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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: United Kingdom: Prime Minister Thatcher
(8690401-8690687)

Date: 9/4/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable (8690401)	#231728Z May 86, 11 p. <i>R 12/6/87 NLRLM07-053 #31993</i>	5/23/86	P1
2. Memo	Bob Linhard/Peter Sommer/Sven Kraemer to John Poindexter, 43: Interim Restraint: Presidential Message to Mrs. Thatcher, 1 p. <i>R 6/3/10 M07-053 #31994</i>	5/22/86	P1
3. Draft Cable	Reagan to Thatcher, 7 p. <i>R 12/6/87 NLRLM07-053 #31995</i>	n.d.	P1
4. Note (8690411)	Oliver Wright to John Poindexter, 1 p.	5/26/86	P1
5. Letter	Thatcher to Reagan, 2 p.	5/26/86	P1
6. Cable (8690471)	#231523Z Jun 86, 3 p. <i>R, 6/30/86 NL598-001 #248</i>	6/23/86	P1
7. Draft Message	Reagan to Thatcher, 3 p. <i>R 12/6/87 NLRLM07-053 #31998</i>	n.d.	P1
8. Cable	#201830Z Jun 86, 2 p.	6/20/86	P1
9. Draft Message (8690687)	Message to Allies, 1 p. <i>Part 12/6/87 NLRLM07-053 #3200</i>	n.d.	P1 B1, B2
10. Cable	#300137Z Sep 86, 2 p. <i>R " #3200</i>	9/30/86	P1
11. Cable	#300046Z Sep 86, 2 p. <i>Part " 3200</i>	9/30/86	P1 B2
12. Cable	#300044Z Sep 86, 2 p.	9/30/86	P1 B2

Part

RESTRICTION CODES

#3203

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: United Kingdom: Prime Minister Thatcher
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Date: 9/4/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. Cable (8690687)cont.	#300212Z Sep 86, 2 p <i>Part 12/6/07 NLRLM07-053 #32004</i>	9/30/86	<i>PT B2</i>
14. Cable	#300018Z Sep 86, 2 p. <i>R</i>	9/30/86	<i>PT</i>
15. Cable	#300155Z Sep 86, 2 p. <i>Part</i>	9/30/86	<i>PL B1, B2</i>
16. Cable	#300228Z Sep 86, 2 p. <i>Part</i>	9/30/86	<i>PL B1, B2</i>

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8690401

RECEIVED 22 MAY 86 19

TO POINDEXTER

FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 22 APR 86

SOMMER

22 APR 86

KRAEMER

22 APR 86

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

GREAT BRITAIN

THATCHER, MARGARET

COMPLIANCE

USSR

HS

SUBJECT: PRES MSG TO THATCHER RE INTERIM RESTRAINT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8690411

NSCIFID

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

dlb 9/4/96
F / B)

CTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

- 5/23 Poindexter approved msg

c 5/23 msg dispatched by Set Room

RL, SIC, AS

ISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

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SYSTEM II
90401

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT934

DTG: 231728Z MAY 86 PSN: 056933
TOR: 143/1607Z

DISTRIBUTION: COM: RLPB SIT BOHN MRCT /006

OP IMMED
DE WTE #3131 1431607
O 231728Z MAY 86
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

QSL 231831Z

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH03131

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET
THATCHER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 23, 1986

DEAR MARGARET,

AS YOU KNOW, THE NEXT U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINE, USS NEVADA,
WILL BEGIN SEA TRIALS ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 28. I WOULD LIKE TO
SHARE WITH YOU, IN ADVANCE OF INFORMING OUR OTHER COLLEAGUES TO
WHOM I PLAN TO WRITE THIS WEEKEND THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS, THE
DECISION THAT I HAVE MADE CONCERNING U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT
POLICY. THIS HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION.

IN COMING TO MY DECISION, I CAREFULLY REVIEWED YOUR APRIL
LETTER. I STRONGLY SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT DEMOCRATIC NATIONS MUST
STRICTLY OBSERVE TREATIES. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE UNITED
STATES HAS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO JUST THAT. HOWEVER, IN
REACHING MY INTERIM RESTRAINT DECISION, I HAVE STRUGGLED WITH ONE
BASIC, FUNDAMENTAL FACT. THE SALT II TREATY IS A FLAWED DOCUMENT
THAT WAS NEVER RATIFIED UNDER THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM07053 #31993

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BY CW NARADATE 12/6/07

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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. EVEN HAD IT BEEN, IT WOULD HAVE ALREADY EXPIRED. MOREOVER, THE SALT II TREATY HAS BEEN UNDERCUT BY THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT AND SUBSEQUENT FLIGHT-TESTING OF THE SS-25, AND BY OTHER SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ITS TERMS. THIS BEING THE CASE, THE SALT II TREATY SIMPLY DOES NOT REPRESENT A LEGALLY BINDING COMMITMENT ON THE UNITED STATES.

I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS GONE MORE THAN THE EXTRA MILE. DESPITE MY RESERVATIONS ABOUT SALT II, IN 1982, ON THE EVE OF THE START NEGOTIATIONS, I UNDERTOOK NOT TO UNDERCUT EXISTING AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING SALT II, PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISED EQUAL RESTRAINT. LAST JUNE, I DECIDED TO DISMANTLE A POSEIDON SUBMARINE TO PROVIDE, ONCE AGAIN, BOTH THE TIME AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN US IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT, ONE WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO FOCUS OUR EFFORTS ON PURSUING THE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS WE CONTINUE TO SEEK IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

REGRETTABLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT RESPONDED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO OUR INITIATIVES. IN FACT, THE SOVIET UNION HAS SELECTIVELY UNDERCUT THE VERY AGREEMENTS UPON WHICH OUR INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY WAS BASED. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I AM CONCERNED THAT, THROUGH A FURTHER EXTENSION OF OUR OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF SALT II, I WOULD, DE FACTO, INSTITUTIONALIZE WHAT AMOUNTS TO INDEFINITE UNILATERAL U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNRATIFIED SALT II TREATY. I CAN NO LONGER PRUDENTLY TAKE SUCH A RISK. TO DO SO WOULD ERODE THE NECESSARY CHECKS AND BALANCES INHERENT IN THE TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION. I HOPE, MARGARET, THAT YOU WILL APPRECIATE MY CONCERN ABOUT THE PRECEDENT THAT COULD BE SET BY SUCH ACTION.

IN THE ATTACHED STATEMENT, WHICH I INTEND TO RELEASE ON TUESDAY, MAY 27, YOU WILL SEE THAT I AM DIRECTING THE RETIREMENT AND DISMANTLEMENT OF TWO POSEIDON SUBMARINES. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE

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LACK OF A SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR CALLS TO JOIN US IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT, I HAVE DETERMINED THAT, IN THE FUTURE, THE UNITED STATES MUST BASE DECISIONS REGARDING ITS STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE ON THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, AND NOT ON STANDARDS CONTAINED IN A FLAWED TREATY WHICH WAS NEVER RATIFIED, WHICH WOULD HAVE EXPIRED IF IT HAD BEEN RATIFIED, AND, WHICH HAS, IN ADDITION, BEEN VIOLATED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

FURTHER, MY STATEMENT POINTS OUT THAT SINCE THE U.S. WILL RETIRE AND DISMANTLE TWO POSEIDON SUBMARINES THIS SUMMER, THE U.S. WILL REMAIN TECHNICALLY IN OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE SALT II TREATY UNTIL WE EQUIP OUR 131ST B-52 HEAVY BOMBER FOR CRUISE MISSILE CARRIAGE NEAR THE END OF THIS YEAR. I DO GO ON TO NOTE THAT, GIVEN THE DECISION THAT I HAVE BEEN FORCED TO MAKE, I INTEND AT THAT TIME TO CONTINUE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. B-52 HEAVY BOMBERS WITH CRUISE MISSILES BEYOND THE 131ST AIRCRAFT AS AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE WITHOUT DISMANTLING ADDITIONAL U.S. SYSTEMS AS COMPENSATION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SALT II TREATY.

SINCE WE WILL REMAIN IN TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE EXPIRED SALT II TREATY FOR SOME MONTHS, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE ADDITIONAL TIME TO CHANGE THE CONDITIONS WHICH NOW EXIST. I CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL USE THIS TIME CONSTRUCTIVELY. IN FACT, MY PUBLIC PRESENTATION MAKES IT CLEAR THAT SHOULD THE SOVIETS DO SO, WE WILL TAKE THIS INTO

ACCOUNT.

I AM VERY AWARE OF YOUR CONCERN ABOUT HOW SUCH A DECISION WILL BE RECEIVED BY THE EUROPEAN PUBLICS AND GOVERNMENTS. THUS, I HAVE EXPLICITLY STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. MY STATEMENT NOTES THAT THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO MEET ITS STRATEGIC NEEDS BY MEANS THAT MINIMIZE INCENTIVES FOR CONTINUING SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCE GROWTH. AS WE MODERNIZE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO RETIRE OLDER FORCES AS OUR

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NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PERMIT AND I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY APPRECIABLE NUMERICAL GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF U.S. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. IN FACT, I WILL EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT DEPLOY MORE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES OR MORE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS THAN DOES THE SOVIET UNION.

AS I HAVE OFTEN TOLD YOU, I HIGHLY VALUE YOUR EXCELLENT ADVICE AND I HAVE GIVEN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE WEIGHT TO THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT YOU HAVE RAISED. I HAVE TRIED TO BALANCE THESE IN A MANNER THAT WILL PERMIT US TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON ACHIEVING THE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS THAT WE BOTH SEEK. MARGARET, I KNOW YOU HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS, BUT I NEED YOUR SUPPORT AT THIS IMPORTANT JUNCTURE.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,
RON

BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

ON THE EVE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) IN 1982, I DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT UNDERCUT THE EXPIRED SALT I INTERIM OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT OR THE UNRATIFIED SALT II AGREEMENT AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISED EQUAL RESTRAINT. I TOOK THIS ACTION, DESPITE MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE FLAWS INHERENT IN THOSE AGREEMENTS, TO FOSTER AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT CONDUCTIVE TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS REDUCTIONS. I MADE CLEAR THAT OUR POLICY REQUIRED RECIPROCITY AND THAT IT MUST NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP.

LAST JUNE, I REVIEWED THE STATUS OF U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY. I FOUND THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD FULLY KEPT ITS PART OF THE BARGAIN. AS I HAVE DOCUMENTED IN THREE DETAILED REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS, THE SOVIET UNION, REGRETTABLY, HAS NOT. I NOTED THAT THE PATTERN OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR EXISTING ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS INCREASINGLY AFFECTED OUR NATIONAL

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SECURITY. THIS PATTERN ALSO RAISED FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS ITSELF. ONE SIMPLY CAN NOT BE SERIOUS ABOUT EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL UNLESS ONE IS EQUALLY SERIOUS ABOUT COMPLIANCE.

IN SPITE OF THE REGRETTABLE SOVIET RECORD, I CONCLUDED AT THAT TIME THAT IT REMAINED IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES TO TRY, ONCE MORE, TO ESTABLISH AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WE PURSUED, WITH RENEWED VIGOR, OUR OBJECTIVE OF DEEP REDUCTIONS IN EXISTING U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENALS THROUGH THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE, I UNDERTOOK TO GO THE EXTRA MILE, DISMANTLING A POSEIDON SUBMARINE, USS SAM RAYBURN, TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION ADDITIONAL TIME TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO JOIN US IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT. HOWEVER, I MADE IT CLEAR THAT, AS SUBSEQUENT U.S. DEPLOYMENT MILESTONES WERE REACHED, I WOULD ASSESS THE OVERALL SITUATION AND DETERMINE FUTURE U.S. ACTIONS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IN LIGHT OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN EXERCISING RESTRAINT COMPARABLE TO OUR OWN, CORRECTING THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE, REVERSING THEIR UNWARRANTED MILITARY BUILD-UP, AND SERIOUSLY PURSUING EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

LATER THIS MONTH, THE 8TH TRIDENT SUBMARINE, USS NEVADA, BEGINS SEA TRIALS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR ANNOUNCED POLICY, I HAVE ASSESSED OUR OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THAT MILESTONE. I HAVE CONSIDERED SOVIET BEHAVIOR SINCE MY JUNE 1985 DECISION, AND U.S. AND ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS IN LIGHT OF BOTH THAT BEHAVIOR AND OUR PROGRAMMATIC OPTIONS. THE SITUATION IS NOT ENCOURAGING.

WHILE WE HAVE SEEN SOME MODEST INDICATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT IN ONE OR TWO AREAS OF U.S. CONCERN, THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING U.S. CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE GENERAL PATTERN OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH MAJOR ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE AREAS OF MOST OBVIOUS AND DIRECT SOVIET

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NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT AND ABM AGREEMENTS. THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR REMAINS A CLEAR VIOLATION. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-25, A FORBIDDEN SECOND NEW ICBM TYPE, CONTINUES APACE. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO ENCRYPT TELEMETRY ASSOCIATED WITH ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTING IN A MANNER WHICH IMPEDES VERIFICATION. WE SEE NO ABATEMENT OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE BUILD-UP. FINALLY, SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT, WE HAVE YET TO SEE THE SOVIETS FOLLOW-UP CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THE COMMITMENT MADE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND MYSELF TO ACHIEVE EARLY PROGRESS, IN PARTICULAR IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS COMMON GROUND, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED, AS WELL AS THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF).

BASED ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR SINCE MY JUNE 1985 DECISION, I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT, AS YET, TAKEN THOSE ACTIONS THAT WOULD INDICATE ITS READINESS TO JOIN US IN AN

INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT. AT THE SAME TIME, I HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED THE PROGRAMMATIC OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. IN TERMS OF THEIR OVERALL NET IMPACT ON U.S. AND ALLIED SECURITY.

WHEN I ISSUED GUIDANCE ON U.S. POLICY ON JUNE 10, 1985, THE MILITARY PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986 WERE ABOUT TO BE IMPLEMENTED. THE AMOUNT OF FLEXIBILITY THAT ANY NATION HAS IN THE NEAR-TERM FOR ALTERING ITS PLANNING IS MODEST AT BEST. OUR MILITARY PLANNING WILL TAKE MORE TIME TO MOVE OUT FROM UNDER THE SHADOW OF PREVIOUS ASSUMPTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE BUDGETARY CONDITIONS WHICH WE NOW FACE. THESE BUDGETARY CONDITIONS MAKE IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAKE THE VERY BEST POSSIBLE USE OF OUR RESOURCES.

THE UNITED STATES HAD LONG PLANNED TO RETIRE AND DISMANTLE TWO OF THE OLDEST POSEIDON SUBMARINES WHEN THEIR REACTOR CORES WERE

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EXHAUSTED. HAD I BEEN PERSUADED THAT REFUELING AND RETAINING THESE TWO POSEIDON SUBMARINES WOULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY AND COST-EFFECTIVELY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY, I WOULD HAVE DIRECTED THAT THESE TWO POSEIDON SUBMARINES NOT BE DISMANTLED, BUT BE OVERHAULED AND RETAINED. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING CURRENT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REALITIES, I HAVE DIRECTED THEIR RETIREMENT AND DISMANTLEMENT AS PLANNED, RATHER THAN TO REFURBISH THEM.

AS PART OF THE SAME DECISION LAST JUNE, I ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT WE WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE RESPONSES WHEN NEEDED TO PROTECT OUR OWN SECURITY IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE. IT IS MY VIEW THAT CERTAIN STEPS ARE NOW REQUIRED BY CONTINUED SOVIET DISREGARD OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE MOST ESSENTIAL NEAR-TERM RESPONSE TO SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE REMAINS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR FULL STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, TO UNDERWRITE DETERRENCE TODAY, AND THE CONTINUED PURSUIT OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI) RESEARCH PROGRAM, TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A SAFER AND MORE STABLE BASIS FOR OUR FUTURE SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES. THE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND 50 PEACEKEEPER MISSILES, IS THE FOUNDATION FOR ALL FUTURE U.S. OFFENSIVE FORCE OPTIONS. IT PROVIDES A SOLID BASIS WHICH CAN AND WILL BE ADJUSTED OVER TIME TO RESPOND MOST EFFICIENTLY TO CONTINUED SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. THE SDI PROGRAM REPRESENTS OUR BEST HOPE FOR A FUTURE IN WHICH OUR SECURITY CAN REST ON THE INCREASING CONTRIBUTION OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT THREATEN NO ONE.

IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAINTAIN FULL SUPPORT FOR THESE PROGRAMS. TO FAIL TO DO SO WOULD BE THE WORST RESPONSE TO SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE. IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY AND SERIOUSLY UNDERCUT OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA BY REMOVING THE LEVERAGE THAT THEY MUST HAVE TO NEGOTIATE EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS IN BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES. IT WOULD SEND PRECISELY THE WRONG SIGNAL TO THE

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LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR RESOLVE CONCERNING THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE. AND, IT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE RISK TO OUR SECURITY FOR YEARS TO COME. THEREFORE, OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY MUST REMAIN THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS.

SECONDLY, THE DEVELOPMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION OF ITS MASSIVE ICBM FORCES CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE SERIOUSLY THE ESSENTIAL BALANCE WHICH HAS DETERRED BOTH CONFLICT AND COERCION. LAST JUNE, I CITED THE SOVIET UNION'S SS-25 MISSILE, A SECOND NEW TYPE OF ICBM PROHIBITED UNDER THE SALT II AGREEMENT, AS A CLEAR AND IRREVERSIBLE VIOLATION. WITH THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED SS-25 MOBILE ICBMS GROWING, I NOW CALL UPON THE CONGRESS TO RESTORE BI-PARTISAN SUPPORT FOR A BALANCED, COST EFFECTIVE, LONG-TERM PROGRAM TO RESTORE BOTH THE SURVIVABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. ICBM PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM SHOULD INCLUDE THE FULL DEPLOYMENT OF THE 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMS. BUT IT MUST ALSO LOOK BEYOND THE PEACEKEEPER AND TOWARD ADDITIONAL U.S. ICBM REQUIREMENTS IN THE FUTURE INCLUDING THE SMALL ICBM TO COMPLEMENT PEACEKEEPER. THEREFORE, I HAVE DIRECTED THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO PROVIDE TO ME BY NOVEMBER, 1986, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BEST OPTIONS FOR CARRYING OUT SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE ICBM PROGRAM. THIS ASSESSMENT WILL ADDRESS SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE SMALL ICBMS IN TERMS OF SIZE, NUMBER OF WARHEADS, AND PRODUCTION RATES.

FINALLY, I HAVE ALSO DIRECTED THAT THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM BE ACCELERATED. THIS WOULD NOT DIRECT ANY INCREASE IN THE TOTAL PROGRAM PROCUREMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT RATHER WOULD ESTABLISH A MORE EFFICIENT PROGRAM THAT BOTH SAVES MONEY AND ACCELERATES THE AVAILABILITY OF ADDITIONAL OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

THIS BRINGS US TO THE QUESTION OF THE SALT II TREATY. SALT II WAS A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND UNRATIFIED TREATY. EVEN IF RATIFIED, IT WOULD HAVE EXPIRED ON DECEMBER 31, 1985. WHEN

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PRESENTED TO THE U.S. SENATE IN 1979, IT WAS CONSIDERED BY A BROAD RANGE OF CRITICS, INCLUDING THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, TO BE UNEQUAL AND UNVERIFIABLE IN IMPORTANT PROVISIONS. IT WAS, THEREFORE, JUDGED BY MANY TO BE INIMICAL TO GENUINE ARMS CONTROL, TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, AND TO GLOBAL STABILITY. THE PROPOSED TREATY WAS CLEARLY HEADED FOR DEFEAT BEFORE MY PREDECESSOR ASKED THE SENATE NOT TO ACT ON IT.

THE MOST BASIC PROBLEM WITH SALT II WAS THAT IT CODIFIED MAJOR ARMS BUILDUPS RATHER THAN REDUCTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN THOUGH AT THE TIME THE TREATY WAS SIGNED IN 1979, THE U.S. HAD, AND ONLY PLANNED FOR, 550 MIRVED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THE SOVIET UNION POSSESSED ONLY ABOUT 600, SALT II PERMITTED EACH SIDE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SUCH LAUNCHERS TO 820. IT ALSO PERMITTED A BUILD-UP TO 1,200 MIRVED BALLISTIC LAUNCHERS (BOTH ICBMS AND SLBMS) EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. HAD ONLY ABOUT 1,050 AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD ONLY ABOUT 750 WHEN THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. IT PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO RETAIN ALL OF ITS HEAVY BALLISTIC MISSILES. FINALLY, IT LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, NOT THE MISSILES OR THE WARHEADS CARRIED BY THE BALLISTIC MISSILES. SINCE THE SIGNING OF SALT II, SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES HAVE GROWN TO WITHIN A FEW LAUNCHERS OF EACH OF THE 820 AND 1,200 MIRVED LIMITS, AND FROM ABOUT 7,000 TO OVER 9,000 WARHEADS TODAY. WHAT IS WORSE, GIVEN THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF SALT II IN CONSTRAINING BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES WILL CONTINUE TO GROW VERY SIGNIFICANTLY, EVEN UNDER THE TREATY'S LIMITS, IN THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF SOVIET RESTRAINT.

IN 1982, ON THE EVE OF THE START NEGOTIATIONS, I UNDERTOOK NOT TO UNDERCUT EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION DEMONSTRATED COMPARABLE RESTRAINT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT EXERCISE COMPARABLE RESTRAINT, AND UNCORRECTED SOVIET VIOLATIONS HAVE UNDERCUT THE SALT II TREATY.

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 10 OF 11 THE WHITE HOUSE 3131 DTG: 231728Z MAY 86 PSN: 056933

LAST JUNE, I ONCE AGAIN LAID OUT OUR LEGITIMATE CONCERNS BUT DECIDED TO GO THE EXTRA MILE, DISMANTLING A POSEIDON SUBMARINE, NOT TO COMPLY WITH OR ABIDE BY A FLAWED AND UNRATIFIED TREATY, BUT RATHER TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION ONE MORE CHANCE AND ADDITIONAL, ADEQUATE TIME TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO JOIN US IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT USED THE PAST YEAR FOR THIS PURPOSE. GIVEN THIS SITUATION, I HAVE DETERMINED THAT! IN THE FUTURE, THE UNITED STATES MUST BASE DECISIONS REGARDING @TS STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE ON THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, AND NOT ON STANDARDS CONTAINED IN A FLAWED TREATY WHICH WAS NEVER RATIFIED, WHICH WOULD HAVE EXPIRED IF IT HAD BEEN RATIFIED, AND, IN ADDITION, WHICH HAS BEEN VIOLATED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

SINCE THE UNITED STATES WILL RETIRE AND DISMANTLE TWO POSEIDON SUBMARINES THIS SUMMER, WE WILL REMAIN TECHNICALLY IN OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE SALT II TREATY UNTIL THE U.S. EQUIPS ITS 131ST B-52 HEAVY BOMBER FOR CRUISE MISSILE CARRIAGE NEAR THE END OF THIS YEAR. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE DECISION THAT I HAVE BEEN FORCED TO MAKE, AT THAT TIME I INTEND TO CONTINUE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. B-52 HEAVY BOMBERS WITH CRUISE MISSILES BEYOND THE 131ST AIRCRAFT AS AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE WITHOUT DISMANTLING ADDITIONAL U.S. SYSTEMS AS COMPENSATION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SALT II TREATY. OF COURSE, SINCE WE WILL REMAIN IN TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE EXPIRED SALT II TREATY FOR SOME MONTHS, I CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL USE THIS TIME TO TAKE THE CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS NECESSARY TO ALTER THE CURRENT SITUATION. SHOULD THEY DO SO, WE WILL CERTAINLY TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO MEET ITS STRATEGIC NEEDS, GIVEN THE PAST SOVIET BUILD-UP, BY MEANS THAT MINIMIZE INCENTIVES FOR CONTINUING SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCE GROWTH. IN THE LONGER TERM, THIS IS ONE OF THE MAJOR MOTIVES IN OUR PURSUIT OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. AS WE MODERNIZE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO RETIRE

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 11 OF 11 THE WHITE HOUSE 3131

DTG: 231728Z MAY 86 PSN: 056933

OLDER FORCES AS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PERMIT. I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY APPRECIABLE NUMERICAL GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF U.S. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT DEPLOY MORE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES THAN DOES THE SOVIET UNION. FURTHERMORE! THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT DEPLOY MORE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS THAN DOES THE SOVIET UNION.

IN SUM, WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT, WHILE PROTECTING OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE, IN ORDER TO HELP FOSTER THE NECESSARY ATMOSPHERE FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES. THIS IS THE URGENT TASK WHICH FACES US. I CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN US NOW IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

HOWEVER, NO POLICY OF INTERIM RESTRAINT IS A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN AGREEMENT ON DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, PROVIDING WE CAN BE CONFIDENT OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH IT. ACHIEVING SUCH REDUCTIONS HAS RECEIVED, AND CONTINUES TO RECEIVE, MY HIGHEST PRIORITY. I HOPE THE SOVIET UNION WILL ACT TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE AGREEMENT I REACHED WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN GENEVA TO ACHIEVE EARLY PROGRESS, IN PARTICULAR IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS COMMON GROUND, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED, AS WELL AS THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT. IF THE SOVIET UNION DOES SO, WE CAN TOGETHER IMMEDIATELY ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY AND A SAFER WORLD.

END TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

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**National Security Council
The White House**

86 MAY 23 11:06 AM

System # I

Package # 90401

DOCLOG RT A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>Dispatch</u>
Situation Room	<u>1</u>	<u>REB</u>	<u>Tab I</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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SYSTEM II
90401

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

May 22, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: BOB LINHARD/PETER SOMMER/SVEN KRAMER

SUBJECT: Interim Restraint: Presidential Message to
Mrs. Thatcher

Per your instructions, attached is the President's privacy channel message to Mrs. Thatcher on interim restraint. Since she will be first outside of a very small circle to know of the President's decision, you may wish to inform Secretary Shultz that the President is giving Mrs. Thatcher advance notification.

Recommendation

That you authorize dispatch of the Tab I Presidential message to Mrs. Thatcher, via the Cabinet office line. (The President's public statement is an attachment to his message.)

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I

Presidential Message to Mrs. Thatcher

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-053 #31994

BY KML NARA DATE 6/3/10

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Released:

John F. Kennedy

FROM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
VIA CABINET OFFICE LINE

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear Margaret,

As you know, the next U.S. Trident submarine, USS Nevada, will begin sea trials on Wednesday, May 28. I would like to share with you, in advance of informing our other colleagues to whom I plan to write this weekend through normal channels, the decision that I have made concerning U.S. interim restraint policy. This has not been an easy decision.

In coming to my decision, I carefully reviewed your April letter. I strongly share your view that democratic nations must strictly observe treaties. There is no question that the United States has, and will continue to do just that. However, in reaching my interim restraint decision, I have struggled with one basic, fundamental fact. The SALT II Treaty is a flawed document that was never ratified under the procedures set forth in the Constitution of the United States. Even had it been, it would have already expired. Moreover, the SALT II Treaty has been undercut by the Soviet Union through the development and subsequent flight-testing of the SS-25, and by other Soviet violations of its terms. This being the case, the SALT II Treaty simply does not represent a legally binding commitment on the United States.

I firmly believe that the United States has gone more than the extra mile. Despite my reservations about SALT II, in 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing agreements, including SALT II, provided the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Last June, I decided to dismantle a Poseidon submarine to provide, once again, both the time and the opportunity for the Soviet Union to join us in establishing an interim framework of mutual restraint, one which would allow us to focus our efforts on pursuing the significant reductions we continue to seek in strategic nuclear arsenals.

Regrettably, the Soviet Union has not responded constructively to our initiatives. In fact, the Soviet Union has selectively undercut the very agreements upon which our interim restraint policy was based. Under these circumstances, I am concerned that, through a further extension of our observance of the terms of SALT II, I would, de facto, institutionalize what amounts to indefinite unilateral U.S. compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty. I can no longer prudently take such a risk. To do so would erode the necessary checks and balances inherent in the Treaty ratification process established by the Constitution of the United States and by subsequent legislation. I hope, Margaret, that you will appreciate my concern about the precedent that could be set by such action.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR 007-053 ^N31995
BY CN NARA DATE 12/6/07

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In the attached statement, which I intend to release on Tuesday, May 27, you will see that I am directing the retirement and dismantlement of two Poseidon submarines. However, given the lack of a Soviet response to our calls to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in a flawed treaty which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and, which has, in addition, been violated by the Soviet Union.

Further, my statement points out that since the U.S. will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, the U.S. will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until we equip our 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. I do go on to note that, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty.

Since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, the Soviet Union will have additional time to change the conditions which now exist. I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time constructively. In fact, my public presentation makes it clear that should the Soviets do so, we will take this into account.

I am very aware of your concern about how such a decision will be received by the European publics and governments. Thus, I have explicitly stated that the United States will continue to exercise restraint. My statement notes that the United States seeks to meet its strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit and I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. In fact, I will emphasize that the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

As I have often told you, I highly value your excellent advice and I have given the fullest possible weight to the considerations that you have raised. I have tried to balance these in a manner that will permit us to concentrate our efforts on achieving the significant reductions in nuclear arsenals that we both seek. Margaret, I know you have some reservations, but I need your support at this important juncture.

With warmest regards,
Ron

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Begin text of Presidential Statement on Interim Restraint

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I interim offensive agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. One simply can not be serious about effective arms control unless one is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded at that time that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union additional time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both that behavior and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas of U.S. concern, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major arms control commitments,

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particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new ICBM type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force build-up. Finally, since the Geneva summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow-up constructively on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Based on Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement as planned, rather than to refurbish them.

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet non-compliance remains the implementation of our full strategic

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modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet non-compliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their non-compliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address specific alternative configurations for the Small ICBMs in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

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This brings us to the question of the SALT II Treaty. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and SLBMs) even though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the ineffectiveness of SALT II in constraining ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have undercut the SALT II Treaty. Last June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and additional, adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose. Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in a flawed treaty which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and, in addition, which has been violated by the Soviet Union.

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Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, at that time I intend to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the past Soviet build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. The United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting our strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

However, no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms, providing we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union does so, we can together immediately achieve greater stability and a safer world.

End text of Presidential Statement

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RECEIVED 27 MAY 86 19

TO . PRESIDENT

FROM THATCHER, MARGARET

DOCDATE 27 MAY 86

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

ARMS CONTROL

SALT

USSR

HS

SUBJECT: THATCHER REPLY TO PRES MSG OF 23 MAY RE INTERIM RESTRAINT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LINHARD

SOMMER

KRAEMER

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

dlb 9/4/96

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J / F)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH

FILE _____

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Rodney McDaniel			
Don Fortier			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>PT</u>	<u>R</u>
Situation Room			<u>SYS II</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

msg. rec'd 1230 Monday fr. British Embassy.

At Pearson's request, original is with Paul Thompson's AM book for possible inclusion with President's morning book.

Other distros included:

SMP
McDaniel
Pearson
Bohn
Sigler
Thompson
Sit.

Linhard rec'd his own copy.

KBeck

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM II
90411

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: _____

~~SECRET~~

86 MAY 27 P 7: 45

ACTION OFFICER: _____ DUE: _____

- | | |
|--|---|
| ☐ Prepare Memo For President | ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew |
| ☐ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier | ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott |
| ☐ Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

FYI

- ☐ ☐ Burghardt
- ☐ ☐ Cannistraro
- ☐ ☐ Childress
- ☐ ☐ Cobb
- ☐ ☐ Covey
- ☐ ☐ Danzansky
- ☐ ☐ deGraffenreid
- ☐ ☐ Djerejian
- ☐ ☐ Dobriansky
- ☐ ☐ Donley
- ☐ ☐ Douglass
- ☐ ☐ Grimes
- ☐ ☐ Hughes
- ☐ ☒ Kraemer
- ☐ ☐ Laux
- ☐ ☐ Lenczowski

FYI

- ☐ ☐ Levine
- ☐ ☒ Linhard
- ☐ ☐ Mahley
- ☐ ☐ Major
- ☐ ☐ Mandel
- ☐ ☐ Matlock
- ☐ ☐ May
- ☐ ☐ Menges
- ☐ ☐ Miller
- ☐ ☐ North
- ☐ ☐ Platt
- ☐ ☐ Pugliaresi
- ☐ ☐ Raymond
- ☐ ☐ Reger
- ☐ ☐ Ringdahl
- ☐ ☐ Sable

FYI

- ☐ ☐ Sachs
- ☐ ☐ Sestanovich
- ☐ ☐ Sigur
- ☐ ☐ Small
- ☐ ☒ Sommer
- ☐ ☐ Soos
- ☐ ☐ Stark
- ☐ ☐ Steiner
- ☐ ☐ Tahir-Kheli
- ☐ ☐ Teicher
- ☐ ☐ Thompson
- ☐ ☐ Tillman
- ☐ ☐ Wigg
- ☐ ☐ Wright
- ☐ ☐ _____
- ☐ ☐ _____

INFORMATION ☐ McDaniel
☐ Rodman

☐ Pearson
☐ Lehman

☐ Secretariat
☐ _____

☐ Poindexter (advance)

☐ Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 9/4/98

Return to Secretariat

8690411

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8690471

RECEIVED 23 JUN 86 13

TO POINDEXTER

FROM POWELL, CHARLES

DOCDATE 20 JUN 86

THATCHER, MARGARET

20 JUN 86

KEYWORDS: SOUTH AFRICA

GREAT BRITAIN

HS

SUBJECT: PM THATCHER MSG TO PRES RE SOUTH AFRICA & PRES RESPONSE MSG

ACTION: POINDEXTER APPROVED MSGS

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

7/4/98 dlb

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

CTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

ISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

86 JUN 23 10: 59

System # II
Package # 90471
DOCLOG BT A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>BT</u>	<u>R (SYS II)</u>
Situation Room	<u>3</u>	<u>(3)</u>	<u>J</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90471

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 WHITE HOUSE 3665
SIT512

DTG: 231523Z JUN 86 PSN: 041322
TOR: 174/1556Z

DISTRIBUTION: RS COMM SIT BOHN MERC /006

OP IMMED
DE WTE #3665 1741556
O 231523Z JUN 86
FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS EYES ONLY WH03665

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM ADMIRAL
JOHN POINDEXTER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

FOR CHARLES POWELL EYES ONLY

I AM FORWARDING THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER'S PERSONAL LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, DATED JUNE 20,
CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICA. INFORMATION ABOUT THIS LETTER HAS BEEN
HIGHLY RESTRICTED AND HAS REMAINED TOTALLY WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE.

TWO OF MY SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS, WALTER RAYMOND AND PHIL RINGDAHL,
WILL BE TRAVELING TO THE U.K. AND WILL BE IN LONDON JUNE 24-26. THEY
HAVE BEEN INVITED BY IAN MACGREGOR TO COME FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE
OF MEETING WITH SEVERAL KEY SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESSMEN, INCLUDING
GAVIN RELLY AND ANTON RUPPERT. THE PURPOSE WILL BE TO EXPLORE
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS IN SOUTH AFRICA WHICH THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
JUDGES MAY HELP GENERATE CHANGE BOTH IN TERMS OF EFFECTIVE PRESSURE
AND DIALOGUE. THIS MEETING HAS ONLY A U.S. - SOUTH AFRICA DIMENSION
AT THIS STAGE, BUT WE REALIZE THAT IF USEFUL IDEAS ARE PUT FORWARD
COORDINATION WITH U.K. AND OTHER BUSINESS SECTORS WILL BE IMPORTANT
AND NECESSARY.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS S98-001 # 248

BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/30/00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 WHITE HOUSE 3665

DTG: 231523Z JUN 86 PSN: 041322

IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IF YOU WOULD WISH TO EXPAND FURTHER ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER YOU MAY WANT TO AVAIL YOURSELF OF THE PRESENCE OF MY OFFICERS TO EXPLORE CERTAIN AVENUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THESE OFFICERS ARE AWARE OF THE DIALOGUE AND HAVE MY FULL CONFIDENCE.

MESSAGES BEGINS:

DEAR MARGARET,

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE OF JUNE 20, AND TO BE INFORMED OF YOUR VIEWS REGARDING SOUTH AFRICA. I TOO SEE THE BENEFITS FROM THE EMINENT PERSONS APPROACH, AND AGREE, AS YOU SUGGEST, THAT WE MUST CONTINUE THE SEARCH TO BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER IN NEGOTIATION. I REALIZE THIS IS A MOST DIFFICULT STEP WHICH WILL REQUIRE OUR BEST EFFORTS AND IMAGINATION IF WE ARE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK.

YOU ASKED THAT I SPEAK FRANKLY AND I SHALL DO SO. I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACT QUICKLY BECAUSE THE TIME AVAILABLE TO US MAY BE LIMITED, BOTH IN OUR ABILITY TO PUT ASIDE OUR RESPECTIVE PRESSURES FOR PUNITIVE, DESTRUCTIVE SANCTIONS, AND IN TURNING AROUND THE DETERIORATING SITUATION INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA. AS YOU, I REMAIN OPPOSED TO PUNITIVE SANCTIONS WHICH WILL ONLY POLARIZE THE SITUATION THERE AND DO THE MOST HARM TO BLACKS. CONTRARY TO SOME NEWS REPORTS, I AM NOT CONSIDERING ANY LIMITED MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. YOU NOTED YOU MAY BE FORCED TO ACCEPT SOME MODEST STEPS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH CONTEXTS TO SIGNAL YOUR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID, AND IN ALL FRANKNESS, WE MAY BE FACED WITH THE SAME SITUATION IF THE CONGRESS, AS EXPECTED, PASSES SOME SANCTIONS BILL LATER THIS SUMMER OR FALL. ALSO, THE EXECUTIVE ORDER I SIGNED LAST YEAR CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE EXPIRING IN SEPTEMBER 1986, AND I SHALL BE MAKING A DECISION ON CANCELLATION OR EXTENSION OF THOSE VARIOUS E.O. MEASURES. AS OUR SITUATION DEVELOPS, I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF WHAT WE ARE PLANNING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 WHITE HOUSE 3665

DTG: 231523Z JUN 86 PSN: 041322

I ACCEPT YOUR SUGGESTION OF STAYING CLOSELY TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE, AND OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING THE LINE TOGETHER. EACH OF US ACTING UNILATERALLY WILL ONLY DILUTE OUR INFLUENCE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS. IN THIS VEIN, I WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS ON WHAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER COLLECTIVELY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WHO PRETORIA RESPECTS AND WHO HAVE THE GREATER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT -- THE U.K., U.S., THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND POSSIBLY FRANCE. THESE COUNTRIES HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF BRINGING PRETORIA INTO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE ADOPT A COORDINATED STRATEGY INVOLVING OUR GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS SECTORS. I UNDERSTAND CHANCELLOR KOHL ONLY RECENTLY SPOKE IN FAVOR OF A SIMILAR APPROACH INVOLVING THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE BOTHA GOVERNMENT TRULY UNDERSTAND OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL, AND THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD RESULT FROM THAT GOVERNMENT'S TEMPTATION TO DROP A CURTAIN AROUND ITSELF.

I AGREE WITH YOUR POINT THAT THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE THINGS THAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN YOUR EUROPEAN MEETING THIS WEEK ARE POSITIVE MEASURES TO HELP SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS. I WOULD HOPE MEASURES AIMED AT UNDERMINING SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMY COULD BE AVOIDED. BECAUSE OF THE ALREADY FIXED VIEW OF SOME OF YOUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN FAVOR OF STRONGLY PUNITIVE STEPS, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE COULD MOVE IN THE POSITIVE WAY WE SEEK. I AM CONVINCED HARSH ACTIONS WOULD ONLY TEND TO INCREASE PRETORIA'S INCLINATION TO RETREAT FURTHER.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CARRYING ANY AGREED UPON IDEAS FORWARD.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

/S/ RON

BT

0827

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90471

FM. WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE

Released:

John Poindexter

FOR
~~TO~~ CHARLES POWELL EYES ONLY

~~MESSAGE~~ FROM JOHN POINDEXTER

I AM FORWARDING THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S PERSONAL LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, DATED JUNE 20, CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICA. INFORMATION ABOUT THIS LETTER HAS BEEN HIGHLY RESTRICTED AND HAS REMAINED TOTALLY WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE.

TWO OF MY SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS, WALTER RAYMOND AND PHIL RINGDAHL, WILL BE TRAVELING TO THE U.K. AND WILL BE IN LONDON JUNE 24-26. THEY HAVE BEEN INVITED BY IAN MACGREGOR TO COME FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF MEETING WITH SEVERAL KEY SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESSMEN, INCLUDING GAVIN RELLY AND ANTON RUPPERT. THE PURPOSE WILL BE TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS IN SOUTH AFRICA WHICH THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY JUDGES MAY HELP GENERATE CHANGE BOTH IN TERMS OF EFFECTIVE PRESSURE AND DIALOGUE. THIS MEETING HAS ONLY A U.S. - SOUTH AFRICA DIMENSION AT THIS STAGE, BUT WE REALIZE THAT IF USEFUL IDEAS ARE PUT FORWARD COORDINATION WITH U.K. AND OTHER BUSINESS SECTORS WILL BE IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY.

IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IF YOU WOULD WISH TO EXPAND FURTHER ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER YOU MAY WANT TO AVAIL YOURSELF OF THE PRESENCE OF MY OFFICERS TO EXPLORE CERTAIN AVENUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THESE OFFICERS ARE AWARE OF THE DIALOGUE AND HAVE MY FULL CONFIDENCE.

DECLASSIFIED

~~JOHN POINDEXTER~~

NLRR 107-053 #31998

BY GL NARA DATE 12/6/07

MESSAGE BEGINS.

DEAR MARGARET ,

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE OF JUNE 20, AND TO BE INFORMED OF YOUR VIEWS REGARDING SOUTH AFRICA. I TOO SEE THE BENEFITS FROM THE EMINENT PERSONS APPROACH, AND AGREE, AS YOU SUGGEST, THAT WE MUST CONTINUE THE SEARCH TO BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER IN NEGOTIATION. I REALIZE THIS IS A MOST DIFFICULT STEP WHICH WILL REQUIRE OUR BEST EFFORTS AND IMAGINATION IF WE ARE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK.

YOU ASKED THAT I SPEAK FRANKLY AND I SHALL DO SO. I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACT QUICKLY BECAUSE THE TIME AVAILABLE TO US MAY BE LIMITED, BOTH IN OUR ABILITY TO PUT ASIDE OUR RESPECTIVE PRESSURES FOR PUNITIVE, DESTRUCTIVE SANCTIONS, AND IN TURNING AROUND THE DETERIORATING SITUATION INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA. AS YOU, I REMAIN OPPOSED TO PUNITIVE SANCTIONS WHICH WILL ONLY POLARIZE THE SITUATION THERE AND DO THE MOST HARM TO BLACKS. CONTRARY TO SOME NEWS REPORTS, I AM NOT CONSIDERING ANY LIMITED MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. YOU NOTED YOU MAY BE FORCED TO ACCEPT SOME MODEST STEPS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH CONTEXTS TO SIGNAL YOUR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID, AND IN ALL FRANKNESS, WE MAY BE FACED WITH THE SAME SITUATION IF THE CONGRESS, AS EXPECTED, PASSES SOME SANCTIONS BILL LATER THIS SUMMER OR FALL. ALSO, THE EXECUTIVE ORDER I SIGNED LAST YEAR CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE EXPIRING IN SEPTEMBER 1986, AND I SHALL BE MAKING A DECISION ON CANCELLATION OR EXTENSION OF THOSE VARIOUS E.O. MEASURES. AS OUR SITUATION DEVELOPS, I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF WHAT WE ARE PLANNING.

I ACCEPT YOUR SUGGESTION OF STAYING CLOSELY TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE, AND

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING THE LINE TOGETHER. EACH OF US ACTING UNILATERALLY WILL ONLY DILUTE OUR INFLUENCE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS. IN THIS VEIN, I WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS ON WHAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER COLLECTIVELY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WHO PRETORIA RESPECTS AND WHO HAVE THE GREATER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT -- THE U.K., U.S., THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND POSSIBLY FRANCE. THESE COUNTRIES HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF BRINGING PRETORIA INTO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE ADOPT A COORDINATED STRATEGY INVOLVING OUR GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS SECTORS. I UNDERSTAND CHANCELLOR KOHL ONLY RECENTLY SPOKE IN FAVOR OF A SIMILAR APPROACH INVOLVING THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE BOTH A GOVERNMENT TRULY UNDERSTAND OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL, AND THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD RESULT FROM THAT GOVERNMENT'S TEMPTATION TO DROP A CURTAIN AROUND ITSELF.

I AGREE WITH YOUR POINT THAT THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE THINGS THAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN YOUR EUROPEAN MEETING THIS WEEK ARE POSITIVE MEASURES TO HELP SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS. I WOULD HOPE MEASURES AIMED AT UNDERMINING SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMY COULD BE AVOIDED. BECAUSE OF THE ALREADY FIXED VIEW OF SOME OF YOUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN FAVOR OF STRONGLY PUNITIVE STEPS, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE COULD MOVE IN THE POSITIVE WAY WE SEEK. I AM CONVINCED HARSH ACTIONS WOULD ONLY TEND TO INCREASE PRETORIA'S INCLINATION TO RETREAT FURTHER.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CARRYING ANY AGREED UPON IDEAS FORWARD.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

15/ Ron

A handwritten signature, possibly "M", in dark ink.

8690471

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RECEIVED 01 OCT 86 20

TO ALLIES

FROM PRESIDENT

DOCDATE 30 SEP 86

KEYWORDS: SUMMIT

NATO

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

ICELAND

USSR

HS

SUBJECT: PRIVACY CHANNEL MSGS TO ALLIED LEADERS RE MTG W/ GORBACHEV / REYKJAVIK
11 - 12 OCT

ACTION: MSGS SENT BY SITUATION ROOM DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

a/4/14 d/b

REF# LOG NSCIFID (J / J)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

86 SEP 31 P 6: 46

System #

II

Package #

90687

DOCLOG

A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Rodney McDaniel			
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>R</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

*Log System II for
record purposes?*

Yes ✓

No _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/30

Imp -

Do you want to
hold on to any
of these for a
while?

7.

No.
f

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE TO ALLIES

Dear (see below):

I want to let you know without delay that General Secretary Gorbachev and I have agreed to meet in Reykjavik October 11 and 12 to review in a private and informal session the agenda for his trip to the United States.

Mr. Gorbachev proposed this meeting not to take the place of his visit to the United States, but to make concrete preparations for the meetings here. I felt that it was important for me to agree to the meeting, in order to stress my commitment to real progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. I also consider it symbolically important that Mr. Gorbachev suggested holding the meeting on the soil of a member of the NATO alliance.

The meeting will be announced around ¹⁰⁰⁰midday Washington time on September 30, and I would appreciate your holding this information in the strictest confidence until the announcement is made.

As I prepare for this meeting, I shall be seeking your counsel on the substantive issues which may arise.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ron

Salutations:

Margaret (Prime Minister Thatcher, London)
Helmut (Chancellor Kohl, Bonn)
Francois (President Mitterand, Paris) - CHIRAC
Bettino (Prime Minister Craxi, Rome)
Brian (Prime Minister Mulroney, Ottawa)
Yasu (Prime Minister Nakasone, Tokyo)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M07-053 #3200

RY

Al

12/6/07

1.4 (c)

B2

*On Paris send one to
Chirac to Amb Rogers
for delivery to PM Chirac
[redacted] and
note duplicate went to
Mitterand.*

J

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOIN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2655
SIT321

DTG: 300137Z SEP 86 PSN: 07534
TOR: 273/0130Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

FLASH

DE WTE #2655 2730130
Z 300137Z SEP 86
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY JAPAN

~~SECRET~~ VIA BATMAN CHANNELS SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH02655

DEAR YASU:

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND 12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDA FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL PROGRESS IN U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-053 #3201

BY CAS NARA DATE 12/6/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2655 DTG: 300137Z SEP 86 PSN: 075340

COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

0222

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOIN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2653
SIT319

DTG: 300046Z SEP 86 PSN: 07523
TOR: 273/0033Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

FLASH

DE WTE #2653 2730033

Z 300046Z SEP 86

FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY BONN

B2

~~SECRET~~ VIA



SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH02653

DEAR HELMUT:

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND 12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDA FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THAT NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOU HOLDING THIS INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR 107-153 #32002

BY CE NARA DATE 12/6/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2653 DTG: 300046Z SEP 86 PSN: 075231

COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

0224

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2652
SIT305

DTG: 300044Z SEP 86 PSN: 07522
TOR: 273/0035Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

FLASH

DE WTE #2652 2730035
Z 300044Z SEP 86
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~SECRET~~ VIA [REDACTED] EYES ONLY SENSITIVE WH02652 *BZ*

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND 12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDA FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M07-053 #32008

BY CN NARA DATE 12/6/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2652 DTG: 300044Z SEP 86 PSN: 075220

COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

0218

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0001
SIT325

DTG: 300212Z SEP 86 PSN: 07547
TOR: 273/0247Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

FLASH

DE WTE #0001 2730212
Z 300212Z SEP 86
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO PALAZZO CHIGI

~~SECRET~~ VIA [REDACTED]

SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

B2

DEAR BETTINO:

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND 12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDA FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL PROGRESS IN U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M07-053 #37004

BY CW NARA DATE 12/6/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0001 DTG: 300212Z SEP 86 PSN: 07547

COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2651
SIT296

DTG: 300018Z SEP 86 PSN: 075167
TOR: 273/0007Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

FLASH

DE WTE #2651 2730007

Z 300018Z SEP 86

FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH02651

DEAR MARGARET

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND 12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDA FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1067-053 #132005

~~SECRET~~

BY CU NARA DATE 12/6/07

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2651 DTG: 300018Z SEP 86 PSN: 075167

COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

0222

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOIN

1.4 (c)

B2

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2670
SIT362

DTG: 300155Z SEP 86 PSN: 07596
TOR: 273/0822Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

FLASH

[REDACTED] #2670 2730822
Z 300155Z SEP 86 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY SENSITIVE WH02670

PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR THOMAS NILES FOR DELIVERY
TO PRIME MINISTER BRIAN MULRONEY

DEAR BRIAN:

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND
12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDS FOR HIS
TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF
HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS
FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO
AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL
PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT
SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE
MEETING IN THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME
ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR 107-053 #32006
BY CU NARA DATE 12/6/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2670 DTG: 300155Z SEP 86 PSN: 075965

INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL ANNOUNCEMENT IS
MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR
COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

246

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

1.4 (cc)

B2

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2657
SIT323

DTG: 300228Z SEP 86 PSN: 075415
TOR: 273/0210Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

FLASH

[REDACTED] 2657 2730210
Z 300228Z SEP 86 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH02657

PLEASE DELIVER EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR JOE M. ROGERS, FOR
DELIVERY TO PRIME MINISTER JACQUES CHIRAC. FOR YOUR INFORMATION
A SIMILAR NOTE WAS SENT TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERAND.

DEAR JACQUES:

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND
12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDA FOR HIS
TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF
HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS
FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO
AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL
PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT
SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE
MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME
ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

~~SECRET~~

NLRR 1007-053 #32007
BY CU NARA DATE 12/6/07

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2657

DTG: 300228Z SEP 86 PSN: 075411

INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

264

~~SECRET~~