

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File
Records

Folder Title: Korean Airlines Shootdown
(08/31/1983-November 1983) (9 of 22)

Box: 43

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Last Updated: 02/11/2025

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:

Archivist: kdb/kdb

Subject File

FOIA ID: F1998-069/1, Mayer

Box/OA#: Box 44

8/31/83 - 11/83

(9/22)

File Folder: Korean Airline Shootdown Vol. III 8/31/83 (1)

Date: 12/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. letter (6569)	Elliott Abrams to William Clark, re George Will column, 2p	9/21/83	P1, F1, P5
2. memo (6903)	Jack Matlock to Clark, re Andropov answer, 1p	9/29/83	P1, F1, P5
3. memo (6903) (8329817)	Charles Hill to Clark, re same topic as item 2, 2p L 5/10/06 NLSF98-069/1 #212	9/28/83	P1, F1
4. memo (6910)	Clark to Edwin Meese, re meeting with Sosuke Uno, 1p R " " " #213	n.d.	P1, F1
5. talking pts	re same topic as item 4, 1p R " " " #214	n.d.	P1, F1
6. memo (6919) (8329212)	Hill to Clark, re KAL claims, 1p R " " " #215	9/29/83	P1, F1
7. memo	Robert Kimmitt to Hill, re KAL claims, 1p R " " " #216	9/22/83	P1, F1
8. memo (6716)	John Lenczowski, Donald Fortier, et al. to Clark, re receipt of KAL debris (w/notations), 2p	9/22/83	P1, F1, P5
9. talking pts	suggested to Clark's call to Sec. Shultz, 1p	n.d.	P1, F1, P5
10. memo (6738) (8329386)	Hill to Clark, re same topic as item 8, 2p PART 5/10/06 NLSF98-069/1 #217	9/24/83	P1, F1
11. memo	original of item 10 (w/notations), 2p PART " " " #218	9/24/83	P1, F1
12. memo	Hill to Clark, re same topic as item 8 (w/notations), 3p	9/24/83	P1, F1, P5
13. memo (6857)	Clark to RR, re State Dept. memo on KAL tragedy (w/notations), 1p R 5/10/06 NLSF98-069/1 #219	10/11/83	P1, F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 SEP 23 P 6: 54

System # I

Package# 6569

addon

CT

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary 1 K

John Poindexter _____

Bud McFarlane _____

Jacque Hill _____

Judge Clark _____

John Poindexter _____

Executive Secretary _____

NSC Secretariat 3 N/OBE

Situation Room _____ RMK

Forther 2 ✓ A

I-Information

A-Action

R-Retain

D-Dispatch

N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Don:

Need reply, Clark -> Abrams,
or at least talking points for a call.

Also, let Paula see his Hungary
comments -- still let State cleared
the speech. Also, cc to Sykes/Childress.
Bels

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:
Subject File

Archivist: kdb/kdb
FOIA ID: F1998-069/1, Mayer

Box/OA#: Box 44

8/31/83 - 11/83

File Folder: Korean Airline Shootdown Vol. III 8/31/83 - (4)

Date: 12/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14. memo	Shultz to RR, re KAL: Managing the Next Phase, 4p	9/27/83	P1, F1, P5
15. memo	Donald Fortier to Clark, re KAL (w/notations), 4p R 11/16/10 F98-069/1 #220	9/28/83	P1, F1
16. draft memo	p 2 of item 15, w/edits, 1p R 11/16/10 F98-069/1 #221	n.d.	P1, F1
17. draft memo	p 4 of item 15, w/edits, 1p R 11/16/10 F98-069/1 #222	n.d.	P1, F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].

P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RECEIVED 19 SEP 83 13

LILAC

FROM KIMMITT

DOCDATE 19 SEP 83

~~SUSPENDED~~

KEYWORDS KAL FLIGHT 007

MEDIA

WILL, GEORGE

USSR

KOREA

AVIATION

SUBJECT REQUESTS ANALYSIS OF KAL FACTS IN RELATION TO WILL COLUMN

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 19 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~LILAC~~ →

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

LEHMAN, R

DE GRAFFENREID

RAYMOND

LEHMAN, C

LEVINE

SIMS

COMMENTS ** DUE COB 9/19

REF#

LOG 8306164

8306202

NSCIFID

(MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
--------------------	----------	-----------------	-----	-----------

Clark

X

9/20

For Decision

-

9/23

Reed Abrams LTR

LILAC

9/23

Prepare memo Clark

C

10/21

ORSE per Kimmitt

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)MR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 23, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT H. LILAC *RL*

SUBJECT: KAL Shootdown - George Will Article

Attached (Tab A) is a letter to you from Elliott Abrams concerning the George Will article.

cc: John Lenczowski
Kenneth E. de Graffenreid
Roger W. Robinson
Walter Raymond, Jr.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System #

Package #

I

6569

83 SEP 19 P 1: 06

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter	3	<i>[initials]</i>	
Bud McFarlane		<i>[check]</i>	
Jacque Hill	4	<i>[check]</i>	
Judge Clark	5	<i>[check]</i>	A
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	2	<i>[check]</i>	Staff
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

Lilac Action
Kenezauschi
Robinson
deGuffeneid
Raymond
Rhehman
Chelman

for 0930 9/20

9.19.83

Bob Lilac:

Judge needs by COB

today for the President an
analysis of the facts and
commentary in the attached
George Will column. Coordinate
with other involved staff members.

Bob Kinnitt

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6569

ACTION

September 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT H. LILAC *RHL*

SUBJECT: KAL Shootdown - George Will article

The NSC staff convened this afternoon to do an analysis of the facts and commentary of George Will's article in the Sunday, September 18 Washington Post (Tab A). A proposed memo to the President is at Tab I, with an analysis at Tab B. The list of recommendations by Senator Armstrong referred to in the article were introduced by Senator Helms last week as the Senate debated its condemnation resolution. The recommendations and Administration response to them were in the Congressional Record (Tab C).

We do not recommend that the President call George Will. You may wish to consider, however, having Bob Sims set up a background meeting between George Will and NSC staff members (such as Roger Robinson, John Lenczowski) to discuss the many steps that we are taking in response to the incident.

JL
RHL for RWR
copy to
copy to
John Lenczowski, Roger Robinson, Walt Raymond, Ron Lehman, Ken de Graffenreid, and Chris Lehman concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the memo at Tab I to the President.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Clark/President

Tab A George Will article, Washington Post,
September 18

Tab B Analysis of Will article

Tab C Recommendations proposed by Senator Armstrong

ACTION

September 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT H. LILAC ^{RHL}

SUBJECT: KAL Shootdown - George Will article

The NSC staff convened this afternoon to do an analysis of the facts and commentary of George Will's article in the Sunday, September 18 Washington Post (Tab A). A proposed memo to the President is at Tab I, with an analysis at Tab B. The list of recommendations by Senator Armstrong referred to in the article were introduced by Senator Helms last week as the Senate debated its condemnation resolution. The recommendations and Administration response to them were in the Congressional Record (Tab C).

We do not recommend that the President call George Will. You may wish to consider, however, having Bob Sims set up a background meeting between George Will and NSC staff members (such as Roger Robinson, John Lenczowski) to discuss the many steps that we are taking in response to the incident.

^{JL} John Lenczowski, ^{RHL} Roger Robinson, ^{RWR} Walt Raymond, ^{copy to} Ron Lehman, ^{copy to} Keh de Graffenreid, and ^{copy to} Chris Lehman concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the memo at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Clark/President
Tab A	George Will article, <u>Washington Post</u> , September 18
Tab B	Analysis of Will article
Tab C	Recommendations proposed by Senator Armstrong

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: KAL Shootdown - George Will Article

Issue

What are the facts behind George Will's article in the Sunday, September 18, Washington Post?

Facts

George Will wrote an article in Sunday's Post (Tab A) which asserts that Administration actions toward the USSR to date have not been strong enough, and that you have failed to use the Korean Airlines massacre as an opportunity to gain public support for those measures which should be taken. An analysis of the article addressing each of George's points is at Tab B. The initial U.S. response to date has been appropriate--in concert with the civilized nations of the world. The underlying principle of our response has been not to turn this incident into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation--it is the USSR versus the world. Will's article, however, ignores that since our response is a "measured" one, it is an ongoing process that is not yet over and that there are other actions we may take. The list of recommendations which George refers to were made by Senator Armstrong. His list was presented to the Senate by Senator Helms during the floor debate on the condemnation resolution, and the recommendations were defeated (Tab C).

Discussion

George's points on arms control violations, forced labor and the ineffectiveness of the U.N. in dealing with matters of this magnitude are essentially correct. His points on declaring Poland in default and the absence of other economic measures are not correct, as you have been responsible for forging the first unified allied approach to the security aspects of East-West trade in the history of the alliance. But George Will makes an important point: the airline atrocity is not the reason for taking strong measures against the Soviet Union--it should make clear why strong measures are reasonable and overdue.

Recommendation

OK NO

____ ____ That you review the analysis at Tab B.

Attachments

Tab A George Will article, Washington Post, September 18
Tab B Analysis of Will article
Tab C Recommendations proposed by Senator Armstrong

Prepared by:
Robert H. Lilac



The public mind, like wax, is easiest to shape when heated. President Reagan has not just missed an opportunity to shape it; he has labored to minimize the opportunity.

The Korean airliner atrocity raised the public's temperature to a healthy degree. But Reagan has squandered the moment, using it to solve what he evidently thinks is one of his political problems—a perception that he is not as peace-loving as the editors of *The New York Times*. In the process he has dissipated a national asset: the Kremlin's anxiety that he just might mean what he says.

It would be one thing—unconvincing and unbecoming but at least intelligible—for him to cite reasons why he should not do any of the many things he could do to strengthen U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. It is something else for him to deny the existence of options other than rhetoric or war.

Sen. William Armstrong (R-Colo.) and others have made him a list. It includes declaring Poland in default on debts owed to the Commodity Credit Corporation.

Last summer, saying there must be "deeds not just words" in Poland, Reagan said: "The Soviets should not be afforded the additional security of a new long-term [grain] agreement as long as repression continues in Poland." Evidently he thinks repression no longer continues in Poland—perhaps because the regime, using words to disguise deeds, took features of martial law and put them in the normal law. Anyway, Reagan also said the Soviet Union would not be guaranteed minimum grain sales if it engaged in "heinous" acts.

Reagan obviously did not mean what he said. He has made a serious case against the usefulness of grain embargoes. But why are we subsidizing Poland?

Armstrong and others want Reagan to report on Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. Reagan has talked not at all to the American people and only flaccidly to the Soviet Union about violations.

The *Wall Street Journal* predicts that when Pershing missiles are deployed in Europe, Moscow will deploy antiballistic missiles (some necessary radars are already deployed, in violation of SALT I) and will say it is not violating the ABM ban because these ABMs are for use against theater, not strategic, weapons. The *Journal* asks: "What will we do then?" Well, what are we doing about violations of other agreements? Consider.

The Soviet Union has in excess of 4 million persons (un-counted thousands of Vietnamese) in 2,000 forced labor camps. In at least 40 extermination camps, the work inevitably causes leukemia or other fatal effects as a result of such things as exposure to radioactivity in uranium mining, or cleaning ex-

haust tubes of nuclear submarines, or polishing glass without ventilation.

According to Mikhail Makarenko, who spent eight years in Soviet camps, the diet for "heavy labor" prisoners is 2,000 calories a day. For "strict regime" prisoners, 1,300. In Auschwitz it was 2,050.

The Soviet Union has subscribed to and is violating the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Anti-Slavery Convention of 1926 and the Forced Labor Convention of 1930. Furthermore, U.S. law forbids the importing of goods "manufactured wholly or in part by convict labor or/and forced labor." The law has never been enforced. The Customs Service has no enforcement mechanism. Armstrong has a list of the goods that would be barred. Reagan should read it. Armstrong has a corrective bill. Reagan should demand it.

Here is an option Armstrong has overlooked: revising U.S. relations with the United Nations.

After wasting her valuable energies wheedling and cajoling, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. representative to the U.N., rounded up just enough votes to get the Security Council to "deplore" (it refusing to condemn) the airline massacre. There are 157 "nations" (counting, of course, Ukraine and Byelorussia) in the United Nations. We pay approximately one-quarter of the U.N.'s bills. If we paid one-eighth, we would pay more than the Soviet Union, which, unlike the United States, benefits from the U.N.'s existence. We should radically reduce our payments. The savings should be invested in substantially more—and more technologically sophisticated—broadcasting into the "evil empire" (a.k.a. "world's most lucrative grain market").

The airline atrocity is not the reason for such measures. Rather, it is an occasion that, properly handled by a leader, would make clear why such measures are reasonable, and overdue. If Reagan continues to say that he has done all that he can do, short of going to war, he will vindicate those who say that American conservatives care more about containing the Occupational Safety and Health Administration than containing the Soviet Union.

TOPIC A

The Fighting in Lebanon

Abdallah Bouhabib

Josef Rom

Caspar W. Weinberger

CLOSE TO HOME

Cars, Booze—and Teen-agers

Bill Goddard



B

Analysis of George Will Article -
Washington Post, Sunday, September 18, 1983

Overall

- George Will says you have missed an opportunity to shape the public mind.
- You have repeatedly stressed that you desire long-lasting action against Soviet violence and intimidation.

What about the conservative criticism that our response has been insufficient?

- A reaction focused on the area where this atrocity was committed--civil aviation--enables us to bring the world together in one voice of condemnation.
- You have consistently forged a unified allied approach to dealing with serious security dimensions of East-West economic relations since the Ottawa Summit in July 1981.
- We now have a security-minded framework in place to ensure that the Soviet Union will have far less opportunity to exploit trade with the West to its advantage and our disadvantage.
- Those vigorous efforts resulted in significant agreements with Allies this spring that had effect of limiting energy dependence on Soviets, ending preferential terms on credits, and further restricting Soviet access to militarily relevant technology.
- We are in the process of making a "measured" response, and our actions are not necessarily over yet, nor have we forsaken any options.

Why not declare Poland in default?

- Our willingness to reschedule Poland's official debt (still contingent on the release of the vast majority of political prisoners) has the effect of reducing the exposure of the American taxpayers in that country by resuming an East-to-West flow of funds.
- Rescheduling does not mean new credits, but it does mean we are being paid back. Commercial banks are receiving some interest.
- Commodity Credit Corporation is making good on its guarantees to commercial banks as it would to any country where such guarantees exist and that country misses payments.
- We want Poland to be forced to repay its obligations and not be able to walk away, as would probably be the case if we called them in default. Rescheduling provides us with continued leverage.

Grain

- When martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981, you stated that we would suspend negotiations on a long-term grain agreement. For some 18 months we held to this position as a symbol of our outrage over continued repression in Poland.
- Unfortunately, alternative supplier countries did not cooperate in this effort and concluded LTAs at the direct expense of our farmers.
- You consistently pointed out that the problem of unilateral action in grain area is the wide availability of this fungible commodity.
- These sales still cost the Soviets precious hard currency and are made on the basis of cash on the barrelhead.

Forced Labor

- The overall thrust of this section is correct. A few substantive corrections are warranted. While the forced labor population is assessed at 4 million, half of whom are incarcerated in camps, the number of camps is 1100 (not 2000). We have no hard evidence of extermination camps. We have a number of emigre reports concerning forced labor use in conjunction with uranium mining, the cleaning of exhaust tubes, etc., but this is not verified by separate intelligence reporting. It is probably correct.
- The Soviet Union is in violation of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the Anti-Slavery Convention of 1926. George Will is correct in terms of the law which forbids the importation of goods by forced labor. CIA sent a list of the goods that would be barred to Senator Armstrong.

Soviet Violations of Existing Arms Control Agreements

- It appears that the Soviets are in violation of some provisions of arms control agreements (e.g., SALT I and II, CBW, etc.).
- Conservatives want you to report on Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.
 - Although you have on several occasions referred to the fact of Soviet violations, and indicated that you might reveal more on these violations in the future, to date, however, there has been no public recitation of these violations.
 - Administration activities to date include the establishment of an interagency group to examine possible violations, presentation of demarches to the Soviets on violations, and a request for a Special SCC meeting to discuss suspected violations.
 - The Soviets rejected both our requests for a Special SCC meeting and the demarches on suspected violations.
- George F. Will's claim that you have not talked to the American people--and talked to the Soviets only flaccidly--has some validity.

- The Wall Street Journal predicts Moscow will deploy anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) in response to our Pershing missile deployment in violation of SALT and will claim the ABMs are not a violation but for use against theater systems.
- As tactical ABM systems evolve with more and more technical improvements, the distinction between tactical and strategic ABM systems is becoming less and less clear.
- Even modern air defense systems have some capability against strategic systems, especially cruise missiles.
- This growing ambiguity has been clearly recognized and must be addressed urgently with regard to each defensive system.
- There is a clear need for a policy decision to initiate an examination of this potential but apparently real emerging problem which could be a first step toward a large-scale Soviet ABM breakout.

United Nations

- The USSR has violated and continues to ignore human rights provisions in several covenants.
- Proper response is to press our case in these and other international fora, which is what we have done in the U.N. And we have achieved, by our measures, far more unanimity and concerted action from our allies and friends than we have in recent years. Condemnation in the U.N. is greater than any action taken against the USSR in a decade.

Soviet Perceptions of US Credibility and Strength

- One of the overall political points in Will's analysis is the nature and the importance of the messages the Administration is sending to the Soviets--especially by our policies on grain trade and treaty violations.
- The Soviets view the credibility of your statements and (when necessary) threats as a key index of U.S. national strength. When that credibility deteriorates, the Soviets sense weakness which they feel they can exploit.

- As Will pointed out, the Soviets have witnessed several cases where we have been inconsistent and our credibility has suffered.
- In spite of the inconsistency between word and deed, the Soviets do understand that domestic political pressures led to our position on the grain issue, not international pressure.
- On the question of calling them on treaty violations, the Soviets probably see the Administration's delay to do this as a sign of weakness exposed by the growing power of the USSR. If the Soviets believe that you have been pressured into silence about violations and circumventions, they can only conclude (1) the international political and military correlation of forces has shifted so far toward the USSR that the U.S. has been compelled to accept the Soviet assertion that no violations have taken place, and (2) the U.S. has been compelled to continue negotiating with the Soviets out of weakness and fear--fear not only of Soviet power, but fear of the political power of Soviet-manipulated "peace" movements in the West.



The United States is a superpower. We cannot withdraw from our responsibilities to the Soviet Union to keep communications open at the highest level and to provide assurances to our friends who look to us to balance Soviet pressure and resist Soviet aims. If we attempt unilaterally to isolate the Soviet Union, we isolate ourselves and weaken our own ability to deal with our major adversary.

We must work with the international community. We must gain a consensus among our allies. We must not take measures which hurt ourselves more than the Soviet Union.

President Reagan's response to the Soviet destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007 has been appropriate and hard hitting. It has gained the acceptance of the international community. It has now gained the unanimous support of 416 House Members in the joint resolution passed yesterday. Let us not dilute the President's effectiveness. We want to support what the President is doing because he is doing it extraordinarily well.

I oppose amendments to the resolution because we have agreement on the leadership resolution. It was after all, sponsored by the majority and minority leaders; by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee; and by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee, Senators BAKER, BYRD, PERCY, PELL, TOWER, and NUNN respectively.

I oppose amendments to the resolution because we do have extensive agreement. This resolution can be considered and pass the Senate today. It can go to the President today. And it will have his immediate signature.

Mr. President, the administration strongly opposes the Helms amendment. The Foreign Relations Committee has received specific comments from the administration this morning on the Helms amendment as it was introduced Tuesday. I would like to read those comments for the benefit of my colleagues because copies of these comments have not yet been received by every member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that just prior to the announcement of the administration's provision on each of these several points of the Helms amendment that a copy of the original Helms amendment be incorporated which the administration is then responding to, taking into account that the Helms amendment has been modified, one item, at least, has been deleted from it. But these are the only comments I have as they relate to the original amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. HAWKINS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The material follows:

HELMS: (1) recall the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union for urgent con-

sultations and reduce the number of Soviet diplomats accredited to the United States to the number of United States diplomats accredited to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

ADMINISTRATION: 1. The United States Ambassador and United States diplomats accredited to the U.S.S.R. are in place vigorously to represent and to promote the interests of the United States. To reduce their number—or to invite such a reduction by reducing the number of Soviet diplomats in the United States—will diminish the capability of the United States to protect its citizens and promote its interests in the U.S.S.R.

HELMS: (2) conduct a comprehensive reappraisal of the complete spectrum of United States-Soviet relations, including arms control, human rights, East-West trade, and regional issues;

ADMINISTRATION: 2. As the President stated in his speech of September 5, the Administration has conducted long meetings, including with the Congressional leadership. The President stated that we cannot "give up our effort to reduce the arsenals of destructive weapons threatening the world." Thus he has spoken to arms control. We continue to promote our human rights concerns, east-west trade and regional issues.

HELMS: (3) report to the Congress on the record of Soviet compliance or noncompliance with the letter and spirit of all existing strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreements and other arms control agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party;

ADMINISTRATION: 3. Procedures exist for dealing with the Intelligence Committees of both Houses on the questions of compliance with arms control agreements.

HELMS: (4) direct the United States negotiators at the strategic arms reduction talks at Geneva to link the possible success of such talks with the willingness of the Soviet Union to abide by international law as a responsible member of the community of nations, paying specific attention to the KAL 7 massacre, Soviet violations of the Helsinki accords, the Soviet invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan, the repression of Poland and its free labor movement, and the use of chemical and biological weapons in contravention of existing treaties;

ADMINISTRATION: 4. With regard to linkage of the START talks with Soviet actions, including the KAL massacre, as noted above the President stated that we must not give up efforts to reduce the arsenals of destructive weapons.

HELMS: (5) reemphasize the inconsistency of the Soviet military presence in the Western Hemisphere with the Monroe Doctrine;

ADMINISTRATION: 5. The President and other Administration officials have stated on many occasions and we have communicated to the Soviets our dissatisfaction with their activities in the Western Hemisphere.

HELMS: (6) declare Poland in default on all or a part of the debt owed to the Commodity Credit Corporation, recognizing that Poland is an integral part of the Soviet economic empire and that financial credit is an element of national strategy;

ADMINISTRATION: (6) Default would take the heat off Poland to continue to pay at least some portion of what it owes.

Default would not stop credits from going to Poland as some allege; no one is lending to Poland now anyway.

Poland has few assets in the West which could be attached in event of default. Thus, default is one sure way not to get paid.

Poland would have more cash if default were declared and would certainly need less short-term financial help from USSR.

HELMS: (7) tighten substantially the foreign policy and military controls over the export of machine tools, high technology products, and equipment for the development of Soviet oil and gas resources; and

ADMINISTRATION: (7) The President stated in his September 5 speech that we are redoubling our efforts with our allies to end the flow of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union.

HELMS: (8) direct the Secretary of the Treasury to use existing statutory authority to prevent the import of any product or material produced in the Soviet Union unless the President certifies that it was produced without the use of forced labor.

ADMINISTRATION: (8) The President and all Americans abhor Soviet use of forced labor. Should it be demonstrated that products or materials produced by forced labor are being imported into the United States the Administration will take appropriate steps.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I understand the desire of the senior Senator from North Carolina to include in the resolution specific recommendations to the President. I would like to take just one point that is made in the revised Helms resolution, which I read as follows:

It is the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the U.S. negotiators at the strategic arms reduction talks at Geneva to link the possible success of such talks with the willingness of the Soviet Union to abide by international law as a responsible member of the community of nations, paying specific attention to the KAL 007 massacre, Soviet violations of the Helsinki accords, the Soviet invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan, the repression of Poland and its free labor movement, and the use of chemical and biological weapons in contravention of existing treaties.

A strict interpretation of that, for instance, reestablishment, let us say, of the free labor movement and labor unions in Poland, just to take one example, literally means that in the course of the Reagan administration's first term, and its expected second term in office, there would simply be no arms control agreement of any kind with the Soviet Union.

If it is a condition precedent to our willingness to enter into such agreement that there is definite linkage between any of these activities, abhorrent as they are, then I think we are simply saying we are going to shelve arms control. The President has already made his decision to do just the contrary. We would be in a position where we are tricking the President not to do something that he has already declared he will do to the world and to our citizenry, that we will carry on arms control negotiations despite our abhorrence of this tragic event.

I am not now speaking on behalf of the administration. I am describing my own strong feelings about this matter. Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze strongly support the President's viewpoint that we should move forward with these talks. Both men are admired tre-

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8306903

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 28 SEP 83 20

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 28 SEP 83

KEYWORDS USSR

KAL FLIGHT 007

INF

UN

SUBJECT ANDROPOV ANSWERS REAGAN RE KAL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE 30 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

FORTIER

SIGUR *Lamy*

LEVINE

LILAC *1*
001

ROBINSON

SOMMER

LINHARD

COMMENTS

REF# 8329817

LOG 8306698

8306714

NSCIFID

(MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

OCT 1
C 10/12 1983

WPC Noted
Noted by Clark

JLA

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA
CB

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System #

Package#

823

I

6903

RA

83 SEP 29 P 5: 11

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	JP	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	3	✓	
Judge Clark	4	✓	I
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



33 SEP 28 P7:00

September 28, 1983

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Andropov Answers Reagan

Andropov's rejoinder to the President betrayed continuing sensitivity in the Soviet leadership over the KAL Incident and an apparent feeling that the President's latest INF move was getting the better of the USSR in the public-relations arena. The result was a shrill response.

Andropov used the unusual vehicle of a "statement" printed in Soviet newspapers to put on record a harsh and authoritative answer to the President's UNGA speech.

- He was exceptionally negative toward the President, asserting that if anyone had any illusions of any turn for the better in US policy, recent events had dispelled them once and for all.
- In his first statement on the issue, Andropov sought to depict the KAL incident as a bilateral US-Soviet issue. He repeated the charge that it was a provocation and dismissed the President's statements as "foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality..."
- Following up on Gromyko's statement yesterday, Andropov dismissed the latest US initiative on INF as nothing new. He charged that the US was not interested in any agreement but merely procrastinating until starting the Pershing deployment.
- Despite his bitter denunciation of those "blinded by anti-communism," Andropov insisted that "we have strong nerves and we do not build our policy on emotion." He reaffirmed Moscow's continuing desire for peace and disarmament, but used a reference to Soviet military to buttress his assertion that Soviet interest in agreement is not to be taken as a sign of weakness.

The final portion of the speech was an emotional appeal to Europeans to resist NATO INF deployments, which Andropov

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-0691, #212at CN, NARA, DATE 5/10/06~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

described as "a step of fundamental dimensions that is hostile to the cause of peace". Andropov depicted the Europeans as hostages of the US, who are preparing to accept a policy that disregards their own interests. He described opponents of the INF deployment as "manifesting the utmost force" of reason in the breadth and scope of their activities.

For minor McKinley

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 29 SEP 83 17

TO CLARK

FROM MCMINN

for 12/20/99

DOCDATE 29 SEP 83

LAUX

29 SEP 83

KEYWORDS JAPAN

INTL TRADE

UNO, SOSUKE

KAL FLIGHT 007

ECONOMICS

SUBJECT TALKERS FOR MEESE MTG W/ UNO 29 SEP

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

No copy of 5 gd Talkers available

REF#

LOG 8306815

NSCIFID

(MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 9/29

Ponderexter sgd

MC ✓, LX ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C) MR

where is
copy of
sgd Talkers
? melane

NSCIS

THIS WAS closed

9/29 & returned

to you

check thru &
files for
original.

BTM

OCT 0 3 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6910

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED
White House CDR, 2002, August 23, 1997
By CS MRA, Date 12/29/89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION

September 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

DOUGLAS McMINN *DM*
DAVID LAUX *DL*
for

SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum for Ed Meese's Meeting with
MITI Minister Uno

We have drafted a memo from you to Ed Meese in preparation for his meeting today with Sosuke Uno, Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Ed Meese at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Norman Bailey concurs. *NB*

Attachments

Tab I Meese memo for signature
Tab A Suggested talking points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 29 SEP 83 12

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C *CB 12/20/99*

DOCDATE 29 SEP 83

KEYWORDS **KAL FLIGHT 007**
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

NSDD

SUBJECT KAL MASSACRE - CLAIMS

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE 01 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

LILAC

SIGUR

LEVINE

RAYMOND

SIMS

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

KRAEMER

COMMENTS

*No further action needed;
briefed orally*

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID NSDD0102 (VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 10/18 No further Action Required

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 18

TO NSC/S

Re: 6919

Per Fortier, no further action
needed; briefed orally.

Thanks.

SSherman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Japanese Minister of
International Trade and Industry, Sosuke Uno
(phonetic: oono)

Purpose

You will be meeting with Minister Uno today at 11:30 a.m. The meeting is designed to give Uno, who is relatively new to his job, some special attention and at the same time allow you to:

- o Thank Uno for the superb cooperation of the entire Japanese government in the Korean airliner tragedy;

- o Express how much the President is looking forward to his upcoming visit to Japan; and

- o Emphasize to Uno the need to make real progress on many of our bilateral economic problems before the President's visit.

Background

Mr. Uno, an eighth term member of the lower house of the Japanese Diet, belongs to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faction headed by Prime Minister Nakasone. Uno is a Nakasone loyalist and a strong supporter of the Prime Minister's views.

As Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI), he is on record publicly as stating that Japan should increase imports in order to reduce friction with its trading partners.

Uno speaks only limited English.

Attachment

Tab A

Suggested Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-069/1 #213~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

27 AS NARA, DATE 5/10/01

Suggested Talking Points

- o Welcome Uno to the White House (his first visit).
- o Thank him for his country's superb cooperation in the Korean airliner tragedy, especially:
 - Japan's role in determining what happened to the airplane;
 - in proving that the Soviets did shoot it down; and
 - making this information available to the world.
- o Emphasize how much the President is looking forward to his upcoming trip to Japan.
- o Point out how important progress on trade issues will be to the success of the visit.
- o Note that we have been making progress in addressing a number of the outstanding trade issues between our two countries. However, many critical trade issues continue to trouble our relationship.
- o Point out that our fundamental objective is to increase U.S. access to the Japanese economy. Japanese exporters continue to have greater access to our economy than we have to Japan's economy. This inequality of access is the cause of most of our trade frictions.
- o Stress that import quotas and barriers to our agricultural products such as beef and citrus, as well as high tariffs on items such as forestry products and alcoholic beverages complicate and harm our bilateral relationship.
 - We would like to see meaningful progress in these tariff and non-tariff areas.
- o State that there are other very visible actions that the Japanese could take in advance of the President's trip, such as:
 - Purchases of telecommunications hardware and energy resources.
- o Emphasize that it is in both of our country's interest to resolve major problems and to ensure long term expansion of trade and investment.
- o Tell Uno that we are counting on him personally to take this message back to his government and to advance the understanding in Japan of the urgency of making difficult decisions now, before the President visits.
- o Convey the President's personal regards to Prime Minister Nakasone.

DECLASSIFIED/RECLASSIFIED
NLS 198-0691 #714
CU NARA, DATE 5/10/06



8329212

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 29, 1983

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Korean Airline Massacre - Claims

As directed in NSDD 102, we are urgently pursuing the development of the USG omnibus claim against the Soviet Union for compensation for the loss of life and property of U.S. citizens. The notes which we delivered to the Soviets, and which they returned, said we would be presenting a more detailed claim later. We are actively preparing such a claim, including a questionnaire to be sent to the families of victims seeking the specific information we need to put a monetary value on our claim. We are coordinating this effort with the Justice Department. We are also consulting closely with other claimant states concerning the development by them of more detailed claims against the Soviet Union on behalf of their citizens. We are further considering seeking their support in making parallel demands on the Soviets to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ or other international tribunal if these governments' final responses are negative on simultaneously filing an application to the ICJ.

We will continue to give attention to the public diplomacy aspects of the claim and take every opportunity to publicize our efforts. We do not believe it would be advisable to pursue the idea of recruiting an international law firm to represent the families since many of the families already have their own attorneys and at least six of the private law suits filed name the United States Government as a defendant. We also have Privacy Act considerations with respect to publicity concerning certain aspects of our detailed claims. However, it should be possible to develop a document about the claim which could be used for public diplomacy purposes. In addition, if we make a demand on the Soviets to submit to third party dispute settlement, we could publicize that effort.

For *William H. Hill*
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-069/1 #215CN NARA, DATE 5/10/06~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

SECRET

SECRET

ACTION (EUR)

~~SECRET~~

8329212

6426

COPIES TO:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

September 22, 1983

S
D
P
T
L

S/S

S/S-S

TMC

sl

RF(rs)

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Korean Airline Massacre - Claims ~~(U)~~

NSDD 102 directed a series of actions in response to the Soviet shootdown of KAL 007. The omnibus claim against the Soviet Union for compensation for the loss of life and property has been proposed. However, the Soviets have rejected our diplomatic notes. In addition to the consideration of going to the International Court of Justice, the public diplomacy aspects of the claims also require increased attention. The IG should consider additional steps such as recruiting a recognized international law firm to represent the families, expediting the determination of the size of the claim, and development of a public document on the case for compensation. ~~(S)~~

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-069/1 #216

AN NARA, DATE 5/10/06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassify OADR

Received in S/S-I

UNCLASSIFIED UFG REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOS (S)

RECEIVED 22 SEP 83 17

TO CLARK

FROM LENCZOWSKI *DB 12/20/99* DOCDATE 22 SEP 83

FORTIER

22 SEP 83

ROBINSON

22 SEP 83

KEYWORDS KAL FLIGHT 007

SUBJECT REQUEST FOR POSSIBLE DELAY OF RECEIPT OF KAL DEBRIS

ACTION FOR DECISION

DUE: 24 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*C 9/23**WPC approved Recom**JL, DF, RO, X*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C)MR

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 SEP 22 4:01

System #

Package#

814

6716

I

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	2	✓	
Judge Clark	3	✓	A
John Poindexter	4	✓	
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

ASAP

(Date/Time)

Judge: Recommend you call Shultz early on Friday, 9/23, using the good points at Tab I. Alternatively, you could raise with Shultz at NSC meeting -- but time is of the essence.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8-9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8306738

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 23 SEP 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

008 12/20/99

DOCDATE 22 SEP 83

HILL, C

24 SEP 83

KEYWORDS KAL FLIGHT 007

SUBJECT ACCEPTING SOVIET KAL DEBRIS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE 27 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LILAC

SIGUR

ROBINSON

LEVINE

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

no action required

REF# 8329157

8329386

LOG

NSCIFID

(CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*Portier**S**9/26**Rec'd State Memo**Any Action Necessary**C**9/28**NFAIR PEN FORTEIN**CHRM*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

Washington, D.C. 20520 6738



September 24, 1983

~~SECRET~~

83 SEP 24 P 1: 58

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Accepting the Soviet KAL Debris

As you know, the Soviets have agreed to turn over debris from the KAL airliner on September 26 (Sunday evening September 25 Washington time) to U.S. and Japanese officials on Sakhalin Island. We have coordinated very closely with the Japanese on our responses and so far the arrangements are proceeding smoothly. Three representatives each from the US and Japan, along with two Japanese interpreters, will be aboard a Japanese civilian vessel which will enter the port of Nevelsk. We have also reached agreement with the Japanese on guidelines for receiving the KAL 007 items from the Soviets at Sakhalin. Principally, if the Soviets refuse to open the sealed boxes of items to permit a detailed inventory, or insist on inclusion of statements affirming acceptance of Soviet political theses in the agreed inventory, that we would refuse to accept the items. The Soviets have informed us the "objects" to be returned do not include human remains and will not require any special logistical arrangements.

Outstanding Issues. There are still several unresolved issues to be worked out Saturday and Sunday before the turnover. The Soviets have rejected the U.S. and Japanese proposal that a Korean representative also be permitted to come ashore, but we are still making strong efforts to obtain the Soviet assent that is required in Soviet territorial waters for a Korean representative to be aboard the vessel. The ROK has issued two strong public demands to the Soviets to be permitted ashore, and we think we must continue to support them. In response to a Japanese request to allow correspondants to be present, the Soviets have agreed that one American and one Japanese news person could come ashore. We have now gone back to the Japanese to urge in the strongest terms that no press be included; the danger of Soviet manipulation is too great.

We are awaiting Japanese assent on a joint approach to ICAO to have their representative aboard the Japanese ship take immediate possession of the airliner debris. (We had previously arranged with ICAO to have their representative on board the U.S. search vessel in the event the "black boxes" are found.) The presence of the ICAO representative would both convince public opinion that there had been no tampering with the evidence and soften the blow if the Soviets refuse to allow the Korean observer to be aboard the Japanese ship. We are also seeking Japanese agreement that all aircraft debris relevant to the ICAO investigation turned over by the Soviets

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 798-0691, #217
By CL, NARA, Date 5/10/06

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

should be immediately given to ICAO rather than first studied by GOJ officials.

Precautions. We are taking every possible precaution to deal with any traps in the Soviet offer:

-- The American contingent on the joint US-Japanese team is headed by Lynn Pascoe, EUR/SOV Deputy Director, who is fully prepared to deal with any Soviet maneuvers on the spot. Other members include our FAA representative in Tokyo, who will ensure that the objects are handled correctly and turned over to ICAO, and a CINCPAC representative who is fully conversant with our search operations underway.

-- We are building several safeguards into our procedures for accepting the objects. Our team will give the Soviets a written disclaimer which states that we are merely accepting what the Soviets are handing over without in any way verifying the authenticity of the objects, and we are urging the Japanese to join in making this disclaimer.

-- We are preparing press guidance to be used here, in Tokyo, and on location to counter Soviet propaganda efforts to take advantage of this turnover. Our cooperation with ICAO will be a great asset in this regard.

-- We are preparing a diplomatic note to give the Soviets in Moscow stating that the South Koreans have designated only the US and Japan to carry out recovery operations for the airliner; pointing out that the Soviets therefore have no right to continue their search activities; and calling on them not to interfere with our efforts. We need prior Korean assent before we present this note, and it is expected shortly.

-- We are planning to have the KAL Task Force reconvene Sunday evening to deal with any unexpected development. All key bureaus will be represented.

Extreme Contingencies. We think it doubtful the Soviets would take any rash action during this procedure. [REDACTED]

31

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

For Mr. Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8306738

UNCLASSIFIED USE
CLASSIFIED ENCLC

65 12/20/99

RECEIVED 23 SEP 83 10

TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 22 SEP 83

KEYWORDS KAL FLIGHT 007

SUBJECT ACCEPTING SOVIET KAL DEBRIS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE 27 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LILAC

SIGUR

ROBINSON

LEVINE

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

no memo needed; briefed orally

REF# 8329157

LOG

NSCIFID

(CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Z 9/23 TRANSFERRED TO FORTIER

FORTIER X 9/23 PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

R 9/26 NFAR PER FORTIER

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

HILL, C

RECEIVED 23 SEP 83 10

DOCDATE 22 SEP 83

24 SEP 83

KEYWORDS KAL FLIGHT 007

SUBJECT ACCEPTING SOVIET KAL DEBRIS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE 27 SEP 83 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LILAC

SIGUR

ROBINSON

LEVINE

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

REF# 8329157

8329386

LOG

NSCIFID

(CL VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 9/27 noted by Clark

DE-

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System #

I

Package#

83 SEP 27 12:28

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary

John Poindexter

Bud McFarlane

Jacque Hill

Judge Clark

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

1

2

3

4

[Handwritten signature]

✓

[Handwritten signature]

I

N/R

I-Information

A-Action

R-Retain

D-Dispatch

N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

NSC/S

Log & file



September 24, 1983

~~SECRET~~

83 SEP 24 P 1: 58

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Accepting the Soviet KAL Debris

As you know, the Soviets have agreed to turn over debris from the KAL airliner on September 26 (Sunday evening September 25 Washington time) to U.S. and Japanese officials on Sakhalin Island. We have coordinated very closely with the Japanese on our responses and so far the arrangements are proceeding smoothly. Three representatives each from the US and Japan, along with two Japanese interpreters, will be aboard a Japanese civilian vessel which will enter the port of Nevelsk. We have also reached agreement with the Japanese on guidelines for receiving the KAL 007 items from the Soviets at Sakhalin. Principally, if the Soviets refuse to open the sealed boxes of items to permit a detailed inventory, or insist on inclusion of statements affirming acceptance of Soviet political theses in the agreed inventory, that we would refuse to accept the items. The Soviets have informed us the "objects" to be returned do not include human remains and will not require any special logistical arrangements.

Outstanding Issues. There are still several unresolved issues to be worked out Saturday and Sunday before the turnover. The Soviets have rejected the U.S. and Japanese proposal that a Korean representative also be permitted to come ashore, but we are still making strong efforts to obtain the Soviet assent that is required in Soviet territorial waters for a Korean representative to be aboard the vessel. The ROK has issued two strong public demands to the Soviets to be permitted ashore, and we think we must continue to support them. In response to a Japanese request to allow correspondants to be present, the Soviets have agreed that one American and one Japanese news person could come ashore. We have now gone back to the Japanese to urge in the strongest terms that no press be included; the danger of Soviet manipulation is too great.

We are awaiting Japanese assent on a joint approach to ICAO to have their representative aboard the Japanese ship take immediate possession of the airliner debris. (We had previously arranged with ICAO to have their representative on board the U.S. search vessel in the event the "black boxes" are found.) The presence of the ICAO representative would both convince public opinion that there had been no tampering with the evidence and soften the blow if the Soviets refuse to allow the Korean observer to be aboard the Japanese ship. We are also seeking Japanese agreement that all aircraft debris relevant to the ICAO investigation turned over by the Soviets

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 89-069/1 #218
By CU, NARA, Date 5/10/06

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

should be immediately given to ICAO rather than first studied by GOJ officials.

Precautions. We are taking every possible precaution to deal with any traps in the Soviet offer:

-- The American contingent on the joint US-Japanese team is headed by Lynn Pascoe, EUR/SOV Deputy Director, who is fully prepared to deal with any Soviet maneuvers on the spot. Other members include our FAA representative in Tokyo, who will ensure that the objects are handled correctly and turned over to ICAO, and a CINCPAC representative who is fully conversant with our search operations underway.

-- We are building several safeguards into our procedures for accepting the objects. Our team will give the Soviets a written disclaimer which states that we are merely accepting what the Soviets are handing over without in any way verifying the authenticity of the objects, and we are urging the Japanese to join in making this disclaimer.

-- We are preparing press guidance to be used here, in Tokyo, and on location to counter Soviet propaganda efforts to take advantage of this turnover. Our cooperation with ICAO will be a great asset in this regard.

-- We are preparing a diplomatic note to give the Soviets in Moscow stating that the South Koreans have designated only the US and Japan to carry out recovery operations for the airliner; pointing out that the Soviets therefore have no right to continue their search activities; and calling on them not to interfere with our efforts. We need prior Korean assent before we present this note, and it is expected shortly.

-- We are planning to have the KAL Task Force reconvene Sunday evening to deal with any unexpected development. All key bureaus will be represented.

Extreme Contingencies. We think it doubtful the Soviets would take any rash action during this procedure. [REDACTED]

31

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

for *Communist*
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

Received SS

1983 OCT 11 PM 1:48

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: State Department Memorandum on KAL Follow-on Strategy

At Tab A is a memorandum from George outlining a continuing work program for responding to the KAL shootdown.

We believe the measures that George has described make sense and will help to continue to focus international attention on this tragic spectacle of Soviet brutality. His proposed measures deserve your support. We believe the memo does somewhat overstate the concrete impact of the actions other countries have so far taken. Indeed, we have learned that the airline pilot associations--discouraged by the limited nature of the official Aeroflot boycotts--may be on the verge of relaxing their own measures. We will also need to carefully consider whether the option of going to the International Court of Justice is likely to pay substantive or public affairs dividends commensurate with the political capital that will be required to get others on board.

In addition to the measures George has described, we believe the following broader actions are also required: 1) a serious review of what the incident reveals about possible tension in the Soviet Union between Andropov and the Soviet military and what this may imply for us; 2) the preparation of a special political-military affairs plan related to your trip that seeks to offset the damage to the confidence of our Asian friends that continuing acts of Soviet brutality have caused; and 3) the preparation of quiet contingency steps in Afghanistan and elsewhere that can be taken to privately signal the Soviets that future such acts of intimidation will be met with firmness and sophistication. These measures can help to induce restraint until the broader improvement of our military strength can be completed to serve as a more durable deterrent to adventurism.

Attachment

Tab A Shultz memo, dated September 27, 1983

Prepared by:
Donald R. Fortier

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc Vice President

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 608-0691 #219
CJL NARA, DATE 5/10/06

SECRET

1-48

11 11 11

SECRET

167813

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 11 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Sept 26 1983

TO NSC/S

From DON FORTIER

Re: 6738, Memo from Hill at State on
Accepting Soviet KAL Debris

No memo needed; briefly orally.

S. Sherman

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 28 SEP 83 08

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 27 SEP 83

KEYWORDS USSR

KAL FLIGHT 007

INF

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SUBJECT KAL: MANAGING THE NEXT PHASE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO CLARK TO PRES DUE: 28 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

ROBINSON

LAUX

MATLOCK

COMMENTS DUE NO LATER THAN C.O.B. TODAY

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(EN)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Kimmett	X 9/29	For Further Action		
Clark	X 9/30	For decision		
	OCT 1 1 1983	Clark approved		
Pres	OCT 1 1 1983	for information		VP
	OCT 1 2 1983	Pres noted		
	C 10/12	Noted by Pres		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
Clark	
McFarlane	
Poindexter	O
Kimmitt	C
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

*Bob K.,
We need to get this
back today. f*

DELIVERED AS:
"EYES ONLY"
for
JUDGE CLARK.

C : Copy

O : Original

National Security Council
The White House
RECEIVED

822

System #

I

Package#

6857

Ra

83 SEP 29 P 3: 35

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	X	
John Poindexter	2	X	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	3	✓	
Judge Clark	4	✓	A
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

Judge,
No doubt the second and third points
will make Shultz nervous but if
they are cast in terms of preparing
papers for you, George and Cops, I
think we might be able to sell it.
John

**National Security Council
The White House**

System #

I

Package#

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>Staff</u>
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Action Fortier

Comment Robinson
Matlock
Lamy

Prepare memo Clark → P due today

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System #

I

Package#

6857

83 SEP 29 A10: 49

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>RMH</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Forther</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>Redo</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob, must I capitalize the "s" after AWACs? I deliberately lower-cased it. . . . OK! I'll be aware of this in the future (I redid it). Thanks.

Sally

Answered via
note 9/29
RMH

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13-14 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

2

suggested the military is now in a more dominant position than ever. Another possibility, however, is that Andropov has pushed the military onto center stage to distance himself from world opprobrium and to protect his own position in the succession crisis. Some speculate that the Soviet general staff--miffed at certain decisions that have not gone their way--deliberately failed to notify the political authorities as a show of independence. If so, then similar such displays may occur in the future. We may not be able to precisely answer any of these questions, but we need to put our best minds to the task. These are not just theoretical questions, inasmuch as the answers hold vital implications for U.S. foreign policy over the next year and beyond.

Second, how is the incident likely to affect our security partners, and what does it suggest in terms of an increasing Soviet tendency to use force for intimidation? You correctly advised State not to put out the line that recent Soviet toughness in the Middle East and elsewhere is a consequence of the KAL. Indeed, if anything, the KAL shootdown is but part of a pattern of toughness worldwide. That pattern is longstanding, and comes as no surprise, but we still need to ask ourselves whether that pattern has not recently taken a noticeable turn toward the worse. The answer would appear to be yes. In addition to the obvious examples: ever more aggressive support for client states and an unwillingness to try to shape a face-saving retreat in Afghanistan (indeed, the Soviets have suddenly begun to increase their Afghan infrastructure on the Iranian border), we have less obvious indicators, such as provocative submarine intrusions in the northern flank that have caused some Norwegians and Swedes to believe the Soviets are self-consciously accelerating their war planning. And we have seen Soviet nuclear threats to Japan and Korea that are so blunt as to be reminiscent of the Khrushchev era.

I believe that consciously--or subconsciously--this pattern of more overt intimidation is having some effect. If so, we may find the short-term outrage and cooperation (in Europe and Asia) giving way to greater implicit fear of the Soviet Union--and hence greater accommodation. If we are to offset this we must do more than consult. We need to concentrate on measures--described in the original decision memo but ignored in the current State plan--such as deployments of F-16s to Japan, AWACS, and so on. These measures do not need to be advertised publicly; indeed, they shouldn't. But we have to be clear enough about their importance internally that the bureaucracy does not lose sight of them.

Finally, there is the question of the signals we privately and publicly send to the Soviets. I am myself confused by the Secretary's recent reassurance to the allies that we do not

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

3

intend to allow the incident "to throw our policy toward the Soviet Union off course." If he means we won't sidetrack arms control, that is one thing. But I assume our policy toward the Soviets continues to be a mix of incentives and disincentives, of dialogue and firmness. If so, then, if anything, the Korean incident suggests we need to more comprehensively enrich our package of available disincentives. That to me is the importance of the Afghan measures I recommended to you at the time of the shootdown--measures which Diane Dornan has now fleshed out--and implementation of the ACEP decision to tighten controls on strategic oil and gas equipment already proposed to COCOM that Roger Robinson has recommended.

Moreover, if the trend of Soviet intimidation by force continues, and indeed if dramatic new incidents arise, then we will also need other tools with which we can work. The New Republic wrote that the Korean incident demonstrated that--given the futility of sanctions--the West has no effective response to Soviet brutality. We cannot allow this perception to take root. The most effective long-term response is the one we have emphasized--rebuilding our strength. The problem is this may not deter the Soviets over the near term where they will enjoy the fruits of their own extended buildup and years of Western disinvestment in defense. We need to then concentrate on political-military measures we can take to increase costs over the near term. At our earlier direction, the CIA has been working on a series of papers on the vulnerabilities of key Soviet proxy states. The problem is that these studies are not due to be completed until late next year, and they fail to examine the crucial interactions between proxies (Syria/Libya; Yemen/Ethiopia; etc.). These studies need to be accelerated and a parallel and highly restricted policy group established to develop contingent responses based on this work.

One final note. One of the signal achievements of this Administration has been to elevate the importance of public diplomacy. The danger in this is that sometimes public diplomacy serves as a tempting substitute for real policy. We cannot allow that to happen here.

How then to translate all this porridge into action? I recommend the following:

First, we should concur generally in the work program outlined by the Shultz memo, though we will want to follow the International Court of Justice option closely to ensure we do not have to pay a heavy price for the involvement of others. Roger Robinson will monitor this package.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

4

Second, Jack Matlock, Ken de Graffenreid and I should convene a small group of Soviet experts--both inside the government and out--to review the data and explore the implications of the incident for Soviet internal politics and future decision making. We will submit a short report directly to you.

Third, the Korean incident has made the political-military dimension of the President's Asian trip more important than before. I recommend that you send a directive to Shultz and Weinberger making this point and directing that Gaston and I jointly chair a small panel--comprised of Howe, Wolfowitz, Armitage, and General Thompson--to explore trip-related political-military proposals that help to build upon existing regional concern in light of the shutdown.

Fourth, we need quick follow-through by CIA on the Afghanistan options. Moreover, we need to ask Casey to accelerate and restructure the proxy vulnerability work. (We will prepare a separate memo on this should you concur.)

Fifth, in order to be better prepared to have quiet but effective responses to future Soviet intimidation, Jack and I should take the lead in transforming the CIA studies into action proposals. This should be a highly restricted effort.

Roger Robinson, David Laux and Jack Matlock concur.

Recommendation

1. That you sign your memo at Tab I to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memo.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

2. That you approve the work plan outlined above.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachment

Tab I

Clark/President

Tab A

Shultz/President dated September 27, 1983

Good analysis!
ups

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF98-069/1 #221

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

2

BY KML NARA DATE 11/16/10

suggested the military is now in a more dominant position than ever. Another possibility, however, is that Andropov has pushed the military onto center stage to distance himself from world opprobrium and to protect his own position in the succession crisis. Some speculate that the Soviet general staff--miffed at certain decisions that have not gone their way--deliberately failed to notify the political authorities as a show of independence. If so, then similar such displays may occur in the future. We may not be able to precisely answer any of these questions, but we need to put our best minds to the task. These are not just theoretical questions, inasmuch as the answers hold vital implications for U.S. foreign policy over the next year and beyond.

Second, how is the incident likely to affect our security partners, and what does it suggest in terms of an increasing Soviet tendency to use force for intimidation? You correctly advised State not to put out the line that recent Soviet toughness in the Middle East and elsewhere is a consequence of the KAL. Indeed, if anything, the KAL shootdown is but part of a pattern of toughness worldwide. That pattern is longstanding, and comes as no surprise, but we still need to ask ourselves whether that pattern has not recently taken a noticeable turn toward the worse. The answer would appear to be yes. In addition to the obvious examples: ever more aggressive support for client states and an unwillingness to try to shape a face-saving retreat in Afghanistan (indeed, the Soviets have suddenly begun to increase their Afghan infrastructure on the Iranian border), we have less obvious indicators, such as provocative submarine intrusions in the northern flank that have caused some Norwegians and Swedes to believe the Soviets are self-consciously accelerating their war planning. And we have seen Soviet nuclear threats to Japan and Korea that are so blunt as to be reminiscent of the Khrushchev era.

I believe that consciously--or subconsciously--this pattern of more overt intimidation is having some effect. If so, we may find the short-term outrage and cooperation (in Europe and Asia) giving way to greater implicit fear of the Soviet Union--and hence greater accommodation. If we are to offset this we must do more than consult. We need to concentrate on measures--described in the original decision memo but ignored in the current State plan--such as deployments of F-16s to Japan, AWACs, and so on. These measures do not need to be advertised; they shouldn't. But we have to be clear importance internally that the bureaucracy understand them.

Finally, there is the question of the signal we publicly send to the Soviets. I am myself Secretary's recent reassurance to the all

↑
Capital S

it of

id

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

↑
Capital S |

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF98-069/1 #221

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

2

BY KML NARA DATE 11/16/10

suggested the military is now in a more dominant position than ever. Another possibility, however, is that Andropov has pushed the military onto center stage to distance himself from world opprobrium and to protect his own position in the succession crisis. Some speculate that the Soviet general staff--miffed at certain decisions that have not gone their way--deliberately failed to notify the political authorities as a show of independence. If so, then similar such displays may occur in the future. We may not be able to precisely answer any of these questions, but we need to put our best minds to the task. These are not just theoretical questions, inasmuch as the answers hold vital implications for U.S. foreign policy over the next year and beyond.

Second, how is the incident likely to affect our security partners, and what does it suggest in terms of an increasing Soviet tendency to use force for intimidation? You correctly advised State not to put out the line that recent Soviet toughness in the Middle East and elsewhere is a consequence of the KAL. Indeed, if anything, the KAL shootdown is but part of a pattern of toughness worldwide. That pattern is longstanding, and comes as no surprise, but we still need to ask ourselves whether that pattern has not recently taken a noticeable turn toward the worse. The answer would appear to be yes. In addition to the obvious examples: ever more aggressive support for client states and an unwillingness to try to shape a face-saving retreat in Afghanistan (indeed, the Soviets have suddenly begun to increase their Afghan infrastructure on the Iranian border), we have less obvious indicators, such as provocative submarine intrusions in the northern flank that have caused some Norwegians and Swedes to believe the Soviets are self-consciously accelerating their war planning. And we have seen Soviet nuclear threats to Japan and Korea that are so blunt as to be reminiscent of the Khrushchev era.

I believe that consciously--or subconsciously--this pattern of more overt intimidation is having some effect. If so, we may find the short-term outrage and cooperation (in Europe and Asia) giving way to greater implicit fear of the Soviet Union--and hence greater accommodation. If we are to offset this we must do more than consult. We need to concentrate on measures--described in the original decision memo but ignored in the current State plan--such as deployments of F-16s to Japan, AWACs, and so on. These measures do not need to be advertised publicly; indeed, they shouldn't. But we have to be clear enough about their importance internally that the bureaucracy does not lose sight of them.

Finally, there is the question of the signals we privately and publicly send to the Soviets. I am myself confused by the Secretary's recent reassurance to the allies that we do not

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

4

Second, Jack Matlock, Ken de Graffenreid and I should convene a small group of Soviet experts--both inside the government and out--to review the data and explore the implications of the incident for Soviet internal politics and future decision making. We will submit a short report directly to you.

Third, the Korean incident has made the political-military dimension of the President's Asian trip more important than before. I recommend that you send a directive to Shultz and Weinberger making this point and directing that Gaston and I jointly chair a small panel--comprised of Howe, Wolfowitz, Armitage, and General Thompson--to explore trip-related political-military proposals that help to build upon exisisting regional concern in light of the shutdown.

Fourth, we need quick follow-through by CIA on options. Moreover, we need to ask Casey to acc
restructure the proxy vulnerability work. (We
separate memo on this should you concur.)

With -- order to be better prepared to have qu
to future Soviet intimidation, Jack an
n transforming the CIA studies into action proposals.
d be a highly restricted effort.

1. nson, David Laxx and Jack Matlock concur.

↓ tion

That you sign your memo at Tab I to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memo.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. That you approve
the work plan
outlined above.

A — D

President

Shultz/President dated September 27, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF98-069/1#222

BY KML NARA DATE 11/16/10

~~SECRET~~

Permalife

100% COTTON CONTENT

↓

↑
#

|

2. That you approve
the work plan |
outlined above.

A — D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

4

Second, Jack Matlock, Ken de Graffenreid and I should convene a small group of Soviet experts--both inside the government and out--to review the data and explore the implications of the incident for Soviet internal politics and future decision making. We will submit a short report directly to you.

Third, the Korean incident has made the political-military dimension of the President's Asian trip more important than before. I recommend that you send a directive to Shultz and Weinberger making this point and directing that Gaston and I jointly chair a small panel--comprised of Howe, Wolfowitz, Armitage, and General Thompson--to explore trip-related political-military proposals that help to build upon exisisting regional concern in light of the shutdown.

Fourth, we need quick follow-through by CIA on the Afghanistan options. Moreover, we need to ask Casey to accelerate and restructure the proxy vulnerability work. (We will prepare a separate memo on this should you concur.)

Fifth, in order to be better prepared to have quiet but effective responses to future Soviet intimidation, Jack and I should take the lead in transforming the CIA studies into action proposals. This should be a highly restricted effort.

RWR Roger Robinson, *DJ* David Laux and *D.F. for* Jack Matlock concur.

Recommendation

That you sign your memo at Tab I to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memo.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Clark/President
Tab A Shultz/President dated September 27, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E98-069/1#222

~~SECRET~~

BY KML NARA DATE 11/16/10