

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: White House Office of Records Management:
Presidential Handwriting File, 1981-1989 (COPY SET)

Series II: Presidential Records

Folder Title: Folder 226 (02/13/1986-02/18/1986)

Box: 15

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Last Updated: 07/31/2025

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: PRESIDENTIAL HANDWRITING: Presidential Records**Archivist:** srj

OA/Box:

FOIA ID:

File Folder: Folder 226 (2/13/86-2/18/86) Box 16

Date: 1/02/01

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. letter	Pres. Reagan to Ward Quaal. 1p.	2/18/86	P6/B6 R 3/5/9
2. letter	handwritten draft of item #1. 1p.	nd	P6/B6 R 3/5/9
3. letter	Quaal to Pres. Reagan. 2p.	2/13/86	P6/B6 R 3/5/9

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].

P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

3662065

ME 001-05

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 13 1986



February 13, 1986

TO: DAVID CHEW

FROM: CHUCK DONOVAN *CD*

Attached is the first letter our office has received from one of the family members of the CHALLENGER astronauts.

*2/13 to
copy
F. Davis*

Heer tremendous - Greg touched alot
48 of lives. The President has seen 2/18


I am sure that you have
heard this from the other wives
but I will also add that
the manned space program must
go on. If not, then 7 lives
were lost for nothing. You can
have all the machinery possible
but nothing can really replace
the human factor. The astronaut
corps of people is a strong but
sensitive group and although the
press does not attribute sensitivity
to them that is the press' loss. So
please try to keep up all our
space work.

Dear President & Mrs. Reagan, ~~Mr. Reagan~~ (back)

I would like to thank you both
for the phone call, the talk and
presence at the Memorial Service and
the telegram. Your sincere warmth
really meant a great deal
to me. Greg was my entire life
but he made me a stronger
person after our 17 1/2 years of
marriage and it's on that
strength that I must draw now.
I am fortunate that I had very
good wonderful years with Greg
who was my best friend among
other things. My friends have

I just want to Thank you again
for coming and caring Greg and I
always admired your strength
and sensitivity and unlike
most people in politics, yours
is real.

Many Thanks,
Marcia S. Jarvis
(Greg Jarvis' wife)



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

David Chew:

RR thought since she didn't mention the photos we sent, she will assume they are in answer to this letter so he won't reply to this particular letter.

Kathy

21-1-10

End
Case
File

395656
PR 007-02

25

Feb. 13, 1986

Dear Mr. President, ^{spurred her on}

##

I can't begin to thank you for acknowledging and wishing Susan Borchard well at the Executive Forum last week. Susan's Doctor - Dr. Arthur Koblinski, granted her a day pass from the hospital to attend because she had shown such an interest. I wish you could have seen her expression, at your mention of her. She was absolutely glowing.

It is a God given miracle that we have Susan with us and I am so very grateful to you for spurring her on.

Susan will be coming home from the hospital today and will return for therapy as an

395656

out patient for some time to
come. She knows she's got
a battle to fight, and thanks
to you, Mr. President, the fight
has been regenerated to conquer
the challenge.

As we Californians like
to say, "She'll be back in the
saddle real soon", on your
White House team.

My Most Sincere Thanks,
God Bless,
Christy Borchard

MCB
2301 CONN. N.W.
7C
WASH., D.C.
20008

End
case
File

The President has seen 2/18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

36619855
F6001

February 18, 1986

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a short note from Bert Lance. In case you missed the articles of the last few days in the press, Mr. Lance was permanently suspended from banking last week by the Comptroller of the Currency. Under these circumstances, acknowledging Mr. Lance's communication is not advised.

David

David L. Chew

RR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. P

of the last few days

Attached is a short note from
But Lance. In case you missed
the ~~last~~ article in the press, Mr.
Lance was ^{permanently} suspended from banking
interest ~~for~~ by the Comptroller of the
Currency. Under these circumstances
acknowledging Mr. Lance's Communist
is not advised.

m

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1986



FRED FIELDING:

Do you have any objection to
the President seeing the
attached?

David Chew

No objection
2/11

IC showing to DTR 2/11



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
FEB 11 1986

February 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan *PJB*

Bert Lance -- Jimmy Carter's ill-fated Budget Director (who is personally an immensely likeable guy) is a fan of yours -- and asked that I pass along to you this letter.

Attachment

BERT LANCE

Reagan
RR

1-31-86

Dear Mr President:

Even Though you have
brought great leadership to our
country over the past 5 years,
I just wanted you to know
I, as I am sure many have,
have been greatly touched by
your superb actions, words &
concerns during the events of this
week.

You make us proud!

Simply put, This is one
Democrat who is a real fan
of The Reagan.

Reagan
Bert Lance

End
Case
File

366148
I M

February 18, 1986

Dear Mr. Yerger:

I regret the delay in responding to your November 21 letter to President Reagan in which you expressed concern about the case of Soviet Seaman Miroslav Medvid. We share your outrage that the local Border Patrol officials who first interviewed Seaman Medvid on October 24 not only returned him to his ship without consulting with officials in Washington, but also did not follow other standard procedures established to ensure that asylum claims made in such circumstances are given full and expedited consideration. The Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has already acknowledged this error and the Attorney General is conducting an investigation of INS handling of this incident. Several INS officials have already been disciplined as a result.

While we all greatly regret the initial mistake, the United States did make a concerted effort to ensure that Seaman Medvid subsequently had an opportunity to decide whether he wished to remain in the United States or to return to the Soviet Union. Seaman Medvid was removed from the Soviet ship and interviewed in an environment under U.S. control, first aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Salvia and again at a U.S. Navy shore facility near New Orleans. Scrupulous care was taken to establish his identity through documents, photos and an eyewitness. He was examined by U.S. medical doctors, and remained in U.S. custody for twenty-four hours. As a matter of policy, we allow Soviet consular officials to be present when their citizens are interviewed to promote reciprocal treatment of our own citizens. The U.S. officials present, however, made sure that no coercion or intimidation took place during the time Seaman Medvid was in U.S. custody. U.S. officials took pains to ensure that Seaman Medvid understood that he was free to remain in the United States if he wanted to do so.

Seaman Medvid was questioned extensively, including about why he first jumped from the Soviet ship and what happened after he was returned to the ship. In response, he repeatedly expressed his desire to return to the U.S.S.R. There was no doubt on the part of the two U.S. military doctors who examined him that he was physically and mentally competent to make such a decision.

Further, despite some press accounts, there was also no doubt about our ability to communicate with Seaman Medvid. The professional interpreter engaged by the Department of State was himself of Ukrainian origin, and was able to communicate with Seaman Medvid in both Ukrainian and Russian. It was the interpreter's assessment that Seaman Medvid was more fluent in Russian than Ukrainian.

Unfortunately, during these interviews it was impossible to recreate Seaman Medvid's original frame of mind on October 24. We will never know what pressures may have been exerted on him while he was on the Soviet ship. Nor did we ever discount the possibility that such pressures may have influenced his final decision. We are under no illusions about the repressive nature of the Soviet Government and its willingness to use coercion and threats to control its people. There was always the possibility that Seaman Medvid would decide to return to the U.S.S.R. and that we would have to respect that choice. In cases such as this, only the individual involved can decide what action to take in light of the risks and personal costs involved for himself or for others. It was not a decision we could make for him.

Despite the initial mistakes, we made a strong effort to give Seaman Medvid a chance to remain in the United States, if he so chose. As a result of this tragic case, the U.S. Government has reviewed and tightened procedures to avoid any recurrence of such incidents.

With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins
Special Assistant to the President
and Director of Correspondence

Mr. Wirt A. Yerger, Jr.

Jackson, MS 39205

add

note on incoming.
per

SUGGESTED REPLY FOR APPROPRIATE
WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL

Dear Mr. Yerger:

I regret the delay in responding to your November 21 letter to President Reagan in which you expressed concern about the case of Soviet Seaman Miroslav Medvid. I want you to know that we share your outrage that the local Border Patrol officials, who first interviewed Seaman Medvid on October 24, returned him to his ship without consulting with officials in Washington, ~~or even following~~ other standard procedures established to ensure that asylum claims made in such circumstances are given full and expedited consideration. The Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has already acknowledged this error and the Attorney General is conducting an investigation of INS handling of this incident. Several INS officials have already been disciplined. *as a result.*

While we all greatly regret the initial mistake, the U.S. did make a concerted effort to ensure that Seaman Medvid subsequently had an opportunity to decide whether he wished to remain in the United States or to return to the Soviet Union. Seaman Medvid was removed from the Soviet ship and interviewed in an environment under U.S. control, first aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Salvia and again at a U.S. Navy shore facility near New Orleans. Scrupulous care was taken to establish his identity through documents, photos and an eye-witness. He was examined by U.S. medical doctors, and remained in U.S. custody for twenty-four hours. As a matter of policy, we allow Soviet consular officials to be present when their citizens are interviewed to promote reciprocal treatment of our own citizens. The U.S. officials present, however, made sure that no coercion or intimidation took place during the time Medvid was in U.S. custody. U.S. officials took pains to ensure that Seaman Medvid understood that he was free to remain in the United States if he wanted to do so.

Seaman Medvid was questioned extensively, including about why he first jumped from the Soviet ship and what happened after he was returned to the ship. In response, he repeatedly expressed his desire to return to the USSR. There was no doubt on the part of the two U.S. military doctors who examined him that he was physically and mentally competent to make such a decision. Further, despite some press accounts, there was also no doubt about our ability to communicate with Seaman Medvid. The professional interpreter engaged by the Department of State was himself of Ukrainian origin, and was able to communicate with Seaman Medvid in both Ukrainian and Russian. It was the interpreter's assessment that Seaman Medvid was more fluent in Russian than Ukrainian.

27
Unfortunately, during these interviews it was impossible to recreate Seaman Medvid's original frame of mind of October 24. We will never know what pressures may have been exerted on him while he was on the Soviet ship. Nor did we ever discount the possibility that such pressures may have influenced his final decision. We are under no illusions about the repressive nature of the Soviet Government and its willingness to use coercion and threats to control its people. There was always the possibility that Seaman Medvid would decide to return to the USSR, and that we would have to respect that choice. In cases such as this, only the individual involved can decide what action to take in light of the risks and personal costs involved for himself or for others. It was not a decision we could make for him.

spelled out
Despite the initial mistakes, we made a strong effort to give Seaman Medvid a chance to remain in the U.S., if he so chose. As a result of this tragic case, the U.S. Government has reviewed and tightened procedures to avoid any recurrence of such incidents.

CP With the President's best
wishes,

Sincerely,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

10001 add on

February 5, 1986

am En act

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *WHP*
SUBJECT: Reply to Wirt Yerger

The President has decided (memo attached) not to reply directly to a letter from Wirt Yerger concerning the Soviet Seaman who jumped ship, but to have a reply signed by the appropriate White House official. I am, therefore, attaching for your consideration a draft reply to Yerger.

Attachments

Tab A President's Memo
Tab B Draft Reply

AVH/NSC/CAD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Received: S
10001
1986 JAN 32 AM 9:4

January 31, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *John M. Poindexter*
SUBJECT: Reply to Yerger on Medvid Case

Issue

How to reply to Wirt Yerger's letter on the Medvid case.

Facts

Yerger's letter to you is based on a Wall Street Journal article which contains numerous inaccuracies. The reply acknowledges the initial mishandling of the case, but sets the record straight on subsequent treatment of Medvid.

Discussion

I recommend that you not sign the reply to Yerger, but have it signed by the appropriate White House official, in order to maintain your distance from the mishandling of the case and to avoid stimulating renewed media interest in the Medvid affair. However, should you desire to reply personally to Yerger, a letter for your signature is at Tab II.

Recommendation

OK No

RR

That you agree to have the attached letter signed by an appropriate White House official

Attachments

Tab A Reply for Appropriate White House official's signature
Tab B Alternative Reply for your Signature

Prepared by:
Judy Mandel

cc Vice President

WIRT A. YERGER, JR.
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

November 21, 1985

*John -
I want to answer this
letter + state the case
accurately. I have trouble
believing the attached
article. RR*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20515

"The Medvid Case: American Honor Lost"


Dear Ron:

Since you are out of the country with your summit conference, I thought I would enclose to you the above-captioned article from today's The Wall Street Journal by Congressman Fred Eckert. I want you to know that I agree totally with his position, and you should be ashamed as our President to have allowed something such as this to happen.

Surely you can pick up the telephone and contact Gorbachev and explain to him that he should allow this young seaman, if by chance he is still alive, to leave the Soviet Union. Their most notable defector just returned; therefore, it would cause them no loss of face and would be a very strong gesture on the Russians' part.

Ron, furthermore, I would hope that you would dismiss all of the U.S. customs and immigrations officials involved, as well as those in the State Department, for their gross insensitivity. It is my hope and prayer that you will personally intervene with compassion and sensitivity.

Sincerely,



WAYJR:dr

cc: Honorable Fred Eckert
Honorable Pat Buchanan

The Medvid Case: American Honor Lost

By FRED J. ECKERT

In the early evening of Oct. 24, on board the Soviet grain freighter Marshal Konev, docked in the Mississippi River just outside New Orleans, a 25-year-old Ukrainian seaman approached the ship's rail and looked down.

He was standing 40 feet above the river. It was dark, stormy and raining.

Miroslav Medvid was ready to jump ship and defect to America. He was wearing short pants, a sweater and tennis shoes. He held a container protecting personal papers valuable to him.

He jumped, from three stories high, into deep, turbulent water. The shore was more than the length of a football field away. He struggled to reach American soil. He struggled to reach freedom.

Miroslav Medvid reached American soil. He did not reach freedom.

Five days later Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, emerged from a meeting with Secretary of State George Schultz at the State Department to tell reporters: "It's settled. He's coming home."

One persistent reporter asked: "If Seaman Medvid really wanted to return to the Soviet Union, why did he jump ship and why did he do so many other things that so clearly indicated he wanted to defect?"

Mr. Dobrynin said: "I am not a sailor." Then he chuckled. And then he turned his back and walked away.

Return to a Nightmare

For the Soviet ambassador, the sad case of the Ukrainian seaman is something to laugh about. But for young Miroslav Medvid, his life has turned into a nightmare, a nightmare inflicted upon him by the incompetence and insensitivity of low-level U.S. officials. A nightmare caused by the feeble fears and limp leadership of high-level U.S. government officials.

After Mr. Medvid jumped ship and swam to shore, he encountered Joseph and Wayne Wymans in the parking lot of their jewelry store. The Wymans say he was very excited and nervous, and that he kept looking over his shoulder to see if he was being followed. The Wymans and Mr. Medvid could not understand anything they said to each other.

The Wymans guessed Mr. Medvid might be Russian and concluded that they were witnessing an attempted defection. They also concluded that he was asking them to take him to the police. Wayne Wymans drove him to a police station. Mr. Medvid was so grateful that he tried to kiss Wayne's hand. Three Soviets later showed up at the jewelry store and one of them told Joseph Wymans in English that they were looking for a friend who had "fallen overboard." Joseph told them he had seen no one.

The police took Mr. Medvid to the Harbor Police, who in turn handed him over to

the Border Patrol, a part of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The police say Mr. Medvid smiled and laughed and seemed very happy.

The Border Patrol set up a three-way telephone interview with Mr. Medvid, a Border Patrol agent and Irene Padoch, a New York-based translator who works part time for INS. She is the only American ever to have spoken with the Ukrainian seaman in Ukrainian. She has testified that she told officials at the scene that Mr. Medvid said he didn't want to return to the ship and did want political asylum. It is standard INS procedure to tape and transcribe such a sensitive conversation—but it was not done in this case.

For reasons that have yet to be explained, U.S. Border Patrol officials told two employees of Universal Shipping Agencies, the private shipping company that serviced the Soviet ship, to turn Mr. Medvid back to the Soviets. The two men hired a launch and set off for the ship. Raymond

They do—but they weren't followed.

Four days later the State Department issued a statement that ends by saying, "The United States Government considers this matter closed." The statement opens by assuring us that from the moment the department "was first informed of this case, the Department of State has been attempting to determine the intentions of Soviet Seaman Miroslav Medvid."

One would think that a review of Mr. Medvid's actions would make it clear what his intentions were—but nowhere in the State Department "case closed" statement is there a single reference to Mr. Medvid's actions prior to his return to the ship.

The department assures us that it "immediately" dispatched "a Russian-speaking Foreign Service Officer." But Mr. Medvid is Ukrainian, not Russian! And the State Department does not mention in its report that it had rebuffed offers of Ukrainian language translators. The department says it provided "an expert Russian inter-

we conclude he had been tortured? Such questions aren't raised in the report.

The State Department does mention that Mr. Medvid was examined by a U.S. psychiatrist who found him competent to decide whether he wanted to defect or not. But the department does not mention that the psychiatrist believed that Mr. Medvid knew what he was doing when he jumped ship and that he believed he had been threatened and that he believed the threats involved Mr. Medvid's parents, and possibly a threat against their lives.

The State Department report has it that we gave this man every chance to defect and that later we afforded him a nice "non-threatening environment" in which to think things over.

The truth, of course, is that a frightened sailor who had been dragged back to the Soviets has very good reason to be leery of Americans—and even more good reason when later they permit Soviets to stand watch over him while they promise him that this time he really can be free.

Congressmen Incensed

But the State Department report was enough to convince the White House to echo that the case was closed. It was also enough to incense this member of Congress and many of my colleagues. Some of us asked the president to order an investigation (which he did do) and to detain the ship and give Mr. Medvid another chance at freedom (which he did not do).

We should have announced the immediate suspension of those government employees responsible for this fiasco—pending dismissal proceedings. Mr. Medvid should have come off that ship and into U.S. custody even if we would have had to physically remove him. We should have detained him until the effects of the drugs inside him had dissipated. And we should have demonstrated to him that most Americans are not as dumb and insensitive as the Border Patrol agents who handed him back the first time and not as feeble and deferential toward the Soviets as the U.S. officials who handed him back the second time. And we should have let him meet with Ukrainian-Americans, including those who say they are related to him. We should have done all this not only to give Miroslav Medvid another chance for freedom but also to give ourselves a chance to atone for disgrace and dishonor.

We should have. But we didn't. Somewhere out on the high seas the Marshal Konev is carrying Ukrainian Seaman Miroslav Medvid to the hell that awaits him back in the Soviet Union. The ship is also carrying away a full load of American grain, and pieces of America's reputation, pride and honor.

Mr. Eckert, a Republican representative from New York, was U.S. ambassador to Fiji from 1982 to 1984.

Medvid again dived into the river and swam to shore. Soviet officers and two Americans grabbed him. He screamed, kicked and bit. But he couldn't escape.

Guthrie, the launch pilot, said: "I felt sorry for the seaman. He was kicking and screaming. He didn't want to go back." And Mr. Medvid ran his fingers across his throat—a gesture indicating he feared harm would come to him.

When the launch came abreast the Soviet ship at about 2 a.m., a Soviet officer spoke to Mr. Medvid. The seaman became even more frightened. He again dived into the river and swam to shore. Soviet officers and the two U.S. shipping-company employees grabbed him. Mr. Medvid screamed, kicked, punched and bit, but he couldn't get free. They handcuffed him, with handcuffs that had been turned over to these private citizens—and, it turns out, to Soviet authorities, too—by the U.S. Border Patrol. Mr. Medvid then began to bang his head against rocks along the shore. He was overpowered again. Finally, he was returned to the Marshal Konev.

Under well-established U.S. government procedure, Mr. Medvid should have been detained for several days until he had time to complete all necessary interviews and applications. But he wasn't.

No Soviet ship sails abroad without KGB agents on board. Now the KGB was free to interrogate and intimidate the young sailor. Free to threaten him with retaliation against family and friends. Free to do whatever they wished.

It was not until Mr. Medvid had been back on the ship for more than 12 hours that the State Department was informed of the matter. One would think that procedures in such a sensitive matter should call for prompt notification to higher-ups.

pre- . . . to ensure there would be no difficulty in communicating with Seaman Medvid." No difficulty for him to communicate in a language that Ukrainians resent? Maybe. Maybe not.

Yes, a team of U.S. officials and a U.S. doctor did communicate with Mr. Medvid aboard the Marshal Konev and later aboard a U.S. Coast Guard cutter. But, no, they never once spoke with Mr. Medvid without Soviet agents present. And never once in his own language.

"We insisted," the State Department boasts in its statement, "on a non-threatening environment in which to conduct the interview." Baloney! Wouldn't it have been more non-threatening if Mr. Medvid had been permitted to speak to U.S. officials without Soviet agents glaring at him and listening to his every word?

We are assured by the State Department that "Medvid appeared to be in generally good condition." Oh? Did the physical examinations given him include blood and urinalysis tests to detect the presence of drugs? Well, no. This despite the fact that we had intercepted a communication between the Soviet Embassy and the captain of the Marshal Konev in which the embassy instructed the captain to administer certain specified drugs to Mr. Medvid. Despite the fact Mr. Medvid once had to be taken to sick bay for nausea.

"Generally good condition?" But U.S. officials observed that Mr. Medvid's wrist had been slit. No mention of that in the official statement! That came out days later in a congressional hearing. Was Mr. Medvid asked if he had attempted suicide? Did

End
Case
File

382519
ME001

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1986

Dear Chuck:

Just a line to thank you for your letter and kind words. Also, to let you know I ran a TV tape last night and saw you in another stellar role: you were narrating a one hour expose of how television distorted the war in Vietnam. It was just great and is something all Americans should see -- but then we know TV will never help them see it.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,



Mr. Charlton Heston
2859 Coldwater Canyon Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90210

February 12, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

I do believe you're on a roll with the American people. Your press conference was superbly handled, as has been everything else you've done lately. Congratulations.

I thank you for your generous comments about my observations at the Variety Club's fund-raiser last month. Believe me, I'll give that speech any place, any time.

Love to Nancy.

As ever,



Dear Church

Just a line to thank you for your letter & kind words. Also to let you know I ran a TV tape last night & saw you in another stellar role: you were narrating a 1 hour expose of how television distorted the war in Vietnam. It was just great and is something all Americans should see - but then we know TV will never help them see it.

Thanks again. Sincerely, Ron

End
Case
File

~
To Ward L. Quaal - 401 No. Michigan Ave.
Suite 3040 Chi. Ill. 60611

Dear Ward

It must be E.S.P. Like you, with something
of the same religious upbringing, I've always
opposed the idea of gambling as a source of govt.
revenue. Lately however I've been having some
second or even third thoughts. Therefore I'm
very appreciative of the clipping you sent as well
as your Jefferson quote, it's one I hadn't heard
before.

Best Regards
Ron

(14)

382520
FI001-02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 18, 1986

Dear Ward:

It must be ESP. Like you, with something of the same religious upbringing, I've always opposed the idea of gambling as a source of government revenue. Lately, however, I've been having some second or even third thoughts. Therefore, I'm very appreciative of the clipping you sent as well as your Jefferson quote -- it's one I hadn't heard before.

Best regards,

Ron

Mr. Ward L. Quaal
Suite 3140
401 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

The Ward L. Duval Company

401 North Michigan Avenue

Suite 3140

Chicago, Illinois 60611

Ward L. Duval

President

Telephone

312/644-6066

February 13, 1986

(dict. 2/12/86

Phoenix office)

The President of the United States
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Re: A "National Lottery"

Dear Mr. President:

With the incredible demands upon your time and the volumes that you must read each and every day, I hesitate to call anything additional to your attention, except in my "role" as your national "clipping service specialist."

Mr. President, like you I grew up in a very religious family. Indeed, my parents were so strict they frowned upon the playing of cards, attendance at motion picture theatres and certainly, gambling, in any form, was out of the question.

Since those days of our boyhood, much has changed and with one state after another approving of lotteries in some form, and succeeding with them, I believe the subject needs review once again on a national basis.

True, there are those persons with both gambling "instincts" and often-times, they are the ones who can least afford it. However, they are going to spend money on gambling in one form or another whether on horse racing, Las Vegas, Atlantic City, or in some other area of activity. At least, participation in the national lottery would bring in revenue to help solve our deficit and permit us for many, many years to come to adhere to your sound principle of not incurring further tax burdens on the people of this lovely land.

Los Angeles, California 213/277-9399. 714/493-3316

The President of the United States
February 13, 1986
Page two


Regarding a national lottery, Mr. President, I like the comment quoted here involving President Thomas Jefferson who, it is said, remarked "the lottery is a wonderful thing; it lays the taxation only on the willing."

Mr. President, I think there is a way to establish a national lottery and to do so on such a "high plane" that those who would ordinarily find fault with the concept might respect the effort and realize that in the final analysis, such a program would be in the national interest.

Concurrently, we should never cease our efforts to bring to you implementation of the all-important and very essential "line item veto."

Warmest wishes to you and Nancy, Ron.

Respectfully yours,


Ward L. Quaal

WLQ:1b
Enclosure

End
case
File