5783

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

[illegible]589

July 24, 1985 JK003[illegible]

Dear Bill:

Thanks for your letter and column regarding the handling of the hostage situation. It was refreshing indeed to read your comments, especially when a few other journalists had taken a different view.

I took the liberty of sending your remarks over to the President. He enjoyed reading them and appreciates your support.

Again, thanks for the kind words.

Sincerely,

Bud

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. William A. Rusher
Publisher
National Review
150 East 35th Street
New York, New York 10016

HANDWRITING FAC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 22, 1985

SIGNED Thank you

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: KARNA SMALL

SUBJECT: Letter from William Rusher, Publisher of the National Review re Beirut Hostage Crisis

In response to your PROFS note, I have prepared a reply to William Rusher, expressing your appreciation for his letter and column in support of the Administration's handling of the Beirut hostage crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Rusher at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments

TAB I Letter to William Rusher
TAB II Incoming correspondence

NATIONAL REVIEW • 150 East 35th Street, New York, New York 10016
Tel. 679-7330

WILLIAM A. RUSHER
Publisher

JUL 10 1985

5783

He's a good friend.

July 8, 1985

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud,

The recent conservative criticisms of the administration's handling of the Beirut hostage crisis (the Podhoretz and Will columns in the Washington Post, and even the editorial in the new National Review) burst onto the scene so rapidly that I had no time to pass along any advance warning.

I do, however, have the pleasure of sending you my own column on the subject, which will probably appear in the Washington Times before this can reach you. Frankly I think the critics are full of hot air, and are guilty of letting their understandable frustration overpower their judgment. Hang in there, and plan a really grisly retaliation.

Best always,

Bill

enc.

William A. Rusher

RECEIVED 22 JU

TO MCFARLANE FROM SMALL DOCDATE 22 JU

KEYWORDS: LEBANON TERRORISM RUSHER, WILLI

SUBJECT: LTR FM RUSHER OF NATL REVIEW RE BEIRUT HOSTAGE CRISIS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: 24 JUL 85 STATUS X FILES WH

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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NEA VIEWPOINT

THE CONSERVATIVE ADVOCATE

William A. Rusher

Mr. Reagan's critics

By William A. Rusher

Reading the comments of some of my conservative colleagues on President Reagan's handling of the hostage crisis, one gets the impression that their basic emotion on the subject is an obscure but powerful sense of dissatisfaction. Since no other convenient means of venting this dissatisfaction suggests itself, they are railing at Mr. Reagan like a flock of angry blackbirds. They are wrong.

In the first place, as I have pointed out, Mr. Reagan managed to bring the hijacked passengers home without yielding to a single one of their captors' demands — a remarkable feat in the circumstances. The decisive factor was probably the threat of a fresh U.S. military intervention in Lebanon — something that both Syria and the Soviet Union would give a great deal to avoid.

In the second place, to criticize Mr. Reagan at this point is like trying to review a play at the end of the first act. The story is patently not over: The whole retaliation scenario remains to be played out — and it may well be delayed substantially by the need to weigh the fate of those remaining seven hostages in the Bekaa Valley. If no retaliation ever ensues, that will indeed be the time, and the occasion, for condemnation. But it is scarcely here yet, and such spasms as Norman Podhoretz's ex post facto proposal of "an ultimatum followed by military strikes of great severity if the hostages were not immediately released" (a course that would probably have resulted in the slaughter of all of them) are simply embarrassing.

Thirdly, the American public would do well to bear in mind the distinction between sentiments appropriate to a highly satisfactory outcome of Act I of this drama and the understandable exasperation of Israel and its friends over some of the dialogue that managed to get onto American television during the crisis. A weary, befuddled hostage or two spoke sympathetically of the Shiite cause (whatever that is); somebody in the administration drew, or allowed to be drawn, an unjustified parallel (George Will's complaint) between kidnapped Americans and detained Lebanese; Syrian President Assad managed to appear transiently benign, despite his own long record of complicity with terrorism. Is Israel's case so fragile that it is vulnerable to pinpricks of that size?

Fourth, the steadfast refusal of people who ought to know better (and let's start again with leading conservatives) to contemplate the implications of the unsuccessful attempt on Qaddafi's life in May 1984, or of the mysterious bomb blast at the home of the head of the Party of God movement in Beirut in March this year, is beginning to border on intellectual irresponsibility. Unless they can formulate a plausible alternative theory to explain these fully reported events, they have no business accusing this administration of having "done nothing" to date.

Finally, let us remember that once the retaliatory blow or blows have landed, these Monday-morning quarterbacks will probably be back again, sneering loftily at the execution of the very retribution they are now demanding. Some aspect of the plan will miscarry; some women and children will die; some (or all) of the major targets will get away. The world's pacifists, and its communists, and the softheaded legions who sustain both, will fall on President Reagan and his administration in righteous fury. Will they be condemning him, too — these mighty journalistic hawks whose biggest real problem on any given day is where to find a paper clip for their copy? Very likely.

"Life is short, and the art long; the occasion instant, decision difficult, experiment perilous." The American people know very well the necessities of this situation — and also its dangers. They haven't by a long shot lost their confidence in Ronald Reagan's ability (and determination) to handle it. Nor should they.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN PJB

SUBJECT: READER'S DIGEST QUESTION

Reader's Digest, which interviewed you for a coming issue, needs, now, one more answer to one more question -- to make their piece current. The Question is: "What was your reaction, sir, when the Doctors told you that you had had cancer, and has the whole experience changed you in any way?"

Following Saturday's radio address, Elizabeth Board will put the question to you -- and the answer, of course, can be as brief or as extended as you wish.

6/12/85 (00)

Questions for Reader's Digest

1. When did you personally first see the inequities in the income tax system and the need for reform?

2. How do you explain the recovery of the U.S. economy? And what lessons are there for other Western nations whose economies seem to be stagnating?

3. You are called a conservative, but your economic policies have not been those of a conventional conservative like, say, Mrs. Thatcher. Can you comment on the differences between your approach and those of more orthodox conservatives?

4. If you could give them advice, what would you say to Lech Walesa and the Solidarity and church activists who have resisted the communist regime in Poland?

5. There are those in the State Department and various European capitals who seem to wish that Walesa and Solidarity would somehow go away so normal diplomatic relations can be resumed. What would you say to them?

6. In your first 4 1/2 years in the White House, you have met with virtually all the leaders of the Free World. I wonder if you could give us some thumbnail recollections or observations of a few of them-- Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Nakasone, Mr. Mitterand, Mr. Kohl.

7. What makes you proudest of America, and what gives you the most concern?

1. I thought I'd answer this in the interview but; — Frankly this has been on my mind & growing for years — dating back to before I was in public life.

2. Simply the reduction of govt. spending & govt. regulations plus the reduction of taxes. Reducing tax rates did not reduce govt. revenues. The stimulant to ec. growth resulted in increased revenues. We estimate the reduction in needless regulations has saved govt. individuals & business $100,000,000 man hours & of paperwork.

3 I really believe I'm faith

READER'S DIGEST
PLEASANTVILLE, N.Y. 10570

WASHINGTON EDITOR • *William Schulz*

June 11, 1985

Dear Pat:

Here are the unasked questions. I'd like answers and the transcript of yesterday's session by early next week if possible.

Many thanks.

Best--

Enclosures

Mr. Patrick Buchanan
The White House
Washington, D. C.

WASHINGTON EDITORIAL OFFICE • 1730 RHODE ISLAND AVE, N.W., SUITE 406, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

When did you personally first see the inequities in the income tax system and the need for reform?

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There are those in the State Department and various European capitals who seem to wish that Walesa and Solidarity would somehow go away so normal diplomatic relations can be resumed. What would you say to them?

In your first 4½ years in the White House, you have met with virtually all the leaders of the Free World. I wonder if you could give us some thumbnail recollections or observations of a few of them -- Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Nakasone, Mr. Mitterand, Mr. Kohl.

What makes you proudest of America, and what gives you the most concern?

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7/26/85

Dear President Reagan,

We wish to Thank you and the State Department for all you did to free the hostages of TWA Flight 847, and we know the other seven Americans still in Beirut will not be forgotten.

It was a pleasure meeting you and Nancy at our wonderful reunion at Andrews Air Force Base on July 3rd.

We are very happy you are doing so well after surgery. You look great.

God bless you always,

Sincerely,

Roger and Marge Testrake

David Station Road
P.O. Box 26
Imlaystown, New Jersey 08526

Att

7-4/85

Dear President Reagan,

We wish to Thank you and the State Department for all you did to free the hostages of TWA Flight 847 and we know the other seven Americans still in Beirut will not be forgotten.

It was a pleasure meeting you and Nancy at our wonderful re-union at Andrews Air Force Base on July 3rd

We are very happy you are doing so well after surgery. You look great.

Sample

It was very thoughtful of you.

God bless you always.

Sincerely,

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The President has seen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Received SS

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July 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Even though the meeting with Gorbachov et alia is yet four months off, we thought you and the First Lady might enjoy perusing a steady flow of selected readings -- from various viewpoints -- on the first meeting between a U.S. President and Soviet Party Chairman since Vienna. Hopefully, these gleanings will deal with summit histories, atmospherics, issues, etc.

Pres. Reading

PERISCOPE

A New U.S.-Soviet Arms-Control Scenario

Senior Reagan administration officials are bracing for a new Soviet arms-control offensive as a prelude to the summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva this fall. Defense Department experts predict that the Soviets will conduct an extensive series of underground nuclear-weapons tests later this month. Then, according to this scenario, on the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on Aug. 6 Gorbachev may announce a halt to further Soviet nuclear testing—and call on the United States to follow his lead. When arms-control talks resume in Geneva in mid-September, U.S. experts theorize, the Soviets may propose a formula for limiting the number of strategic missiles and warheads—a suggestion made to New York Rep. Stephen Solarz in Moscow earlier this summer—in return for a U.S. agreement to limit Reagan's Star Wars initiative to research work. In this scenario, if U.S. negotiators refuse to bargain over Star Wars, the Soviets might stage a walkout in Geneva just before the start of the November summit—laying the blame on Washington for the breakdown in the talks. Reagan could then be vulnerable to pressure from Europe to "save the talks" by compromising on Star Wars during his face-to-face sessions with Gorbachev. Washington analysts note that the Soviets have not set a closing date for the next round of arms-control talks—which they interpret as a signal of Moscow's intention to terminate the round abruptly.

Kaddafi's New Friends in Argentina

Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi, who has long sought to extend the flying range of his fighter planes, has just concluded a $10 million deal with a private Argentine company to give his Air Force in-air refueling capabilities. According to Western intelligence sources, the South American firm has agreed to refit two of Kaddafi's U.S.-made C-130 Hercules transports as flying tankers—thus putting virtually the entire Mediterranean and most of North Africa within range of Libya's 500 fighters. An Argentine spokesman in Washington said the contract was for "maintenance" only, and stressed that the arrangement did not involve the government in Buenos Aires.

Sakharov: A Nuclear-Proliferation Threat?

Human-rights activist Andrei Sakharov will not be allowed to leave the Soviet Union because his release would violate the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, straight-faced Soviet officials recently told U.S. Sen. Paul Simon. As a leading nuclear physicist and a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Sakharov was privy to vital atomic secrets that he could pass on to Third World countries, academy president Anatoly Aleksandrov explained to the visiting Illinois Democrat. The 64-year-old Sakharov, who has been living in exile in Gorky since 1980, might even give such information to terrorists, another Soviet official added. And while an astonished Simon "expressed disbelief" at the rationale, according to a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the State Department, embassy officials said that the Soviets may continue to invoke it anyway.

Reagan Treasures a Symbol of Camelot

A small brass statue of a spread-winged American eagle that once graced President John F. Kennedy's desk is now a treasured memento to Ronald and Nancy Reagan—much to the dismay of a number of old Kennedy hands from the Camelot era. At a recent party at his home to raise funds for the John F. Kennedy Library, Sen. Edward Kennedy presented the eagle to the president and First Lady with thanks for their support for the library. When the Reagans returned to the White House that night, Nancy Reagan brought it to their private quarters for safekeeping. The next morning she placed it on the president's desk in the Oval Office—where it was clearly visible in a nationally televised address Reagan delivered several days later. Some former JFK aides were upset by Ted Kennedy's gesture and thought that he had given away too much. "It was more than a token," one grumbled. "It was something of a symbol to a lot of people."

Paying for Free AIDS Information?

Officials at the national Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta are disturbed by the announcement of a new weekly newsletter called The CDC AIDS Weekly that is scheduled for publication in September. The brainchild of editor Charles W. Henderson, who admits to having no medical or science background, the newsletter will offer the latest information about AIDS—primarily material gleaned from a free CDC publication—to public-health officials, physicians, epidemiologists, blood banks and hospitals at the cost of $900 for a two-year subscription. According to Henderson, CDC researchers suggested that he launch the publication. Not so, counters Dr. James Curran, head of the CDC's AIDS task force, who is distressed by Henderson's plan to use freely available CDC material in his private newsletter. "It has nothing to do with us, and I don't like our name associated with it," says Curran. "I advised [Henderson] against it. He's not going to be talking to me every week."

The Poachers Gain on Africa's Rhinos

African wildlife officials are troubled by the growing threat the continent's last great rhinoceros herd faces from poachers involved in the illegal market for rhino horns. Since the beginning of the year at least 28 rhinos in the game reserve in Zimbabwe's northern Zambezi River basin have been killed, and the entire herd of nearly 800 is faced with extinction. Two poachers from neighboring Zambia have been killed in shoot-outs with game patrols and eight more have been arrested. Local authorities say they have evidence that a top official in the Zambian government is involved with the poachers. And they believe that North Korean diplomats in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, are buying rhino horn from the poachers and smuggling it back home for sale commercially—and as a gift for North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. In the Far East crushed rhino horn is used in medicines and aphrodisiacs.

China: A Big Chill for Dance Fever

As part of Deng Xiaoping's post-Mao cultural counterrevolution, dance fever has struck China, but foreigners complain of a chill when they try to join the fun. Longtime foreign residents of the main hotel in the northern port city of Dalian were recently asked by the manager to recommend a name for the hotel's new disco. He accepted their suggestion—Shangri-La—then turned them away from the opening-night party. When a West German businessman who was barred from a dance hall in Kunming with the words "Chinese only" questioned the restrictions, he was told, "There is a difference between Chinese and non-Chinese people." Foreigners can join Chinese on the dance floor at the International Club in Peking, but most other dance halls are closed to outsiders.

LUCY HOWARD with bureau reports

Presidential Reading



'Why ... did the Soviet Union ... respond positively ... to the American overture for a summit ...?'

Why Sovs stalled for summit

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF | Moscow aims to put burden of success or failure on United States

THE announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union will hold a summit conference in Geneva on Nov. 19-20 represents a belated Soviet response to President Reagan's invitation for such a meeting first extended in January 1984, two Soviet leaders ago.

At that time Yuri Andropov was on his deathbed. His successor, Konstantin Chernenko, was unprepared to meet President Reagan for fear of giving the administration a boost in the midst of the 1984 U.S. election campaign.

As it became clear that President Reagan would be elected to a second term, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was dispatched to Washington to indicate Moscow's willingness to return to the arms-control talks. The talks had been suspended by the Soviet Union at the end of 1983 after they failed in their campaign to halt the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.

Why, then, did the Soviet Union finally respond positively this month to the American overture for a summit conference that it had previously rejected?

The summit announcement coincided with the elevation of Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Soviet presidency, which most Western observers had incorrectly assumed would be taken by Gorbachev himself.

The removal of Gorbachev's rival Grigory Romanov from the ruling Politburo represents not so much the consolidation of power in the hands of a new Soviet leadership as it does the growing influence of the KGB. Each of the three new Politburo members appointed by Gorbachev has come from the ranks of the Soviet internal security and espionage apparatus. This was unprecedented even in Stalin's time.

At the very least, it means that Gorbachev is not beholden to mythical "reformist" elements that will modify long-established policies.

Whatever the convergence of forces within the Soviet leadership that produced these top personnel changes, it is necessary to search for a more deeply rooted meaning in Gorbachev's decision to meet with President Reagan.

The summit conference will coincide with the final decision that the administration plans to take concerning compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty, set to expire at the end of 1985. The United States has charged the Soviet Union with massive violations, but it has stepped back from denouncing a treaty, which, before entering office, Reagan called "fatally flawed," but which the United States has pledged not to "undercut."

There is little prospect that the administration will end U.S. compliance with the SALT II Treaty as it goes to the summit. There will be public pressure on the Reagan administration to show "good faith" by continuing to uphold the SALT II Treaty and to downplay Soviet violations. Under such circumstances, the Soviet Union will have less incentive to halt strategic programs that are clearly in violation of the SALT II Treaty.

Of even greater consequence is the meaning to be attached by Moscow to the development of a "constructive relationship," the term used by the administration to describe its goal with respect to the Soviet Union. Already, Gorbachev has called for a binding reaffirmation by both Moscow and Washington of the 1972 ABM Treaty. He has called it "the key link of the entire process of nuclear arms limitation" and said the American Strategic Defense Initiative "would invariably lead to the breakup of that document."

This is a cynical ploy, for the Soviet Union is now in violation of the ABM Treaty by the building of the huge phased-array radar complex in Krasnoyarsk. While Moscow condemns the American research program misnamed "Star Wars," the Soviet Union is engaged in a major effort of its own to develop strategic-defense technologies.

The Soviet Union maintains the world's only deployed ABM system. Thus, from Gorbachev's perspective, strategic defense per se is not "destabilizing"; only the American program is, because it would lessen and perhaps eventually eliminate the ability of the Soviet Union to launch strategic missiles against targets in the United States.

The Shultz-Gromyko meeting in January that led to the resumption of arms-control negotiations represented a media event blown out of proportion. However extravagant, such coverage pales by comparison with the press and electronic media spotlight that will be focused on the first U.S.-Soviet summit meeting since 1979, when Presidents Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna.

In the months ahead, the Soviet Union can be expected to step up its propaganda and other active measures to campaign against the Reagan administration's strategic-defense research. Immense pressure will be placed on the United States, and on President Reagan himself, to halt or delay its strategic-defense research program in order to cut through the present arms-control stalemate. In all likelihood, Moscow will attempt to place on the United States the onus for any failure of the summit conference to produce desired results. From Gorbachev's perspective, the summit will have failed if Moscow does not succeed in scuttling the American strategic-defense program.

'In the months ahead, the Soviet Union can be expected to step up its propaganda and other active measures to campaign against Reagan's strategic-defense research.'

Undoubtedly, Gorbachev has sensed the potential dividends available to Moscow resulting from the excessive expectations that abound in the West, despite the failure of previous meetings between Soviet leaders and their Western counterparts to produce lasting or even major short-term benefits to our overall security.

So great is Gorbachev's eagerness to test and exploit this Western penchant that the announcement of the U.S.-Soviet summit followed almost immediately the release of the 39 hostages of TWA 847, with Moscow's client state Syria having played a key role in ending this latest hostage crisis. Undoubtedly, Moscow is playing for much higher stakes than the brutalized passengers of TWA 847 as Gorbachev makes his debut as the new Soviet leader on the international stage of U.S.-Soviet summitry.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. is president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and professor of international security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

ARMS CONTROL: Three Centuries of FAILURE

William R. Hawkins

HARVARD'S RICHARD PIPES has observed that "neither détente nor the arms-limitation agreements accompanying it . . . have produced a dent in the upward curve of Soviet defense expenditures." Instead, Pipes argues, by adopting the public rhetoric of arms control, "the Soviet Union has been able to push through, at relatively small price to its own deployments, severe restrictions on those of the U.S." Edward N. Luttwak of Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies has written that "the hope . . . that arms control may in itself bring the strategic competition to an end . . . is supported neither by the pure logic of arms control nor by its experience in practice." Former ambassador Seymour Weiss has challenged proponents of arms control to show "just what evidence exists that recent nuclear-arms-limitations agreements with the USSR have actually contributed to U.S. security." Even President Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has argued that arms control is dead.

However clear and commonsensical such evaluations seem, the conventional wisdom still overwhelmingly favors some sort of commitment to arms control or the arms-control "process." Indeed, many liberals in politics and in the media seem to regard opposition to arms control as irresponsible, extremist, or radical—as a view beyond the pale of rational discussion. Yet empirically, it is *advocacy* of arms control that must be regarded as the radical position, for it is virtually impossible to find examples of successful arms-control agreements between major powers, not just in the period since World War II, but in any period of history. Those who are suspicious of arms control are the genuine "moderates" in this controversy—the ones whose stand is based on traditional diplomatic practice.

The first discussion of a mutual reduction in arms between two major powers in the modern era occurred in 1766 when the Austrian chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, informally suggested to a Prussian official that both nations reduce their standing armies by three-quarters. For verification, each nation would send commissioners to inspect the other's forces. A proportional reduction would leave the balance of power unchanged while reducing the burden of military spending. The Seven Years' War had ended only three years before, and both Prussia and Austria were nearly bankrupt.

Frederick the Great rejected this overture. Prussia had retained control of the former Austrian province of Silesia in the recent conflict, and he feared Austrian revanchism. A reduction of standing armies would weaken Prussian security because of Austria's faster rate of mobilization. Also, Austria's recent ally, France, was not included in the proposal. Frederick knew the proposal reflected Austria's financial weakness and saw no reason to lessen the pressure. Austria might be forced to disarm unilaterally. In addition, Frederick's considerable experience led him to believe that "agreement will never be arrived at between powers on the number and quantity of troops that each shall maintain against the others."

In 1787, Britain, its finances strained by the American Revolution, proposed to France that neither power increase its naval strength above the usual peacetime establishment without first notifying the other. An agreement was signed on August 30. Less than three weeks later, as France was about to intervene in Holland to help overthrow the pro-British Stadtholder, the British informed France that forty ships of the line were being recommissioned. The British show of force was successful. France backed down, and new agreements were signed in October. Napoleon later claimed that this diplomatic defeat had contributed to the French Revolution by undermining the prestige of the monarchy.

In 1831, France, England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia concluded an agreement that attempted to reduce forces to a peacetime level. The original proposal, made by France, stemmed from the Italian crisis, which had brought Paris and Vienna near war. A protocol was signed and forgotten. The crisis remained, and the next year French troops occupied Ancona in response to an Austrian move into Bologna. Deterrence rather than détente prevented a wider clash.

Arms-control or disarmament negotiations have almost always been tactical and short-lived. Arms limitations of some duration occasionally have been imposed by victors

Mr. Hawkins is an assistant professor of economics at Radford University in Radford, Virginia. He is also director of the South Foundation's Southern Studies Project, which develops educational materials for private high schools.

on the vanquished. But security demands lead nations to escape such limits as soon as possible. Under the 1856 Treaty of Paris ending the Crimean War, the Black Sea was neutralized, a prohibition directed at Russia by Britain and France. Russia renounced the prohibition at the first opportunity, as, in 1870, Prussia defeated France and England became isolated.

There is one classic example of a successful and enduring arms-limitations agreement. The 1817 Rush-Bagot Convention between the United States and Great Britain limited the arming of ships on the Great Lakes, and became the basis for the still demilitarized Canadian border. The agreement was the result of the evenly fought War of 1812, but it was preserved by what was soon to be a very uneven balance of power in North America. Britain's imperial commitments left no margin for trouble with the United States. Fortunately for London, American restraint and the lack of serious disputes removed the threat of war between the two powers in the nineteenth century, while in the twentieth century Washington, London, and Ottawa have been allies.

This and all the previous examples show the dominance of political and security considerations in diplomacy. Disarmament is powerless at best unless it is linked to a political settlement and a peaceful environment. Those who deny linkage or call for an arms agreement simply for its own sake are howling in the wind. Nations arm because they wish to expand their power or resist the expansion of others. Until the nations concerned can settle on an acceptable status quo, there is no chance for meaningful arms control or peace. In today's context, as long as the Soviet Union is openly committed to a revolutionary agenda encompassing global change, disarmament can only undermine the security of all those states outside the Soviet sphere.

This principle was well understood by the professional diplomats and governing hierarchies of the nineteenth century. By the turn of the century, however, an influential body of liberals, isolationists, and socialists were advocating multilateral arms control, and eventual disarmament, as a principle not *of* diplomacy but *above* diplomacy. These activists put forth as cures for war everything from free trade, to the abolition of finance capitalism and the private manufacture of armaments, to the general strike. This left-wing agitation came in addition to the traditional pacifist stance of various Christian sects. It was also reinforced by a school of conservative legalists who, out of a desire for order, wished to replace the anarchy of power politics with international law and a world court system. These views manifested themselves in several rounds of negotiations before and after World War I.

The first of these negotiations was the Hague Conference of 1899, proposed in 1898 by Czar Nicholas II. In popular perception it was a conference to promote disarmament, but in reality the aim was only to slow the development of new armaments. Russia had just completed a buildup of forces in Asia and had recently re-equipped its army with a new rifle. Yet technology was marching on. The Germans had developed a new field gun with six times the previous rate of fire, and Germany's ally, Austria, was bound to acquire the gun, which the Russians could not afford to buy. Russia needed a "freeze" to keep from falling behind.

Russia's motives were well known in diplomatic circles, but the pressure the peace movement was able to exert throughout the West was such that no government could openly reject an invitation to negotiate. Twenty-six states sent delegates.

It is interesting to note the American attitude toward the talks. The head of the delegation was Andrew D. White, ambassador to Germany, co-founder of Cornell University, and a moderate Republican committed to the legalist approach. He pushed hard for the establishment of an international court of arbitration. In his *Autobiography* he sums up his instructions from Secretary of State John Hay:

> As regards the articles relating to the non-employment of new firearms, explosives, and other destructive agencies, [and] the restricted use of the existing instruments of destruction, . . . they are lacking in practicality . . . The expediency of restraining the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense is by no means clear, and considering the temptations to which men and nations may be exposed in time of conflict, it is doubtful if an international agreement of this nature would prove effective.

Among the other members of the delegation was Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose classic *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* made him among the best-known delegates. Mahan had no delusions about arms control. Only two years earlier he had written:

> Time and staying power must be secured for ourselves by that rude and imperfect, but not ignoble arbiter, force—force potential and force organized—which so far has won, and still secures, the greatest triumphs of good in the checkered story of mankind.

White noted of Mahan that "When he speaks, the millennium fades and this stern, severe actual world appears."

In fact, only three concrete measures for restricting weap-



The conference was the center of attention and the focus of peace groups. White noted that 'The queer letters and crankish proposals which come in every day are amazing. . . . The Quakers are out in force'

ons were adopted by the Hague Conference: a ban on the "dum-dum" expanding bullet; a ban on the use of poison gas in naval warfare; and a five-year moratorium on the dropping of bombs from balloons or other aircraft. The British and American military men—Mahan; his counterpart from the Army, Captain William Crozier; and his opposite number on the British delegation, Admiral Sir John Fisher—led the opposition to all three restrictions.

Admiral Fisher's biographer, Richard Hough, believes that "It was one of Lord Salisbury's shrewdest moves . . . to show the world the nature of the man they would have to break if they took up arms against England." Fisher was a blunt and colorful speaker. He described his early deterrence theory:

> If you rub it in both at home and abroad, that you are ready for instant war with every unit of your strength in the first line, and intend to be first in, and hit your enemy in the belly, and kick him when he is down, and boil your prisoners in oil (if you take any!), and torture his women and children, then people will keep clear of you.

As First Sea Lord, Fisher made the decision to revolutionize battleship design, a decision implemented with the launching of the *Dreadnought* in 1906. Fisher was also among the first to predict the use of unrestricted submarine warfare (Winston Churchill thought this view was extremist in 1913). He listened to the speakers at The Hague "wondering that they could think that any of their resolutions would be recognized in war."

The ban on expanding bullets was passed to annoy the British, who had developed them for use in colonial warfare. On the other two matters, the military men argued that if naval gas weapons or aerial bombardment proved useful, a ban would be neither prudent nor practical. In the event, the Germans used their Zeppelins for bombing raids on London in World War I before they were replaced by more capable aircraft. Gas weapons at sea proved impractical, though the major powers made extensive use of poison gas on land in World War I.

At the time, the conference was the center of attention and the focus of peace groups. White noted that "The queer letters and crankish proposals which come in every day are amazing," and added: "It goes without saying that the Quakers are out in force." A journalist reported that "Young Turks, old Armenians, emancipated and enthusiastic women, ancient revolutionaries from the Forties buzzed about The Hague like bees."

A second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 was initiated by President Theodore Roosevelt, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize the previous year for helping settle the Russo-Japanese War. But the purpose of this conference had nothing to do with disarmament. Roosevelt wrote Ambassador Whitelaw Reid in London:

> We must not grow sentimental and commit some Jefferson-Bryan-like piece of idiotic folly such as would be entailed if the free people that have free governments put themselves at the hopeless disadvantage compared with the military despotisms.

The First World War shattered hopes that religion or free trade or the solidarity of the working class would transcend the political imperatives of the nation-state. Nevertheless, among the victors, it was thought that a sufficient body of common interest made arms control a possibility. Again, this proved an illusion.

The new attempt at arms control focused on the naval arms race. Battleships were the most advanced (and costly) weapons systems of their day, the source of both prestige and power. It was also widely held that the pre-war naval race between England and Germany had contributed to the tensions leading to war. Hence the Washington Naval Conference was called. On February 6, 1922, the five great naval powers signed a treaty limiting their capital ships. The U.S., England, Japan, France, and Italy agreed to a ratio of, respectively, 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 for battleships. Limits on number and tonnage were laid out, as were schedules for new construction running until 1942. Both the U.S. and England were required to scrap some existing warships. Aircraft carriers were also restricted, but these were considered secondary at the time.

For the Harding Administration, the conference was a way to participate in world affairs without joining the League of Nations. It united isolationist Republicans with liberal Democrats under the disarmament umbrella. The only strong objections came from the extreme isolationists who wanted unilateral disarmament without the "entangling" aspects of treaties. For the naval treaty was linked with two other treaties dealing with Asia, which were meant to create a political settlement as a foundation for arms control.

The two Asian treaties reaffirmed the American Open Door policy on China, ended the bilateral relationship between Japan and England, and constituted the U.S., England, Japan, and France as the four imperial powers in Asia. Yet to win the support of enough isolationist senators, the Administration had to pledge that the U.S. was not bound to any action in support of the treaties. As Selig Adler concludes in his study *The Isolationist Impulse*: "The treaties they made relied for enforcement only on the good will and the continued power of the Japanese liberals. Today we know that this was a vain hope."

The naval limitations gave Japan regional dominance because its fleet was concentrated, whereas the British and American fleets had commitments outside the Pacific. The U.S. was not allowed to fortify bases west of Hawaii, which made it impossible to hold the Philippines against invasion. Britain halted work on its Singapore naval base.

Even this was not enough for Tokyo, which was soon demanding "equality" with London and Washington. Owing to Japan's demands, plus rivalry between France and Italy, a new round of talks in Geneva in 1927 failed to reach limits for cruisers and destroyers.

In January 1930, the London Naval Conference opened. After four months the negotiators agreed to six-year limits on cruisers and submarines. Japan's position was strengthened to 70 per cent of the U.S. and British levels in cruisers and destroyers with "parity" in submarines. Capital-ship limits were reduced another 10 per cent. The U.S. and Britain were allowed 15 battleships each (down from the 33 and 43 the two powers respectively had in hand or under construction in 1921), and Japan was allowed nine. These limitations obviously worked to the advantage of the weaker industrial power. In the wake of the treaty, President Hoover proposed a cut of one-fourth to one-third in most U.S. Navy ship categories to help balance the budget.

Meanwhile, the Japanese liberals were on the way out. In 1934 Tokyo drew up an unlimited naval-construction plan centering on a new class of super-battleships, and gave the required two-year notice that it was abandoning the arms-control treaties. The Japanese Navy hoped to steal a five-year head start on the United States. By 1935, Japanese building had already passed the treaty limits. In January 1936 Admiral Nagano walked out of the new set of London talks, which had started the previous month. In response, the Roosevelt Administration increased shipbuilding, but most of the heavy units were not ready until after Pearl Harbor.

While some of the great powers wrestled with the concrete issues of naval armaments, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, a more ambitious effort to outlaw war itself, was concluded on August 27, 1928. The High Contracting Parties included the U.S., England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Ireland, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India. The treaty was brief and simple; it renounced war "as an instrument of national policy" and pledged that solutions to "all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin . . . shall never be sought except by pacific means."



The original impulse behind this treaty was neither so simple nor so idealistic. French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand desired to draw the United States into his carefully engineered system of alliances surrounding Germany, but he realized that American isolationist sentiment would never allow an open alliance. Briand hit upon the idea of a Pact of Perpetual Friendship that would entail no active commitment, only a forswearing of hostility. He coupled his formal plan with an appeal to the American peace movement, and the movement responded with a well-organized campaign.

Briand's first setback came when Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg offered a counter-proposal: not a bilateral pact, but a multilateral pact including Germany and as many other powers as possible. Briand did not want a multilateral pact, but having based his appeal on the cry for peace he could not retreat from the American offer. Outlawing war had been the central nostrum of peace movements everywhere. Even more than the naval limitations, it united all shades of isolationist, pacifist, and liberal opinion. Its simplicity was a guarantee of both its popularity and its ultimate failure.

Historian Robert H. Ferrell has written of Kellogg-Briand as an example of the problem of conducting a realistic foreign policy in a democracy:

> American diplomats were capable and serious men, well intentioned, as full of good will as the peace leaders and workers who bothered them. But they had to cope with a public opinion whose only virtue often was that it was public and opinionated. The strength, voice, and unintelligence of American public opinion during the Twenties forced the State Department into tortuous diplomatic maneuvering—necessitating even the grand proposal of a multilateral treaty against war.

The sort of thinking the Kellogg-Briand Pact revealed contributed in two different but converging ways to the fatal appeasement policies of the 1930s, which opened the door for aggression. First, Kellogg-Briand was read by some as mandating endless negotiations to settle disputes by pacific means. There was no limit to the concessions that might be granted to keep talks going and avoid action. Even after Imperial Japan and Fascist Italy left the 1935 London Naval Conference, the three democracies continued to talk and set limits among themselves. Then the fighting in Manchuria in 1931, the withdrawal of Germany and Japan from the League of Nations in 1933, the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932-34, the Japanese break with naval limits in 1934, and Hitler's 1935 rejection of the Versailles disarmament clause were taken by some as proof that diplomatic measures such as Kellogg-Briand were powerless to control military expansionism in foreign lands. This strengthened the isolationist and unilateral-disarmament camps in the peace movement. Our own policies, these groups insisted, should steer us away from war no matter what other states might choose to do.

The Western values of democracy, self-determination, and a peaceful world order were imposed on the liberated areas. But these ideals reached no further than American and British troops could march

A typical statement of this view comes from a letter Lord Allen of Hurtwood wrote to the *Manchester Guardian* in 1933:

> . . . our duty is to call for the disarmament of the old Allies and not to join the hue and cry against German rearmament. . . . Herr Hitler has declared his willingness for his country to abandon her own armaments if other nations do likewise.

In June 1935, England abandoned the Versailles ban on German naval rearmament by signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement allowing Germany to build a fleet with 35 per cent of the tonnage of the Royal Navy (slightly more than was allowed France by the Washington/London system). Submarines were again permitted to the *Kriegsmarine*, an outright concession to German demands as laid down in a speech by Hitler on May 21, 1935. Hitler had also demanded parity in air power. But because Hitler couched his rearmament plans in the rhetoric of arms control (his goals were termed limits) he won the immediate support of the Trades Union Congress, the Labour Party National Executive, and the Fabian Society, all of which demanded that the Conservative government hold an immediate conference with Germany. France was enraged by London's unilateral concession, but was powerless to reverse it. The German Navy soon exceeded the limits established.

June 1935 was also the month that the results of the British Peace Ballot were released. Its organizer, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, known for his founding role in the League of Nations and his reduction of the Royal Navy, was backed by an impressive array of peace and church groups including the Anglican Archbishops of York and Canterbury, the Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool, and many leaders of the Non-Conformist Churches. The 11 million respondents to the poll (all registered voters) returned 10 to 1 margins in favor of "overall disarmament by international agreement" and the abolition of all military aircraft by treaty. Such results could not help but propel politicians toward continued disarmament and appeasement. By the time of the Munich crisis, the Versailles system was gone.

Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey, in his study *The Causes of War*, sums up the military side of the breakdown of the European order that led to World War II:

> As the victors at Versailles were the custodians of international morality, and as that morality rested on military superiority, it was vital that they should retain that superiority. They forgot that victory is mostly a wasting asset. They failed as custodians because, as if lulled by their own rhetoric, they continued to assert morality while they neglected armaments.

In the same way, the Western Allies were the custodians of international morality at the end of World War II. The Western values of democracy, self-determination, and a peaceful world order were imposed on the defeated Axis nations and restored to the liberated areas. But these ideals depended on military superiority. They reached no further than American and British troops could march. Wherever the Red Army ruled, a far different system was imposed.

The most dramatic symbol of Western superiority was the atomic bomb. When the Soviets tested their first hydrogen bomb, eclipsing that symbol, the counsel of those who had urged U.S. self-restraint in weapons development was temporarily devalued. But the voices of disarmament and arms control soon returned. Congress even established an internal lobby, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), to counter those who were engaged in the traditional pursuit of national security.

There is no Soviet counterpart to the ACDA. However revolutionary Soviet rhetoric may be, in foreign policy the USSR is strictly within the ancient Realpolitik tradition of an imperial state. As Samuel P. Huntington has remarked,

> The Soviet Union and the Soviet system constitute the last of the major nineteenth-century empires. . . . Perhaps the most important historical function of the Bolshevik Revolution was to enable the Czarist empire to avoid the fate of its counterparts by providing it with a new ruthlessly effective leadership.

Diplomacy is governed by the "correlation of forces." Treaties last only as long as they serve the national interest. Thus the Soviets have violated most of their agreements. Though this is often cited as if it were a unique record of irresponsibility, in truth it is the standard practice of nations throughout history. It is the American view of treaties as matters of principle rather than convenience that is radical, based as it is on the assumption of a universally accepted system of values and interests on which international law can rest. There is, of course, no such system. As Laurence W. Beilenson reminds us in his classic study, *The Treaty Trap*:

> Wherever and whenever there have been political treaties, troubles to test them, and a strong interest in breaking them, the paper chains have severed. . . . Treaty-reliance has not been as constant as unreliability, but the disease has recurred so often that it can be classified as an occupational disease of statesmen.

In the modern era, as in earlier times, the most important components of national security have been deterrence and an active defense should deterrence fail. Arms-limitation agreements have not contributed significantly to security and in some cases have undermined it. This has been true especially of arms limitations divorced from wider political settlements and not linked to a prior reduction in tensions. It is time that the American public as well as its official representatives recognize how the world of international politics really works and support a return to the traditional methods of statecraft.

the awesome military strength of the Soviet Union.

A refusal to make distinctions between totalitarian regimes makes it impossible to understand the world today, as well as making a muddle of history. Vietnam is totalitarian and allied with Russia; Pol Pot is totalitarian (the worst of them all, probably, short of Hitler), and allied with China. Can anyone deny that a better totalitarianism has replaced a worse in Cambodia? We refuse to recognize the better, not because we prefer the worse, but because we hope there is a "third force" that will be preferable to both.

Hannah Arendt, author of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, believed that to say "totalitarian" told us a good deal about a political regime. When Hitler ruled Germany and Stalin ruled Russia, there was much that supported that belief. But even then there were enormous differences, more important for some people than for others. In Poland Jews and communists and socialists knew that it would be much better to escape to the East (Russia) than to the West (Germany). It was awful in the East, too, and those who could got out fast after the war. But the difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia for many people was as simple as the difference between death and life.

IN OBJECTING to the assertion of "moral equivalence" of all totalitarian regimes, I am concerned about both the past and the future. First, we should not obscure the unique evil of Nazi Germany. That evil had no necessary connection with totalitarianism. "Totalitarian" Fascist Italy (at least it tried to be totalitarian, even if it did not succeed so well) had nothing against its Jews until Hitler forced it to adopt anti-Jewish laws. We will never fully understand the Nazi evil or take its measure. But we can never say Nazi Germany was a nation like other nations—even totalitarian nations.

Second, we should not pretend that this concept of "totalitarianism" can be a real guide to our foreign policy. It doesn't tell us what to do about Russia, or about China. Obviously we cannot be indifferent to totalitarianism. The United States prefers democracy, it defends democracy. If it doesn't, it should. But how that affects its foreign and military policy, in the light of all other considerations that must be weighed, is another matter.

One consequence of the emphasis on totalitarianism is that it lets authoritarianism off the hook. In human terms, what Argentina did to people was far worse than what Yugoslavia, for example, does. There is indeed no comparison. In fact, using torture as a test, it may well be that in any given year the authoritarians come out worse than the totalitarians. But I don't recommend torture as a single test, either. The exigencies of foreign policy have caused us to be friends with torturers. Torture should weigh heavily in the balance. But I don't know if one can set up an absolute rule.

In analyzing our conflict with Soviet Russia, old labels are less and less helpful. Marxism doesn't help, Leninism doesn't help, and even totalitarianism, I would argue, doesn't help much. It does not outline the distinctive characteristics of our conflict that cause it to continue today, long past the time when Marxist (or totalitarian) ideologies served as an internal threat to our friends and allies in Europe. Something else is going on, and the totalitarian label doesn't tell us what it is.

NATHAN GLAZER

Nathan Glazer, professor of education and sociology at Harvard, is the editor most recently of *Clamor at the Gates: The New American Immigration* (Institute for Contemporary Studies).

How to break the arms control impasse.

A STAR WARS SOLUTION

THE USUAL *danse macabre* of American-Soviet arms control negotiations is about to begin. The process is typically initiated by a Soviet announcement to leaders of the U.S. government, and to the myriad self-appointed American accommodationists trooping to Moscow to seek on their own a "fair" solution, that the ongoing stalemate is due entirely to American rigidity. The Soviets insist that they cannot give an inch, and that only a massive display of American good faith—translated into unilateral concessions—can revive the negotiations.

In the late 1970s the Soviets made it clear that progress in negotiations would be contingent upon U.S. abandonment of its cruise missile program. In 1984 they premised even the beginning of arms control talks on the dismantling of the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles already deployed in Europe. Then the MX missile came to be designated as the impediment to any compromise. And now the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan's so-called Star Wars proposal, has been identified as the mortal enemy of arms control.

These arguments are then faithfully reproduced on the Op-Ed pages of U.S. and West European papers. Renowned professors, former ambassadors, various politicized scientists, and leaders of the arms control lobby plead for a demonstration of American good faith—which happens to coincide with the acceptance of what the Soviets have been demanding. The process of negotiation thus begins in earnest—but among us Americans! The Russians, meanwhile, sit at the table in Geneva and wait for the eventual U.S. concessions.

It is a normal procedure for the United States to prepare for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union by defining a tough opening gambit, to be followed by a more flexible position that would be exercised in conjunction with some demonstrated Soviet willingness to compromise. But it is usually only a matter of time before some disgruntled official leaks the substance of the fallback position to one

of the ex-ambassadors, peace-loving professors, or any one of the 535 representatives and senators who have lately become our surrogate secretaries of defense and state. Any one of them then feels free to publicize the fallback position as his constructive suggestion. Indeed, the latest fashion is to compose a joint letter published under three or four prestigious signatures, strongly urging the U.S. to make further unilateral concessions in order to convince the Soviets that we are negotiating in earnest. After we prove our good intentions, the Russians may be prepared to accept our third—or fourth—fallback position as a proper match for their own unyielding position.

THE SOVIET argument against SDI and the domestic critics' case against SDI are politically complementary. The Soviets say that SDI threatens the militarization of space, and that there will be no arms control agreement unless it is abandoned. The American critics say SDI will not work, that it will cost too much, that the Soviets can very easily overcome it, and that the Soviets are dreadfully fearful of it. The logical inconsistency of these arguments is less important than the political symmetry of their intended effect—namely that the U.S. should unilaterally forgo the SDI program.

In fact, nothing could be more damaging to the prospects for real arms control than the jettisoning of SDI. Indeed, the time has come for the United States to bite the bullet on the SDI question. Only if a strategic defense system is deployable within the next decade or so, and only if our will to deploy it is proven credible, can the United States trade it for a genuine and comprehensive arms control agreement with the Soviets. It is essential that this system be capable of disrupting and rendering militarily useless a Soviet first strike by intercepting missiles early in flight or by knocking them out as they descend toward the United States. Anything less than that virtually guarantees that there will be no comprehensive arms control agreement.

The reason for this proposition, unpalatable though it may be to the arms control lobby, is rooted both in the changing character of nuclear weaponry and in the nature of Soviet strategic deployments. In the 1970s both sides enjoyed large strategic forces whose primary function was to pose the threat of annihilation to the other country. These systems were not susceptible to preemptive destruction. The emerging reality of the 1980s and 1990s is that both sides are deploying far more accurate weapons. These weapons are capable of a preemptive first strike that could eliminate the opponent's strategic forces—and prevent effective retaliation. For the first time it is possible to contemplate the possibility of an attack that destroys an overwhelming majority of the other side's forces while also disrupting its command and communications structures to such an extent that any response would be marginal, spasmodic, and conceivably not totally destructive. In short, as accuracy increases so does the benefit of striking first.

This is not to argue that the Soviets (or the United States) are likely or certain to launch a first strike. It is simply to say that the nuclear relationship is growing ever more precarious. This is the current danger in the American-Soviet military situation. It needs to be addressed and resolved by the arms control process, if possible; or unilaterally, if arms control remains stalemated.

But there is another problem raised by the advent of the highly accurate weaponry. The Soviet Union is now deploying such forces in large numbers; the United States is not. How can we negotiate effectively in this situation? We somehow have to convince the Soviets to limit the further deployment of their new SS-24 and SS-25 missiles, and to limit significantly the deployment of existing SS-18s and SS-19s, all of which have counterforce capability. Without such limitations, by the early 1990s the Soviets—even by conservative estimates—will have enough missiles to place the entire U.S. arsenal in jeopardy. Only our Trident and Poseidon submarines already out at sea *might* escape destruction from a Soviet first strike. And with the confusion and resulting disintegration of communications systems, the submarine forces might not be in a position to retaliate effectively.

In contrast, the United States is not likely to be able to threaten the Soviet Union in a comparable way. No ongoing or likely deployment program will enable us to launch a disarming attack. Even if the U.S. had some form of strategic defense in order to protect its missile forces, we would still have far too few MX missiles, D-5 missiles on Trident submarines, and Midgetmen to even permit contemplation of such a disarming first-strike attack at any point between now and the end of the century.

IN THESE circumstances, the decision to go ahead with the SDI makes eminent sense. But it also means reformulating it politically and strategically. The U.S. should drop or at least de-emphasize President Reagan's idealistic hope for total nuclear defense for all our population. We should also abandon our unwillingness to consider SDI in the bargaining process. If we implement that part of the SDI program which by the mid-1990s would enable us to disrupt a Soviet first strike, we would reinforce deterrence and promote nuclear stability. That means concentrating on terminal defense and boost-phase interception.

Once we establish our determination to act on the SDI, we are in a better position to strike a bargain. We can say to the Soviets that we both face essentially two choices, one mutually beneficial, the other especially costly to them, but both stabilizing. The first choice is to renegotiate the 1972 ABM treaty to permit deployment of strategic missile defense, but without either side improving its ability to carry out a first strike. Then, in return for significant reductions in SS-24s, SS-25s, SS-18s, and SS-19s, the United States would not deploy its strategic defense system. The second option would be pursued if Soviets were unwilling to accept such a bargain. The United States would unilaterally terminate the ABM treaty and proceed with the SDI. This would render the Soviets' new generation of accurate

missiles useless and wipe out their multibillion ruble investment in them.

Some critics of the SDI argue that the Soviets could respond by vastly increasing their offensive deployments. There are two problems with this line of thinking. First, if the Soviets do respond by building up, they will confirm the ominous suspicion that they are intent on preserving a first-strike capability against the United States; if so, the urgency of negating that threat is all the greater.

Second, if the Soviets expand their offensive forces, the strategic defense could be expanded proportionally. Remember that such a system would not need to be foolproof since it would not be designed to defend populations; it would only need to be capable of significantly disrupting an attack on U.S. strategic forces. In such a competition we would have the advantage. It would be far cheaper for us to add defensive missiles than for them to add highly accurate offensive missiles. (Those who make the most ambitious claims for the SDI should bear in mind that we could not compete so well if we were seeking to build a foolproof defense of our cities. If our defense had to be 100 percent effective, it would cost us far more to expand it than it would cost the Soviets to expand their offensive forces.)

To shape such an effective U.S. defense strategy and a meaningful negotiating posture, President Reagan's SDI needs to be redefined. We must show the Soviets both that we can deploy a strategic defense system soon and that we will negotiate over its deployment if they are willing to make stabilizing reductions in their offensive missile forces. In the event of Soviet unwillingness to accept such an arrangement, we would be in position unilaterally to achieve strategic security for ourselves. And because the SDI would not be accompanied by a massive deployment of disarming first-strike offensive U.S. systems, we would in no way increase our strategic threat to the Soviets. Either way SDI promises a genuinely stabilized nuclear equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is time to act.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Zbigniew Brzezinski was assistant to the president for national security from 1977 to 1981.

Betty Ford ministers to the rich and famous.

ADDICTION À L.A. MODE

BY P. J. CORKERY

Los Angeles

IN A CITY that already regards chefs, hairdressers, and lawyers as acceptable playmates, the flowering of yet another exotic social type can't be regarded as particularly noteworthy. But in Los Angeles this season there's a new species of personal companion on the rialto that is not only positively orchidaceous but that demonstrates just how chic addiction has become. The hottest companion here is a "disenabler."

A "disenabler" (also known as a "key voice") is a person who keeps you from doing drugs or from drinking. I saw my first disenabler at a party given by a producer last February in honor of his new mountainside home in Beverly Hills, an eccentric 35-room pile that looks like Mount Vernon descending Benedict Canyon. As the producer's wife was showing me around, I watched my host, a dapper fellow in his 50s, being followed around by a weather-beaten guy about the same age dressed in jeans, jersey, and a baseball jacket that had the initials "S.O.B." sewn on the back.

The producer and his follower eventually came by and the producer said to me, "Great place isn't it? Meet Charlie." I shook hands with Charlie. The two strolled away. "Is Charlie somebody I should know?" I asked the producer's wife, fearing that I might have insulted some studio face card or other local figure of consequence.

"No," trilled the producer's wife, "Charlie is just here to keep Leo from doing any drugs."

"I didn't know Leo had a problem."

"The worst. Leo just got out of Betty Ford's," she explained. "While I was down at the fat farm in La Costa, Leo checked into Betty Ford's."

"I thought that was a drying-out place."

"Yeah, but everyone goes there. Leo went there for his coke problem. They told him after he got out to go down to the Cocaine Anonymous meetings at Cedars-Sinai. Paul, you should see the women at those meetings. And the men! Primo! All great-looking. Well, anyway, Leo's been going. And Leo talked at one meeting about how hard it is to stay off the stuff at parties.

P. J. Corkery, a Hollywood writer, is addicted to California.

End
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File

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1985

Dear Virginia and Holmes:

Thank you very much for your letter and for sending me the letter from Teresa Hardy. I'm feeling fine, but I must admit looking at her in that snapshot was a real shot in the arm. I've dropped her a line.

I won't try to write anymore, but Nancy and I are looking forward to seeing you both real soon.

Love,

Ron

Mr. and Mrs. Holmes Tuttle
1237 East Mountain Drive
Santa Barbara, Calfiornia 93108

Mr. and Mrs. Holmes Tuttle
1237 East Mountain Drive
Santa Barbara, California 93108

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1985

Dear Mrs. Hardie:

Our friends, the Tuttles, made sure I received your message and the word of your own experience thirty years ago. Thank you so very much. You were more than kind to think of me.

I'm already feeling fine and, while I won't be chopping wood for awhile, I expect to be on a horse in a few more weeks. Do you know the most encouraging part of your message was to learn you've managed without popcorn for thirty years. I received the same orders you did -- no popcorn, nuts, etc. from now on. I happen to be a popcorn freak and will eat any given amount. I've been wondering what life will be like without it. You've reassured me that I'll be able to adjust.

Well, again, my thanks. Nancy sends her regards as do I.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mrs. Teresa A. Hardie
4626 El Cerrito Drive
San Diego, California 92115

Mr. & Mrs. Holmes Tuttle - 1237 East Mountain Dr.
Santa Barbara Calif. 93108
Virginia Tuttle

Our dear Mr President,

Holmes and I regret that it was necessary for you to undergo your recent surgery, but we are so grateful that it was very successful and we pray that you will soon be back to normal.

Last year we asked you for an autographed photo to take to Teresa Hardee in San Diego for her 100th birthday. We were there to celebrate and she was thrilled with your photograph. (You can see it on the mantel in the enclosed snapshot.)

Interestingly, we just received a letter from her which I am enclosing to you, that proves that you can expect to enjoy life for many years to come.

We are looking forward to seeing you in August and to celebrate Nancy's birthday.

We send our love to you both -

Devotedly, Virginia

July 28-85
August

How we met Teresa -

She is a dedicated Republican as well as a devoted Reagan fan.

In 1979 she observed the name Holmes Tuttle in the San Diego paper along with Governor Ronald Reagan and wrote a letter to Holmes asking him if he was the baby (Holmes Tuttle) born on the Tuttle Ranch in Oklahoma 1905-? Holmes's father Jim Tuttle had engaged Teresa to teach his children (in the one room schoolhouse - 1904) While there, baby Holmes was born 1905.

We have kept in touch with Teresa since receiving this letter and have found her to be an interesting and remarkable lady.

June 15, 1985

Dear Holmes of Virginia -
The time goes by so fast I think of you often and I am so happy you came for my birthday.

Three of my grand daughters are now married - The youngest Terri works in L.A. and she and a friend who she knew in the Kappa Alpha Sorority have an apartment in Sheta Torrence and she comes down quite often -

I wanted to write you about Ronald Regans operation, about 30 years ago I had the same trouble - Pre cancer tumor in the colon, in the S shaped or Sigmoid part of the colon - the doctor who operated on me was Dr. Benjamin J Eager, a fine Dr & fine man -

The operation has nothing to do with the mind or spirit of a person - If there are no further developments Ronald Regan will be

back to normal health in about 3 weeks -

I learned, no hard food like nuts, popcorn or such, ever

I hope no one comes up with the idea Ronald is done for and thinks of replacing him -

He may have occasional trouble with stoppage in the colon later on, but the Doctors know how to take care of that

I wanted you to tell him I have lived to be 100 and so can he. I hope.

I know there are busy days for you and surely hope you both keep well and when you can I would enjoy hearing from you

With Love and appreciation for your friendship.

Teresa Hardee

To Mrs. Teresa A. Hardie 4626 El Cerrito Dr.
San Diego Calif. 92115

Dear Mrs. Hardie

Our friends the Tuttles made sure I received your message and the word of your own experience 30 yrs. ago. Thank you so very much, you were more than kind to think of me.

I'm already feeling fine and while I wont be chopping wood for a ~~few weeks~~ while I expect to be on a horse in a few more weeks.

Do you know the most encouraging part of your message was to learn you've managed without ~~pop~~ corn for 30 years. I received the same orders you did — no popcorn, nuts etc. from now on. I happen to be a popcorn freak and will eat any given amount. I've been wondering what life will be like without it. You've reassured me that I'll be able to adjust.

Well again my thanks. Nancy sends her regards as do I. Sincerely RR

To Mr. & Mrs. Holmes Tuttle - 1237 East Mountain Dr.
Dear Virginia & Holmes Santa Barbara Calif. 93108

Thank you very much for your letter and for sending me the letter from Teresa Hardie. I'm feeling fine but ~~have~~ must admit looking at her in that snapshot was a real shot in the arm. I've dropped her a line.

I wont try to write anymore but Nancy & I are ~~looking~~ looking forward to seeing you both real soon.

Love Ron

End
case
File