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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING: Presidential Records

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Date: 11/9/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Letter	L. Brezhnev from Pres. Reagan, Sp R, 6/28/00 NLSF98-011 #4	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1982

MR. PRESIDENT:

Per your request, attached
are: (A) information on
the acquisition of copper
for the strategic minerals
stockpile, and (B) details
of the NOAA regulations
affecting Northern
California fishermen.

Dick

Richard G. Darman

*Thanks very much
Ron*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER
RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON

SUBJECT: ACQUISITION OF COPPER FOR STRATEGIC
MINERALS STOCKPILE

In his letter to you, Governor Bruce Babbitt (D-Arizona) urged an acceleration of the acquisition of copper for the Strategic Minerals Stockpile. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in conjunction with NSC, establishes the policy and priorities for acquisition of strategic minerals; and GSA purchases them. Decisions by FEMA to recommend the purchase of various strategic minerals are based, fundamentally, on short-term national security considerations (short-term being 3-5 years). There are five classes of priorities for strategic minerals to be stockpiled; and copper falls within the third class.

While the supply of copper in the Strategic Minerals Stockpile is not near the quota amount allocated to copper, North America, Canada, and Mexico have vast copper resources and copper mining capacities. FEMA and NSC have reasoned, therefore, that short-term national needs could be met without the stockpile because such excess copper resources are readily available to the Federal Government. That fact, coupled with current budgetary constraints on GSA purchasing power due to a reduced funding level of \$57 million; and because there are other higher priority strategic minerals which are not so readily available to the U.S.; there is no program for copper acquisition at this time. Likewise, unless you decide to upgrade the priority status of copper, there is not likely to be any significant move to purchase copper in the near future.

Governor Babbitt's letter is timely in that it coincides with legislation (S. 2429) introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona). Senator DeConcini's legislation, if passed, would authorize what would in effect be a \$250-\$300 million supplemental appropriation for the acquisition of 200,000 short tons of copper. Arizona has large copper resources and has experienced the general malaise of the domestic mining industry, attributable in part to the declining auto and construction industries; and symptomatic of a general slump in world copper markets. FEMA is preparing comments and a recommendation for submission to OMB that the Administration not support S. 2429, as it is inconsistent with Administration policy in building our stockpile; and represents, to some extent, a bail-out for the copper industry. OMB had not received FEMA's comments as of this writing, but it is expected that OMB will concur.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CRAIG FULLER
RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON

SUBJECT: NOAA REGULATIONS AFFECTING NORTH COASTAL
CALIFORNIA FISHERMEN

The issue which Mr. Erick Hedlund raises in his letter concerns restrictions under the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act on salmon and the management of that species. Basically, the issue is over how many fish can be caught and during what period of time.

The survival of the salmon population in the north coastal California area is increasingly threatened. The authority of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, and of the Fisheries Division of NOAA (Commerce Department) in enforcing that Act, is to ensure conservation of species -- salmon, in this case. The main issue in regulating fisheries in the area is the level of escapement -- that is, what volume into the Klamath river to lay eggs and therefore assure perpetuation of the species for years to come.

Current restrictions provide that between 80,000 and 120,000 fish must survive annually to ensure the perpetuation of the salmon species. However, in an effort to address the current economic stress in that north coastal region, NOAA has reduced the escapement level to 45,000, making an additional 40,000 fish (approximately) available to the fisheries in that area including Eureka County. While under existing 1980 regulations those fisheries would be required to close from June 1 to July 15, NOAA proposed (and is in the process of implementing) a Secretarial amendment to the Fisheries Management Plan that will limit the closure period to three (instead of eight) weeks, from June 9-10.

That compromise was worked out with the fishermen and State representatives not only in California, but also in Washington, Oregon and Utah, states affected because of their own fishing constituencies and the swimming patters of salmon. Although NOAA concedes no one is very satisfied with the compromise, it has been accepted for the time being.

Emergency regulations are to be published in the Federal Register this month and the delay of closure is to be granted by month's end.

The Fisheries division of NOAA is very aware of the problems in the Eureka County area and has investigated the situation there. With respect to the impact on unemployment of regulating salmon fisheries, NOAA maintains that the problems indigenous to that area are a result of the failing lumber industry, rather than of the fishing industry. Additionally, NOAA contends that employment or unemployment as a function of fishing is directly related to the number of fish caught. NOAA estimates that the number of fish that will be caught this year will be equal to last year's volume. NOAA concedes that because the salmon population has diminished to so great an extent, these restrictions of fisheries cannot improve in any significant way the existing salmon stock. Rather, NOAA indicates such restrictions will help to stabilize the rate of decrease in that species.

As an aside, it should be noted that the Indians also represent a significant constituency of salmon fishermen, fishing for food and because it is part of their heritage. Under Secretary Hodel, Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs, is apparently a strong proponent of more restrictions on fisheries in order to make more fish available to the Indian.

RRS
5/19/82

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON *RSW*

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMOS

Attached are two memos to the President from Craig Fuller and myself in response to his request for more information (see attached correspondence summary).

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUMDATE: 5/20/82 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: --SUBJECT: American Apparel Manufacturers Association Ad

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	GERGEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HARPER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	JAMES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CLARK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROLLINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> SS	WILLIAMSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DOLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WEIDENBAUM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	BRADY/SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Remarks:

The President has noted this with approval. Obviously, it would be desirable to see many more such ads from supporters.

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
(x2702)

Response:

To Dick
7.18
RO

"Courage and patience to allow our programs to work."

Ronald Reagan - President of the United States



This morning at the Annual Meeting of the American Apparel Manufacturers Association, President Reagan, via a video-taped address, called for "courage and patience" to allow his programs to work. This is a tough order at a time when the economy and our industry are at one of their lowest points since World War II.

But we, as an industry, stand behind President Reagan. We believe his programs will:

- ★ reduce government spending increases;
- ★ reduce business and individual taxes to spur investment, productivity, and employment; and
- ★ loosen the Federal regulatory stranglehold.

Already results have begun to show. Inflation, soaring at more than 14 percent just a year ago, is now below 5 percent. Regulatory reform initiative has cut the growth of Federal regulation by one-third. Growth of an unmanageable Federal bureaucracy has been cut by more than one-half. Accelerated depreciation policy has laid the ground work for increased capital formation.

Our deeply ingrained economic problems have been developed over a generation. They will not be resolved in 16 months, or 36 months, or even 48. But a start has been made.

The American Apparel Manufacturers Association agrees with you Mr. President. With courage and patience we can continue to make progress. With mutual cooperation and support for the President's programs, this nation, its businesses, and its consumers can achieve the objective of a robust economy — showing real and lasting growth.



American Apparel
Manufacturers Association

1611 N. Kent St./Suite 800
Arlington, VA 22209

David T. Shirey, Chairman
Ellis E. Meredith, President

End
Cage
Fil

FINANCIAL WORLD

ALFRED H. KINGON
Editor-in-Chief

May 21, 1982

No Reply.

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thanks for your kind response to my most recent letter. It was not only reassuring to me, but when I conveyed these sentiments to many of my Wall Street friends, I assure you they were and are much heartened.

Yesterday morning I wrote Dave Gergen a letter. To my surprise, I see that you are the recipient of similar advice in the Wall Street Journal reports this morning. May I intrude to add my two cents worth.

As ever, be assured of my best wishes and support.

Sincerely,



AHK/sm

enc.

FINANCIAL WORLD

ALFRED H. KINGON

Editor-in-Chief

May 20, 1982

The Honorable David R. Gergen
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Dave:

Watch out! I think the "team" may be heading into a self-made trap. Do what you can to dismantle it. I am referring to the now oft repeated predictions that interest rates will fall when a budget solution is forthcoming.

Dave it just may not happen that way and again we could have egg on our faces.

Look, I'm not at all convinced that the cause of the persistently high interest rates is either the current deficit or the numbers that are projected (I am convinced, however, that these deficits have been discounted in the various securities markets -- and any news to the contrary will be good news).

Having said that, I am convinced that the majority of investment professionals, and the public, believe that the projected deficits are the cause of high interest rates which can abort the recovery, bring back inflation, ad infinitum. As you know, I wrote the President that I thought the right course, therefore, was to do everything possible to reduce the deficit short of endangering the fundamental long term program which I am quite confident will be the catalyst for major long term non-inflationary growth.

I have to tell you that hearing Secretary Regan relay opinions at a lunch in his dining room as to why interest rates were high, and hearing really careful analyses from Wall Streeters and other bankers as to why interest rates are up, and reading various economists and other assorted pundits, well, none were very persuasive. Someday we will add to our knowledge about interest rates in economics much as we did the whole concept of marginal tax rates in the late 60's and 70's.

The Honorable David R. Gergen

May 20, 1982

Page two

If you must know my guess, I believe that the current high rates reflect the lagging shift from an inflationary to a non-inflationary psychology. Or, as one astute Wall Streeter put it, the high rates represent "losses yet to be taken" and the orders yet to be cancelled with their consequent removals from the current money market strains. What I am saying is that before the recession runs its course we may see some more Braniffs and a whole shift in plans for the upcoming year reflecting the non-inflationary society.

Now if you ask me when this process is going to be completed, I don't know. And I think anyone who does predict, well, he's risking too much. Would it come as a surprise to me that a budget compromise is reached, say not later than June or July, and interest rates stay up? Not on your life. When the process of adjustment to the removal of the inflation factor from the economy runs its course, interest rates will have nowhere to go but down. When? My guess -- the very latter part of this year irrespective of when the budget compromise is reached. Would I predict it? Yes! Would I predict it if I were in public office? No way!


Is there anything that can upset this process and derail the recovery? Yes. The abandonment of the basic program to stimulate growth (actions like more taxes in a recession) which would renew the fears that the now dormant inflationary forces would rise again.

I am afraid when our President, Treasury Secretary and high White House officials predict so confidently that interest rates will fall when the current budget dilemma is solved is not so far removed from predictions of a half year ago that the economy would come surging back. I'm not trying to embarrass anyone but I think it would be much better for all concerned to "hope", "expect", or "believe" that interest rates will begin their downward adjustment when the budget process is on track and when the long term program begins to build up steam.

What are you going to do if interest rates stay right up there through September and October providing the opposition with some juicy items, only to have them fall right after the election?

I hope you can deflect some of these hard and fast predictions. I presume you know the old Wall Street saw that the sure way to madness is women, booze, and predicting interest rates.

Best personal regards.



AHK:sm

085528
ME001-02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: Biff Heneley

DATE: 5-21-82

For your special Personal
folder.

Thanks.

FROM: Kathy Osborne
Personal Secretary
to the President



Ext. 2858

3-26-82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

Today is Sandra Day O'Connor's birthday.

Can we send wire -
~~Dear Sandra~~
Happy Birthday. You are a
long way from having to first
celebrate anniversaries of your
39th so enjoy.
Mammy & Ron

✓ WIRE VIA ANN HIGGINS

SECRET

RR's COMMENTS
BELOW

Dear Mr. President,

With regard to your message to me of May 7, 1982 I would like above all to emphasize that the Soviet Union - the correspondence between us being a clear testimony thereof - has been steadily and persistently calling on the United States to agree on joint measures aimed at effectively bridling the arms race, first of all, in nuclear weapons.

We have been proceeding from the premise that only by moving along this path is it possible to achieve the objective of preventing a nuclear war, which would become an irreparable tragedy for all mankind.

Life itself puts questions of limitation and reduction of strategic arms in the center of Soviet-American relations. We have always favored increasingly radical steps in this direction. And it is not our fault that the strategic arms limitation process was interrupted for a long period of time.

?
History does not confirm.

References made to this or that event on the international scene cannot justify the lack of readiness on the part of the U.S. to resolve the issue which you yourself justly call one of critical importance for our two countries and the world at large. And the special responsibility of our two countries and their leaders in this respect is certainly not a thing that has emerged today. That responsibility existed in equal measure one year ago, a year and a half ago. On our part we always proceeded from this premise.

How about the last 35 years?

SECRET
RDS-1 5/20/02

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-011 #4
BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/28/00

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

If the U.S. side has now come to understand the need to resume negotiations on the problem of strategic arms, that in itself is a positive fact.

Our position of principle in favor of continuing such negotiations is surely well known to you. I can reaffirm that it has not changed. We agree that specific questions concerning the organizational aspect of those negotiations, including the time and venue for holding them, be discussed in the near future through diplomatic channels.

Speaking of the coming negotiations, one can be certain that a great deal of effort will be required to recoup for the time lost and the opportunities missed. But that must be done. Helpful in this respect can be, first, the preservation of whatever positive has already been achieved through the joint efforts of our two countries in the area of strategic arms limitation and, second, a genuinely serious willingness to seek a mutually acceptable agreement commensurate with the scope and significance of the truly historic task that stands before us.

In other words it is important that the negotiations be set on the right course from the very beginning, that they be conducted constructively without one side attempting to gain advantage in them at the expense of the other.

I deem it necessary to say it with all clarity, since the position with which the U.S., judging by your speech of May 9, is approaching the negotiations cannot but cause apprehension and even doubts as to the seriousness of the intentions of the U.S. side.

*H. H. H. H.
be building.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

After all, it is obvious that to isolate just any one component out of the totality of the strategic systems and to make it a subject of negotiations with no connection to the others, as you suggest, would inevitably lead to a distorted picture of the balance of forces between the sides. Thus, the "substantial" reductions the U.S. side is talking about on the basis of the picture it has itself presented would naturally be substantial only for the Soviet side.

*They become
have the
most.*

Only one thing would be the result of such a one-sided approach - an upsetting of the existing balance of forces and a breach of that very stability which the U.S. side is allegedly so anxious to ensure.

*He means
imbalance.*

There should be no misunderstanding, Mr. President: this is not a realistic position, not the path toward agreement. Besides, as you know, we are not the only ones who hold such a view.

We believe it is difficult to argue against the fact that, when it comes to matters touching upon national security, neither side can allow a tilt to be made in favor of the other and to the detriment of its legitimate interests. We are realists and do not expect that the United States would accept that. To an equal degree, it cannot be expected of the Soviet Union either. I consider it necessary to state this directly, with nothing omitted.

In your letter you mention that a possible agreement should be understandable and acceptable to the American people. But this does not make any more convincing the arguments for such an

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

approach which is clearly unacceptable to the USSR, to the Soviet people.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to say that I found it necessary also to express publicly in my speech on May 18, 1982 at the Komsomol Congress, our attitude toward such a one-sided approach and our opinion regarding the principles on which a genuinely fair and equitable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms should be based.

In doing so, I also stated the readiness of the Soviet Union to reach agreement with the United States to the effect that right now, as soon as the negotiations begin, the strategic nature of both countries be frozen quantitatively and that their modernization be limited to the utmost. Such agreement would, in our view, create favorable conditions for the negotiations and facilitate achieving the objectives therein. I would ask you, Mr. President, carefully to consider this proposal.

*I have over it's
an appeal for an
accord.*

I am convinced that the American people would understand and support an agreement between the USSR and the USA which would be based on the principle of equality and equal security, and which would meet the objective of mutual limitation and reduction of strategic arms, just as they have supported the previously reached agreements that you cited. Soviet people - and you can take my word for that - will resolutely support such an agreement.

*How will
them know?
They haven't been
told the truth
for years.*

And the last point. In our correspondence I have already spoken about to whom an appeal for restraint in international

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

affairs should be addressed. Since you raise that subject again, I shall only say, without repeating myself, that it is precisely of the U.S. that we, and indeed other countries, expect restraint and a constructive approach both to issues of bilateral relations and to fundamental international problems, above all to those related to limiting the arms race and strengthening common security.

We, of course, are giving and will continue to give a proper evaluation to unacceptable manifestations in U.S. policy as well as to the incessant attacks made regarding the Soviet Union. But we, on our part, have been seeking neither sharp polemics nor confrontation.

You may be assured, Mr. President, that a readiness to deal on an equal basis, to respect the interests of each other, and to develop mutual trust, will meet a most positive response on the part of the Soviet Union.

We will, as before, continue to do all we can so that people can look into the future with confidence and calm, without fearing for the threat of war which is not needed equally - I repeat, equally - either by the Soviet or the American people.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

*He's a journal
of things.*

May 20, 1982

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE

Dear Eppie

Hope you'll forgive me
but I had to write a Dear Ann
letter.

Nanny sends her best.

Sincerely
Ron

D79925
ND 018

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 24, 1982

Dear Ann Landers:

I'm writing about your recent column regarding the letter from "Terrified in D.C." I want you to know that I'll take second to none in my concern over the threat of nuclear war. That is why in my April 17 radio address to the nation, I said:

"To those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say I'm with you. Like my predecessors, it is now my responsibility to do my utmost to prevent such a war. No one feels more than I the need for peace."

It is, indeed, my highest priority to deter and prevent such a war, for its consequences would be disastrous for mankind.

That is why I've called for negotiations leading to major arms reductions, not limitations that only codify high levels. Under the so-called limitations of "SALT II," the Soviet Union and the United States could actually substantially add to their nuclear arsenals. I have, instead, called for the reduction of the most destabilizing strategic elements, the ballistic missile warheads, by one-third in the first phase of negotiations on Strategic Arms Reduction. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, I have also proposed the elimination of the most threatening systems, the land-based missiles.

During the last decade, the United States restrained its deployment of new nuclear forces, while the Soviet Union enormously increased its forces. We,

therefore, now face a serious imbalance which decreases the credibility of our deterrent. That is why we have to modernize our own forces, both to reduce the dangerous imbalance and to make clear to the Soviet leaders that they should join us in negotiating the kind of substantial, equal, and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms the world demands.

Ann, we've tried many times since WW II to persuade them to join us in reducing or even eliminating nuclear weapons, with little success. Perhaps, instead of sending copies to me, your readers should send copies of your May 17 column to President Brezhnev.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Ann Landers
Field Newspaper Syndicate
Chicago Sun-Times Building
Chicago, Illinois 60611

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1982

DB's
Comments
here on

Dear Ann Landers:

I'm writing about your column of May 17 regarding the letter from "Terrified in D.C." I've had a few scares myself since I've been here, but none of them radioactive.

Don't get me wrong, I'll take second to no one in my concern over the nuclear weapon threat -- such a war is unthinkable. That is why I've called for negotiations leading to reduction -- not ^{simply} limitation of nuclear weapons. Under the so-called limitation terms of "Salt II" both the United States and the Soviet Union could go on adding to the nuclear arsenals. We must have a true verifiable reduction leading to an eventual elimination of all such weapons.

Has NSC
agreed to
this ??

?? [We have to prove to the Soviet Union we are prepared to match them in such weapons or they won't even negotiate. Pretend to negotiate -- yes. Make any headway -- no. They have such an edge on us now we have no choice but to rearm. As their superiority grows, so does the danger of confrontation.

Ann, we've tried 19 times since WW II to persuade them to join us in reducing or even eliminating nuclear weapons with ~~no~~ ^{1. HK} success. Wouldn't it be better if your readers sent that May 17 column to President Brezhnev?

Sincerely,

Ann Landers
Field Newspaper Syndicate
Chicago Sun-Times Building
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Dear Ann Landers

I'm writing about your column of May 17 regarding the letter from "Terrified in D.C." I've had a few scares myself since I've been here but none of them radioactive.

Don't get me wrong I'll take second no one in my concern over the nuclear weapon threat. Such a war is unthinkable. That is why I've called for negotiations ~~to~~ leading to reduction — not limitation of nuclear weapons. Under the so called limitation terms of ~~the~~ "Salt II" ~~the~~ both the U.S. & the Soviet Union could go on adding to the nuclear arsenals. We must have a true verifiable reduction leading to an eventual elimination of all such weapons.

~~But Ann~~ We have to prove to the Soviet U. we are prepared to match them in such weapons or they won't even negotiate. Pretend to negotiate — yes. Make any headway — no. They have such an edge on us now we have no choice ~~but to~~ ^{get to work} ~~fight~~. As their superiority grows so does the danger of confrontation.

Ann we've tried 19 times since W.W.II to persuade them to join us in reducing or even eliminating nuclear weapons with no success. Wouldn't it be better if your readers sent that May 17 column to President Brezhnev?
Sincerely RR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Ann Landers' Column on Nuclear War

We have reviewed the draft of the letter from the President to Ann Landers responding to her recent column on nuclear war, on which you requested our comments (Tab B).

We have provided a number of suggested revisions, true to the spirit of the President's draft, which we have incorporated in a revised text attached at Tab A. We recommend that the President sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Revised Proposed Presidential Response to Ann Landers
Tab B Incoming Draft Presidential Response

Ann Landers

Dear Ann Landers:

Can you stand another letter about the woman who didn't know whether to leave her gold crowns to relatives when she dies, for fear she might need them when she returns to life for the resurrection?

If the two strongest nations in the world, the United States and Russia, don't agree to put a freeze on nuclear weapons she won't have to worry about her teeth or anything else because they will be vaporized in a matter of minutes—along with millions of people.

Talk about a limited nuclear war and plans for civilian defense are insane. It would be impossible to evacuate the cities. Where would people go? What would they eat? What would they drink? Who would take care of them? The physicians and hospitals would be blown to smithereens.

You are more than an advice-to-the-lovelorn columnist, Ann Landers. You mold public opinion. People believe in you. For the love of mankind and its survival, please address yourself to this issue.—Terrified in D.C.

Dear Terrified:

Thank you for writing about a subject that is plaguing us all.

Dr. James E. Muller of the Harvard Medical School said, "The horror of nuclear war is so great that many people choose to deny it exists."

"An all-out attack on the United States could kill as many as 150 million Americans. Their immune systems, weakened by radiation, would succumb to fatal diseases. At least 80 percent of the doctors would be incinerated."

As the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh said at a UCLA peace rally, "The living would envy the dead."

The New Republic pointed out in a recent editorial that the global arms budget for all countries is now

\$550 billion a year. About \$100 billion is earmarked for nuclear weapons. When one considers that \$500 billion equals the entire annual income of the poorer half of the earth's 4 billion people, one begins to grasp the magnitude of that expenditure. Meanwhile, we are cutting programs that benefit the elderly, the handicapped and the poor. More cheery news: Our Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan says, "Our economy is dead in the water."

The standard reference is the Hiroshima bomb. It destroyed the city with the equivalent of 12,500 tons of TNT. (This is 12.5 kilotons.) The newest nuclear bomb is not measured in kilotons, but in megatons. The yield would be equivalent to approximately 12 million one-ton trucks filled with TNT.

The Poseidon submarine carries 16 missiles, each with 10 warheads. Each warhead has three times the explosive force of that single bomb dropped on Hiroshima. We can already kill every Russian seven times. Now we are trying to build our arms supply so we can kill each Russian 14 times. The United States and other major powers are spending themselves broke on a war we dare not let happen.

Jonathan Schnell wrote in The New Yorker, "The machinery of destruction is in place, poised on a hair-trigger, waiting for the button to be pushed by some misguided or deranged human, or for some faulty computer chip to send out the instructions to fire."

I implore every person to sign his or her name across this column and mail it to President Ronald Reagan, the White House, Washington, D.C. An overwhelming response might prevent a nuclear holocaust that would mean the end of all life on this planet. Do it TODAY. Nothing on your calendar can be more important.

OK I signed the
NSC version but
do we have the card
(Dear Eppie) I wrote?
It's to go in the
envelope with the
letter. We know the
gal - that's her real name
M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1982

MR. PRESIDENT:

I took the liberty of having NSC/Bill Clark take a look at your response to Ann Landers before sending it. NSC suggests a few revisions. The NSC version is at Tab A. Your original version is at Tab B. Although yours is clearly more readable, the NSC technical changes would seem appropriate to incorporate.

Sorry to complicate matters.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dick", written in dark ink.

Richard G. Darman

RSJ has letter

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/20/82 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: c.o.b. TODAY

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter Re Arms Negotiations with Soviets

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>Sara checked 5/21</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CLARK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> SS		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DOLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Remarks:

Attached is a response the President himself drafted to an Ann Landers column, also attached. Could you please provide comments ASAP.

Thank you.

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
(x2702)

Response:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5-17-82

Mr. President:

The attached Ann Landers column about nuclear war caught my eye this morning. I ran it by Dick Darman to see if he thought we should respond to it before we get a lot of mail on it. He suggested I show it to you and, also, he suggested that we consider asking Ann Landers to tell her readers to send her column to Brezhnev instead of to you.

Your thoughts?

Kathy

~~RECEIVED~~
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/20/88 MAY 20 AM 95 ACTION/CORRECTION/COMMENT DUE BY: C.O.B. TODAY

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter Re Arms Negotiations with Soviets

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	GERGEN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HARPER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	JAMES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CLARK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROLLINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> SS	WILLIAMSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DOLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WEIDENBAUM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	BRADY/SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Remarks:

Attached is a response the President himself drafted to an Ann Landers column, also attached. Could you please provide comments ASAP.

Thank you.

Richard G. Darman
 Assistant to the President
 (x2702)

Response:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD G. DARMAN AND CRAIG L. FULLER

SUBJECT: CRIME PROGRAM

The following items were reviewed during today's Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. The Department of Justice's proposal for a Crime Program consists of the following elements, which you are asked to accept or reject. The items approved would be submitted in a legislative package with zero funding.

<u>RECOMMENDATION:</u>	<u>Accept</u>	<u>Reject</u>	<u>Defer Action for future Consideration</u>
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The members of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy concurred on a recommendation to accept all elements of Issue A except Number 7, which they recommend be deferred. There was also consensus on a recommendation to accept Issues B and C.

A. The Crime Program, with the following elements as presented and discussed in the CCLP meeting of 5/24 should be approved by the President.

1. Bail Reform Act	OK RR		
2. Sentencing Reform	OK RR		
3. Criminal Forfeiture	OK RR		
4. Protection for Senior Federal Officials	OK RR		
5. Federal Property Act Amendment	OK RR		
6. Insanity Defense	OK RR		
7. Capital Punishment			OK RR
8. Habeas Corpus Reform	OK RR		
9. Exclusionary Rule Reform	OK RR		
10. Miscellaneous Administration Proposals	OK RR		
11. Witness & Victim Protection	OK RR		

B. The Administration should support a program for Criminal Justice Assistance, as proposed by Justice with modifications regarding funding suggested by OMB and with a 5% assessment on Federal fines to help finance the program. (Acceptance will allow Congressional consultation to move forward.)

OK RR

C. A final decision on the character of a legislative package or packages will be made following Congressional consultations.

OK RR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 5/25/82

NOTE FOR: ED MEESE
CRAIG FULLER

The President has

seen ☒

acted upon ☒

commented upon ☐

the attached; and it is forwarded to you for your:

information ☒

action ☒

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
(x-2702)

cc: Central File - Original

End
case
File