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WITHDRAWAL SHEET **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection: PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING FILE: Records

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Date: 6/21/99

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
1 -Memo	Frank Carlucci to the President re Submission of Treaties to Congress, 2p R, 6/29/00 NLSF98-016 # 36	1/12/87	-P4	
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RESTRICTION CODES

- Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
 P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
 F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIAL
- Release would violate a Federal statue ((b)(3) of the FOIA).
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]. F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- ((b)(8) of the FOIA). Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN

Martin Gross, author of that book, <u>The Red President</u>, lives at 18 Quail Road, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830. His phone number, from his letter, is 203/661-0598.

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1987

Dear Martin:

Thanks for the books; Novak confirmed his enthusiastic review; sent the President's copy on to the hospital. He has been casting about for your phone number. Look forward to reading the book myself; and good luck with it.

at number,

Best wishes.

Sincerely

Patrick J. Buchanan Assistant to the President

Mr. Martin L. Gross 18 Quail Road Greenwich, Connecticut 06830

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FromPat Buchanan

Martin Gross, author of that book, The Red President, lives at 18 Quail Road, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830. His phone number, from his letter, is 203 661-0598

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 6, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN

While I have not read this novel myself, Tom Clancy (Red Storm Rising), Arnaud de Borchgrave, and Robert Novak vouch for its contents, both ideologically and entertainment-wise. Martin Gross, the author, sent it to me -- for you -- and I thought you might want some light reading, while recuperating at Navy Medical.

Pot - thanks very much for the book. How and thanh Martin Hours? Do me have a phone number? & An I'please him. Rd



PUBLICITY DEPARTMENT DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC. 245 PARK WENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10467 (2):2 98 p.7564

THE RED PRESIDENT Martin Gross

THE RED PRESIDENT
Publication Date:
January 16, 1987
\$17.95 hardcover

Contact: Patti Kelly 212/984-7084

"As taut a doomsday thriller as you will ever read."

-- Tom Clancy author of The Hunt for Red October

"Just when you think you've read it all, along comes THE RED PRESIDENT. Brilliantly conceived, meticulously researched, and a joy to read, this is one book that dares to tell a story everyone is thinking about, but no one had the courage to write about until now."

-- Arnaud de Borchgrave Co-Author of The Spike

NEW NOVEL ENVISIONS SECRET TAKEOVER OF WHITE HOUSE

Doubleday announces the publication of THE RED PRESIDENT, a novel of political intrigue and international suspense by author and former nationally syndicated columnist, Martin Gross.

Using his background in journalism and national politics, Mr. Gross has woven carefully researched details of American and Soviet defense and CIA-KGB operations into his novel, bringing a sense of documentary truth to a revealing tale.

THE RED PRESIDENT goes behind the closed doors of Washington and Moscow to present the ultimate horror of a vulnerable democratic nation: a Soviet plot to place an apparently loyal American politician -- actually a secret Marxist-Leninist -- into the White House.

Masquerading as a liberal, the handsome, wealthy and brilliant candidate becomes both kingpin and pawn in the Kremlin's bold plan, project "Oval Red." Using the crazyquilt of the American primary system and the machinations of the Washington-based KGB operation, he succeeds in gaining the nation's highest office.

Once in the Oval Office, the new President hides his pro-Soviet sympathies while he misdirects American foreign policy, only to find he is being treated as an instrument of the Kremlin's will rather than as the head of a sovereign state.

While hiding their suspicions from the public, a handful of key Washington figures -- including a retired head of CIA counterintelligence and a network television newscaster -- risk their lives and reputations to uncover the truth. In a race to prevent the permanent encroachment of American freedom, they seek the real story behind violent crimes and startling innuendoes leaking from the Hill, the Pentagon and the Oval Office itself.

Through the gripping pages of THE RED PRESIDENT, we follow the intricate paths of Soviet espionage, the turmoil within a divided CIA, and the indecision of a Congress confused by the policies of a disloyal Oval Office. This tautly controlled political thriller borders unnervingly between fiction and reality, culminating in an unforgettable showdown between the superpowers.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 6, 1987

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

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End lass File To my pen part - Rudwy Hims We have Ini and was Dear Russy Dim a little late with This lost Namy & I want you to know how much me appricate the beautiful scarps me formed and under on Christmas the. Please Thank your not simbe me down much med slet & rottom handi-work. We left for Resil, right after Christman Treach ed in showing the way wall back & at Palm 3 prings. I had my annual goof game. med st in nock men tral since beyong the same place. Then the day after me got brock to here I went into the haspital. & Everything turned out fine & I'm back at the White House gu printatas again our thank to you & you mather.

468546 GIOUZ

January 9, 1987

Dear Ruddy

I'm a little late with this, but Nancy and I want you to know how much we appreciate the beautiful scarves we found under our Christmas tree. Please thank your mother and tell her how much we admire her handiwork.

We left for California right after Christmas and had New Year's with friends in the desert at Palm Springs. I had my annual golf game. Hadn't played since last New Year's in the same place. Then, the day after we got back here, I went into the hospital. Everything turned out fine, and I'm back at the White House catching up.

Again, our thanks to you and your mother.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Rudolph Hines 607 Savannah Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20032

RR: AVH:pps

RR Dictation

John Hilboldt

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

456314
PROOZ

TO:

Jane Erkenbeck

FROM: KATHY OSBORNE

DATE:

1-12-87

The President has already seen this -- Mrs. Reagan may not be aware that we

received this.

has soon

Souls

				A.

- CHE

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PRESIDENT AND MRS RONALD REAGAN

CARE KATHY OSBORNE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC 20500

DUPLICATE OF TELEPHONE TELEGRAM

4-0402258009 01/09/87

456314

OUR SUPPORT AND OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU IN EVERYTHING.

BYRON ANFD MARIA JANIS

521 PARK AVE

NEW YORK NY 10021

2122 EST

2149 EST

Ful Casc File THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 12, 1987

Dear Jim:

This is a late answer to your kind and warm letter of December 11, but it has only just arrived at my desk. That happens back here many times. Let me give you a clear channel. Letters reach me on schedule if you put on the front of the envelope, c/o Kathy Osborne.

Jim, thank you for writing as you did. Nancy and I are most grateful. I'd like to read your views on the Middle East if it isn't too much trouble. Again, thanks.

Sincerely,



Mr. James M. Hall 2922 Owen Street San Diego, California 92106 ₹ — U

JAMES M. HALL

2922 Omen et. Don Diegrardeil . 92106

11 Jecamber 1986

Var President and Mrs Reagan,

There are many of us who were once. privileged to serve you who are ready to stand with you in the current Iran Situation. Onfortunately, we have no way of communicating with you, so we are left to observe the untolding events in trustration. Having spent the last seven years traveling to and Fram the Middle Fast, partic-Warly Saudi Arabia, I have some theories about the current situation that are probably not representative of the advice you are currently receiving, but which I believe are accurate. Best wishes for a Merry Christmas and a much happier War Gar. Sucerely,

Mr. James M. Wall 2912 Owen st. Son Diegn Carif. 92108 Dear Jim This is a late answer to your hind & plus sad I tal 11. sel go will more first arrived at my sack. That happens hand here many times. Let me give your a clear channel. Letters reach me on achedule if you put on the front of the envelope, Co Kathy Ostone. Jem thank you for writing as you did, Kaney I dane most greteful. did like to han ved your wiend on the Middle East if it ient too much trouble. again thanks. Sureary Rom

4446815J NP018

Jan 87

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 12, 1987

MR. PRESIDENT:

Earlier this afternoon, you took with you to the residence the Message to the Senate urging the ratification of 2 testing treaties between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

If you sign this document this evening, please give it to the ushers office for return to my office. If not, we will pick it up in the morning. We are hopeful to get it to the Hill as early as possible tomorrow.

Thank you.

David L. Chew

Deliner three to David Chem's oppine.

SECRET



THE WHITE HOUSE

90845 Add-on

WASHINGTON

ACTION

January 12, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

FRANK C. CARLUCCI

SUBJECT:

Submission of Nuclear Testing Treaties to Congress

Issue

To carry out your commitment to seek Senate advice and consent to ratification the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).

Facts

In October 1986, as part of an agreement to forestall threatened Congressional denial of funds for nuclear testing above 1 KT, you agreed to submit the TTBT and PNET to the Senate in early January for advice and consent as to ratification, with an appropriate reservation to ensure the treaties would not take effect until they are effectively verifiable. You pledged to work with the Senate on the text of such a reservation.

Discussion

A message requesting the Senate to act on the treaties and proposing an appropriate reservation is at Tab A. The approach is not to seek a formal treaty reservation, but rather to propose that the Senate resolution of advice and consent state that you may not ratify the treaties until you have negotiated new verification protocols providing for direct, on-site yield measurement of underground nuclear tests, certified that those protocols make the treaties effectively verifiable, and submitted the new protocols to the Senate for advice and consent. A key element of this approach is ensuring that the new verification provisions have equal legal status with the existing treaty.

The new Senate leadership is anxious to act on these treaties quickly in order to show early accomplishments by the new Senate Hearings are scheduled for 13-15 January with floor action possible as early as 28 January. To implement your commitment to work with the Senate on the text of the reservation, we have worked with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff on the reservation text. We have not, however, reached complete agreement. Senator Pell, new Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, would prefer that we not include a provision that the future verification protocols be submitted to the Senate for

Declassify on: OADR

SFORET

cc: The Vice President Mr. Donald Regan

NLS F98-016 TO



their advice and consent. We disagree, since failing to submit these verification standards could upset Republicans, put you in the position of infringing on the Senate's Constitutional perogatives, and make it easier for a future President to accept weakened verification standards if negotiations are not concluded during your Administration. All agencies except State support this view. State would continue attempts to work with Pell and thus would submit no reservation text; we believe, however, it is important to have your position before the Senate when hearings begin. I have so informed Pell, who understands our position.

Except for the State view noted above, all agencies agree with the text of the proposed message. State Department treaty experts have verified that this format is proper even though the treaties have previously been submitted and you are now simply providing your recommendations on their disposition.

Recommendation

OK

No

M

That you sign the message to the Senate at Tab A transmitting your recommendations on the two treaties.

Will Ball concurs.

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Message to the Senate

SECKET



Two treaties between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on (1) the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and the Protocol thereto, known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974, and (2) Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, and the Protocol thereto, known as the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976, were transmitted to the Senate by President Ford on July 29, 1976 with a view to receiving advice and consent to ratification. (Senate Executive N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.) Although hearings were held a year later, the Senate itself has not acted on the treaties. I ask the Senate to consider these important treaties anew in light of developments that have taken place over the last decade.

On August 14, 1986, I transmitted to the Congress a comprehensive study which stated U.S. national security concerns as well as our views on necessary verification improvements to the TTBT and the PNET, in response to the requirements of Section 1003 of the FY 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 99-145). I am enclosing a copy of this study and commend it to your attention.

The security of the United States and the entire free world, today and for the foreseeable future, depends on the maintenance of an effective and credible nuclear deterrent by the U.S. This is a considerable challenge, in light of continuing efforts by the Soviet Union to undercut the effectiveness of our deterrent. With the support of Congress we have succeeded in meeting this challenge, and together we must continue to do so in the future.

Today I am requesting per my October 10, 1986 letter that the Senate give advice and consent, subject to the condition set out below, to two pending treaties that have significant implications for Western security: the TTBT and PNET. These

treaties have the common purpose of limiting individual nuclear explosions to no more than 150 kilotons. The TTBT, which prohibits nuclear weapon tests above 150 kilotons, places significant constraints on the efforts we may undertake in the U.S. nuclear test program to respond to Soviet nuclear and non-nuclear activities aimed at undercutting our deterrent. Hence, it is imperative that we have the necessary provisions that will make the TTBT effectively verifiable and thus assure ourselves that the Soviet Union is fulfilling its obligations and is thereby equally constrained.

Unfortunately, as I have frequently stated and the enclosed study makes clear, the TTBT and PNET are not effectively verifiable in their present form. Large uncertainties are present in the current method employed by the United States to estimate Soviet test yields. I have on several occasions reported to the Congress on the problems with Soviet compliance with the TTBT. Therefore, achieving Soviet agreement to improved verification measures that would provide for effective verification of these treaties has been my highest priority in the area of nuclear testing limitations.

As I stated in my March 14, 1986 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, effective verification of the TTBT and PNET requires that we reduce the current unacceptable level of uncertainty in our estimates of the yields of nuclear tests. Indeed, leaders in previous Congresses have shared my view that the present large degree of uncertainty in such estimates is unacceptable, as well as my desire for sharp improvements. In this regard, we require -- and have conveyed to the Soviets that we require -- effective verification through direct, on-site hydrodynamic yield (CORRTEX) measurement of all appropriate high-yield nuclear detonations. Further, I informed General Secretary Gorbachev that, if the Soviet Union

would agree to essential verification procedures for the TTBT and the PNET, I would then be prepared to request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the treaties.

Ratification of the treaties without such provisions would be contrary to the national security interests of the United States.

As written, the TTBT relies solely on teleseismic detection and yield measurement systems and on inadequate, and unverifiable data exchange. The Soviet Union has apparently had problems in correctly assessing the yields of U.S. nuclear tests. Despite our best efforts, the Soviet Union has so far not accepted our practical proposal for achieving the necessary verification improvement of the TTBT and the PNET. We have not yet found any alternative approach which equals the effectiveness of CORRTEX -- we are striving to achieve a yield-estimation accuracy of about 30 percent by this method. We have, nonetheless, advised the Soviets, at three Geneva nuclear testing experts meetings in 1986, that the U.S. is willing to consider any other direct yield measurement method the Soviets might propose, provided it is at least as capable (in terms of accuracy and non-intrusiveness) as CORRTEX. To date, they have not been forthcoming in proposing or explaining alternative verification techniques that would meet our requirements.

Recognizing the role of the Senate in the ratification process, I am therefore requesting that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the TTBT and the PNET, subject to a condition in the following form:

"The Senate's Resolution of advice and consent to ratification is subject to the condition that the President shall not proceed with ratification of the Treaty on Limitation of Underground Weapon Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes until the President has certified to the Senate

that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has concluded with the United States additional agreements expanding upon the obligations stated in Article II of the Treaty on Limitation of Underground Weapon Tests and including provisions for direct, accurate yield measurements taken at the site of all appropriate nuclear detonations so that the limitations and obligations of these treaties, <u>inter alia</u> the 150 kiloton limit, are effectively verifiable, and until such agreements have been submitted to the Senate, and the Senate has advised and consented to their ratification."

I am hopeful we can reach an agreement with the Soviet Union which will allow me to certify that the treaties are effectively verifiable. I will be prepared to ratify the TTBT and the PNET at such time as the condition cited above has been fulfilled.

Further, I informed the General Secretary in Reykjavik that, once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, I would propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

The steps in this program would take into account our long-standing position that a comprehensive test ban is a long-term objective which must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces.

Ronald Rayon