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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 7/7/2015

File Folder IRELAND (3/1-83-3/10/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 15

SKINNER

59

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
168233	REPORT		1	8/2/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

National Security Council
The White House

560

1220P
MAR 01 1983

Package # 1106

Bourque

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>AB</i>	<i>A</i>
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>m</i>	
Jacque Hill	3	<i>✓</i>	
Judge Clark	4	<i>✓</i>	<i>A</i>
John Poindexter	5	<i>✓</i>	
Staff Secretary	6		<i>D</i>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

NOTE

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other *DAILEY*

COMMENTS

Judge,

This is only referred to in the FBI report.

F10:

This letter should have been on small paper. Should be brought to attention of whom ever typed. AB

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1983

Mario
Dear Congressman Biaggi:

Thank you very much for your letter of February 14 concerning a meeting on the subject of Ireland. I regret that I will not be able to meet with you and your delegation. I know that we all share a commitment to solving the problems of Northern Ireland through peaceful means based on the will of the people of Northern Ireland. Americans who love Ireland have the responsibility of supporting peaceful attempts to solve these problems and speaking out against the men of violence.

Sincerely,

Bill

William P. Clark

The Honorable
Mario Biaggi
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

REFERRAL

DATE: 08 MAR 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: BIAGGI, MARIO

SOURCE: CLARK

DATE: 08 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: IRELAND CONGRESSIONAL

AC

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO BIAGGI LTR RE REQUEST FOR MTG RE IRELAND

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH TO PETER H. DAILEY

US AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND

DUBLIN

DUE DATE: 11 MAR 83

COMMENTS: ** COURTESY COPY OF CLARK LTR


FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER

STAFF SECRETARY

NW
4**MEMORANDUM**ACTION**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

February 23, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: DENNIS G. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Biaggi's Letter

Attached for your signature is a reply to a letter from Mario Biaggi requesting a meeting with you to discuss the issue of reunification of Ireland. You have nothing to gain from such a meeting and the letter for your signature at Tab I politely turns down the request.

Peter Peter Sommer concurs.RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove *Ltr signed 3/5/83.*

Tab I	Letter to Biaggi
Tab A	Biaggi letter

*I am not a member of this org!
send cc. of letter to D.P. Daily*

MARIO BIAGGI
10TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2464

DISTRICT OFFICES:
BRONX
2004 WILLIAMSBRIDGE ROAD
BRONX, NEW YORK 10461
(212) 931-0100

QUEENS
SECOND FLOOR
22-02 STEINWAY STREET
QUEENS, NEW YORK 11105
(212) 932-4448

1106 5
FEB 1 1983
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

February 14, 1983

Hon. William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Judge Clark:

As Chairman of the bi-partisan Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs, and on behalf of a delegation of concerned Irish Americans mostly from the Ancient Order of Hibernians, I am writing to request a meeting with you to discuss the issue of the reunification of Ireland.

This meeting would be the direct outgrowth of a meeting which I attended in New York on January 21, 1983 sponsored by Mr. James A. Delaney, one of the National Directors of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. The meeting was called to discuss strategies aimed at developing a more positive United States role in the cause of peace and justice in Ireland. Among those who would attend the meeting is Mr. Joseph A. Roche, National President of the Ancient Order of Hibernians.

In light of a brief discussion I had with you on the subject of Ireland and your own trip to Ireland as well as your membership in the Ancient Order of Hibernians, I hope you will be able to find time to meet with the delegation. I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

With warm regards, I am

Sincerely,


MARIO BIAGGI, M.C.

P.S. Attached please find a list of names and addresses of individuals who would want to be included in any meeting you would agree to. They were in attendance with me on January 21 in New York.

COMMITTEES:
EDUCATION AND LABOR

SUBCOMMITTEES:
ELEMENTARY, SECONDARY AND
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
SELECT EDUCATION

VICE-CHAIRMAN
MERCHANT MARINE AND
FISHERIES
CONGRESSIONAL PORT CAUCUS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
CHAIRMAN,
MERCHANT MARINE
COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

SUBCOMMITTEE:
CHAIRMAN, HUMAN SERVICES

DEMOCRATIC STEERING AND
POLICY COMMITTEE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
(EX-OFFICIO)

CHAIRMAN, AD HOC
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR IRISH AFFAIRS

Clark, William P.

-2-

February 14, 1983

- 1) Joseph A. Roche, National President, Ancient Order
of Hibernians, 13002 Fork Road, Baldwin, Maryland 21013
- 2) James A. Delaney, National Director/Chairman, Right to
Life Committee, 247 Patricia Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78216
- 3) James P. Shannon, National Director/Constitution Ritual and
Progress Committee, 747 Val Sereno, Olivenhain, California
92024

RECEIVED 16 FEB 83 17

TO CLARK

FROM BIAGGI, MARIO

DOCDATE 14 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: IRELAND

CONGRESSIONAL

AC

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ CLARK RE REUNIFICATION OF IRELAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 19 FEB 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLAIR

SOMMER

FORTIER

MYER

KIMMITT

HILL

COMMENTS

REF#

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(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Clark	3/1	In Signature	3/5	
	MAR 0 8 1983	Clark spd ltr		DB

DISPATCH

3/08

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)MB

cy to AMB Peter Dailey done MB

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

WPC HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

NLRR 74875-301-7

October 4, 1982

BY KDB NARA DATE 7/2/13

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Irish Foreign Minister Collins
October 4, 1982, 10:30 a.m.

Attached is a State briefing paper for Eagleburger giving the four most important U.S.-Irish issues of the moment. You can expect that Collins will give you his negative views on the Prior initiative, and perhaps request that you personally put pressure on the British to adopt a different approach. In addition, Collins may ask you to accede to the Irish position on the Air Lingus dispute. The Irish wish to reply to ~~British~~ *our* questions *in writing* concerning Air Lingus contacts with Libya. We prefer to send a Commerce Department official to Dublin.

Tab A Briefing memo



DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-15-30-2-6

BY COB NARA DATE 7/7/05

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

CONFIDENTIAL (Entire Text)

TO: Under Secretary Eagleburger
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt, Designate
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Irish Foreign Minister
Gerard Collins at the UNGA

I. YOUR OBJECTIVES

1. Seek Collins' views on the future role of UNIFIL.
2. Reaffirm US policy on Northern Ireland: that a lasting solution can be found only through a process of reconciliation between the two traditions in Northern Ireland and between Britain and Ireland.
3. (If Asked) Affirm the US need to obtain information on transfer of Aer Lingus aircraft to Libya and our sensitivity to Irish concerns.
4. (If Asked) Express our commitment to resolve promptly the rates (real estate tax) issue

II. SETTING

Collins came to the position of Foreign Minister with no background or known interest in foreign policy. In New York and Washington (October 1-5) he will press his government's announced first political priority -- the unity of Ireland. His schedule includes media appearances and meetings with members of Congress. Collins is sensitive to the kind of welcome he receives from Administration officials, given the Fianna Fail perception that the US favors a FitzGerald Government in Dublin. Collins may continue to seek an opportunity to meet privately with the Secretary.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Ireland

Under Secretary Eagleburger
Richard Burt - EUR

Foreign Minister Collins

Attachments:

1. President's Statement of 3/17/82
2. Biographic Sketch

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL. OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-2-~~

Drafted:EUR/NE:MBarry

Clearances:EUR:RBlackwill
EUR/NE:MSpendleton
EB/EWT:RKirkpatrick
IO/UNP:HSizer
NEA/ARN:EJones
L/M:KMalmborg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

Seek Collins' views on the future role of UNIFIL

As a troop contributor to UNIFIL, the GOI is concerned about its future role as a peacekeeping force and will want to know your views. Prior to departing for New York, Collins told the press that Ireland has no intention of unilaterally withdrawing troops from Lebanon, but he expressed his concern about the current "inability of UNIFIL to fulfill its mandate". Collins is due to meet September 29 with the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Israel.

Collins has emphasized the need "to put the Security Council and the Secretary-General on notice about the need to strengthen the mandate of the peacekeeping forces and improve their military capacity to ensure that they are allowed to discharge their role".

Former Prime Minister FitzGerald expressed a similar view to us during his visit this week, adding that the make-up and quality of the force, which includes both trained professional soldiers (Irish) and conscripts, should also be reviewed.

- o A KEY PART OF OUR EFFORT IN LEBANON IS TO NEGOTIATE A FRAMEWORK FOR THE EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.
- o THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE SOUTH.
- o A STRENGTHENED UNIFIL WITH A WIDER MANDATE REMAINS OUR PREFERRED OPTION AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
- o WE HOPE IRELAND WILL CONTINUE ITS PARTICIPATION IN UNIFIL.
- o WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE MANDATE?

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

Reaffirm US policy on Northern Ireland: that a lasting solution can be found only through a process of reconciliation between the two traditions in Northern Ireland and between Britain and Ireland.

The British "rolling devolution" proposal, calling for Assembly elections October 20, appears in serious trouble, although the major parties will at least field candidates. The Haughey Government has rejected the proposal. Collins will be looking to Washington to pressure the British to add an all-Ireland dimension and will emphasize that the solution should be worked out directly between Dublin and London. Specifically, Haughey and Collins want the British to withdraw its "guarantee" that Northern Ireland's relationship to the UK can be terminated only with the agreement of the majority community. Their position contrasts with ours and with that of Garret FitzGerald, who is convinced any solution requires that the separate identities of the two communities be guaranteed and who thinks the Prior plan, with all its defects, should be given a chance.

Our interest at this time is to avoid any action which might contribute to an abortion of Prior's efforts. We also have an interest in encouraging the moderates, including John Hume's SDLP, to take seats in the Assembly, although this message to Collins would be more effective if it came from interested Congressional leaders. If the present limited political movement in the province breaks down, the IRA and other extremists may fill the void.

- o THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 17 STATEMENT CONTINUES AS THE BASIS OF US POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND.
- o WE HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE PRIOR PLAN EXCEPT GENERALLY TO ENCOURAGE BRITISH EFFORTS TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE TWO COMMUNITIES.
- o WE THINK A SOLUTION DEPENDS ON THE EFFORTS OF LEADERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, BRITAIN AND IN THE REPUBLIC.
- o WE ARE ANXIOUS TO SEE YOUR RELATIONS WITH LONDON BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL.
- o IF THE MODERATES MAKE A GOOD SHOWING IN THE ELECTION, THEY WILL HAVE MORE CREDIBILITY BOTH HERE AND IN LONDON.

CONFIDENTIAL

(If asked) Affirm the US need to obtain information on the transfer of Aer Lingus aircraft to Libya and our sensitivity to Irish concerns.

Since October 1981 Commerce has been investigating the sale of three Boeing 707's by Aer Lingus to Libya's United African Airlines (UAA). The aircraft were sold without reexport licenses required by US law. The sale of a fourth Aer Lingus aircraft was cancelled after Commerce issued a temporary denial order in September 1981 against Aer Lingus and its agents. A request for information on the transfers and for Aer Lingus cooperation in the investigation was presented to the Irish in a December 3, 1981 diplomatic note. The Irish have cooperated by terminating a servicing contract for the aircraft between a partially-owned subsidiary, ATEL, and UAA.

We have confirmed to the Irish that statutorily we are obligated to continue through the information gathering phase of the investigation, despite Irish complaints that the issue should not be "re-opened". We have proposed to make available Commerce DAS Ted Wu to travel to Dublin to review the issue with Foreign Affairs Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Sean Gaynor. The Irish have countered with a proposal that we provide the GOI a questionnaire or specific list of documentation required. Wu has told us he strongly prefers not to specify the documentation or prepare a questionnaire for presentation to the Irish but prefers to travel to Dublin as we had proposed. You should confirm to Collins our interest in resolving this issue promptly, and if pressed, reaffirm our desire to send Wu to Dublin for informal consultations in late October or early November.

The Irish are anxious to resolve this matter quickly and quietly. Ambassador Dailey has assured Secretary General Sean Donlon that we are sensitive to that interest.

- o WE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THIS MATTER AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT STATUTORILY WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RENEW OUR REQUEST TO AER LINGUS TO PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION ON THE SALE.
- o CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF US LAWS AND REGULATIONS REQUIRES THAT OUR INVESTIGATION CONTINUE.
- o WE ARE ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER PROMPTLY.
- o (If Pressed) WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE COMMERCE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WU TRAVEL TO DUBLIN FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, RATHER THAN TO MAKE A MORE FORMAL, WRITTEN SUBMISSION.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(If asked) Express our commitment to resolve promptly the rates (real estate taxes) issue.

The Dublin Corporation has assessed real property taxes (rates) against various US Government-owned properties since 1948. We have refused to pay these taxes on the ground that the affected properties are entitled to exemption based on international law, treaties in force between the two countries and reciprocity. Negotiations since 1948 have been relatively unproductive. Recently, the Dublin Corporation mounted a media campaign to embarrass the USG on this issue. The key issue underlying the dispute is whether the USG is obliged to pay the so-called "beneficial portion" of the rates.

We believe that agreement between the two governments is near and that the USG will end up agreeing to a payment between 20% (the rate we pay in London) and 80% of the beneficial portion (claimed by the Dublin Corporation). Fil Shamwell from L/M will travel to Dublin in November for discussions with the Irish and will be prepared to make a concrete offer.

- o WE ARE ANXIOUS TO SETTLE THE RATES ISSUE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
- o WE WILL BE SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO DUBLIN IN NOVEMBER WHO WE HOPE WILL BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON BOTH THE BACK TAXES AND A SCHEDULE FOR FUTURE PAYMENTS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 17, 1982

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

St. Patrick's Day reminds us of the power of joy. It is a day when spirits are lifted, when millions join together in friendship; when strangers greet each other with affection.

The spell cast on us by a small island 3,000 miles away began more than a century ago when Irish immigrants first came to this land -- immigrants whose sweat and labor built our economy, whose hearts and minds shaped our literary and intellectual history, whose smiles and mirth gave us the gift of laughter, whose conscience and spirituality reminded us of the importance of religious faith in our lives.

Today all Americans -- of Irish descent and honorary Irish descent -- celebrate one of the happiest days of the year in our country -- a day marked by peace, friendship and harmony.

Yet today our thoughts cannot be entirely joyful -- we who owe so much to the "land across the Irish sea" cannot help but reflect on a tragic irony: Northern Ireland is troubled by conflict and violence. We in America who owe so much to our kinsmen of both Irish and British heritage, Protestant and Catholic alike, can never be indifferent to the problem of violence in Northern Ireland. That is why we seek to contribute in any way we can to a lasting, peaceful solution that will bring to an end years of conflict and violence.

The twelve months since last St. Patrick's Day have brought both hope and sorrow in Northern Ireland. There have been grounds for optimism for the future. The level of violence continued its generally downward trend. In this country, U.S. law enforcement authorities confiscated a large number of weapons intended for terrorist hands in Ireland. Perhaps most important despite the sorrows of the past year, there are signs that the climate has improved for moderate political solutions.

We will continue to stand by our policy -- to urge the parties in Northern Ireland to come together for a just solution and to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence. We believe a

-MORE-

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lasting solution can be found only through a process of reconciliation between the two traditions in Northern Ireland and between Britain and Ireland. We encourage and applaud such efforts. We particularly welcome the British and Irish governments' widening of the framework of their cooperation to this end.

But as much as we wish for a just and peaceful settlement, we in the United States cannot chart a course for the people of Northern Ireland. If solutions are to endure, they must come from the people themselves.

We stand unalterably opposed to the forces of violence and discord in Northern Ireland, which obstruct the process of reconciliation so necessary to peace. Those who advocate violence or engage in terrorism will have no welcome in the United States.

Last year, I called on all Americans to question closely any appeal for financial or other aid from groups involved in the Northern Ireland conflict to ensure that contributions do not end up in the hands of those who perpetuate violence, either directly or indirectly. Today, I renew that request. Continued violence, even by a misguided few, can only frustrate the desire for peace of the overwhelming majority of the entire community of Northern Ireland.

As we look to the future, we can be proud that the United States already is making an important contribution toward economic and social progress in Ireland. We are proud of our role in strengthening the Irish economy. There are over 300 American companies with manufacturing plants in Ireland. This investment by American industry shows a clear commitment to a future based on peace and well-being for the people who live in Ireland, North and South.

This Administration will maintain the U.S. commitment to facilitate growth of additional job-creating investment -- investment that will benefit all the people of Ireland. In the meantime, we encourage the American private sector to continue to assist in creating more job opportunities in Ireland.

In affirming these principles of our policy toward Northern Ireland, I wish to add my appreciation and support for the many true friends of Ireland in this country, in the Congress and among the public, who continue to speak out against violence and in support of peace and reconciliation. Their efforts are among the most important contributions to the cause of peace in Northern Ireland, and I join them in the prayer that our hopes will soon be realized. It is by assisting in commercial development, combating terrorism and encouraging the process of peaceful reconciliation that we in America can do our part to bring peace to Northern Ireland.

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

For 10:30 am mtg

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~

RECEIVED 04 OCT 82 13

TO

CLARK

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 04 OCT 82

19

KEYWORDS: IRELAND

AC

COLLINS, GERARD

SUBJECT: CLARK MTG W/ IRISH FOMIN 4 OCT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921356
P 191340Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9404
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4061
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1100
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
E O. 12356: DECL: 10/15/88
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, EI, UK
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE EVOLUTION OF DUBLIN'S
POLICY
REF: A) DUBLIN 3697; B) DUBLIN 3436; C) DUBLIN 3291;
D) DUBLIN 1851; E) DUBLIN 1641; F) DUBLIN 1562;
G) DUBLIN 1045; H) DUBLIN 892; I) 81 DUBLIN 4584

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT
I. SUMMARY

2. EVEN THOUGH THE CURRENT FREEZE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
DUBLIN AND LONDON EXACERBATED THE IRISH SHIFT
ON THE FALKLANDS SANCTIONS, THE FREEZE'S REAL
ORIGINS LIE IN DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE TWO COUNTRIES
INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES THE BEST
APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN
PART, STEMS FROM CLEARLY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF WHAT THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE SIGNIFIES AND
WHAT AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED AS A RESULT OF
THE PROCESS. FOR DUBLIN THE DIALOGUE ITSELF IS
BASED UPON A RECOGNITION BY LONDON OF AN IRISH
RIGHT TO A ROLE IN THE DETERMINATION OF NORTHERN
IRELAND'S FINAL STATUS. FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS
PROCESS, THE IRISH BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD WON
AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL AND REGULAR
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON
ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS.
FROM THE IRISH POINT OF VIEW THERE WERE INADEQUATE
CONSULTATIONS OVER THE PRIOR PLAN AND WHAT THERE WERE
RAISED FALSE HOPES IN DUBLIN THAT WERE DASHED BY THE
FINAL PRODUCT -- A DOCUMENT THAT THE GOI
BELIEVES TO BE VOID OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AND
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NORTHERN NATIONALISTS.

3. THE HAUGHEY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO USE ITS
INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PROPOSALS IN
MARCH 1982 AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO GET A GREATER
"IRISH DIMENSION" INCLUDED. THAT EFFORT BECAME
ENMESHED IN THE FALKLANDS ISSUE, HOWEVER, AND BY
LATE SPRING, RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON
HAD REACHED THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR TEN YEARS. THUS,
WHILE THE GOI DID NOT NECESSARILY WANT THE SDLP TO
TAKE THE LATE AUGUST DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT SEATS
IN THE ASSEMBLY DUBLIN OFFICIALS ACCEPT THAT, FROM
THE NATIONALIST POINT OF VIEW, THE PARTY HAD LITTLE
OPTION. THERE ARE FEARS IN DUBLIN, HOWEVER, THAT
A FAILURE OF THE ASSEMBLY COULD, AT BEST, LEAD TO
A CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICAL STERILITY OF DIRECT
RULE OR, AT WORST, TO MOVES FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND'S FULL INCORPORATION INTO THE UK.

4. AT THIS POINT, OTHER THAN THEIR INCREASINGLY
DIMINISHED HOPE FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN "IRISH
DIMENSION" IN PRIOR'S NORTHERN PLAN, THE GOI SEES
FEW OPTIONS STILL OPEN. ESSENTIALLY, THE MAIN
GAMBIT FOR THE MOMENT SEEMS TO BE THE TIME-HONORED
APPROACH OF TURNING TO THE USG FOR HELP TO
PRESSURE LONDON EITHER TO THINK MORE IN TERMS OF
AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AS THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION
TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND OR -- EVEN
BETTER IN DUBLIN'S VIEW -- TO ALTER OR ELIMINATE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE BRITISH "GUARANTEE" ON NORTHERN IRELAND. WE
BELIEVE THAT, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME (PERHAPS BY
MARCH OR APRIL), AND IF NEEDED, THE USG MIGHT PLAY A
QUIET BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE IN GETTING LONDON AND
DUBLIN TALKING AGAIN. OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982 STATEMENT THAT IF NORTHERN
IRELAND SOLUTIONS TO "ENDURE THEY MUST COME
FROM THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES" SHOULD REMAIN VERY
MUCH THE BASIS OF OUR APPROACH TO THE ULSTER
PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.

II. MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER DIALOGUE

5. EVEN BEFORE THE IRISH SHIFT ON THE FALKLANDS
SANCTIONS QUESTION IN MAY, 1982, LONDON-DUBLIN
RELATIONS HAD COOLED PERCEPTIBLY. IN LARGE
MEASURE THE DECLINE WAS STARTED BY A RIFT OVER
NORTHERN IRELAND AND SIMPLY ACCELERATED BY
DIFFERENCES OVER THE FALKLANDS. INDEED, NEWLY
ELECTED PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY LITERALLY FROM
HIS FIRST DAY BACK IN OFFICE -- DESPITE THE FACT

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BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN A CAMPAIGN ISSUE - DECLARED
NORTHERN IRELAND HIS PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PRIORITY
(REF H). TWO WEEKS LATER, ON MARCH 22, HE
REJECTED THE PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR DEVOLUTION IN
NORTHERN IRELAND -- THEREBY SETTING THE GOI ON A
SEEMINGLY INEVITABLE COLLISION COURSE WITH THE
BRITISH (REF G).

6. THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IRISH AND
THE BRITISH -- AS VIEWED FROM DUBLIN -- STEMS
FROM A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OVER THE NATURE OF
THE UNDERSTANDINGS WORKED OUT DURING THE ANGLO-IRISH
DIALOGUE. THAT DIALOGUE STARTED IN DECEMBER 1980
WITH A MEETING IN LONDON BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER
HAUGHEY (THEN IN HIS FIRST TERM IN OFFICE) AND PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER. THE IRISH VIEW THE PROCESS

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WHICH STARTED WITH THAT FIRST MEETING AS BASED UPON A CLEAR ACCEPTANCE BY LONDON THAT DUBLIN WOULD HAVE A ROLE IN ANY FUTURE NORTHERN IRELAND SETTLEMENT AND THAT FUNDAMENTAL TO THAT ROLE WOULD BE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO - GOVERNMENTS OVER PROPOSALS SUCH AS NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY JAMES PRIOR'S DEVOLUTION PLAN.

7. SOURCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION CONCEDE THAT THE DIALOGUE PROCESS HAD ALREADY COME CLOSE TO DERAILING IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1981 OVER THE HUNGER STRIKE ISSUE. INDEED, MANY POLITICAL OBSERVERS IN DUBLIN SUGGEST THAT CHARLES HAUGHEY'S DEFEAT IN THE JUNE 1981 GENERAL ELECTIONS WAS PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS VERY VISIBLE INABILITY TO PERSUADE MRS. THATCHER TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE OVER THE HUNGER-STRIKE ISSUE. HAUGHEY HAD STAKED A GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL CAPITAL UPON THE RELATIONSHIP HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH LONDON AS PART OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE PROCESS, BUT WHEN THAT RELATIONSHIP COULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO SOMETHING IN POLITICAL TERMS HAUGHEY WAS SEEN AS BEING UNABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS. DENNIS COGLAN, THE IRISH TIMES POLITICAL CORRESPONDANT, TOLD AN EMBOFF THAT THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE "BAD BLOOD" BETWEEN HAUGHEY AND THATCHER WHICH HAS MADE THE DETERIORATION IN LONDON-DUBLIN RELATIONS SOMETHING NOT ONLY POLITICAL BUT QUITE PERSONAL. ACCORDING TO COGLAN, HAUGHEY IN PRIVATE BLAMES MRS. THATCHER PERSONALLY AND DIRECTLY FOR HIS 1981 DEFEAT.

III. ORIGINS OF THE PRIOR PLAN -- TOO MUCH RATHER

- THAN TOO LITTLE CONSULTATION

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8. RELATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN STARTED OFF SHAKILY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF GARRET FITZGERALD'S ADMINISTRATION IN JULY 1981. IN PARTICULAR, FITZGERALD'S ATTEMPT TO ENLIST PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ASSISTANCE IN PRESSURING PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE OVER THE HUNGER STRIKE DID NOT, ACCORDING TO DFA OFFICIALS, "SIT WELL" WITH LONDON. NONETHELESS, THE APPOINTMENT OF JAMES PRIOR TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFIM IN SEPTEMBER AND HIS INITIAL OPENNESS TO DUBLIN GAVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS AND CREATED A NEW OPTIMISM AT DFA.

9. THIS NEW OPTIMISM WAS CAPPED IN NOVEMBER 1981 WHEN PRIME MINISTER FITZGERALD AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER MET IN LONDON FOR A NEW ROUND OF THE DIALOGUE AND AT THE END OF A CORDIAL AND SUCCESSFUL ROUND OF TALKS ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WHICH CALLED FOR THE RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO TRADITIONS IN IRELAND AND FOR CONTINUING EFFORT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND (REF 1). ALREADY BY THEN PRIOR, WHO HAD BEEN ON THE JOB LESS THAN TWO MONTHS, WAS PUTTING TOGETHER A NEW INITIATIVE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

10. IN MARCH OF 1982 PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS HE REJECTED THE DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN PROMULGATED WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH DUBLIN. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DFA. AND GOI POLITICAL LEADERS, HOWEVER, EMBOFF WAS TOLD REPEATEDLY THAT PROBLEM WAS TOO MUCH CONSULTATION -- FALSELY RAISING EXPECTATIONS -- RATHER THAN TOO LITTLE. FROM NOVEMBER 1981 TO JANUARY 1982 PRIOR, HIS DEPUTY LORD GOWERY. OR
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BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE OFFICIALS DISCUSSED
POSSIBLE ASPECTS OF A DEVOLUTION PLAN WITH THE
LEADERS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) AND DUBLIN OFFICIALS.

11. THE SDLP LEADERSHIP IN TURN -- AS CUSTOMARY
DISCUSSED PRIOR'S APPROACHES QUITE REGULARLY
WITH SENIOR IRISH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
FIGURES, INCLUDING BOTH THEN PRIME MINISTER
GARRET FITZGERALD AND THEN OPPOSITION LEADER
CHARLES HAUGHEY. FROM THE QUESTIONS BEING ASKED
BY PRIOR AND HIS PEOPLE, FROM THE IDEAS THAT
EMERGED FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND THE SEEMING
READY ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT ONE DFA OFFICIAL
DESCRIBED AS SOME "TRULY INNOVATIVE IDEAS", MOST
GOI OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL LEADERS BELIEVED THAT
PRIOR FULLY INTENDED TO MAKE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD
CONTAIN A VERY REAL "IRISH DIMENSION", POSSIBLY
INCLUDING SOME FORM OF POWER-SHARING -- THOUGH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PERHAPS NOT UNDER THAT EMOTIONALLY CHARGED NAME.

12. FROM JANUARY 1982 ONWARDS, HOWEVER, IT
BECAME APPARENT TO OFFICIALS IN DUBLIN THAT PRIOR
WAS BACKING AWAY FROM SOME OF THE MORE INNOVATIVE
MEASURES HE AT FIRST HAD SEEMED TO BE ADVOCATING
AND MOVING TOWARD WHAT ONE IRISH OFFICIAL
DESCRIBED AS THE "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR"
APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION. THE REASONS FOR PRIOR'S
SHIFT TO A DEVOLUTION PLAN THAT, IN THE VIEW OF
MANY SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS NOW COMPLETELY IGNORES
THE IRISH DIMENSION, HAVE BEEN VERY ABLY REPORTED
BY BELFAST (REF C). FOR MOST HERE IN DUBLIN
THE "BOTTOM LINE" IS THAT PRIOR "CHICKENED-OUT"
WHEN HE SAW THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AT WESTMINISTER
TO A FULL IRISH DIMENSION BEING INCLUDED IN ANY

POTENTIAL DEVOLUTION PLAN. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN
IS A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE PRINCIPAL
WESTMINISTER OPPOSITION WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HERSELF.

13. FROM JANUARY ONWARD, WHEN THE SHIFT ON THE
ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS OCCURRING,
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN SEEM TO
HAVE COME TO AN END. IN DFA'S VIEW, IT WAS WHEN
PRIOR RAN INTO WESTMINISTER OPPOSITION TO HIS
MORE INNOVATIVE ASPECTS OF HIS PLAN THAT CONSULTA-
TIONS BETWEEN PRIOR'S TEAM AND THOSE DEALING
WITH NORTHERN IRELAND IN DUBLIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN
AT THEIR HEIGHT. INSTEAD, JUST THE OPPOSITE
OCCURRED. PRIOR SEEMS TO HAVE "HUNKERED-DOWN"
AND PUSHED THROUGH WHAT HE COULD GET AT
WESTMINISTER WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO THOSE
HE HAD SO ACTIVELY CONSULTED IN THE INITIAL STAGES
OF THE PROCESS. AS ONE GOI OFFICIAL PUT IT, "HE
RAISED EXPECTATIONS, WHETTED APPETITES, AND THEN
SNATCHED IT ALL AWAY."

IV. DUBLIN'S EARLY REJECTION OF THE PLAN--A TACTIC

- WHICH FAILED.

14. IT IS, PERHAPS, THIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND
DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH LED TO HAUGHEY'S EARLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REJECTION OF THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PLAN WHEN HE
MANAGED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT IN MARCH. THAT
REJECTION FROM THE OUTSET WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY
COORDINATED WITH THE SDLP. IT IS BY NO MEANS
CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REJECTION WAS MEANT
TO BE FINAL. RATHER, AS ONE FIANNA FAIL DEPUTY TOLD
EMBOFF, IT WAS INTENDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER
"AS A WARNING SHOT ACROSS THE BOW" TO JIM PRIOR
WITH THE HOPE--PERHAPS IN RETROSPECT FORLORN--
THAT ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS COULD BE ADDED TO THE
DEVOLUTION PLAN.

15. MOST NOTABLY, THE SDLP REPRESENTATIVES, IN
THEIR TALKS IN DUBLIN, SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LOOKING
FOR DUBLIN SUPPORT TO OBTAIN SOMETHING IN THE
PLAN THAT WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY SATISFY
THEIR NATIONALIST CONSTITUENCY IN THE NORTH THAT
SOME ASPECT OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" HAD BEEN
INCLUDED. VARIOUS PROVISIONS TO ACHIEVE THIS ARE
MENTIONED AND CERTAINLY SOME FORM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
POWER SHARING WOULD HAVE COME THE CLOSEST TO
SATISFYING DUBLIN. MOST NOTABLY, HOWEVER, THE
CONCEPT OF A PARLIAMENTARY TIER TO THE ANGLO-IRISH
- PROCESS IS MOST FREQUENTLY CITED IN DUBLIN
AS THE FACTOR WHICH COULD HAVE MADE THE DIFFERENCE
IN NATIONALIST ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAN.

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BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

16. SUCH A TIER WOULD HAVE CREATED A COMMITTEE (NOT CALLED A COUNCIL OF IRELAND BECAUSE THAT TOO IS AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED TERM) MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM THE NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, THE IRISH PARLIAMENT, AND PRESUMABLY THE WESTMINSTER PARLIAMENT AS WELL. REACTING TO JAMES PRIOR'S RECENT CHARACTERIZATION OF SUCH A TIER AS MERELY A "TALK SHOP," A DFA OFFICIAL OBSERVED THAT "IT WOULDN'T MATTER IF AT FIRST IT WAS ONLY A TALK SHOP BECAUSE EVEN "TALKING" BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARIANS FROM DUBLIN AND BELFAST WOULD REPRESENT MORE PROGRESS THAN WE HAVE MADE IN THE FULL 60 YEARS SINCE THE TREATY."

17. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THE PRESSURE OF DUBLIN REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN AS A BARGAINING PLOY WITH LONDON WAS NEVER REALLY PUT TO THE TEST. WITHIN A FEW WEEKS LONDON WAS ENMESHED IN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FALKLANDS CRISIS AND DUBLIN, FOR MANY REASONS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO PIQUE OVER THE DEVOLUTION PLAN (SEE REF A FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH LED TO DUBLIN'S BREAK) HAD BROKEN WITH THE EC OVER THE ARGENTINE SANCTIONS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON HAD REACHED THE "DEEP-FREEZE" LEVEL. NO "THAW" IN RELATIONSHIPS HAS OCCURRED SINCE THAT POINT.

18. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY AND THE SDLP WERE COORDINATING CLOSELY AT THE TIME OF HIS INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN, IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN--AND INDEED STOUTLY DENIED IN DUBLIN--THAT THE GOI WAS BEHIND THE SDLP'S DECISION TO CONTEST THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION BUT NOT TAKE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA OFFICIALS

MAINTAIN THAT--WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE SDLP'S REASONS FOR THE DECISION--IRISH OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY, WOULD HAVE BEEN HAPPIER IF THE SDLP HAD ENTERED THE ASSEMBLY. IF THE SDLP'S WORST FEARS HAD BEEN REALIZED AND THE ASSEMBLY BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE AS WHAT ONE COMMENTATOR DESCRIBED AS "STORMONT REDIVIVUS," THE SDLP COULD HAVE BROUGHT IT DOWN BY THEN WITHDRAWING. ONE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY TOLD EMBOFF THAT, THOUGH HE SHARED THE SDLP'S PESSIMISM OVER THE POLITICAL VIABILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SDLP IF THEY HAD "AT LEAST APPEARED WILLING TO TRY AND MAKE IT WORK."

19. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THAT WAS NOT THE PATH THE SDLP ELECTED TO FOLLOW, DUBLIN, THEREFORE, NOW FACES BOTH IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM "UNPLEASANT REALITIES." WITH THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION LESS THAN TWO DAYS AWAY THE DFA AND THE POLITICAL LEVEL LEADERSHIP IN DUBLIN IS WELL AWARE THAT THE SDLP ITSELF FACES A MAJOR CRISIS OVER THIS ELECTION. THE PARTY HAS ASKED ITS SUPPORTERS FOR AN ELECTORAL MANDATE ENDORSING THEIR DECISION NOT TO TAKE THE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA FEARS THAT SUCH A MANDATE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE MODERATE NATIONALIST POSITION IN THE NORTH WILL BE SEVERELY DAMAGED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DFA IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THERE IS AT LEAST A CHANCE (ALBEIT--THEY HOPE--A SMALL ONE) THAT THE UNIONIST PARTIES OF THE NORTH WILL--WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOST NATIONALIST VOTERS WILL SIMPLY STAY AWAY FROM THE POLLS--BE ABLE IN THEIR OWN RIGHT TO GARNER THE 70 PERCENT OF THE SEATS NEEDED UNDER THE PRIOR PLAN TO VOTE FOR THE DEVOLUTION TO THE ASSEMBLY OF CERTAIN REAL POWERS MAKING IT INDEED A NEW STORMONT.

20. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS DUBLIN'S FEAR THAT FOR NOW THE PRIOR INITIATIVE, WHICH THEY BELIEVED WAS DOOMED FROM THE BEGINNING, WILL LEAVE THE BRITISH IN THE POSITION OF AT LEAST SEEMING TO HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN TURN, WILL THEREBY LESSEN ANY PRESSURE THAT MIGHT BE APPLIED TO MRS. THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION WHICH MOST NOW EXPECT NEXT AUTUMN. IN THE LONG TERM, IF THOSE ELECTIONS ARE CLOSE--AS SOME EXPECT--THERE IS REAL FEAR IN DUBLIN THAT THE 12 OR 13 SEATS WHICH THE UNIONISTS WILL LIKELY HAVE IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENT WILL EXERT FAR MORE INFLUENCE THAN NOW--MUCH AS THEY DID IN THE WANING DAYS OF THE CALLAGHAN GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE 70'S. IF MRS. THATCHER WINS OUTRIGHT, DFA IS EVEN MORE

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BELFAST BY POUCH

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

CONCERNED THAT, GIVEN HER OWN INCLINATIONS, SHE

WILL SIMPLY DROP ALL PRETENSE AT TRYING TO FORM

A DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND

MOVE FOR FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE UK. (DFA

DOES NOT REALLY ENTERTAIN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LABOR

WINNING NEXT YEAR. IN ADDITION, THE GOI TAKES

LITTLE COMFORT FROM VARIOUS LABOR PARTY

PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND NOTING THAT

WHAT LABOR SAYS WHEN THEY ARE OUT OF OFFICE

DIFFERS GREATLY FROM WHAT THEY DO WHEN IN GOVERNMENT.)

VI. NEXT STEPS FOR DUBLIN--LOOK TO WASHINGTON

21. FACED WITH THESE RATHER UNPLEASANT REALITIES
AND NO NEAR TERM HOPE OF MUCH MOVEMENT IN THE
ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE, DUBLIN SEEMS TO BE ACCELERATING
ITS EFFORT TO GAIN US SUPPORT FOR THE INCLUSION
OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" IN LONDON'S THINKING ON
ULSTER. CERTAINLY, FROM HIS FIRST DAYS IN OFFICE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT WAS PART OF PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY'S
HOPE--AS BEST EVIDENCED BY HIS STATEMENTS AT THE
TIME OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON ST. PATRICK'S
DAY AND HIS EFFORTS WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL
FRIENDS OF IRELAND IN JUNE. AS ONE ASSOCIATE OF THE
PRIME MINISTER TOLD EMBOFF, HOWEVER, "IN MARCH THAT
WAS ONE OF SEVERAL ARROWS IN THE TAOISEACH'S
(PRIME MINISTER'S) QUIVER--TODAY ITS THE ONLY ONE
LEFT."

22. SPECIFICALLY, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE
TO SEE WASHINGTON PRESSURE LONDON--AT A MINIMUM--TO
REEXAMINE THE PRIOR PROPOSALS AND THINK MORE IN
TERMS OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION." EVEN BETTER IN
DUBLIN'S VIEW, HOWEVER, WOULD BE US PRESSURE TO
END--OR AT LEAST MODIFY--THE GUARANTEE TO NORTHERN

UNIONISTS THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN A PART OF
THE UK SO LONG AS THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE WISH
IT TO BE. DUBLIN, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ENDING
THE GUARANTEE, WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT PHRASED IN A
MORE POSITIVE FASHION THAT WOULD IMPLY SOME
ACCEPTANCE FROM LONDON OF AN EVENTUAL
REALIGNMENT IN THIS ISLAND--PERHAPS TO THE EFFECT
THAT "HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OBJECT
TO A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND SO
LONG AS THAT CHANGE CAME ABOUT BY THE WILL OF THE
MAJORITY."

23. FOREIGN MINISTER COLLINS, BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE
FOR THE US, PUBLICALLY STATED THAT NORTHERN
IRELAND WOULD BE THE CENTRAL THEME OF HIS VISIT
TO THE US (REF B). REPORTS ON THAT VISIT INDICATE
THAT HE LOOKED FOR AS MUCH SUPPORT AS HE COULD
MUSTER BOTH FROM THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH IN GENERATING THE KIND OF PRESSURE DUBLIN
BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL CHANGE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND USED THE OCCASION OF
THE VISIT TO GENERATE AS MUCH MEDIA ATTENTION AS
POSSIBLE TO THIS END.

24. COMMENT

A RENEWED ATTEMPT BY THE GOI TO ENLIST AMERICAN
SUPPORT FOR HELPING TO ACHIEVE CHANGES IN NORTHERN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IRELAND BY BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON LONDON
NEEDS TO BE APPROACHED AT TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS.
FIRST, ON THE QUESTION OF OVER-ALL US POLICY, WE
BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982
STATEMENT STILL OFFERS THE BEST AND WISEST AMERICAN
APPROACH TO THE GENERAL NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION.
SPECIFICALLY, WHILE URGING THE DISPUTANTS TO COME
TOGETHER "THROUGH A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND IRELAND," THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR
THAT "WE IN THE UNITED STATES CANNOT CHART A
COURSE FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. IF
SOLUTIONS ARE TO ENDURE THEY MUST COME FROM THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES."

25. AS TO THE SECOND AND MORE IMMEDIATE QUESTION
OF WHAT ROLE THE UNITED STATES CAN PLAY TO HELP
RE-ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN,
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT HERE THE USG MIGHT BE OF
SOME ASSISTANCE, BUT ONLY RPT ONLY AT THE APPROPRIATE
TIME. AS FOR NOW, SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE THIS AN
INAUSPICIOUS TIME TO TRY TO PLAY SUCH A BRIDGING
ROLE. SPECIFICALLY:

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BELFAST BY POUCH

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

-- THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IS TETTERING ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE AND SOME LOCAL OBSERVERS THINK THAT A NEW GENERAL ELECTION COULD BE CALLED BY FEBRUARY OR MARCH 1983. SOME PREDICT IT COULD COME AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER 1982. EVEN THOUGH PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY SURVIVED A CHALLENGE TO HIS LEADERSHIP OF THE MEETING ON OCTOBER 6 (REF A) THAT CHALLENGE ONLY INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEW ELECTIONS.

-- THE BRITISH ARE COMMITTED TO THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PLAN AND UK GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS STILL ASSERT THAT THE PLAN HAS A CHANCE OF WORKING. MANY HERE IN DUBLIN DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW BUT MOST READILY CONCEDE THAT NOTHING WILL BE SERVED BY FURTHER TALKS WITH LONDON UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD, THE ASSEMBLY CONVENED, AND THE END RESULT OF THE PROCESS MORE APPARENT.

-- DUBLIN HAS NOTHING SPECIFIC BY WAY OF ALTERNATIVES TO OFFER. THEY EXPECT THAT AFTER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS THE VARIOUS NATIONALIST PARTIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM. DFA EXPECTS THAT THE SDLP WILL WANT TO DISCUSS SOME OF THESE IDEAS AND THE GOI WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO PROPOSE ALTERNATIVES UNTIL THE DUST SETTLES. SOME OF THE RUMORED ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE PROPOSAL FOR AN "ALL IRELAND" ASSEMBLY BASED IN DUBLIN, COULD HEIGHTEN RATHER THAN LESSEN THE TENSIONS.

-- MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PERSONAL ANOMOSITIES BETWEEN MR. HAUGHEY AND MRS. THATCHER ARE NOW SO GREAT THAT--IF IT WILL EVER BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO WORK IN HARMONY AGAIN--AT A MINIMUM A GOOD DEAL MORE TIME MUST ELAPSE FOR "COOLING OFF." (THOUGH GIVEN THE PROSPECT OF NEW IRISH ELECTIONS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PROBLEM WILL RESOLVE ITSELF AT

26. AS TO WHEN SUCH A RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE IS POSSIBLE, THE DFA VIEW, WHICH WE SHARE, IS THAT IT MUST WAIT UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY HAS HAD FIVE OR SIX MONTHS TO FUNCTION. THUS, PERHAPS BY MARCH OR APRIL THE TIME WILL AGAIN BE RIGHT FOR A RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN DUBLIN'S AND LONDON'S MUTUAL INTEREST TO SEE THE DIALOGUE RENEWED AND EXPECT THAT FORCES ALREADY AT PLAY WILL HAVE THE TWO CAPITALS TALKING TO EACH OTHER AGAIN BY THEN. IF NOT, HOWEVER, WE SUSPECT THAT THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE USG MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE EXTENDED--BEHIND THE SCENES AND WITH ZERO VISIBILITY--TO URGE BOTH SIDES TO AGAIN SIT DOWN TOGETHER. DAILEY

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATIONOctober 26, 1982
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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLFR 15-30-5-3

FROM:

DENNIS ~~DCB~~ BLAIRBY CPD NARA DATE 7/15

SUBJECT:

Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
and the United States (U)

As you know, the results of last week's Assembly elections in Northern Ireland were a disappointment to Jim Prior. Sinn Fein took 5 seats, the SDLP won 13, and both parties have reaffirmed their intention not to participate. Paisley will take his seats, and will work for majority rule. Prior has vowed to convene the Assembly, to treat the absentee members as if they were participating, and to attempt to establish some credibility for the Assembly. The "failure" of the elections has set rumors loose in London that Prior's days are numbered, and that Mrs. Thatcher is looking for the opportunity to let him go. How all of this will work out is anyone's guess. (C)

As you know from Foreign Minister Collin's visit, the Republic of Ireland's fear is that with the Prior initiative stalled, there will be no more motion on Northern Ireland from this Thatcher government, which means at least another year of immobility. As the attached excellent cable from Dublin makes clear (hilited for skimming), the lever which Haughey will attempt to use to produce motion is the U.S. connection. We can expect Irish messages requesting us to prod the British to work together with Dublin for some "all-Ireland" solution. (C)

Unfortunately, Dublin has no better ideas than London how to reach a solution that would be acceptable to both communities in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the best course for the United States, as Ambassador Dailey makes very clear in his cable, is to continue our policy of "concerned neutrality" which was laid out most clearly in the ~~President's~~ statement of last St. Patrick's day. (C)

Tab A Cable on Irish election results

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815

BELFAST BY POUCH

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/15/88

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, EI, UK

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE EVOLUTION OF DUBLIN'S
POLICY

REF: A) DUBLIN 3697; B) DUBLIN 3436; C) DUBLIN 3291;
D) DUBLIN 1851; E) DUBLIN 1641; F) DUBLIN 1562;
G) DUBLIN 1045; H) DUBLIN 892; I) 81 DUBLIN 4584

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

1. SUMMARY

2. EVEN THOUGH THE CURRENT FREEZE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON EXACERBATED THE IRISH SHIFT ON THE FALKLANDS SANCTIONS, THE FREEZE'S REAL ORIGINS LIE IN DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE TWO COUNTRIES INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES THE BEST APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN PART, STEMS FROM CLEARLY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE SIGNIFIES AND WHAT AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED AS A RESULT OF THE PROCESS. FOR DUBLIN THE DIALOGUE ITSELF IS BASED UPON A RECOGNITION BY LONDON OF AN IRISH RIGHT TO A ROLE IN THE DETERMINATION OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S FINAL STATUS. FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS PROCESS, THE IRISH BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD WON AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL AND REGULAR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS. FROM THE IRISH POINT OF VIEW THERE WERE INADEQUATE CONSULTATIONS OVER THE PRIOR PLAN AND WHAT THERE WERE RAISED FALSE HOPES IN DUBLIN THAT WERE DASHED BY THE FINAL PRODUCT -- A DOCUMENT THAT THE GOI BELIEVES TO BE VOID OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NORTHERN NATIONALISTS.

3. THE HAUGHEY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO USE ITS INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PROPOSALS IN MARCH 1982 AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO GET A GREATER "IRISH DIMENSION" INCLUDED. THAT EFFORT BECAME ENMESHED IN THE FALKLANDS ISSUE, HOWEVER, AND BY LATE SPRING, RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON

HAD REACHED THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR TEN YEARS. THUS, WHILE THE GOI DID NOT NECESSARILY WANT THE SDLP TO TAKE THE LATE AUGUST DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY DUBLIN OFFICIALS ACCEPT THAT, FROM THE NATIONALIST POINT OF VIEW, THE PARTY HAD LITTLE OPTION. THERE ARE FEARS IN DUBLIN, HOWEVER, THAT A FAILURE OF THE ASSEMBLY COULD, AT BEST, LEAD TO A CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICAL STERILITY OF DIRECT RULE OR, AT WORST, TO MOVES FOR NORTHERN IRELAND'S FULL INCORPORATION INTO THE UK.

4. AT THIS POINT, OTHER THAN THEIR INCREASINGLY DIMINISHED HOPE FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" IN PRIOR'S NORTHERN PLAN, THE GOI SEES FEW OPTIONS STILL OPEN. ESSENTIALLY, THE MAIN GAMBIT FOR THE MOMENT SEEMS TO BE THE TIME-HONORED APPROACH OF TURNING TO THE USG FOR HELP TO PRESSURE LONDON EITHER TO THINK MORE IN TERMS OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AS THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND OR -- EVEN BETTER IN DUBLIN'S VIEW -- TO ALTER OR ELIMINATE THE BRITISH "GUARANTEE" ON NORTHERN IRELAND. WE BELIEVE THAT, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME (PERHAPS BY MARCH OR APRIL), AND IF NEEDED, THE USG MIGHT PLAY A QUIET BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE IN GETTING LONDON AND DUBLIN TALKING AGAIN. OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982 STATEMENT THAT IF NORTHERN IRELAND SOLUTIONS TO "ENDURE THEY MUST COME FROM THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES" SHOULD REMAIN VERY MUCH THE BASIS OF OUR APPROACH TO THE ULSTER PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.

II. MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER DIALOGUE

5. EVEN BEFORE THE IRISH SHIFT ON THE FALKLANDS SANCTIONS QUESTION IN MAY, 1982, LONDON-DUBLIN

RELATIONS HAD COOLED PERCEPTIBLY. IN LARGE MEASURE THE DECLINE WAS STARTED BY A RIFT OVER NORTHERN IRELAND AND SIMPLY ACCELERATED BY DIFFERENCES OVER THE FALKLANDS. INDEED, NEWLY ELECTED PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY LITERALLY FROM HIS FIRST DAY BACK IN OFFICE -- DESPITE THE FACT

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815

BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN A CAMPAIGN ISSUE - DECLARED
NORTHERN IRELAND HIS PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PRIORITY
(REF H). TWO WEEKS LATER, ON MARCH 22, HE
REJECTED THE PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR DEVOLUTION IN
NORTHERN IRELAND -- THEREBY SETTING THE GOI ON A
SEEMINGLY INEVITABLE COLLISION COURSE WITH THE
BRITISH (REF G).

6. THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IRISH AND
THE BRITISH -- AS VIEWED FROM DUBLIN -- STEMS
FROM A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OVER THE NATURE OF
THE UNDERSTANDINGS WORKED OUT DURING THE ANGLO-IRISH
DIALOGUE. THAT DIALOGUE STARTED IN DECEMBER 1980
WITH A MEETING IN LONDON BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER
HAUGHEY (THEN IN HIS FIRST TERM IN OFFICE) AND PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER. THE IRISH VIEW THE PROCESS
WHICH STARTED WITH THAT FIRST MEETING AS BASED
UPON A CLEAR ACCEPTANCE BY LONDON THAT DUBLIN
WOULD HAVE A ROLE IN ANY FUTURE NORTHERN IRELAND
SETTLEMENT AND THAT FUNDAMENTAL TO THAT ROLE
WOULD BE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS OVER PROPOSALS SUCH AS NORTHERN
IRELAND SECRETARY JAMES PRIOR'S DEVOLUTION PLAN.

7. SOURCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(DFA) ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION CONCEDE THAT THE
DIALOGUE PROCESS HAD ALREADY COME CLOSE TO
DERAILING IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1981 OVER
THE HUNGER STRIKE ISSUE. INDEED, MANY POLITICAL
OBSERVERS IN DUBLIN SUGGEST THAT CHARLES HAUGHEY'S
DEFEAT IN THE JUNE 1981 GENERAL ELECTIONS WAS
PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS VERY VISIBLE INABILITY
TO PERSUADE MRS. THATCHER TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE OVER
THE HUNGER-STRIKE ISSUE. HAUGHEY HAD STAKED A
GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL CAPITAL UPON THE
RELATIONSHIP HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH LONDON AS PART
OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE PROCESS, BUT WHEN
THAT RELATIONSHIP COULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO SOMETHING
IN POLITICAL TERMS HAUGHEY WAS SEEN AS BEING
UNABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS. DENNIS COGLAN, THE
IRISH TIMES POLITICAL CORRESPONDANT, TOLD AN
EMBOFF THAT THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE "BAD BLOOD"

BETWEEN HAUGHEY AND THATCHER WHICH HAS MADE THE
DETERIORATION IN LONDON-DUBLIN RELATIONS SOMETHING
NOT ONLY POLITICAL BUT QUITE PERSONAL. ACCORDING
TO COGLAN, HAUGHEY IN PRIVATE BLAMES MRS. THATCHER
PERSONALLY AND DIRECTLY FOR HIS 1981 DEFEAT.
III. ORIGINS OF THE PRIOR PLAN -- TOO MUCH RATHER

- THAN TOO LITTLE CONSULTATION

8. RELATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN STARTED OFF
SHAKILY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF GARRET FITZGERALD'S
ADMINISTRATION IN JULY 1981. IN PARTICULAR,
FITZGERALD'S ATTEMPT TO ENLIST PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
ASSISTANCE IN PRESSURING PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO
ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE OVER THE HUNGER
STRIKE DID NOT, ACCORDING TO DFA OFFICIALS,
"SIT WELL" WITH LONDON. NONETHELESS, THE
APPOINTMENT OF JAMES PRIOR TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND
OFFICE IN SEPTEMBER AND HIS INITIAL OPENNESS TO
DUBLIN GAVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS AND
CREATED A NEW OPTIMISM AT DFA.

9. THIS NEW OPTIMISM WAS CAPPED IN NOVEMBER 1981
WHEN PRIME MINISTER FITZGERALD AND PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER MET IN LONDON FOR A NEW ROUND OF THE
DIALOGUE AND AT THE END OF A CORDIAL AND
SUCCESSFUL ROUND OF TALKS ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE
WHICH CALLED FOR THE RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO
TRADITIONS IN IRELAND AND FOR CONTINUING EFFORT
BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND
(REF I). ALREADY BY THEN PRIOR, WHO HAD BEEN ON
THE JOB LESS THAN TWO MONTHS, WAS PUTTING TOGETHER
A NEW INITIATIVE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

10. IN MARCH OF 1982 PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY
SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS HE REJECTED THE
DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN PROMULGATED
WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH DUBLIN. IN CONVERSATIONS
WITH THE DFA, AND GOI POLITICAL LEADERS, HOWEVER,
EMBOFF WAS TOLD REPEATEDLY THAT PROBLEM WAS TOO
MUCH CONSULTATION -- FALSELY RAISING EXPECTATIONS --
RATHER THAN TOO LITTLE. FROM NOVEMBER 1981 TO
JANUARY 1982 PRIOR, HIS DEPUTY LORD GOWERY, OR
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815

BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE OFFICIALS DISCUSSED
POSSIBLE ASPECTS OF A DEVOLUTION PLAN WITH THE
LEADERS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) AND DUBLIN OFFICIALS.

11. THE SDLP LEADERSHIP IN TURN -- AS CUSTOMARY
DISCUSSED PRIOR'S APPROACHES QUITE REGULARLY
WITH SENIOR IRISH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
FIGURES, INCLUDING BOTH THEN PRIME MINISTER
GARRET FITZGERALD AND THEN OPPOSITION LEADER
CHARLES HAUGHEY. FROM THE QUESTIONS BEING ASKED
BY PRIOR AND HIS PEOPLE, FROM THE IDEAS THAT
EMERGED FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND THE SEEMING
READY ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT ONE DFA OFFICIAL
DESCRIBED AS SOME "TRUELY INNOVATIVE IDEAS", MOST
GOI OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL LEADERS BELIEVED THAT
PRIOR FULLY INTENDED TO MAKE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD
CONTAIN A VERY REAL "IRISH DIMENSION", POSSIBLY
INCLUDING SOME FORM OF POWER-SHARING -- THOUGH
PERHAPS NOT UNDER THAT EMOTIONALLY CHARGED NAME.

12. FROM JANUARY 1982 ONWARDS, HOWEVER, IT
BECAME APPARENT TO OFFICIALS IN DUBLIN THAT PRIOR
WAS BACKING AWAY FROM SOME OF THE MORE INNOVATIVE
MEASURES HE AT FIRST HAD SEEMED TO BE ADVOCATING
AND MOVING TOWARD WHAT ONE IRISH OFFICIAL
DESCRIBED AS THE "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR"
APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION. THE REASONS FOR PRIOR'S
SHIFT TO A DEVOLUTION PLAN THAT, IN THE VIEW OF
MANY SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS NOW COMPLETELY IGNORES
THE IRISH DIMENSION, HAVE BEEN VERY ABLY REPORTED
BY BELFAST (REF C). FOR MOST HERE IN DUBLIN
THE "BOTTOM LINE" IS THAT PRIOR "CHICKENED-OUT"
WHEN HE SAW THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AT WESTMINISTER
TO A FULL IRISH DIMENSION BEING INCLUDED IN ANY
POTENTIAL DEVOLUTION PLAN. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN
IS A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE PRINCIPAL
WESTMINISTER OPPOSITION WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HERSELF.

13. FROM JANUARY ONWARD, WHEN THE SHIFT ON THE
ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS OCCURRING,

CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN SEEM TO
HAVE COME TO AN END. IN DFA'S VIEW, IT WAS WHEN
PRIOR RAN INTO WESTMINISTER OPPOSITION TO HIS
MORE INNOVATIVE ASPECTS OF HIS PLAN THAT CONSULTA-
TIONS BETWEEN PRIOR'S TEAM AND THOSE DEALING
WITH NORTHERN IRELAND IN DUBLIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN
AT THEIR HEIGHT. INSTEAD, JUST THE OPPOSITE
OCCURRED. PRIOR SEEMS TO HAVE "HUNKERED-DOWN"
AND PUSHED THROUGH WHAT HE COULD GET AT
WESTMINISTER WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO THOSE
HE HAD SO ACTIVELY CONSULTED IN THE INITIAL STAGES
OF THE PROCESS. AS ONE GOI OFFICIAL PUT IT, "HE
RAISED EXPECTATIONS, WHETTED APPETITES, AND THEN
SNATCHED IT ALL AWAY."

IV. DUBLIN'S EARLY REJECTION OF THE PLAN--A TACTIC

- WHICH FAILED.

14. IT IS, PERHAPS, THIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND
DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH LED TO HAUGHEY'S EARLY
REJECTION OF THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PLAN WHEN HE
MANAGED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT IN MARCH. THAT
REJECTION FROM THE OUTSET WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY
COORDINATED WITH THE SDLP. IT IS BY NO MEANS
CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REJECTION WAS MEANT
TO BE FINAL. RATHER, AS ONE FIANNA FAIL DEPUTY TOLD
EMBOFF, IT WAS INTENDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER
"AS A WARNING SHOT ACROSS THE BOW" TO JIM PRIOR
WITH THE HOPE--PERHAPS IN RETROSPECT FORLORN--
THAT ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS COULD BE ADDED TO THE
DEVOLUTION PLAN.

15. MOST NOTABLY, THE SDLP REPRESENTATIVES, IN
THEIR TALKS IN DUBLIN, SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LOOKING
FOR DUBLIN SUPPORT TO OBTAIN SOMETHING IN THE

PLAN THAT WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY SATISFY
THEIR NATIONALIST CONSTITUENCY IN THE NORTH THAT
SOME ASPECT OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" HAD BEEN
INCLUDED. VARIOUS PROVISIONS TO ACHIEVE THIS ARE
MENTIONED AND CERTAINLY SOME FORM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
POWER SHARING WOULD HAVE COME THE CLOSEST TO
SATISFYING DUBLIN. MOST NOTABLY, HOWEVER, THE
CONCEPT OF A PARLIAMENTARY TIER TO THE ANGLO-IRISH
- PROCESS IS MOST FREQUENTLY CITED IN DUBLIN
AS THE FACTOR WHICH COULD HAVE MADE THE DIFFERENCE
IN NATIONALIST ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAN.

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815

BELFAST BY POUCH

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

16. SUCH A TIER WOULD HAVE CREATED A COMMITTEE (NOT CALLED A COUNCIL OF IRELAND BECAUSE THAT TOO IS AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED TERM) MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM THE NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, THE IRISH PARLIAMENT, AND PRESUMABLY THE WESTMINSTER PARLIAMENT AS WELL. REACTING TO JAMES PRIOR'S RECENT CHARACTERIZATION OF SUCH A TIER AS MERELY A "TALK SHOP," A DFA OFFICIAL OBSERVED THAT "IT WOULDN'T MATTER IF AT FIRST IT WAS ONLY A TALK SHOP BECAUSE EVEN "TALKING" BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARIANS FROM DUBLIN AND BELFAST WOULD REPRESENT MORE PROGRESS THAN WE HAVE MADE IN THE FULL 60 YEARS SINCE THE TREATY."

17. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THE PRESSURE OF DUBLIN REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN AS A BARGAINING PLOY WITH LONDON WAS NEVER REALLY PUT TO THE TEST. WITHIN A FEW WEEKS LONDON WAS ENMESHED IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND DUBLIN, FOR MANY REASONS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO PIQUE OVER THE DEVOLUTION PLAN (SEE REF A FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH LED TO DUBLIN'S BREAK) HAD BROKEN WITH THE EC OVER THE ARGENTINE SANCTIONS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON HAD REACHED THE "DEEP-FREEZE" LEVEL. NO "THAW" IN RELATIONSHIPS HAS OCCURRED SINCE THAT POINT.

18. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY AND THE SDLP WERE COORDINATING CLOSELY AT THE TIME OF HIS INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN, IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN--AND INDEED STOUTLY DENIED IN DUBLIN--THAT THE GOI WAS BEHIND THE SDLP'S DECISION TO CONTEST THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION BUT NOT TAKE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA OFFICIALS MAINTAIN THAT--WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE SDLP'S REASONS FOR THE DECISION--IRISH OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY, WOULD HAVE BEEN HAPPIER IF THE SDLP HAD ENTERED THE ASSEMBLY. IF THE SDLP'S WORST FEARS HAD BEEN REALIZED AND THE ASSEMBLY BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE AS WHAT ONE COMMENTATOR DESCRIBED AS "STORMONT REDIVIVUS,"

THE SDLP COULD HAVE BROUGHT IT DOWN BY THEN WITHDRAWING. ONE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY TOLD EMBOFF THAT, THOUGH HE SHARED THE SDLP'S PESSIMISM OVER THE POLITICAL VIABILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SDLP IF THEY HAD "AT LEAST APPEARED WILLING TO TRY AND MAKE IT WORK."

19. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THAT WAS NOT THE PATH THE SDLP ELECTED TO FOLLOW, DUBLIN, THEREFORE, NOW FACES BOTH IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM "UNPLEASANT REALITIES." WITH THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION LESS THAN TWO DAYS AWAY THE DFA AND THE POLITICAL LEVEL LEADERSHIP IN DUBLIN IS WELL AWARE THAT THE SDLP ITSELF FACES A MAJOR CRISIS OVER THIS ELECTION. THE PARTY HAS ASKED ITS SUPPORTERS FOR AN ELECTORAL MANDATE ENDORSING THEIR DECISION NOT TO TAKE THE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA FEARS THAT SUCH A MANDATE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE MODERATE NATIONALIST POSITION IN THE NORTH WILL BE SEVERELY DAMAGED. DFA IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THERE IS AT LEAST A CHANCE (ALBEIT--THEY HOPE--A SMALL ONE) THAT THE UNIONIST PARTIES OF THE NORTH WILL--WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOST NATIONALIST VOTERS WILL SIMPLY STAY AWAY FROM THE POLLS--BE ABLE IN THEIR OWN RIGHT TO GARNER THE 70 PERCENT OF THE SEATS NEEDED UNDER THE PRIOR PLAN TO VOTE FOR THE DEVOLUTION TO THE ASSEMBLY OF CERTAIN REAL POWERS MAKING IT INDEED A NEW STORMONT.

20. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS DUBLIN'S FEAR THAT FOR NOW THE PRIOR INITIATIVE, WHICH THEY BELIEVED WAS DOOMED FROM THE BEGINNING, WILL LEAVE THE BRITISH IN THE POSITION OF AT LEAST SEEMING TO HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN TURN, WILL THEREBY LESSEN ANY PRESSURE THAT MIGHT BE APPLIED TO MRS. THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION WHICH MOST NOW EXPECT NEXT AUTUMN. IN THE LONG TERM, IF THOSE ELECTIONS ARE CLOSE--AS SOME EXPECT--THERE IS REAL FEAR IN DUBLIN THAT THE 12 OR 13 SEATS WHICH THE UNIONISTS WILL LIKELY HAVE IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENT WILL EXERT FAR MORE INFLUENCE THAN NOW--MUCH AS THEY DID IN THE WANING DAYS OF THE CALLAGHAN GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE 70'S. IF MRS. THATCHER WINS OUTRIGHT, DFA IS EVEN MORE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815

BELFAST BY POUCH

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

CONCERNED THAT, GIVEN HER OWN INCLINATIONS, SHE
WILL SIMPLY DROP ALL PRETENSE AT TRYING TO FORM
A DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND
MOVE FOR FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE UK. (DFA
DOES NOT REALLY ENTERTAIN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LABOR
WINNING NEXT YEAR. IN ADDITION, THE GOI TAKES
LITTLE COMFORT FROM VARIOUS LABOR PARTY
PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND NOTING THAT
WHAT LABOR SAYS WHEN THEY ARE OUT OF OFFICE
DIFFERS GREATLY FROM WHAT THEY DO WHEN IN GOVERNMENT.)
VI. NEXT STEPS FOR DUBLIN--LOOK TO WASHINGTON

21. FACED WITH THESE RATHER UNPLEASANT REALITIES
AND NO NEAR TERM HOPE OF MUCH MOVEMENT IN THE
ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE, DUBLIN SEEMS TO BE ACCELERATING
ITS EFFORT TO GAIN US SUPPORT FOR THE INCLUSION
OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" IN LONDON'S THINKING ON
ULSTER. CERTAINLY, FROM HIS FIRST DAYS IN OFFICE,
THAT WAS PART OF PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY'S
HOPE--AS BEST EVIDENCED BY HIS STATEMENTS AT THE
TIME OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON ST. PATRICK'S
DAY AND HIS EFFORTS WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL
FRIENDS OF IRELAND IN JUNE. AS ONE ASSOCIATE OF THE
PRIME MINISTER TOLD EMBOFF, HOWEVER, "IN MARCH THAT
WAS ONE OF SEVERAL ARROWS IN THE TAOISEACH'S
(PRIME MINISTER'S) QUIVER--TODAY ITS THE ONLY ONE
LEFT."

22. SPECIFICALLY, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE
TO SEE WASHINGTON PRESSURE LONDON--AT A MINIMUM--TO
REEXAMINE THE PRIOR PROPOSALS AND THINK MORE IN
TERMS OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION." EVEN BETTER IN
DUBLIN'S VIEW, HOWEVER, WOULD BE US PRESSURE TO
END--OR AT LEAST MODIFY--THE GUARANTEE TO NORTHERN
UNIONISTS THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN A PART OF
THE UK SO LONG AS THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE WISH
IT TO BE. DUBLIN, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ENDING
THE GUARANTEE, WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT PHRASED IN A
MORE POSITIVE FASHION THAT WOULD IMPLY SOME
ACCEPTANCE FROM LONDON OF AN EVENTUAL
REALIGNMENT IN THIS ISLAND--PERHAPS TO THE EFFECT
THAT "HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OBJECT

TO A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND SO
LONG AS THAT CHANGE CAME ABOUT BY THE WILL OF THE
MAJORITY."

23. FOREIGN MINISTER COLLINS, BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE
FOR THE US, PUBLICALLY STATED THAT NORTHERN
IRELAND WOULD BE THE CENTRAL THEME OF HIS VISIT
TO THE US (REF B). REPORTS ON THAT VISIT INDICATE
THAT HE LOOKED FOR AS MUCH SUPPORT AS HE COULD
MUSTER BOTH FROM THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH IN GENERATING THE KIND OF PRESSURE DUBLIN
BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL CHANGE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND USED THE OCCASION OF
THE VISIT TO GENERATE AS MUCH MEDIA ATTENTION AS
POSSIBLE TO THIS END.

24. COMMENT

A RENEWED ATTEMPT BY THE GOI TO ENLIST AMERICAN
SUPPORT FOR HELPING TO ACHIEVE CHANGES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND BY BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON LONDON
NEEDS TO BE APPROACHED AT TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS.
FIRST, ON THE QUESTION OF OVER-ALL US POLICY, WE
BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982
STATEMENT STILL OFFERS THE BEST AND WISEST AMERICAN
APPROACH TO THE GENERAL NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION.
SPECIFICALLY, WHILE URGING THE DISPUTANTS TO COME
TOGETHER "THROUGH A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND IRELAND," THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR
THAT "WE IN THE UNITED STATES CANNOT CHART A
COURSE FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. IF
SOLUTIONS ARE TO ENDURE THEY MUST COME FROM THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES."

25. AS TO THE SECOND AND MORE IMMEDIATE QUESTION

OF WHAT ROLE THE UNITED STATES CAN PLAY TO HELP
RE-ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN,
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT HERE THE USG MIGHT BE OF
SOME ASSISTANCE, BUT ONLY RPT ONLY AT THE APPROPRIATE
TIME. AS FOR NOW, SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE THIS AN
INAUSPICIOUS TIME TO TRY TO PLAY SUCH A BRIDGING
ROLE. SPECIFICALLY:

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 DUBLIN 3815 DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023258
EDB971 AN007539 TOR: 292/1441Z CSN: CRI169

DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 MYER-01 /002 A2

DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF

EOB:

OF DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN DUBLIN'S AND LONDON'S MUTUAL INTEREST TO SEE THE DIALOGUE RENEWED AND EXPECT THAT FORCES ALREADY AT PLAY WILL HAVE THE TWO CAPITALS TALKING TO EACH OTHER AGAIN BY THEN. IF NOT, HOWEVER, WE SUSPECT THAT THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE USG MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE EXTENDED--BEHIND THE SCENES AND WITH ZERO VISIBILITY--TO URGE BOTH SIDES TO AGAIN SIT DOWN TOGETHER. DAILEY

BT

PRIORITY

DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921436

P 191340Z OCT 82

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9409

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4866

AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1105

~~C O N F I D E N T~~ A L SECTION 06 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815

BELFAST BY POUCH

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

-- THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IS TETTERING ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE AND SOME LOCAL OBSERVERS THINK THAT A NEW GENERAL ELECTION COULD BE CALLED BY FEBRUARY OR MARCH 1983. SOME PREDICT IT COULD COME AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER 1982. EVEN THOUGH PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY SURVIVED A CHALLENGE TO HIS LEADERSHIP OF THE MEETING ON OCTOBER 6 (REF A) THAT CHALLENGE ONLY INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEW ELECTIONS.

-- THE BRITISH ARE COMMITTED TO THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PLAN AND UK GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS STILL ASSERT THAT THE PLAN HAS A CHANCE OF WORKING. MANY HERE IN DUBLIN DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW BUT MOST READILY CONCEDE THAT NOTHING WILL BE SERVED BY FURTHER TALKS WITH LONDON UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD, THE ASSEMBLY CONVENED, AND THE END RESULT OF THE PROCESS MORE APPARENT.

-- DUBLIN HAS NOTHING SPECIFIC BY WAY OF ALTERNATIVES TO OFFER. THEY EXPECT THAT AFTER THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS THE VARIOUS NATIONALIST PARTIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM. DFA EXPECTS THAT THE SDLP WILL WANT TO DISCUSS SOME OF THESE IDEAS AND THE GOI WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO PROPOSE ALTERNATIVES UNTIL THE DUST SETTLES. SOME OF THE RUMORED ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE PROPOSAL FOR AN "ALL IRELAND" ASSEMBLY BASED IN DUBLIN, COULD HEIGHTEN RATHER THAN LESSEN THE TENSIONS.

-- MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PERSONAL ANOMOSITIES BETWEEN MR. HAUGHEY AND MRS. THATCHER ARE NOW SO GREAT THAT--IF IT WILL EVER BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO WORK IN HARMONY AGAIN--AT A MINIMUM A GOOD DEAL MORE TIME MUST ELAPSE FOR "COOLING OFF." (THOUGH GIVEN THE PROSPECT OF NEW IRISH ELECTIONS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PROBLEM WILL RESOLVE ITSELF AT THE BALLOT BOX.)

26. AS TO WHEN SUCH A RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE IS POSSIBLE, THE DFA VIEW, WHICH WE SHARE, IS THAT IT MUST WAIT UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY HAS HAD FIVE OR SIX MONTHS TO FUNCTION. THUS, PERHAPS BY MARCH OR APRIL THE TIME WILL AGAIN BE RIGHT FOR A RENEWAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 7334

'82 OCT 26 P1:07

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	NRT ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

35
ID 8207334

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 26 OCT 82 15

TO CLARK

FROM BLAIR

2/7/15 CDB

DOCDATE 26 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: IRELAND

PRIOR, JIM

FEIN, SINN

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	NOV 17 1982	Clark noted		DB-

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

36

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 11 6194 DTG:011610Z NOV 82 PSN: 043166
SIT803 DATE 11/01/82 TOR: 305/1652Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

NLRR 748-15-30-6-2
BY 6013 NARA DATE 7/7/15

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC 11 6194 DTG:011610Z NOV 82 PSN: 043166

SIT:
EOB:
WHOR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6194 3051652
O 011610Z NOV 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 2428

INFO COMMISSION UGON NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3592
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 006194
E.O. 11656: DECL: 10/26/88
TAGS: IS, LE, EI, FOPG, MOPS, PSCD
SUBJECT: LETTER OF CONDOLENCE OR DEATH OF THREE IRISH
UNIFIL SOLDIERS

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY TO REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER COLLINS.

BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:

I WAS SADDENED TO LEARN OF THE DEATH OF THREE SOLDIERS
OF THE IRISH BATTALION OF UNIFIL IN SOUTHERN-LEBANON.
I KNOW THAT THEY ARE NOT THE FIRST IRISH TROOPS OF
UNIFIL WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES IN THE SERVICE OF
PEACE IN LEBANON. THE SACRIFICE OF THESE BRAVE MEN IS
ANOTHER REMINDER OF HOW MUCH IRELAND HAS CONTRIBUTED TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

MAY I EXTEND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND TO THE FAMILIES OF
THE DECEASED MY DEEPEST AND MOST HEARTFELT SYMPATHY.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

END TEXT. SHULTZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

37

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 DUBLIN 4738 4136 DTG:231400Z DEC 82 PSN: 049538
SIT775 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 357/1619Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB BLAR
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: FYICKLISTST-- T

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUFHDB #4738 3571401
P 231400Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9713

INFO AMCONSUL BELFAST 1160
AMEMBASSY LONDON 4161
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DUBLIN 04738
PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINT, US, EI
SUBJECT: ANCIENT ORDER OF HIBERNIANS TO ATTEND
FUND-RAISING DINNER
REF: 4729

1. REFTEL REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT ROCHE OF ANCIENT
ORDER OF HIBERNIANS (AOH) PLANS ATTEND NORAIID ANNUAL
FUND-RAISING DINNER.

2. IF NO OBJECTIONS PERCEIVED, AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKE
FOLLOWING TRANSMITTED TO MR ROCHE:
BEGIN QUOTE.

DEAR MR ROCHE: THE IRISH PRESS RECENTLY REPORTED YOU
HAVE AGREED TO BE GUEST OF HONOR AT NORAIID'S ANNUAL
DINNER.

I REGRET THIS VERY MUCH. LENDING YOUR PRESENCE AS
PRESIDENT OF THE ANCIENT ORDER OF HIBERNIANS (AOH) TO
THIS DINNER DOES A DISSERVICE TO BOTH THE CAUSE OF
SECURING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IMAGE OF THE AOH.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS LONG BEEN CONCERNED THAT FUNDS
CHANNELED THROUGH NORAIID GO TO SUPPORT TERRORISM.
AS YOU KNOW, THE USG HAS TAKEN LEGAL STEPS TO HAVE
NORAIID REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN LOBBY. AT A RECENT
ARMS TRIAL IN NEW YORK, NORAIID OFFICIALS STATED THAT
NORAIID WAS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ARMS TRANSFERS TO
NORTHERN IRELAND. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND CONSIDERS
NORAIID A PRINCIPLE CHANNEL FOR ILLEGAL ARMS PURCHASES
WHICH ARE SENT TO NORTHERN IRELAND WHERE THEY CONTRIBUTE
TO THE SICKENING SPIRAL OF ARMED VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL
POLARIZATION. THESE SAME ARMS MAY CONVULSE THE
REPUBLIC TOMORROW.
PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND CARTER AND U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERS HAVE DENOUNCED VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT IT.

CHURCH LEADERS, INCLUDING THE POPE AND IRELAND'S
HIERARCHY, HAVE DENOUNCED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS
VIOLENCE AND THE GUNMEN. THESE CHURCH LEADERS HAVE
CALLED FOR A HALT TO THE SENSELESS VIOLENCE WHICH
EXACERBATES THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH. SURELY, THOSE WHO SUPPPOT
SUCH VIOLENCE WITH FUNDS HAVE A HEAVY BURDEN OF
CONSCIENCE TO BEAR.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I THINK YOUR DECISION TO ATTEND
THE NORAIID DINNER IS MOST UNFORTUNATE. I HOPE
YOU WILL RECONSIDER. END QUOTE. DAILEY

DUBLIN 4738 4136 DTG:231400Z DEC 82 PSN: 049538

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NSC/S PROFILE

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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

ID 8301604

38

TO

BREMER

FROM WHEELER

BLAIR

RECEIVED 10 MAR 83 19

DOCDATE 10 MAR 83

10 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: IRELAND

AP

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TALKING POINTS FOR PRES ATTENDANCE AT THE IRISH EMBASSY
ON MAR 17

ACTION: WHEELER SGD MEMO TO BREMER DUE: 10 MAR 83 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

FORTIER

TYSON

WHEELER

COMMENTS ** DISPATCHED VIA LDX.

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	Z 3/12	Rec'd 5/5 8307179		
Blair	S 3/12	Prepare memo to DGE		DF, CT
	C 3/17	please close out per DC Blair	3/17/83	
		WAL		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(Pa) 11

DECLASSIFIED



NLRR 748-15-30-8-6

BY 10123 NARA DATE 7/7/8

S/S 8307179
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

1604
39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 11, 1983

A12 14


SIT. ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Reception at the Irish Embassy,
March 17

The Department submits herewith a draft toast for the President to use at the March 17 reception at the Irish Embassy and talking points for use in his telephone conversation with Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald.

In the draft toast, the President again condemns those who want to use violence to resolve the problems of Northern Ireland. In the draft talking points with FitzGerald, the President reminds the Prime Minister of his continuing interest in the problem of Northern Ireland and reaffirms his support for FitzGerald's efforts to achieve reconciliation.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft Presidential Toast
2. Telephone Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

40

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1604

March 10, 1983

VIA LDX

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Reception at the Irish Embassy,
March 17

At the invitation of the Irish Ambassador, the President will be attending an afternoon reception at the Irish Embassy on March 17. He will be presented a bowl of shamrocks and will receive a phone call from Prime Minister FitzGerald. The State Department is requested to provide by close-of-business, Friday, March 11 a briefing paper for the reception. A draft toast and draft talking points for the telephone conversation.

Donna S. Moore
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

MEMORANDUMACTION**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

March 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: President's Reception at Irish Embassy, March 17

Attached for your signature is a memo to State requesting materials for the President's visit to the Irish Embassy next Thursday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Tab I Memo to Bremer

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8301598

RECEIVED 10 MAR 83 12

TO

CLARK

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 10 MAR 83

TYSON

10 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: IRELAND

AP

SUBJECT: PRES LUNCHEON AT IRISH EMBASSY ON MAR 17

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 12 MAR 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8301142

8301580

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C

3/11

Clark agd memo

DB, CT

DISPATCH

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W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C)


THE WHITE HOUSE

1598

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK SUBJECT: President's Activities on St. Patrick's Day,
March 17

Following lunch on Capitol Hill the President will go to the Irish Embassy for a reception, accompanied by Speaker O'Neill. At the embassy reception he will receive a bowl of shamrocks, propose a toast, and will talk by telephone with Prime Minister FitzGerald. My staff is working with the State Department and speechwriters to prepare the papers and statements for the President's use.

MEMORANDUM**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**ACTION

March 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *ms*FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *ms*

SUBJECT: President's Reception at the Irish Embassy

Attached for your signature is a memo to Mike Deaver outlining the events in which the President will participate at the Irish Embassy on St. Patrick's Day.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Deaver at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I Memo to Deaver

National Security Council
The White House

574

1825P

MAR 1 0 1983

Package # 1598
Redo

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>✓</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

573

National Security Council The White House

Package # 1598

1242

MAR 1 0 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

*CPT to Sub
Revised Version*
*this version
fbl*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: President's Luncheon at the Irish Embassy

The plans for the President's St. Patrick's Day luncheon at the Irish Embassy has just now fallen into place. They include lunch, a toast and a phone call with Prime Minister FitzGerald in Dublin. Attached for your signature is a memo to Deaver informing him of the events to take place during the lunch.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Deaver at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Tab I Memo to Deaver

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1598

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: President's Luncheon at Irish Embassy

During the luncheon at the Irish Embassy on St. Patrick's Day, March 17, the President will make a toast and receive a phone call from Prime Minister FitzGerald in Dublin. My staff will provide necessary papers for the President and will work with speechwriters to write the toast.