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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

11/6/87

MEMO FOR Mr. Kelly

Attached is a package containing a proposal for the encryption of AFKN. ISA has formulated a proposed reply non-concurring in the idea. However, Mr. Armitage has asked for your opinion on the matter.

Would you please scan this material at your convenience and drop us a line or call us with your opinion?

Thank you.

Mary O'Sullivan/Wally Knowles  
Assistants for Korea  
695-6944

*File  
Korea  
Military*



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:  
I-87/18532

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Encryption of American Forces Korea Network

My office has reviewed the material on encryption of American Forces Korea Network television broadcasting forwarded with your memorandum of 22 October. Although the idea may seem a simple solution to host country sensitivities, we feel that encryption of AFKN television programming would not serve U.S. interests.

Although AFKN programming is directed at an American audience, it nonetheless reaches a large number of Koreans and is a source of unbiased news reporting. In June of this year, the ROKG agreed to implement various democratization measures, including the easing of restrictions on the press. The U.S. government has publicly applauded the adoption of those measures. Thus, the encryption of AFKN programming shortly after the ROKG has broadened freedom of the press would appear to be inconsistent with U.S. policy.



EAP

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE  
601 N. FAIRFAX ST., ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314-2007

October 22, 1987

Operating  
elements:

Armed Forces  
Radio and  
Television  
Service

American  
Forces  
Press and  
Publications  
Service

Defense  
Audiovisual  
Policy

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [ASD/ISA has seen]  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)  
DIRECTOR, ARMY BROADCASTING SERVICE  
DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE BROADCASTING SERVICE  
DIRECTOR, NAVY BROADCASTING SERVICE  
COMMANDER, ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION  
SERVICE-BROADCAST CENTER

SUBJECT: Encryption of American Forces Korea Network

The Commander in Chief, United States Forces Korea, has proposed encrypting the current over-the-air television signal distributed by the American Forces Korea Network (AFKN). Although this proposal would seem to be a solution to the ever increasing problems of host nation sensitivities and program restrictions, the procedure does raise significant questions which must be addressed.

The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) has forwarded the proposal to the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command for complete analysis of the political, legal and internal information implications of encrypting this signal.

A copy of the complete package is provided for your information.

Jordan E. Rizer  
Director, AFIS

Attachment





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE  
601 N. FAIRFAX ST., ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314-2007

OCT 14 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US PACIFIC COMMAND

Operating  
elements

SUBJECT: Encryption of American Forces Korea Network

Armed Forces  
Radio and  
Television  
Service

American  
Forces  
Press and  
Publications  
Service

Defense  
Audiovisual  
Policy

During a visit to Washington, D.C., the Commander in Chief, United States Forces Korea, discussed the possibility of encrypting the over-the-air American Forces Korea Network (AFKN) TV signal with MG Charles Bussey, Chief of Public Affairs, U. S. Army, and Mr. William Clark, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far East, U.S. Department of State. The Army has asked us to take the lead in establishing a U.S. government position regarding the policy implications of the encryption proposal. Our assessment is that a more thorough analysis of the subject is required.

Request that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command conduct a thorough study of the political, legal and internal information implications of encrypting the AFKN telecasts. This study should address, as a minimum, the following issues:

1. The impact on the U.S./Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement.
2. The impact on AFKN's right to broadcast.
3. The impact on the "shadow" audience. If encrypted, the TV signal would be available to U.S. Forces personnel only. However, AFKN radio would continue to be transmitted in the clear.
4. The lifting of certain program restrictions. AFKN has a number of programs restricted because U.S. program distributors are attempting to sell their products to the Korean networks. If encrypted, many of these programs should become available to the AFKN audience.
5. The impact on host country sensitivities. If the signal is encrypted and not available to the host country audience, then all sensitivities should disappear.
6. The impact of removing the American television presence on the government of Korea and the general population. This is directly related to the Korean sovereignty issue, program criticism by the Korean Ministry of Culture and Information and allegations of news censorship by various U.S. and Korean factions.

7. If a decision is made to encrypt, what is the right time to address the issue with the Korean government? What should be the USG negotiating stance?

8. Resource requirements of encrypting the AFKN signal may well be substantial. This includes the source of necessary funding to procure and install the system and follow-on operation and maintenance, accountability of the decoders, and control of the encryption system.

9. The technical requirements of the encryption system should not be addressed at this time. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) will assist in any technical review, if required, at a later date. Numerous addressable encryption systems that could meet this requirement are available on the commercial market.

The Army Broadcasting Service (ABS) has obtained Army staff input on this issue which is enclosed for your review. ABS previously provided a copy of its staff paper to your Public Affairs Office.

The AFIS point of contact is Mr. Melvin Russell, Assistant Director, AFIS (AFRTS), AV 284-4856 or commercial 202-274-4856.



Jordan E. Bizer  
Director

Attachments





# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, DC 20310-1600


MEM  
27 AUG 1987  
XO

OFFICE, CHIEF OF  
LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ATTN: SFPA-ABS  
(LTC FOWLER)

SUBJECT: Encryption of American Forces Korea Network (AFKN)  
Telecasts

1. OCLL nonconcurs with the proposal to restrict the viewing audience of AFKN by encrypting the telecasts.
2. In the past, Members of Congress (Representatives Atkins and Solarz) have complained when selected programs which purportedly offended the sensitivities of the Government/people of the Republic of Korea (ROK) were deleted from the AFKN programming schedule. It seems reasonable to conclude that there will be a great deal more Congressional opposition to limiting the entire AFKN in Korea to only DoD personnel.
3. The reasons cited to limit AFKN to DoD personnel include AFKN programming which: criticizes the Government of ROK, and allows opposing political parties to use AFKN as a tool for internal ROK political advantage and obnoxious programs which "invade the culture" of ROK. It appears that the primary concern at this time is the sensitivity to criticism directed toward the Government of ROK and coverage given opposition leaders. Normal AFKN telecasts may include programming, the content of which is so biased, slanted or lacking in objectivity, that it legitimately offends the Government/people of ROK. Programs in this category probably should not be aired on AFKN, but this should only represent a very small portion of potential AFKN programming. In sum, program restrictions should be exercised with extreme care.
4. A US Foreign Policy goal which enjoys wide Congressional support with respect to ROK is to assist that country in its effort to move further toward democracy. This worthy objective will not be enhanced by restricting or limiting the ability of ROK citizens to view US television programming. Further, the US Government spends large sums of money to carry the US concepts of freedom to countries behind the Iron Curtain and other countries under the domination and control of Communism, using programs quite similar to those carried on AFKN telecasts. It makes no sense to deny our ally, who is struggling toward democracy, this same information.

  
FREDRICK PETERS  
Colonel, GS  
Executive





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310 - 04



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DAMO-SSM

23 September 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Army Broadcasting Service

SUBJECT: Encryption of American Forces Radio and Television  
Service (AFRTS) Television in Korea

1. IAW your memorandum of 18 Aug 87, subject proposal has been reviewed by this office.
2. The proposal, if implemented, may offer certain advantages to the U.S. government and to authorized viewers in Korea. The current political situation in Korea, however, with growing public emphasis on democracy and freedoms, requires a more thorough analysis of the pros and cons of encryption at this time than is presented by USFK (ENCL 2). Therefore, prior to formulation of a HQDA position on this issue, recommend the proposal be returned to HQ USFK for a more in-depth analysis of political and legal implications. The analysis should include, but not be limited to, the following considerations:
  - a. Is now the right time to propose encryption? Given the current political situation in Korea, with citizens becoming ever more concerned with rights and freedoms, is it advisable for the USG to initiate an action that could well be perceived (albeit perhaps incorrectly) by the Korean populace as cooperation with the incumbent ROK political authorities to restrict the "right" to view AFKN?
  - b. There is no indication that the ROKG intends to raise this issue during the annual renewal process of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which governs U.S. broadcast signals in Korea. Do we wish to voluntarily restrict the AFKN television signal without a ROKG guarantee to delete the requirement for consideration of host country sensitivities?
  - c. It appears as if the potential for encrypting AFKN television could be useful as a counterproposal, if utilized in conjunction with other concessions desired from the ROKG, should the ROKG again raise the issue or threaten to terminate the existing MOU. Additionally, it would appear that if the ROKG raises the issue, the USG would be on more firm ground when asking the ROKG to fund the encryption process.
  - d. The AFKN signal transmission is not addressed by the Status of Forces Agreement. USFK JAG should address the rights, obligations, and implications of the existing MOU vis-avis the rights, obligations, and implications should encryption take place.

DAMO-SSM

SUBJECT: Encryption of American Forces Radio and Television  
Service (AFRTS) Television in Korea

3. There is no indication that USPACOM, the Unified Command, has commented on this proposal from U.S. Forces Korea, a subunified command. For HQDA to make a formal proposal in the absence of Unified Command input would be inappropriate. Therefore, following completion of the recommended in-depth review by USFK, this proposal should be forwarded through Unified Command channels for action.

4. At ENCL 1 are detailed JAG comments.

*for Robert F. Jodoin, LTC, USA*  
KENNETH F. JODOIN  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Politico-Military  
Division





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2200



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DAJA-IA (27-1a)

10 September 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAMO-SSM, ATTN: LTC GUTHRIE

SUBJECT: Encryption of AFRTS Television in Korea

1. Subject proposal has been reviewed by this office as requested.
2. The US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement does not address U.S. transmission of the AFRTS signal. As a result it grants the U.S. no rights and does not obligate the ROK government in relation to such transmissions.
3. The United States transmits the AFRTS signal based upon a 1983 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the ROK Ministry of Communications and the American Forces Korea Network (AFKN). The U.S. obligation to give consideration to host country sensitivities stems from this agreement. The MOU has no termination date, but is subject to termination by either party at the time of annual renewal. Subject proposal must be evaluated in light of the existing rights and obligations imposed under this MOU. The office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USFK, is in the best position to make such an evaluation, and such an "in country" legal review should be included in the proposal prior to the formulation of an HQDA position.
4. Presentation of any U.S. proposal to limit or restrict AFRTS signal transmission in Korea may be inadvisable, absent a complaint or threatened termination of the MOU by the ROK government. At present there is no reason to believe that the ROK would be willing to delete the requirement for consideration of host country sensitivities based upon U.S. encryption of the AFRTS signal. Subject proposal may be more useful as a potential U.S. negotiating position, or U.S. response to ROK complaint or threatened termination of MOU. AFRTS transmissions are also limited by power and transmitter location restrictions, focusing primarily in areas of high U.S. personnel concentration. Any concessions by the U.S. should be made only after consideration of equivalent concessions desired from the ROK. Absent concessions by the ROK government, encryption may accomplish very little other than to greatly increase costs for the U.S. or ROK (but absent complaint, ROK funding would seem doubtful) or both, and stimulate the encryption industry.
5. Recommend subject proposal be sent to USFK for a more in-depth analysis, to include review by the Staff Judge

10  
DAJA-IA (27-1a)

SUBJECT: Encryption of AFRTS Television in Korea

Advocate. Additionally, it is the opinion of this office that subject proposal should be held as a counter proposal, or at least include consideration of concessions desired from the ROK.

FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:



JAMES A. BURGER  
Colonel, JAGC  
Chief, International Affairs  
Division





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON DC 20310

18 August 1987

OFFICE OF THE  
CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SFPA-ABS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE

SUBJECT: Encryption of AFRTS Television in Korea

The Chief of Public Affairs has been asked by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces Korea, to assess the technical and policy aspects of encrypting American Forces Korea Network (AFKN) telecasts. The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your assistance in determining technical feasibility and DoD policy regarding this proposal.


The Army Broadcasting Service provided the Talking Paper at Tab A to the Chief of Public Affairs in preparation for his 12 August meeting with General Menetrey. It provides pros and cons.

The proposal at Tab B was prepared for CINCUSFK by the Commander, 1st Signal Brigade who is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the AFKN nationwide transmission system. It recommends encryption (vice cable) as the most economical and effective option, i.e., \$10.4M for initial procurement and installation to serve all DoD audience members in Korea.

The Point Paper at Tab C was prepared by the USFK Public Affairs Officer and includes a memorandum from the U. S. Embassy Political Officer supporting encryption.

Your assistance is requested in conducting a technical feasibility study which would define methodology, costs, and equipment required for a nationwide AFKN television encryption system. Further, request AFIS take the lead in developing a coordinated U. S. government position regarding policy implications of the encryption proposal.

The Army Broadcasting Service is providing copies of this document to appropriate Army staff elements and agencies for information and review/comment, as appropriate. You will be provided copies of any comments. The ABS point of contact is LTC Fowler, 274-4800.



JOSEPH L. COOK  
COL, SC

Director, Army Broadcasting Service

Enclosure





TALKING PAPER

1. ISSUE: To provide the Chief of Public Affairs with background information regarding suggestions to encrypt/cable the AFKN TV signal in Korea.

2. FACTS.

a. Shortly after becoming CINC this past June in Korea, General Menetrey asked his communications staff to brief him on the pros and cons of taking AFKN television off the air and distributing the signal via an encryption system and/or a cable system. The objective was to remove the signal from the public domain and relieve the pressure brought on the U.S. in Korea due to telecasts of politically sensitive news and culturally sensitive entertainment programs.

b. Reasons to restrict AFKN's signal to the DoD population in Korea.

(1) Keeps the ROKG and opposition parties from using AFKN as a barometer of the USG position regarding internal politics.

(2) Removes the issue of "cultural invasion" in the press and national assembly.

(3) Reduces AFKN program restrictions.

(4) Lowers the U.S. profile in a developing nation with strong nationalist tendencies.

c. Reasons to retain the system as an over-the-air broadcast service.

(1) Political/social signals which removing the signal from the air may generate. AFKN is regarded by some segments of the Korean population and some U.S. political leaders as a window to the western world. Pulling the shade on this window blocks outside information and, to some degree, indirect U.S. influence.

(2) Costs for a government project are estimated at \$10.4M to encrypt the signal and \$33.5M for cable distribution. Estimates do not include O&M of the system.

(3) Cabling would reach only about 42 percent of authorized viewers. Result is creation of a have/have not society and an overall decrease in AFRTS audience in Korea.

(4) No guarantee in the dynamic electronics field that today's encryption devices can't be broken tomorrow. Security of devices is also a major concern.



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## FACT SHEET

BACKGROUND: To provide alternatives for securing the AFKN television network.

DISCUSSION:

- Present AFKN TV system configuration is a one-way microwave transmission system with local broadcast transmitters on frequencies and power levels allocated and controlled by the Korea Ministry of Communications (MOC). Present open-air transmission makes it possible for anyone within the broadcast radius to receive AFKN.

ALTERNATIVES:

Alternative 1: Cable television (CATV) cost \$33.5M

Advantages:

- Possible of increased programming
- Reduce sensitivity

Disadvantages

- Cost prohibitive (\$33.5 M)
- Limits video coverage to on-post personnel
- Long, involved implementation
- Separate maintenance contracts
- Lack of security (blackmarketing)
- Denies access to interested third party individuals

Alternative 2: An encoded/scrambled system cost \$10.4M

Advantages:

- Least cost, when compared to CATV (\$10.4 M VS \$33.5 M)
- No restriction to authorized viewers
- Less additional maintenance
- Shorter implementation than CATV
- Selective encryption capability

Disadvantages

- Lack of security (blackmarketing)
- Denies legitimate access by third party individuals

*as per 10. MOC  
for security -*

31 Aug 1981

AFKN


TELEVISION

NO CONTRACTOR

# AFKN TV NETWORK

## LEGEND


- △ AFKN HQ & MAIN STUDIO
- MICROWAVE (M/W) RELAY
- ⊙ M/W & TERMINAL STATION
- ⊗ TV TRANSLATOR





## **ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED**

- I. ENCODING AFKN TRANSMISSION UTILIZING COMMERCIALY AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT**
- II. CABLE TELEVISION (CATV) FOR AFKN DISTRIBUTION**



**SATELLITE  
RECEPTION**

**STUDIO  
YONGSAN**

**TRANSMISSION  
RELAY  
RECEPTION**

**TV TRANSMITTER  
SITE  
POST, ANYWHERE**


**VIEWER**

# COST ESTIMATE FOR ENCODING

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>UNIT PRICE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>COST</u>
HEAD-END EQUIPMENT AND ENCODER	\$30,000	2 (REDUNDANCY)	\$60,000
ENCODER/DECODER BOOSTER	6,000	136	816,000
MODIFICATION TO ALL TV TRANSMITTERS	500	17	8,500
DECODERS	135	60,000	8,100,000
<u>MAJOR ITEM EQUIPMENT SUB-TOTAL:</u>			\$8,984,500
MISCELLANEOUS INSTALLATION HARDWARE			1,347,675
ASSISTANCE DURING INSTALLATION PHASE			10,000
TRAINING (IN - COUNTRY)			7,500
<u>TOTAL SYSTEM COST :</u>			\$10,349,675

NO CONTRACTOR

# CABLE TELEVISION



## CATV COSTS FOR ALL OF KOREA

INSTALLATION	COST FACTOR	QUANTITY	COST
LARGE	\$2,085,071	8	\$16,680,568
MEDIUM	1,214,340	10	12,143,400
SMALL	92,488	29	2,682,152
		SUBTOTAL	<u>\$31,506,120</u>

BACKBONE DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS: 2,000,000

TOTAL \$33,506,120

NO CONTRACTOR



# **CABLE TELEVISION (CATV) SYSTEM**

## **ADVANTAGES**

- POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED PROGRAMMING
- REDUCE SENSITIVITY

## **DISADVANTAGES**

- COST PROHIBITIVE (\$33.5 MILLION)
- LIMITS VIDEO COVERAGE TO ON-POST PERSONNEL
- LONG, INVOLVED IMPLEMENTATION
- SEPARATE MAINTENANCE CONTRACTS
- LACK OF SECURITY - BLACKMARKETING
- DENIES ACCESS TO INTERESTED THIRD PARTY INDIVIDUALS

**NO CONTRACTOR**

# **ENCODED/SCRAMBLED SYSTEM**

## **ADVANTAGES**

- LEAST COST, WHEN COMPARED TO CATV (\$10.4 M VS. \$33.5 M)
- NO RESTRICTION TO AUTHORIZED VIEWERS
- LESS ADDITIONAL MAINTENANCE
- SHORTER IMPLEMENTATION THAN CATV
- SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION CAPABILITY

## **DISADVANTAGES**

- LACK OF SECURITY (BLACKMARKETING)
- DENIES LEGITIMATE ACCESS BY THIRD PARTY INDIVIDUALS

**NO CONTRACTOR**

# POPULATION

LOCATION	COMMAND SPONSORED			NON-COMMAND SPONSORED			LOCATION TOTAL	% NCS FAMILIES
	SOFA/EMBASSY PERSONNEL	SPOUSES	DEPENDENTS	SOFA/EMBASSY PERSONNEL	SPOUSES	DEPENDENTS		
CP AMES	4	4	5	116	13	7	149	76.5
CP CARROLL	115	107	157	853	117	83	1432	52.2
CP CASEY	70	66	77	9561	857	601	11232	92.8
CHINHAE NAVY B	49	48	64	59	4	2	226	7.7
CP HENRY	484	438	674	1298	225	170	3289	33.9
CP HIALIAH	123	115	199	520	123	89	1169	51.7
CP HUMPHREYS	124	120	143	3758	613	378	5136	83.6
K-2 AIR BASE	120	117	179	721	101	69	1307	46.3
KIMHAE AIR BASE	14	12	14	24	3	7	74	20.0
KIMPO AIR BASE	1	1	0	29	2	2	35	66.7
KUNSAN AIR BASE	33	30	23	3099	361	230	3776	92.3
KWANGJU	4	4	1	452	71	46	578	94.7
CAMP LONG	2	2	2	329	36	19	390	94.7
CP MARKET	51	44	74	452	55	40	716	55.6
CP MC NAB	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	N/A
OSAN AIR BASE	529	445	538	5880	1033	735	9160	69.9
CAMP PAGE	3	3	0	474	62	23	565	95.4
CP RED CLOUD	57	53	56	1639	275	202	2282	83.8
CP STANLEY	4	4	1	2867	287	176	3339	98.6
SUWON AIR BASE	22	19	27	1041	172	138	1419	90.1
YONGSAN	2809	2527	3645	7096	1151	912	18140	31.3
WESTERN CORRIDOR	11	10	9	3629	260	162	4081	96.3
TOTAL	4629	4169	5888	43898	5821	4091	68496	58.3

BASED ON J-1, JUN 87 POPULATION REPORT COMMAND/NON-COMMAND SPONSORED TOTALS ARE:

SOFA/EMBASSY PERSONNEL TOTAL: 48527  
 SPOUSES TOTAL: 9990  
 DEPENDENTS TOTAL: 9979  
 -----  
 TOTAL: 68496





POINT PAPER

AFKN AND HOST COUNTRY SENSITIVITIES

BACKGROUND: To provide information concerning American Forces Korea Network and Host Country Sensitivities for Korea

DISCUSSION:

- Under terms of the Republic of Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement, AFKN (radio and television) broadcasts over open airwaves allocated by the ROK Ministry of Communications.
- The SOFA refers only to the use of frequencies by AFKN, while USFK's agreement with MOC contains only a general comment that AFKN will give due consideration to ROK sensitivities.
- Because AFKN broadcasts by permission of the ROK, the country team associated with programming review attempts, consistent with AFKN's mission to provide uncensored news and stateside entertainment for the USFK audience, to give appropriate consideration to legitimate Korean sensitivities.
- A major purpose in giving this consideration is to protect the very existence of this vital medium for USFK -- a fact of life that AFKN shares with other U.S. military radio/TV networks in overseas areas.
- Armed Forces Radio and Television Service worldwide publishes a sensitivity list for nations where U.S. armed forces radio and television stations operate, including Korea. (USCINCPAC usually consolidates and approves the sensitivity listing for Asia/Pacific nations.)
- Items on the list must be legitimate host government concerns and are reviewed annually or as needed.
- There has been criticism, including from Congress, that AFKN was being censored by the withholding of items unfavorable to the ROK Government. The facts surrounding these charges by Congressmen Atkins and Solarz are discussed at TAB A.
- Subsequently, State and DOD reviewed the sensitivities list for the ROK, taking in consideration the greater freedom of press resulting from dramatic steps toward democratization and also the fact that the country team review has had no occasion to withhold any programs from AFKN since 15 July 1986.
- AmEmbassy/USFK concurred with the State/DOD proposal to reduce the sensitivity list for Korea to the following two items:

- 49
- Broadcasts which include egregious distortions of fact; and
  - Broadcasts which imply U.S. Government partisanship in Korean domestic politics.
  - State Department notified Congress of the reduced sensitivity list on 4 Aug.
  - The sensitivities list for Korea prior to the reduction is at TAB B.
  - A summary of cases when the country team review system resulted in programs being withheld from airing by AFKN under the former sensitivities list is at TAB C.
  - U.S. Embassy conducted a separate study, added at TAB D, that notes the reduced list will reduce problems with Congress, but not with the ROKG. It examines other problems and concludes that conversion of the AFKN signal by a scrambler system is the best solution. It also notes that this might be done by the Koreans, not USFK. This probably would have to be an agreement under the SOFA between USFK and the ROKG, rather than a contract between USFK and a ROK firm as suggested in the Embassy memorandum. Since the Embassy raised the option, a more detailed look at it has been added as paragraph 3 to a summary of an AFKN alternate signal study at TAB E.
  - ROK concern has been expressed by the government, primarily but not exclusively with regard to news programs, and also by other groups, particularly news media and academia at both student and professoral level.
  - Embassy remains concerned that, regardless of whether the greater press freedom results in less official criticism of AFKN news programs, the long run problem is what Koreans find offensive to their cultural sensitivities which could bring renewed calls for control or elimination.
  - The summary of a study made by USFK of alternatives to AFKN's current use of open airwaves is at TAB E.

APPROVED BY

B.F. Waller  
COL B.F. WALLER, JR.

5 Encls

1. TAB A - Discussion Paper on Congressmen's Charges
2. TAB B - Former Sensitivities List
3. TAB C - Prior Program Withholdings
4. TAB D - AmEmb Study on ROK Reaction
5. TAB E - Summary of Alternative Signal Study



CENSORSHIP CHARGES BY CONGRESSMEN ATKINS AND SOLARZ

1. Cable News Network, in a report received in Korea on 19 June 1987, carried charges by Congressmen Atkins and Solarz that AFKN telecasts were censored, including coverage of demonstrations then going on in the ROK, at the instigation of the Ambassador. Their comments came during testimony by Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur. A similar story was later distributed by the Associated Press.

2. The allegations of censorship were untrue. In the case of the June-July demonstrations, there was neither withholding of news items by AFKN nor censorship. AFKN's daily news coverage of those events was timely and complete.

3. The AFKN coverage included running the CNN program in which the congressmen made their charge of censorship. At the end of that segment, AFKN carried the following statement from the USFK PAO:

"The United States Forces Korea Public Affairs Officer categorically denied the allegation carried by CNN in the preceding news item that commercial news coverage of the demonstrations in the Republic of Korea has been censored from AFKN.

"Colonel Ben Waller said this allegation had to be based on a lack of accurate information and none of the news programs AFKN has received on the current demonstrations have been censored.

"As anyone who has been watching AFKN for the past week or so can readily attest, the demonstrations have been covered daily.

"As to programs of news analysis, such as ABC's Nightline, which was aired last night, these too will be used as long as the contents present a balance of views and opportunity for all parties to comment."

4. State Department, in coordination with DOD and with input from the country team, subsequently augmented its response to the Congressmen to clarify why and how AFKN and the country team have implemented broadcast guidelines of the Department of Defense and US CINCPAC with regard to host-country sensitivities.

5. At the same time, State, in coordination with DOD, initiated a review of the sensitivity list for Korea in consideration of the greater freedom of the press resulting from democratization steps being taken by the Koreans themselves and also in view of the fact that the country team review process had not had cause to withhold any news programs from AFKN since 15 July 1986.



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6. That review led to reduction of the list to two guideline items:

- Broadcasts which include egregious distortions of fact; and
- Broadcasts which imply U.S. Government partianship in Korean domestic politics.

7. The country team concurred that the modification was warranted and the guidelines should be sufficient to address most cases that could come up in the foreseeable future.

FORMER SENSITIVITIES LIST FOR KOREA

1. Criticism of the president, or implying that he is any way personally associated with wrongdoing.
2. Criticism of the constitutional system.
3. Use of the term "South Korea," except as a geographical reference. When referring to the government or the nation, the correct term is the "Republic of Korea."
4. Favoritism toward either the government or the opposition in Korean domestic politics.
5. Suggestions that the ROK is heavily dependent on U.S. military, economic or other assistance and is a U.S. satellite.
6. Stories and/or information concerning significant medical problems which could have negative impact on the ROK as a desirable venue for international meetings and tourism. AIDS is a sensitive listing for Korea.

END

# HISTORY OF PROGRAMS WITHHELD FROM AFKN

1. AFKN's records of potential programming sensitivities date back to mid-1984. Since that time, there have been almost 600 country team reviews in response to the sensitivities' trigger; however, no news programs have been withheld from AFKN since 15 July 1986. From 1 February 1985 to 15 July 1986, a total of 17 news items were not cleared for broadcast by the review process.

2. In early April 1987, a decision was made through the review process not to air a non-news program -- an episode of "Trapper John M.D." that sympathetically portrayed a North Korean soldier as humanitarian and caring while South Koreans in the program came across as mean and petty. The theme was apolitical, but nevertheless egregious in impact.

3. Listed below in chronological order are the 17 news programs and subjects which were withheld from AFKN as a result of the host country sensitivity review since 1 February 1985. (See explanatory note below)

7 Feb 85	NBC Today Show	Kim Dae-Jung*
8 Feb 85	CNN Headline News	Kim Dae-Jung*
	CNN Take Two	Kim Dae-Jung*
	CNN Headline News	Kim Dae-Jung*
9 Feb 85	ABC News	Kim Dae-Jung*
	NBC News	Kim Dae-Jung*
13 Feb 85	ABC News	Kim Dae-Jung*
	NBC News	Kim Dae-Jung*
11 Dec 85	NBC Today Show	Torture in ROK
16 Jan 86	NBC News	Torture in ROK
12 Mar 86	ABC News	Anti-Gov't Protests
14 Mar 86	ABC Nightline	ROK-Philippine Parallels
10 Apr 86	NBC Today Show	Kim Dae-Jung*
16 May 86	CNN Take Two	Anti-Gov't Riots
2 Jun 86	CNN Headline News	South-North Korea Talks
15 Jul 86	CBS Sunday Morning	Torture in ROK

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(\*NOTE: Kim Dae-Jung, per se, was never a sensitivity item. Decisions in 1985 and early 1986 to not air network interviews with him were based on the content of his comments measured by

the criteria of political sensitivity, balance and fairness. In each case, the decision not to air the interview was based on the country team's judgement that the comments constituted editorial criticism, not news. It should also be noted that at that time, Mr. Kim's political and civil rights had been suspended by the ROKG following his conviction in 1980 on charges of sedition. In July 1987, his rights, including political rights, were restored by the ROKG.)





*Embassy of the United States of America*

M E M O R A N D U M

August 4, 1987

TO: The Ambassador

THROUGH: DCM - Thomas S. Brooks

FROM: POL - David <sup>Do</sup>Pierce

SUBJECT: AFKN - Unresolved Problems and the Scrambler Solution

-- Changing the Sensitivity List Solves Only Half the Problem

It was Congress's recent criticism of AFKN's broadcast policy that led Washington to pare down the host country sensitivities list to the bare minimum. This should reduce problems with Congress, but not with the ROKG. Failure to respect host country sensitivities, as we have promised to do in writing on a number of occasions such as the 1983 SATNET MOU, will cause a rise in anti-Americanism and increased SOFA demands. Key issues will be the "political" content of broadcasts (regardless of which party wins the coming election), cultural pollution, and sovereignty.

-- The Short Term - Congress Has Set The Tinder

Korean political events this fall and winter will keep U.S media attention focused on Korea. We can expect further commentary, sure to anger either the DJP or the opposition, from the American press and public figures which we will not be able to control. The opposition party is already complaining about negative comments by American print journalists. They will be as sensitive to criticism of their people or policies aired on AFKN as the current ruling party. They are also more likely to play to anti-american sentiments.

-- After the Political Dust Settles, Cultural Pollution

AFKN is one of the most ubiquitous and obvious reminders of the American presence, a presence for which Koreans are not universally grateful. Korean values hinge on

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stability and order. Change is disruptive. Korea is in the midst of massive change on several fronts, including the cultural area, which many Koreans feel is besieged by American cultural values. AFKN's open broadcasting, on the premise that what is acceptable to Americans should be acceptable to Koreans, puts American culture into Korean homes as no other aspect of our presence does.

One of the most vocal critics of the cultural effects of AFKN is the Ministry of Culture and Information. MOCI proposed a consultative body to review AFKN program content in the spring of 1983. We refused, but in a period of rising nationalism following the Olympics, MOCI's attacks on AFKN will continue and will carry more weight. Their influence should not be underestimated.

-- Over the Long Term - Sovereignty Questions

When we do run a program which offends Korean cultural sensibilities, we reinforce a prevailing suspicion that we abuse Korean sovereignty. On this issue they have temporarily surrendered it. Even so, the suspicion does not work in our interest, especially as AFKN is a function of the military and Koreans are doubly confused and suspicious about the influence of the American military on the Korean Government as a whole and on the ROK military in particular, especially if anyone associated with the ROK military takes a public position or role in Korean domestic politics.

-- We Lose the Privilege or Pay for It.

We cannot avoid the AFKN problem indefinitely. Korean resentment over any of these three issues will contribute to rising anti-americanism. If we don't solve the problem the Koreans will. At worst, American personnel, and the shadow audience of some 30,000 Americans "non-sponsored" (and probably large numbers of Koreans and third country viewers) whose reception of AFKN is useful to us, will have nothing. At best, we will be forced to make concessions worth more to us than the cost of a scrambler system. AFKN broadcasting could well be used as a major bargaining chip in renegotiation of the SOFA and other agreements.



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-- Korean-Financed Scramblers May Be The Best Way Out

We believe that a scrambler system represents the best option for solving both USG and ROKG concerns. We do not believe that it must be paid for by USFK. A contract with a Korean firm to develop, distribute, and maintain the system - at cost or with a nominal charge per unit to the user - would have a number of advantages. The Korean company (under ROKG supervision and control) would make its profit by marketing additional decoding units to third country nationals, hotels, and other businesses servicing foreign clientele. They could also distribute decoders to Korean viewers as they wished, and controlling blackmarket sales would be their responsibility. We suspect this would effectively meet the ROKG's sovereignty and other concerns and USG interest at the least possible cost to the USG.

Drafted:MDSlack *pl*

## SUMMARY OF ALTERNATE SIGNAL STUDY FOR AFKN TV

1. The U.S. Forces Korea J6 and the 1st Signal Brigade conducted a cost/feasibility study of alternative means to send the AFKN TV broadcast signal. Following are the major factors:

a. The requirement was to determine if costed alternatives to restrict access to the AFKN TV signal were feasible.

b. The current system configuration is a one-way microwave distribution with local broadcast transmitters extending from Camp Casey in the north to Chinhae on the south coast. As it exists, anyone within the broadcast range of one of the local AFKN transmitters can receive the AFKN TV signal.

2. The alternative methods considered to deliver the signal were cabling and encryption (scrambled signal), with a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of each.

a. Estimated costs for installation/use of a cable system is \$33 million. The major disadvantage, in addition to the high cost, is that only 48 percent of the USFK audience would receive cable.

b. Costs for a scrambler device, figuring 60,000 units plus 20 percent for maintenance and logistic float, are estimated at \$10 million with the signal available to all USFK personnel.

3. Subsequent to -- and not included as part of -- the J6 study, the American Embassy suggested a possibility that Korea might agree to provide the decoding devices which would make the scrambler alternative feasible and affordable. It would require an agreement under the SOFA between USFK and the ROKG. The ROKG would be responsible to have the decoders produced in the numbers required by USFK.

a. This would be an opportunity for the ROKG to resolve this issue in a manner that will be as effective as they, not USFK, choose to enforce.

b. It would negate the need for the country team to review and withhold programs and thus preclude any temptation for the ROKG to consider withdrawing AFKN's use of open airwaves.

c. The Embassy also points out that the likely production and blackmarketing of the decoding devices would be a matter for the ROKG to control. This would remove USFK as the target of Korean complaints in that regard.

d. ROKG willingness to provide the decoders has not been explored.