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PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CONFERENCE

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am both honored and delighted to have the opportunity to address this most distinguished Conference on Religious Liberty. I know that a good many of you have come a long way to attend this Conference, and that all of you have given greatly of your time, your energy, and above all of your concern to be here today. I hope that each of you has found the Conference a productive and memorable experience. More important, perhaps, I hope that those now suffering around the world for their worship of God will draw renewed courage from your works.

The history of religion and its impact on our civilization are matters which cannot be summarized in a few days, much less a few minutes. Yet it seems clear to me that one of the distinguishing features of all religions--any religion--is its sense of the sacred. All religions draw a distinction between the temporal and spiritual spheres. All religions, in effect, echo the words of the gospel of St. Matthew, Chapter 22, Verse 21:

"Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things which are God's." What this biblical injunction teaches us is that the individual cannot be entirely subordinate to the state, that there exists a whole other inviolable realm of individual thought and action which is sacred, totally beyond and outside of state control.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this idea in the development of human rights. For only in an intellectual climate which sharply distinguishes between Caesar's realm and God's realm--and which categorically affirms the independence of God's realm, and forbids any infringement by the state on its prerogatives--only in such a climate could the ideal of individual human rights take root and grow and eventually flourish.

The connection between religious conviction and human rights is especially clear in our own American political tradition. The founders of the American republic rooted their democratic commitment in the belief that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." The Declaration of Independence invoked "the law of nature and of nature's God" as the source of the equality of men and the

rights which belong to them as God's creatures. "To secure these rights", the Declaration Independence continues, "Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Thus, far from subordinating the individual to the demands of the state, the Founding Fathers created a system of government whose avowed purpose is the protection of the individual's God-given rights. Indeed, democracy itself may be seen as the political expression of the great religious ideal of the equality and brotherhood of mankind.

~~But what happens if a citizen runs afoul of the system by refusing to do his duty?~~ as all Bulgakovs only too well

But to all too many regimes in the world today, the notion that a man or a woman can have a greater loyalty to God than to the State is totally unacceptable. It is a threat Atheism is not an incidental element of their ideology, but its core, for their ruling parties claim for themselves the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience which believers ascribe to God alone. Totalitarian parties seek to impose the complete control of the state over all areas of life, and that which they cannot control, they try to destroy. For this reason, totalitarianism can best be understood as a modern form of idolatry, an attempt to establish the Party as

the final arbiter of truth, justice and morality. Not for nothing, then, did Alexander Solzhenitsyn identify hatred of God as the "principal driving force" of communist ideology.

In countries which have fallen under Communist rule, it is often the Church which forms the most powerful bulwark against the consolidation of a totalitarian system. It is not surprising, then, that totalitarian regimes invariably seek, as a matter of the utmost priority, either to destroy the Church, or, if that should prove physically impossible, then at least to subvert it, to undermine it from within and convert it into yet another of the State's numerous "transmission belts." We must unreservedly condemn this attempt to subvert the role of religion as guardian of man's spirit in God's world. Similarly, we must condemn the actions of any regime which attacks the religious authorities and structures for their defense of human rights. Time after time, when a dictator seeks to repress free speech or free press, or forbid elections, or jail opponents, or cows them with threats or acts of brutality, it is the voice of religion that reminds us all of the values of human life, freedom, and dignity. Of course to a dictatorial regime, this will be a challenge, and it will be denounced as interference in politics. But as long as religious leaders are simply defending their flocks and

reminding the rules of their responsibilities, they are not interfering in politics; it is the dictators who are interfering with the dignity and freedom of the individual. And the worst interference by any government is with the right of the individual to worship God. You know what is true but nearly unbelievable: There are Monks and Priests and Ministers and Imans in jail today, Jews and Christians and Muslims and Buddhists and Hindus and Bahais for worshiping God and following his laws. (NB: add examples of Soviet Christian, Bahai in Iran, Muslim, Jew, Buddhist (Vietnam)).

~~They believe in God and He will not fail them. But will~~ A prime element - perhaps the most essential element in our effort to do the to. we? Let us therefore rededicate ourselves wholeheartedly to the cause of religious freedom. Let us prove, in word and deed alike, that we truly are our brother's keeper. Let our message go forth from this conference to prisoners of conscience everywhere: "Take heart, you have not been forgotten! We, your brothers and sisters in God, have made your cause our cause, and we vow never to relent until all of you have regained the freedom that is your birthright to worship in the manner of your own choosing, so help us God."

Drafted HA:JShattan

0079C

NICARAGUA'S DEVELOPMENT AS A MARXIST-LENINIST STATE*

A detailed comparison of five Third-World Marxist-Leninist states--Cuba, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, and, before October 1983, Grenada--demonstrates a common pattern in the consolidation of power and development of ties to the USSR and its surrogates. When viewed in the context of this established pattern, the Nicaraguan revolution is clearly following a Marxist-Leninist path; the Sandinistas have taken most of the same steps taken by the five other Marxist-Leninist regimes early in their stages of power consolidation. In particular, Managua has completed its control over the military and security services. However, the Sandinistas lag in establishing complete single party control and in eliminating vestiges of independent labor, media, and professional groups. Moreover, the Catholic Church has deep roots in Nicaragua and remains the regime's strongest non-military opponent.

Based on the patterns established by the five Marxist-Leninist regimes, we would expect the Sandinistas to continue to tighten their control over opposition parties, independent trade unions, professional organizations, and the remaining opposition press. Like some of the regimes we examined, the Sandinistas may follow a more measured path in centralizing control over the economy and increasing control over private education. On the international front, we expect the regime to continue to support regional revolutionary causes and seek additional Soviet and Soviet-surrogate ties.

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* This comparative analysis is intended to emphasize the Marxist-Leninist dynamics of the Nicaraguan revolution and the role of the USSR and its allies, as well as to suggest policies the Sandinistas are likely to adopt in the future.

THE INDICATORS

Our analysis of the Nicaraguan revolution is based on the application of 46 indicators (see Table) that both measure general progress in consolidating power and the extent to which this consolidation will lead to a Marxist-Leninist regime strongly influenced by the USSR and its surrogates. Five Marxist-Leninist regimes were examined--Cuba, Grenada, Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. To ensure the broader applicability of the indicators, regime selection was influenced by varied geographic location, length of revolutionary process, method of gaining power, and sociological and political characteristics.

To help differentiate between revolutionary dynamics per se and those uniquely associated with a Marxist-Leninist movement, we applied our indicators to Iran. The parallel is interesting: Iran mirrors many of the steps the Marxist regimes have taken while adopting an Islamic rather than a Marxist ideology. The similarities in tactics used to consolidate internal control demonstrate the powerful revolutionary dynamics driving all of these regimes, including Nicaragua; the differences, in turn, highlight Marxist-Leninist strategy and the role of the USSR and its surrogates.

The indicators were arranged under 10 major categories of steps that each of the regimes has taken to consolidate power and firm its relationship with the Soviet Bloc. These identified categories are:

-- Developing a strong centrally controlled single party government;

-- Taking control of and expanding the military as well as seeking to quell whatever internal or external armed opposition might exist;

-- Taking control of and strengthening the security and intelligence services;

-- Gaining control of the private sector and developing a centrally controlled and planned economy;

-- Forming new or taking over existing labor movement and mass organizations aimed at groups such as youth, students, and women;

-- Developing a monopoly of the country's media;

-- Increasing control of education systems and using them to promote ideology;

-- Exerting control over the population through restriction of civil liberties and intimidation;

-- Curbing influence of religious institutions;

-- Aligning with the Soviet Bloc through international forums and other means and through support to other leftist or revolutionary causes.

Move to One-Party Government

Internal Activities: In each of the Marxist-Leninist governments studied, the regimes first came to power as part of a broad-based opposition to a previous government. In the case of Nicaragua, Cuba, Grenada, Ethiopia, and Iran the government was viewed as repressive and out of touch; in Angola and South Yemen, the struggle was against colonial rule, as well as competing nationalist organizations. The more moderate or dissident members of the new government, however, were soon neutralized--in some cases they became disillusioned and left on their own, in others they were forced out. Only in Nicaragua, Grenada, and in the early days of the Cuban regime were there attempts to develop any semblance of coalition governments before casting off the moderates. Most of the regimes fairly quickly established one-party systems. Nicaragua has not done so but is moving in that direction. While the Sandinistas have privately professed their belief in Marxism, they have not yet adopted it as the official state ideology. Iran provides an interesting parallel here: it soon established an official ideology, but it was Islam rather than Marxism.

External Activities: In most cases Moscow's role was small, either directly or through a pro-Soviet Communist party, prior to the establishment of these regimes. In Cuba and South Yemen, there were communist parties but neither played a significant role in the revolution; only afterwards were they integrated into the regime. In Ethiopia, the existing Communist movement has been co-opted and neutralized. Grenada did not have a Communist party, and the pro-Soviet party in Nicaragua was largely bypassed by Havana. In Nicaragua, however, Cuba had long-term ties to Sandinista leaders and played a major role in arming them in the last year of their struggle to attain power. Only in Angola did the USSR provide significant support to the regime prior to the regime's gaining power.

In every case, nonetheless, ruling party ties to the Soviet bloc increased after the regime came to power; these ties included training of cadres and assistance in reorganizing and strengthening party and bureaucratic structures. In South Yemen, for instance, Moscow helped establish a party school. Another important indicator is how Moscow classifies foreign revolutionary movements--it currently regards the ruling parties in Nicaragua, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, (and Grenada before the intervention) as "revolutionary democratic parties"--considered by the USSR as the last stage in development before it becomes a true Communist party. Only Cuba has an officially recognized ruling Communist party.

Control of Military and Security Services

Internal Activities: Each of the regimes studied either established new or reorganized old military and security services, and moved quickly to strengthen these institutions and put them under firm control, frequently by an extensive purge of personnel. To keep the military in line, extensive political/ideological training programs were developed and political cadres or commissars were assigned. With the exception of Ethiopia (which is basically a military government), they have brought the military under the control of the ruling party. As an additional check on the regular military forces, many of these regimes also established popular militias.

External Activities: Each of the Marxist regimes turned to the Soviet Bloc to fulfill their needs for military equipment, training, and advisers. While they may obtain weapons from other sources, the USSR and Eastern Europe have become the major suppliers. Soviet and Cuban advisors often play key support roles--providing training, assisting in military planning and piloting aircraft. The Angolan and Ethiopian regimes rely on thousands of Cuban troops to assist in defending against internal or external threats. The East Germans have been the most active in helping regimes train intelligence/security officers and strengthening their security organizations--frequently reorganizing them along the lines of the Soviet and East German services, and East German advisers frequently hold key positions within the services, particularly in communications security. East German security and intelligence advisers are reported to be in Nicaragua.

Exert Economic Controls

Internal Activities: Each of the regimes has taken steps to control the country's economy, but the extent and pace of this activity has varied widely, reflecting a number of factors such as the need to consolidate political power, the preexisting economic structure of the country, and--in most cases--the need to rely on the West for economic and technical assistance. Although there were plans for additional nationalization and land redistribution, Grenada nationalized only a few companies. Angola, while nationalizing farms and businesses that had been abandoned by the Portuguese, set up joint ownerships with a number of foreign companies, particularly in the vital oil industry. Ethiopia and South Yemen conducted major nationalization programs--particularly of foreign businesses--and land redistribution; a number of state farms and cooperatives have also been formed. Nicaragua has nationalized a large share of its industry, banking, and investing as part of its efforts to gain greater control of the economy. It also redistributed more than a fifth of its agricultural land, most of it to state farms and cooperatives. Cuba, by comparison, fairly quickly gained control of the private sector but has had difficulties with central planning.

External Activities: While all of the Marxist regimes have moved to develop closer economic ties to the Soviet bloc--including trade, credits, technicians, and minor economic aid--all except Cuba still rely heavily on the West for economic trade and assistance. This reliance is due partly to the inability and unwillingness of Moscow and its allies to provide to other countries the high level of economic assistance it provides Cuba.

Mass Organizations and the Media

Internal Activities: All of the regimes made efforts to take over existing labor organizations or develop new ones under strict party control. Similarly, these regimes have either penetrated existing mass organizations or formed new ones aimed at such societal groups as women, youth, and students. Only Nicaragua has not completely eliminated or outlawed independent mass groups (neither had Grenada during its short tenure). All of the regimes established monopoly control of the media, and Nicaragua is close to this point now.

External Activities: Each of the regimes surveyed established closer ties with the Communist bloc nations in the areas of labor, mass organizations, and the media. East Germany has been particularly active in training journalists and providing equipment, but the USSR and (especially in Latin America) Cuba have also been active.

Education and Religion Control

Internal Activities: The Sandinistas, like the Marxist-Leninist regimes we examined, have increased the level of ideological content in the educational system and have conducted literacy campaigns along the lines of Cuba's as a means of indoctrinating adults and youths. In Nicaragua, however, efforts to control the educational curriculum and increase Marxist ideology have been impeded as the Catholic Church has fought to preserve the autonomy of church-run schools. In fact, only Cuba and Ethiopia have been successful in closing all private schools.

The extent of efforts to control religious institutions has depended to some degree on whether they constitute a viable political opposition. In Angola and South Yemen--and to some extent in Ethiopia--religious institutions did not constitute a major obstacle to the regime. While some controls were taken, such as banning religious broadcasts, confiscating property, or restricting foreign ties, religion--except for some fundamentalist groups--was not attacked as has been the case in Cuba. The Nicaraguan regime, on the other hand, is faced with a politically active church that--although it supported the revolution--is now considered a major obstacle to consolidation; accordingly, the Sandinistas are actively trying to discredit and split the church hierarchy. Nicaragua's promotion of a pro-regime faction of the church is unique among the cases studied, as its assertion that Marxism and Christianity are compatible.

External Activities: All of the Marxist regimes have sent large numbers of students to the Communist Bloc for academic training. While many go to the USSR and Eastern Europe, Cuba also hosts large numbers of African and Latin students. There are, for example, four high schools in Cuba specifically set up for some 2,400 Ethiopian students. In addition, Cuban teachers have been sent to Nicaragua, and Communist Bloc educational materials and equipment are used there. There is little evidence of Communist Bloc involvement in domestic religious problems, although Cuban advisers in Grenada closely monitored the situation and suggested that the regime seek advice from Nicaragua in handling church resistance problems.

Social Control

All of the regimes surveyed restricted civil liberties and used intimidation and harassment tactics to discourage opposition. A favorite tool has been the development of revolutionary defense committees--groups organized in neighborhoods, workplaces, and so forth--aimed at both spreading the revolutionary ideals and monitoring citizens for signs of anti-revolutionary behavior. In some cases--particularly in Ethiopia--such groups have gotten out of hand and caused widespread terror. Police and security forces have also played a major role suppressing opposition.

International Alignment

In the international arena, all of the Marxist regimes have aligned themselves more closely with Soviet foreign policy positions, and have supported them--and generally opposed the United States--in international arena; all have actively participated in international Communist-front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. All of the revolutionary regimes along with Iran have supported foreign revolutionary causes--particularly in neighboring countries--to varying degrees. Cuba has been the most active in this area, particularly in the early days of its own revolution. Angola has supported liberation groups in southern Africa; South Yemen has in the past supported insurgents in North Yemen and elsewhere; Ethiopia has supported liberation groups, particularly in Africa, Grenada was helping to support leftists in the Caribbean; and Nicaragua has been active in supporting revolutionary groups in neigboring countries. The USSR and many of the other Bloc countries have signed friendship treaties with Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. While the Soviets have refrained from signing such treaties in the three Latin country cases, East Germany signed one with Cuba in 1980. Cuba is the only one of the three Latin American countries where the Soviets have access to naval, air, and/or military facilities in country.

IMPLICATIONS

The observed pattern of developments for those Marxist-Leninist states that have been in existence longer than Nicaragua suggest a number of steps that the Sandinista government will attempt to undertake in the future. The pace and vigor of each of the following activities, however, will likely depend on a number of factors including domestic resistance, concern over international reaction (principally from the United States), and the degree of external support from the USSR and Cuba. Expected new initiatives include:

-- Continued consolidation of political control, in large measure by making it increasingly difficult for opposition groups and parties to operate and coopting those that participate in the loyal opposition.

-- Over the longer haul, establishing a one-party regime with Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology.

-- Tighter controls over independent trade unions and professional organizations.

-- Efforts to gain control over communications media, by such means as adopting more restrictive media laws.

-- Initiatives to increase control over business while stopping far short of complete abolition of the private sector.

-- Additional attempts to control the ideological content of education, such as imposing curriculum changes in Catholic schools and discrediting outspoken clergy.

-- Efforts to increase ties with the USSR, Cuba, and other Communist countries--particularly in the military area--as a way of increasing the regime's chances of survival. For instance, after the regime consolidates control, we would expect the Sandinistas to seek friendship treaties with Bloc states.

-- Continued military and diplomatic support to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements--particularly in the region--by providing training, sanctuary, logistics, and political support.

Table 7
Consolidation of Power by Marxist-Leninist Regimes:
An Indicators Approach
(Plus signs indicate steps taken by regimes, minus signs steps not completed)

	Nicaragua	Cuba	S. Yemen	Ethiopia	Angola	Grenada	Iran
Regime's time in power	5½ years	26 years	17 years	10 years	9 years	4½ years	6 years
Move to One-Party Government							
Internal Activities							
• Take power as a broad-based opposition to previous government.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Neutralize or eliminate moderate or dissident factions.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Enhance central party control of government.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Suppress, harass, or co-opt other political parties.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Establish one-party system.	−	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Adopt Marxism-Leninism as official ideology.	−	+	+	+	+	−	−
External Activities							
• Communist Bloc party ties, training of cadres	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Communist Bloc assistance in reorganizing and advising party/government.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Soviet designation as vanguard, revolutionary democratic party.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Soviet acceptance as Communist party.	−	+	−	−	−	−	−
Take Control of Military							
Internal Activities							
• Establish new or reorganize and expand old military services.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Conduct political training, assign political commissars.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Put under party control.	+	+	+	−	+	+	+
External Activities							
• Receive major military equipment, advisers, training from Communist Bloc.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Have large number of foreign Communist combat troops in country.	−	+	−	+	+	−	−
Take Control of Security Services							
Internal Activities							
• Establish new or reorganize and expand old security and intelligence services.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Put under tight control.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Table 7 (Continued)
Consolidation of Power by Marxist-Leninist Regimes: An Indicators Approach •
(Plus signs indicate steps taken by regimes, minus signs steps not completed)

	Nicaragua	Cuba	S. Yemen	Ethiopia	Angola	Grenada	Iran •
External Activities							
• Receive equipment, training, and assistance in organizing/managing intelligence/security services from East Germany or other Communist country.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Develop closer security/intelligence relations (liaison) with Bloc services	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Exert Economic Controls							
Internal Activities							
• Nationalize some key companies (such as utilities), initiate land reform/redistribution.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Major nationalization and/or joint ownership of industries	+	+	+	+	+	−	+
• Major land redistribution, formation of co-ops and state-controlled farms	+	+	+	+	+	−	−
• Centralize control and planning of all significant means of production.	−	+	−	+	−	−	−
External Activities							
• Increase economic ties with Communist Bloc (trade, credits, technicians).	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Become reliant on USSR for economic survival.	−	+	−	−	−	−	−
Form or Take Over Labor/Mass Organizations							
Internal Activities							
• Penetrate existing or form new labor and other mass organizations (youth, women, etc.).	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Tighten party control.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Prohibit independent mass organizations.	−	+	+	+	+	−	+
External Activities							
• Increase ties with mass organizations in Bloc countries (exchanges, training).	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Develop Media Monopoly							
Internal Activities							
• Censor, harass, and/or close newspapers and other independent media.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Put all media under central party/government control.	−	+	+	+	+	+	+
External Activities							
• Receive Communist Bloc journalist training, equipment, news services.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Increase Control of Education							

Table 7 (Continued)
Consolidation of Power by Marxist-Leninist Regimes:
An Indicators Approach [a]
(Plus signs indicate steps taken by regimes, minus signs steps not completed)

	Nicaragua	Cuba	S. Yemen	Ethiopia	Angola	Grenada	Iran [a]
Internal Activities							
• Increase ideological content and political control of education through curriculum, literacy campaigns, and teachers.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Close private schools and put all schools systems under direct party/government control.	−	+	−	+	−	−	−
External Activities							
• Receive Communist Bloc academic/political training, teachers, materials, equipment.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
Exert Social Control							
• Use intimidation, harassment to discourage opposition (through defense committees, police, etc.).	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Restrict civil liberties (right to strike, freedom of speech, assembly).	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Use large-scale terror tactics to thwart internal opposition (torture, executions).	−	−[b]	+	+	−	−	+
Curb Religious Influence							
• Reduce influence of religion through control or co-optation.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Harass clergy and laity, including removing religious leaders.	+	+	−	+	−	−	−
• Gain effective control (major church closings, expulsions, discrimination against churchgoers) of religious institutions.	−	+	−	−	−	−	−
Alignment With Soviet Bloc							
• Conduct high-level exchanges/meetings with Communist Bloc leaders.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Participate in international Communist-front organizations	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Support the Soviet Union against the United States in international forums.	+	+	+	+	+	+	−
• Provide support to other leftist or revolutionary groups.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
• Sign friendship treaty with USSR or other Bloc country.	−	+	+	+	-	−	−
• Allow Soviet access to naval/air/military facilities.	−	+	+	+	+	−	−

[a] Iran was examined as a means of differentiating general totalitarian traits from those unique to Marxist-Leninist movements.
[b] Immediately after Castro came to power, however, there were as many as 2,000 executions of people judged to have committed atrocities under the Batista regime.

Office of the Republican Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

WILLIAM F. GAVIN

Special Assistant to
Rep. Robert H. Michel
The Republican Leader

Pat:
With the speedy assistance of Linas Kujalis of your staff I was able to put together the attached list of Baltic and Ukrainian prisoners of conscience. Bob has a similar list he will present to Gorbechev himself if he gets the chance.

The point here is that The Council on Soviet Jewry was magnificant in making sure that the Congressional delegation did not leave without extensive data on Jews in the Soviet Union, but Catholics didn't say a thing! If it were not for Linas' contacts and knowledge, the delegation would have gone over there without these names of Christian victims.

A suggestion: in all Presidential speeches or remarks about religious persecution in the Soviet Union, the Catholics in Lithuania and Ukraine, Protestants (Jehovah Witnesses, etc) and Islamics should be mentioned along with Soviet Jewery. This in no way diminishes concern for Soviet jews but shows sensitivity for forgotten Christain victims as well. This should be a policy for the speechwriters.

H-230 U.S. Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-0600

B.

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

April 4, 1985

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the House
H-204, The Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I want to take this opportunity to bring to your attention the following names of political prisoners in the Soviet Union in the hope that our Human Rights Task Force can present this list to the relevant Soviet officials:

Mrs. Jadvyga Bieliauskiene
Mr. Balys Gajauskas
Mr. Vladas Lapienis
Mr. Viktoras Petkus
Prof. Vytautas Skuddis
Father Alfonsas Svarinskas
Mart Niklus
Enn Tarto
Ints Calitis
Lidija Lasmane-Doronina
Yuriy Shukhevych
Mykola Rudenko
Oksana Meshko
Danylo Shumuk
Mykola Horbal
Igor Ogurtsov
Julius Sasnauskas
Rev. Sigitas Tamkevicius
Rev. Jonas Matulionis

If additional information about any names on this list is desired, please contact Bill Pitts of my office (x50600); he will be accompanying me on the trip.

Sincerely,

Robert H. Michel
Republican Leader

Dan Rostenkowski
Chairman, Ways and Means Committee

cc: Honorable George Miller, Chairman, Task Force on Human Rights
Honorable Silvio Conte, Co-Chairman, Task Force on Human Rights



Notes made by Hopkins prior to his last conference with Stalin in May, 1945: Public opinion in America is in your hands No economic interest No committments relative to Poland No Cordon Sanitaire No opposition to any govt the Poles want so long as it be one not *opposed to Soviet Union*

But 1. Want to work out with the three of us 2. A free election 3. A genuinely independent country 4. Not by unilateral action

Harriman have told me that Hopkins' response was wonderful to behold. Although he appeared too ill even to get out of bed and walk across "N" Street, the mere intimation of a flight to Moscow converted him into the traditional old fire horse at the sound of the alarm. But he expressed the despondent conviction that Truman would never agree to send him on this mission.

Harriman then went to the White House and presented the suggestion to the President, who said he was much interested in the idea but would need some time to think it over. Several anxious days followed with Hopkins fearing that it would all come to nothing, but then Truman sent for him and asked him if he felt capable of making the long journey; Hopkins' reply was an immediate, enthusiastic affirmative.

He left Washington on May 23, less than two weeks after his retirement from government service. On this trip, the war in Europe being over, he was accompanied by his wife, and also by Harriman and Bohlen. They flew first to Paris and then straight across Germany. When Hopkins looked down at the ruins of Berlin, he said, "It's another Carthage." They arrived in Moscow on the evening of May 25. The first meeting in the Kremlin was at 8:00 P.M. on May 26. Present were: Stalin, Molotov and Pavlov and Hopkins, Harriman and Bohlen. The full record of this meeting follows:

> After an exchange of amenities during which Marshal Stalin expressed his great pleasure on seeing Mr. Hopkins again, there was a brief conversation concerning Mr. Hopkins' flight in over Germany.
>
> *Mr. Hopkins* asked Mr. Molotov if he had recovered from the battle of San Francisco.
>
> *Mr. Molotov* replied that he did not recall any battles but merely arguments at San Francisco.
>
> *Mr. Hopkins* then said before he told Marshal Stalin the reason why President Truman had asked him to come to Moscow, he thought the Marshal would be interested in a brief description of President Roosevelt's state of mind just prior to his death. He said that on the way back from Yalta it had been clear to him that President Roosevelt was very tired and that his energy was on the decline. On the other hand, on the morning of his death he had done a good deal of work and had written a number of important letters relating to domestic and foreign policies. None of his doctors had expected he would have a stroke. In fact his principal doctor, Admiral McIntire, had not even been at Warm Springs. The President never regained consciousness after his stroke and had died without any suffering whatsoever. Many of those who had been closest to him had felt that his quick, easy death was really preferable to his lingering on as a hopeless invalid. Mr. Hopkins said that the President had died fully confident of the victory which was in sight.
>
> *Marshal Stalin* observed that Lenin had also died of a cerebral

hemorrhage following a previous stroke which had left his hand paralyzed.

Mr. Hopkins said that on the trip home from Yalta the President had frequently reviewed with him the results of the Crimea Conference and that he had come away from that Conference with renewed confidence that the United States and the Soviet Union could work together in peace as they had in war. President Roosevelt on the trip home had frequently spoken of the respect and admiration he had for Marshal Stalin and he was looking forward to their next meeting which the President hoped would be in Berlin.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he recalled the toast at the Crimea Conference to their next meeting in Berlin.

Mr. Hopkins said that he recalled his first meeting with the Marshal in July, 1941, during the troubled and anxious days of the German offensive. He said he remembered vividly the frankness with which Marshal Stalin had told him of the Soviet position and of the unalterable determination of the Soviet Union to wage war against Germany until final victory was assured. He had returned to the United States and conveyed to President Roosevelt his own conviction that the Soviet Union would hold fast and President Roosevelt had thereupon initiated the program of assistance to the Soviet Union. At that time most people believed that a Germany victory was inevitable but President Roosevelt, in spite of all such opinions had decided otherwise and through his leadership he had put through a program of aid to Russia.

Marshal Stalin observed that at that time there had been many doubts of the ability of the Soviet Union to keep going.

Mr. Hopkins said that although in 1941 the United States was not in the war, President Roosevelt had already decided that Hitler was just as much an enemy of the United States as he was of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hopkins then said that a few days ago President Truman had sent for him and had asked him to come to Moscow to have a talk with Marshal Stalin. There were a number of things that he and Mr. Harriman hoped to discuss with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov while he was in Moscow, but before going into those specific questions he wished to tell the Marshal of the real reason why the President had asked him to come, and that was the question of the fundamental relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two months ago there had been overwhelming sympathy among the American people for the Soviet Union and complete support for President Roosevelt's policies which the Marshal knew so well. This sympathy and support came primarily because of the brilliant achievements of the Soviet Union in the war and partly from President Roosevelt's leadership and the magnificent way in which our two countries had worked together to bring about the defeat of Germany. The American people at that time hoped and confidently believed that the two countries could work together in peace as well as they had in war. Mr

Hopkins said there had always been a small minority, the Hearsts and the McCormicks, who had been against the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. These men had also been bitter political enemies of President Roosevelt but had never had any backing from the American people as was shown by the fact that against their bitter opposition President Roosevelt had been four times elected President. He said he did not intend to discuss this small minority but to discuss the general state of American opinion and particularly the present attitude of the millions of Americans who had supported President Roosevelt's policy in regard to the Soviet Union and who believed that despite different political and economic ideology of the two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union could work together after the war in order to bring about a secure peace for humanity. He said he wished to assure the Marshal with all the earnestness at his command that this body of American public opinion who had been the constant support of the Roosevelt policies were seriously disturbed about their relations with Russia. In fact, in the last six weeks deterioration of public opinion had been so serious as to affect adversely the relations between our two countries. He said he wished to emphasize that this change had occurred in the very people who had supported to the hilt Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. He said that for the moment he was not going into the reasons why this had occurred, or the merits of the case, but merely wished to emphasize that it was a fact. The friends of Roosevelt's policy and of the Soviet Union were alarmed and worried at the present trend of events and did not quite understand why, but it was obvious to them that if present trends continued unchecked the entire structure of world cooperation and relations with the Soviet Union which President Roosevelt and the Marshal had labored so hard to build would be destroyed. Prior to his departure President Truman had expressed to him his great anxiety at the present situation and also his desire to continue President Roosevelt's policy of working with the Soviet Union and his intention to carry out in fact as well as in spirit all the arrangements, both formal and informal, which President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin had worked out together. Mr. Hopkins added that as the Marshal knew he had not been well and he would not be in Moscow unless he had felt the situation was serious. He also said he would not have come had he not believed that the present trend could be halted and a common basis found to go forward in the future.

Mr. Hopkins said that it was not simple or easy to put a finger on the precise reasons for this deterioration but he must emphasize that without the support of public opinion and particularly of the supporters of President Roosevelt it would be very difficult for President Truman to carry forward President Roosevelt's policy. He said that, as the Marshal was aware, the cardinal basis of President Roosevelt's policy which the American people had fully supported had been the concept that the interests of the United States were world wide and not confined to North and South America and the Pacific Ocean and

it was this concept that had led to the many conferences concerning the peace of the world which President Roosevelt had had with Marshal Stalin. President Roosevelt had believed that the Soviet Union had likewise worldwide interests and that the two countries could work out together any political or economic considerations at issue between them. After the Yalta Conference it looked as though we were well on the way to reaching a basic understanding on all questions of foreign affairs of interest to our respective countries, in regard to the treatment of Germany, Japan and the question of setting up a world security organization, to say nothing of the long term interests between the United States and the U.S.S.R. He said in a country like ours public opinion is affected by specific incidents and in this case the deterioration in public opinion in regard to our relations with the Soviet Union had been centered in our inability to carry into effect the Yalta Agreement on Poland. There were also a train of events, each unimportant in themselves, which had grown up around the Polish question, which contributed to the deterioration in public opinion. President Truman feels, and so does the American public, although they are not familiar with all the details, a sense of bewilderment at our inability to solve the Polish question.

Marshal Stalin replied that the reason for the failure on the Polish question was that the Soviet Union desired to have a friendly Poland, but that Great Britain wanted to revive the system of *cordon sanitaire* on the Soviet borders.

Mr. Hopkins replied that neither the Government nor the people of the United States had any such intention.

Marshal Stalin replied he was speaking only of England and said that the British conservatives did not desire to see a Poland friendly to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hopkins stated that the United States would desire a Poland friendly to the Soviet Union and in fact desired to see friendly countries all along the Soviet borders.

Marshal Stalin replied if that be so we can easily come to terms in regard to Poland.

Mr. Hopkins said that during his visit here there were a number of specific questions that he and Mr. Harriman hoped to discuss with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov but that the general statement he had just made concerning public opinion in the United States was the principal cause of anxiety at the present time. He said he had wished to state frankly and as forcibly as he knew how to Marshal Stalin the importance that he, personally, attached to the present trend of events and that he felt that the situation would get rapidly worse unless we could clear up the Polish matter. He had therefore been glad to hear the Marshal say that he thought the question could be settled.

Marshal Stalin replied that in his opinion it was best to settle it but not if the British conservatives attempted to revive the *cordon sanitaire*.

Mr. Hopkins said that he had in mind the other following questions

to discuss with Marshal Stalin while he was in Moscow: (1) The desire of President Truman to meet Marshal Stalin in order to discuss all of the problems arising out of the end of war in Europe and the time and place of such a meeting.

Marshal Stalin said that he had already replied to President Truman concerning the place of meeting and he had suggested the region of Berlin.

Mr. Hopkins said that that message must have come in after he had left and Marshal Stalin instructed Mr. Molotov to give a copy to Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman.

Mr. Hopkins said the second question he desired to discuss was the setting up of the Control Council for Germany. General Eisenhower had already been appointed the American Representative on the Control Council and he hoped that at an early date the Soviet Representative would be named so that the Council could meet and get to work.

Marshal Stalin apparently had not heard of the appointment of General Eisenhower and stated that Marshal Zhukov would be appointed the Soviet Representative on the Control Council for Germany. He implied that this appointment would be announced shortly.

Mr. Hopkins said the third question he wished to discuss was that of the Pacific War and the future relations of the United States and Soviet Union to China. He said that although he realized the answer would depend on a good many considerations it would be most useful to the American military authorities if he could take back some idea of the approximate date of the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the Pacific.

Marshal Stalin said he would discuss that question with his advisors and let Mr. Hopkins know.

Mr. Hopkins concluded that there was of course the Polish question which he hoped to discuss here. He added that if Marshal Stalin for his part had any political questions concerning the United States which were worrying him he would of course be glad to discuss them.

Marshal Stalin replied that they had in fact several disturbing questions on their minds in regard to the United States. He added that he was very glad that the President had sent Mr. Hopkins to Moscow and thus give him this opportunity to explore all these questions.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he would certainly not have gotten out of bed to come to Moscow had he not believed that the future well-being of hundreds of millions of people depended on the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union, nor would he have come had he not believed that any difficulties could be reconciled.

Marshal Stalin said he hoped that Mr. Hopkins's views would prove to be right.

Mr. Hopkins said he would stay here as long as it was necessary to accomplish what could be accomplished, although naturally he did not wish to be away too long.

Marshal Stalin said he was entirely at Mr. Hopkins's service and

now that war in Europe was over he had more time at his disposal than he had, for example, a year ago.

Mr. Hopkins said he hoped the Russians would find the body of Hitler.

Marshal Stalin replied that in his opinion Hitler was not dead but hiding somewhere. He said the Soviet doctors thought they had identified the body of Goebbels and Hitler's chauffeur, but that he, personally, even doubted if Goebbels was dead and said the whole matter was strange and the various talks of funerals and burials struck him as being very dubious. He said he thought that Borman, Goebbels, Hitler and probably Krebs had escaped and were in hiding.

Mr. Hopkins said that he knew the Germans had several very large submarines but that no trace of these had been found. He said he hoped we would track Hitler down wherever he might be.

Marshal Stalin said he also knew of those submarines which had been running back and forth between Germany and Japan, taking gold and negotiable assets from Germany to Japan. He added that this had been done with the connivance of Switzerland. He said he had ordered his intelligence service to look into the matter of these submarines but so far they had failed to discover any trace and therefore he thought it was possible that Hitler and company had gone in them to Japan.

Ambassador Harriman then said he wished to observe that President Truman in selecting Mr. Hopkins had chosen a man who, as the Marshal knew, had not only been very close to President Roosevelt but personally was one of the leading proponents of the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. President Truman had sent him to have the kind of frank talk with Marshal Stalin that we all knew Marshal Stalin liked to have. Ambassador Harriman continued that we had, as Marshal Stalin knew, very intimate relations with Great Britain which had been developed since the American Revolution and that the Soviet Union of course had their special relations with Great Britain and that although President Roosevelt had always felt that the three powers had a special responsibility, nevertheless it was obviously desirable that the United States and the Soviet Union should talk alone on matters of special interest to them and that that was also one of the reasons for Mr. Hopkins's visit.

Marshal Stalin said he thought the Ambassador's remarks were correct and very much to the point.

Mr. Hopkins then said that at San Francisco Mr. Molotov had scored a neat trick on us by quoting President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull on the Argentine question.

Marshal Stalin and *Mr. Molotov* laughed and *Mr. Hopkins* observed that it was possible that some time in the future we might be quoting Marshal Stalin's own words to him.

Marshal Stalin then said that there was one question he wished to raise and that was the question of a peace conference to settle the

European War. He said the question was ripe and, so to speak, knocking at the door.

Mr. Hopkins replied that he thought the forthcoming meeting between the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister would be a preliminary step toward such a conference. He said he knew in general President Truman's views on the subject and would be glad while he was in Moscow to convey them to Marshal Stalin along general lines.

Marshal Stalin replied that he felt the uncertainty as to the peace conference was having a bad effect and that it would be wise to select a time and place so that proper preparations could be made. The Versailles Conference had been badly prepared and as a result many mistakes had been made. He repeated that he had already sent a message to President Truman suggesting Berlin as a place for their preliminary meeting.

(In a message received subsequently from Mr. Molotov it was explained that the reference to Berlin as a suggested place of meeting had not been in a message to President Truman but in a reply from Mr. Molotov to Mr. Joseph Davies concerning a meeting between Marshal Stalin and the President alone.)

(*Note.* This completes the record of the first meeting.)

The second meeting, involving the same six participants as the first, was held in the Kremlin at 8:00 P.M. on May 27. Following is the record of this meeting, in full:

Mr. Hopkins said that last night the Marshal had indicated that there were a number of questions concerning the United States which were worrying him. He asked Marshal Stalin if he would perhaps care to begin with these questions.

Marshal Stalin said he would not attempt to use Soviet public opinion as a screen but would speak of the feeling that had been created in Soviet governmental circles as a result of recent moves on the part of the United States Government. He said these circles felt a certain alarm in regard to the attitude of the United States Government. It was their impression that the American attitude towards the Soviet Union had perceptibly cooled once it became obvious that Germany was defeated, and that it was as though the Americans were saying that the Russians were no longer needed. He said he would give the following examples:

(1) The case of Argentina and the invitation to the San Francisco Conference. At Yalta it had been agreed that only those states which had declared war on Germany before the first of March would be invited but at San Francisco this decision had been overturned. He said it was not understood in the Soviet Union why Argentina could not have been asked to wait three months or so before joining the world organization. He added that the action of the Conference and the attitude of the United States had raised the question of the value of agreements between the three major powers if their decisions could

be overturned by the votes of such countries as Honduras and Porto Rico.

(2) The question of the Reparations Commission. At Yalta it had been agreed that the three powers would sit on this Commission in Moscow and subsequently the United States Government had insisted that France should be represented on the same basis as the Soviet Union. This he felt was an insult to the Soviet Union in view of the fact that France had concluded a separate peace with Germany and had opened the frontier to the Germans. It was true that this had been done by Pétain's Government but nevertheless it was an action of France. To attempt to place France on the same footing as the Soviet Union looked like an attempt to humiliate the Russians.

(3) The attitude of the United States Government towards the Polish question. He said that at Yalta it had been agreed that the existing government was to be reconstructed and that anyone with common sense could see that this meant that the present government was to form the basis of the new. He said no other understanding of the Yalta Agreement was possible. Despite the fact that they were simple people the Russians should not be regarded as fools, which was a mistake the West frequently made, nor were they blind and could quite well see what was going on before their eyes. It is true that the Russians are patient in the interests of a common cause but that their patience has its limits.

(4) The manner in which Lend Lease had been curtailed. He said that if the United States was unable to supply the Soviet Union further under Lend Lease that was one thing but that the manner in which it had been done had been unfortunate and even brutal. For example, certain ships had been unloaded and while it was true that this order had been cancelled the whole manner in which it had been done had caused concern to the Soviet Government. If the refusal to continue Lend Lease was designed as pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up then it was a fundamental mistake. He said he must tell Mr. Hopkins frankly that if the Russians were approached frankly on a friendly basis much could be done but that reprisals in any form would bring about the exact opposite effect.

(5) The disposition of the German Navy and merchant fleet which surrendered to the Allies. Stalin said that as we knew certain units of the German Army who had been fighting against the Russians had been anxious to surrender to the western allies but not to the Russians, but under the surrender terms German troops were supposed to surrender to the army against which they had fought. He said, for example General Eisenhower as an honest man had correctly turned over to the Soviet Command in Czechoslovakia some 135,000 German troops who had tried to surrender to the American Army. This was an example of fair and honest behavior. However, as regards to the German fleet which had caused so much damage to Leningrad and other Soviet ports not one had been turned over to the Russians despite the fact the fleet had surrendered. He added that he had sent a message to the President and Prime Minister suggesting that at least one-third of the German Navy and merchant marine thus surrendered be turned over to the Soviet Union. The rest could be disposed of by Great Britain and the United States as they saw fit. He added that if the Soviet Union had been entitled to a part of the Italian fleet they certainly had more right to their fair share of the German fleet, since they had suffered five million casualties in this war. He said that the Soviet Government had certain information leading it to believe that both the United States and England intended to reject the Soviet request and he must say that if this turned out to be true it would be very unpleasant. The Marshal concluded by saying that he had completed the range of his account.

Mr. Hopkins said he first of all wished to express his appreciation of the frankness with which Marshal Stalin had exposed his worries. He said that insofar as he and Ambassador Harriman were able they would answer equally frankly and if on certain points they did not have full information they would endeavor to obtain it. He said he would take the case of the German fleet first. From conversations he had had with Admiral King he was able to state that the United States had no desire to retain any portion of the German fleet and merely wished to examine the vessels for possible new inventions or technical improvements. After that we were prepared to sink the share turned over to us. He also said that he had always understood that the fleet was to be divided between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and that insofar as the United States was concerned there was no objection to whatever disposition the Soviet Government wished to make with its share. He added that he thought that this matter could be definitely settled at the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of Government.

Mr. Hopkins then said on the subject of Lend Lease he thought it had been clear to the Soviet Union that the end of the war with Germany would necessitate a reconsideration of the old program of Lend Lease to the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin said that was entirely understandable.

Mr. Hopkins continued that the history of Lend Lease showed that although in certain cases we had not always been able to meet every Soviet request we had nonetheless freely accepted commitments which we had done our best to carry out in spirit as well as in fact.

Marshal Stalin said that was undoubtedly true.

Mr. Hopkins stated that even prior to the end of the war in Europe we had made an agreement with the Soviet Union known as Annex 3 to Protocol I, which involved delivery of supplies which might be of use in the Far East. He said that this grew out of recent conferences in which Far Eastern matters had been discussed. He emphasized that this commitment was accepted in full by the United States and we were in the process of carrying it out. In regard to the unloading of the ships he said that that was a technical misunderstanding and did not in any sense represent a decision of policy on the part of

the United States. That it had been the action of one government agency involved in Lend Lease and that it had been countermanded promptly within twenty-four hours. He said that no one who was responsible for Lend Lease policy or American Government policy had had anything to do with that mistaken order. The only question which had to be reconsidered was the program of deliveries to the Soviet Union which had been based on the needs of the war against Germany and that it had been made clear that on the basis of this reconsideration we would be glad to reconsider any Soviet requests and that he thought some were now being considered. He said he wished to emphasize that he had seen no tendency on the part of those responsible for American policy to handle the question of future Lend Lease to the Soviet Union in an arbitrary fashion. It was in fact a question of law, since the basic Lend Lease Act made it clear that materials could only be delivered which would be useful in the process of the war. The United States Government, however, had interpreted this in its broadest sense and had included in addition to munitions of war foodstuffs and other non-military items.

Marshal Stalin said this was true.

Mr. Hopkins concluded by saying that there had naturally been considerable confusion in the United States Government as to the status of Lend Lease towards Russia at the end of the war and that there had been varying legal interpretations but that he wished to emphasize that the incident to which Marshal Stalin referred did not have any fundamental policy significance.

Marshal Stalin said he wished to make it clear that he fully understood the right of the United States to curtail Lend Lease shipments to the Soviet Union under present conditions since our commitments in this respect had been freely entered into. Even two months ago it would have been quite correct for the United States to have begun to curtail shipments but what he had in mind was the manner and form in which it was done. He felt that what was after all an agreement between the two Governments had been ended in a scornful and abrupt manner. He said that if proper warning had been given to the Soviet Government there would have been no feeling of the kind he had spoken of; that this warning was important to them since their economy was based on plans. He added that they had intended to make a suitable expression of gratitude to the United States for the Lend Lease assistance during the war but the way in which this program had been halted now made that impossible to do.

Mr. Hopkins replied that what disturbed him most about the Marshal's statement was the revelation that he believed that the United States would use Lend Lease as a means of showing our displeasure with the Soviet Union. He wished to assure the Marshal that however unfortunate an impression this question had caused in the mind of the Soviet Government he must believe that there was no attempt or desire on the part of the United States to use it as a pressure weapon. He said the United States is a strong power and does not go in for those methods. Furthermore, we have no conflict of immediate interests with the Soviet Union and would have no reason to adopt such practices.

Marshal Stalin said he believed Mr. Hopkins and was fully satisfied with his statement in regard to Lend Lease but said he hoped Mr. Hopkins would consider how it had looked from their side.

Ambassador Harriman then suggested that he and Mr. Molotov might go into the details of the whole Lend Lease matter together with Mr. Mikoyan the following day.

Mr. Hopkins concluded the discussions of Lend Lease by stating that he thought it would be a great tragedy if the greatest achievement in cooperation which the Soviet Union and the United States had on the whole worked out together on the basis of Lend Lease were to end on an unsatisfactory note. He said he wished to add that we had never believed that our Lend Lease help had been the chief factor in the Soviet defeat of Hitler on the eastern front. That this had been done by the heroism and blood of the Russian Army.

Mr. Hopkins then turned to the question of the Reparations Commission. He said it was true that we had suggested France as an additional member and that the Soviet Government had indicated that if France was to be a member there were other countries with equal or better claims to be represented. He said that he had not been directly involved in this question since the Yalta Conference because of his illness but so far as he knew our only motive was that France was to be represented on the Control Council for Germany and it therefore appeared reasonable and logical that she should participate in the reparations discussions. He said he realized that the Soviet Union had reluctantly agreed to the participation of France in the Control Council at the Crimea Conference. In any event the situation now was that the three powers were to go ahead and begin discussions in Moscow without France. He wished to state that he also had in mind the doubts which Stalin and Molotov had in regard to the subject of reparations and how seriously they regarded this question. He wished only to say that the United States for its part considered reparations a most important and serious question which must be thrashed out in the Reparations Commission. He said he did not of course know, but he felt that we would probably not insist in an unyielding manner on the question of the admission of France.

Marshal Stalin replied that Poland, which had suffered even more than France should certainly be represented if France was to be, and that Yugoslavia also deserved a place.

Mr. Hopkins then said in regard to the Argentine question, since he had not been at San Francisco he would ask Ambassador Harriman to explain that situation. He added that he had been at Yalta and he must say that the Marshal was right in regard to the decision there.

Ambassador Harriman said that he hoped that he could speak frankly on the subject of the Argentine and that Mr. Molotov would

forgive him if he spoke in that fashion. He said he had not been at Mexico City and therefore was not familiar with all of the implications of certain commitments taken there. In brief, however, the situation was that we came to San Francisco with a commitment which President Roosevelt assumed at Yalta to support the admission of the Ukraine and White Russia as original members of the world organization and also with certain commitments with the South American countries in regard to Argentina. At San Francisco, at Mr. Molotov's request, Mr. Stettinius had taken up with the Latin American countries the question of their willingness to support the Crimea Decision in regard to the Ukraine and White Russia. The Latin American countries had immediately tried to connect this question with that of the admission of the Argentine. Mr. Stettinius had made it plain that he would not make any such connection and if Mr. Molotov recalled the Latin American countries had voted solidly in support of the Yalta decision. There was, however, another step to the Ukraine and White Russia question, namely that of inviting them to the Conference, concerning which the United States had taken no commitment at Yalta. Mr. Harriman said that he, personally, felt that if Mr Molotov had not introduced the question of an invitation to the present Polish Government we might have been successful in persuading the Latin American countries to postpone the question of Argentina, but that once Mr. Molotov had connected the question of Argentina with that of an invitation to the present Polish Government, Mr. Stettinius felt that because of the willingness of the South American countries to support the Crimea Decision and the invitation to the Ukraine and White Russia, he was committed to vote for the admission of Argentina.

Mr. Molotov said that his request for more time had not been granted.

Marshal Stalin said in any event what had been done could not be put right and that the Argentine question belonged to the past.

Mr. Hopkins then said with the Marshal's permission he would like to review the position of the United States in regard to Poland. He said first of all he wished to assure the Marshal that he had no thought or indeed any right to attempt to settle the Polish problem during his visit here in Moscow, nor was he intending to hide behind American public opinion in presenting the position of the United States.

Marshal Stalin said he was afraid that his remark concerning Soviet public opinion had cut Mr. Hopkins to the quick and that he had not meant to imply that Mr. Hopkins was hiding behind the screen of American public opinion. In fact he knew Mr. Hopkins to be an honest and frank man.

Mr. Hopkins said that he wished to state this position as clearly and as forcibly as he knew how. He said the question of Poland *per se* was not so important as the fact that it had become a symbol of our ability to work out problems with the Soviet Union. He said that we had no special interests in Poland and no special desire to see any particular kind of government. That we would accept any government in Poland which was desired by the Polish people and was at the same time friendly to the Soviet Government. He said that the people and Government of the United States felt that this was a problem which should be worked out jointly between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and that we felt that the Polish people should be given the right to free elections to choose their own government and their own system and that Poland should genuinely be independent. The Government and people of the United States were disturbed because the preliminary steps towards the re-establishment of Poland appeared to have been taken unilaterally by the Soviet Union together with the present Warsaw Government and that in fact the United States was completely excluded. He said he hoped that Stalin would believe him when he said that this feeling was a fact. Mr. Hopkins said he urged that Marshal Stalin would judge American policy by the actions of the United States Government itself and not by the attitudes and public expressions of the Hearst newspapers and the Chicago Tribune. He hoped that the Marshal would put his mind to the task of thinking up what diplomatic methods could be used to settle this question, keeping in mind the feeling of the American people. He said he himself was not prepared to say how it could be done but that he felt it must be done. Poland had become a symbol in the sense that it bore a direct relation to the willingness of the United States to participate in international affairs on a world-wide basis and that our people must believe that they are joining their power with that of the Soviet Union and Great Britain in the promotion of international peace and the well being of humanity. Mr. Hopkins went on to say that he felt the overwhelming majority of the people of the United States felt that the relations between the United States and the USSR could be worked out in a spirit of cooperation despite the differences in ideology and that with all these factors in its favor he wished to appeal to the Marshal to help find a way to the solution of the Polish problem.

Marshal Stalin replied that he wished Mr. Hopkins would take into consideration the following factors: He said it may seem strange although it appeared to be recognized in United States circles and Churchill in his speeches also recognized it, that the Soviet Government should wish for a friendly Poland. In the course of twenty-five years the Germans had twice invaded Russia via Poland. Neither the British nor American people had experienced such German invasions which were a horrible thing to endure and the results of which were not easily forgotten. He said these German invasions were not warfare but were like the incursions of the Huns. He said that Germany had been able to do this because Poland had been regarded as a part of the *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet Union and that previous European policy had been that Polish Governments must be hostile to Russia. In these circumstances either Poland had been too weak to

oppose Germany or had let the Germans come through. Thus Poland had served as a corridor for the German attacks on Russia. He said Poland's weakness and hostility had been a great source of weakness to the Soviet Union and had permitted the Germans to do what they wished in the East and also in the West since the two were mixed together. It is therefore in Russia's vital interest that Poland should be both strong and friendly. He said there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Union to interfere in Poland's internal affairs, that Poland would live under the parliamentary system which is like Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Holland and that any talk of an intention to Sovietize Poland was stupid. He said even the Polish leaders, some of whom were communists, were against the Soviet system since the Polish people did not desire collective farms or other aspects of the Soviet system. In this the Polish leaders were right since the Soviet system was not exportable—it must develop from within on the basis of a set of conditions which were not present in Poland. He said all the Soviet Union wanted was that Poland should not be in a position to open the gates to Germany and in order to prevent this Poland must be strong and democratic. Stalin then said that before he came to his suggestion as to the practical solution of the question he would like to comment on Mr. Hopkins' remarks concerning future United States interests in the world. He said that whether the United States wished it or not it was a world power and would have to accept world-wide interests. Not only this war but the previous war had shown that without United States intervention Germany could not have been defeated and that all the events and developments of the last thirty years had confirmed this. In fact the United States had more reason to be a world power than any other state. For this reason he fully recognized the right of the United States as a world power to participate in the Polish question and that the Soviet interest in Poland does not in any way exclude those of England and the United States. Mr. Hopkins had spoken of Russian unilateral action in Poland and United States public opinion concerning it. It was true that Russia had taken such unilateral action but they had been compelled to. He said the Soviet Government had recognized the Warsaw Government and concluded a treaty with it at a time when their Allies did not recognize this government. These were admittedly unilateral acts which would have been much better left undone but the fact was they had not met with any understanding on the part of their Allies. The need for these actions had arisen out of the presence of Soviet troops in Poland; it would have been impossible to have waited until such time as the Allies had come to an agreement on Poland. The logic of the war against Germany demanded that the Soviet rear be assured and the Lublin Committee had been of great assistance to the Red Army at all times and it was for this reason that these actions had been taken by the Soviet Government. He said it was contrary to the Soviet policy to set up Soviet administration on foreign soil since this would look like occupation and be resented by the local inhabitants. It was for this reason that some Polish administration had to be established in Poland and this could be done only with those who had helped the Red Army. He said he wished to emphasize that these steps had not been taken with any desire to eliminate or exclude Russia's Allies. He must point out however that Soviet action in Poland had been more successful than British action in Greece and at no time had they been compelled to undertake the measures which they had done in Greece. Stalin then turned to his suggestion for the solution of the Polish problem.

Marshal Stalin said that he felt that we should examine the composition of the future Government of National Unity. He said there were eighteen or twenty ministries in the present Polish Government and that four or five of these portfolios could be given representatives of other Polish groups taken from the list submitted by Great Britain and the United States. (Molotov whispered to Stalin who then said he meant four and not five posts in the government). He said he thought the Warsaw Poles would not accept more than four ministers from other democratic groups. He added that if this appears a suitable basis we could then proceed to consider what persons should be selected for these posts. He said of course they would have to be friendly to the USSR and to the Allies. He added that Mikolajczyk had been suggested and he thought he was acceptable and that the question was now who else. He inquired of Mr. Hopkins whether possibly Professor Lange might be willing to join the government.

Mr. Hopkins said he doubted whether Professor Lange, who was an American citizen, could be induced to give up his American citizenship for this purpose but that of course was only a private opinion.

Marshal Stalin then said it might be wise to ask some of the Warsaw leaders to come to Moscow now and to hear what they had to say and to learn more of what had been decided. He added that if we are able to settle the composition of the new government he felt that no differences remained since we were all agreed on the free and unfettered elections and that no one intended to interfere with the Polish people.

Mr. Hopkins said he would like to have some time to consider the Marshal's suggestion.

Marshal Stalin then said that there were three other questions they had not touched on:

(1) Future policy in regard to the occupation of Germany;
(2) Japan; and
(3) Meeting of the three heads of Government.

In reply to Mr. Hopkins' question *Marshal Stalin* said that he was prepared to meet at any time but had not yet heard from the President and Prime Minister whether the Berlin area was acceptable or not.

In conclusion *Mr. Hopkins* said he felt it would be most desirable if Marshal Stalin could announce publicly as soon as possible the appointment of Marshal Zhukov as Soviet Representative on the Con-

trol Council for Germany so that that body could start its work as soon as possible.

Marshal Stalin said he was prepared to announce Marshal Zhukov's appointment either tomorrow or the next day or whenever we wanted.

It was agreed that the next meeting would take place at 6 P.M. tomorrow, May 28th.

(*Note.* This completes the record of the second meeting.)

After each of these meetings, Hopkins reported on them in detail by cable to Truman and the State Department, which kept the British Foreign Office fully informed as to the progress of the conversations. It will be noted that Hopkins was now most scrupulous in keeping to the formal "channels." He had never reported to Roosevelt in the same way—not, at any rate, since his first trip to England in January, 1941. So complete was his knowledge of Roosevelt's state of mind before he departed on each trip that he usually needed only to cable something like "making good progress along lines we discussed" or "having some difficulties on SLEDGEHAMMER but will explain this when I see you." He knew that Roosevelt did not want long reports from him in which the language was necessarily somewhat guarded, preferring to wait until Hopkins could give him a full account in characteristic terms in the privacy of the Oval Study. However, this time, the fate of the San Francisco Conference and perhaps of the whole future of world peace was at stake and the issue could not wait for Hopkins' return to Washington.

Hopkins' cabled report on the third meeting was as follows:

1. By August 8 the Soviet Army will be properly deployed on the Manchurian positions.

2. The Marshal repeated his statement made at Yalta that the Russian people must have a good reason for going to war and that depended on China's willingness to agree to the proposals made at Yalta.

3. For the first time he stated that he was willing to take these proposals up directly with Soong when he comes to Moscow. He wants to see Soong not later than July 1 and expects us to take the matter up at the same time with Chiang Kai-shek. This procedure seems from our point of view most desirable in light of Stalin's statements about the Far East which follow.

4. Stalin left no doubt in our mind that he intends to attack during August. It is therefore important that Soong come here not later than July 1. Stalin is ready to see him any time now.

5. He made categorical statement that he would do everything he could to promote unification of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He further stated that this leadership should continue after the war because no one else was strong enough. He specifically stated that no Communist leader was strong enough to unify China. In spite of the reservations he expressed about him, he proposes to back the Generalissimo.

6. Stalin repeated all of his statements made at Yalta that he wanted a unified and stable China and wanted China to control all of Manchuria as part of a United China. He stated categorically that he had no territorial claims against China and mentioned specifically Manchuria and Sinkiang and that in all areas his troops entered to fight the Japanese he would respect Chinese sovereignty.

7. The Marshal stated that he would welcome representatives of the Generalissimo to be with his troops entering Manchuria in order to facilitate the organization in Manchuria of Chinese administration.

8. He agreed with America's "Open Door" policy and went out of his way to indicate that the United States was the only power with the resources to aid China economically after the war. He observed that for many years to come Russia would have all it could do to provide for the internal economy of the Soviet Union.

9. He agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under the United States, China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

10. We were very encouraged by the conference on the Far East.

This was followed by another cable on the same meeting:

1. Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it.

2. Peace feelers are being put out by certain elements in Japan and we should therefore consider together our joint attitude and act in concert about the surrender of Japan. Stalin expressed the fear that the Japanese will try to split the allies. The following are his statements about surrender:

A. The Soviet Union prefers to go through with unconditional surrender and destroy once and for all the military might and forces of Japan. Stalin thinks this is particularly to our interest because the Japanese have a deep seated antipathy to the United States and if the war lords, the industrial leaders and the politicians are permitted to withdraw to Japan with their armies undefeated, their navy not totally destroyed and their industrial machine partially intact, they will start at once to plan a war of revenge. Stalin made it quite clear that the Soviet Union wants to go through with unconditional surrender and all that is implied in it.

B. However, he feels that if we stick to unconditional surrender the Japs will not give up and we will have to destroy them as we did Germany.

C. The Japanese may offer to surrender and seek softer terms. While consideration of this has certain dangers as compared with (A) it nevertheless cannot be ruled out. Should the Allies depart from the announced policy of unconditional surrender and be prepared to accept a modified surrender, Stalin visualizes imposing our will through our occupying forces and thereby gaining substantially the same results as under (A). In other words, it seemed to us that he

proposes under this heading to agree to milder peace terms but once we get into Japan to give them the works.

3. The Marshal expects that Russia will share in the actual occupation of Japan and wants an agreement with the British and us as to occupation zones.

4. He also wants an understanding between the Allies as to areas of operation in China and Manchuria.

At this same meeting in which Far Eastern matters were discussed, there was also some talk about the endless problem of postwar treatment of Germany, which was far from settlement even now, three weeks after V-E Day. In his report to Truman, Hopkins said:

On two occasions Stalin has emphasized the importance of planning at once for the organization of the Peace Conference in so far as it related to Europe. Apparently he is thinking about a formal conference and he emphasized that the Allies were not properly prepared at Versailles and that we should not make that mistake again. At your forthcoming meeting he will bring this up.

We reminded Stalin some days ago that he had made a speech in which he said that he did not favor the dismemberment of Germany. This appeared to be contrary to the position he took both at Teheran and Yalta. His explanation of this action on his part was that his recommendation had been turned down at Yalta and more specifically that Eden and Strang on behalf of the British had stated the dismemberment was to be accomplished only as a last resort and that Winant, who was present at the Conference at which this discussion took place in London, interposed no objection, hence Stalin states that it was his understanding that both Great Britain and the United States were opposed to dismemberment. I undertook to tell him that this was not the case; that while you had made no final decision in regard to this, the United States considered this an open question and that you would surely want to thrash it out at your next meeting. I told him that he must not assume that the United States is opposed to dismemberment because he may learn from you that just the opposite was the case. He then said that dismemberment was a matter which the three Allies must settle among themselves and that he would keep an open mind in regard to it.

He went into some detail regarding the definition of the German General Staff and stated that it would be desirable if the members of that Staff could be detained for ten to fifteen years and if a legal way could be found to prosecute and convict the General Staff as a war criminal organization that would be all the better. The Soviets have captured certain members of the General Staff whom they consider to be war criminals and who they propose should be prosecuted as such under any circumstances. Stalin stated that the Soviets permitted no prisoners of war to go to work on farms or in factories. As to exactly what he was doing with prisoners of war he was somewhat noncommittal but he indicated that he was bringing many of them back to White Russia and the Ukraine to work in mines and on reconstruction. He said that he did not know just how many prisoners of war they had but he thought they had about 2,500,000 of which 1,700,000 were Germans and the balance Rumanians, Italians, Hungarians, etc. He stated that the officers were not repeat not being required to work. You can be sure that at your next meeting Stalin will have some pretty specific proposals to make about prisoners of war, and more particularly, I believe, about war criminals. He did not, as we anticipated, express any criticism of our handling of war prisoners. Stalin outlined in some detail his administrative procedure in local German communities, but I shall delay a report on that until I return home. He said he believed we should do everything to encourage them to get to work on their farms in order to provide food for themselves, and indicated that we should cooperate in getting their light consumer goods industries going. He indicated that Germany should be permitted those heavy industries required for the rehabilitation of their transportation systems, electric power, water, sewage, etc.

Although he promised that he was going to appoint Zhukov as his member of the Control Council for Germany, it has not yet been done. We shall at tonight's meeting again urge him to announce at once Zhukov's appointment.

On May 30, the fourth day in Moscow, Hopkins and his wife enjoyed some sightseeing, particularly a visit to the Russian Ballet School. When he met Stalin at the meeting at six o'clock that evening, he told his host how greatly he had enjoyed seeing this school which was then as it has always been the veritable fountainhead of ballet art for the entire world. Hopkins noted, "Marshal Stalin said that although he had been twenty-eight years in Moscow, he had never visited the Ballet School"—precisely like the traditional New Yorker who says, "I've lived here all my life but I've never yet seen the Statue of Liberty." Hopkins assured the Marshal that this was something not to be missed.

The topics discussed at this fourth meeting were the disposition of the German Fleet, arrangements for the forthcoming Potsdam Conference and Poland. Hopkins stated the basic American attitude toward the infinitely difficult Polish question in the following conversation:

Mr. Hopkins said he would like to accent once again the reasons for our concern in regard to Poland, and indeed, in regard to other countries which were geographically far from our borders. He said there were certain fundamental rights which, when impinged upon or denied, caused concern in the United States. These were cardinal elements which must be present if a parliamentary system is to be established and maintained. He said for example:

1. There must be the right of freedom of speech so that people could say what they wanted to, right of assembly, right of movement and the right to worship at any church that they desired;

2. All political parties except the fascist party and fascist elements who represented or could represent democratic governments should be permitted the free use, without distinction, of the press, radio, meetings and other facilities of political expression;

3. All citizens should have the right of public trial, defense by council of their own choosing, and the right of habeas corpus.

He concluded that if we could find a meeting of minds in regard to these general principles which would be the basis for future free elections then he was sure we could find ways and means to agree on procedures to carry them into effect. He then asked the Marshal if he would care to comment in a general sense or more specifically in regard to the general observations he had made concerning the fundamentals of a new Polish state.

Marshal Stalin replied that these principles of democracy are well known and would find no objection on the part of the Soviet Government. He was sure that the Polish Government, which in its declaration had outlined just such principles, would not only not oppose them but would welcome them. He said, however, that in regard to the specific freedoms mentioned by Mr. Hopkins, they could only be applied in full in peace time, and even then with certain limitations. He said for example the fascist party, whose intention it was to overthrow democratic governments, could not be permitted to enjoy to the full extent these freedoms. He said secondly there were the limitations imposed by war. All states when they were threatened by war on their frontiers were not secure and had found it necessary to introduce certain restrictions. This had been done in England, France, the Soviet Union and elsewhere and perhaps to a lesser extent in the United States which was protected by wide oceans. It is for these reasons that only in time of peace could considerations be given to the full application of these freedoms. For example he said that in time of war no state will allow the free unrestricted use of radio transmitters which could be used to convey information to the enemy. With reference to freedom of speech certain restrictions had to be imposed for military security. As to arrest, in England during the war individuals dangerous to the state had been arrested and tried in secret; these restrictions had been somewhat relaxed but not entirely repealed in England since the war in the Pacific was still going on.

He said, therefore, to sum up: (1) during time of war these political freedoms could not be enjoyed to the full extent, and (2) nor could they apply without reservations to fascist parties trying to overthrow the government.

Marshal Stalin continued that he wished to give a few examples from Russian history. He said that at the time of the revolution the Russian communist party had proclaimed the right of freedom of religion as one of the points of their program. The Russian Patriarch and the entire then existing church had declared the Soviet Government an anathema and had called on all church members not to pay taxes nor to obey the call to the Red Army but to resist mobilization, not to work, etc. He said what could the Soviet Government do but to in fact declare war on the church which assumed that attitude. He added that the present war had wiped out this antagonism and that now the freedom of religion, as promised, could be granted to the church.

Mr. Hopkins said he thoroughly understood the Marshal's opinions. He added that when he had left the Crimea Conference President Roosevelt had thought the Polish matter was virtually settled. He had been relaxed and pleased over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said he and all the other American representatives thought the same and felt that in very short time Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr would be able to carry out the Crimea Decision. Since that time he had been sick and out of touch with Washington and had only followed events from the press and from personal letters which he had received from time to time. He must confess that he had been bewildered and disturbed that one thing after another seemed to occur to prevent the carrying out of the decision which all had thought was clear and sure. He said that if, with his knowledge, he had been bewildered as to the real reason for this it was easy to imagine how bewildered and concerned the masses of people in the United States were over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said that he must say that rightly or wrongly there was a strong feeling among the American people that the Soviet Union wished to dominate Poland. He added that was not his point of view but it was widely held in the United States and that friends of international collaboration were wondering how it would be possible to work things out with the Soviet Union if we could not agree on the Polish question. Mr. Hopkins added that for himself he felt very strongly that if we could find a meeting of the minds on the substance of what we wished to see in the new Polish state we should be able to overcome the difficulties. He himself had had difficulty in understanding the immediate causes of disagreement, namely interpretation of wording such as the role of the existing government in the future Provisional Government of Poland. He concluded that he felt that the three great powers should in a short time be able to settle this matter.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was true but it was necessary for all three Governments genuinely to wish to settle this matter. If one of them secretly did not wish to see it settled then the difficulties were real.

Mr. Hopkins replied that as far as the United States Government was concerned we had no interest in seeing anyone connected with the present Polish Government in London involved in the new Provisional Government of Poland and he did not personally believe that the British had any such idea.

After this fourth meeting, Hopkins cabled Truman that Stalin had agreed to meet with the President and Churchill in the Berlin area about July 15. In this cable, he added:

I completed the exposition of your position relative to Poland with Stalin. The conference tonight was encouraging. It looks as though Stalin is prepared to return to and implement the Crimea decision and permit a representative group of Poles to come to Moscow to consult with the Commission. We are having what we both emphasized would be an informal exchange of views on possible candidates to come here for consultation with the tri-partite Commission at an early date. Harriman, in preparation for this exchange of views, will go over with the British Ambassador the list of candidates already submitted by us and the British.

The fifth meeting on May 31 involved a detailed discussion of names of various candidates for the Polish Government. In this, Hopkins had to rely on the information he had received from Harriman, Bohlen and the State Department. He recognized such names as Mikolajczyk or Lange, but as names of other men came up he had no direct knowledge of their political background or the precise extent of their reliability. In all of these discussions of Poland, Hopkins repeated many times that it was the desire of his government that the Polish Government should be friendly to the Soviet Union, and Stalin agreed that this was all that he demanded. But, here again, as Roosevelt had said to Churchill, "The Russians do not use words for the same purposes that we do": and there was apparently no way of translating the word "friendly" from one language to the other so that it would end up meaning the same thing.

After the fifth meeting, Mr. and Mrs. Hopkins had a private dinner with Stalin at which were present some twenty of the most important men in the Soviet Union, including several members of the Politburo—Mikoyan, Beriya, Kaganovich and Shvernik and Malenkov and Voznesenski (then alternate members). George Kennan who was identified as the author of the famous "Mr. X" article in the magazine, *Foreign Affairs,* some two years later, was also present at this dinner. After dinner Hopkins had a private conversation with Stalin, nobody else being present except the interpreter, Pavlov. Hopkins wrote the following record of this:

Last night after dinner I saw Stalin alone with Mr. Pavlov, interpreter. I told him that I wanted to impress on him as earnestly as I knew how the unfavorable effect in America caused by the detaining of the fourteen Poles within Poland and, specifically, those that were charged only with having illegal radio transmitters. I made it clear to him that I was not talking about the others charged with more serious crimes. I told him that I believed we would have no great difficulty with getting the list approved of names who might come to Moscow to consult with the Moscow Commission, if this business could be settled. I made it clear that while I did not know anything about the merits of the case, I nevertheless felt that even though the Marshal thought the offense was far more serious than it appeared to us, it was in the interest of good Russian-American relations that I hoped he would release these prisoners.

I told Marshal Stalin that if the solution of the Polish matter waited until the conference in Berlin on the 15th of July it would stir up endless trouble and probably take most of the time of the Berlin meeting. I outlined at great length the American position in regard to the Soviet Union after the war and told him that we believed the repeated assurances which he had given us that the Soviet Union also wanted to have a firm and friendly understanding with us; that we assumed that that was correct. But if that were to be accomplished I told him it had to be done in an environment that made it possible for President Truman to carry American public opinion with him.

I reminded him again of the many minority groups in America who were not sympathetic to the Soviet Union and told him very forcefully that he must believe me when I told him that our whole relationship was threatened by the impasse of Poland. I made it clear again to Stalin that Poland was only a symbol, that the United States had equal interests in all countries in this part of the world and that if we were going to act or maintain our interests on a tripartite basis, it was hopeless to do so without a strong American public opinion. I told him there was no hope of getting certain minority groups in sympathy with this position for many years and perhaps never, and reminded him again that he should not assume that the Chicago Tribune or the Hearst press had any real influence on American public opinion; that I was speaking for and on behalf of the millions of Americans who support a policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

I told Stalin further that I personally felt that our relations were threatened and that I frankly had many misgivings about it and with my intimate knowledge of the situation I was, frankly, bewildered with some of the things that were going on.

Stalin then said that he was unwilling to order those Poles released who were charged only with use of illegal radio sets. He stated that he had information in regard to these prisoners which was not available to us and inferred that all of them were engaged in what he called diversionist activities. He stated that he believed that Churchill had misled the United States in regard to the facts and had made the American Government believe that the statement of the Polish London Government was accurate. Just the opposite was the case.

Marshal Stalin stated that he did not intend to have the British manage the affairs of Poland and that is exactly what they want to do. Nevertheless, he stated that he believed me when I told him it was having an unfavorable effect on public opinion in America and he assumed the same was true in Great Britain, and therefore he was inclined to do everything he could to make it easy for Churchill to get out of a bad situation because if and when all the evidence is published it would look very bad for the British and he does not want to make the situation worse than it is. He stated that the men must be

tried but that they would be treated leniently and he clearly inferred that he was going to consider at once what could be done in regard to these prisoners that I was concerned with to clear the matter up.

He did not, however, indicate at any time that he was not going to have them tried. I asked him that if he was determined to go through with the trial, when the trials would be held, reminding him that so long as things were in this kind of a state it was bound to create friction between all of us.

His reply to that was he did not know but that he would find out and let me know tomorrow. He said that we must take into consideration Russian opinion as well as American opinion; that it was the Russian forces that had liberated Poland and said that if they had not gained the victory in Poland, with such a great loss of Russian life, nobody would be talking about a new Poland. He said several times that he blamed the British for conniving with the London Poles, and each time I reminded him that we had no desire to support in any way the Polish Government in London.

He listened very attentively to everything I said in the first part of the conversation and I gained the impression that he is going to consider the move which the Soviet Union will make and that we would hear from him at an early date.

I closed the conversation by telling him that I thought the real solution lay in his releasing these men entirely so that we could clear the atmosphere not only for the immediate discussions about Poland but in preparation for the Berlin Conference.

He repeated that the men should be tried but that he would let me know.

During the next few days, Hopkins took it easy in Moscow waiting for further orders from Truman. Voluminous cables passed back and forth between Washington, London and Moscow containing comments on all the various Polish names mentioned. Churchill cabled Hopkins his congratulations on the splendid job that he was doing and he cabled Truman that a break in the deadlock seemed to be resulting from Hopkins' devoted efforts. In one of these cables, Churchill referred to "The Iron Curtain" which had descended over Europe; this phrase did not come into popular currency until a long time later.

On June 6, Hopkins had his sixth and last meeting with Stalin and Molotov, with Harriman and Bohlen also present. During this, the following conversation took place:

Marshal Stalin said that he wished to thank Mr. Hopkins for his great assistance in moving forward the Polish question.

Mr. Hopkins then said he would like to raise an entirely separate question with Marshal Stalin and that relates to the impasse which had come about at the San Francisco Conference in regard to voting precedure in the security council. He said he had received an urgent message from President Truman to take this up with Marshal Stalin and to indicate the seriousness of this matter. He said it referred to the Soviet insistence that nothing could be discussed by the security council without the unanimous vote of the permanent members exclusive of those involved in a particular situation. He said that the United States Government had agreed with the Marshal that there must be unanimity among the members in regard to all questions involving enforcement action in any of its aspects but that in the consideration of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, parties to the dispute, whether permanent members or not would abstain from voting. He added that the United States thought the Yalta formula as agreed on safeguarded the freedom of discussion and the right of any member to bring before the council any situation for discussion. And that this right, which was rightly a question of the agenda, should therefore be decided by the council by simple majority without any power having the right to veto it. He said he earnestly hoped the Marshal would see eye to eye with us and the other sponsoring powers and France who were agreed on this question.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet position was based squarely on the Crimea decision and that in matters involving peaceful settlement parties to dispute would not vote and that the full unanimity applied only to enforcement action. The Soviet position was that the same formula for peaceful settlement should apply in deciding whether or not the council should take up and discuss any given question. (Ensued a conversation in Russian between Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin from which it was clear that the Marshal had not understood the issues involved and had not had them explained to him. During this conversation Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought it was an insignificant matter and that they should accept the American position.)

Marshal Stalin then stated that he had no objection to a simple majority being applied in discussions relating to pacific settlement but of course not to any matter involving enforcement action. He said he stressed this aspect because he knew these considerations were raised by the small nations. He had most respect for the small nations (but) it must be admitted there was a tendency among them to exploit and even to create differences between the great powers in the hope that they would obtain the backing of one or more of the great powers for their own ends. He said it was a mistake to believe that just because a nation was small it was necessarily innocent. He added that it should not be understood he would only say this in secret since he was quite prepared to tell the little nations this to their faces. He said, after all two world wars had begun over small nations.

Mr. Hopkins said he thought that possibly the difficulties at San Francisco had grown more out of misunderstandings than real differences.

Marshal Stalin continued that certain statesmen were interested in getting hold of the votes of small nations and that this was a dangerous and slippery path since obviously the small nations would like to get great nation support.

Marshal Stalin then stated that he was prepared to accept the American position on the point at issue at San Francisco in regard to voting procedure.

Mr. Hopkins then said he had one more question to raise and he hoped Marshal Stalin would not think he was always raising troublesome questions. He said the American people through the American Red Cross were anxious to show their admiration and respect for the Polish people by sending them relief in the form of medical supplies which, unfortunately, would only be of moderate proportions. He said for this purpose American Red Cross desired to send three representatives headed by Dr. Bowers to handle the distribution of these supplies. He added that these men would, of course, refrain from any political activity and as a member of the Central Committee of the American Red Cross he was prepared to guarantee that.

Marshal Stalin said he had no objection but it was necessary to obtain the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government, which could be done when they came to Moscow.

Mr. Hopkins then told Marshal Stalin of his plan to leave tomorrow, stopping in Berlin and going on to Frankfurt. He said he looked forward to what for him would be a pleasant spectacle, the present state of Berlin and he might even be able to find Hitler's body.

Marshal Stalin replied that he was sure that Hitler was still alive.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed to Marshal Stalin, on the part of Mrs. Hopkins and himself, their great appreciation for the many kindnesses and courtesies they had received during their stay in Moscow. He said it had been a great pleasure for them to have been here and he only wished to repeat what he had said before, that our two countries had so much in common that they could find a way to work out their problems. He added that these meetings here had left him with renewed assurances on that point.

Marshal Stalin said he fully shared Mr. Hopkins' views.

Following this last meeting, Hopkins cabled Truman: "Marshal Stalin agrees to accept the United States position regarding voting procedure in the Council." This was the real news that the San Francisco Conference had been saved.

Hopkins and his wife left Moscow early in the morning of June 7 and arrived in Berlin in time for lunch. The word had been passed along to the Russian military authorities there to show the distinguished travelers every consideration and these orders were obeyed to an almost embarrassing extent. The Hopkinses may have been the first American civilians to be shown into some of the Nazi holy places which were then completely under the control of the Red Army. Yielding to some of the eternal temptations of the souvenir hunter, Hopkins helped himself to several books from Hitler's private office and presented these to friends on his return.

From Berlin they flew to Frankfurt to spend a day at General Eisenhower's new headquarters, and from there to Paris. Hopkins wrote the following personal notes:

One of the difficulties in negotiating the Polish agreement in Moscow was that President Truman had sent me without discussing it in advance with Churchill. Altho, at the time of my departure, he acquainted him with my impending visit to Moscow, no British representative was present at any of my conferences with Stalin and I was in no position to deal directly with Churchill. Fortunately, Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador to Moscow, was an old friend of mine and quite in sympathy with my visit and I am sure he reported very fully to the British Foreign Office and Churchill. And, more than that, he was making recommendations to Churchill urging the British to back us up. I began to hear from Kerr that Churchill was obviously quite disturbed about the whole business but there was not very much he could say because it was probably to his political interest to get agreement on the Polish question before the British elections.

When I reached Frankfurt there was an urgent telephone message from Churchill which I answered and in which he insisted on my going to London. I stalled about this, telling him my health was not too good and that I thought I ought to get right back but would let him know, and that under any circumstances I would not go without the approval of the President. I felt it unwise for me to go to England and see Churchill before reporting to Truman, so I gave Churchill no encouragement. Churchill wired Truman and Truman replied in the negative to Churchill. I was not acquainted with this until I got to Paris when Churchill again called me and told me the answer had come from Truman and expressed great regret at the decision and acted a little petulant about it over the telephone. I told him, however, that there was nothing I could do about it and, under any circumstances, my health was such that I felt I should not do anything but go right home.

I had several long talks with Eisenhower during the 24 hours Mrs. Hopkins and I spent at his country place about 15 miles outside of Frankfurt. Amongst other things, Eisenhower told me that he and his family had always been Republicans and had voted against Roosevelt every time up until 1944; but that he did vote for Roosevelt this last time.

He discussed his future at great length, repeatedly emphasizing that he did not want to go into politics. This seemed to be apropos of nothing in particular that I had said. He told me, however, that a good many people passing through raised the question of his running for President—obviously on the Republican ticket.

He seemed pretty dubious about the Allied Control Commission and was very fearful that the several governments would not give the Allied Control Commission sufficient power. I told him I was sure that the Russian Government intended to control General Zhukov completely and repeated to him the story of Vyshinski being in

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution guarantees the "right to profess or not to profess any religion and to conduct religious worship or atheistic propaganda." In practice, however, religious believers are subjected to many restrictions. Participation in religious ceremonies causes exclusion from the Communist Party and, sometimes, dismissal from employment. Soviet law requires religious congregations with a minimum of 20 adults to register with the authorities. In practice, the authorities reserve the right to grant or withhold registration. Soviet refusal to grant registration can be used to limit the number of congregations, or even to deny legal status to an entire religious denomination, as has been the case, for example, with the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church. Religious believers, moreover, are prohibited from engaging in charitable activity, proselytizing, or providing religious training to their children. In some instances, the authorities have removed children from families which have permitted or have conducted such instruction. The number of functioning seminaries and other institutions of clerical education, and the numbers of students permitted to pursue a religious vocation, do not provide a sufficient body of trained clergy for even the officially registered denominations. Unregistered believers, such as some Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Pentecostals also may be subject to a wide variety of repressive measures, including harassment at school or place of employment, denial of access to housing, dismissal from work, and even imprisonment.

Examples of such repression of religious freedom were abundant in 1984. Pentecostal Bishop Stephan Kosyuk and fellow worshipper Robert Zimmermann were convicted in Moscow on criminal charges of conducting unauthorized worship services. Ivan Luchko, a Pentecostal from Rovno, was sentenced during the summer to 2 years' deprivation of freedom and 3 years' probation reportedly in connection with his religious activism. In September, 55 Pentecostal Christians in the Soviet Far East went on a month-long hunger strike to dramatize the desire of their small community to emigrate. Three leaders were subsequently arrested, and Soviet authorities moved to take custody of 78 community children after their parents had pulled them out of Soviet schools to protect them from beatings and harassment. Moscow Pentecostals Il'ya and Lydia Staskevich and family conducted a 14-day hunger strike in May protesting their inability to renounce Soviet citizenship and worship freely. A Moscow Pentecostal deacon who led a small congregation of parishioners was sentenced in September to 5 years' deprivation of freedom for leading unauthorized worship services.

Religious persecution in the U.S.S.R. is without regard for religious denomination. Russian Orthodox activist Sergey Markus was sentenced in August to 3 years in a labor camp for allegedly circulating religious materials and including too many religious references in his privately-organized lectures on Russian culture. Russian Orthodox priest Nikolay Temirbayev was sentenced in June to 2 years' deprivation of freedom on the trumped-up charge of hooliganism for allegedly beating his wife and trying to strangle one of his parishioners. Also in June, Evangelical Lutheran preacher Jakob Rein was sentenced in Kazakhstan to 5 years at hard

labor for allegedly holding non-registered worship services. On June 30 police in Kazakhstan stopped the car in which Baptists Eduard Ewert, Ivan Tkachenko and Nikolay Loeven (a minister) were traveling and confiscated religious literature from them. Two weeks later all three were arrested. On May 22, youth evangelist Peter Peters was sentenced to 3 years in a strict regime labor camp for not being officially employed. Vladimir Zinchenko, a Baptist whose wife gained notoriety when she unfurled a banner (drawing attention to religious persecution) in Moscow's Baptist Church during the visit of 256 members of the U.S. National Council of Churches in June, was sentenced on May 31 to 3 years in a strict regime labor camp.

The Soviet central press announced the arrests during 1984 of at least seven unregistered Seventh-Day Adventists in Central Asia. These included Vladimir Shelkov, son of Adventist Leader Vladimir Andreyevich Shelkov, who died in labor camp in 1980. Also arrested and tried were Vladimir Vasilchenko, Gennady Bedarev, Aleksey and Mikhail Murkin, Ivan Cheremisov and R. Chernolokova. Charges were described as related to the group's underground existence, which was allegedly anti-Soviet in nature.

The second half of 1984 also witnessed the beginning of a new crackdown on the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church. Uniate priest Vasily Kobrin was arrested on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda on November 12. His colleagues, Iosif Terelya and Grigory Budzynskiy, have also been detained and threatened by Soviet authorities. Other reports indicate that Soviet authorities burned a Catholic church to the ground near Lvov in June, and have closed two Catholic monasteries. These moves followed the appearance earlier in the year of a new samizdat journal, "The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in the Ukraine," produced by Uniate activists.

The Jewish community faced an exceptionally difficult year in 1984, which saw a sharp increase in official anti-Semitic propaganda thinly veiled as anti-Zionism. The "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public," under the chairmanship of Col. Gen. D. A. Dragunskiy, staged several press conferences, one specifically designed to link Zionists to Nazis. A television program aired in Moscow in November repeated this theme and accused Jewish leaders of conspiring with the Nazis to send Jews to the death camps. The authorities' patently false propaganda line, espoused by the Committee, continues to assert that the Jewish emigration "problem" has been solved since any Jews who wanted to leave the Soviet Union have already done so. The overall atmosphere of anti-Semitism was as bad in 1984 as it has been at any time in the past several decades.

There have been numerous reports of discrimination against Jews, such as denial of access to higher education and certain professions. Such revocation of degrees in practice means the end of one's career, and usually the loss of one's job and income. Many individual Jewish "refuseniks" (Jews who have been refused permission to emigrate) were arrested and/or put on trial in 1984.

Moshe Abramov of Samarkand was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp for hooliganism when he reportedly refused to withdraw his emigration application. Jewish activist Zakhar Zunshaine from Riga was sentenced on June 29 to 3 years in a labor camp

for doing little more than writing letters on behalf of his own family's emigration efforts. Accused of evading the draft since 1977, Moscow refusenik Aleksandr Yakir was only arrested after he had passed his 28th birthday and was no longer legally eligible for induction. He was nevertheless sentenced to 2 years in a labor camp. Iosif Begun, who was sentenced in 1983 to 7 years in a labor camp and 5 years of internal exile, was placed in special confinement for infringement of camp rules in May 1984. Scheduled to remain there for 6 months, he began a hunger strike and was hospitalized in June.

July saw the beginning of a major, sustained crackdown on Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists. By year's end, nine activists, including four Hebrew teachers, had been arrested and three sentenced to labor camp. The arrests were accompanied by a series of searches, beatings, and threats which sent shock waves through the Soviet Jewish community. Moscow Hebrew teachers Aleksandr Kholmianskiy and Yuliy Edelstein were arrested in late summer, respectively, for hooliganism and possession of drugs. Police reportedly located a pistol in Kholmianskiy's room at his parents' apartment and drugs in Edelstein's apartment. Close relatives assert that the items were in both cases planted by the police. In December, Edelstein was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp. Yakov Levin, a Jewish activist from Odessa, was sentenced to 3 years in prison on charges of anti-Soviet slander for circulating religious materials. His prospective father-in-law, Mark Nepomnyashchiy, was also arrested. Their friend, refusenik Yakov Mesh, was arrested in October on trumped-up charges of resisting the police. The authorities released Mesh and dropped charges against him in December due to the severe injuries he sustained from a beating administered following his arrest. Iosif Berenshtein, a Kiev Hebrew teacher, was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp in December, also for allegedly resisting the police. He too was savagely beaten while in custody.

As is the case with other religions, the Soviet authorities severely limit the practice of Islam. They restrict the opening of mosques, the number of students at religious schools, and the number of believers permitted to go on the haj to Mecca. In addition, many Muslim religious practices have been criticized in the Soviet media as "survivals of the past," although in practice Muslims are perhaps somewhat less harassed than Christians for both domestic and foreign policy reasons.

Beyond the persecution of specific classes of believers, the Government exerts wide-ranging pressure to discourage religious belief in general among its citizens. This pressure has intensified in the course of 1984. The Communist Party, defined in the Constitution as the "leading and guiding force in Soviet society," is, according to its rules, an atheistic organization. Membership in the party, considered incompatible with religious belief, is, in effect, a requirement for advancement to most positions of authority or prestige in the country. Thus the Government has structured career incentives in such a way as to virtually exclude practicing believers from educational opportunities and desirable careers.

The official media feature large amounts of anti-religious propaganda, and only a few religious publications of controlled content, such as the Vestnik of the Russian

Orthodox Patriarchate, are allowed to appear. The practice of religion is also discouraged by strictly applied limitations on the number of sacred books, such as the Bible or the Koran, which may be printed and by government prohibitions against their importation. Few works are published in Hebrew. The number of clergymen and places of worship today is only a small fraction of the number which existed before the October 1917 Revolution.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Freedom of movement is neither guaranteed by law nor respected in practice. Although citizens are generally free to move about within the territory of the U.S.S.R., travel in certain areas (e.g., frontier regions or areas of military significance) requires special permission. All adults are issued identity documents or internal passports which must be carried on their person during travel in the U.S.S.R. and used to register visits of more than 3 days with the local authorities. In practice, vast areas of the country remain closed to foreigners.

The right to choose one's place of residence, although formally guaranteed by law, is subject to restrictions. Everyone is required to register his place of residence. The authorities limit the number of residence permits in some large cities, such as Moscow and Leningrad, where housing is at a premium and where the Government attempts to maintain showcase conditions for foreign tourists--cities free of so-called "undesirable" elements.

Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar who has spent much of his adult life in labor camps for proclaiming his people's right to return to their native homeland, was convicted of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda in a February trial in Tashkent.

The U.S.S.R. has ratified the U.N. Charter and other international documents in which the right to leave one's country and return thereto is recognized. In reality, however, Soviet law does not recognize the right of citizens to emigrate by choice, and the only recognized motive for emigration is reunification of divided families. On this basis, emigration increased significantly during the 1970's, especially by Soviet Jews, Armenians, and ethnic Germans. However, in late 1979 overall monthly emigration levels began to drop as the authorities introduced restrictive practices, apparently as part of deliberate emigration policy.

There was a continued sharp drop in the number of Jews allowed to emigrate in 1984: 896 compared to approximately 1,300 in 1983 and over 51,000 during 1979. Many Jews have waited in vain for more than 10 years for permission to emigrate. Jewish sources estimate that there still are more than 200,000 Soviet Jews who possess the letters of invitation (vyzovs) from Israel necessary for application to emigrate. The number of ethnic Germans and Armenians emigrating from the U.S.S.R. also declined in the first 9 months of 1984. Only 655 ethnic Germans emigrated during this period, compared to 1,017 during the same period in 1983. Only 67 Armenians emigrated from the Soviet Union to the United States during the first 9 months of 1984 as compared with 171 for the same period in 1983 and

intersections in the countryside. Militiamen arbitrarily stop and search vehicles. There have been many reports of persons stopped on tram cars and city buses who have been asked for identity documents and have had shopping bags and personal belongings checked by the authorities.

The authorities often enter homes on the pretext of looking for building code violations, excessive consumption of electricity (60 watt bulbs maximum), illegal use of electrical appliances, etc. These searches also allow the authorities to look for other items such as forbidden books and publications, religious materials, or any evidence of "wrongdoing."

Rent codes in the cities tend to encourage another form of invasion of privacy: if an apartment tenant cannot afford to pay the exorbitant premium rental rate for any space in excess of the official 18-square meter maximum per person, the city housing authority may lease part of the dwelling to someone else without consulting the tenant.

Invasion of family privacy frequently takes place in the schools, where the children are asked about their parents' ideas, topics of evening discussions, visitors, etc. This information has reportedly been used against the parents when it has served the interest of the authorities. In addition, there are reports that the Communist Party has applied pressure on parents at their workplaces in order to influence the activities of their children.

Violation of privacy of the person has also become common as a result of the current anti-abortion campaign. Reports have been received of female workers forced to undergo monthly or bimonthly pregnancy tests and physical examinations to insure that an abortion has not taken place.

Complaints about interference with both domestic and international correspondence are common. Letters to or from persons considered "of interest" often simply never arrive at their destination. People have reportedly been questioned by the security police about topics discussed in letters which were delivered seemingly unopened. On other occasions, people have been questioned about statements made in letters sent abroad but never received by the addressee.

International telephone calls are monitored closely. Interruptions are common. Telephone conversations of Romanian religious and political dissidents are particularly monitored. Their calls are frequently cut off, and they are often interrogated by security police regarding telephone conversations. On occasion, the telephones of these persons are out of order while foreign visitors are in Romania and are restored to service upon the foreigner's departure.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Freedom of speech and press is severely restricted in Romania, despite a full range of constitutional guarantees. Opposition to established policies is not permitted, and perceived challenges to the system are usually dealt with harshly.

The Government and party control all information disseminated to the public. The government-owned mass media practice

self-censorship. For live theater, censorship boards approve all new productions before the opening performance. All typewriters must be registered with the local police, and usage of duplicating machines is strictly regulated in an effort to prevent the establishment of an independent underground press.

Western publications are not available to the general public, and unauthorized import and distribution of such materials is forbidden. Foreign broadcasts in the Romanian language are not jammed, however, and serve as the major source of domestic and foreign news for the Romanian people.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Government attempts to control all group activity in the country. No organization independent of government or party influence is allowed to exist. Assembly and association without permission are usually short-lived and may have severe repercussions for those involved. Citizens are strongly discouraged from making contact with foreigners, and the law requires that all such contacts be reported to the authorities within 24 hours.

Free trade unions are not permitted. Membership in government-controlled unions is mandatory for workers in every economic sector. Union meetings deal with problems such as work safety, productivity, fulfillment of the production plan of the enterprise, vacation schedules, procurement of sports and cultural tickets, approval of loans to members (union dues are used to provide low-interest, long-term loans to members supposedly on a non-partisan basis), and other non-controversial topics. New government laws and regulations are read to the membership, generally without discussion, and highlights of recent political happenings are brought up. Topics such as wages, reduction of the workweek, and additional holidays are not discussed.

During the 1984 deliberations of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Romanian labor practices were criticized on two points: First, members of the Committee recalled that the ILO Committee of Experts, in 1981, raised the issue that Romanian trade unions are not free to determine their constitutions, activities, or programs since they had to follow the dictates of one central administration. Second, the unions were used mainly to "mobilize the masses for the accomplishment of the party program and policy." No change in either policy was perceived in the interim. The Committee recommended that the Government consider the possibility of receiving a direct contacts mission from the ILO to help resolve these issues.

c. Freedom of Religion

The exercise of freedom of religion is greatly limited despite constitutional guarantees. The Communist Party advocates atheism, and religious activism by state officials and party members is strongly discouraged.

The Government, through the Department of Cults, recognizes and financially supports 14 officially sanctioned faiths and denominations including Romanian Orthodox (the largest), Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Unitarian, Baptist,

Pentecostal, Seventh-Day Adventist, Jewish, and Muslim. The Department is responsible for closely monitoring all religious groups, licensing clergymen, paying their salaries, and overseeing retirement benefits, and serves as the official liaison between the Government and church groups. It must also approve all requests for new church construction, new clergymen, religious publications, and foreign travel by church representatives.

During 1984, fewer cases of harassment were reported, although the persecution of members of denominations not recognized by the State, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Romanian Uniates continues. Individuals are still fined and imprisoned for religious practices. Early in 1984, a Baptist minister was arrested and fined for possession and distribution of unauthorized materials (religious publications brought into the country from abroad without the necessary official permission). In addition, Pentecostals reported that many persons were fined for worshiping in private homes and unauthorized places. The Romanian Orthodox priest, Father Gheorghe Calciu, imprisoned since 1979 for sermons critical of the Romanian Government, was released in August 1984. However, there is continuing concern that he is being confined under house arrest or may be removed from Bucharest to prevent contact with human rights activists from abroad.

In a potentially positive move, the Department of Cults has promised additional places in religious seminaries to several faiths, including the Baptists, the Calvinists, and the Unitarians, though no results are yet apparent.

The construction and remodeling of churches of certain denominations remains a problem. A Pentecostal church in the city of Cluj-Napoca was demolished early in 1984 because of the unauthorized remodeling of the interior. The country's largest Baptist church, located in the center of the city of Oradea, has been ordered demolished, ostensibly due to the redevelopment of the area where it is located. On the other hand, the Department of Cults has approved the construction of more new churches in several cities and villages around the country than in recent years.

Bibles and other religious texts are still in short supply in Romania, and their importation is strictly regulated. Promises have been received from the Department of Cults for a common edition of the Bible to be printed in the near future for the Baptists, Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Lutherans. The number of copies to be printed remains a point of contention.

A few Catholic clergy recently have been permitted to travel abroad for training and consultations.

Anti-Semitic literary works which appeared at the end of 1983 were removed from book shops in April 1984. One 19th century play of an anti-Semitic nature was republished late in the year, but President Ceausescu denounced anti-Semitism in his November 19 report to the Communist Party's 13th Congress.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

There are no official restrictions placed on travel within Romania, with the exceptions of restricted military areas

(access prohibited) and border areas (access is carefully limited to residents of the areas and those with economic need to travel there). For fuel conservation reasons, a national ban on driving on alternate Sundays based on license numbers reduces the amount of weekend traffic.

There have been reports of persons forbidden by the authorities from traveling to attend certain functions such as religious gatherings, funerals, and international events, because these were not perceived to be in the Government's interest.

The right of a citizen to change place of residence is extremely restricted. Admission of new residents to the larger Romanian cities is legally restricted to persons able to obtain both housing and employment: since each is contingent on assurances of the other, official sponsorship for any relocation to the larger cities is effectively required. Residence in smaller Romanian cities is easier to obtain than in Bucharest and the larger cities.

Travel outside of Romania, especially outside of the Eastern European countries, is a rare privilege. Those who are allowed to travel abroad are usually individuals who hold relatively senior positions in the party or Government, or those who have been able to convince the authorities of their intent to return, usually by leaving close family members behind. Another group to receive passports are older parents traveling to visit children resident abroad.

The Government does not accept as a right the permanent departure of citizens from Romania. In October 1984, President Ceausescu said it is the duty of all citizens to stay and build a better society for themselves and for their children. Those who do express a desire to emigrate continue to face a wide variety of punitive discouragements. Some prospective emigrants continue to wait years before they are issued emigration passports. Once a passport is issued, the intended emigrant is no longer allowed to work, own property, send children to school, receive public medical benefits, pensions, or rationed items, or benefit from any other state-subsidized service.

Many persons leaving Romania for reasons other than family reunification are forced to renounce their citizenship. This action precludes individuals from repatriation in the future.

There have been cases reported during the past year of persons who have returned to take up residence in Romania without incident. Others, who have been turned over to the Romanian authorities after leaving the country illegally, have faced immediate trials and prison sentences for the offense.

Though official policy discourages emigration, 1984 saw an upturn in the total numbers of persons allowed to leave Romania for Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States. Nearly 19,000 left in 1984. In addition, the waiting time for passports was generally shorter than in the past.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The individual citizen has almost no voice in shaping public policy or choosing public officials, since government at all

Those who are considered opponents of the regime bear the brunt of heavily intrusive surveillance. They, their families, and friends are routinely subjected to such measures as bugging of homes, tapping of telephones, and monitoring and destruction of mail. Discrimination in education and employment is regularly practiced against the families of dissidents and religious activists. After 16 years few of the half million Communist party members who were purged in 1969-71 have been "rehabilitated" and allowed to return to their jobs. Many of their children have faced discrimination in education and employment. Children of Charter 77 activists Jiri Dienstbier and Vaclav Benda have been denied entrance to high schools of their choice. Fear that their children will be denied higher education is a major factor in preventing open dissent among intellectuals and white-collar workers.

A special problem exists for religious believers who wish to raise their children in their faith. Organization of religious instruction or ceremonies in private homes is forbidden. It was reported that at least one priest lost his state permit in 1984 because he provided educational materials to a woman who wanted to teach her children about religion. Parents must seek the permission of the local authorities for their children to receive religious education at school. However, many Czechoslovak citizens believe that such a request could be damaging to a child's future education and career prospects.

Contacts with individuals and receipt of information from the West are discouraged. Czechoslovaks in many professions are required to file a report each time they have a conversation with a Westerner. Broadcasts of Radio Free Europe in Czech and Slovak are jammed in Prague and other major cities, although they can often be heard in rural areas. Voice of America, BBC, and other Western broadcasts are not jammed. Many people who live near the western or southern borders are able to receive West German or Austrian television broadcasts.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Although the Czechoslovak Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, in practice these freedoms do not exist. The Constitution states that they must be exercised "in accordance with the interests of the working class." In effect, individuals may not voice opinions publicly that differ from party policy or question the legitimacy of party rule, the fundamental principles of the "socialist" state, or the regime's relationship with the Soviet Union. Likewise, academic freedom is severely limited by political directives.

In order to publish, writers must belong to the state-controlled Union of Writers. All newspapers and magazines are published by political parties or mass organizations (e.g., the Youth League, Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, or Sports Federation) which are controlled by the Communist Party. All legal religious literature and periodicals come under Communist Party supervision. Publishing houses and the news media, all state-owned, are self-censored under Communist Party guidelines. In cases where insufficient care is exercised, fines are imposed or editors may be fired.

Only a limited number of Western non-Communist periodicals are allowed into the country, and they are beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. Since the early 1970's libraries have restricted access to Western publications of a political character to individuals who have obtained special permission from their employers, documenting their need for the material for official purposes. Periodicals such as Time and Newsweek are locked in cabinets controlled by special personnel. Books and periodicals published within Czechoslovakia during the 1968-69 period or other publications considered ideologically "harmful" are subject to similar controls.

Printing and photocopying equipment, except typewriters, are controlled by the Ministry of Interior and cannot be legally obtained by individuals. Reproduction of printed materials is limited to 11 typewritten copies. For this reason, samizdat (self-published) materials are usually "published" by a chain of typists, each of whom produces the legally permitted 11 copies.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Although freedom of assembly is protected in theory by the Constitution, it is tightly controlled in practice. Public meetings may be held only with permission of the police, and this permission is given only when the meeting supports state objectives. When the authorities wish to have a large rally (May Day or "peace" demonstrations), people are often pressured to attend.

All labor unions and professional groups are controlled by the Communist Party and are subordinated to it. Independent organizations are banned. An abortive attempt to form an independent trade union in the early 1980's was suppressed. At least one Czech (Jan Wunsch) is still in prison charged with "subversion" because of his contacts with and support for the Polish independent trade union Solidarity.

Membership in the official trade unions or professional associations is virtually obligatory for workers and those seeking to practice a profession. Strikes, collective bargaining, and lobbying are not permitted. Workers have little influence over production or economic planning, although they have had occasional successes in bringing about improvements in working conditions at the local level and in reducing production norms.

The right and duty to work are guaranteed in the Constitution. In practice, people who are considered dissidents have difficulty retaining professional positions and are often forced into menial jobs, a practice which was condemned by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The same fate has befallen individuals purged from their jobs because they were considered politically unreliable.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Government espouses "scientific atheism" as the only valid system of belief. Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution but is strictly limited in practice. Those who practice religion openly are effectively disqualified from advancement in many fields, although this is less true in Slovakia, a more traditionally Roman Catholic area, than in the Czech lands.

In order to function legally in Czechoslovakia, a church must be officially registered. Religious groups that emphasize proselytizing, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, are banned outright, and their members suffer frequent harassment and arrest. Jehovah's Witnesses have been reported in several prisons, but they shun publicity, so there are no reliable estimates of their number.

The Roman Catholic Church, which claims 11 million (at least nominal) adherents, is the largest of Czechoslovakia's 18 officially registered religious bodies. The official press occasionally acknowledges that alongside the registered Catholic Church there exists an "underground Church" in Czechoslovakia, made up of secretly ordained priests and bishops, laymen and laywomen, and members of religious orders. Male orders are banned; female orders may exist legally but have not been allowed to accept new members for some time. There are no reliable estimates of the size of the "underground Church."

State control over the Catholic clergy begins in Czechoslovakia's two remaining seminaries (in Litomerice and Bratislava) where students, whose number is limited, need state approval to be admitted and to be ordained. In addition, the state must approve each priest's assignment to a parish or higher office. As a result of these restrictions, many priests have to cover more than one parish, and only 3 of Czechoslovakia's 13 dioceses have resident bishops.

"Pacem in Terris," the state-sponsored "peace association" of clergy has been a major instrument of state control over the Catholic Church since it was founded in 1970. The association has been losing ground since 1982 when the Vatican banned clergy participation in political organizations worldwide. Although Cardinal Tomasek and the overwhelming majority (as much as 80 percent according to one report) of the clergy in the Czech lands and Slovakia have disassociated themselves from "Pacem in Terris," priests associated with the organization have retained control of Katolicke noviny (Catholic News), the only legally published Catholic newspaper.

The printing of religious literature is severely restricted, and Bibles are in short supply. A Czech-language Bible was published several years ago, but it has long since been sold out. There are no known plans for another printing run of the Bible. The gap is filled by Bibles smuggled in from abroad and by samizdat. Despite harassment and occasional prison terms for the "publishers," some 700 titles have been "published" on religious themes in samizdat.

Activities and public statements by priests, including sermons and homilies, are closely monitored by the state. Priests who oppose "Pacem in Terris" or are believed to be associated with the "secret Church" are subject to harassment, which may include revocation of their licenses and/or prosecution on charges of "abusing religious office" or "obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies." Two Catholic priests, Josef Kajnek and Adam Rucki, are known to have had their licenses revoked in 1984. There are no reports of large-scale detentions of Catholic activists in 1984, as there were in 1983. However, there have been complaints of mistreatment of individuals who gathered thousands of signatures on petitions inviting the Pope to visit

Czechoslovakia in 1985. Travel by official religious leaders to and from Czechoslovakia is usually authorized.

The numerous Protestant denominations registered by the Government operate under similar constraints as the Catholic Church: proselytizing is forbidden; religious education is strictly forbidden and may not be organized in private homes; religious ceremonies are restricted for the most part to church premises (although some traditional pilgrimages are permitted); and education of clergymen is carefully limited. Protestant clergymen active in Charter 77 are subject to particular harassment: at least two ministers had their licenses revoked in 1984.

The Jewish community, measuring several thousand, has a central religious organization, financially supported and controlled by the Government. There are synagogues and prayer houses open for worship. In addition, in Prague, there is a Jewish Museum operated by the state. There are no Jewish schools or rabbinical seminaries, but there are two rabbis, one in Prague and one in Bratislava.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Except for the restrictions imposed on political prisoners under the "protective supervision" regime, freedom of movement within Czechoslovakia is generally not restricted, although travel in some areas near the western and southern borders or in the vicinity of military installations is prohibited.

Travel to Western countries is difficult since travelers must obtain permission and, unless visiting close relatives, a hard currency authorization. The number of such authorizations issued each year is far below the demand. Travelers to the West must usually leave some member of the immediate family at home to insure their return. These restrictions are often relaxed for retired persons.

Travel by citizens of Czechoslovakia to other East European countries has become more difficult in recent years. A special passport is now required for trips to Yugoslavia, but so far this has failed to reduce the number of Czechoslovak citizens who defect to the West via Yugoslavia. Travel to Poland has been severely restricted since 1981. The restrictions were moderated somewhat in 1984 to permit group travel, visits to immediate family, and travel for humanitarian or medical purposes. Travel to Hungary has been made more difficult by limiting the amount of currency which may be exchanged and the number of trips which may be made in one year. Citizens who are deemed politically "unreliable" may find that they not only are denied permission to travel to the West; they also cannot visit other East European countries.

The right to emigrate is extremely limited. It is generally enjoyed only by those wishing to join a foreign citizen spouse, or in the case of retired persons, foreign citizen children abroad. Others wishing to emigrate find their applications accepted only in rare circumstances, and then only after a long and arduous wait. Those who do apply may suffer reprisals such as demotion or loss of employment after application. Czechoslovakia occasionally denies the right of repatriation by stripping the citizenship of those citizens it wishes to keep out. Emigration passports are not valid for

LITHUANIA

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The right to associate is provided for in the Constitution, but the authorities strictly control all associations and organizations. The Helsinki Monitoring Group is not sanctioned by the authorities, and hence its members have been subject to harassment, arrest, and conviction for "anti-state activity."

Soviet labor law and practice are enforced in Lithuania. Although the Constitution guarantees all Soviet citizens the right to form trade unions, any efforts by workers to exercise this right independently of state-sponsored and controlled unions have been brutally repressed. Given Soviet concern that the ideas of the Polish Solidarity movement might spread, this has been especially true in the Baltic states.

c. Freedom of Religion

Despite constitutional guarantees, religious activity is subject to systematic harassment. Soviet authorities have apparently mounted a large-scale assault on religion. Reportedly, they are taking control of church committees and excluding priests from them. Because of governmental control over admissions to Lithuania's only theological seminary, the shortage of priests is such that 139 parishes are said to have no permanent priest. Children are harassed to deter them from attending church services. In school, the children of believers are sometimes forced to join atheist organizations or are punished for not joining them.

Catholics attending religious festivities have been interrogated and physically abused, and historic shrines or artifacts have been desecrated. On March 4, 1984, the 500th anniversary of Lithuania's patron Saint Casimir, thousands of believers attended ceremonies throughout Lithuania despite extensive efforts by the Government to curtail the commemoration by spreading disinformation, withholding a message from Pope John Paul II, disconnecting loudspeakers outside crowded churches, and scheduling school activities for children during the ceremonies. The Government refused to allow either Pope John Paul II or his representative to visit Lithuania in honor of St. Casimir, and no Lithuanian religious leaders were permitted to attend ceremonies at the Vatican. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities approved the elevation of Bishop Liudas Povilonis to the rank of archbishop in the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Church, as well as the ordination of a new bishop in a public ceremony attended by a large number of believers.

Because of difficult conditions created by government reprisals and threats, a group of the Lithuanian Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights decided it could no longer function publicly and has gone underground. Although Soviet authorities have tried to suppress its activities, the Catholic Church in Lithuania remains an active and vigorous religious denomination.

In 1983, two Catholic priests were arrested for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, a founder of the Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, a key contributor to Catholic underground publications, and an activist in the struggle for religious freedom, was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment and 3 years of internal exile.

LITHUANIA

Father Sigita Tamkevicius, an associate of Svarinskas, played a major role in defending religious beliefs. He was apparently arrested during the trial of Father Svarinskas when he testified as a friendly witness. Many supporters of Tamkevicius were detained, interrogated, and in some cases briefly jailed when they in turn sought to attend his trial. Tamkevicius was sentenced in December 1983 to 6 years in a labor camp and 4 years in internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." In November 1984, Father Maturlonas, one of Father Tamkevicius' supporters, was arrested in Kybartai.

Bishop Steponavicius and 98 priests from the Kaunas Archdiocese sent a letter to the Soviet Communist Party General Secretary in Father Svarinskas' defense, emphasizing the impossibility for Catholic clergy of obeying both canon law and Soviet law on religious activities. Later in 1983, some 123,000 Lithuanians signed a petition for freedom for the two priests despite official efforts to prevent the collection of signatures. The January 1984 issue of the Chronicle of the Catholic Church contained the text of a petition to the Chairman of the Presidium of Lithuania which listed 13 specific examples of religious persecution. Included in the list were lack of religious literature, prohibition of religious processions to cemeteries, government seizure of a church built by the people, and prohibition of teaching religion to children.

For both religious and political reasons, there has been opposition in Lithuania to the drafting of young men into the Soviet Army, particularly for service in Afghanistan. Draft deferment or alternative service for reasons of conscience or religious belief is not permitted by the Soviet regime. Draftees who resist service in Afghanistan have been maltreated and threatened with court martial for treason. Those who enter the military service but continue their religious practices are subject to physical maltreatment and psychological abuse.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The right to travel has been restricted even further during the last 4 years. Many Lithuanians have family and personal ties with Poland. In past years, travel back and forth was relatively frequent. Since the emergence of the independent Solidarity trade union movement in Poland in 1980, the Polish-Lithuanian border has been closed for extended periods. The importation of printed materials from Poland was sharply curtailed during 1981. Soviet propaganda in Lithuania against the Solidarity union, designed to suppress the formation of a free labor movement in Lithuania, was particularly active.

Emigration from Lithuania virtually stopped in 1984. Although many Lithuanians have close relatives abroad, Soviet authorities use various vague phrases, such as "against the interests of the state," in order to refuse to permit the reunification of families. The authorities try to deter people from emigrating by dismissal from employment, psychological harassment, and alteration of the procedures for exit visa applications. At least six Lithuanian families have been repeatedly refused permission to emigrate to the United States. Another five families each contain a member with a

The Primate, the Episcopate as a whole, and the clergy continue to call for greater individual freedom and respect for human rights. The Government and the government-controlled press have often been critical of what they consider unwarranted church involvement in political affairs and the alleged use of churches, shrines, and pilgrimages for political purposes. A few members of the clergy have been singled out for special criticism and have been the subject of police investigations and public admonitions. Father Jerzy Popieluszko, kidnapped and murdered in October 1984, was one of the priests most frequently attacked for human rights activism, and in the first half of 1984 he was the target of an official investigation. Father Henryk Jankowski, a priest in Gdansk, was the subject of a similar investigation. In addition, two priests were separately assaulted, beaten, and tortured by unknown persons who intruded into their homes in what was widely believed to be an attempt at intimidating the Church.

There is no official discrimination against minority religions in Poland. However, the Eastern Orthodox, Uniate, Muslim, and Jewish faiths, and the various Protestant denominations, experience varying degrees of difficulty in maintaining places of worship and in providing training for their clergy both because of the number and distribution of their adherents and their limited financial resources. On balance, however, their situation, like that of the Roman Catholic Church, is better than that of their counterparts in other Communist countries.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.

There are no restrictions on travel within Poland, although each person intending to stay more than one day outside his normal place of residence (e.g., at a vacation spot) is supposed to register with the local militia. This can be done in person or by the hotel or hosts. There are no legal restrictions on changing one's residence, but the housing shortage makes this nearly impossible in practice. Cases of persons working in one location and legally "residing" hundreds of kilometers away are not uncommon.

A law of July 21, 1983, permits a plant manager in an "essential industry" to prolong by 6 months the employment of any worker who gives notice to terminate employment. It also sets up compulsory labor exchanges which provide a potential basis for restricting the mobility of workers connected with the dissolved Solidarity union or involved in new trade union activities considered undesirable by the state.

In conjunction with the lifting of martial law, the Government announced a policy of liberalized passport issuance, and a new law went into effect in late 1983. Passport offices must now accept all applications for passports and give written reasons for any denials of issuance, a significant improvement from previous times when offices could and often did simply refuse to accept applications. However, the authorities still require a notarized invitation from a relative or friend outside of Poland before passport issuance can be considered for individual travel to the West. A passport must be returned after completion of travel, and a new application submitted for each trip abroad.

In order to receive an emigration passport, a Pole must divest himself of all property and obtain customs permission for any personal items he or she wishes to take. Once residing abroad, a Polish citizen must exchange an emigration passport for a consular passport (one issued by a Polish consulate abroad) for return trips to Poland. Otherwise there are no formal restrictions on an emigrant's return to Poland.

Only Polish citizens who have been issued emigration passports are legally permitted to take up residence in another country. Polish citizens who depart Poland on tourist passports and take up residence abroad without the permission of the Polish Government may, should they return to Poland for a temporary stay, experience difficulties departing again. Polish citizens who emigrate legally from Poland and who desire to return for brief visits on consular passports generally experience few difficulties with the authorities.

Under Polish citizenship law, only the Council of State may revoke citizenship. According to the law, involuntary revocation must be based on one of the following illegal activities: actions violating the duty of allegiance to the Polish state; actions detrimental to the substantial interests of Poland; departure from Poland after May 9, 1945, and failure to return when so requested by the Polish Government; evasion of military service; or conviction abroad of a crime also recognized as a felony under Polish criminal law. The Government has rarely invoked any of the foregoing provisions.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

General Jaruzelski governs the country along with his close advisors, including trusted colleagues usually from the armed forces, but also from the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party, the technocracy, and the security apparatus. The Military Council of National Salvation dissolved itself with the ending of martial law, but the military continues to have unusually strong influence. Although technically the Communists share power with two other parties, the United Peasants Party and the Democratic Party, in fact the latter two are dominated by the former.

The Constitution specifies that the Sejm (Parliament) is the chief legislative body of the country. While in practice the Sejm approves bills presented to it by the executive with only token dissent, since 1980 a substantial minority of opposition votes has occasionally been recorded, usually on economic issues. Sejm elections to be held in 1984 have been postponed at least until late 1985. In the past, election procedures assured the Communists of a majority of seats.

After public consultations the Sejm enacted a new local election law in February 1984. This law introduced the principle that two candidates may contest each seat, but the method of selecting these candidates and of pairing them virtually assured that the result would be acceptable to the ruling elite. The government-sponsored Patriotic Movement for National Renewal was made the focus of this electoral process. A round of public appearances and media presentations by various candidates preceded the first elections of the post-martial law period, held in June for

Life on the Soviet Precipice



Even official Soviet sources acknowledge that religious revival is breaking out among young people. Below: Some foreign youth studying in the USSR communicate their Christian faith to Soviet students.



Christians in the USSR are seeing revival despite the most severe repressions since Khrushchev.

In the late 1950s Nikita Khrushchev boasted that religion in the USSR would become obsolete by 1965. When that happened, he hyperbolically said he would insist that at least one Christian be preserved and placed in a museum so that future generations of Soviets could view an extinct species.

The fossilization of religion in the USSR predicted by a succession of Soviet leaders has not happened despite Communist rule that cost the lives of an estimated 60 million Soviet citizens between 1917 and 1953. Some 66 million others were incarcerated, of whom as many as half may have been Christian believers.

Not only has religion survived in the USSR, but reports—from sources as wide-ranging as the Soviet and Western press—are reaching the world of a recrudescence of religion. Not yet a conflagration, sparks of spiritual revival are discernible from the Baltic Sea to Siberia, and in some satellite countries.

This rise in religious interest is occurring despite the most severe repression since Khrushchev's virulent antireligion crusade of the early 1960s. Beset by internal problems and international setbacks, Soviet leaders have assumed an increasingly isolationist, reactionary stance. The Kremlin's campaign for conformity and compliance in a tightening, totalitarian society includes a crackdown on religion. "We're living on a precipice these days," said one Soviet Christian.

Despite current repressions, some Soviet sources acknowledge that 15 to 20 percent of the adult population in the USSR are religious. David Barrett, compiler of the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, estimates that in the Soviet Union (pop. 273 million) there are 96,726,500 "affiliated" Christians, 23 percent of them nonpracticing. In his book *Soviet Believers: The Religious Sector of the Population*, Sovietologist William Fletcher estimated in 1981 that "around 45 percent, and hence 115 million of the [total] population, belong to

the religious sector to some degree or another."

That nearly half of its citizens may be religious may not be surprising in a country once called "Holy Rus," where most citizens once belonged to the state Orthodox church. Also, as many as 50 million Muslims live in the Soviet Union, primarily in Central Asian regions. Nevertheless, strong religious adherence is remarkable in a country that has experienced 68 years of militant Marxism-Leninism, an ideology to which atheism is integral.

The number of known Christian prisoners in the USSR has risen to 332, more than twice the number at any period since the early 1960s. Most leading Christians and other dissident activists are in prison or have been exiled from the USSR.

During 68 years of Soviet rule, the "freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or antireligious propaganda" guaranteed by the Soviet constitution has consisted primarily of freedom to perform religious rites in a restricted number of houses of worship permitted by the government. In the last few years, even the limited freedoms allowed during some periods of Soviet history have been further circumscribed by new legislation. For example, a 1983 law making infractions of labor camp regulations a criminal offense has been used as a pretext for extending the sentences of Christian prisoners. Since 1984, Christians and others who accept Christian literature or funds from abroad are subject to heavy prison sentences under the revised penal code on anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Under a 1984 decree, Christians and others who offer foreigners lodging or transportation may be fined severely.

Furthermore, continuing covert Soviet policies lead to closure of registered churches, harassment of pastors and priests, removal of children from Christian families, and discrimination against believers at all levels of life.

But a correlation exists between repression and religious revival. During some periods of severe persecution (such as the earlier Stalinist years), *open* religious adherence in the USSR plummeted. By the end of 1939, only four Baptist–Evangelical Christian churches remained open. During World War II, however, Stalin granted concessions to the church in order to enlist the

These cartoons are used for antireligious propaganda. The one on the left depicts a fish hook, labeled "sects," trying to entice fish with a ticket to heaven. The cartoon on the right shows a young woman praying to pass an exam in scientific atheism. In the foreground, her mother is saying: "I don't care how she does it, as long as she passes."

support of Christian citizens; as many as 20,000 churches sprang up across the USSR in the 1940s and '50s. Later, during Khrushchev's antireligion campaign, at least 12,500 of these churches (primarily Orthodox) were closed. Citing a proverb to describe the complex relation between religious repression and revival, one Russian Christian told us, "If you pound a stick, it may break. But if you pound too hard, it will stick."

In some nations, such as Albania, restrictions, repressions, and persecutions have seemingly annihilated religion. In others, such as Poland, adversity has roused Christians, and religion has rooted more firmly. Even during the most severe periods of persecution in the Soviet Union, seeds of the gospel were sown by Christian prisoners and martyrs. "The churches of the Soviet Union can easily be closed," Stalin once said. "But then the peasant and the peasant woman become a church underground and build the church in their souls. Such churches cannot be controlled by the secret police."

Even before the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin sounded the battle cry against religion: "Religion and communism are incompatible in theory as well as in practice. . . . We must fight religion." Although strategies and tactics have varied, Lenin's successors have all waged war against religion and promoted atheism as a crucial part of that campaign. Six million professional propagandists promulgate atheism in the USSR. In 1982 in Ashkhabad, the capital of mostly Muslim Turkmenistan, local Soviet authorities announced the opening of the first of 22 new "universities," featuring a two-year curriculum to train missionaries of atheism.

From kindergarten through university, atheism courses are compulsory in Soviet education. One book, *Atheistic Education in the Schools: Questions of Theory and Practice*, states: "The atheistic education of youth in our country is realized through a system of educational and upbringing institutions and through Young Pioneer and Komsomol [Young Communist League] organizations . . . a major role in this system belongs to the schools. . . ."

Annually, the Kremlin invests millions of rubles to produce a plethora of atheistic publications, films, lectures, exhibitions, and other presentations. In the Soviet press, articles regularly appear calling for more convincing atheistic propaganda and greater vigilance in the struggle against religion.

The October 11, 1984, issue of *Pravda* exhorted, "It is imperative to carry out more active propaganda of scientific-materialistic opinions, pay more attention to atheistic education. . . . The Party is particularly concerned that young people should form firm atheistic convictions." The steady stream of articles related to religion and atheism in the Soviet press indirectly confirms continued and seemingly spreading spiritual interest in those areas of the

SLAVIC GOSPEL ASSOCIATION PHOTOS



CREED

Above: A pastor baptizes several young women in Siberia. Right: Christian musicians Sergei Timokhin, left, and Valeri Barinov were sent to labor camps.

USSR where religion is strongest.

The surfeit of atheism in the Soviet Union has helped ignite spiritual curiosity. University students are increasingly asking, "Why, if there is no God, is it necessary to speak against him so much?" Staff members of the Slavic Gospel Association have heard of many conversions of atheists and agnostics. In the Ukraine, an atheism propagandist permitted to read the Gospels so as to combat Christianity became a believer in the process. In Siberia, a scientist, whose mother was an ardent member of the Znanie Society (an organization that propagates atheism), had never attended a church, read the Scriptures, or been well acquainted with Christians. He became a believer as he read the account of Nikolai Gogol's conversion in Gogol's letters.

The chasm that exists today between Marxist promises of another generation and the reality of the present situation in the Soviet Union has severely shaken the Russian soul. It is almost as if the country has lost its moral moorings. Commenting on this phenomenon, observer George Feifer says, "People from nonideological societies cannot easily grasp the significance of this. It is as if the American Bible Belt had lost its faith in God. A traveler in Russia has a sensation of moving in the wake of an epidemic of rejected belief." Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovski states, "From top to bottom no one believes in Marxist dogma anymore, even though they refer to it and use it as a stick to beat one another with."

Even jokes often display disdain for Marxism. One such joke asks and answers three questions: "What is philosophy? Searching in a dark room for a black bed. What is Marxism? Searching in a dark room for a black bed that isn't there. What is Marxism-Leninism? Searching in a dark room for a black bed that isn't there and shouting, 'I've found it!' "

The spiritual emptiness created by the bankruptcy of Marxism is especially abhorrent to Russians, an innately ideological people. In his book *Origins of Russian Communism*, Russian Orthodox philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev characterizes this idealism, which initially attracted many to Marxism: "What was scientific theory in the West, a hypothesis or, in any case, a relative truth, partial, making no claim to be universal, became among the Russian intelligentsia a dogma, a sort of

religious revelation. The Russian spirit craves for wholeness. . . . It yearns for the absolute and desires to subordinate everything to the Absolute. . . ."

Russian author Fyodor Dostoevsky once wrote, "Yes, for real Russians the questions of God's existence and of immortality, or, as you say, the same questions turned inside out, come first and foremost, and of course they should. . . . For the secret of man's being is not only to live, but to have something to live for."

The quest for spiritual reality is particularly pronounced among Soviet youth. Significantly, the ranks of Christians are being replenished by many young people from nonreligious families—some from the Soviet elite. These trends alarm Soviet authorities, who may tolerate religion among the old and ignorant but cannot ideologically explain its existence among youth, inculcated from infancy in Marxist atheism.

Even official Soviet sociological surveys reveal increasing indifference toward atheism among youth. One 1982 survey asked young workers what their attitude would be toward a colleague who participated in the baptism of a child. Between 1969 and 1978, those who would openly condemn the colleague fell from 12.4 percent to 10 percent. Those who would tacitly condemn him fell from 15.7 to 8 percent. Those to whom the matter was immaterial rose from 60.5 percent to 66.3 percent.

Evident among all Christian denominations, the revival of Christianity among youth is most visible among evangelicals. In a 1982 article in the *Los Angeles Times*, Robert Gillett wrote: "Interest in religion in the Soviet Union has unquestionably declined in the more than 60 years since the Bolshevik revolution, but many young men and women are now turning back toward religion—and often not to the relatively passive and ritualistic Orthodox faith of their grandparents but to the passionate and proselytizing evangelical Christian sects that Soviet authorities find much harder to co-opt and control" (© *L.A. Times*; reprinted by permission).

One young Baptist, Valeri Barinov—recently sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison for his impassioned Christian witness—composed music that struck a resonant chord among many searching youth. In response to his opera, *Trumpet Call*, young people across the Soviet Union wrote to Barinov, asking about the message of his music. In a letter to the West, the musician wrote, "On the basis of these letters it is evident that people, especially young people, are beginning to wake up from a spiritual slumber which has been caused by official atheism. People are beginning to understand that a desolate soul cannot be satisfied wth alcohol, drugs, or even wealth. It is as if the cry of the spirit of our people is expressed in these letters—we want to know about God, we need God. . . ."

Besides the noticeable numbers of young people in church meetings, spiritual renewal also is manifest by unofficial groups and gatherings held outside churches. One of these, the Christian Seminar for the Problems of Religious Renaissance in Russia, is representative of an unknown number of similar house groups that meet secretly. They are often dismantled if discovered by the KGB (the Soviet secret police). Formed in 1974 among newly converted young Orthodox Christians, Christian Seminar pursued *obschina* (community) and *sobornost* (fellowship), and considered the works of a spectrum of Christian writers, including Berdyaev, Solovyov, and Billy Graham. One member, Vladimir Poresch, now in prison, notes that seminar members welcomed "the normal human speech" they were able to cultivate with each other in unfettered discussions.

The founder of Christian Seminar, Alexander Ogorodnikov, also now in prison, followed a path illustrative of other young Soviet intellectuals who have turned to Christianity. An outstanding student, Ogorodnikov's interest in Christianity was stirred when he was permitted to see Pasolini's film *The Gospel According to St. Matthew* at the

Left: This Russian Orthodox church in Leningrad was converted into a museum. Below: Soviet citizens visit a museum of religion and atheism in a former Orthodox cathedral, also in Leningrad.

cinematography institute where he was studying.

Youth and intellectuals are the two often-overlapping sectors of Soviet society where flames of spiritual revival are today burning most brightly. For example, spiritual themes are becoming increasingly visible in the arts. Reports also are reaching the West of spiritual probings among scientists—intellectuals who should have no spiritual inclinations according to Marxist cosmology.

An acquaintance of ours, a Christian Eastern European scientist, told us about working at a science research institute in the Soviet Union. Although none of his colleagues dared attend church, several were intensely interested in spiritual subjects and eagerly participated in a clandestine Bible study that our friend organized.

In 1970, dissident publicist Mark Popovsky unofficially conducted a survey to analyze the extent of religious belief among scientists. One hundred questionnaires were cautiously distributed among scientists from several cities in the Soviet Union. Ninety-five percent of the respondents maintained that there was no contradiction between science and religion. Some went to considerable lengths to explain that the two have again come very close after a period of mutual estrangement in the nineteenth century.

In response to a question asking how widespread are religious convictions among Soviet scientists, most respondents said that of 1,200,000 natural scientists in the USSR, 100,000 to 150,000 were religious believers—some 10 percent on the average. Almost all respondents stated that religious convictions have a direct positive impact on man's creativity and, hence, on his productivity as a scholar.

Religious renewal among intellectuals, youth, and other strata of Soviet society is a complex phenomenon, of which evangelical Christianity is only one strand. For some Russian Orthodox Slavophiles, for instance, Christianity is inextricably interwoven with patriotism and nationalism. Nationalism is also a potent force in spiritually fervent Catholic Lithuania and in the religious revival occurring in Poland.

KESTON COLLEGE

Dudko

A return to Christianity for some Soviets appears to be motivated primarily by the desire to dissent. Christianity, with its historic and nationalistic supports, provides a strong challenge to the Soviet Communist government and, even with all the restrictions imposed upon religion, offers almost the only officially tolerated alternative to communism within Soviet society.

The search for spiritual reality by some Russians is characterized by a fascination with the occult and with Eastern religions. In 1983, the Soviet newspaper *Trud* reported that some young people are seeking the services of fortune tellers rather than relying on the Komsomol. All of this is a manifestation of the current religious renaissance, and Western Christians may wonder how strong an element biblical Christianity is among the swirling currents of religious revival.

Statistics seemingly do not indicate

(continued on page 68)

"We Used to Think the Churches Would Disappear"

Articles in the Kremlin-controlled Soviet press are confirming the phenomenon of religious renewal in the USSR by deploring the resilience of religion and acknowledging its resurgence.

- In an August 24, 1984, interview with *Christian Science Monitor*, Yuri Smirnov, head of international information for the Soviet Council for Religious Affairs, conceded, "We used to think in a primitive way, after the revolution, that the old people would die and the churches would disappear. But that hasn't happened."
- The Soviet armed forces newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), expressed concern in a March 21, 1984, article about signs of religiosity among recruits. Urging instructors to "step up atheistic work," the writer of the article complained, "Time and again one sees the glint of a copper cross on the chest of a recruit."
- In a June 1983 speech to the Central Committee Plenum, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko acknowledged that religion still influences the lives of "not a very insignificant part of the population."
- A 1982 article in the Soviet publication *Questions of Scientific Atheism* examined what the author, P. Kurochkin, called "causes of a definite revival of religion or at least of the interest in religion in certain regions and in some population layers" of the USSR.
- On October 18, 1984, *Pravda* indicated increased Kremlin concern that large numbers of young people are drifting to religion and called on schools and youth organizations to intensify atheistic propaganda. The editorial accused "imperialist circles" in the West of using religion as a weapon against communism.

Recently, Western media also have spotted signs of religious renewal in Iron Curtain countries.

- A 1984 report from *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, the publication of the broadcasting service to the USSR and Eastern Europe sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency, states, "A new phenomenon, which is often described as a 'religious revival,' can be observed in Eastern Europe and in parts of the Soviet Union, especially the Baltic States."
- A January 23, 1984, *New York Times* article entitled "Signs of Religious Renewal Rising Across East Europe" reported: "Eastern European communist parties, with the exception of Albania, appear to have abandoned the hope that religion—Marx's opiate of the people—will vanish in some foreseeable future."
- On September 10, 1983, *The Economist* observed, "Church attendances are increasing in many cities in Russia, Rumania, and Bulgaria . . . the religious stirrings are viewed with apprehension by communist governments."
- In a February 1981 article in *Harper's* magazine, Soviet observer George Feifer wrote: "Hence the return-to-roots search for 'new' values in old Russia. This is linked to the religious revival, the country's most important social movement by far, despite persecution whose severity and range is scarcely [comprehendible] to Westerners." □

INSIGHT

(continued from page 28)

significant growth among evangelicals. However, in a nation where religious manifestations are restricted, statistical data may primarily reveal the cost of open membership in registered churches and the difficulty in obtaining government permission to build new churches. Neither do statistics shed much light on the number of catacomb churches and crypto-Christians.

Several identifiable factors are, however, fueling the flames of biblical Christianity. Forbidden to proclaim their faith verbally, Christians provide powerful witness through the presence of Christ radiated in their lives. In Moscow, a Christian youth group regularly visits nearby villages and seeks out widows, invalids, and other needy people for whom they can chop wood and perform other chores. In a city in Siberia, an atheistic agitator persistently harassed believers meeting in an unregistered congregation. The agitator became ill with cancer. Dying in the hospital, he received few visits from his atheistic comrades, but the Christians he had persecuted, laden with flowers and food, came to his bedside daily.



Television is one medium used by 6 million professional propagandists in the USSR.

No missions or parachurch organizations are permitted in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Soviet believers strive to fulfill the Great Commission. "In our country, every Christian is a missionary," a Baptist leader once told us. Although Soviet Christians cannot travel to foreign countries as missionaries, some are moving to unevangelized areas of their own country, primarily for missionary purposes.

Soviet authorities regularly blame rising religious interest in the USSR on external influences. An article in *Radyanska Ukraina* (Aug. 18, 1984), titled "Blessing—in the name of the CIA: Clerical Anti-Soviets—an Instrument of Anti-Communism," condemns religious organizations in the West that are preoccupied with the religious situation in the USSR. The May 25, 1984, issue of *Pravda* charged that there was a worldwide conspiracy by Christians, Muslims, and Jewish extremists to undermine the Soviet Union by fostering religion there. "One must not underestimate the danger," *Pravda* cautioned.

It is true that many Christian individuals and organizations are actively stoking embers of spiritual revival in the USSR. Western Christians are officially and unofficially importing Bibles and Christian literature into the USSR. Also, monthly, more than 2,000 broadcasts are beamed into the Soviet Union from Protestant international radio stations. Catholic and Orthodox programs also are transmitted from Radio Vatican, Voice of America, Radio Liberty, the BBC, and elsewhere.

Christian broadcasts have stirred spiritual renewal. David Barrett estimates that there are 39,750 congregations of isolated radio churches scattered across the Soviet Union. Radio missionaries emphasize the significance of Christian broadcasting to church growth. One reports: "In one town of Russia there were no Christians at all. Eight people of that town began listening to the Christian broadcasts. . . . Because of those eight friends, today there is a registered church there. Many young people are being converted. There are revivals all over the country. . . . Many Russian believers fast and pray every Friday for better reception of shortwave broadcasts and for revival."

While the future path of religious revival in the USSR is impossible to predict ("the wind blows where it wishes"), many Christians in the East and West are expectant. Russian Orthodox priest Dmitri Dudko, for example, forecasts a religious revival in the USSR—particularly among youth—that cannot be halted. "Persecution and attacks on religious themes accelerate the religious process," he says. "Young people who are always sensitive to contemporary processes of any sort are interested in religion and this can't be halted anymore. It's useless to even try. Everyone must hurry to take part in the process."

In a *samizdat* (underground press) article circulated in 1984, a Russian Christian named N. Alexiev, wrote: "But the 'transmission of religion' in our country is occurring outside the limits of the religious 'family.' It escapes the control and even the observation of the forces that would like to see the church annihilated from Russian soil. . . . The authorities can, with great effort and loss, slow the growth of religiousness in our country. . . . But to stop this movement, this growth, to crush it, to annihilate it, they can't do it."

Malcolm Muggeridge has written, "After more than half a century of authoritarian government bent on extirpating the Christian religion and all its work, Christ is alive in the USSR as nowhere else."

French Catholic writer François Mauriac once said that if he saw light anywhere in the world, it was coming only from Russia.

Some East European Christians envision a spiritual fire in the USSR and Eastern Europe that will spread beyond their borders, kindling revival in other countries. An East European scientist told us, "Communism with the suffering it has brought to believers has swept away corrupt and lukewarm Christianity in our country. It has created a vacuum in millions of people . . . which can be truly filled only with vital Christianity. And that is what is happening—Christianity, purified and revitalized, is spreading throughout our country. Perhaps the day will come when our suffering church will be sending missionaries to your country."

After 68 years of militant Marxist atheism, religion has not been incinerated in the Soviet Union. In fact, out of the ashes of atheism, a phoenix of religious revival is rising.

ANITA AND PETER DEYNEKA, JR.

Anita Deyneka is a teacher in the Slavic Gospel Association's Institute of Slavic Studies. Her husband, Peter, Jr., is the director of the SGA.

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

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God and Man in the Soviet Union

Orwell was wrong. Despite the endless propaganda efforts of Big Brother, religious belief int he Soviet Union has not withered away.

STEPHEN MILLER

IN THE SOVIET UNION there is an old joke about two communists who are eager to eradicate religion. They hide in a church while an old babushka kneels at the altar and asks god to protect Brezhnev. Emerging from his hiding place, one communist says: "There is no God, babushka. Sixty years ago you prayed for the Czar." The old lady replies: "I did. And look what happened to him."

Until about 15 years ago, it was commonplace for Western observers to assume that in the Soviet Union only babushkas believed in God. Moreover, many Soviet citizens probably agreed with this assessment. In Andrei Sinyavsky's powerful novel, *The Makepiece Experiment,* the narrator regards such babushkas as mysterious survivors of an earlier culture. "The mothers were there, spread all over the floor of the church like old mushrooms, so old and humped and tottering it was a wonder they were still alive. Where did they find the strength to keep alive, let alone drag themselves to church?" The narrator is moved by the sight of these women, but mostly he is puzzled by them.

Things have changed. In recent years many Western observers have come to realize that not only babushkas are found in Soviet churches. According to Gail Lapidus, an American scholar, "there is heightened interest among younger people, evident in increased church attendance, growing use of religious symbolism and the affirmation of moral and spiritual values . . ."

Some Western observers, most notably a group of American church officials who visited the Soviet Union this past June, want to give credit to Soviet leaders for allowing Soviet citizens to worship as they please. Religious freedom, these gullible souls often point out, is guaranteed by the Soviet constitution. But most observers disagree with such a benign assessment of the regime's attitude towards religion. Soviet media, they point out, continually spew out anti-religious and pro-atheist propaganda.

The Western observer who knows most about the situation of believers in Soviet-bloc countries is the Rev. Dr. Michael Bourdeaux, the founder and director of Keston College — an independent, British-based research center that monitors religious life in Eastern Europe and publishes a journal, *Religion in Communist Lands.* In a recent interview with Radio Liberty, based in Munich, Bourdeaux said that the situation has gotten significantly worse during the last five years. "The policy of the Soviet regime . . . is to squeeze all believers into one mold, to make sure they all conform to the present policies of the Soviet government and to the views of official church leaders that religion is going along very well."

According to Bourdeaux, the religious revival is taking place despite attempts on the part of the regime to make life very difficult for those who want to proselytize in behalf of religion. The revival began in the 1960s, perhaps as a response to Khrushchev's strong anti-religious policies. At that time hundreds — perhaps even thousands — of churches were destroyed or closed down because Khrushchev argued that "Communist education presupposes emancipation from religious prejudices and superstitions." Nowadays churches are no longer being destroyed, but many are being converted into places "for social and cultural purposes" — that is, into places where atheist rites are held and atheist sermons delivered. The regime wants to persuade the world that it allows believers to worship as they please, but it also desperately wants to contain the religious revival. As a Party theorist put it in 1981: "No communist can afford to . . . adopt a passive attitude towards religious ideology, which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism."

Soviet policy towards believers, however, is not uniform. The regime takes a dim view of religious groups that seem to have a nationalist tinge, especially those that look to non-Soviet religious leaders for spiritual guidance. All specifically Ukrainian religious institutions are suppressed, Bourdeaux says, and Ukrainian Catholics — members of a church that is not recognized under Soviet law — have come in for particularly harsh treatment. Iosyf Terelya, the head of an "Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church" in the Ukraine, has spent 18 years in labor camps and psychiatric hospitals because he wants to get the Ukrainian Catholic church

registered — that is, recognized as legal under Soviet law. Released in 1981, he continued to file petitions, and as a result was rearrested in 1982.

Lithuanian Catholics have also been treated harshly, but the church is registered and the regime has made some concessions to church leaders, allowing four Lithuanian bishops to visit the Vatican in 1983.

Treated most harshly are the members of unregistered Protestant sects. In the early Sixties these sects broke away from the official "All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists" because they regarded that group as simply a docile tool of the regime. According to Oxana Antic, who monitors religious dissidence for Radio Liberty Research, there has been no let-up in the persecution of members of these sects. Many are serving long sentences in labor camps, and several leading members of the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, their umbrella organization, have been given a second term before having finished serving their first term.

A Soviet citizen is much less likely to end up in a psychiatric hospital or labor camp if he is a Moslem or a member of the Russian Orthodox church, but even these believers must refrain from being "active" believers. They cannot speak up for religious freedom in general nor can they propagate on behalf of religion. Distribution of religious literature is strictly forbidden. In 1983, 13 Moslems in Tashkent were sentenced to prison terms for reproducing and selling a pamphlet entitled "On Muslim Faith" as well as cassettes with recordings of religious prayers from the Koran. In the same year, a group of young Russian Orthodox believers who reproduced and disseminated prayer books and other religious literature met the same fate.

Jews are a special case. Officially categorized as a nationality, not a religious group, Jews are regarded with suspicion as disloyal Soviet citizens who want to leave the Soviet Union. They are not persecuted the way the members of unregistered protestant sects are, but they are certainly subject to various forms of discrimination. Though the regime sponsors a number of Yiddish cultural activities — in fact it has increased its support for these activities in recent months — it exerts the same pressures on Jewish believers as it does on other believers.

How extensive is the religious revival? It would be a mistake to offer exact figures, since religious affiliation is not taken note of in any official documents concerning Soviet citizens. A survey taken by Radio Liberty of almost 4,000 Soviet citizens in the West indicates that almost 47% of the adult urban population of the Soviet Union has some kind of religious affiliation. Bourdeaux and others point out that Protestant sects are growing much faster than any other group, though they remain very much in the minority. According to some estimates, there are about 500,000 members of Protestant sects, 200,000 of them members of unregistered sects. The religious revival taking place throughout the Soviet Union, but Bourdeaux and others say that religious ferment is the strongest in the Baltic states and the Ukraine.

What worries Soviet leaders is not the persisten belief among babushkas but the strong interest in religio the part of many young people. Articles in the Soviet have spoken of the current fad among the young for va religious objects such as crosses and icons. And in 19 Soviet journal contained two articles that dealt with chil leaving their parents because of the *children's* religious victions.

Clearly the regime can't arrest everyone who re an interest in religion. What the regime has done, aside arresting those who proselytize, is increase the numb pro-atheist organizations as well as make it very difficu obtain religious literature. In the Western Ukraine, for ex ple, there are 587 commissions for the inculcation of S festivals and rites whose task it is to substitute Ma Leninist rites for religious ones. There are also [illegible] ughout the Soviet Un religious literature is hard to come by. It cannot be bro in bookstores, and even most parishes lack relig literature to distribute to their members.

There are also hidden pressures to contend v Young people fear that their careers will be hurt if they seen going to church. More frightening is the possibili losing one's children to the state, since a 1968 law says every child is to be brought up "in the spirit of the m code of the builder of communism." Practicing relig then, is in Soviet eyes a kind of child abuse, and s members of unregistered sects have had their children ta away from them, to be "re-educated" by the state.

No doubt, the regime's policies have made m Soviet citizens think twice about openly professing relig

beliefs. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Soviet citizens are going to church and an increasing number are proselytizing. In recent months Soviet newspapers have carried reports of young people carrying crosses, singing religious songs, or selling religious scenes on buses and trains.

Those who wonder why such a religious revival is taking place, it is tempting to reply: Why not? After all, the atheist propaganda ground out by the regime is boring and mindless, so there was bound to be a reaction to it. But one shouldn't underestimate the influence of particular individuals — above all, Pope John Paul II, who has stirred up an interest in religion as well as given moral support to believers throughout the Soviet bloc. Bourdeaux recounts that Keston College recently received a letter from a Pentecostal group in Siberia that was addressed to "the Polish Pope." Another major influence has been Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whose writings are widely circulated in the Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn constantly argues that one of the chief reasons for totalitarianism is the decline in religious belief.

Finally, religion has become intellectually respectable, so that many artists, writers, and intellectuals are more inclined to take religion seriously if not become believers themselves. If in the past religious thought was considered obscurantist and reactionary, now the tables are turned: it is Marxist-Leninist thought that is considered obscurantist and reactionary.

The religious revival has a long way to go before it poses a real threat to the Soviet regime, but it does erode the Party's basis for legitimacy, since one of the central tenets of Marxism-Leninism is atheism. The Soviet leaders are worried, especially about religious ferment in areas where nationalism remains strong, and so they have recently begun to resort to their old rhetorical standby. In 1983, a Moscow journal published a series of articles that insinuated all believers are potential spies and that many receive money from Western intelligence agencies.

Practicing religion, in Soviet eyes, is a kind of child abuse, and some members of unregistered sects have had their children taken away, to be "re-educated" by the state.

And in 1983 a Soviet theoretician said that "religious centers" in the West "are trying to urge the church on to an active offensive against Marxist-Leninist ideology." Thus the religious revival is nothing but a bourgeois-fascist plot to overthrow the Soviet Union.

Of course, Soviet leaders don't really think that the religious revival is totally manipulated by the West, but they do worry — and rightly so — that the explosive mixture of nationalism and religion to be found in Poland may infect — indeed has already infected — such areas of the Soviet Union as the Ukraine and the Baltic states. But much of the religious revival is home grown and would have happened even if there were no Pope John Paul II.

It is impossible to know whether the communists or the babushka will have the last laugh. We cannot say what long-range effect the religious revival will have, but we can say one thing with certainty: Orwell was wrong. In the long run, despite Big Brother's endless propaganda, people will think their own thoughts, and it is inevitable that some of them will be religious in nature. The regime has about as much chance of wiping out religious belief as it has of convincing Soviet citizens that the State will wither away.

Stephen Miller works for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and is the author of Excellence and Equity: The National Endowment for the Humanities *(University of Kentucky Press).*

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Paul Johnson



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