreign Briefs

BODY:

The Bahai Information Office of France says that two Bahais were killed in Iran during February and March, bringing the number of Bahais executed over the past six months to 18.

The office said in a statement Wednesday that there had been a "wave of arrests" of Bahais in January and February and that a recent inquiry shows that 707 Bahais are imprisoned in Iran.

The Bahai faith was founded in 1863 by Hossein Ali Nouri. The Islamic republic of Iran is predominately Shiite Moslem.

4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

MARCH 8, 1985, FRIDAY, AM CYCLE

LENGTH: 215 words

HEADLINE: BAHA'IS AT U.N. BODY DEPLORE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN IRAN

DATELINE: GENEVA, MARCH 7

KEYWORD: BAHA'I

BODY:

A BAHA'I OBSERVER TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TODAY ACCUSED THE TEHRAN GOVERNMENT OF CONDUCTING A REMORSELESS CAMPAIGN OF PERSECUTION AGAINST THE FAITH'S 300,000 MEMBERS IN IRAN.

'TO DATE A TOTAL 140 BAHAI'S HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY EXECUTED IN IRAN, AND A FURTHER 54 HAVE BEEN EITHER MURDERED ... OR HAVE DIED MYSTERIOUSLY IN PRISON, OR HAVE SIMPLY DISAPPEARED,' GERALD KNIGHT OF THE BAHA'I INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SAID IN A SPEECH.

SINCE THE 43-NATION BODY'S LAST SESSION, THESE VIOLATIONS HAD CONTINUED UNABATED 'IN AN OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN OF PERSECUTION SO REMORSELESS AND SO ALL-EMBRACING THAT IT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY MANY INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS AS 'RELIGIOUS GENOCIDE,' HE SAID.

'THEY HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED, TORTURED AND EXECUTED, DENIED JOBS AND EDUCATION AND DEPRIVED OF THEIR HOMES AND POSSESSIONS,' HE ADDED. THEIR HOLY PLACES HAD BEEN DESECRATED AND DESTROYED, AND FINANCIAL ASSETS SEIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

A SPECIAL U.N. INVESTIGATOR REPORTED TO THE COMMISSION LAST MONTH THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO RESPOND TO HIS APPEAL LAST AUGUST ON BEHALF OF 32 BAHA'IS SENTENCED TO DEATH.

EIGHT OF THESE HAD SINCE BEEN EXECUTED, KNIGHT SAID, AS WELL AS A FURTHER SIX WHOSE SENTENCES HAD NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC, THE MOST RECENT DURING THE COMMISSION'S CURRENT SESSION.

6TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

The New York Times

February 14, 1985, Thursday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section A; Page 1, Column 5; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 1561 words

HEADLINE: A RIGHTS REVIEW POINTS TO GAINS IN LATIN REGION

BYLINE: By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

, Special to the New York Times

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, Feb. 13

BODY:

The State Department, in an annual review, has found continuing deprivation and abuses of human rights in most countries around the world. But a senior department official asserted that the most important trend consisted of improvements in Latin America.

Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, said at a news conference today, ''Worldwide, I think I would say that the only significant overall trend is the trend toward improvement in the Western Hemisphere.''

''In the last five years, I think, we are now up to nine countries that have gone from military dictatorship to democracy,'' he said. ''Zero countries have gone from democracy to dictatorship.''

Ninth Annual Study

This was the ninth annual volume of human rights findings since such a report was first mandated by Congress in 1976. It has grown over the years from an examination of human rights practices only in countries that received American foreign aid, to a worldwide study of the status of human rights in 164 countries. Its 1,453 pages cover not only foreign aid recipients, but also Communist governments and other friendly and unfriendly countries that do not get foreign aid.

The reports that were likely to receive the most attention dealt with the situation in El Salvador, where the Administration continues to seek major increases in foreign aid, and Nicaragua, which it is trying to undermine by securing aid for the anti-Government rebels.

It said that while ''human rights abuses remain a central issue in El Salvador, there has been substantial progress in the last year.''

Substantial Drop Cited

It said political killings ''are now substantially lower than in the past.'' The report said the rate per month had dropped from 800 in 1980 to 46 in the last half of 1984. ''In contrast to the situation in the past, there is no

credible evidence to suggest that violence against civilians is now even tacit Government policy.''

''As far as can be determined, the majority of alleged civilian deaths stemming from military operations were actually guerrilla combatants,'' it said.

However, some rights group were quick to criticize some sections of the report, particularly those dealing with El Salvador.

On Nicaragua, the report said that the Government ''continued to tighten Sandinista control over Nicaraguan society and to intimidate the remaining opposition.'' It quoted from the Permanent Human Rights Commission, an independent group, as finding that the Managua Government was responsible for ''the deaths of a number of detained persons in 1984'' - it cited six cases - and had carried out ''systematic physical and psychological abuse and torture.'' The report said the Roman Catholic Church, once supportive of the Sandinistas, was now ''increasingly disenchanted.''

The report found that in Guatemala, a country whose human rights abuses were sharply criticized in past studies, ''significant steps'' were taken last year ''to return the country to democratic rule.'' It said that ''overall human rights conditions improved.''

The State Department found that the human rights situation in some key countries, such as Chile and Peru, was aggravated by terrorist activities.

Pinochet's State of Siege

In Chile, under the army general, President Augusto Pinochet, the report said, the Government imposed a state of siege ''to curb growing terrorism and to control delinquency and violent protesters.''

''However, the same authority was used against nonviolent political dissenters as well,'' it said. The state of siege, it said, had ''resulted in numerous violations of internationally-recognized human rights and a general deterioration of human rights practices.''

In Peru, the report said, the rise of terrorist activity has had ''a seriously disruptive effect on the political life of the country.''

''An upsurge of terrorist violence in mid-1984 appeared to provoke a corresponding campaign of security force counterviolence,'' it said.

''The fact of a rising death toll and widespread brutality was indisputable,'' it said.

The report noted that the Peruvian Government had disputed charges of purported abuses made by international and local human rights spokesmen, and was often uncooperative in dealing with them. Peruvian officials have regularly asserted that they were in compliance with accepted standards of human rights.

Chile a Big Disappointment

Mr. Abrams said Chile ''was the greatest disappointment'' because a movement toward a return to democracy ''has been stalled and the degree of political

repression has grown during the year.''

The Soviet Union and all of its Warsaw Pact allies were found to have committed many violations of human rights. ''Soviet performance in the realm of human rights fails to meet accepted international standards,'' the report said. ''The regime's common response to efforts to exercise freedom of expression is to incarcerate those concerned in prison, labor camp, or psychiatric hospital.''

Mr. Abrams said there was a new crackdown last year in the Soviet Union on Jews and Protestants.

In Iran, the report said, there has been ''improvement in the past two years,'' although ''serious abuses'' are continuing.

It singled out Iran's persecution of the Bahai religion. The report said that at least 29 Bahais in custody were killed in 1984 and that 750 or more remained in prison.

''Although many abuses continue, conditions have improved over the immediate postrevolutionary period,'' it said. The report said that Iranian authorities allowed, besides Moslems, Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians to practice their religions. But since the Bahai religion is not recognized, ''Bahais have suffered severe persecution since the revolution, mainly Government-directed and aimed at the religious leadership.''

Some Concern Over China

In China, the report noted that although it was contrary to official Chinese policy, ''there have been numerous reports of coercive birth control practices, including forced abortions and sterilizations.''

''Another apparent result of the Government's effort to curb population growth has been a revival of the traditional practice of female infanticide,'' it said, although senior Chinese officials condemn it and say it is not widespread.

In the Philippines, an American ally facing insurgencies and political opposition, the report said ''there continued to be serious human rights violations in 1984, particularly in areas affected by the Communist insurgency.''

It said there were many well-founded reports of ''harassment of civilians; arbitrary arrests, detentions, and disappearances; instances of torture; unlawful searches and seizures; and summary executions or 'salvagings' of suspected insurgents and insurgent sympathizers.''

Although the Government has ordered investigations and urged respect for civilians, ''few within the military are seriously punished for abusive actions,'' the report said.

Question on South Korea

The report said that in South Korea, despite guarantees of freedom and human rights, they were ''abridged'' in practice. It noted that the maintenance of tight security in that country had ''brought charges that dissent and peaceful

opposition political activity are suppressed, and to many Koreans the degree of legitimacy of the Government of President Chun Doo Hwan is open to question.''

It said that politicians and newspapers ''who publicly criticize the Government are aware that there are limits beyond which they may be subject to some form of government action.''

Uganda was cited as a country where ''grave human rights violations occurred'' last year, ''including large numbers of extra-legal killings and detentions on the one hand by insurgents and on the other by military.''

The trend back toward the return of law that had been evident in 1983 ''underwent very serious setbacks in 1984,'' it said.

Human rights groups were quick to find fault with some aspects of the report. A statement issued by Americas Watch, the Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights said that of the individual country reports it reviewed in this year's volume, most provided ''credible and comprehensive coverage of human rights conditions around the world.''

But the statement said the report on El Salvador was ''so thoroughly flawed that it tends to discredit the entire document.''

''In marked contrast to other country reports, including many describing countries friendly to the United States, the report on El Salvador goes to extraordinary lengths to minimize continued gross violations of human rights by that Government.''

It said the State Department had minimized human rights abuses in El Salvador and that this had done a disservice to the cause of human rights because American influence was thereby ''squandered.''

''It is evident that political considerations also entered into the writing of the reports on Guatemala and Nicaragua, with abuses played down in the former case, and exaggerated in the latter.

''With respect to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the country reports have more the characteristics of propaganda for the Reagan Administration policies than the qualities of even-handed human rights reporting,'' it said.

SUBJECT: Terms not available

itself as regards the distinction between natural and artificial machines, the former manifesting a technologic of which consciousness remains the essential and nonduplicatable trait.

Yet concern about the "mentality" of machines in contemporary thought is symptomatic of the sociocultural meaning that the man-machine has acquired in post-industrial societies on the threshold of automation. The technical superiority of the machine, by transforming mere efficiency into a human ideal, has set in motion a convergence between itself and man which tends, on the one hand, to lift the robot to a sort of sub-human role, and on the other, to assimilate man to the machine not only in the biological or psychophysiological sense, but also in relation to his values and conduct. Such an invasion of man's private world by criteria typical of automata has provoked, understandably, a reaction which raises the problem of how far his nature may be equated with that of the machine. The *golem*, which in sixteenth-century Yiddish folklore was envisaged as a beneficent servant of man, has spawned in our own time a numerous progeny of "mechanical creatures" about whose intentions we are far less confident. The obsessive *leitmotiv*, so popular in science fiction, of human civilization being threatened by a robot takeover, would seem thus to betray symbolically a widespread fear of the automatization of life; for the menacing robot rival is actually man himself perceived in a depersonalized future shape.

In conclusion, the man-machine idea may be said at present to occupy a strategic and fateful position at the confluence of several disciplines and traditions: in neurophysiology and psychology it is above all a fecund empirical hypothesis of indefinite promise to research; in philosophy, it is a speculative option in the attempt to resolve the body-mind problem; in technology, it expresses the demiurgic goal of mastering our environment by the mechanical maximation of our limited powers; and as a theme in sociology and the imaginative arts, it most often conveys the malaise of dehumanization in modern culture, and conjures up fantasies that put in doubt the survival of man's authentic self.

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The translations for Descartes are by the author of the article.

ARAM VARTANIAN

[See also **Behaviorism**; Dualism; **Epicureanism and Free Will**; Historical and Dialectical Materialism; Necessity; Organicism; Positivism; **Psychological Ideas in Antiquity**; Pythagorean . . .; Unity of Science.]

MARXISM

MARXISM like Christianity is a term that stands for a family of doctrines attributed to a founder who could not have plausibly subscribed to all of them, since some of these doctrines flatly contradict each other. Consequently any account that professes to do justice to Marxism must be more than an account of the ideas of Karl Marx even if it takes its point of departure from him.

As a set of ideas one of the remarkable things about Marxism is that it is continually being revived despite formidable and sometimes definitive criticisms of its claims and formulations. For this and other reasons, it cannot be conceived as a purely scientific set of ideas designed "to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society" (Preface to first edition of *Capital*) and to explain all cultural and political developments in terms of it. There is little doubt that Karl Marx himself thought that his contributions were as scientific in the realm of social behavior as Newton's in the field of physics and Darwin's in biology. But there is no such thing as a recurring movement of Newtonianism or Darwinism in physics or biology. The mark of a genuine science is its cumulative development. The contributions of its practitioners are assimilated and there is no return to the original forms of theories or doctrines of the past.

The existence of Marxism as a social and political *movement* inspired by a set of ideas, sometimes in open opposition to other movements, is further evidence that we are dealing with a phenomenon that is not purely scientific. For such a movement obviously goes beyond mere description or the discovery of truth. That its normative goals may in some sense be based upon descriptive truths, i.e., not incompatible with them, may justify using the term "scientific" at best to differ-

entiate these goals from those that are arbitrary or impossible of achievement.

Marxism has often been compared with, and sometimes characterized as, a religion with its sacred books, prophets, authoritative spokesmen, etc. But this is not very illuminating until there is agreement about the nature of religion, a theme which is even more ambiguous and controversial than that of Marxism. Nonetheless there are some important features which Marxism shares with some traditional religions that explain at least in part its recurrent appeal despite its theoretical shortcomings.

Marxism is a monistic theory that offers an explanatory key to everything important that occurs in history and society. This key is the mode of economic production, its functioning, the class divisions and conflicts it generates, its limiting and, in the end, its determining effect upon the outcome of events. It provides a never failing answer to the hunger for explanation among those adversely affected by the social process. That the explanations are mostly ad hoc, that predictions are not fulfilled, like the increasing pauperization of the working class, that important events occur that were not predicted like the rise of Fascism, the emergence of a new service-industry oriented middle class, the discovery of nuclear technology—are not experienced as fatal, or even embarrassing, difficulties. Just as belief that everything happens by the will of God is compatible with whatever occurs, so belief in the explanatory primacy of the mode of economic production and its changes is compatible with any social or political occurrence if sufficient subsidiary hypotheses are introduced. That is why although Marxism as a social and political movement may be affected by the events and conditions it failed to explain (like the latter-day affluence of capitalist society), as a set of vague beliefs it is beyond refutation. In the course of its history, now more than a century old, few, if any, Marxists have been prepared to indicate under what empirical or evidential conditions they were prepared to abandon their doctrines as invalid.

A second reason for the recurrence of Marxism in various guises—there are today existentialist Marxisms and even Catholic Marxisms—is that its theories are an expression of hope. Marxisms of whatever kind all hold out the promise, if not the certainty, of social salvation, or at the very least, relief from the malaise and acute crises of the time. Whether the future is conceived in apocalyptic terms or less dramatically, it is one with a prospect of victory through struggle, a victory that will insure peace, freedom, prosperity, and surcease from whatever evils flow from an improperly organized and unplanned society, dominated by the commodity producing quest for ever renewed profit.

The third reason for the recurrence of Marxism is a whole series of semantic ambiguities that permit Marxists to appeal to individuals and groups of democratic sentiment despite the fact that Marxists often direct savage and unfair criticisms against nonsocialist democracies. The growth of democratic sentiment and the allegiance to the principle of self-determination in all areas of personal and social life are universal phenomena. They are marked by the fact that almost every totalitarian regime seeks to pass itself off as one or another form of democracy. Marxists, for reasons that will be made clearer below, are the most adept and successful in presenting Marxism as a philosophy of the democratic left, despite the existence of ruthless despotisms in the USSR and Red China, and other countries that profess to be both socialist and Marxist. Although the existence of these two dictatorial regimes and of other avowedly Marxist regimes in Eastern Europe creates some embarrassment for those who identify the Marxist movement with the movement towards democracy, the terrorist practices of these regimes are glossed over and explained away. They are represented either as excesses of regimes unfaithful to their own socialist ideals or as temporary measures of defense against enemies of democracy within or without.

Finally there are certain elements of truth in Marxism that, however vague, explain some events and some facets of the social scene that involve the growth of industrial society and its universal spread, the impact of scientific technology, the pressure of conflicting economic class interests and their resolution. Although not exclusively Marxist, these insights and outlooks have been embodied in the Marxist traditions. They function to sustain by association, so to speak, the more specific Marxist doctrines in the belief system of their advocates. Although they are generalized beyond the available evidence, they bestow a certain plausibility on Marxist thought when other conditions further their acceptance.

This brings us to the important and disputed question of what constitutes the nature of Marxism. What are the characteristic doctrines associated with the Marxist outlook upon the world? For present purposes we are distinguishing Marxism and its variants from the question of what Marx and Engels *really* meant. Historically, this question is by far not as significant as what they have been *taken* to mean. Marx like Christ might have disowned all of his disciples: it would not affect how their meaning has been historically interpreted and what was done in the light of that interpretation. It may be that in the future there will be other interpretations of what Marx really meant and that even today there are several esoteric views of his thought

different from those to be considered but they obviously cannot be considered as part of intellectual history.

There are three main versions of Marxism identifiable in the history of ideas that have received wide support. The first, oldest, and closest to the lives of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in point of time is the Social-Democratic version. The second version which acquired widespread influence after the October 1917 Russian Revolution is the Communist version, sometimes called the Bolshevik-Leninist view. The third version, which emerged after the Second World War, may be called "existentialist." Marxism is regarded from an existentialist view as primarily a theory of human alienation, and of how to overcome it. It is based primarily on Marx's unpublished Paris economic-philosophical manuscripts first made available in 1932. Although these three interpretations of Marxism are not compartmentalized in that they share some common attitudes, values, and beliefs, some of their basic theories are incompatible with each other. It would not be too much to say that if the basic theories of one of these three interpretations are taken to be true they entail the falsity of the corresponding basic theories of the other two.

I

The first version of Marxism is represented mainly by the writings of the later Engels, the early Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, George Plekhanov, and in the United States by Daniel De Leon. It accepts as literally valid six interrelated complexes of propositions.

1. The fundamental and determining factor in all societies is the mode of economic production. All important changes in the culture of a period—its politics, ethics, religion, philosophy, and art—are ultimately to be explained in terms of changes in the economic substructure.

2. The capitalist mode of economic production is fundamentally unstable. It cannot guarantee, except for very limited periods, continued employment for the masses, a decent standard of living, and sufficient profit for the entrepreneurs to justify continued production. The consequence is growing mass misery culminating in the crisis and breakdown of the system of production. The deficiencies and fate of capitalism are not due to any specific persons or human actions, but flow from the law of value and surplus value in a commodity-producing society. The collapse of capitalism and its replacement by a socialist classless society are inevitable.

3. Classes are defined by the role they play in production. Their conflicting economic interests give rise to economic class struggles that override on crucial occasions and, in the long run, all other kinds of struggle—religious, racial, national, etc. The variations in the intensity of these types of struggle, even their origin, are directly or indirectly a consequence of the "underlying" economic class struggle.

4. The state is an integral part of the political and legal order. It therefore has a class character which must be changed through class struggles, peaceful where possible, violent where not, before the forces of production can be liberated from the quest for ever-renewed profit and utilized for the benefit of the entire community, in which the economic exploitation of men by other men is no longer possible.

5. Capitalism prepares the way for the new socialist society by intensive development and centralization of industry, concentration of capital, and rationalization of the techniques of production. These are necessary presuppositions of a socialized, planning society in which the abolition of private ownership of the social means of production, and its vestment in the community as a whole, abolishes the economic class divisions of the past.

6. The movement towards socialism is a movement towards democracy. *Political* democracy must be defended against all its detractors and enemies but from the point of view of democracy as a way of life, it is necessary but not sufficient. Political democracy must be used to achieve a complete democracy by extending democratic values and principles into economic and social life. Where democracy does not exist the socialist movement must introduce it. (The *Communist Manifesto,* because of the absence of political democracy on the European Continent, advocated revolution by forcible overthrow.) Where democracy already exists, the working class can achieve power by peaceful parliamentary means (cf. Engels' critique of the Erfurt Program in 1891 and also his introduction to the first English translation of *Capital*).

There are many other doctrines that are part of the Marxist position (like equality between the sexes, self-determination for national minorities, the desirability of trade unions and cooperatives) that are easily derivable from the above propositions and some implicit value judgments about the desirability of human dignity, freedom, and creative self-fulfillment, even though they are obviously not uniquely entailed by them.

Marxism, in this its original version, was primarily a social philosophy. Its spokesmen as a rule adopted positions in philosophy and religion only in opposition to those metaphysical or theological doctrines whose suspected impact obstructed the growth of the working class movement and the development of its socialist consciousness. Philosophical and religious freedom of thought were extended to all thinkers who accepted

the complex of social and economic propositions enumerated above which defined the theoretical Marxist orthodoxy of the German Social-Democratic Party and the majority of the members of the Second International. Dialectical materialism, for example, despite its espousal by Engels in his *Anti-Dühring* (1878) and *Ludwig Feuerbach* . . . (1888; trans. as *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, 1934), was of peripheral importance in the Marxism that flourished up to 1917. The attack on Eduard Bernstein as a revisionist of Marxism was motivated primarily by his criticism of the first four of the complex of propositions identified above, and of the party programs of the political movement based on Marxism. It was only because he rejected the economic analysis of his party comrades and the political program presumably based on it (he approved its day-by-day activities) that attacks were made on his philosophical views.

The predominant characteristic of Social-Democratic Marxist thought is its determinism, its reliance upon the immanent processes of social development to create the conditions that would impel human beings to rationalize the whole of economic production in the same explicit and formal way in which an efficient industrial plant is organized. Formulated during an era in which the theory of evolution was being extrapolated from the field of biology to all other fields, especially the social and cultural areas of human activity, the laws of social development were considered universal, necessary, and progressive. The vocabulary was not very precise, partly because of the popular audience to which the teachings of Marxism were addressed. But even in *Capital*, as well as in his more popular writings, Marx used the term "inevitable" in describing the laws of economic change in heralding the collapse of capitalism. Engels was particularly addicted to the vocabulary of necessitarianism. Although aware of the differences in the subject matter of the natural and social sciences, and opposed to the reduction of the latter to the former, Marxists regarded the laws in both domains as working themselves out with an ineluctable "iron" necessity.

The concept of social necessity remained unexamined by the Marxist theoreticians and could not be squared, when strictly interpreted, with the recognition of alternatives of development, alternatives of action, and objective possibilities presupposed in the *practical* programs of the Marxist movement of the time. Nonetheless it possessed a rational kernel of great importance. For it stressed the importance of social readiness, preparedness, and maturity as a test and check on proposals for reform and revolution. It served as a brake upon the adventurism and euphoria of action induced by revolutionary rhetoric, and also as a consolation in defeat when objective conditions were proved to be unripe.

On the other hand, belief in the concept of social necessity tended psychologically to inhibit risk-taking actions, especially as the Marxist movement and its political parties increased in influence and acquired a feeling of responsibility. Belief in determinism, and in the heartening conviction that the structure of the socialist society was being built within the shell of the old even by those opposed to socialism, could not obviate the necessity of making choices in economics and politics, whether it was a question of supporting a call for a general strike, or voting for welfare and/or war budgets. But it naturally tended to reinforce in practice, if not in rhetoric, the choice of the moderate course, the one *less* likely to provoke opposition that might eventuate in violence and bloodshed. And why not, if the future, so to speak, was already in the bag?

This attitude of caution and restraint was reinforced by the implicitly teleological interpretation of evolutionary processes. What came later in time was assumed to be "higher" or "better"; setbacks were only temporary, the reverse stroke of an historical spiral that had only one direction—upward to a higher level. This led in practice to a commitment to the *inevitability of gradualism* so that the very pace of reforms tended to slow down as a sense of the urgent, the critical, and the catastrophic in history eased, and became replaced by a feeling of security in the overall development of history. Even the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, which destroyed the belief in the necessarily progressive character of change, failed to dispel the moderation of the Social-Democratic variant of Marxism. It was unprepared not only to take power but to exercise it vigorously when power was thrust upon it—at the close of the first World War in Germany. It moved towards the welfare state very slowly, partly in fear of provoking civil war.

Beginning with the last decade of the nineteenth century, as Social-Democratic movements gained strength in Europe, an enormous literature has been devoted to the exposition, criticism, and evaluation of Marxism. At first neglected, then refuted, then reinterpreted, modified, and qualified, Marxism in all its varieties has become at present perhaps the strongest single intellectual current of modern social thought. It has left a permanent impress upon economic historians like Max Weber and Charles Beard, even as they disavowed belief in its basic ideas. Here we shall offer only a brief review of the principal interpretations of the historical role and validity of the central notions of Marxism.

1. The doctrine of historical materialism is accepted

by many historians as a heuristic aid in describing the ways a society functions, its class power relations, and their influence on cultural activities. But it is woefully deficient in clarity with respect to all its basic terms. It is clear enough that it is not an economic determinism of human motives of a Benthamite variety, nor a technological determinism *à la* Veblen. But the connection between "the social relations of production" and "the material forces of production" is left obscure, so that there is some doubt whether the basic motor forces of historical development are tools, techniques, and inventions, especially what Whitehead calls "the invention of the method of invention," all of which express the productive drive of human beings—a drive which would open the door to a psychological, idealistic interpretation—or whether the immanent laws of the social relations of production are the ultimate determinants. Actually although many historians express indebtedness to Marxism for its theory of historical materialism, they mean no more by this doctrine than that "economics," in one of its many different meanings, must always be taken into account in an adequate understanding of history. But so must many other things that are not economic.

There is a further difficulty in ascertaining whether Marxism asserts that "social relations of production" or "the mode of economic production" *determines* the cultural superstructure, and if so to what degree, or merely *conditions* it. If it is taken to mean that it determines culture in all important aspects—historical monism—it is obviously untenable. In the face of evidence to the contrary, Marxists are wont to introduce reference to other factors reserving the determination of these factors by the mode of economic production—"in the last analysis"—despite the fact that scientifically speaking there is no such thing as "the last analysis."

The monistic determinism of Marxism is conspicuous in its treatment of "great men" in history. From Engels to Kautsky to Plekhanov to all lesser lights it is dogmatically assumed that no event-making personality has existed such that in his absence anything very important in history would have been different. With respect to any great event or phase of social development it is assumed that "no man is indispensable." Nonetheless, to cite only one difficulty, the overwhelming evidence seems to show that without Lenin there would in all likelihood have been in 1917 no October Russian Revolution.

Even if all problems of meaning are resolved and every trace of incoherence is removed from the theory of historical materialism, its claims that the mode of economic production determines politics, that "no social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed," and that no new social order can develop except on the basis of the economic foundations that have been prepared for it—have all been decisively refuted by the origin, rise, and development of the USSR and Communist China. Marxism as a theory of social development has been proved false by the actions of adherents of the Marxism of Bolshevik-Leninism. Lenin and his party seized political power in an industrially backward country and proceeded to do what the theory of historical materialism declared it was impossible to do—build the economic foundations of a new society by the political means of a totalitarian state.

2. The economic theory of Marxism is clearer than the theory of historical materialism, and events have more clearly invalidated it by negating its specific predictions especially the pauperization of the working classes, and the continuous decline in the rate of profit. The theory failed to predict the rise of what has been called the "new middle class" of the service industries as well as the economics of the totalitarian state, on the one hand, and of the welfare state, on the other. Even before events invalidated the Marxist economic assumptions, the theoretical structure of Marxist economics never recovered from Eugen Böhm-Bawerk's searching critique in the 1890's of its inconsistencies. Much more successful were the Marxist predictions about the historical development of capitalism, even though they did not uniquely follow from his theory of value and surplus value. The Marxists foresaw the growth of monopolistic tendencies, the impact of science on industrial technology, the periodic business cycle (although mistaken about its increasing magnitude), and imperialistic expansion in quest for foreign markets. Although Marxists anticipated progressive and cumulative difficulties for the capitalist system, as Joseph Schumpeter and others in the twentieth century have pointed out, they failed to see that these difficulties resulted from the successes of the system rather than from its failures.

3. The Marxist theory of the class struggle differs from all other theories of the class struggle in that it weights the component of economic class membership more heavily than any other theory in relation to other social groupings and associations, and in its expectation that economic class struggles will cease when the social instruments of production are collectivized. Although economic class interests and struggles play a large and indisputable role in political, social, and cultural life, on crucial occasions nationalist and religious ties have exercised greater weight. Although the international Marxist movement was pledged to a general strike against war, when World War I broke out, French workmen, instead of making common cause with

German workmen against their respective ruling classes, joined their "domestic exploiters," the French capitalists, in a common "national front" or "sacred union." The same was true in all major countries. National allegiance almost always proves stronger than class allegiance when national interest and class interest conflict. The union of capitalist Great Britain and United States supporting the socialist USSR against the invasion by capitalist Germany not only constitutes a difficulty for the theory of historical materialism—since the mode of economic production here was not decisive—but also for the theory of the class struggle, since the differences between the economic interests of the capitalist class as a whole and those of the USSR, especially in its opposition to capitalism declared from its very birth, are obviously far greater than the differences among the capitalists themselves. Even within the culture of a single capitalist country the Marxist theory of the class struggle fails to account for the degree and extent of class cooperation. The organized American labor movement seems just as hostile to collectivism as an economy and to communism as a political system as is the National Association of Manufacturers.

With the advent of collectivist economies in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, class struggles have not disappeared but have taken on a new form, sometimes expressed in strikes that are legally forbidden, in widespread pilfering, the use of a private sector to buy and sell, growth of bureaucratic privileges that some observers regard as indicia of a new class, and disparities in income and standards of living that are not too far removed from the upper and lower ranges of earned income in some capitalist countries. V. Pareto and Robert Michels, who agreed with Marxism that class struggles rage in society but disagreed with Marxism in holding that these struggles would continue even after Marxists came to power in what they call a socialist society, seem to have been justified by events.

Very little was done to solve some of the obvious difficulties in using the concept of class consistently with its definition, viz., the role played by individuals in the mode of production. In ordinary discourse, the various meanings of class take their meanings from the varied contexts in which they are used. One would have expected an attempt by Marxists to show that the chief uses of the term "class" that are different are derivative from the central Marxist one. Even more important was the failure to relate the concept of class interest to individual interest. Marxism is not a theory of human motivation, and especially not a theory of self-interest or egoism. The question remains: how does class interest get expressed? Classes are not individuals. They are abstractions. Only individuals act in history. On the Marxist theory of class, regardless of whether individual members of the class are selfish or unselfish, the interests of their class presumably get expressed. How does this happen and through what mechanisms? Is there an implicit statistical judgment that describes the behavior of most members of a class or are there representative leaders who speak for the class? These are some of the questions that remained unexplored, with the result that the concept of class interest, often invoked, appeared as vague and mystical as "national interest," "the spirit of the times," "the spirit of the people," and similar expressions.

4. The Marxist theory of the state in its simplest form asserts that the state—consisting of the legislature, courts, and armed forces—is nothing but "the executive committee of the dominant economic class." If this were so, it would be hard to explain the character of much of the criminal law or rules of evidence and procedure, which reflect either common ethical norms or professional interests not directly related to economic interests. The Marxist movement soon discovered that its economic power could be wielded in a political way to bring pressure on the state to liberalize and humanize the social relationships of men, and to reduce inequalities in living conditions. It soon discovered that with the extension of the franchise it could use the state power to redistribute social wealth through taxation, subsidies, and price supports. Under such circumstances the state, especially when it functions as a welfare state, does not act as the "executive committee" of the dominant economic class. It may do things that are bitterly opposed by that class. The state, then, becomes the instrument of that class or coalition of classes strong enough to win electoral victory. Allowing for time lags, where the democratic process prevails the state can become more responsive to those groups that wield political power with majority electoral support, than to dominant economic interests.

5. Marxism as a movement became unfaithful to Marxism as a theory because of the success of capitalism in sustaining a relative prosperity—even if uncertain and discontinuous in times of acute crisis. Over the years, the numbers of the unemployed and poverty-stricken decreased instead of increasing. Real wages increased. Nonetheless, in order to achieve and sustain this relative affluence the state or government had to intervene in the economy with controls and plans foreign to the spirit and structure of a free market economy. The result has been a type of mixed economy—a private and public (often hidden) sector, unanticipated by the theorists both of capitalism and socialism. It turns out that the free enterprise economy of capitalism and the fully planned and planning col-

lectivist economy of socialism are neither exclusive nor exhaustive possible social alternatives, and that in the political struggles of democracy the issue was rarely posed as a stark choice between *either* a free economy *or* a planned economy, *either* capitalism *or* socialism, but rather as a choice between *"more or less."*

6. The Marxism of the Social-Democratic movement became transformed into a broad democratic people's front in which socialist measures are the means of extending democracy, providing security, defending human dignity and freedom. It no longer speaks in the name of the working class even when the latter constitutes its mass base but instead in behalf of the common interest and common good. Despite the revolutionary rhetoric, it has become a people's socialism. Marxism is no longer the ideology of the German Social-Democratic Party whose program in broad outline (in the 1960's) barely differs from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in the USA or the Labor Party in Great Britain. A multiplicity of problems remain to be met in order to make the Welfare State truly devoted to the human welfare of all its citizens. Progress is no longer regarded as automatic but as requiring patience and hard work. But so long as the processes of freely given consent are not abridged in democratic countries and so long as large-scale war is avoided, the prospects of continued improvement are encouraging.

II

Marxism of the Bolshevik-Leninist persuasion is an extreme voluntaristic revision of the Social-Democratic variety that flourished in the period from the death of Marx (1883) to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. The fact that it claims for itself the orthodoxy of the canonic tradition has about the same significance as the claims of Protestant leaders that they were returning to the orthodoxy of early Christianity. Even before the First World War, in Tsarist Russia the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social-Democratic movement had taken positions that evoked charges from its opponents that the leaders of the group were disciples of Bakunin and Blanqui, rather than of Marx and Engels. Their voluntarism, especially in its organizational bearings, received a classic expression in Lenin's work *What Is To Be Done?* (1902). But the emergence of Bolshevik-Leninism as a systematic reconstruction of traditional Marxism was stimulated by the failure of the Social-Democratic movement to resist the outbreak of the First World War, and the disregard of the Basel Resolutions (1912) of the Second International to call a general strike; by the Bolshevik seizure of power in the October Russian Revolution of 1917 and the consequent necessity of justifying that and subsequent events in Marxist terms; by the accession of Stalin to the supreme dictatorial post in the Soviet Union; and, finally, by the adoption of the systematic policy of building socialism in one country (the Soviet Union) marked by the collectivization of agriculture—in some ways a more revolutionary measure, and in all ways a bloodier and more terroristic one, than the October Revolution itself. The chief prophet of Marxist-Leninism was Stalin, and the doctrine bears the stigmata of his power and personality. Until his death in 1953, he played the same role in determining what the correct Marxist line was in politics, as well as in all fields of the arts and sciences, as the Pope of Rome in laying down the Catholic line in the domains of faith and morals. Although Stalin made no claim to theoretical infallibility, he exercised supreme authority to a point where disagreement with him on any controversial matter of moment might spell death.

The Bolshevik-Leninist version of Marxism got a hearing outside Russia, at first not in virtue of its doctrines, but because of its intransigeant opposition to the First World War. The Social-Democratic version of Marxism was attacked as a "rationalization" of political passivity, particularly for its failure to resist the war actively. Actually there was no necessary connection between the deterministic outlook of Social Democracy and political passivity, since its electoral successes were an expression of widespread political activity albeit of a non-revolutionary sort. Further, not only did some Social-Democratic determinists with a belief in the spontaneity of mass action, like Rosa Luxemburg, oppose the war, but even Eduard Bernstein, the non-revolutionary revisionist, who ardently believed that German Social Democracy should transform itself into a party of social reform, took a strong stand against the War. The attitude of Social Democracy to the First World War in most countries was more a tribute to the strength of its nationalism than a corollary of its belief in determinism. Nonetheless, the Bolsheviks on the strength of their anti-war position were able to insinuate doubts among some working-class groups, not only about the courage and loyalty to internationalist ideals of Social-Democratic parties, but about their Marxist faith and socialist convictions.

After the Bolshevik Party seized power in October 1917 and then forcibly dissolved the democratically elected Constituent Assembly, whose delayed convocation had been one of the grounds offered by that Party for the October *putsch*, and in which they were a small minority (19%), it faced the universal condemnation of the Social-Democratic Parties affiliated with the Second Socialist International. In replying to these criticisms Lenin laid down the outlines of a more voluntaristic Marxism, that affected the meaning and emphasis of the complex of doctrines of traditional

Marxism, especially its democratic commitments, in a fundamental way.

Finally with Lenin's death and the destruction of intra-party factions, which had preserved some vestigial traits of democratic dissent, the necessity of controlling public opinion in all fields led to the transformation of Marxism into a state philosophy enforced by the introduction of required courses in dialectical materialism and Marxist-Leninism on appropriate educational levels. Heretical ideas in any field ultimately fell within the purview of interest of the secret police. Censorship, open and veiled, enforced by a variety of carrots and whips, pervaded the whole of cultural life.

As a state philosophy Marxist-Leninism is marked by several important features that for purposes of expository convenience may be contrasted with earlier Social-Democratic forms of Marxist belief.

1. Marxism became an all-inclusive system in which its social philosophy was presented as an application and expression of the ontological laws of a universal and objective dialectic. During the heyday of Social-Democratic Marxism, the larger philosophical implications and presuppositions of its social philosophy were left undeveloped. So long as the specific party program of social action was not attacked, the widest tolerance was extended to philosophical and theological views. There was no objection even to the belief that God was a Social Democrat. Social Democrats, without losing their good standing within their movement, could be positivists, Kantians, Hegelians, mechanistic materialists, even, as in the case of Karl Liebknecht, subjectivists of a sort in their epistemology.

All this changed with the development and spread of Marxist-Leninism. The works of Engels, particularly his *Anti-Dühring* and *Dialectics of Nature,* of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and *Notebooks,* and subsequently, those of Stalin, became the sacred texts of a comprehensive system of dialectical materialism, devoted to explaining "the laws of motion in nature, society and mind." The details of the system and its inadequacies need not detain us here (Hook, 1941; 1959), but what it professed to prove was that the laws of dialectic guaranteed the victory of communist society, that no one could consistently subscribe to the ontology of dialectical materialism without being a communist and, more fateful, that no one could be a communist or a believer in communist society without being a dialectical materialist.

The comprehensiveness of this state philosophy resulted in a far flung net of new orthodox dogma being thrown over all fields from astronomy to zoology, the development of what was in effect a two-truth theory, ordinary scientific truth and the higher dialectical truth which corrected the one-sidedness of the former, and political control of art and science. All communist parties affiliated with the Third Communist International were required to follow the lead of the Russian Communist Party. The literalness of the new orthodoxy is evidenced in the fact that the antiquated anthropological view of Engels and its primitive social evolutionism, based upon the findings of Lewis Morgan's pioneer work, *Ancient Society* (1877; 1959), were revived and aggressively defended against the criticisms of Franz Boas, Alexander Goldenweiser, Robert Lowie, and other investigators who, without any discredit to Morgan's pioneer effort, had cited mountains of evidence to show that social evolution was neither universal, unilinear, automatic, or progressive. Oddly enough the acceptance of the Engels-Morgan theory of social evolution, according to which no country can skip any important phase in its industrial development, would be hard to reconcile with the voluntarism of Bolshevik-Leninism, which transformed Russia from a backward capitalist country with strong feudal vestiges into a highly complex and modern industrial socialist state.

Reasoning from the dubious view that all things were dialectically interrelated, and the still more dubious view that a mistaken view in any field ultimately led to a mistaken view in every other field, including politics, and assuming that the party of Bolshevik-Leninism was in possession of the truth in politics, and that this therefore gave it the authority to judge the truth of any position in the arts and sciences in the light of its alleged political consequences, a continuous purge of ideas and persons, in accordance with the shifting political lines, marks the intellectual history of the Soviet Union. Here, as often elsewhere in the world, theoretical absurdities prepared the way for the moral atrocities whose pervasiveness and horror were officially partly revealed in N. Khrushchev's speech before the XXth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1956. Most of what Khrushchev revealed was already known in the West through the publications of escapees and defectors from the Soviet Union, and the publications of Commissions of Inquiry into the Truth of the Moscow Trials, headed by John Dewey.

1. The theory of historical materialism was invoked by all the socialist and Marxist critics of Bolshevik-Leninism since, if it were valid, a *prima facie* case could be made against Lenin and his followers for attempting to skip a stage of industrial development and introduce socialism in a backward country. Lenin and Trotsky in consequence reinterpreted the theory by asserting that the world economy had to be treated as a whole, that the world was already prepared for socialism as a result of modern science, technology,

and industry, and that the *political* revolution could break out at the weakest link in the world economic system as a whole. This would serve as a spark that would set the more advanced industrial countries like England, the USA, and Germany into revolutionary motion (places where Marx and Engels had expected socialism originally to come). This meant, of course, that the theory of historical materialism could no longer explain the *specific* political act of revolution, since on the theory of the weakest link, a political revolution by a Marxist party anywhere in the world, even in the Congo, could trigger off the world socialist revolution:

On the theory of the weakest link, after the political revolution successfully took its course and spread to other countries, the world *socialist* revolution, marked by the socialization of affluence, would be initiated by advanced industrial countries, with Russia and China once more bringing up the rear because of their primitive economies. But they would be the last in a socialist world, and only temporarily, until the world socialist economy was established and strategic goods and sources flowed to areas of greatest human need.

When the theory of the "weakest link" led in practice to the fact of a severed or isolated link, in consequence of the failure of the October Russian Revolution to inspire socialist revolutions in the West, the program of "building socialism in one country" was adopted. The attempt to build socialism in one country—and in a bankrupt, war-torn, poverty-stricken country at that—flew in the face of any reasonable interpretation of historical materialism. Nonetheless, by a combination of great courage, and still greater determination and ruthlessness, and aided by the ineptitude of their political opponents, the Bolshevik-Leninists succeeded in doing what the theory of historical materialism declared impossible. There is no doubt but that a new economy had been constructed by political means. Despite this, however, the theory that the economic base determines politics and not vice versa is still canonic doctrine in all communist countries.

2. In expectation of the socialist revolution occurring in the highly industrialized countries of the West, the theorists of Marxist-Leninism have clung to the letter of Marx's critique of capitalism and his predictions. For decades they have painted a picture of mass misery and starvation in the West. They have denied that capitalism has been modified in any significant way and that the Welfare State exploits the workers any less than the more individualistic economies it replaced. On the contrary, their claim is that economically the rich get richer, and the poor become poorer—and the rest is bourgeois propaganda.

3. The concept of "class" has been quite troublesome to Marxist-Leninism particularly with Stalin's declaration that a "classless" society had been introduced in the Soviet Union with the adoption of its new constitution of 1936. If the concept of "proletariat" or "working class" is a polar one it implies, when concretely used, a "capitalist class." But if capitalism is abolished and all social ownership is vested in the community, who or which is the exploiting class? On a functional conception of property, viz., the legal right or power to *exclude* others from the use of things and services in which property is claimed, critics have argued that the social property of the Soviet Union in effect belongs to the Communist Party considered as a corporate body. And although there is no right to individual testamentary transmission, so long as the Communist Party enjoys the privileged position assigned to it in the Soviet Constitution, in effect, one set of leaders, in the name of the Party, inherits the power over social property from its predecessors, and the differential use and privileges that power bestows. Milovan Djilas, in his *The New Class . . .* (1957), on the basis of his study and experience in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union argued that in current communist societies the bureaucracy constituted a ruling elite enjoying social privileges which justified calling it a "class." Subsequently other writers claimed that divisions and conflicts within the ruling elite presented a picture of greater class complexity (Albert Parry, *The New Class Divided*, 1966). It is obvious that the Marxist-Leninist concept of class cannot do justice to the Soviet, not to speak of the Chinese experience, in which peasants are often referred to as proletariat in order to give some semblance of sense to the terminological Marxist pieties of the Communist Party.

Actually the position of the worker is unique in the Soviet Union, in that it corresponds neither to the "association of free producers," envisaged by Marx nor to "the Soviet democracy" used by Lenin as a slogan to come to power. Nor is it like the position of the workers in modern capitalist societies, since the Soviet workers cannot organize free trade unions independent of the state, cannot without punitive risk leave their jobs, cannot travel without a passport and official permission, and cannot appeal to an independent judiciary if they run afoul of the authorities. Oscar Lange, the Polish communist economist, before his return to Poland, and while he was still a left-wing Socialist, characterized the Soviet economy as "an industrial serfdom" with the workers in the role of modern serfs. Like the phrases "state capitalism" and "state socialism," which have also been applied to the Soviet Union, this indicates that present-day communist economics and class relationships require a new set of economic and political categories to do justice to them.

Nonetheless, that its economy is distinctive, although sharing some of the features of classical capitalism and classical socialism, is undeniable.

4. Even more embarrassing is the nature of the state in the Marxist-Leninist theory. If the state is by definition "the executive committee of the ruling class," then as classes disappear the state weakens and finally withers away. But since the Soviet Union is declared to be a classless society, how account for the existence of the state, which instead of withering away has become stronger and stronger? The conventional reply under Stalin was that so long as socialism existed within one country, which was encircled by hungry capitalist powers intent upon its dismemberment, the state functioned primarily as the guardian of *national* integrity. This failed to explain the regime of *domestic* terror, and a concentration camp economy, worse than anything that existed in Tsarist days. Furthermore as communism spread, and the Soviet Union became no longer encircled by capitalist nations but emerged as co-equal in nuclear power to the West, more threatening to than threatened by the countries adjoining it, the state showed no signs of weakening. Although the domestic terror abated somewhat under Khrushchev, it still remains, after fifty years of rule, much stronger than it was under Lenin, before the Soviet Union consolidated its power.

Theoretically, the Soviet Union is a federal union of autonomous socialist republics which theoretically possess complete ethnic and national equality and with the right of secession from the Union guaranteed. In fact, it is a monolithic state that can establish or destroy its affiliated republics at will, and in which some ethnic minorities have been persecuted and subjected to severe discrimination.

5. The economy of the Soviet Union has remained a highly centralized, planned, and planning economy, primarily a command economy, functioning best in time of war and largely indifferent to the needs and demands of the consumer. The result has been the transformation within a period of fifty years of an agricultural economy into a great, modern industrial economy. The human costs in bloodshed and suffering of this transformation have been incalculable. The excessive centralization has led to inefficiency and waste, the development of a hidden market, and other abuses. To supplement the controlled economy's efforts to take care of consumers' needs, the state has tolerated a private sector in which goods and services are sold or exchanged for profit. Under the influence of E. G. Liberman and other economic reformers, some tentative steps have been taken to decentralize, and to introduce the concept of net profit in state enterprises in order to provide incentives and increase efficiency. Greeted as a return to capitalistic principles, it overlooks the limited function of profit as conceived in a socialist economy, in which prices are still controlled by the central planning authority.

What these and similar reforms do that is difficult to square with the theory of Marxist-Leninism is to increase the power of the plant manager over the workers, and to differentiate even further the incomes received. Because of differences created by advances in technology, comparisons in standards of living are difficult to make between different historical periods. With respect to per capita consumption of the material necessities of life, the workers in most of the advanced industrial economies today seem to enjoy, without the sacrifice of their freedoms, a substantially higher standard of living than the workers of the Soviet Union. But there is nothing in the structure of the socialist economy which makes it impossible to equal and even surpass the standards of living of workers in capitalist countries. An economy that can put a Sputnik in the sky before other industrial societies, can probably outproduce them, if the decision is made to do so, in the production of refrigerators or television sets. The major differences lie not in what and how much is produced, but in the freedom to choose the system of production under which to live.

6. This brings us to the major Bolshevik-Leninist revision of the Marxism of the Social-Democratic variety—viz., the abandonment of its commitment to democracy as a system of social organization, as a theory of the political process including political organization, and, finally, as the high road to socialism.

Until the October Russian Revolution, the phrase "the dictatorship of the proletariat" was rarely used in Marxist literature. Marx himself used the term very infrequently, and Engels pointed to the Paris Commune of 1871, in which Marx's group was a tiny minority, as an illustration of what the phrase meant. Even those who spoke of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" meant by it the class rule of the workers, presumably the majority of the population, which would democratically enact laws introducing the socialist society. That is what Engels meant when he wrote in 1891 that the democratic republic was "the *specific* form for the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Marx and Engels, *Correspondence 1846–1895,* New York [1936], p. 486). Marx and Engels also anticipated that the transition to socialism would be peaceful where democratic political institutions had developed that gave the workers the franchise. Force would be employed only to suppress armed rebellion of unreconciled *minorities* against the mandate of the majority.

The Marxist-Leninist version of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" is that it is substantially "the dictator-

ship of the Communist Party," which means not only a dictatorship over the bourgeoisie but *over* the proletariat as well. The Paris Commune on this view is not really a "dictatorship of the proletariat." The dictatorship of the Communist Party entailed that no other political parties, not even other working-class parties, would be tolerated if they did not accept the Leninist line. It meant that there could be no legally recognized opposition of any kind. For as Lenin put it, "Dictatorship is power based directly upon force, and unrestricted by any laws," and again "dictatorship means neither more nor less than unlimited power, resting directly on force, not limited by anything, not restricted by any laws, nor any absolute rules" (*Selected Works*, VII, 123).

This whole conception is based frankly on the assumption that armed by the insights of Marxist-Leninism, the Communist Party knows better what the true interests of the working class are than the workers know themselves; that it cannot give the workers their head but must, if necessary, restrain or compel them for their own good. Thus Lenin proclaimed "All power to the Soviets," the organs of the Russian workers and peasants after 1917, when he anticipated that they would follow the Communist (Bolshevik) Party line, but this slogan was abandoned and even opposed when there was fear the Soviets would not accept the Communist Party dictatorship. This view of the dictatorship of the Party is central to all Marxist-Leninist parties. Thus the Hungarian communist premier, Jan Kadar, in his speech before the Hungarian National Assembly on May 11, 1957, justifying the suppression by the Red Army of the Hungarian workers in the Budapest uprising of 1956, makes a distinction between "the *wishes* and *will* of the working masses" and "the *interests*" of the workers. The Communist Party, knowing the true *interests* of the workers and having these interests at heart, is therefore justified in opposing the *wishes* and *will* of the masses. This is the Leninist version of Rousseau's doctrine that the people "must be forced to be free."

The antidemocratic conception of the political party actually preceded the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the party over the proletariat. Logically the two ideas are independent, since a hierarchically organized party could accept the democratic process as providing an opportunity for coming to power legitimately. The Social-Democratic conception of party organization made it a very loose-jointed affair. Marx and Engels actually assumed that in the course of its economic struggles, the working class spontaneously would develop the organizational instrumentalities necessary to win the battle. Lenin, on the other hand, thought of the political party as an *engineer* of revolution, spurring on, teaching, even lashing the working class into revolutionary political consciousness.

The political party structure devised by Lenin owes more probably to the fact that the socialist parties were underground and had to work illegally in Russia than it does to Marxist theory. The theory of "democratic centralism" was really better adapted for a resistance movement than for political democratic process. Nonetheless all of the many Communist Parties associated with the Communist International were compelled to adopt that theory as a condition for affiliation. The Central Committee of the Party was the chief organizing center, the final link in a chain of command that extended down to the party cells. The Central Committee had the power to co-opt and reject delegates to the Party Congress which nominally was the source of authority for the Central Committee. Because of its access to party funds, lists, periodicals, and control of organizers, the leadership of the "democratic centralized" party tended to be self-perpetuating. Certain maneuvers or *coups* from the top would bring one faction or another to the fore, but no broad-based movement of member opposition was possible. Until Stalin's death changes in the leadership of Communist Parties outside of the Soviet Union occurred only as a consequence of the intervention of the Russian Communist Party acting through representatives of the Communist International. Thus, to cite a typical example, the leadership of the American Communist Party which claimed to have the support of 93% of the rank and file was dismissed by Stalin in 1928, and the new leadership of W. Z. Foster and Earl Browder appointed. The processes of "democratic centralism" then legitimized the change. After the Second World War, Browder, based on the ostensibly unanimous support of the party membership, was unceremoniously cashiered as leader by signals communicated by Jacques Duclos of the French Communist Party at the instigation of the Kremlin.

There have been some developments in the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism of the first political importance. Lenin and Stalin both believed that the capitalist countries were doomed to break down in a universal crisis; that because of their system of production they must expand or die, and that before they died, they would resort to all-out war against the Soviet Union. The classic statement of this view was Lenin's declaration of November 20, 1920, repeated in subsequent editions of his and Stalin's writings:

"As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over World Capitalism" (*Selected Works*,

VIII, 297). Despite the hypothetical possibility of a capitalist triumph, the victory of communism was declared to be inevitable in consequence of the inevitable war for which it was preparing. The Soviet Union and all its communist allies must consider itself to be in a state of undeclared defensive war against the aggression being hatched against it; Communist Parties abroad must have as their first political priority "The defence of the Soviet Union"—which sometimes led to difficulties with workers who struck industrial plants in capitalist countries manufacturing goods and munitions for the use of the Soviet Union.

The doctrine of the inevitability of armed conflict between the democratic countries of the West and the Soviet Union undoubtedly played an important role in Stalin's war and postwar policy. Even though Great Britain and the United States were loyal allies in the struggle against Hitler, the war had to be fought with an eye on their capacity for the subsequent struggle against the Soviet Union. This led to an extensive development of Soviet espionage in allied countries during, and especially after, the war; the expansion of Soviet frontiers; the establishment of a communist regime by the Red Army in adjoining territories; and a political strategy designed to split the Western alliance. Although aware of the development of nuclear weapons, Stalin was skeptical about their capacity for wholesale destruction, and remained steadfast in his belief in the inevitable victory of communism through inevitable war.

Nikita Khrushchev, who by outmaneuvering Bulganin, Malenkov, and Beria, succeeded Stalin, had a far greater respect for the potential holocaust involved in nuclear war. Although he spurred on the development of Soviet nuclear power, he revived the notion of "peaceful coexistence," a theme originally propounded by Lenin in an interview with an American journalist in 1920, and periodically revived for propaganda purposes since. But what was highly significant in Khrushchev's emendation of the doctrine, was his declaration that although the final victory of world communism is inevitable, world war was not inevitable; that it was possible for communism to succeed without an international civil war. This recognized the relatively independent influence of technological factors on politics, and created an additional difficulty for the theory of historical materialism.

The second important political development since the death of Stalin has been the growth of communist polycentrism, and the emergence of Communist China as a challenge to Soviet hegemony over the world communist movement. Communist "polycentrism" meant the weakening of the centralized control of the Russian Communist Party over other Communist Parties, and the gradual assertion of political independence in some respects by hitherto Communist Party satellites. For the first and only time in its history the American Communist Party officially declared itself in opposition to Soviet anti-Semitism. After Khrushchev's speech exposing Stalin's terrorism, it has become impossible for Communist Parties to resume the attitude of total compliance to Kremlin demands. The degree of independence, however, varies from country to country—the Italian Communist Party manifesting the most independence and the Bulgarian Communist Party the least.

The strained relations between Communist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and especially between Communist China and the Soviet Union—all invoking the theory of Marxist-Leninism—are eloquent and ironical evidence that some important social phenomena cannot be understood through the simple, explanatory categories of Marxism. After all, war was explained by Marxists as caused by economic factors directly related to the mode of economic production. That one communist power finds itself not only engaged in military border skirmishes with another, but actually threatens, if provoked, a war of nuclear annihilation against its communist brother-nation, as spokesmen of the Soviet Union did in the summer of 1969, is something that obviously cannot be explained in terms of their *common* modes of economic production. Once more nationalism is proving to be triumphant over Marxism.

III

The third interpretation of Marxism may be called for purposes of identification, "the existentialist view" according to which Marxism is not primarily a system of sociology or economics, but a philosophy of human liberation. It seeks to overcome human alienation, to emancipate man from repressive social institutions, especially economic institutions that frustrate his true nature, and to bring him into harmony with himself, his fellow men, and the world around him so that he can both overcome his estrangements and express his true essence through creative freedom. This view developed as a result of two things; first, the publication in 1932 of Marx's manuscripts written in 1844 before Marx had become a Marxist (on the other two views), which the editors entitled *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, and second, the revolt against Stalinism in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II among some communists who opposed the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism. Aware that they could only get a hearing or exercise influence if they spoke in the name of Marxism, they seized upon several formulations in these manuscripts of Marx in which

he glorifies the nature of man as a freedom-loving creature—a nature that has been distorted, cramped, and twisted by the capitalist mode of production. They were then able to protest in the name of Marxist humanism against the stifling dictatorship of Stalin and his lieutenants in their own countries, and even against the apotheosis of Lenin.

Independently of this political motivation in the reinterpretation of Marx, some socialist and nonsocialist scholars in the West have maintained that the conception of man and alienation in the early writings of Marx is the main theme of Marx's view of socialism, the aim of which is "the spiritual emancipation of man." For example, Eric Fromm writes that "it is impossible to understand Marx's concept of socialism and his criticism of capitalism as developed except on the basis of his concept of man which he developed in his early writings" (*Marx's Concept of Man* [1961], p. 79). This entails that Marx's thought was understood by no one before 1932 when the manuscripts were published, unless they had independently developed the theory of alienation. Robert Tucker's influential book, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge, 1961), asserts that the significant ideas of Marx are to be found in what he calls Marx's "original Marxism" which turns out to be ethical, existentialist, anticipatory of Buber and Tillich, and profoundly different from the Marxism of Marx's immediate disciples. How far the new interpretation is prepared to go in discarding traditional Marxism, with its emphasis on scientific sociology and economics as superfluous theoretical baggage alien to the true Marx, is apparent in this typical passage from Tucker:

> *Capital*, the product of twenty years of hard labor to which, as he [Marx] said, he sacrificed his health, his happiness in life and his family, is an intellectual museum piece for us now, whereas the sixteen page manuscript of 1844 on the future of aesthetics, which he probably wrote in a day and never even saw fit to publish, contains much that is still significant (p. 235).

Another source of the growth of this new version of Marxism flows from the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, especially the former's *Critique de la raison dialectique* (Vol. I, 1960) in which despite his rejection of materialism and his exaggerated voluntarism, Sartre seeks to present his existentialist idealism as ancillary to Marxism, which he hails as "the unsurpassable philosophy of our time" (p. 9).

For various reasons, detailed elsewhere, this third version of Marxism is making great headway among radical and revolutionary youth that have disparaged or repudiated specific political programs as inhibiting action. Among those who wish to bring Marx in line with newer developments in psychology, and especially among socialists and communists who have based their critiques of the existing social order on ethical principles, the existentialist version of Marx has a strong appeal.

The theoretical difficulties this interpretation of Marxism must face are very formidable. They are external, derived from certain methodological principles of interpretation and from textual difficulties; and internal, derived from the flat incompatibility of the key notions of existential Marxism with other published doctrines of Marx, for which Marx took public responsibility. Of the many external difficulties with the interpretation of Marxism as a philosophy of alienation, three may be mentioned.

1. The theory of alienation according to which man is a victim of the products of his own creation in an industrial society he does not consciously control, is a view that was common coin among the "true" socialists like Moses Hess, Karl Grün, and others. It was not a distinctively Marxist view. Even Ralph Waldo Emerson and Thomas Carlyle expressed similar sentiments when they complained that things were in the saddle and riding man to an end foreign to his nature and intention.

2. In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx explicitly disavows the theory of alienation as "metaphysical rubbish," as a linguistic Germanic mystification of social phenomena described by French social critics. Thus as an example of "metaphysical rubbish," Marx says, "Underneath the French critique of money and its functions, they wrote, 'alienation of the essence of mankind,' and underneath the French critique of the bourgeois State they wrote 'overthrow of the supremacy of the abstract universal' and so on" (Riazanov edition; English trans. London [1930], p. 59).

3. If Marxism is a theory of human alienation under all forms and expressions of capitalism, it becomes unintelligible why, having proclaimed the fact of human alienation at the outset of his studies, Marx should have devoted himself for almost twenty years to the systematic analysis of the mechanics of capitalist production. The existence of alienation was already established on the basis of phenomena observable whenever the free market system was introduced. Nothing in *Capital* throws any further light on the phenomenon. The section on the "Fetishism of Commodities" (*Capital*, Vol. I, Ch. I, Sec. 4) is a *sociological* analysis of commodities where private ownership of the social means of production exists, and dispenses completely with all reference to the true essence of man and his alienations of that essence. What Marx calls "the enigmatic character" of the product of labor when it assumes the form of a commodity is the result

of the fact that *social* relationships among men are experienced directly by the unreflective consciousness as a *natural* property of things. The economic "value" of products that are exchanged is assumed to be of the same existential order as "the weight" of the products.

This results in the fetishism of commodities which is compared to the fetishism of objects in primitive religion in which men fail to see that the divinity attributed to the objects is their own creation. Or to use another analogy, just as what makes an object "food" ultimately depends upon the biological relationships of the digestive system, and not *merely* upon the physical-chemical properties of the object, so what makes a thing a "commodity" depends upon social relationships between men, and not merely on the physical characteristics of what objects are bought and sold. Marx's analysis here is designed to further his contention that men can control their economic and social life and should not resign themselves to be ruled by economic processes as if they were like natural forces beyond the possibility of human control. The Marxist analysis is used here to argue for the feasibility of a shorter working day and better conditions of work.

The "internal" difficulties that confront the existentialist interpretation of Marx are grave enough to be considered fatal in the absence of a politically inspired will to believe.

1. The doctrine of "alienation" runs counter to Marx's scientific materialism. Its religious origins are obvious in the idealistic tradition from Plotinus to Hegel. It is inherently dualistic since it distinguishes an original "nature" of man separate from its alienated manifestations to which men will someday return.

2. It even more obviously violates the entire historical approach of Marxism which denies that man has a natural or real or true self from which he can be alienated. Marx maintained that by acting upon the external world, nature, and society, man continually modifies his own nature (*Capital,* Eng. trans., I, 198), that history may be regarded as "the progressive modification" of human nature, and that to argue that socialism and its institutional reforms are against human nature—one of the oldest and strongest objections to the Marxist program—is to overlook the extent to which the individual with his psychological nature is a social and therefore historical creature. Many of the difficulties of the view that Marxism is a theory of alienation and a social program liberating man from his alienation are apparent as soon as we ask: *From* what self or nature is man alienated?, and then compare the implications and presuppositions of the response with other explicitly avowed doctrines of Marx. The attempt by Tucker to distinguish in Marx between a constant human nature—productive, free, and self-fulfilling—and a variable human nature—alienated in class societies—attempting to save the doctrine of alienation, fails to explain how it is possible that man's constant nature should come into existence, according to Marx, only at the end of prehistory, only when the classless society emerges. In addition, Marx like Hegel repudiates the dualism between a constant and variable human nature to the point of denying that even man's biological nature is constant.

3. In Marx's published writing, where psychological phenomena are mentioned that have been cited as evidence of Marx's belief in the importance of the doctrine of alienation, despite his refusal to use the early language of alienation, Marx explains these phenomena as a *consequence* of private property in the instruments of production. But in his early *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* (written before 1847), he asserts that alienation is the *cause* of private property. This would make a psychological phenomenon responsible for the distinctive social processes of capitalism whose developments the mature Marx regarded as having causal priority in explaining social psychological change.

4. The concept of man as alienated in the early manuscripts implies that alienated man is unhappy, maladjusted, truncated, psychologically if not physically unhealthy. It does not explain the phenomenon of alienation which is active and voluntary rather than passive and coerced. Marx himself was alienated from his society but hardly from his "true" self, for he undoubtedly found fulfillment in his role as critic and social prophet. From this point of view to be alienated from a society may be a condition for the achievement of the serenity, interest, and creative effort and fulfillment that are the defining characteristics of the psychologically unalienated man. Marx's early theory of alienation could hardly do justice, aside from its inherent incoherences, to Marx's mature behavior as an integrated person alienated from his own society.

5. The existentialist interpretation of Marxism makes it primarily an ethical philosophy of life and society, very much akin to the ethical philosophies of social life that Marx and Engels scorned during most of their political career. Nonetheless this ethical dimension of social judgment and criticism constitutes a perennial source of the appeal of Marxism to generations of the young, all the more so because of the tendencies both in the Social-Democratic and, especially, in the Bolshevik-Leninist versions of Marxism to play down, if not to suppress, the ethical moment of socialism. In the canonic writings of these interpretations of Marxism, socialism is pictured as the irreversible and inescapable fulfillment of an *historical* development and

moral judgments are explained, where they are recognized, as reflections of class interest, devoid of universal and objective validity. The doctrinal writings of both Marx and Engels lend color to this view—despite the fact that everything else they wrote, and even the works purportedly of a technical and analytical character, like *Capital* itself, are pervaded by a passionate moral concern and a denunciation of social injustices in tones that sound like echoes of the Hebrew social prophets. The very word *Ausbeutung*, or "exploitation," which is central to Marx's economic analysis, is implicitly ethical although Marx seeks to disavow its ethical connotations. Even critics of Marx's economic theories and historicism, like Karl Popper, who reject his contentions, recognize the ethical motivation of Marx's thought. Capitalism is condemned not only because it is unstable and generates suffering, but because uncontrolled power over the social instruments of production gives arbitrary power over the lives of those who must live by their use.

Nonetheless, despite its ethical reinterpretation of Marxism, existentialist Marxism fails to make ends meet theoretically. Either it ends up with a pale sort of humanism, a conception of the good and the good society derived from the essential nature of man and his basic needs—a lapse into the Feuerbachianisms rejected by Marx—or it denies the possibility of a universally valid norm of conduct for man or society, stresses the uniqueness of the individual moral act, makes every situation in which two or more individuals are involved an antinomic one in which right conflicts with right and self with self. If the first version generates a universalism of love or duty and brotherhood of man which Marx (and Hegel) reject as unhistorical, the second points to a Hobbesianism in which "the other" far from being "a brother" is potentially an enemy. Marx conceals from himself the necessity of developing an *explicit* positive ethics over and above his condemnations of unnecessary human cruelty and injustice. The closest he comes to such an ethic is in his utopian conception of a classless society whose institutions will be such that the freedom of each person will find in the freedom of every other person "not its limitation but its fulfillment." Many critics find this expectation an astonishingly naive conception of man and society, which does not even hold for traditional versions of the Kingdom of Heaven. But even this utopian construction can hardly absolve Marxists from the necessity of making and justifying specific ethical judgments for the City of Man.

The periodical revivals of Marxism in our age reflect moral and political interests in search of a respectable revolutionary tradition. The discovery of the social problem by phenomenologists, Neo-Thomists, positivists, and even linguistic analysts usually results in an attempted synthesis between Marx and some outstanding philosophical figure who has very little in common with him (Hook, in Drachkovitch, 1966).

From the point of view of sociological and economic theories claiming objective truth, Marxism has contributed many insights that have been absorbed and developed by scholars who either do not share or are hostile to the perspective of social reform or revolution. Scientifically there is no more warrant for speaking of Marxism today in sociology than there is for speaking of Newtonianism in physics or Darwinism in biology. The fact that Marxism has become the state doctrine of industrially underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa is testimony to the fact that his system of thought proved to be inapplicable to the Western world whose development it sought to explain. There is also a certain irony in the fact that the contemporary movements of sensualism, immediatism, anarchism, and romantic violence among the young in Western Europe and America which invoke Marx's name are, allowing only for slight changes in idiom, the very movements he criticized and rejected during the forties of the nineteenth century—the period in which Marx was developing his distinctive ideas. Some modes of consciousness and modes of being that are the concern of New Left thought and activity today Marx scornfully rejected as characteristic of the *Lumpenproletariat*.

At this stage in the development of Marxism it may seem as fruitless a task to determine which, if any, version of Marxism comes closest to Marx's own doctrinal intent as to ask which conception of Christianity, if any, is closest to the vision and teachings of its founder. Nonetheless, although difficult, it is not impossible in principle to reach reliable conclusions if the inquiry is undertaken in a scientific spirit. Even if he was in some respects self-deceived, Marx after all did conceive himself as a scientific economist and sociologist. Allowing for the ambiguities and imprecision of Marx's published writings, there is greater warrant for believing that those who seek to provide scientific grounds for his conclusions are closer to his own intent and belief than are those who, whether on the basis of Marx's unpublished juvenilia or Sartre's metaphysical fantasies, would convert him to existentialism. The scientific versions of Marxism have an additional advantage: they permit of the possibility of empirical refutation, and so facilitate the winning of new and more reliable scientific truths which Marx as a scientist presumably would have been willing to accept. Existentialist versions of Marxism, where they are not purely historical, are willful and arbitrary interpretations of social and political phenomena.

"Marxism," declares Sartre, "is the unsurpassable philosophy of our time," but only because he interprets it in such a way as to make it immune to empirical test. Holding to it, today, therefore, is not a test of one's fidelity to truth in the service of a liberal and humane civilization, but only a measure of tenacity of one's faith.

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[See also Alienation; Existentialism; **Historical and Dialectical Materialism; Ideology of Soviet Communism;** Nationalism; Social Democracy; **Socialism;** State; Totalitarianism; Welfare State.]

MARXIST REVISIONISM: FROM BERNSTEIN TO MODERN FORMS

HISTORICALLY, "Revisionism" was the name given to the main heresy which arose in European, and particularly German, Marxism and Social Democracy in the time of the Second International (1889–1914). Its originator was Eduard Bernstein, who also gave the most systematic exposition of its theoretical content. The main thesis of this theory was that the catastrophic collapse of capitalist society, predicted by Marx, was unlikely to take place; from this it followed that Social Democrats should alter their political strategy away from revolutionary and towards evolutionary methods. After the October Revolution and the emergence of Moscow as the center of World Communism, Revisionism lost most of its original content, degenerated into a term of abuse, and was largely superseded by other pejorative labels. Only after the Second World War, with the appearance of new divisions in the World Communist Movement, did Revisionism regain any consistent meaning. Still remaining a term of abuse, it was used by the *soi-disant* "orthodox" Marxists to qualify those of their opponents who could at all plausibly (if sometimes unjustly) be embarrassed by the accusation of accommodation with bourgeois society or its extension, imperialism. Even here, however, consistency was not long maintained. With the emergence of Sino-Soviet differences into a full-scale political and ideological dispute, not only did the Chinese accuse the Russians of "Revisionism" on the grounds of compromise with imperialism, but Soviet ideologists, who normally accepted this meaning of the word (without, of course, admitting that it could apply to themselves), also described the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung and his followers as "left" Revisionism.

By the 1890's German Social Democracy was in a position to offer both the institutional stability and the ideological rigidity which are the necessary soil on which any heresy must be bred. These two aspects of German Social Democracy were closely linked. As an institution, it had grown inside, but isolated from, German society of the time; the revolutionary ideology maintained and justified the isolation. Bernstein's perception that certain points of the analysis of society contained in the ideology were apparently at variance with reality therefore had serious implications for the German Party as a whole. In 1890 the adoption of the Erfurt Program by the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) crystallized its ideology as revolutionary Marxism, and provided a canon of theoretical orthodoxy. At the same time the Party's organizational success in a generally prosperous economy enabled its leaders to forget the contradiction between their revolutionary doctrine and their increasingly reformist practice. It took a man as uncomfortably honest and persistent as Eduard Bernstein to remind them of this contradiction. His views first reached the public in a series of articles in the *Neue Zeit* in 1896–98, and were presented in book form under the title *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* in 1899 (trans. as *Evolutionary Socialism*, 1909). Although the systematization of these views possibly owes more to Bernstein's critics than to him-

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MOSTAFA REJAI

[See also Alienation; Baconianism, **Idea; Ideology of Soviet Communism; Marxism;** Perfectibility.]

IDEOLOGY OF SOVIET COMMUNISM

THE IDEOLOGY of Soviet communism is that of the party which seized power in the former Russian Empire, a party with monolithic authority and influence which reaches beyond the borders of the Soviet Union and imposes on several European countries. Its history, or rather its prehistory, goes back to 1903, when the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party adopted its doctrinal program.

This program, or statement of principles was drawn up by G. V. Plekhanov and was amended and presented to the Congress by the editorial staff of the journal *Iskra* (while Lenin was on its staff). It was very similar to the French Workers Party program (written by J. Guesde and P. Lafargue, and adopted at Roanne in 1882) and to the German Social Democratic Party program (composed by K. Kautsky and adopted at Erfurt in 1891, inspired by the ideas of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels). The Russian program of 1903 proclaimed its identity of purpose with the aim of social democrats in all countries. It formulated the universal ideas of Marxian socialism as it was understood up to the World War of 1914–18.

According to these general ideas capitalist society consists of a small privileged class, which owns the means of production and exchange, and a huge majority of proletarians or semiproletarians exploited by the dominant minority. The inevitable evolution of this society through technological advances, economic crises, and imperialist wars only accentuates the antagonistic interests and conflicts between the diminishing minority and the growing majority, thus creating conditions which bring about the replacement of capitalist production by the relations of socialist production; in short, the achievement of a "social revolution." After replacing the private ownership of the means of production by collectivist ownership, this revolution would finally abolish the division of society into classes, and would liberate all of oppressed mankind by putting an end to the various forms of exploitation of labor, manual or intellectual.

Besides the expression of these general principles, the Russian program of 1903 departed nevertheless on one point from the French and German programs:

> The necessary condition of this social revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the seizure by the proletariat of the political power which will enable it to crush all resistance by the exploiters.

The source of this idea was the French socialist Louis Auguste Blanqui, and its formula, if not the idea itself, reappears very briefly in certain writings of Marx and Engels; but they thought that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be exercised democratically as a transitional stage by the great majority of people through universal suffrage. This dictatorship was, however, understood differently in Russia when the Social Democratic Party there became divided and broke up into two factions, Bolshevik and Menshivik, in conflict with each other during the internal party struggles preceding the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The rest of the 1903 program conformed to the aspirations of all the socialist parties of the time, but with certain features pertaining to the Tsarist autocracy. It advocated the instauration of a democratic regime with a single Parliament, elected by direct universal suffrage and secret ballot available to all citizens; the inviolability of person and home; freedom of conscience, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of unions and their right to strike; the equality of all before the law without discrimination of sex, religion, race, or nationality; the autonomous right of nations to govern themselves; the replacement of a standing conscripted army by a volunteer army of the people; the separation of church and state; universal free education; the elimination of indirect taxes; an eight hour workday and a day of rest each week; and finally, a set of social laws and measures to cover improved working conditions for city workers and peasants, all of which was to be brought about by a Constituent Assembly fully elected by the people.

Such was the ideology of the Bolshevik Social Democrats who seized power in 1917, eight months after the first World War had caused the fall of Tsarism. But between the former regime (March 1917) and the

Bolshevik coup (November 1917) a new sort of social reality appeared, which the Party had not anticipated, namely, the spontaneous creation of the "Soviets," that is, not well defined "councils" of delegates consisting of laborers, peasants, soldiers. They assumed different prerogatives, depending on the situations and circumstances, in the absence of representative legal and established institutions. The two factions of social democracy, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, though claiming the same program and proclaiming the necessity of a sovereign "Constituent Assembly," were bitterly opposed to each other on the granting of power to the Soviets, in which the Bolsheviks finally won a substantial majority.

After November 1917 the more radical social democratic ideology soon became the Soviets' specific ideology, and because of its wish to maintain power, the politically victorious party gradually relinquished the essential features of its previous program. It idealized the worst circumstances after making a virtue of necessity, and set up as lasting models the temporary measures of expediency that were enforced contrary to principles previously announced. It was to be the new ideology decreed by the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, actually effected by the party which monopolized the totality of power.

A rapid transformation was achieved in the course of the civil war which broke loose after the military coup had proclaimed "power to the Soviets." All the freedoms inscribed in the Party's program, the rights of man and the rights of the people, universal suffrage, democracy, and a parliament, and *a fortiori*, the end of the army and the police, etc. became nothing more than historical and literary memories. The Constituent Assembly met on January 5, 1918 with the Bolsheviks in a minority, and was dissolved the next morning by force. The single party in power assumed the label "Communist Party" in 1918 and decided on a new program to be drawn up by Bukharin and Lenin; it was adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party in 1919. Approximately from that time on, the terms "Communist" and "Soviet" became synonymous, and the official ideology of the regime consists in justifying by code and propaganda all the practices contrary to the Party's theories but dictated by circumstances in order to support and perpetuate the new power.

While Lenin was alive, the ideology of Soviet communism flowed chiefly from his personal views with various changes at times, from his new articles, his speeches, and his books. However, an ever deepening abyss occurs between theory and practice; ideas more or less well argued remain academic, whereas actions constitute reality whose expression becomes in effect the actual Soviet ideology. Lenin's Marxism, already adapted to specifically Russian conditions, takes on an original character by underscoring certain disputable or challenged ideas, or by accentuating in any case, nonessential ones borrowed from Marx and Engels.

More particularly, between the two Russian revolutions of 1917, Lenin developed and formulated theories of the State considered simply as the instrument of domination by the propertied classes. He maintained that the advent of the proletariat to power, in reality, the dictatorship of his party, which he identified as the "conscious avant-garde" of the proletariat, would determine by itself the withering away of the State, that is to say, the progressive extinction of the bureaucracy, of the police, and of the army, supplanted by the benevolent, direct administration of the people. All public offices being elective and all office holders being subject to recall at any moment by their electors, what would follow would be the disappearance of all class superiority, of all privilege, of all parasitism, and the realization of this masterpiece of Lenin's plan, as the supplement to the Party's program, would finally attain the realization of the anarchistic ideal.

However, during the course of a half century or more, reality has continued to belie the fiction; the Soviet State far from withering away has continued to grow in power, attaining an omnipotence never before known in history; the professional bureaucracy, the secret police, and the army as a vocation compose the strongest apparatus of coercion the world has ever seen. Distinctly separate from the people, a stranger to the nation, the single Party retains exclusively all the political and economic privileges, controlling the State as its private property while the utopia on its books remains inseparable from the communist ideology (cf. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, Petrograd [1918]; countless editions in all languages).

The government defines itself as being the "dictatorship of the proletariat," contradicting the theory of the withering away of the State until its extinction, and Lenin did not fear declaring that the dictatorship signifies "unlimited power depending on violence and not on law." He repeated time and again that "the scientific acceptance of the dictatorship is nothing more than a power which can provide no limits, that no law nor absolute rule can restrain, and which is based specifically on violence" (*On the History of the Dictatorship*, in Lenin's *Works*, 3rd ed., Moscow [1937], Vol. 25).

Moreover Lenin was to recognize that his Party, once it was in complete command of the State and of the means of production, was in the hands of a real "oligarchy," namely, the Central Committee and its Politburo, with the power to decide everything and to subordinate the many organizations called "soviets"

(Lenin, *Infantile Malady of Leftism in Communism*, St. Petersburg [1920], in numerous editions in all languages). The official ideology registers this remark of Lenin's on "the oligarchy," even while it persists in asserting that the power of the Soviets belongs to the city workers and to the peasants organized spontaneously in Soviets, but which have lost their original character and are appointed by authority from above, i.e., through the corresponding echelons of the Party.

Even after the Civil War (1917–21), while conflicts resolved by sheer force were stamped in his memory, Lenin specifically prescribed in the Penal Code (1922) the use of terror, asserting its "justification or legitimacy" in "the broadest possible" manner; the application of capital punishment was left to the decision of judges recruited at random (cf. Lenin's *Complete Works*, 5th ed., Moscow [1964], 45, 190). Apologies for the use of terror, paralleling its growing intensive application, increased in proportion as the original causes invoked to motivate such terror kept losing any basis in reality, to the point of becoming nonexistent.

In this regard, Soviet ideology admitted that methods of repression and oppression in the service of a despotic "oligarchy" were turned over to the secret police; growing in numbers soon beyond count, ubiquitous, skilled in jailing, tormenting, judging, deporting, and executing millions of defenseless victims in disregard of all legal forms, of all guarantees of justice, this unprecedented body of police became an actual State within the State.

Nevertheless the old socialist program of the Party had remained unchanged, held in common by the Menshevik social democrats and the new Bolshevik communists, but when a new program was adopted in 1919, with its first part largely reproducing the 1903 program, the term "social democracy" was replaced by "Communist Party." There was added to the old text a thesis dear to Lenin, namely imperialism as the "supreme stage of capitalism," corresponding to the evolution of capitalism in "putrefaction" and opening up, it seemed, "the era of the universal socialist revolution." This thesis, dating back to 1916, was obviously shown to be false by tangible historical facts but it remained an integral part of communist ideology, for it subsists in the third program of the Party elaborated during a period of about thirty years and ratified by the twenty-second Communist Congress in 1961. While Lenin was alive the theory inherited from the socialist past remained unchanged, but thereafter it was augmented by new ideas that were inspired by the improvised practices of the bolshevism that came into power.

The Soviet ideology, as received from its creator, rests first on the dogma of absolute materialism, which presupposes that matter exists independently of human consciousness or sensations, and implies that material conditions determine all historical phenomena, social and spiritual. Lenin and his intellectual disciples think, as did J. J. Rousseau, that man was innocent in the beginning, but lost his innocence through his contact with a corrupt society, more precisely with the capitalist world. By abolishing private ownership of the means of production and by forbidding the exploitation of labor by a minority of property owners, the Soviet regime was gradually to suppress class differences; it would allow workers to blossom out in complete freedom while giving the best of themselves to society. The idea then was to undertake the establishing of socialism by stages, developing to its logical goal along the lines stated by the principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," the goal of communism.

However, Lenin, contrary to his explicit doctrine, employed the terms "socialism" and "communism" indifferently during the first years of his regime. If by "ideology" we mean the cluster of principles and ideas professed by a given group of people, then the Soviet ideology appears to be more and more elusive in proportion to the ways in which the march of events and succession of historical facts impose on this group's thinkers (especially on its leading thinker) variations of language, terminology, and opinion which belie the initial intentions and diminish the chances of rendering a coherent translation. Lenin's successive trenchant declarations intermingling strategy and tactics, marked by a realism belatedly contradicting academic utopianism, continue to be corrected, superseded, and refuted to such an extent that Soviet ideology is becoming unrecognizable from one year to the next.

In his commentary on the new program of 1919, Lenin expounded the view that "the program of a Marxist party should be founded on facts established with absolute certainty" ("Marxist," "socialist," and "communist" were synonyms for Lenin). The specifically Soviet ideology was thus the reflection of the Leninist union of "practice" with the "theory" of the former social-democratic party. By "absolute certainty" he meant the "fact" that the decay of capitalism leads to imperialism and that "the era of social revolution on a worldwide scale" begins with the seizure of power by the Bolshevik party in Russia, the prelude to the institution of socialism in the whole world. But, Lenin remarks, "as to stating what the achieved socialism will look like, we simply do not know." For he emphasizes the fact that "we do not have enough material to enable us to define socialism. The bricks to be used in the building of socialism are not yet made."

What Lenin believed he did know with scientific certainty was that socialism meant "the suppression

of class distinctions"; now, "so long as there will continue to be urban workers and peasants, there will be different classes, and consequently there will be no integral socialism." At the same time he judged that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the extension of the proletarian class's struggle in new forms." On another occasion he would say that socialism is "bookkeeping." But he would agree that "our attempt to pass immediately to communism has rewarded us with defeat. . . ." He confessed that "we have thought it possible . . . to pass directly to the construction of socialism," and he stated elsewhere that "we have been vanquished in our attempt to bring about socialism by assault." Thus communism and socialism, at this stage of his reflection, were interchangeable ideas. And at the end of an ill considered policy, which tended to ruin the stages of social evolution, he proposed "abandoning the immediate construction of socialism in order to fall back on state capitalism in many economic matters." Thus socialism, communism, and state capitalism coexist intermingled with a problematic ideology.

In speaking of state capitalism as defining the "new economic policy" (abbreviated as NEP), Lenin in 1921 put an end to the preceding economic policy which he called "war communism." But among the leading ideologists of the Party an obscure debate and controversy arose as to whether the NEP was to be considered a form of state capitalism or state socialism, with no conclusive result. For the soviet "intelligentsia," after Lenin's death in 1924, the terms socialism, war communism, and state capitalism amounted to an uncertain and very confused doctrine.

The disturbed period which followed brought no clarification; on the contrary, when the leaders of the Party became increasingly and actively hostile to traditional religions, taunting, repressing, and persecuting them mercilessly, they soon saw to it that an atheistic substitute for religion was systematically instituted, namely, the cult of Lenin's personality; they are both the officiating priests and beneficiaries of that materialistic cult. After various crises, in the course of which the major ideas imposed on the population were those selected from the works of Lenin, complicated by contradictions and uncertainties, a new order of ideas was framed and steadily imposed under the banner of "Leninism," namely, the views of a new leader, Stalin. The verbal similarities remain deceptive.

The term "Leninism" was not in use in Soviet Russia under Lenin, who would not tolerate it, for he claimed that his doctrine was simply "Marxism." By "Marxism," of course, he meant his particular interpretation of it, which was sharply disputed by socialists of other tendencies. The two main factions of the Party, struggling with each other for the succession to Lenin, elaborated Leninism in contradictory ways, each claiming to be the true continuators of Lenin. This system implies the myth of Lenin's infallibility and developed into a sort of complex theology with its dogma, mystique, and scholasticism; as a new ideology, it was not only soviet but ecumenical, since it was propagated in all countries by the Communist International (Comintern) and by many auxiliary public and secret organizations with branches throughout the world.

Stalin first formulated the Leninist creed (after Lenin's burial), then the first catechism, *Principles of Leninism* (Moscow, 1926), and the articles of faith, *Questions on Leninism* (Moscow, 1926). Subsequently, having decreed that Leninism was "the Marxism of the age of imperialism," Stalin deemed it necessary to establish a link with Karl Marx. The expression "Marxism-Leninism" was adopted to stand for the body of Stalin's judgments and aphorisms; it is known outside the Soviet Union as "Stalinism."

The ideology of Marxism-Leninism, that is to say, Stalinism, reflects the mass of empirical measures decreed by Stalin in order to maintain and perpetuate himself in power as long as possible. From the verbal heritage of Marxism and Leninism the ideology retains the outer husk of the words in defiance of the kernel; it invokes the word which kills at the expense of the spirit which gives life. The socialist phraseology persisted while the exploitation of man by man increased even to a greater degree than in any Western capitalist country. The international revolutionary preaching continued; in 1924 Stalin predicted worldwide revolution, whereas in 1925 he was compelled to recognize the facts when he definitely admitted the "stabilization of capitalism." Lenin, who understood the necessity of the *NEP*, had stressed that it should be enforced "seriously and for a long time"; Stalin suppressed it at short notice remarking that Lenin had not said "forever." The right of nationalities to self-determination, to settle their own affairs (*disposer d'eux-mêmes*), including the right to break away from Russia, a right about which Lenin had theorized for many years, was definitely denied to ethnic groups who were subjected to increasing national oppression, much worse than the relentless political oppression and social and economic exploitation from which all people under the communist oligarchy suffer.

Stalin's "Marxist-Leninist" ideology assumed the contrary of the thesis of Marx and Lenin in Stalin's claim that socialism could be attained in one country, more exactly, Russia. In vain did Lenin write in 1918 that socialism is inconceivable for only one country, "even less backward than Russia." On this point he

really did not vary, even though he had earlier, in 1915, seen the victory of socialism possible in only one country, but in the sense in which one party, called socialist, acceded to power; and even in 1923 when he believed it possible to hope for a transformation of the commercial economy by means of widespread "cooperation," freely agreed to, and which would take "a whole era of cultural development of the masses." Basically he says unequivocally: "It is very doubtful whether the next generation will be able to realize socialism in all its spheres." The following year he repeats: "We cannot actually introduce a socialist regime here; God wills that it should be installed by our children, perhaps even by our grandchildren." And finally, in his last article in 1923: "We are not sufficiently civilized to proceed directly to socialism, although we have the political premises." However, in 1932 Stalin decided that the basis of socialism was established in his country, and in 1936 he would celebrate "the total victory of the socialist system in all spheres of the national economy." The word, socialism, had changed its meaning.

Lenin had developed many times the theme which Stalin disregarded while pretending to respect it: "Socialism is impossible without democracy"; but Stalinism was the antithesis of democracy and of socialism, even while it proclaimed to the whole world that the Soviet Constitution was "the most democratic in the world." In fact Stalin's regime turned out to be more "totalitarian" than fascism, a term which Mussolini invented. But Soviet totalitarianism through its chauvinism, militarism, and anti-Semitism shows its kinship chiefly with German "national-socialism." It surpasses all previous and contemporary regimes of terrorism by carrying out on the reverse side of its ideology and with unbridled violence the forced "collectivization" of the countryside, which involved a hecatomb of cattle, and sacrifice of millions of human lives.

Here again we have evidence of the flagrant antinomy in the repeated prescriptions of Lenin favoring the overwhelming majority of peasants, although the prescriptions were camouflaged in a slogan which became classical: "the alliance of the proletariat and the peasants." The height of the repudiation of socialist ideology, or of genuine communism, was reached when Stalin concluded a pact with Hitler in order to throw the second World War out of gear; with a stroke of the pen Stalin soon suppressed the Communist International, the creation of Lenin who had assigned to the Comintern a role of fundamental importance in his dream of world revolution.

Whereas Stalinism made unrelenting use of the same terminology to justify everything and the opposite of everything during climactic crises and turning points of history, circumstances compelled the Soviet Union to draw closer to the really democratic nations when it needed temporary alliances to carry out its great "patriotic war against the Berlin-Rome axis." Stalin then changed his language in order to praise England and the United States, who contributed an enormous amount of material aid and saved the Soviet regime; ideology was adapted to the circumstances. Once the danger was over, Stalin returned to his position of systematic hostility to the Western democracies, and modified the ideology again in order to bring it into conformity with his politics, strategy, and tactics; he kept on denouncing an undefined "imperialism," and in particular the United States. At the same time he proclaimed a doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" to cover subversive activities operating underground and undermining the free world. He supported and stirred up social disturbances everywhere and encouraged local wars. He used the rostrum and lobbies of the United Nations to sow dissension, poison relations, and provoke discord. After his death the epigons persevered in the same Marxist-Leninism dissociating themselves to some extent from the homicidal practices which had horrified public opinion all over the world. These followers persist in preserving the heritage of an ideology fabricated of fiction and myth. Such is the ideology of Soviet communism, an ideology which does no more than make one aware of the realities it conceals.

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Everything concerning Lenin is in the collections of his works of which there exist (in Russian) five editions, each more complete than the last, though not quite complete yet; they are augmented by copious annotations presenting a great many variants and contradictions. Cf. Lenin, *Works*, first edition in 20 vols. (Moscow, 1924–27); third edition in 30 vols. (Moscow, 1927–35); *Complete Works*, fifth edition in 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958–65). The second and third editions are similar; the fourth is to be avoided.

Stalin's texts up to January 1934 are found in the collection called *Works* in 13 vols. (Moscow, 1946–51), the publication of which was held up after the death of the author. A supplement of three volumes covering the years 1934–53, edited by Robert H. McNeal, was published by the Hoover Institution (Stanford, 1967).

All matters pertaining to the ideology and life in the Soviet Union, except those that are state secrets, are treated in the encyclopedias and dictionaries the successive editions of which reveal the official versions and reflect the changes between editions. Cf. *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in 65 vols. (Moscow, 1931–47); 2nd ed. in 51 vols. (Moscow, 1949–58); *The Small Soviet Encyclopedia*, 10 vols. (Moscow, 1930–31); 2nd ed., 11 vols. (Moscow, 1933–47); 3rd ed., 11 vols. (Moscow, 1958–61). *Small Philosophical Dictionary*

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BOLSHEVIK, bōl'shə-vik, a member of a revolutionary political faction that later became an independent party. The faction was organized in 1903 by one wing of Russian Marxists led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin.

Marxist Origins. The doctrines of Karl Marx had interested certain Russian radicals from the time of their enunciation, but it was not until the 1880's in Switzerland that there appeared among Russian revolutionaries the first group of Marxists, led by Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov. The Russian revolutionary movement of the 19th century, from the time of the discussions preceding the abortive Decembrist revolt of 1825 (see DECEMBRISTS), was shaped by various groups among the intelligentsia. During the 1860's and 1870's most of these groups used the name "Populist." But Plekhanov and his friends, revolting against terrorism, sought a new approach. The eclectic "looseness" of populism was abandoned in favor of the "scientific" claims of Marxism. The Populist goal of remaking society directly was scrapped in favor of the Marxist tactic of seizing state power first. The peasantry, on which the Populists relied, was replaced by the proletariat as the chosen vehicle of revolution. Plekhanov's new Marxist circle (1883) was called the Group for Liberation of Labor.

Marxist intellectuals did not attract sizable numbers of workers in Russia until the 1890's. During the strikes of 1895–1897 in St. Petersburg, Julius Martov (who had already won his spurs in Marxist activity in Vilna) and Lenin gained sufficient prominence to be arrested and exiled to Siberia. By 1900 there were circles of Russian Marxists in Switzerland, France, and Germany, and in several Russian cities these groups included workers. Marxism, however, appealed chiefly to intellectuals until 1905, and even to some degree until 1917. In a series of public and private debates in the 1890's, the young Marxists won out over the older Populists. One wing of Populists thereupon adopted many Marxist doctrines, but they retained their belief that the peasantry would escape the doom Marx seemed to have pronounced on them. This faction formed the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) party. Since the police, while fearing the Populist terrorists, brushed aside Marxism as an abstract and bookish doctrine, a number of Marxists were able to publish books and magazines that got past the censors. One of these "legal Marxists," Pyotr Struve, was chosen to write the manifesto for a small group of delegates from Marxist circles that assembled in Minsk in March 1898 to form an officially constituted Russian Social Democratic Workers' party—that is, a Marxist party. By this time the police were on the alert, and they arrested many delegates after the meeting. As a result, organization of the party was postponed.

SOVFOTO

Georgi Plekhanov redirected the revolutionary movement in Russia along Marxist lines in the 1880's.

The question agitating the Marxists at this time was whether they ought to push further "economic" (wage and hour) demands, as had been done during the strike movement of 1895–1897, or to concentrate on the overthrow of the government. The "economists" were sharply attacked by Lenin and Martov from Siberia, and Plekhanov from abroad. When Lenin and Martov were released in 1900, they joined the exiles in Switzerland to publish a newspaper called *Iskra* (*The Spark*) defending as fundamental the orthodox Marxist emphasis on political action. By 1903 it seemed that the "economists" had been silenced. Renewed strikes and demonstrations promised new revolutionary opportunities, and the *Iskra* group deemed the time ripe for attempting again to organize a party.

Bolshevik-Menshevik Split. The Second Congress (leaving the designation "First" for the ill-fated Minsk meeting of 1898) met in Brussels and London beginning July 30, 1903. The dominant *Iskra* group promptly split into two factions over the issue of party membership. Lenin, who believed party membership should entail "personal participation" in a party organization, was outvoted by the followers of Martov, who asked only "regular personal assistance" under organization guidance. Following a walkout of certain delegates, however, Lenin forced another vote on the question of a new editorial board for *Iskra* and won narrowly. His adherents assumed the name *bolsheviki* (men of the majority), while Martov's faction became known as *mensheviki*. The Russian words are ambiguous: *bolshe* means more, *menshe*, less. Many people simply concluded that the Bolsheviks wanted "more" of a change, the Mensheviks "less" of one, and so there is a legend that the Mensheviks were not really orthodox Marxists, but semisocialists. The difference was actually not over Marxist doctrine but its tactical application for the Russian scene. Both groups believed Russia was in a precapitalist—commonly it was said "feudal" or "semifeudal"—stage in which capitalism was growing rapidly. The revolution that they saw in prospect was therefore bound to be "bourgeois." The Mensheviks interpreted this to mean that "bourgeois" leaders (liberals) must take political power. The Marxist leaders of the proletariat, therefore, could not compromise themselves by trying to form or share in a government, but would have to restrict themselves to pushing "bourgeois" reform to the limit, while preparing the way for the final socialist revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat. This second revolutionary phase, however, would have to await the passage of a "significant interval."

Lenin and the Bolsheviks regarded this analysis as a counsel of despair. Lenin's insistence on a tight party organization was based on the fear that "bourgeois" liberals would otherwise infiltrate and dupe the workers as to their real interests. The section of the "bourgeoisie" with which he preferred to cooperate was the peasantry. He assumed it would follow, being unable to lead as the liberals were. The "bourgeois" revolution, therefore, would bring the Marxists

SOVFOTO

V. I. Lenin (*seated ce*
and Julius Martov (*se*
right) **were the leader**
an activist Marxist gr
the Union for the Libera
of the Working Class,
was formed in St. Pe
burg in 1895. Later,
tov led Menshevik opp
tion to Lenin's Bolshe

into power through peasant backing ("revolutionary democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry"). While Marxists could not inaugurate socialism instantly, they would lead the "poor peasantry" against the "rich peasantry" (kulaks) and thereby achieve the "proletarian" revolution that would introduce socialism.

Leon Trotsky, who was younger and less influential than Lenin or Martov, rejected parts of both the Bolshevik and Menshevik platforms. The Russian proletariat, he thought, could merge "bourgeois" and "proletarian" phases of revolution, as Lenin said, but not with the Bolsheviks' proposed peasant ally. Nor could the Bolsheviks rely on the liberals, as the Mensheviks did, for any kind of useful reform. Only the proletariat of western Europe could provide the aid needed to make the revolution "permanent"—that is, enable it to pass from one phase to another without a "significant interval."

Following the Second Congress, Lenin's Bolsheviks found themselves in a role at variance with their title of "majority." The newspaper *Iskra* passed to the Mensheviks, as did the party's central committee. While Plekhanov had supported Lenin at the Congress, he soon joined the Mensheviks, who included Martov, Paul Axelrod, Vera Zasulich, and others of the older generation.

The Effect of the 1905 Revolution. Russia's military defeats in the war with Japan of 1904–1905 and a renewed wave of urban agitation against the czarist government produced the Revolution of 1905, in which Bolsheviks and Mensheviks worked together closely on the local level, despite the differences of their leaders. The leaders of the two factions played little part in the events of 1905, but Trotsky became the chief figure in the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, an attempt at a "workers' parliament." The Marxists came to dominate it, and they used it to coordinate a series of general strikes for political objectives.

The first of these general strikes had the effect of leading the czar to grant a form of constitutional government. The revolutionary in- lectuals were deserted by much of their m following as a result of the czar's October Ma festo of 1905, and the urban revolt was quashed. The widespread wave of peasant r which began and ended later than the movem in the cities, was largely unaffected by atten of the revolutionary intellectuals to lead them 1906, and even more by 1907, the Marxists their fellow revolutionaries were nearly b where they had started, reduced again to s hunted, underground bands. They still w eligible to take part in the Duma (national le lature), and even after arguments as to whe to boycott the Duma or to try to use it as a olutionary podium, Marxists managed to get of their adherents elected to the Second Du in 1907. The majority of these deputies Mensheviks, who had emerged as the majo faction in the party at the Fourth Congress Stockholm, held in 1906. By the Fifth Congr held in London in 1907, the Bolsheviks managed to reach a position of roughly e strength. However, the alteration of the

Leon Trotsky at 25, from an identification photo taken by the czarist police about the time of his second arrest and exile to Siberia.

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frage laws by Pyotr Arkadievich Stolypin, president of the council of ministers, in 1907 reduced Marxist strength in the succeeding Dumas to a handful, and the party leaders were compelled to seek refuge abroad. In the following years the party splintered into six or more fragments, and when Lenin and his followers "expelled" the Mensheviks at the Prague conference in 1912 and took the new name Russian Social Democratic Workers' party (Bolsheviks), it was a gesture that was to have greater future than contemporary significance.

The Marxists in World War I. The Russian Marxists had always thought in terms not merely of leading a revolution in Russia, but of doing their part in an international revolutionary upheaval. However, at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, many Social Democrats were willing to identify themselves to a degree with the respective national war efforts. Lenin attacked this tendency bitterly and called for conversion of "imperialist war into a civil war" and an end of thinking in national terms.

He did not foresee the February (New Style, March) Revolution of 1917, in which war weariness and dissatisfaction with government mismanagement of the war combined to bring down the Romanov dynasty. Following the formation of a provisional government by liberal leaders in 1917 and the revival of a Petrograd (as St. Petersburg had been renamed in 1914) Soviet of Workers' Deputies, the Mensheviks invoked their old doctrine of "bourgeois revolution" and refused to take power. The Socialist Revolutionaries, who rapidly became the largest Russian party, and at first some Bolsheviks, followed the Menshevik lead.

Lenin arrived in Russia on April 16, 1917, and promptly dumbfounded most of his hearers, including Bolsheviks, by a series of denunciations. First, he attacked the provisional government and demanded that the Soviets (still dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries) take power. Second, he attacked the decision to continue the war and called for its transformation into international revolution. Third, he denounced the whole Second International of Social Democrats and called for a Third International of new "Communist" parties, as he said the Bolsheviks should rename themselves.

The Bolshevik Seizure of Power. The provisional government was too weak to govern, while the Menshevik-Socialist Revolutionary-led Soviets, which were strong enough to govern, refused on doctrinal grounds to do so. Nevertheless, after several weeks, they consented to send a few representatives to the cabinet. The Bolsheviks used their opportunity to the fullest. On July 16–17 a Bolshevik-led demonstration frightened the head of the provisional government, Aleksandr Kerensky, sufficiently so that he arrested or tried to arrest many Bolshevik leaders. However, when he quarreled with his commander in chief, Gen. Lavr Kornilov, he then felt he needed Bolshevik support. The Bolsheviks were even permitted to organize armed bands for the "defense of the revolution."

Lenin and other party leaders remained in hiding to plan an uprising to be led by these bands. On Nov. 7 (Old Style date, October 25), 1917, an insurrection overthrew the provisional government. On the same day there was convened in Petrograd the Second All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (the Soviet of Peasant Deputies met separately somewhat later and voted against the Bolsheviks), which revealed a majority for approval of the new government established by the insurrection. It was headed by Lenin as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and included Trotsky as foreign commissar, Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov as commissar of the interior, and Joseph Stalin as commissar of nationalities. Lenin announced a program of immediate distribution of land to the peasants and peace with the Central Powers. Postponing for the time being the Marxist agricultural prescription for large-scale collective farms, Lenin accepted the land distribution program of the Socialist Revolutionary party, from which the left wing had detached itself to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. Thus the ground was laid for a "coalition" government of Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries, presumed to represent workers and poor peasants, respectively. The Bolsheviks again declared that their objective was to introduce socialism in Russia, although they had placed an obstacle in their own path by sanctioning land division.

The coalition with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries lasted only until Lenin, finally abandoning hope that revolution would unseat the German and Austrian regimes with which peace had to be negotiated, insisted on signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918). In protest against the harsh German terms that Lenin had accepted, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries resigned, and the Bolsheviks remained in sole power. The Seventh Congress of the party, which approved the treaty, also renamed the party the Russian Communist party (Bolsheviks); in 1925, "Russian" was replaced by "All-Union." The word "Bolsheviks" in parentheses was dropped by the Nineteenth Congress, which began Oct. 5, 1952. See also UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—*16. History of Russia and the USSR.*

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BOLSHOI, bul-shoi', is the name of a famous theater in Moscow and of the ballet and opera companies that reside there. The word "bolshoi" means "big" or "grand" in Russian; thus a "bolshoi" theater is the largest theater in any city, such as the Bolshoi Theater that flourished in St. Petersburg from 1783 to 1889.

The Bolshoi Theater in Moscow is renowned for its excellent acoustics and its vast size. It can accommodate an audience of slightly more than 2,000. The ballets and operas presented at the Bolshoi are usually traditional and are given spectacular productions using large numbers of performers and elaborately realistic scenic effects.

The Bolshoi is heir to an old tradition. Its predecessor was the Petrovsky Theater, opened by Prince Urussov in 1780. After the Petrovsky Theater burned in 1805, the Bolshoi Theater was built in 1825. It, too, burned, in 1853, and its remaining eight great entrance columns were incorporated into the new Bolshoi Theater, which opened in 1856 with Bellini's opera *I Puritani.*

The Bolshoi ballet company had its origins in the late 18th century in the work of Filippo

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TASS, FROM SOVFOTO

LENIN, in May 1919, as head of the new Bolshevik regime, reviews troops parading in Moscow.

LENIN, len'ən, **Vladimir Ilich** (1870–1924), Russian revolutionary writer, who, with Leon Trotsky, led the revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power in November 1917. (All dates are given in New Style.) He was head of the Soviet government, in fact until illness removed him from the scene in 1922 and formally until his death in 1924. Lenin, who founded the Comintern—the Third, or Communist, International—is recognized by all branches of the international Communist movement as their chief forebear in theory, along with Marx and Engels, and in practice.

To Russians who identify with the old monarchy, to national minorities of the USSR who seek independence, and to many Russian and non-Russian advocates of democracy, Lenin was a destroyer and an evil genius. To many historians, including those who do not share his views or aims, he was an immensely gifted man who did much to shape the history of the 20th century. To many Soviet citizens he was the virtual father of their country.

First Years. Vladimir Ilich, whose original surname was Ulyanov, was born in Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk), Russia, on May 4, 1870. He was the son of Ilya Ulyanov, a provincial school inspector who had been raised to the ranks of nobility for his government service, and of Maria Ulyanova, daughter of a physician, partly of German descent. Lenin was one of six children. His mother taught him to read and play the piano, and the whole family read aloud and sang together the great Russian and European poems and songs.

In 1887, Lenin's eldest brother, Aleksandr, was executed for leading an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Czar Alexander III. The plot was under the auspices of the People's Will, a populist revolutionary organization. A few week[s] his brother's execution, Lenin graduated fr[om] Simbirsk secondary school with a medal fo[r] its best student. Fyodor Kerensky, the [school] director, was, ironically, the father of Ale[x] Kerensky, future prime minister of the prov[isional] government that the Bolsheviks were to [over]throw. The director vouched for Lenin[']s ability when he successfully applied for ad[mission] to Kazan University in the fall of 1887.

Early Political Career. Lenin's higher ed[ucation] was less important to him than revolutiona[ry] tivity. Within a few months he was ex[pelled] from Kazan University for taking part in [a] dent demonstration. He began to read the [works] of Karl Marx and organized a Marxist ci[rcle] Samara (now Kuibyshev), where the fami[ly] moved. Having passed the law examinat[ions] the University of St. Petersburg—though [he] not attended classes there—he set up a law [prac]tice in Samara. However, he spent most [of his] time with his Marxist circle. In 1893 he [went] St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) and join[ed] other Marxist group, which was training [small] numbers of workers in the doctrines of [Marx]. Lenin persuaded some of his associat[es] broaden the scale of their agitation.

In 1895, Lenin went abroad for [medical] treatment. In Switzerland he met Geo[rgi] Plekhanov, the "father of Russian Mar[xism]." Plekhanov was the first and last of Lenin's [con]temporaries to whom he deferred in wisdom [and] that for only a few years. Now in his [early] twenties, Lenin already impressed those [around] him as a man who had never been young. [Despite] his apparently inexhaustible energy, com[bined] with precision and understanding, suggested [abil]ities of leadership.

Returning to Russia in the fall of 1895, [Lenin] plunged into the work of the Social Demo[cratic] party, in close association with Julius M[artov], future leader of the rival Menshevik factio[n]. December both men were arrested, and [after] more than a year in jail, Lenin was exil[ed] eastern Siberia. He was joined there by a [fellow] rade from St. Petersburg, Nadezhda Kons[tantin]novna Krupskaya, who became his wife in [1898] and his lifelong co-worker. They did not [have] any children.

While in exile he wrote his first major [work], *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, [which] lished in 1899 under the pseudonym *Vla[dimir] Ilin*. In this book he analyzed Russian econ[omic] life in Marxist fashion and concluded that [capitalism] result of the rise of capitalism, a bourgeois [revo]lution was the next important step on the ro[ad to] a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and soci[alism].

In 1900, Lenin was released and went a[broad] to join with Martov, who had been releas[ed] the same time, and with émigré Marxist le[aders] in publishing a newspaper called *Iskra* (*[The] Spark*). The editors sought to recall the [Social] Democrats inside Russia to the task of prep[aring] for the overthrow of czarism and the capt[ure] political power, fearing that the party was d[evoting] ing too much attention to achieving such ga[ins] improved working conditions. In a 1902 [pam]phlet, *What is to Be Done?*, Lenin conte[nded] that in order to win the political struggle [the] party must be led by a group of "profess[ional] revolutionaries" who would not be tempt[ed] concentrate on short-term objectives or "re[form]ist" compromises. By this time he was usi[ng] pseudonym Lenin quite regularly.

Emergence of the Bolshevik Party: 1903–1912. At the Social Democrats' Second Congress, held in Brussels and London beginning on July 30, 1903, Lenin found himself at odds with all the other prominent Marxist leaders, except Plekhanov, who soon withdrew his support, on the issues of party organization and tactics. Lenin's personal intransigence and "dogmatism" evoked sharp attacks from his erstwhile comrades, while he expressed distrust of them for rejecting his plan of a tightly organized party nucleus and for indicating their willingness to cooperate with liberal groups during the bourgeois revolution that all Marxists expected soon. Along these lines the congress split, organizing not one united party but two opposing factions—the Bolsheviks under Lenin and the Mensheviks under Martov and others. See also BOLSHEVIK.

After the congress was over, Lenin's Bolsheviks found themselves without either a party organ—*Iskra* passed into Menshevik hands—or control of the party's new Central Committee. Thus the Mensheviks entered the revolution of 1905 with an advantage, and their influence over the soviets of workers' deputies, which sprang up late in the year, was much stronger than that of the Bolsheviks. During 1905, Lenin made clear his conviction that the Russian bourgeois revolution should not end in a liberal bourgeois government but in a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry," in which the party should lead and the peasants play the "bourgeois" role. The Bolsheviks did not recover their lost ground and in 1906 felt compelled to attend a "unification" congress in Stockholm, which confirmed the Mensheviks' majority in the party. However, Lenin maintained his own factional machinery. By the time of the nominally reunited party's Fifth Congress, which opened in London on May 13, 1907, Lenin had regained a slight edge in voting delegates.

From 1907 to 1917, a time when Lenin lived abroad, the Social Democrats were divided into many warring groups. Conflicts occurred over whether to boycott the Duma, the legislative assembly, and whether to permit the "expropriations"—that is, robbery—of bank funds for party use. The question of whether to sanction the "religion of collectivity" expounded by Anatoli V. Lunacharsky and others also caused conflict. Because of Lenin's powerful and uncompromising personality, most such squabbles became splits.

During one of these squabbles, Lenin wrote *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (1909), attacking Aleksandr A. Bogdanov and other Bolsheviks who, in his view, were departing from philosophical materialism. In the book he set forth so categorically his belief in the interrelation between philosophy and political practice that professional philosophers were horrified. In 1912, Lenin convened a conference in Prague that declared the Bolsheviks to be a separate party and forced the pro-Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Duma to form their own "fraction" separately from the pro-Menshevik. Shortly afterward he co-opted Joseph Stalin into the party's Central Committee as one of his chief aides.

World War I and the Revolution of 1917. At the outbreak of World War I, Lenin denounced European socialist leaders who were willing to support the war effort of their governments, as well as the Mensheviks, most of whom believed that neither side ought to win. He declared that the defeat of Russia would be the "lesser evil," since it would lead to the weakening of the monarchy by the loss of the lands of the national minorities. To this end he argued in favor of "national self-determination," against the Polish-born, German Social Democrat Rosa Luxemburg and the Bolshevik Nikolai I. Bukharin, who regarded national issues as beneath Marxist notice.

In 1916, in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,* Lenin expounded his view of world history since Marx's time. He suggested that the capitalist powers had saved themselves temporarily through the export of surplus capital, but would undermine each other in rival efforts at expansion, which he interpreted as the essence of World War I. The opportunity for the international socialist revolution would then be at hand.

On April 16, 1917, just over a month after the overthrow of the monarchy, Lenin returned to Russia on a sealed train provided by the Germans, who hoped that his arrival would hasten the end of Russian resistance. On April 17 he announced the "April Theses," calling for the overthrow of the "bourgeois" provisional government, its replacement by the revived soviets—even though they were still dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries—and the transformation of the "imperialist" war into international civil war, that is, socialist revolution.

Following Lenin's lead, after initial confusion, the Bolsheviks attacked unceasingly the provisional government and the leadership of the soviets. Lenin exploited the indecision of both about possible continuance of the war. When his own program of "nationalization" of the land made little headway among the peasants, he adopted the Socialist Revolutionary program of division of the remaining large estates into small privately owned farms. By September he was winning over the soviets of workers' deputies. Counting on majority support in a national congress of soviets scheduled for November, Lenin and Leon Trotsky, whom he had converted in the summer, organized the overthrow of the provisional government on Nov. 7, 1917. The Second All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which convened the same day, confirmed the establishment of a new government for the Russian Soviet Republic, with Lenin at its head as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, a post he retained when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed in 1922.

Soviet Power. In *The State and Revolution* (1917), which he broke off unfinished at the time of the revolution, Lenin explained how he visualized the coming "dictatorship of the proletariat" and how he expected the subsequent "withering away of the state" to occur. Although he had never held any public office, he took up the duties of chief of government with vigor. He directed the organization of a Red army under Trotsky as war commissar and of a secret police, the Cheka.

The immediate task of these organizations was to deal with the resistance to Bolshevik rule, resistance that grew rapidly in 1918 as opponents of the new regime seized control of the Ukraine, southern Russia, and Siberia. The anti-Bolshevik White forces were supplied and supported by the Allies. The Allies hoped to get Russia back into the war, from which Lenin had withdrawn by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. The Poles invaded the Ukraine on their own account. These opposition forces were not defeated until the winter of 1921.

Despite the civil war Lenin did not put aside his long-declared purposes. He dispersed the Constituent Assembly, elected after the revolution in November, since it had only a small minority of Bolshevik delegates. He also renamed the party "Communist" and, at a Moscow congress beginning on March 2, 1919, proclaimed the formation of the Third, or Communist, International (see also INTERNATIONAL). He attempted to deal with both short-range economic needs and long-range political considerations by a policy of "war communism," which only aggravated the Communists' troubles. Admitting that world revolution would evidently be delayed for some time and recognizing that peasant discontent and economic breakdown were imperiling his regime, Lenin proclaimed a retreat in the New Economic Policy of March 1921.

Lenin suffered his first stroke in May 1922 and remained seriously ill for the rest of his life. He also suffered from the aftereffects of a wound received in an assassination attempt in August 1918. Though ailing, he tried to avert the rise of a new Communist bureaucracy and to allay the tensions among his closest assistants, especially Trotsky and Stalin. Lenin died in Gorky, near Moscow, on Jan. 21, 1924. By decision of the Politburo, his body was embalmed and placed on permanent public view in a mausoleum in Red Square, Moscow.

Evaluation. Virtually everything Lenin ever wrote coupled immediate polemic purpose with exposition of general principles. He was a less gifted writer and orator than was Trotsky. His genius lay in his ability to accept temporary setbacks and face unpleasant realities without sacrificing his principles or goals. His personal life was always subordinated to his political objectives. For example, he would not listen to the music of Beethoven because it made him feel "weak." He decided against pursuing one liaison with a lady because, as he told her, she was "not a Social Democrat," to which she amicably but accurately replied that he was "only a Social Democrat."

However, Lenin felt that to be a Social Democrat, or rather a Bolshevik, was to commit one's whole life to this political ideal. The irony of his career is that he laid the foundations for Soviet totalitarianism, both in theory and practice, while intending to liberate humanity from every kind of oppression. For good or ill, few, if any, of his contemporaries in any country have influenced history more than he.

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LENIN PEAK, a mountain in the USSR, is in the Trans Alai Range, on the border between the Kirghiz and Tadzhik republics. The peak reaches 23,382 feet (7,127 meters). Until the 1930's, when Stalin Peak (now Mt. Communism) was found to be taller, Lenin Peak was thought to be the USSR's highest mountain.

It was formerly known as Kaufmann Peak after Konstantin Petrovich Kaufmann, a Russian general who played a part in Russian expansion into central Asia in the 19th century.

LENINABAD, lyā-nyi-nōō-bät', a city in the USSR, is the second-largest city in the Tadzhik SSR. It was called Khojend or Khodzhent until 1936.

Located on the Syr Darya, at the western end of the Fergana Valley, it is the center of an irrigated agricultural oasis, producing cotton, silk and dried fruit. Its silk textile and fruit-preserving industries are among the largest in Soviet Central Asia. Other industries make cotton fibers, wine, leather, and food products. A mining school trains engineers for nearby coal and nonferrous metal mines.

The site of Leninabad has been occupied by cities since ancient times. There, about 329 B.C., Alexander the Great founded the city of Alexandria, which later became an important trade center on the route from China to western Asia. The city flourished under the Seljuk Turks in the 11th century and under Timur (Tamerlane) in the 14th. In 1866 the city fell before the Russian advance into Central Asia. In 1929, it was incorporated into the newly founded Tadzhik SSR. Population: (1970) 103,000.

THEODORE SHABAD
Editor of "Soviet Geography"

LENINAKAN, lyā-nyi-nōō-kän', a city in the USSR, is the second-largest city in the Armenian SSR. It is on a bare plateau about 5,000 feet (1,500 meters) high, five miles (8 km) from the Turkish border.

Leninakan is the industrial center of Armenia's Shiraki agricultural district, which produces wheat, sugar beets, and truck crops. Dairying is also carried on, and beef cattle and sheep are raised. The city has one of the Soviet Union's largest cotton textile mills and a knitwear factory, and manufactures bicycles and metalware. There are also a meat-packing plant; furniture and footwear industries; and a variety of rug, wool, and silk handicrafts.

The city lies on the railroad from Tbilisi in the Georgian SSR to Yerevan, capital of the Armenian SSR. Although a branch railroad leads from Leninakan to Erzurum in Turkey, there has been no train service across the border under the Soviet regime. The railroads follow ancient trade routes that linked Turkish and Persian spheres of interest.

When Russian troops reached the present site of Leninakan in the early 19th century, they found the small town of Kumairi (Gyumri). In view of the trade center's strategic importance, it was given the status of a city in 1834 and renamed Aleksandropol. It served as a base for periodic Russian inroads into Turkey. In 1924 the city was renamed Leninakan. It lies in an earthquake zone and was badly damaged by a quake in 1926. Population: (1970) 164,000.

THEODORE SHABAD
Editor of "Soviet Geography"

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40 When the lord therefore of the vineyard cometh, what will he do unto those [r]husbandmen? *farmers*

41 They say unto him, [s]He will miserably destroy those wicked men, and will let out *his* vineyard unto other [r]husbandmen, which shall [r]render him the fruits in their seasons. Luke 20:16 • *farmers* • *pay*

42 Jesus saith unto them, [s]Did ye never read in the scriptures,

> the stone which the builders rejected,
> the same is become the head of the corner:
> this is the Lord's doing,
> and it is marvelous in our eyes? Is. 28:16☆

43 Therefore say I unto you, [s]The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a [r]nation bringing forth the fruits thereof. 8:12 • *people*

44 And whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken: but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder.

45 And when the chief priests and Pharisees had heard his parables, they [r]perceived that he spake of them. *understood*

46 But when they sought to lay hands on him, they feared the multitude, because [s]they took him for a prophet. John 7:40

CHAPTER 22 c. A.D. 30

The parable of the marriage feast

AND Jesus answered and spake unto them again by parables, and said,

2 The kingdom of heaven is like unto *a* certain king, which made a marriage for his son,

3 And sent forth his servants to call them that were[r]bidden to the wedding: and they would not come. *invited*

4 Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them which are bidden, Behold, I have prepared my dinner: my oxen and *my* fatlings *are* killed, and all things *are* ready: come unto the marriage.

5 But they[r]made light of *it*, and went their ways, one to his farm, another to his merchandise: *paid no attention*

6 And the [r]remnant took his servants, and [r]entreated *them* [r]spitefully, and slew *them*. *rest* • *handled* • *in mean fashion*

7 But when the king heard *thereof*, he was wroth: and he sent forth [s]his armies, and destroyed those murderers, and burned up their city. Dan. 9:26; Luke 19:27

8 Then saith he to his servants, The wedding is ready, but they which were bidden were not [s]worthy. Acts 13:46; 10:11

9 Go ye therefore into the[s]highways, and as many as ye shall find, bid to the marriage. Ezek. 21:21; Obad. 14

10 So those servants went out into the highways, and [r]gathered together all as many as they found, both bad and good: and the wedding was [r]furnished with guests. 13:38, 47 • *provided*

11 And when the king came in to see the guests, he saw there a man [s]which had not on a wedding garment: Col. 3:10, 11

12 And he saith unto him, Friend, how camest thou in hither not having a wedding garment? And he was speechless.

13 Then said the king to the servants, Bind him hand and foot, and take him away, and cast *him* into[r]outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. *tie* • *the outside*

14 [s]For many are called, but few *are* chosen. 20:16; 2 Pe. 1:10

God and Caesar

15 [s]Then went the Pharisees, and took counsel how they might entangle him in *his* talk. Mark 12:13; Luke 20:20

16 And they sent out unto him their disciples with the He-ro'-di-ans, saying, Master, we know that thou art true, and teachest the way of God in truth, neither carest thou for any *man:* for thou [r]regardest not the person of men. *do not pay attention to*

17 Tell us therefore, What thinkest thou? Is it [r]lawful to give[s]tribute unto Caesar, or not? *right* • 17:25; Luke 2:1; 3:1

18 But Jesus [r]perceived their wickedness, and said, Why [r]tempt ye me, *ye* hypocrites? *saw* • *test*

19 Show me the tribute money. And they brought unto him a [r]penny. *denarius*

20 And he saith unto them, Whose *is* this image and [r]superscription? *inscription*

21 They say unto him, Caesar's. Then saith he unto them, [r]Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.

22 When they had heard *these words*, they [r]marveled, and left him, and went their way. *were astonished*

The question about the resurrection

23 [s]The same day came to him the Sadducees, [s]which say that there is no resurrection, and asked him, Luke 20:27

24 Saying, Master, [s]Moses said, If a man die, having no children, his brother shall marry his wife, and raise up [r]seed unto his brother. Deut. 25:5

25 Now there were with us seven brethren: and the first, when he had married a wife, [r]deceased, and, having no issue, left his wife unto his brother:

26 Likewise the second also, and the third, unto the seventh.

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Christian Life Outlines and Study Notes

THOMAS NELSON, PUBLISHERS
Nashville • Camden • New York

My dear friends,

In a recent trip to Eastern Europe, I spoke with a priest who had spent ten years in prison. He asked us to deliver a message to the West: "There is a war going on. It is not a nuclear, but a spiritual one. The fall-out of the atheistic explosion is everywhere." Although the fall-out may be everywhere, we are reminded that God too is everywhere and not even tyrannies can keep Him out.

I invite you to become a part of the CREED community and our mission of freedom. Together, through faith and action, we will intercede in behalf of our persecuted brothers and sisters.

With every blessing,

Dr. Ernest Gordon
President

Ernest Gordon was Dean of the University Chapel at Princeton from 1955-1981. During World War II he served with the 93rd Highlanders of Scotland. After action in Malaysia, he was captured by the Japanese and worked on the infamous Railroad of Death. Near death, he experienced his freedom in Christ and developed his theology of freedom. His books include **Miracle on the River Kwai** and **Me, Myself and Who.**

Persecuted for Their Faith

Galina Vilchinskaya
Baptist, USSR

Father Gleb Yakunin
Orthodox, USSR

Zoya Krakhmalnikova
Orthodox, USSR

Vytautas Skuodis
Catholic, Lithuania

Sergei Khodorovich
Orthodox, USSR

Natalia Lazareva
Orthodox, USSR

Pray for them.

CREED

- There are over 100 million Christians within the Soviet Empire.
- It is illegal within the Soviet Empire to give religious instruction to your own children.
- It is illegal within the Soviet Empire to hold Bible studies in your own home or with friends.
- In the USSR penal system there are over 2,500 prison camps, with 120 exclusively for women and children.

The Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents is committed to intercede in behalf of those who are imprisoned, refused emigration or suffer other forms of persecution for their faith.

What is CREED?

CREED is a community of concerned people dedicated to the mission and ministry of freedom.

What are CREED's goals?

- To educate people in the Biblical doctrine of freedom and its implications for moral responsibility.
- To obtain the liberation of imprisoned and oppressed believers.
- To communicate directly with the persecuted, thus affirming our unity in the Body of Christ.

"CREED fills a vacuum in the Christian community, which has been a concern of mine for some time. I am thrilled with CREED's mission of freedom and identification with all those who are oppressed. It gives me additional courage."

—Sen. Mark O. Hatfield

"Having just returned from the Soviet Union I am aware of the impact of active world opinion on decisions regarding believers and the Church. I look foward to working with the future efforts of CREED."

—Basil Rodzianko, Bishop of San Francisco and the Western United States

"If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together."

I Corinthians 12:26

Millions of Christians within the Soviet Empire suffer daily oppression because they are believers. In the free Western world, little has been known of these persecuted people and less has been done to help them.

Although there are a few well-known cases of persecuted believers such as the "Siberian Seven", great numbers of Christians suffer alone and unknown. CREED's mission is to find out who they are, to understand their suffering and to work for their freedom.

CREED's educational program reaches Americans from the grassroots to the Halls of Congress.

CREED serves as a link between private citizens and congressional and diplomatic leaders.

CREED's witness of the Biblical doctrine of freedom is carried to believers in the Soviet Empire via broadcasts and personal missions.

Contributions to CREED are tax-deductible.

Send to CREED, 117 Prince Street,
Alexandria, VA 22314
703-549-0047

☐ I would like to know more about CREED's mission of freedom.

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

_____ ZIP _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR BEN ELLIOTT

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Presidential Remarks for the Conference on Religious Liberty, April 16, 1:30 p.m.

Per your request, the NSC has reviewed and approved, as amended, the proposed Presidential remarks to the Conference on Religious Liberty on Tuesday, April 16, at 1:30 p.m.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Presidential Remarks

cc: David Chew

(Noonan/BE)
April 12, 1985
10:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPBY AT CONFERENCE ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 1985

Thank you very much.

I am deeply honored to address this conference. I know that a good many of you have come a long way to be here today, and I know you have given greatly of your time, energy and concern. And I can only hope, as you do, that those now suffering around the world for their beliefs will draw renewed courage from your work.

The history of religion and its impact on civilization cannot be summarized in a few days, never mind minutes. But one of the great shared characteristics of all religions is the distinction they draw between the temporal world and the spiritual world. All religions, in effect, echo the words of the gospel of St. Matthew: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things which are God's." What this injunction teaches us is that the individual cannot be entirely subordinate to the state, that there exists a whole other realm, an almost mysterious realm of individual thought and action which is sacred, and which is totally beyond and outside of state control.

This idea has been central to the development of human rights. Only in an intellectual climate which distinguishes between the City of God and the City of Man -- and which explicitly affirms the independence of God's realm, and forbids any infringement by the state on its prerogatives -- only in such

a climate could the idea of individual human rights take root, grow, and eventually flourish.

We see this climate in all democracies, and in our own political tradition. The founders of our republic rooted their democratic commitment in the belief that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." And so they created a system of government whose avowed purpose was -- and is -- the protection of those God-given rights.

But, as all of you know only too well, there are many political regimes today that completely reject the notion that a man or a woman can have a greater loyalty to God than to the state. Marx ~~[illegible]~~ feared that religious belief would subvert his ~~[illegible]~~ materialist philosophy. And, as developed by Lenin, ~~Under Marxism~~ the ruling party ~~was to~~ claim for itself the attributes which religious faith ascribes to God alone. ~~[illegible]~~ Under the Soviet system, the state has become ~~the final arbiter of truth, justice, and morality.~~ And so Marx declared religion an enemy of the people -- a drug, an opiate of the masses. And Lenin said, "Religion and communism are incompatible in theory as well as in practice . . . We must fight religion."

All of this illustrates a truth that I believe must be re-understood: atheism is not an incidental element of communism, not just part of the package -- it is the package, as the Soviet ideologists themselves affirm.

In countries which have fallen under communist rule, it is often the church which forms the most powerful barrier against the imposition of a completely totalitarian system. And so, totalitarian regimes

always seek either to destroy the church or, when that is impossible, to subvert it. In the former, we have the Soviet Union, where the church was immediately attacked by the communist revolution, [illegible] The Soviets [illegible] often characterized their actions as merely defensive.

In 1945, Josef Stalin met with Harry Hopkins, who had been sent by Harry Truman to discuss various East/West problems. In the middle of a talk about politics, Stalin interjected the following: In 1917, he said, the Russian communist party had proclaimed the right of religious freedom as part of their political program. But, he said, the churches of Russia had declared the Soviet government anathema, and had called on church members to resist the call of the Red Army. Now what could we do, said Stalin, but declare war on the church. He assured Hopkins, however, that World War Two had ended the church-state antagonism and now freedom of religion could be granted. [illegible]

Well, this, as you know, goes under the heading "The Big Lie." But it was told in a typically plaintive and put upon manner, as if there was just no choice, try as we could to reason with these cruel and powerful priests, they just wouldn't stop attacking us and so we had to close their churches.

Well, history has taught us that you can bulldoze a church but you can't extinguish all that is good in every human heart. And so, in spite of the dangers involved there are Christians

throughout the communist world, and Muslims, and Jews, who continue to practice their faith. Some of them have been imprisoned for their courage.

There is the late Valery Marchenko, who died in a Soviet prison hospital a few short months ago. He was 37 years old, a scholar and a Christian who, at his most recent trial, said that all of his life he had tried to "serve goodness" which he considered to be his "Christian duty." There is Father Gleb Yakunin, who was recently sent to Siberia for 5 years of internal exile. He is another prisoner of faith. And Vladislav Rakay, recently jailed for helping to distribute bibles in Czechoslovakia. These are only a few of many.

Dr. Ernest Gordon, the President of an organization named CREED -- Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents -- noted that on a recent trip to Eastern Europe, he spoke with a priest who had spent 10 years in prison. The priest asked him to deliver a message to the West: there is a war going on; it is not nuclear but spiritual. ~~The fallout of the atheistic explosion is everywhere.~~ But Dr. Gordon added, "Although the fallout may be everywhere, we are reminded that God too is everywhere and not even tyrannies can keep him out."

We in the United States have protested this terrible abuse of people who are nothing less than heroes of the century. Most recently, when Congressional leaders met in Moscow with ~~President~~ General Secretary Gorbachev, House Minority leader Bob Michel brought along a list of Baltic and Ukrainian prisoners of conscience. And the Council on Soviet Jewry was magnificent in making sure that the

congressional delegation did not leave without extensive data on repression against Jews in the Soviet Union.

Religious persecution, of course, is not confined to Europe. We see it in Iran, whose leaders have declared virtual war on the Bahais. We see it in Afghanistan, where the Soviet military occupiers have resorted to increasingly cruel measures against the proud, Moslem people of that country. And we see a variation on how to abuse religious freedom in the Sandinista regime of Nicaragua.

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista regime is faced with a politically active church that -- although it supported the revolution -- is now considered a major obstacle to complete totalitarian control. And so the Sandinistas are actively attempting to discredit and split the church hierarchy. One area to be watched, by the way: the Sandinistas, like all communist regimes, are injecting their ideology into the educational system and have begun widespread [redacted] campaigns to indoctrinate children and adults. But the Catholic Church is fighting to maintain autonomy and keep this indoctrination out of church-run schools.

This has not been resolved. Cuba solved the problem by closing all private schools, including religious schools. So did Ethiopia.

The general state of religious liberty in Nicaragua is suggested by testimony from various sources, including refugees. We recently learned of a pastor of the Evangelical Church in a Nicaraguan town who told the Freedom Fighters that the Sandinistas had threatened to send the 3,000 members of his church to relocation camps. The pastor and his church members

are now hiding out in caves and temporary settlements in the countryside.

May I interject here that stories like this are the reason we are asking Congress for aid to help the Freedom Fighters, and to help the victims of the Sandinista regime.

The Sandinistas also harassed Jews. Two Nicaraguan refugees, Sarita and Oscar Kellerman, have told of the firebombing of their synagogue by the Sandinistas -- and how they wrote on the synagogue and the Kellerman's home the words, "Jews -- Out of Nicaragua."

When I think of Nicaragua these days, it occurs to me anew that you can judge any new government, any new regime, by whether or not it allows religion to flourish. If it doesn't, you can be sure it is an enemy of mankind -- for it is attempting to ban what is most beautiful in the human heart.

But we must not feel despair, because it is not appropriate to the times. We are living in a dramatic age. Throughout the world, the machinery of the state is being used as never before against religious freedom -- but at the same time, throughout the world, new groups of believers keep springing up. Points of light flash out in the darkness, and God is honored once again. Perhaps this is the greatest irony of the communist experiment: the very pressure they apply seems to create the force, friction, and heat that allow deep belief to once again burst into flame.

I believe that the most essential element of our defense of freedom is our insistence on speaking out for the cause of religious liberty. I would like to see this country rededicate

itself wholeheartedly to this cause. I join you in your desire that the Protestant churches of America, the Catholic Church, and the Jewish organizations remember the members of their flock who are in prison or in jeopardy in other countries.

We are our brothers' keepers, all of us. And I hope the message will go forth, from this conference to prisoners of conscience throughout the world: "Take heart, you have not been forgotten. We, your brothers and sisters in God, have made your cause our cause, and we vow never to relent until you have regained the freedom that is your birthright as a child of God."

Thank you. God bless all of you.