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Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

February 16, 1984

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Marshall Breger
FR: Herbert A. Fierst

RE: Lt. Commander Arnold Resnikof, Jewish Chaplain, Sixth Fleet

As requested in our telephone conversation this afternoon, here is the background you need for obtaining the brief return of Commander Resnikof for the JINSA dinner:

1. Call Admiral Neal Stevenson, Chief of Navy Chaplains; 694-4327 (unless you prefer to go through Secretary Weinberger's office).

2. The Navy is sponsoring an important event for the American Jewish community. The White House wants him to address a dinner honoring Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick; the keynote address will be delivered by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle. The dinner will be at 7:00 pm, Sunday 4 March.


3. We would like Commander Resnikof to return for 48 hours to attend the dinner. If this is possible, we will send further details.

4. Time is of the essence, so that all the necessary arrangements can be made.

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19 March 1984

Marshall Breger, Special Assistant
to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Marshall:

On behalf of the Board of Advisors and the Board of Directors of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, I would like to thank you for all of your assistance in bringing Lt. Commander Arnold Resnicoff to our Annual Dinner on 4 March.

The evening was a tremendous success, and I'm only sorry you were unable to join us. Rabbi Resnicoff's moving remarks added great significance to the evening.

Again, our deep appreciation for your efforts.

With all good wishes

Shoshana Bryen
Executive Director

Board of Advisors

Sen. Rudy Boschwitz
Lt. Gen. Devo! Brett (Ret.)

Paul S. Cutter
The Hon. Jack Kemp
I. L. Kenen


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Jacques Torczyner
Gen. John Vogt (Ret.)
Gordon Zacks

Adm. Elmo Zumwalt (Ret.)

Sincerely,



Shoshana Bryen
Executive Director

SB/mpd



SECURITY AFFAIRS

Editorial

BRAVO!!!

Our admiration for US determination to catch and try the murderers of a US citizen is unqualified. Our esteem for the US Navy and its ability to perform so skillfully in service of the defense of our people is likewise unqualified. We believe our feelings are widely shared, even by some who have not been all that supportive of our military.

It takes a great deal to bring Americans to the end of our enormous store of patience, but the Palestinian terrorists have worked at it exceptionally hard for a long time. There is relief in knowing that you know who the bad guys are, and that your government knows it too.

We are pleased, too, by the refusal of Greece and Tunisia to allow the terrorists' plane to land. They have, it appears, learned it is not in their interest to accommodate terrorists.

Those are the simple feelings.

But there are some feelings more complicated and sobering. Italy, a NATO country, a longtime friend, a country able to face hard choices about domestic terrorism has behaved in a way that is immoral and illegal. The government of Italy broke the US-Italian extradition treaty and smuggled a terrorist out of the country to escape justice. Italian Prime Minister Craxi's protestation that Abu Abbas had a diplomatic passport is meaningless. As is the new warrant for Abbas's arrest.

Egypt, the US hope for Arab moderation, pro-Westernism and peace with Israel, did more than avert its eyes as the Palestinian terrorists left their country. Is Egypt so threatened by internal dissent that Mubarak had to demand a formal apology from the US for our interception of their plane carrying terrorists they had released? President Mubarak lied but he feels wronged because we caught him in the lie. It is, apparently, our job not to embarrass him, nor his to tell the truth. Egypt does not deserve an apology for our actions, and will not get one.

One couldn't expect much of Yugoslavia.

While the Administration considers how to express displeasure with people we believed shared some of our most basic assumptions about life, liberty and terrorism, we must remember that most people don't.

Italy was behaving true to form: it has long been an Italian policy to fight only one group of terrorists—the Red Brigade. (This, of course, ignores the well-known fact that the Red Brigade and many other terrorist groups are intimately linked.) Italian governments have assumed that if they were nice to other terrorists, other terrorists would leave them alone. They saw no reason to change their policy in the recent confrontation. Perhaps they will have learned something.

None of this, however, should keep us from pursuing justice. Nor should it dampen our enthusiasm for having found that we are not powerless (although clearly we cannot work in a vacuum) and that it feels good to exercise our power in a moral, legal, ethical and effective way.

Bravo!!!

NEWSBRIEFS

TESTING ISRAELI GUNS: The US Marine Corps has decided to test a 60mm Israeli cannon for use on a new armored vehicle. A Belgian 90mm gun is also being tested. Israel Military Industries and Mecar of Belgium beat out French and British companies for the testing contract. The eventual winner of the competition will supply guns for the Marines' planned purchase of 758 light armored vehicles (LAVs) ranging from those used for command and control to those equipped with anti-tank and air defense missiles.

US FUNDING SOVIET BUILDUP?: According to a CIA report released by the Pentagon, Soviet acquisitions (legal and illegal) over the past ten years of US technology have resulted in gains for the Soviet military establishment. Among the Soviet weapons systems

that use technology obtained from the West are fire control radar on the MiG-29 jet fighter; space-based chemical laser weapons; a new torpedo for Soviet subs; and microelectronics and computers. (See related item below)

(Continued on page 6)

Correction

In last month's *News Briefs* column, we incorrectly stated the percentage of South Africa's exports which go to Israel. The correct figure is one half of one percent.

NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM: WILL THE WEST BE FOOLED AGAIN?

R.K. Squire

Ed Note: Mr. Squire has served with both the DOD and DOE offices of International Security Affairs (Arms Control) and was a Special Advisor to the Ambassador, U.S. Comprehensive Test Ban (Negotiation) Mission during the Carter Administration.

When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced a Soviet "moratorium" on nuclear testing many in the West with long memories felt a sense of déjà vu, for it seemed that the world was to be subjected to a replay of the events leading up to the 3 year moratorium in 1958 and to the subsequent Soviet breakout. Even The Washington Post, hardly a hotbed of nuclear testing enthusiasts, noted that "The Soviets gave unilateral moratoriums an unfortunately bad name by breaking, with a huge bang, theirs of 1958-61."

But, the larger question, the answer to which resonates with ominous overtones for the West, is how a ban on the testing of nuclear warheads, rather than a ban on the building of nuclear weapons, ever came to be seen as a desirable arms control objective by the U.S. An inquiry into this question offers sobering insights into Soviet "arms control" strategies and Western political vulnerabilities.

Originally, the testing of nuclear warheads had been seen as an issue worth even passing mention in the efforts to control nuclear weapons and to defuse the growing international tensions of the immediate post World War II period. The U.S. Bureau Plan did not single out testing for any special concern; what was at issue was the elimination of nuclear weapons as instruments of war. The Soviet Union apparently embraced a similar view at the time; when they launched their world-wide "peace offensive" in March, 1950, it was to "Ban the Bomb," not to ban tests.

After years of frustration and stalemate on arms control, the U.S. attempted a new approach. In March, 1955 President Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen as "Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament." This action—unprecedented in world history and rare even today among governments of the world—raised disarmament policy to cabinet status. The move was intended, among other things, to show U.S. interest in reaching an accord on the control of nuclear weapons; President Eisenhower's bold action was hailed by the world.

Mr. Stassen quickly gathered an outstanding staff which created a set of guiding principles on which specific arms control policies should be based. At the head of the list were the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the development of concrete measures to guard against surprise attack. On the whole, the White House disarmament staff under Stassen's direction did an extraordinary job, for the recommenda-

tions made at that time—way back in the '50s—are just as valid today. In April, 1956, Mr. Stassen presented these U.S. concepts for a comprehensive arms control program to the London Disarmament Conference.

Originally, the testing of nuclear weapons was not seen as...worth even passing mention in the efforts to control nuclear weapons.

But a year earlier the Soviets had officially tabled at the Bandung Conference a proposal for ending nuclear weapons tests. The subject of an immense international appeal, for much of the world had developed an inordinate fear of fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests. At the Geneva Summit Conference in July, 1955, Soviet Premier Bulganin had repeated the call for a test ban. In London in 1956, the Soviets greatly stepped up the pressure for a test ban and succeeded in turning the attention of the London Disarmament Conference away from the American proposals. Mr. Stassen struggled with the Soviet opposition to the U.S. initiatives and with the Soviet's adamant, single-minded approach to the complex issues of the Conference.

After a year of fruitless negotiations in London, Mr. Stassen returned to Washington in May, 1957 for a series of conferences culminating in a meeting with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. After that meeting Mr. Dulles announced that the President had decided that the linkage between the nuclear-test issue and a cutoff on weapon production and other U.S. disarmament propositions could be loosened. The U.S. would also, Dulles said, take up the Soviet "offer" of a temporary suspension of nuclear tests.

The U.S. policy of opposition to a nuclear test ban, separate from other disarmament measures, had been overturned.

The outcome is well known. From that day in May, 1957 to August, 1961, the U.S. became increasingly absorbed with the concept of a test ban as an arms control measure and with the mechanics of a formal negotiation of a test ban with the Soviet Union. Those in the West, and there were many, who warned that there was little or no relationship between a test ban and arms control were ignored; the emotional appeal of a test ban was too powerful a siren call for the democracies to resist. Of course in the end the West got neither a test ban nor arms control.

(Continued on page 6)

EDITORIALS

GORBACHEV IN PARIS

When Mikhail Gorbachev hired the Soviet equivalent of J. Walter Thompson to manage his publicity, he appeared to have hit on a good thing: Westerners, being accustomed to political campaigns, would see his campaign Western-style. The reviews are in on his trip to Paris, and they are mixed. But the West did better than expected.

The Gorbachev show had some style and grace. Mrs. Gorbachev was notably more attractive than her predecessors. Unfortunately, some "analysts" thought that had something to do with arms control. French President Mitterrand was able to make the distinction and was admirably firm in his determination not to have France used as a wedge between Europe and the US. He flatly refused Soviet-French negotiations on nuclear weapons. He even swallowed his distaste for SDI and refused to condemn it for the benefit of Gorbachev's image. Others, including some in the media, appear to be following Mitterrand's lead.

While campaigning is certainly new to Soviets, and while Soviets might find themselves impressed that their leader can eat with grace in the Palace of Versailles, Westerners have seen many, many campaigns. We have become just a little bit cynical when style and substance don't match.

And, in this case, they don't match because the "new Soviet man" was offering mainly old proposals. Gorbachev announced "50-50" as a goal for strategic arms reductions, but continued to call anything that can hit the Soviet Union "strategic"—including our medium-range missiles in Europe. He announced his old desire to negotiate separately with France and Britain, dividing us from our allies by more than an ocean. Britain declined, joining France. Gorbachev's insistence on stopping SDI is only a new incarnation of the old Soviet desire to stop anything the US prefers to be doing well.

(That is not to say that he didn't say anything new. He did. He said, with a straight face, that if there is a country in which Jews fare better than they do in the USSR, he doesn't know what country that is. A large demonstration of Frenchmen turned out to tell him.)

Whether the Soviet proposals can form the basis of serious arms control negotiations remains to be seen. Congenial optimism makes us hope so, but experience and history make us skeptical. For the moment, it is enough to say that the Gorbachev show was seen for what it is—an attempt to push style over substance—and that he seems to have failed.

And that is good news, as we go to the summit, as much for what it says about us as for what it says about him.

WHO DID WHAT TO WHOM AND WHO PAYS THE BILL?

Ahwas Liberation Front

Al Sa'iq

Anti-Imperialist Fighters for a Free Palestine

Arab Revolutionary Movement

Black June Organization

Black September Organization

Eagles of the Palestine Revolution

Fatah

Free Nasserite Revolutionaries

Justice for Palestine Organization

Marabitt Movement

Organization for the Vengeance of the Martyrs of Sabra and Shatila

Organization of Avengers of Palestinian Youth

Palestine Front Against Qatar

Palestine Liberation Front

Palestine Liberation Organization

Palestinian Revolutionary Armed Forces

People's League of Free Palestine

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The above are only some of the Palestinian terrorist organizations which have claimed responsibility or been blamed for specific attacks. The US State Department, which maintains a more complete list, qualifies the names by saying:

Certain of the claims of responsibility are probably false. Some of the names may be fictional ones invented by organizations not wishing to accept responsibility for particular actions or by criminals or psychotics for their own purposes. In some cases the group names listed may be merely different English versions of the same group names. In other cases, organizations may have claimed credit (or have been blamed) for actions they did not take.

Let us now consider Yasser Arafat's disclaimer that the pirates of the Achille Lauro and murderers of a US citizen were "not from the PLO". Assume even that they came from one of the other organizations on the list. How, then, can Arafat

claim the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people? Apparently, the Palestinian people have more representatives than they could possibly know what to do with.

If Arafat is taken at his word (a risky proposition at best), the authority of the PLO in any possible negotiation with Jordan, with the US and certainly with Israel, dwindles to minuscule dimensions. The only reason we might ever have had to hold discussions with the PLO was to end the cycle of terrorist violence. Arafat clearly cannot, even if he should want to, and so his bargaining chip is gone.

ISRAEL'S RAID REVISITED

The Administration should go back and reassess its reaction to the Israeli retaliatory raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia.

When President Reagan spoke last summer about US retaliation, he said it depended on the confluence of several elements: positive identification of the terrorists; identification of the group to which they belonged; an appropriate target to hit; and certainty of little or no collateral damage, including, of course, no casualties among the innocent. Only then, he said, would retaliation be acceptable.

Critics immediately charged that by setting the standards high, the President had ensured that they could not be met. No so. He simply ensured that proportionate retaliation would not be easily confused with indiscriminate retribution.

Israel's raid on PLO headquarters met all the criteria. It was retaliation, not retribution. It was sure. It was almost surgical. And the President's first reaction (which one suspects was his real one) was that Israel had acted properly in defense of the security of her citizens.

Unfortunately, every US reaction after the first retreated from the position articulated by the President. The legitimacy of retaliation as self-defense was questioned by anonymous worrywarts at the Pentagon. A statement deploring all violence regardless of source came from the Secretary of State, although it is determined to blur the distinction between victims and aggressors. (See "Security Affairs" Aug/Sept.) Sympathy for the destruction in Tunisia came from almost everywhere, though there has been little sympathy for the Israelis murdered around the world.

And, finally, there was the cowardly American abstention at the UN. And our allies were wise. We abstained. They had the nerve to defend the harboring of terrorists—an immoral position which encourages only more terrorism.

We should have affirmed them, not later, that countries harboring people committing terrorist acts are not immune to the effects of retaliation. This affirmation shouldn't have waited for our interception of the Egyptian airplane holding the terrorists. Although we had encouraged Tunisia to take members of the PLO as refugees, we did not expect or encourage them to permit terrorist acts from their territory.

The fact is, terrorists don't happen to have their headquarters and training camps in Western countries (except maybe Italy)—although they may have operatives there. The TWA hijackers didn't happen to take the plane to Kansas City. They didn't happen to negotiate from Chicago. They didn't happen to melt into the scenery in New Orleans. They hide where it is hard to catch them and where they believe no democratic government will go after them. They especially don't hide in the Soviet Union. In fact, they don't live in any country with an infrastructure strong enough to stop them—if that country wants to.

We have proven that the US can and will go after terrorists—that it will be harder and harder to hide from us. We have said now that there can be no haven for terrorists. We are right and we are on the record. Will we go back and admit that our partner in this fight, Israel, did no more or less than we are willing to do?

Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

I was filled with great emotion when I read the latest article regarding my comrades stationed around the European and Mediterranean areas.

Needless to say I was a bit disappointed to see that the only two Rabbits in uniform in the Pacific, (not by name, but at least by presence) were not acknowledged.

I realize that it was merely an oversight and am sure that in the future some device will be conceived to correct this unfortunate error.

I am also writing to inform you that your newsletter is given great respect by the members of the Seventh Fleet PAO. When I am done reading it my friends over there eagerly await its receipt in our guard mail service.

I know that the news you print gives them a glimpse into nonpropagandist material. Please don't flag in your constant vigilance. Look forward to every edition of the newsletter.

Respectfully,
Jonathan A. Panitz
LT, CHCC, USNR

IS THERE A STRATEGIC VALUE IN ARMING HUSSEIN?

Making arms sale policy is difficult. The US has numerous interests in the Middle East to balance, and more than one objective: Although there will be no further action on arms sales to Jordan until at least 1 March 1986, the interregnum would be well spent examining issues in the absence of pressure. We should consider whether there is any common objective among the US, Israel and Jordan. There is: preventing the realization of Syrian aspirations to control "Greater Syria" territory which includes Lebanon, Jordan and northern Israel.

President Assad has made no secret of his belief that Israel, Jordan and Lebanon should have no "artificial" borders, and that all should be ruled from Damascus. Frustration of his plan

Jordan has no diplomatic antidote for its problems with Israel either—inviting the Soviets to a conference, clinging to the PLO and refusing to negotiate directly with Israel are not likely to bring peace to the region any time soon.

It is true that tension will heighten. However, the Administration admits that Syria's first moves against Jordan involve terrorism which has already begun. And Improved I-HAWK surface air-missiles will not do a thing to stop it. Why has the US not discussed counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training, and internal security measures?

2) "The Jordanian Air Force probably could not hold off a Syrian attack for more than a few days... Syria's air power would operate with relative ease."

A) the Jordanians wouldn't have to;

It is absurd to speak of using Jordanian military capability to protect Israel from a Soviet presence.

should be seen as the common element in US policy toward the three potential "victim" countries.

In a carefully worded article in *The New York Times*, the Administration's policy concerning Jordan and arms was revealed to contain some of that understanding, but also some basic misconceptions. The major points deserve to be looked at. More than a single arms sale proposal rests on these understandings.

1) "Every step Jordan takes toward peace with Israel will virtually guarantee greater tension with Syria. Here is a cycle of violence for which Jordan has no diplomatic antidote—only the deterrence of its armed force."

and b) the Syrians wouldn't be allowed to. It is not likely that Syria would lead into Jordan with its air force. And, in any event, Syrian planes off the ground in attack formation would be considered a prima facie threat to Israel. They would be dealt with by the IAF as such.

The idea that Israel would let the Syrian Air Force operate "with ease" anywhere near the Israeli border is naive.

Furthermore, Syria has a wealth of tanks, and some ability in tank warfare—as Israel admits following engagements in the Bekka Valley. It would be more appropriate to consider arming Jordan against the tank threat: anti-tank missiles, including TOWs (which Israel used with success). More appropriate,

more to the point and probably less than threatening to Israel.

If HAWKS are deemed essential, why do away with the eminently successful 1977 compromise to set them in cement as the new sale proposals to do? At that time, the HAWKS were placed around Amman and vital military areas to form a point defense. This time, rather than supplying mobile HAWKS, they could be mounted in northern Jordan. They would still not address the real threat to Jordanian security (terrorism and tanks), but they would pose a lesser threat to Israel.

3) Giving Jordan sophisticated air defense would spare Israel "The Hobson's choice of either intervening in a war between Arabs or standing by as the Soviet-armed enemies took control of its longest frontier."

For the reason stated above, there is no Hobson's choice. Israel intervened in Jordan's Civil War in 1970 to the extent necessary to prevent Syria from taking advantage of the chaos. And Israel would do so again.

It is, furthermore, absurd, to speak of using Jordanian military capability to protect Israel from a Soviet presence. One might more reasonably admit that the security of Jordan rests upon the military capability of Israel and proceed from there.

And why does the Administration not do that? First, because of the understandable political delicacy involved. But also because the Administration operates under a series of political and historical misconceptions. One might, by now expect not to have to deal in such depth with history, but someone hasn't been paying attention. For example:

4) "The absence of any redress for the political aspirations of the Palestinian people has been one factor underlying its (Jordan's) 37 years of armed hostility toward Israel."

This ignores at least two facts. First, that most of the Palestinian refugees were created by Arab leaders telling Arab residents of the Mandate area to flee until Arab victory over the Jews. Those Arabs who remain in Israel are citizens. Those who remain stateless after 37 years do so because of Arab belligerence in the face of the UN creation of Israel. This was followed by Arab intransigence.

Second, Jordan had "redress" for Palestinian aspirations from 1948, when Jordan annexed the West Bank in the face of near-unanimous world opposition (only Britain and Pakistan recognized the annexation), until 1967 when King Hussein lost it in a war he was warned to stay out of.

5) "The King has put forward his peace initiative precisely so that this time bomb [spreading the cycle of violence to Palestinians in Jordan] will no longer threaten the existence of his nation."

The existence of his nation is threatened by two factors (aside from Syria) that would not disappear even in the event of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank: 1) The PLO has declared Jordan as bastard a state as Israel and plans to make it part of "Palestine"; and 2) the demographic composition of Jordan do not favor the Bedouin King.

6) "Israel's frontier with Jordan... has been quiet for 15 years. Jordan, a frequent terrorist target, has steadfastly kept its territory from being used as a staging ground for terrorist attacks against Israel."

True, of course, but why? The 15 years are those since Black September. Hussein's success in throwing out the PLO was bloody, and came only with Israeli assistance in keeping Syria at bay.

It was costly to remove the PLO from between Jordan and Israel, but in its absence, quiet prevails.

Furthermore, the PLO left Jordan for Lebanon. The previously quiet Israel-Lebanon border came the only available opening for PLO terrorist attacks into Israel.

It should be clearer than ever today that where the PLO goes, terrorism and other trouble follows. The governments of Syria, Egypt and Jordan know it is in their interest to keep terrorists from infiltrating into Israel, and so they cooperate.

In sum, the Administration knows how to make a good case for the importance of King Hussein (something that was never in doubt). The Administration can make a fair case for addressing Jordan's security concerns even though the proposed solution is inappropriate. But thus far, there has been no case made for the confluence of US, Jordanian and Israeli interests which surely exists.

Our own interests are best served by explicitly recognizing that Israel, Jordan and Lebanon are natural allies against Syria. The US cannot now arm Lebanon. We should arm Jordan and Israel in a mutually complementary manner—one which minimizes the threat they pose to each other.

King Hussein might well be offended by a presumed affront to his political stature, but the US has deeper concerns. It is about time US interests were expressed in arms sales.

NEWSLETTER

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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As We Go to Press

The Nunn-Goldwater report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, has just been released. The 645-page bipartisan staff study, launched in 1982 by Senators John Tower and Henry Jackson, is of major importance. JINSA will be presenting relevant selections and expert commentary on the report in coming months.

SDI AND ISRAEL: OPPORTUNITIES AND QUESTIONS ARISE

by Emanuel A. Winston

Ed. Note: Mr. Winston is a trustee of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and is a contributing editor to Israel Today.

America is throwing a \$25 billion party and Israel has been invited. The question is, "Will the come, and will the arrive in time for the main course?"

The "party" is the Strategic Defense Initiative—a scientific initiative planned to answer the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles. It is a defensive program which, with bolts of energy traveling through space, is designed to destroy missiles as they leave their launch pad.

It is anticipated that the results of this almost new field of research and development will hurt our scientific knowledge forward with blinding speed. The space research programs of the recent past provided the world with new knowledge in working materials, medi-

Paying the Bills

It must be recognized that in the US, Europe and Japan, there are facilities which have very expensive, in-place, well-equipped research laboratories. R&D facilities exist in private industry and in well-financed science-based universities. Will Israel be able to compete on tender (bid) offers against these well-financed giants?

When Israeli industry bids, it will often have to include the capital outlay for purchase of the basic equipment, in addition to the cost of the actual work done. Will the US take this into consideration when the bids are issued? Perhaps Israel's participation in the Administration's request to Congress will act as a counter-balance or as an offset from the beginning. If not, what consideration, if any, can Israel receive? Has the government of Israel made any such request?

instance, "Aviation Week and Space Technology" (9/2/85) lists 22 US companies which had been awarded a total of \$408,958,000 as of April 1984.

(Israel has) much to offer, but can't be disorganized or expected to sell (its) hard-won expertise cheap.

Bids on Specifications

There is another area in which Israel must work to get a fair share of available contracts. Often when a new contract is to be let, and there are no standing plans or specifications, a leading contractor or expert is called in to assist in developing these parameters. The participating contractor has certain initial advantages by establishing specifications (Mil-Specs), which fit his capabilities and equipment. Once these Mil-Specs are established, all other competing bidders must use them as the basis for their tender (bid). Even if there are later financial changes allowed, the initial bid must be made according to the bid specs.

In certain areas, Israel may be able to bid competitively (as in communications), but in other areas the would clearly do better if they participated in creating the specs. Is Israel prepared?

It can be assumed that sophisticated manufacturers in the US, Europe and Japan have been maneuvering for some time to ensure themselves as large a share of the contracts as possible. It can also be assumed that various lobbyists have been employed in Washington to line up political support for their clients. Has Israel acted fast enough in this arena? Or are Israelis arguing the merits of SDI among themselves while smart, enterprising corporations have already secured preferred positions?

In "Newsweek" (6/17/85), it was clearly stated that private industry in European countries has been going around their governments to evade of-

ficial footdragging and indecision. The science and military-based industries recognize that if they wait for their governments to negotiate or establish policy through normal, political bureaucracy, they will lose business. In some cases, governments have even encouraged industries to circumvent the internal political difficulties.

The Benefits

Israel's science and military knowledge is quite advanced and can be of incalculable value to the SDI program. In fact, in many areas they are years ahead of the West and the East. They have much to offer, but can't be disorganized or be expected to sell their hard-won expertise cheap.

In fact, the opposite is true, Israel must map a strategy for full participation in SDI. And further, must decide what, aside from money, there is to be gained by participating. If Israel is to supply technological expertise to the program, she must also walk away with new technology. Areas of SDI research in which Israel does not directly participate must be open to her. Minimally, her scientists should be allowed to share in the R&D originating in Israel and observe the assembly in the US of the final products to which they have contributed components. These points must be raised early.

In August, there was an international conference on SDI in Israel, where Dr. Edward Teller, the "father" of the hydrogen bomb and leader in SDI decision-making, spoke of the merits of SDI for America, the world, and for Israel's science and industry.

Dr. Teller was brought to Israel by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS). The Director of IASPS, Professor Robert J. Lowenberg, initiated this conference for the purpose of asking Dr. Teller, who favors Israel's participation, some of the questions voiced in this article. A follow-up, public SDI conference is planned by IASPS for late November, and will focus on business opportunities for Israel and the advancement of science into the year 2000.

With SDI research, technologies such as laser surgery...are expected to improve; plastics will replace expensive metal; ceramics will out-perform metals and plastics; computer and communications fields will...grow exponentially.

cine, communications, and more. This knowledge was put to use in profitable conventional industry. With SDI research, technologies such as laser surgery for the eye are expected to improve; plastics will replace expensive metal; ceramics will out-perform metals and plastics; computer and communications fields will continue to grow exponentially.

All of these current and future technical advances will be very important for Israel in the next 15-20 years, if she keeps pace with the world leaders.

Most knowledgeable Israelis have already answered the question, "Will Israel participate?" What presently confronts Israeli industry, the military and the government is, "How?"

What can Israel do to ensure its full participation and profit from the contracts to be awarded to the winners of competitive bidding? How will the US benefit from Israeli expertise? How will Israel benefit from future profits which will come from the technological spin-offs that can be expected in so many fields?

There remain even more questions to be asked and requests to be made, if Israel is to participate as a full-fledged partner with America in SDI.

For example, does the mere fact of Israel's cooperation provide the US with benefits? Will Congress be more disposed to pass the required budget if Israel is part of the program? Will Israel's friends in Congress see the benefits not only in terms of US defense requirements, but also warmly approve of the close working relationship that will result from this long-term project? In a word, will the appropriation requests be more likely to pass (without substantial cuts) if Israel's name is in the bill?

If so, will Israel benefit in proportion to a dual role?

Certainly Israel can expect to see small contracts awarded without bids at the discretion of the program's US directors. These contracts are not to be disregarded, because, although they may be small in comparison to the total available, defense contractors and industries will welcome them warmly. However, will they receive merely token contracts, while the more lucrative contracts are placed elsewhere?

Significant contracts have already been awarded in the US, prior to the official start-up of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization operation. For

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RABBIS AMONG WARRIOR PART IV

by Albert W. Bloom

STUTTGART, West Germany—Chaplain Kenneth J. Leinwand, 33, is married to pretty Bracha (Blessing), an Israeli of Kurdish descent (third of nine children). The ex-Foxian calls Jerusalem "home." He keeps a Koran in his Hebrew library for Muslims, and remarks, "I have more freedom, Jewishly, in the Army than in any other form of the rabbinate."

Chaplain Leinwand is an example of the bright and many-faced people who are in the U.S. military chaplaincy overseas, "Rabbis among Warriors" in the "new" Army, Navy, Air Force.

About Chaplain Leinwand and others like him, Brig. Gen. Richard G. Cardillo, 52, of East Orange, N.J. and Denver, chief of staff of the U.S. Seventh Corps, remarks:

"A good commander turns to his chaplains for moral advice."

General's Operations Cover Most of Germany

Gen. Cardillo's area covers "half-to-two-thirds of Germany". The general is a Catholic of Italian descent who "made it" in an America of opportunity. He notes:

"We are dealing with a new Army of young people; youngsters who often for the first time are away from home. They are freer, their parental bonds are gone. They are eager to explore and exchange ideas. Their philosophical ideas are still forming. And one of the first things they change is their attitude toward religion."

Gen. Cardillo is a vigorous man with an erect military bearing even when sitting comfortably. As he spoke to us, he was dressed in camouflage uniform. His jet black hair was flecked with a touch of gray, attesting to his heavy responsibilities as commander in this North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) post.

"We don't want to tell our people church or synagogue. But our first job is to minister to the young. Once we do that to our men and their families, we want to encourage them to be part of their own religious environment."

"I don't have enough chaplains, Jewish or Catholic."

We Are All Success Oriented

"The difficult thing is that we are all success-oriented. We are interested in success with the soldier and with his family—and they are younger these days. Attendance at religious services in the military overseas is based on the family, but there are only a few teenagers in attendance, and often only about two percent are the soldiers themselves."

"We fail somewhere. Chaplains of all faiths have a heavy duty. It is difficult anywhere today (let alone far from home) to take an 18-to-20-year-old man or woman and in 18-to-20 months make a drastic change in his or her whole attitude toward life. But we do it. We focus on success."

Chaplains of Christian faiths often express surprise that even though Jews are few and scattered over the varied command units, they seem to gravitate to their Jewish religious and social institutions in groups disproportionate to their numbers.

"One Jewish soldier remarked to us: 'We are pretty isolated over here. I don't see another Jewish person during the whole week.'"



RABBIS AMONG WARRIORS IV:

Cold autumn rain falls as Chaplain Kenneth J. Leinwand (left with dark stripe on trousers) leads prayer at gravesite unweaving in Stuttgart, West Germany. German Jewish community feels a "closeness" to the chaplain and he is frequently asked to officiate on such occasions.

Photo by Albert W. Bloom

Chaplain Leinwand observed that "Jewish identity often seems more important to these soldiers than their religious practices."

Chaplain Leinwand Runs Open House Study Groups

While there are not enough little children to have a religious school at the Stuttgart base, Chaplain Leinwand holds "open house" and study groups in his home for children, youth and adults. His wife Bracha is the "religious studies coordinator". He also provides individuals with self-study texts, compliments of JWB's Commission on Jewish Chaplaincy.

Here again, "lay leaders" are needed to keep a Jewish continuity going in remote stations where the chaplain rarely can visit.

Chaplain Leinwand is also administrative funding officer for the chaplains under the jurisdiction of Col. Chandler P. Robbins II, 49, deputy commanding officer, Stuttgart.

"Chaplains are as important as surgeons to the Army," said Col. Robbins. "The chaplaincy is as American as motherhood and apple pie. We could not imagine our military services without our chaplains and their help."

The Stuttgart Military Community is "like a large American city within a German city...we are scattered all over the map," said Col. Robbins, gesturing to a chart on his wall.

"We support 30,000 soldiers, their dependents, and civilian employees in the Stuttgart Military Community, along with the logistical services. The needs of the American population here go very deep, very broad, regardless of religious denomination."

"We've Got to Worry About Americans 24 Hours a Day"

"We have got to worry about our American community 24 hours a day, including families with family problems. This is different from life in the U.S.A. We also have German law to worry about, since 'status of forces' agreements regulate relationships between

Americans and Germans in the host country."

In fact, most German Jews do not feel or consider themselves West Germans, though they hold West German passports. The legacy of the recent past, Hitler's murderous legacy, is present, even when people put on their social-blinders.

Therefore, the Stuttgart Jewish community feels a closeness in many respects to American Jewish Chaplain Leinwand. When the local civilian rabbi of the "Stuttgart Gemeinde" community was absent on a day we were there, Chaplain Leinwand was summoned to officiate at an unveiling of a gravestone in the Jewish cemetery. He went routinely, as did we, despite the cold fall rain. The mourner's kaddish mingled with the thunders above.

Hardly a word was spoken between the two communities of mourners. The raindrops hid the tears in a cemetery where there was a gap of a generation on the gravestone markers!

In central Stuttgart, the Jewish community has a rebuilt, new (1951) "Gemeinde Centrum," with two synagogues, a school, a library, a kosher restaurant, a mikvah (ritualarium), and communal offices, guarded by sophisticated electronic security services, a precaution against Arab terrorists.

Dinner at Kosher Restaurant With Leaders

Leaders of the Gemeinde waited dinner for us at the kosher restaurant. They were Roman and Lote Mandelbaum, he of Crakow, she a Stuttgart native. How did the survive the Nazis? "I was not Jewish then," she smiled. After the war, she converted to Judaism, married, and became a leader in the community. Roman is an engineer. Arno Fern, a textile manufacturer, who was born in Nuremberg, was with us, too.

They estimate there are about 700 Jews in the Stuttgart area, about 420 in the city itself—with as many as 200 more "unregistered" for a variety of reasons, including social and psychological "escapism."

The future? "I am not sure that there

is a 'future' for Jews in Germany," Mandelbaum insists. "People come back to die."

"Some are afraid of anti-Semitism, still." Why do they come? Some because it is more "natural" for them, despite the painful memories; some to qualify for their pensions, which they can only receive if they reside in the country; still others are Jewish refugees from Nazi-shattered, post-war Eastern Europe, now Soviet occupied.

The chaplain, a graduate of Hebrew Union College and the University of Manitoba, has been in the Army for seven and a half years.

Chaplain Leinwand's parents have come from Israel, where they had retired, to live near their son in West Germany. Sidney Leinwand is a volunteer lay leader in Heilbronn. He also teaches science in a junior high school. Florence Leinwand, the chaplain's mother, is the registrar of the City College of Chicago branch connected with the U.S. military overseas.

Chaplain Feels Strongly About His Roles

Chaplain Leinwand views his roles as:

"1. Opportunity for every Jewish person in the military to express his or her Jewish identity."

"2. The best image of Jews and Judaism within the Army."

"3. Education to non-Jews about Judaism and joining in dialogue between Jews, Christians and other non-Jews."

"4. A patriotic expression of the ideal of religious freedom in America by service in the military."

He urges more Jewish youngsters to join the military and those who are eligible, the chaplaincy, for unique Jewish service.

One of his duties as chaplain is educational coordinator of religious teachers of various faiths in the U.S. military. We met them, all bright young American wives and mothers.

Now these U.S. civilian teachers are planning with Chaplain Leinwand to visit the Holy Land, a pilgrimage which he will lead to Jerusalem, a place Chaplain Leinwand calls "home."

✓ file.

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February 20, 1984

Dr. Marshall Breger
Special Assistant to the President
Office of Public Liaison
Room 197, OEOB
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Marshall,

Shoshana Bryen
Executive Director

Just a short note to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to meet with me, Saul and Herb last Friday. I think we had a very worthwhile and interesting discussion.


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Enclosed is the information you requested: the Lavi article, which appeared in our November Newsletter; the schedule for Pentagon Fly-In V; and the list of participants on JINSA's second mission to Israel.

I look forward to seeing you again soon.

With all good wishes

Sincerely,



Shoshana Bryen
Executive Director

SB/mk

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PARTICIPANTS ON JINSA'S SECOND MISSION TO ISRAEL:

Mr. & Mrs. Saul Stern
Mr. & Mrs. Herbert Fierst
Dr. & Mrs. Lawrence Goldmuntz
Mr. Galen Kelly
Mr. Clement Caditz
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SCHEDULE FOR PENTAGON FLY-IN V:

Monday 5 March 1984

8:30-9:45 AM: Dr. Stephen Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Trade and Security Policy:
"Technology Transfer"

10:00-11:00 AM: Col. Jack Spitler:
National Military Command Center

11:15-12:15 PM: Rear Adm. Donald Felt, Assistant Deputy Director for Force Development & Strategic Plans:
"US Nuclear Defenses"

12:30-2:00 PM: General Bernard Trainor (USMC), Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Operations & Policy:
"Lebanon"

2:15-3:30 PM: Nestor Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs:
"Grenada and Central America"

3:45-4:30 PM: Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke (USAF, Ret.)

JINSA LETTER

JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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December 1983

NEWSBRIEFS

KUWAITI DEFENSE MINISTER TO GO TO MOSCOW: The Soviet Union has invited the Defense Minister of Kuwait to visit Moscow in 1984 for military cooperation talks. The visit will be the first to Moscow by a defense leader from the conservative Gulf Cooperation Council.

US COMPUTER SEIZED IN SWEDEN: A US-manufactured computer was seized in the Swedish port of Helsingborg, apparently en route to the Soviet Union. The computer has the capacity to guide long-range missiles and is identical to a computer that was confiscated in Hamburg, West Germany, in early November. West Germany, which is a member of the Coordinating Committee, a technology-export watchdog panel, has cooperated fully with the US in its efforts to keep sensitive American technology from reaching the USSR. However, Sweden is not a member of the Committee and is more liberal in its trade policies with the Soviets. The Reagan Administration is conducting negotiations with the Swedish government to prevent the shipment of the computer.

HOUSE APPROVES EGYPTIAN BARE MONEY: The House Appropriations subcommittee on military construction has approved \$49 million to build facilities at an Egyptian base that would be used by US rapid deployment forces in the event of an emergency in the Middle East. The committee approved the funds on condition that no further US money be spent; this is a decrease from the Administration's proposed \$870 million to be spent on the facility at Ras Banas on the Red Sea. The funds, which would be matched by Egyptian funds, would be spent on improving an airport runway and constructing a desalination plant for drinking water, a fire station and jet fuel tanks.

IRAQ OFFERS TO HOLD MISSILES: The government of Iraq has offered not to use the Super-Standard fighter-bombers which it has received from France in its war with Iran, if Iran will accept a UN Security Council cease-fire resolution. Iraq has already accepted

the resolution which also calls for peace talks to end the four-year old war. The President of Japan, Mr. Nakasone, is deeply involved in mediation efforts between the two countries and has urged the US to join him; however, the Administration has declined, citing its total lack of influence with Iran and limited influence on Iraq, whose main Western friend is France.

ARMS SALES: Britain expects to take the Number 3 world position in arms sales this year by selling a record \$3.3 billion in weapons. London has recently sold \$150 million in Rapier surface-to-air defense missiles to Turkey. Meanwhile, the US is planning to buy Franco-German Roland missiles to give to Turkey, Israel, which is the fifth largest arms seller, has asked Grumman, which is a major contractor for the Israeli Levi, to help it sell 300 old A-4 strike fighters. Malaysia, although a Muslim country, has agreed to buy 34 of the A-4 planes.

Globalized US ARMS SALES IN 1983: The Reagan Administration announced that it concluded \$18.3 billion in arms sales in fiscal 1983 to 74 nations and NATO. This was a decrease of \$3.1 billion from the previous year, however 1984 may set another record. Nearly \$8.8 billion in sales were pending when fiscal 1984 began in October and the Pentagon has proposed the sale of 160 F-16 jet fighters to Turkey for another \$4.2 billion.

US-THAI EXERCISES: American and Thai pilots joined together in combat exercises at Takli Royal Thai Air Force Base, 140 miles north of Bangkok. The exercises were designed to increase coordination between the two countries and includes six F4E fighters and 85 American pilots and 12 F5E warplanes from the Thai Air Force.

JORDAN ON THE RIF: According to Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasbi, Jordan had nothing to do with the proposed rapid deployment force, which has been raised by Congress. He claimed that these "reports" were part of an Israeli media campaign designed

(Continued on page 6)

"DEJA VU"

Israel as a Security Asset for the United States

Editor's Note: The US-Israel strategic cooperation, which is now so much in the news, is not a new concept. The JINSA philosophy has been that the security of Israel is of tremendous importance to the US for American reasons, and the defense and security of the US is important to Israel for Israeli reasons. The interests of the two countries overlap in certain areas, even as they diverge in others. The converging areas provide the overriding basis for "strategic cooperation."

The following article appeared in the JINSA Newsletter in July 1979, and was reprinted in the Congressional Record. It is equally valid today.

The growth of Soviet naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and, through its basing facilities, the Persian Gulf gives the USSR the capability to bottle up Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf oil in a crisis situation. Moreover, the very capability the Soviets are developing creates conditions where the political leaders in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, as well as Northeast Africa, make efforts to be responsive to Soviet requests. All of this is harmful to Western interests. Given the growth in Soviet military capability and the incapacity for the US in the short term to do much directly about it, the following JINSA essay outlines the role Israel may well play in rendering to the US and the Western Alliance vital assistance.

Israel is a small country that, over its brief existence as a modern state, has spent most of its time fighting for its survival. Under this circumstance, consideration of Israel as a security "asset" to the United States might appear as presumptuous.

However, a number of important developments in the Middle East and in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union have altered the picture considerably and have projected Israel from a state dependent entirely on military assistance to a nation of considerable and growing importance to the United States and to the Western Alliance.

These developments can be summarized as follows: the expansion and elaboration of Soviet conventional force and its spill-over into the Middle East; the shifting naval balance of power in the Mediterranean, enhancing Soviet prestige in the third world and placing her nuclear capability realistically within range of the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Most clearly visible is the growth of Soviet conventional military capability and the transfer by the Russians of sophisticated military hardware to her client states in the Middle East. By 1973 the Soviets had moved to the area advanced aircraft of the fighter-bomber variety, including swing-wing

MIO 23 and advanced Tupolev and Sukhoi designs; modern tanks equipped with laser aiming devices and night-fighting gear; modern missiles, including the SA-4, then the most advanced type of its kind, enabling the Russian-backed Arab armies to move forward into Israeli-held territory under a "missile umbrella"; extremely modern bridging equipment, radar and other types of communications and

target designating equipment; and surface-to-surface missiles with strategic potential and moderately long range, possessing relatively good accuracies.

The appearance of massive quantities of Soviet equipment in the region, and the realization by Western experts that much of the military hardware was much more effective than theretofore believed, required Israel to acquire on a rapid basis the means to combat any further convergence of Russian arms into the region. This was done with US backing and strenuous political and economic efforts by Israel, resulting in Israel today fielding one of the best equipped and battle tested military forces of its kind in the world.

Unfortunately, the pace Israel has

(Continued on page 4)



The recent visit of Prime Minister Shamir to Washington has returned the concept of strategic cooperation to the news.

The Board of Directors and the Board of Advisors are pleased to announce the return of Herschel Blumberg to the Board of Directors. Mr. Blumberg is past president of the UJA Federation of Greater Washington.

EDITORIALS

Strategic Cooperation

This Administration is again prepared to place Western interests at the forefront of American strategic planning by giving Israel her proper place as our ally.

King Hussein of Jordan automatically denounced the new spirit of cooperation between the US and Israel, claiming that since the US did not pressure Israel for immediate political concessions, there is no benefit to America. He was followed in short order by President Mubarak and Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia. These "moderate Arabs" have not yet adjusted their rhetoric to the realities of the American position in the Middle East or the world. The world does not begin on the coast of Israel and end in the Persian Gulf.

The United States, as a superpower, has commitments to NATO, among which is the responsibility of ensuring Western access to the vital shipping lanes of the Mediterranean. Soviet power there has grown substantially over the past fifteen years, with little growth in Western capability. The southern flank of NATO (Greece and Turkey) is weak and requires a secure anchor in the form of American naval and air power.

US military planners have acknowledged some of our weaknesses in that area, and have now looked to Israel to assist us. We benefit by drawing upon the strengths of a firmly pro-Western country with an active policy of defending, and approving the defense of, Western interests. It would be further in our interest to look to the inclusion of Israel in NATO, a framework that looks West. Arab rejection of Israel for 35 years does not serve Western interests. Arab countries have not, and are not willing, to provide needed facilities to the US. Israel is.

- There are no US ground bases anywhere in the Arab world, because the Arabs desire to have neither superpower in their region. Even Oman, which is truly pro-Western, has granted us only "facilities," as has Egypt. The Soviets, however, have bases in Aden, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Iraq. The recently formed Gulf Cooperation Council is designed to ensure the independence of the Gulf from superpower rivalry. The countries with Soviet bases do not belong to the GCC.

- The Syrians and the Iraqis have numerous Soviet advisors. The Jordanians flirt outrageously with the Soviets, and Egypt is preparing to reestablish relations (having already invited "technicians" and "advisors" back in).

- The Saudis pay the bills for radical Arabs to purchase Soviet equipment and training, which are then exported to Nicaragua, El Salvador and other countries, damaging Western interests around the globe, and used to kill US servicemen in Lebanon.

- OPEC policies are responsible for recession and unemployment in the West, and the near-bankruptcy of many Third World countries. (For example, 100% of Jamaica's oil is imported, and 90% of her imports are oil.)

While the US would like to have the friendship of moderate Arab states, there seems to be no shared strategic or economic approach.

By contrast there is Israeli militarily and politically committed to the West; able to provide specific assets to the defense of Western interests (see accompanying article); and requiring from us an open, unabashed commitment to her survival and security. It is a good deal.

The only immediate problem is that we have hesitated in turning our commitments into policy. The establishment of committees to determine the precise outline of cooperation is a waste of precious time. We are in Lebanon and Israel is in Lebanon. Immediate cooperation on the ground would allow both countries to manage their positions with maximum efficiency, and make the best use of available allied resources.

President Reagan has long had an appreciation of Israel's importance to the US. He and Prime Minister Shamir should affect cooperation by simple, direct orders to their respective military services.

The Medical Plan

The use, or non-use, of Israeli medical facilities by US forces following the terrorist attack on our Marine HQ in Beirut has less to do with US-Israeli relations than it does with the nature of emergency plans as formulated by the Department of Defense.

The commander on the ground—the man making the immediate decisions affecting the lives of his troops—has at his disposal plans to cover emergencies. They are there to reduce his need to make snap judgments under extreme pressure. His job, as commander, is to use, not to second-guess, those plans. In this case, he used them and the plans worked. (That one soldier died on the way to Germany is an indication that he probably should have remained in the region—i.e., the British Akrotiri hospital in Cyprus—not that he necessarily should have gone to Israel.)

Should we be satisfied because the existing plan worked this time? No. But the questions should be directed at the plan itself and the reason the plan was what it was.

The point of contingency planning is to ensure that all bases will be covered in an emergency, and that all of the facts needed for planning will be available. In the case of Beirut and Israeli facilities, the relevant facts are these:

- 1) Israel has excellent medical facilities and a number of doctors and nurses who speak English;
- 2) Israel is physically close to the scene;
- 3) Israel has a stable government, unlikely to renege on a commitment;
- 4) Israel is allied to the West in all but treaty; and
- 5) Israel has made offers in the past for the use of many facilities.

Why then, did the contingency planners, with the luxuries of time and information, not include Israel in the plan rather than Germany? At a minimum, Rambam Hospital in Israel would appear to be superior to the facility at Akrotiri, for which we made an arrangement with the British.

The reason is the deep-seated unwillingness of American planners to use facilities of *any of our allies*. Not only medical facilities, but any facility. US hospitals in Germany are the only place on the continent we plan to send casualties in the event of a war in Europe. US ships and Diego Garcia are planned for RDF casualties (Diego Garcia is 2000 miles from the Persian Gulf).

There are times and places, of course, that for reasons of national security US plans must rely solely on US facilities and abilities. However, we are constrained by budget and manpower. We cannot presume to produce everything, service everything and repair everything in every part of the world. Somewhere, we must begin to take up offers made by our allies for assistance. Where offers are not forthcoming, and where we believe we need assistance, we must begin to ask.

We must, furthermore, do these things before the crisis arises. Our government has considered and used American military power as an appropriate backup to our diplomacy. With the luxury of time, and in the relative comfort of Washington, military planners must ensure that in an emergency, the nearest and best facilities of our allies will be available to us.

It is not possible to assess any differences that might have occurred in the horrendous death toll of the Beirut massacre had Israeli hospitals been used in addition to or in place of Akrotiri and Wiesbaden. But to couch the decisions of our military on the ground and in Washington in terms of US-Israeli relations is to obscure the larger problems.

The new spirit of cooperation between the US and Israel paves the way for the planners to include Israel in future plans—medical, tactical and strategic. Certainly this should be our priority. If this furthermore becomes the opening through which US experts begin to consider other allied facilities, US-Israeli cooperation will produce benefits for US troops far removed in time and place from the Middle East.

NEWSLETTER

The Jewish Institute is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE VIEW FROM TWO CONTINENTS

Our Nuclear World

Editor's Note: The author has worked in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government.

As we enter the time of year traditionally epitomized by the phrase "peace on earth and good will towards men," it is sad, but realistic, to state that the world is not close to this noble sentiment, and prospects for global stability are not encouraging for the coming year. The US must be prepared for whatever challenges await us.

War and conflict have been part of man's history since the dawn of time. There have been wars, there are wars in several regions today, and unfortunately, they probably will be wars in the future. Man has fought over racial and ethnic differences; natural resources; religion; and ideology. Current examples of such conflicts extend from Southern Africa to Northern Ireland to the Persian Gulf to the Indian subcontinent to the anguished tables of Geneva.

Many of the conflicts that exist, for example, in the Third World, are centuries (or even millennia) old in origin. The parties involved have resorted to types of fighting ranging from conventional warfare to terrorism to chemical warfare. And today, some nations, such as India and Pakistan, are preparing for a possible "next round" with nuclear military program underway.

Herein lie two of the great problems which have arisen in the past 35 years, and which should bring into question the relevance of Western nuclear freeze movements.

First, the technical ability to manufacture nuclear weapons is no longer held exclusively by the super-

powers. Scientists in many smaller nations, with access to materials and adequate financial support could, in time, produce small, crude, but very effective destructive devices. In other words, if a nation will stop at nothing to obtain or produce nuclear weapons, chances are that it may succeed.

Second, despite the awesome size of the nuclear weapons inventories of the US and the USSR, the probability of nuclear war being fought between the two is less than the probability between North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, Iran and Iraq, or India and Pakistan. Where historical and continuous enmities exist between continuous states, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being utilized is greater.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has, by and large, failed to stop some countries from pursuing their nuclear military ambitions. It is in the Third World where nuclear freeze movements neither exist nor would be tolerated by the governments that the likely origin of the next global conflict lies, and there is no known way to retrieve what technology and material has already been too late to hostile and unpredictable regimes. This is a rarely mentioned nightmare that we shall have to cope with. Israel's strike on the Iraqi reactor has given us only one possible solution.

The US & the USSR

Despite the problem of proliferation in the Third World, the main concern of the Western press and public has been the possibility of nuclear conflict between the US and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear freeze activists, joined by isolationists here and in Western Europe, have naively equated the Amer-

ican with the USSR since both have large nuclear arsenals. In the eyes of many of the leaders of the Western freeze movement, there is no moral difference between the two superpowers. These leaders fail to take into consideration, or they discount, the fact that the Soviets have an expansionist policy which routinely violates the rights of its citizens, especially minorities; occupies much of Eastern Europe and Afghanistan by force; actively supports international terrorism; and has over 350 SS-20 nuclear missiles (among other strategic weapons) targeted on Western Europe and some nations in east Asia.

The issue is "conflict resolution," not weaponry. New technology will, in time, surpass nuclear power.

Our Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise missiles, none of which are as powerful as the Soviet SS-20, are merely an attempt to redress the current military imbalance caused by the Soviets, and place real bargaining chips on the table in the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks in Geneva. Nuclear freeze claim the American missiles make Europe a Soviet target. This is a false premise. The fact is the Western Europeans have been Soviet targets for many years. The US missiles are pointed at Soviet targets, not Western Europe. It is the Soviet missile, not the US missile, which threatens Europe.

Yet nuclear freeze leaders, such as Petra Kelly of West Germany, almost

exclusively single out the US for criticism in their demonstrations. They rarely, if ever, criticize the Soviets, and some even claim that it is "beyond their ability" to influence the Soviet Union. The "freezers" believe, naively, that the problem is the technology. They say, "you cannot fight a nuclear war without nuclear weapons, and if the weapons are dismantled, we will be on the road to peace." Nonsense.

The issue is "conflict resolution," not weaponry. New technology will, in time, surpass nuclear power. Neither Asila the Hun nor Adolf Hitler had nuclear weapons, yet they ravaged the world with the technology available to them at the time. Ridding the US of weapons without resolving the issues between us and the Soviets is the worst possible disillusion. While arms should be reduced, arms must change as well. Without such changes, it will be only a matter of time before nations re-arm.

We must continue to do all we can at the negotiating table—being prepared for sensible concessions with reciprocity—while at the same time, keeping our deterrence strong and prepared for any eventuality. It would be incongruous to watch the Soviets agree to reduce their arsenal while remaining committed to "world domination and armed revolution."

Negotiation is a tortuous and expensive proposition with great risks. However, we cannot be stampeded by fear into the same mind-set that was prevalent in Western Europe in the late 1950s. We must remain as determined and ready as President Kennedy was over 20 years ago to both negotiate and/or meet any challenge the Soviets

pose. This will mean prolonged periods of negotiating setbacks and possible confrontations. There is no guarantee against a possible direct or indirect military confrontation, but we cannot and should not accept their aims of world domination; support for terrorism; attempts to use our strategic technology; and nuclear intimidation. We have a right and an obligation to defend ourselves and our allies against these Soviet goals, and make the Soviets realize that unless they come to diplomacy, they could pay a stiff price for their conduct.

True arms reduction and eventual disarmament will only be accomplished if there is a fundamental re-examination by the Soviets of their ideological objectives and means. If they do not change, we will be destined to be participants in a protracted struggle to influence the course of history and peace.

The nuclear freeze activists can only disarm the West, and negate all the sacrifices and values fought for in WWII. Peace, or nonbelligerence at a minimum, is at least as dependent on strength to serve moral purposes as it is on diplomacy.

Those who want to stifle our defense budget and "throw the Soviets a bone," do this nation a disservice. The single most important role of a national government is to protect its citizens from hostile foreign action. Yes, the people deserve peace, but we may have a long wait. In the interim, we must remain resolute in our principles, attempt to arrive at diplomatic solutions, and maintain a strong defense posture so that the peace arrived at is one we can live with, not "rest in."

Those Inscrutable Europeans: Why Don't They Cooperate?

Anthony Korenstein

Editor's Note: Mr. Korenstein is a British citizen.

In recent months the media in the United States have not lacked newsworthy material to report from Europe. Week after week, stories about massive "peace" demonstrations in Amsterdam and Hamburg, London and Brussels have been faithfully relayed to the people of America who learn of the opposition which the NATO allies are encountering to the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe which began in November, with the delivery of equipment to the three host nations.

The questions have not been answered...nor have they even been properly addressed.

The question underlying these sensational reports, as well as other telling of strains in relations between the allies, have not been answered in the American press, nor have they even been properly addressed. Why are the Europeans so divided on the issue of their own defence, and why are they so reluctant to accept the responsibilities as well as the benefits which are essential to their security and freedom?

To be sure, there are many issues which are frequently identified as the causes of the apparent disparity in which the NATO alliance finds itself today, as in the past. The economic recession from which the United States is now beginning to extricate herself, is still very much in evidence across the water. The welfare states in Europe are struggling to keep their economies afloat as massive unemployment (whose proportions, in some cases, far outstrip anything seen in America) reduces government revenues while increasing the demand for unemployment and other welfare payments to the jobless.

These financial problems have made the increase in defence spending by these countries, as agreed in 1978 and demanded by the United States, ever more difficult to attain. Much of the blame for the continuing economic problems in Europe has been placed at the door of the Administration in Washington, whose massive borrowing has pushed interest and exchange rates to unprecedented levels, while tension between the superpowers has led to the cooling of trade relations between the NATO allies and their fellow Europeans beyond the Iron Curtain.

The recession, too, has increased the attractiveness of cheaper solutions to the perennial problems of European

defence. The deployment of the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) missiles will provide relatively cheap protection against the Soviet SS-20s which are now trained on the great cities of Europe. Here lies, however, one of the paradoxes which exist today in European politics. Many states on the Continent, while anxious to preserve their freedom from nuclear arms, find no practical alternative to accepting the agreed deployment despite the opposition which it arouses. Yet the fragility of several European coalition governments requires that they appear to be doing all in their power to obviate, through negotiation with the Soviet Union, the need for these weapons.

Successive administrations in Washington have proven insensitive to the needs of the European allies. The memory of Vietnam still haunts the American people who long to be relieved of their country's commitment to the security of others, and whose representatives in Congress have played a considerable role in prodding the Europeans towards assuming a greater responsibility for their own defence. Such demands, though, exacerbate fears in Europe that the United States will shrink from defending the Continent "when the crunch comes." Concern

(Continued on page 5)



Anti-nuclear protesters in Europe.

DEJA VU


(Continued from page 1)

had to keep up because of the potential of Soviet pressure—represented by recent heavy arms acquisitions by Syria, Iraq and Libya—has not been matched by parallel buildups of US forces in or near the Middle East. Quite the contrary, US power in the region has declined, partly with the loss of extensive facilities in Iran and an impressive loss of front-line military hardware, and partly with the lack of growth in US naval capability in the Mediterranean.

The contempt of American military power in the Middle East is the presence in the Mediterranean of the US Sixth Fleet. The Sixth Fleet is the anchor that secures the vital sea lanes of the Mediterranean, projects US power in southern Europe, safeguarding NATO's southern flank, and inhibits the Soviets from considering active military intervention in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Recent signs of erosion of America's military capability—the more visible use by the Russians of surrogate states as the Cubans in the African Horn and in South Yemen (PDY), the extensive Soviet program of base expansion in and around the area, and the stockpiling of large stores of modern Soviet weapons in countries like Libya, reveals a Russian perception of US vulnerability and weakness.

Authorities are generally agreed that Soviet boldness has been stimulated by the investment they have made over the past 15 years in their own naval presence in the Mediterranean. Lt. Commander Bruce Watson, writing in *Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century* says: "Since 1960, the shift in the Mediterranean balance of naval power has been in favor of the Soviet Union." In the decade, 1966 to 1976, the Soviets have indeed improved their naval position in the Mediterranean, as the chart below derived from the recently published Atlantic Council volume *Securing the Seas Illustrates*:

US/USSR COMBAT DEPLOYMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN



The chart reflects aircraft carriers, general purpose submarines, major surface combatants, minor surface combatants, amphibious ships and mine warfare ships. It does not account for the greater firepower of the smaller Soviet vessels compared to American vessels of equal tonnage, nor does it reflect the greater sea-carried air power of the US carrier fleet, or the land-based Soviet naval air force, used to protect the Soviet fleet.

The expansion of Soviet naval capability in the Mediterranean, and its concentration in the Eastern Mediter-

anean, has not been matched by any enlargements of the US Sixth fleet, or even by a rapid modernization of the carrier task force. Frequent battles in the Congress on devising ways to combat the Soviet build-up has hindered US naval expansion on a timely basis. Moreover, the US has experienced serious problems in the NATO alliance making it difficult to deploy large numbers of US vessels on a regular basis, or to carry on effective NATO exercises in the Aegean and Mediterranean. This trouble, principally with Greece and Turkey, is yet unresolved and neither country has yet reached a final military agreement with the US. Greece remains partly outside of the NATO alliance.

This leaves the southern flank of NATO partially unhinged and creates opportunities for the Russians to exploit

Any conflict...in which US naval forces become embroiled with Soviet flotilla could leave the two sides in an undecided battle.

Turkey and possibly Greece as well. Any conflict in the area in which US naval forces become embroiled with the Soviet flotilla could leave the two sides in an undecided battle—perhaps enhancing Soviet opportunities on the ground in southern Europe. The recent Atlantic Council study suggests that ultimately the balance of forces in the Mediterranean turns on air power. "The battle for the Mediterranean," the study says, "would probably be heavily influenced by the relative availability of airpower to each side. A substantial force of land-based, long-range naval aircraft from Soviet bases would be pitted against the extensive carrier-based aircraft of the Sixth Fleet. The outcome could well hinge on the ability to supplement US naval land-based aircraft from various land bases on the Mediterranean



The Israeli Air Force is equipped with American F-15s, which can be used for air support of American naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean.

QUICK REFERENCE:
ISRAEL AS A US SECURITY ASSET

1. Israel has a strong, secure location in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2. Israel has a well developed military infrastructure, featuring a wide range of sophisticated communications, transport, and supply systems.
3. Israeli forces are equipped to maintain, service and repair as needed US origin military equipment including the most sophisticated electronic equipment and aircraft. Israel has a proven capacity for quick turnaround during conflict and the capacity to innovate rapidly in wartime.
4. Israel has an excellent deep water port at Haifa bay, featuring communications and military infrastructure.
5. Nearby Haifa, Israel has excellent air facilities of the most modern type and can service virtually any variety of jet engine or aircraft type.
6. Israel is close to vital sea lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Her ability to effect a rescue at Entebbe, jam radars in Uganda, maintain in the air a command and control and medevac aircraft, indicate a clear ability to project power over long distances.
7. Israel maintains a domestic air force larger than many fighter forces in Western Europe and possessing more up-to-date military hardware.
8. Israel is a multilingual country with an in-depth capability to monitor Soviet and Eastern European broadcasts, and to maintain surveillance over hostile states in her immediate region. Most Israeli officers read, write and speak English, and received training in the United States, Great Britain or France.
9. Israel is experienced in combating Soviet tactics and is familiar with a wide range of Soviet military methods.
10. Israel is well situated to provide substantial assistance to the US Sixth Fleet when operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. It keeps in its arsenal equipment common to the fleet, including naval models of the US Phantom F-4 aircraft, many types of missiles, and the E2-C early warning aircraft, used widely by the Sixth Fleet.
11. In the case of wide-scale war in which the US may be tied down in southern Europe, Israel can provide essential military support to the US by combating flanking operations sponsored by the Soviets, by tying down

local troublemakers, and by requiring the Soviets to commit forces to preventing an Israeli strike against her port facilities, air bases, and military stations in and around the Mediterranean. Israel can also provide emergency air cover for the Sixth Fleet if needed.

12. Israel is a democratic country with tested anti-Soviet, pro-Western leanings, a high level of internal order and a strong orientation to support the NATO system.

There is no doubt that Israel possesses the ability and the will to act as a vital back-up to the United States in the Mediterranean. The only outstanding issue is whether the US will take advantage of Israel's capability. This cannot be done passively. To make use of Israel's military power requires extensive, prior coordination between the two countries, detailed staff planning, and understanding of objectives between the commanders of the respective forces. While there has been some recent discussion of the potential of Israel, the critical issue for US national security, for NATO, and for Israel as well, is whether the US will take advantage of Israel's potential in a timely manner.

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EUROPEANS

(Continued from page 3)

about this "decoupling" of American interests from those of her European allies was not allayed by talk in Washington of fighting a limited nuclear war on European soil which increased further the suspicion with which many European analysts regard the deployment of the INF missiles.

However, despite Britain's maintenance of her own nuclear deterrent and France's demonstrative absence from the NATO military council, there is little doubt among those who determine policy on the Continent that American soldiers guard it against a conventional war and that the American nuclear umbrella provides the ultimate safeguard to its continued freedom. The presence of American troops and the deployment of the INF missiles in Europe are intended to reassure the allies of Washington's commitment to their security as well as to serve notice of this to the Kremlin. The people of Europe, we are told, may rest easy, safe in the knowledge that they are well protected.

That they do not do so is apparent from the public demonstrations and diplomatic disagreements with which Washington must deal. The experience of the devastation of two wars in their towns and villages heightens the Europeans' wish to avoid a third. The United States, on the other hand, does not share this legacy yet enjoys power unprecedented. There is a fear that America, in her idealism and naivete, will commit NATO to a conflict of whose necessity the Europeans are unconvinced and in which they are unwilling to join. This is a concern which has been bolstered by the results of policies laid down in Washington (such as the oil-fuel pipeline embargo against the Soviet Union) which have threatened the detente in which many in Europe place great hope, and which West Germany would dearly love to see restored as a means of improving her relations with her eastern counterpart.

The recent invasion of Grenada by U.S. troops, which was greeted with such dismay by the European allies, is an example of why this fear exists. The precarious balance of power in Europe rests not only on military forces but on certain principles of international law, including the right of every nation to enjoy freedom from invasion. Could not the U.S., in some similar adventure elsewhere on the globe, set inadvertently on Soviet toes thereby triggering a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe—or worse? This question, which may seem far-fetched to Pentagon strategists, is of vital importance to those in Paris, London and Bonn. Indeed, it is one of the apprehensions being expressed in the mass demonstrations of which we hear so much.

The problem it poses is one not only of security, but of the need of independent states to retain their national identities and to mould their own futures. The nations of Europe differ from one another in language and culture but they share a fierce pride in their separate histories and a desire to shape their own destinies, whether collectively or alone, as they have done in the past.

It is this which causes the ambivalence with which the nations of Europe regard the United States and produces strained relations between the allies. The protection so generously provided them is indispensable, but they fear what may result from placing their trust in a country whose interests often are not identical to their own.

There seems little doubt that the

NATO alliance will endure. The United States' stake in the survival of a free Europe is too great for decoupling to occur. However, if the West is to gain more than the preservation of its status quo, and achieve an easing of tensions between the great blocs, Washington would do well to understand more fully the trends—political, military and economic—of its allies in Europe. Only by promoting such understanding can the Alliance display the sense of common and indivisible purpose, which alone may convince the Soviet leadership that their attempts to defeat the alliance through internal opposition cannot succeed. With this opinion removed from the Kremlin's arsenal, we may hope to see the sort of progress towards world stability for which the young protestors of Europe have been calling so vocally.

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Publisher of AEI Defense and Foreign Policy Review as well as occasional papers and monographs on defense and foreign policy.

Arms Control Association
11 Dupont Circle NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6450

Publisher of Arms Control Today, a monthly review of developments in the field of arms control, complete with a detailed bibliography of newspaper articles, magazine articles, and additional materials relating to arms control and international security.

The Atlantic Council of the United States
1616 H Street NW
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(202) 347-9353

Publisher of the Atlantic Quarterly and the monthly *Atlantic Community News* focusing on defense matters of concern to the NATO Alliance.

The Brookings Institution
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Foreign Policy Association
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New York, N.Y. 10016
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Publisher of the *Hendling Series* monographs focusing on current defense and foreign affairs topics intended to reach a concerned lay audience.

International Studies Association and Section on Military Studies
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Columbia, South Carolina 29208
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Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
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April 8, 1985

Dr. Marshall Breger, Special Assistant
to the President
The White House
Washington, DC


Dear Marshall:

The message from President Reagan to JINSA and Jack Kemp was eloquent, and generous in its praise. Thank you so much for your help and support, both for our Annual Meeting and for the work of JINSA.

We are so sorry you were unable to join us for the dinner, we had looked forward to your presence and having you read the message. Let me assure you that Elliot Cole did an admirable job in your stead.

Best wishes for a happy and healthy Passover season.

Sincerely,


Shoshana Bryen
Executive Director

SB:abd

cc: Elliot Cole

NEWSLET

JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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Vol. III, No. 30

August 1984

NEWSBRIEFS

SEA EAGLE TESTED: The British Navy carried out several successful tests of its new Sea Eagle sea-skimming missile. The missile, which destroyed an old Navy warship in the trial, is fitted with the largest warhead of any missile of its type and is more destructive than the French Exocet missile.

SOVIETS TEST SEA-SKIMMER: The London Sunday Times reported that the Soviets have tested a revolutionary, sea-skimming transport plane, known as the Wig (short for wing in ground effect). The Wig, which is designed to fly just above sea or ground level and at high speeds, carries up to 400 troops or several armored vehicles. The plane could give the Soviets a decisive edge over NATO in a conventional European war by enabling Moscow to take troops and tanks for a frontal attack on Norway or Denmark. The prototype has been outfitted with SS-N-22 sea-skimming, antiship missiles; full production is scheduled to begin in three years.

SOVIETS BUILDING CARRIER: According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the Soviet Union is building an aircraft carrier that, for the first time, will be able to challenge the firepower of American carriers. The carrier, which will be nuclear powered, 1000 feet long and will carry up to 70 fighter aircraft, will be operational within the next decade. Intelligence reports indicate that the Soviets plan to build eight of the carriers. (See related article, "View from the Kremlin.")

SAUDI MILITARY BUDGET SET: Saudi Arabia's military budget for 1984-1985 has been set at \$23 billion of an overall spending allocation of \$75 billion. The budget authority is only slightly larger than the \$21.88 billion of the previous year. The military security budget will allow the continuation of the Saudi's equipment modernization program. New materials on order include AWACS, tankers, improved surface-to-air missiles, helicopters, with antiship missiles and reconnaissance aircraft.

SOVIETS IN JORDAN: Since Soviet SAM-9 appeared in Jordan over a year ago, Russian military advisors have been training Jordanian officers in their operation. The SAM-9s will be integrated into the Jordanian air defense system, which is presently based on American Hawk missiles, which are stationary and limited in their coverage of Jordanian air space.

MOSQUITO COOPERATION: According to official sources, the governments of Israel and Jordan have been talking about joint cooperation in the extermination of mosquitoes in the Gulf of Aqaba. Although in previous years, Jordan seemed anxious to have such cooperation, this year they prefer to delay joint efforts and therefore no agreement has yet been reached.

Defense Spending: A Necessary Evil—Or Good?

Francis P. Hoebler

It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditure on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.

—Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, World War II.

Editor's Note: Mr. Hoebler is a Contributing Editor to the Newsletter.

Defense spending is unpleasant to think about: it reminds us that we live in a world plagued with conflict, as it has been through recorded history; it seems to imply fewer dollars available for social and personal needs; it is often said to cause conflict and to be rationalized "only because the Soviets are doing it."

Defense spending also seems a dull subject, at least to the non-specialist: too many figures and graphs glaze the eyes, and arguments about definitions—obligational authority, authorizations, appropriations, outlays, as well as Soviet rubles vs. U.S. dollars and current ("this year") vs. constant, or "real" dollars—confuse experts as well as amateurs. JINSA has published a number of articles which go far to explain and enliven these issues, putting defense spending and the reason for it in perspective.

But this discussion is concerned with the defense budget as a continuing political issue, especially in leap years. At the political level, the issues are what

people believe, not what may be fact. We will deal, therefore, with what many people believe, and what, as far as we can tell, is real.

First, there is a widely held and widely "played-upon" belief that the arms the budget provides for are unproductive—a term not really defined. Many people delight in refuting Isaiah's prophecy

Strategic nuclear forces have taken only about 10% of the US defense budget... people tend to forget (they were) invented because they were cheap.

that "...they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks..." But note the preceding lines of this verse (Isaiah 2:4): "He shall judge between the nations, and shall decide for many peoples..." In short, the plowshares and pruning hooks will come after the Lord shall have established peace on Earth, when "...nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn any more..."—an appealing but utopian world.

Arms do not cause wars, conflicts do. But lack of arms may cause unfightable wars and loss of vital national interests, interests usually shared by the United States with Israel, NATO, and other allies. Arms can defend those interests and where possible deter threats to them.

"Still," many reply, "arms must be unproductive—that's why they are inflationary." Yet, how can this be, when the 1970s saw a tremendous shift in priorities away from the military (see Jeffrey Males in June/July Newsletter) and toward social services. But with this shift in priorities, transfer payments went up, the savings rate went down, and inflation went up. In truth, when the monetary supply, productivity, and demand are out of sync, everything is inflationary; that is, additional expenditures for any purpose add to inflationary pressures.

"But," the argument goes on, "we should not spend money on the military just because the Soviets do, and, anyway, Soviet expenditures are probably exaggerated by the Pentagon as part of the military-industrial complex program to increase arms expenditures." Indeed, we should not spend just because the Soviets do; one may even be forgiven for hoping the Soviets waste a lot of their expenditures. But the arms the Soviet expenditures buy, the forces they support, and how these are used for coercion and subversion in the international arena certainly should govern what we require and therefore what we need to spend. We need to spend it wisely and as efficiently as possible, but this is equally true of the programs fostered by the health-industrial complex and the education-government, the urban-government and even the government-social worker complexes.

Another misconception that tends to dominate the politics of defense spending is that the budget—and the "arms race"—are dominated by the strategic nuclear forces. Yet for years the strategic nuclear forces have been only about 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget—less than one-fourth as much as the "general-purpose," or conventional, forces. People tend to forget that nuclear weapons were invented because they were cheap. Remember the "bigger bang for the buck" in the Eisenhower years? Moreover, there has not really been an "arms race" in either category.

As Defense Secretary Harold Brown remarked, "We build, the Soviets build; we stop, the Soviets build." If Congress sustains the Reagan strategic modernization program—the MX and Trident II missiles, the B-1, the follow-on small ICBM (SICBM) and stealth bomber, and possible outcomes of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), including even eventual space-based missile defense—the strategic forces may rise above 10 percent of the total. But if the drive of the "peace forces" to stop all nuclear catch-up with the Soviets is successful, we may see such Soviet domination as to "make the world safe for major conventional war." Catching up with Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional force levels will be far more costly, and there is no evidence of U.S., NATO or "Free World" willingness to spend at the necessary level—and Western Europe is no more anxious to be destroyed in a nuclear war III by conventional than by nuclear weapons.

"I don't care!" the defense budget critics counter to all of the above. "There are still limits on what we can spend on defense." Perhaps, though the limits have seldom been demonstrated, even in wartime. In any event, with unemployment around 7 percent and capacity utilization at 80-odd percent, the limits today are clearly not economic, but political. We may have the political will to do what we must. This is what JINSA is all about.

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EDITORIALS

Arms Transfers and US Policy

In his Annual Report to the Congress, the Secretary of Defense articulates the highest priority national security objectives of the Administration. In the 1984 Report, the objectives are (in brief):

- 1) to deter military attack by the USSR and its allies;
- 2) in the event of an attack, to deny the enemy his objectives;
- 3) to promote meaningful and verifiable mutual reductions in nuclear and conventional arms through negotiation;
- 4) to inhibit further expansion of Soviet control and military presence; and
- 5) to foster a reduction in the Soviet Union's overall capability to sustain a military buildup.

In the Middle East, our objectives are stated as:

- 1) to preserve and protect the independence of states in the region, including both Israel and friendly Arab nations, from aggression and subversion;
- 2) to help secure a lasting peace for all the people of the Mideast;
- 3) to prevent the spread of Soviet influence and the consequent loss of freedom and independence it entails;
- 4) to protect Western access to the energy resources of the area, and to maintain the security of key sea lanes to this region.

US arms sales should be considered as one element in support of those objectives, not as a separate goal. If the purchasing country is most likely to use the arms to carry out policies in accordance with US objectives, we can look upon the sale favorably. If the likely outcome is inimical to our interests, we should refuse the sale. This is, of course, a general rule, requiring judgment, evaluation and imagination on our side.

Over the years, however, there have been many arms sales which appear to be predicated on economic benefit, or on our interest in placating a country that wants something from us or on preempting a country from turning to the Soviets for arms. The general rule summarized above would appear to be a superior method of evaluation—particularly when considering some recent requests.

1) *Stingers to Saudi Arabia.* Shoulder-fired and largely used against an incoming enemy, Stingers form an additional line of defense for the Saudi oil fields. This is definitely in the interest of the US and the Saudis. However, there is a danger in such a sale, in that Stingers are relatively easily stolen and can be used by terrorists in various ways contrary to our interests. Two questions should be raised early: a) do the Saudis need an item as mobile and as sophisticated as Stingers? and b) how do they plan to protect the Stinger arsenal if they receive it?

2) *The conformal fuel tanks for Saudi F-15s.* Extending the range of the F-15 supplies the Saudis with an offensive capability, raising the question, "Against whom?" Likely targets are Iran and Israel, and, for different reasons, a Saudi attack against either would be contrary to our stated objectives.

3) *Stingers to Kuwait.* The Administration chose not to entertain this one. But, if the US chooses, for reasons of American policy, not to sell, we should expect that country to look elsewhere even to the Soviet bloc. After all, the Kuwaitis and Jordanians, et al., are looking for leverage over US policy through their arms purchases, just as we are looking for leverage through our sales. We have to say, "So be it."

4) *2,000 Sidewinders to Saudi Arabia.* Sidewinder air-to-air missiles would have a defensive application in protecting Saudi airspace from Iranian or other intruders. Since US policy is to have Saudi Arabia defend itself insofar as possible, rather than relying on US involvement, this type of weapon would appear reasonable. Also, since they are useful only when attached to aircraft, they are not attractive to terrorists.

But 3,000? The enormity of that suggests three things: a) that they are going to use them in such a way that we may not sell them more and therefore they have to stock up; b) that we are in fact trying to preposition stocks for ourselves; or c) there is economic benefit to the US in disposing of them for a price.

If a), we should be extremely leery of selling them the first round; if b), we might as well say so; if c) our overall objectives should be checked carefully before letting income dictate a sale.

The conformal fuel tanks lengthened the striking range of the Saudi F-15s. If they combine range with the capability of the Sidewinder, they have the ability to reach Israel and take on the Israel Air Force. The Saudis always had the range to reach Israel from their northern airbases, but said they would not position F-15s there. Now they can use more southern bases as a jumping off point. Would they? Do we want to find out? If they did, would it be compatible with US objectives in the region?

How would the general rule be applied to other countries in the region? Consider Israel.

US weapons are sold to Israel with the proviso that they be used for self-defense only; this being clearly compatible with stated US objectives. There have been questions raised about specific actions, but Israel's general policies—Western oriented, stable, democratic, anti-terrorist, and willing and able to be of assistance to the West—place her squarely in our "camp." It is this congruence of basic Israeli objectives and basic US objectives which allowed the announcement of developing "strategic cooperation" last year. Sales of individual items to Israel should be evaluated within this general framework.

Regarding other countries, specifically Saudi Arabia, the general framework of policies has not always been congruent with US interests. The Saudis have supported the PLO and the Syrians, sent troops to fight against Israel and have tried to undermine our closeness with Israel. They have failed to support our objective of deterring Soviet influence in the region (although they themselves have no relations with the USSR). Therefore, sales of individual items to Saudi Arabia should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, each time relating to the possible congruence with, or divergence from, US objectives.

Turkey And NATO And Israel

Turkey is one of America's most dependable NATO allies. It is also the only Muslim nation allied to us by a defense pact. Turkey currently receives the third largest amount of US foreign aid, most of which is allocated for the procurement of modern military hardware to replace its largely obsolete Korean War vintage equipment. Only by improving its military capability, will Turkey continue to constitute a credible deterrent to Soviet military involvement both in the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East.

Though staunchly pro-American, Turkey maintains only low-level diplomatic contacts with Israel, our other close ally in the region. And for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the Turks will upgrade their relationship with Israel.

The Soviets must realize that, at the very least, the Turks can hamper any kind of sea- or air-lift, and can prevent Soviet land reinforcement during a Middle Eastern crisis. And, as a NATO ally, one of Turkey's missions is to deny the Soviets egress from their Black Sea ports in time of war between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO.

In addition, Turkish listening posts provide NATO with detailed early warning information inside the USSR. If the Soviets send reinforcements into the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf or the Middle East, the US will know this long before troops or materiel reach their destination. This gives our state extremely valuable time to take the necessary countermeasures.

Moreover, the scenario in which the US and its NATO allies use Turkish bases in the event of a major war in the Middle East or a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact poses a significant strategic consideration for the Soviets. Soviet manpower and equipment that might otherwise be earmarked for involvement in the Persian Gulf or in an Arab-Israeli conflict would have to be deployed instead against Turkey.

It is therefore in both America's and Israel's interests that Turkey remain pro-Western and strongly committed to NATO, whether or not Turkey maintains close ties with Israel.

NEWSLETTER

The Jewish Institute is committed to exploring the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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EDITORIAL

Lebanon

Consistently and rightly, the US has refused to concede the inevitability of Soviet, Soviet-inspired or Soviet-allied control—whether the targets be Andrei Sakharov, Polish dissidents, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada or Afghanistan. This is not necessarily based on any expectation of dislodging the Soviets or their friends, or even on any expectation of changing their minds. Rather, it is based on the belief that as long as we keep the heat on, there is a possibility that the denouement may better coincide with our interests.

We work to control the flow of Western technology to the East, not because we can stop it altogether and not because we can make the Soviets stop trying to buy it or steal it. We control it because we can slow it down, make it expensive, make it difficult, and in the end, cost the Soviets the ability to sustain a cheap and easy military buildup at our expense.

In Lebanon, however, it appears we are willing to look the other way for the benefit of the Soviet Union's close collaborator—Syria.

Americans are being given the impression, through the State Department and through the media, that some stability has come to Lebanon; that a central government under the hand of Syria is exercising some control over the country, with the exception of the Israeli-controlled portion. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy credited Syria with the ability to reconcile opposing Lebanese factions and improve the security of Beirut. Secretary of State George Shultz muted the praise somewhat by stressing that Syria's interests and ours still diverge, but he, too, said the Syrians are in control.

Were they correct, Americans might simply have to swallow the unpleasant thought that the Syrians had accomplished something we could not. But they were wrong—and their remarks particularly ill-timed, coming after weeks of intensive military activity in the form of: 1) open warfare in Beirut and its suburbs, Tripoli and the surrounding towns and villages, and the Bekka Valley; 2) terrorist activity in the south; and 3) the rearming, repositioning and reinforcing of militias of all religious and ethnic stripes.

The American media, usually quick to point out flaws in an administration's analysis, were strangely silent this time. This may be, in part, because Israeli and/or American influence is not at the heart of much of the current fighting. Political statements to the contrary, Israel is not the prime force of factional Lebanese military interest. See accompanying article.)

Americans can look at those weeks of summer as typical of the past nine years of Lebanese history: 1) there is no Syrian control, only Syrian influence; 2) there is no Lebanese central government that functions with authority; 3) there is no fact accompli; and 4) there is no change—fighting has continued in Tripoli for more than two months, and shows no sign of abating.

The Syrians are still arming those militias they wish to help, pressuring those they wish to weaken and openly fighting those who oppose them.

The Lebanese are still loyal to their factional leaders: former Prime Minister Suleiman Franjyah, Government Ministers Nabih Biri and Walid Jumblatt; President Amin Gemayel and others all have militias in the fighting.

There are pro-Iranian, pro-Syrian, pro-Arafat, pro-Israeli, anti-Soviet, anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-Syrian, and anti-Arafat groups fighting. There are Christians, Alawites, Sunnis, Shiites and Druze involved.

There may be little room for the US to maneuver directly, and in fact, we may well not want to. However, as a famous baseball coach once said, "The game isn't over until it's over." The game in Lebanon clearly is not over, and it would be useful for the US to delay conceding it all to Syria until we see how it ends.

Editor's Note: While much of the American press has focused on Shiite dissidents in southern Lebanon, citizens of Tripoli and its environs have been subjected to open warfare. Beirut has been subjected to machine gun fire, sniping and artillery duels.

One need look only at a representative three weeks in July to see that the pattern of sectarian violence has not been changed by the ascendancy of Syrian influence in Beirut. What Israel does in southern Lebanon is only one factor among many that will determine the final disposition of power in Lebanon.

THE SOURCES

The following was compiled from newspaper and radio accounts in Lebanese and other sources. Recognizing the partisan nature of the various Lebanese media, a general estimate has been made to counterbalance competing claims.

THE PLAYERS

The Civil War in Lebanon, unlike the two-sided US Civil War, combines numerous armed groups, loyal to various political and religious figures. The leadership belongs, in many cases, to the current government (ostensibly trying to govern the country at a broad coalition). Their groups divide and recombine according to circumstance. The major armed groups include:

Beirut and Environs

PLO—pro-Arafat Palestinians
Amal—Shiite, under Gov. Minister Nabih Biri

Lebanese Forces—Phalange, general, pro-Gemayel

Hezbollah—Iranian-orientated
As Sa'ad Brigades—Shiite, anti-Libyan

As Sayf al-Had—anti-Soviet, anti-US
Al Marashiti—Nasserite, anti-Soviet, anti-US (mainly Syrian)

Lebanese Armed Forces—Government troops

Tripoli and Environs

Islamic Unification Movement—Sunni
Alawite Red Knights—Alawite

Syrian Socialist National Party—pro-Syrian, includes Syrian nationals

Al Marashiti—Christian, under Suleiman Franjyah

Arab Democracy Party—pro-Syrian
Sons of Ash-Shibbanah—unidentified

Bekka Valley

Arab Revolutionary Movement—Sunni-led, pro-Libyan

Iranian Revolutionary Guard—pro-Shiite

Amal—Shiite
Abu Musa Group—pro-Syrian

Palestinian
Syrian Army—Syrian Government troops

Southern Lebanon


Pro-Arafat Palestinians
National Resistance Front—Shiite, anti-Israeli

Progressive Socialist Party—mainly Druze, under Gov. Minister Walid Jumblatt

Army of Southern Lebanon—mainly Christian, pro-Israeli

Amal—Shiite
IDF—Israeli Government troops

Shoshana Ben



Tripoli and the surrounding towns and villages subjected to fighting throughout the summer.

THE SCRIPT

5 July

Tripoli was the scene of continued fighting between the Islamic Unification Movement and the Arab Democratic Party, primarily in the Al-Qubbah neighborhood. Clashes were described as "fierce" and casualties are estimated at approximately 45 dead and 125 wounded.

In the South, the National Resistance Front attacked two cars on the Tyre-Ma'aklah Road.

6 July

Amal gunmen still surround Palestinian refugee camps in Buri al Barajneh and Shaila in Beirut, after several days of fighting there. Government Minister and Amal head Nabih Biri is quoted as saying Amal will hand over security of the camps to government troops.

In Baal, north of Beirut, a car bomb killed a child and two women, and injured two men.

Arab Revolutionary Movement roadblocks went up in the Bekka Valley today near the towns of Jabbala, Taabbayeh and Bar Elias. The ARM had been reported receiving arms sent by Libya in the name of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, while Libyan representatives appear to have arrived in the Bekka to train ARM members led by Zayad al-Hadid, a Sunni.

Also in the Bekka Valley, following clashes between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Syrian forces, the IRG set up four new military centers: Hays al-Shurawani, Hays al-Shamsi, Hays ash-Shaykh Hamud, and Hays al-Wadi. These are in addition to the two existing IRG centers in the area. Weapons were seen arriving for Amal members, near the Syrian position in Ta-nayil in the Bekka.

In political news, Palestinian group leader Abu Wa'il broke away from Abu Salih and joined the Abu Musa group with his followers.

7 July

The PLO's Faruq Qaddumi decided in Damascus to transfer \$1 million each month to Beirut in support over 3,000 Palestinian fighters there.

Short clashes took place between National Resistance men and the IDF in Jabbal Safi and Ma'adoun in the South.

8 July

In the East Beirut neighborhoods of Al-Karaminah, Sahat Seini and Al-Anshafah, clashes occurred among wings of the Lebanese National Forces. Early reports indicate over 15 casualties.

Fighting continued through 7-8 July between Amal and the Palestinians of Sabra, despite Minister Biri's earlier indications that Amal would withdraw. Several people have been reported killed or kidnapped.

A number of explosions were heard in the town of Alayh, east of Beirut. At least two members of the Progressive Socialist Party were killed there. Unidentified gunmen in the towns of Basaba and al-Marayfah fired on each other for several hours.

An explosive charge went off near Kfar Meiki in the South, while an IDF patrol was nearby.

9 July

Despite reports of improvements in the Tripoli security situation, fighting took place in the neighborhoods of Hays ash-Shaykh Hamud and Hays al-Wadi.

All of the crossing points between East and West Beirut were closed by relatives of persons said to have been kidnapped during the Civil War.

(Continued on page 7)

Major Issues In National Security: Part I

An interview with
Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

Editor's Note: The Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr., has been involved in US national security matters for over 35 years. He was a weapon designer in the defense industry for 15 years, followed by 12 years in the Department of Defense. From 1973 to 1976, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. Since then he has been an independent consultant, and has worked with such organizations as the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Republican National Committee, and the Heritage Foundation. Mr. Sullivan went on to the second JINSA tour to Israel, and agreed to this interview with JINSA's Executive Director, Shoshana Bryn. Part II will appear in the September issue of the Newsletter.

BRYN: Mr. Sullivan, you are known as a hawk, and a conservative on national security. Do you think we are devoting enough of our national resources to our national security?

SULLIVAN: No, Mr. Bryn, I really don't. But let me hasten to add that "our" national security refers not just to the United States by itself, but collectively to the free countries of the West. The security of all the OECD nations—plus others, like Israel—is inextricably tied together. Furthermore, our future well-being and security depends on many other things besides spending by the Defense Department. The Soviets assess their security within a broader context: the "correlation of forces," which includes relative political, economic, and ideological strength as well as military strength. We would do well to assess our own collective security within a similar framework.

BRYN: But I presume the major expense is still for our armed forces. Do you have any way of telling how much is enough?

SULLIVAN: Well, you're right. Ready, active forces are the big expense, and it's very hard to be precise about just how much we have to spend on them. But my logic runs along the following lines: If the Free World is to defend its total interests against the maximum threat that the Soviets, their allies, and some of the Third World "poliers" could generate, then my best guess is that the US should be maintaining force levels at least 20% larger than they are now. Moving from a 500- to a 600-ship navy is a major step in this direction. One can then calculate approximately how much those larger forces would cost to operate, maintain and equip. My best guess is that we should be spending roughly 10% of our GNP for defense, as we did in the early 1960s.

BRYN: That's a lot more than we are spending now. Even with Reagan's recent increases in defense spending, we're only up to about 7% of GNP now, aren't we?

SULLIVAN: Yes. The Congress has refused some of President Reagan's requested increases—mainly because neither was willing to raise revenues to pay for them. But I doubt that Americans are willing to tolerate much more than, say, 8% of GNP on a continuing basis. In many ways, I don't blame them. After all, our European NATO allies don't spend more than about 4% on the average, Canada gets

away with under 2% of its GNP, and Japan, with the second highest economy among Western nations, only applies 1% of their GNP to our collective defense. If everybody pulled the same weight, everybody's defense budget could stay below 5% of GNP.

BRYN: Jerry SIAARE's General Report only pushing the Europeans for 3% to 4% per year?

SULLIVAN: No, be careful. There are two different kinds of presents involved here. One is spending level as a fraction of GNP; the other is annual rates of increase. Rogers is asking the other NATO members to increase their spending by 3-4% each year, and most don't seem willing to do that. Unfortunately, it wouldn't be enough to accomplish what he wants anyway. It takes 3-4% annual increases (after inflation) just to keep current force levels from depreciating. It takes a much larger increase if force levels or equipment levels are to be raised significantly.

I favor a major restructuring of our alliances to recognize the shifting "correlation of forces"—not only between the Pact and the West, but between members of the Western coalition.


BRYN: But you do agree that Americans could spend too much for their military forces, don't you?

SULLIVAN: Of course. If we weaken our overall economic strength, our political strength, or our faith in our own Government, then defense spending becomes counterproductive. The dilemma we face is that 8% of US GNP will simply not be enough unless we can find others to help foot the bill, or unless we can find ways to charge our current strategy—which is, to me, by no means overly ambitious.

BRYN: Are there any realistic ways to cut back on our strategy?

SULLIVAN: Well, maybe, but they certainly aren't very appealing. We could, for instance, decide to cut back on our strategic forces and trust the Soviets not to exploit their position of nuclear superiority. We could decide to leave more of NATO's defense to our Europeans, and concentrate on the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean at the same time: we would pick the ones we wanted to save, and risk the Soviets moving into the others. We could also just decide that the Soviets really aren't about to start a war, cut back on the readiness of our active standing forces, and rely more on a rejuvenated American mobilization capability in times of increasing tensions or deteriorating relations.

BRYN: Well, let's try to take these one at a time. Don't you believe that we can be successful in negotiating strategic arms limitations with the Soviets?



The Hon. Leonard Sullivan

SULLIVAN: We must continue to try, of course. Nobody can be agnostic real reductions in the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. But I am skeptical on at least three counts. First, it is not clear to me that the Soviets still see any real benefits in continuing the negotiating process per se. They may see more mileage in trying to make us out to be warmongers. Second, even if they do decide to return to negotiations, I doubt that it will result in any large reductions in nuclear weapons. Third, even if there are some minor reductions in nuclear forces, it would not change our overall modernization costs much. Besides, on the average, less than 30% of our defense budget goes for these forces.

BRYN: Why do you think the Soviets have lost interest in the arms control talks? Didn't we drive them away?

SULLIVAN: We didn't drive them away. We took a somewhat tougher stance and they walked away. If they saw the same advantage in negotiating as they did ten years ago, they'd still be at the table. I suspect they have concluded that they have gotten about all they can out of the negotiating process. They are not motivated to reduce military spending. They delayed our nuclear modernization programs about as long as they could. SALT II essentially ratified their position of nuclear parity five years ago. Their legitimacy as a

superpower is no longer in question. They are accepted politically—and economically too—around the world. They have largely gained the stature they seek. But most of all, you should recognize that the Soviets probably do not view "parity" in nuclear weapons to be politically "stable," as we like to think.

BRYN: You mean the Soviets are not satisfied with the idea of equal nuclear forces on the two sides? Is that because they also have China to worry about?

SULLIVAN: Well, they do have more to worry about from the Chinese than we do. We should not completely discount their arguments for "equal security" rather than equal forces. But that's not the basic issue. The basic issue is that the Soviets approach their security from the standpoint of warfighting—not bookkeeping. Mathematical equality does not appeal to the warfighter mentality. The concept that if your neighbor has a big dog, you will be safe if you get a dog just the same size, is a notion that only appeals to analysts, accountants, and some Catholic bishops. A warfighter, on the other hand, is more likely to conclude that if his neighbor has a big dog, then he should get himself a lion—or a bear. That's stable.

BRYN: You would agree with me, then, that the Soviet leaders look at the

world very differently than Western leaders, even though they are equally rational people?

SULLIVAN: Yes, Soviet leaders are rational people, but that does not make them just like us. They are as much captives of their own background as we are of ours. Considering all the differences in education, outlook, history, geography, economics, demography, internal politics, and the like, it is hard to imagine any subject that would be perceived the same way through each side's prism of experience. Generally trusting and optimistic, Americans tend to see only reflections of themselves when they look at the rest of the world. The Soviets, on the other hand, tend to be skeptical of the rest of the world. They do not mirror-image themselves; they tend to be as treacherous wherever they look. Frankly, I cannot imagine that they would interpret political parity on the world scene the same way we do. Some of the current difficulties in US-Soviet relations may very well stem from embedded inabilities associated with superpower political parity. We should worry about that.

BRYN: If the Soviets don't accept parity, and if the chances for meaningful nuclear arms negotiations are declining, then you're saying that we're headed for a protracted nuclear arms race, aren't you? What can we do about that?

SULLIVAN: I'm not necessarily be a "race"—I don't really like that term—but there will certainly continue to be a contest in which the Soviets seek a position of predominance, and the West attempts to deny it. My personal hope is that we can convert the contest away from offensive weapons like MX and Trident to some kinds of defensive weapons that negate the value of a continued Soviet offensive buildup. As President Reagan has tried to articulate, the moral high ground must lie in making offensive weapons ineffective—rather than proliferating them. I'm not sure that our new "Star Wars" approach will—or should—be entirely successful, but it establishes a thrust that is certainly worth serious attention. Another approach would be to improve our federal planning for national survival. Our current civil defense planning is hopelessly inadequate. It is inconceivable to me that we could enhance our nuclear deterrent—vis-à-vis the Soviets—by declaring that we will not think about either defending ourselves against, or raising the odds for surviving, nuclear aggression.

(Continued on page 11)

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JINSA Luncheon Series

View From The Kremlin: The Navy in Soviet Foreign Policy

by Markle Koenen

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 gave the Soviet Union the impetus to establish itself as a major naval power. Under the leadership of Adm. S.G. Gorchikov, his Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Naval Forces, the USSR embarked on a program to build a balanced fleet that could fight conventional and nuclear war.

Adm. Sumner Shapiro (Ret.), Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché in Moscow in the mid-1960s and Director of Naval Intelligence from 1978 to 1982, addressed a JINSA luncheon on the role of naval power in Soviet strategic planning. Adm. Shapiro said that, "Succeeding generations of Soviet leaders have never wavered from their ideological and worldwide economic and political domination." Three major thrusts characterized Soviet strategy: to replace U.S. dominance in Western spheres of influence; to separate the US from its allies and from the raw materials that we depend on even in peacetime (69 of the 72 key strategic materials required by US industry are imported); and to achieve these goals by means short of outright war. The Soviets, because of their longstanding paranoia about defending their empire, will use "war of national liberation" and client states to foster unrest which undermines American interests around the world.

"However," Adm. Shapiro warned, "The Soviets, above all else, are pragmatic. They are preparing for all-out war with the West." The scenario upon which Soviet planners base their strategy is that of a large-scale war beginning in Europe, where the national interests of the superpowers converge to the point where the US will eventually engage Warsaw Pact troops. The Soviets, according to Shapiro, believe that such a war with the West will ultimately lead to nuclear exchange.

The New Soviet Navy

Enhanced Soviet naval power has been a decisive factor in the Soviet's strategy and increasingly aggressive foreign policy. The US, in fact, is an island nation, surrounded by two oceans. The Cuban Missile Crisis underscored the Soviet's geographic advantage and from that point on, Gorchikov had the Kremlin's support in building a navy that could conduct "gunboat diplomacy" in peacetime and provide a strategic defense against American lines of communication during war.

The Soviet Union is currently developing seven new classes of major surface ships, all capable of challenging the United States. The KIROV class is a nuclear powered ship, the largest in the world, save for aircraft carriers. Its high technology equipment includes twenty surface-to-surface missiles with a 300 mile range and speed of Mach 2.5, and anti-aircraft missiles. The KIEV class aircraft carrier, which is also nuclear powered, has obliterated the Soviet's dependence on land-based aircraft to protect their naval operations. The KIEV can accommodate helicopters and VTOLs (vertical takeoff and landing aircraft). Through these new ships, the Soviets are steadily evolving into a true tactical sea power, capable of extending political influence to areas never before accessible to them.

Two classes of submarines are under construction. Adm. Shapiro described several classes which now pose credible threats to the US. Two classes of subs carry the Typhoon missile, which has a range of 4000 miles; one of these is the largest submarine ever built, with a displacement of 25,000 tons (compared to the Trident's 17,000). The twenty multiple-warhead missiles can target the continental United States from Soviet territorial waters. The OSCAR is a formidable threat to all ships on the high seas, and the ALPHA (a titanium welded sub), the fastest and deepest diving ship in the world, is a testament to the level of technological development achieved by the Soviet Union.

The true measure of Soviet power to threaten the West is through their increasing ability to operate sophisticated equipment.

It is frightening, Shapiro pointed out, to analyze the long-range capital that is invested in Soviet ships, and to realize that the existing capacity for further expansions portends that these trends of development and technological advance can continue, even at the expense of the capital-starved civilian sector.

A Soviet Foreign Policy Tool

The Soviet navy and merchant marine have become increasingly effective tools of Soviet foreign policy. Since 1964, the level of Soviet naval activity has increased fifteen times. An average of 175 ships operate out of home waters; this number increases by 100-150 ships during naval exercises. They maintain a permanent presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, and the South China Sea, besides frequently sailing in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

Their enhanced capability has allowed the Soviets to project power by reacting to local crises as well. In 1981, at the height of Solidarity activity in Poland, the Soviets conducted amphibious exercises, including ships from its four fleets, and staged landings on the Baltic coast near Poland. Shortly afterward, Polish premier Jaruzelski initiated his crackdown on the labor union.

The Soviets reinforce their positions by delivering weapons to the Third World: submarines to Cuba and Libya; missile attack boats to Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, S. Yemen and Algeria; and naval reconnaissance aircraft to Libya, S. Yemen and Ethiopia. With such allies, they have acquired guarantees of continuous port access in strategic areas. They now maintain a permanent presence in the former US naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, a symbol of naval ascendancy not lost on the US and the rest of the world. They operate most activity in regions that are vital to Western interests: near US allies, resource markets, sea lines and choke points.

of military advisors in their client states sevenfold since 1965 to the current level of 21,000 advisors and technicians in 31 countries. And they support international terrorism through training and weapons, although most this is conducted through surrogates.

Conclusion

"The true measure," warned Shapiro, "of the Soviet power to threaten the West is through their increasing ability to operate sophisticated equipment...The threat from the Soviet Union is real, multifaceted and growing. Their military buildup cannot, by any analysis, be defined as defensive."

Although they still hope to achieve their goal of domination without a

direct confrontation with the West, the Soviets are pragmatic enough to prepare for waging and winning a nuclear war. According to Shapiro, the US Navy is the key to putting pressure on the Soviets, because we can no longer be complacent about the distances that separate the superpowers. The advantage we hold at sea will continue to erode as the Soviets advance technologically, increase their fleet and move into placing more tactical aircraft on ships.

"The ships [the Soviets] have today are not the problem. It is the ships being built today that will be the threat in the year 2000. Obsolescence is our biggest problem."



KIROV, The Soviets' Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Cruiser

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- that in 1974, the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO for two years (to protest anti-Israel activities), but that in 1977 Congress voted not only to resume payments, but appropriated the withheld 1975-76 funds as well?
- that Greece, our NATO ally, voted with the US only 26.8% of the time in the 1983 General Assembly? It has, however, twice as often as the USSR did. Kampuchea voted with us more often than Saudi Arabia.
- that in the 1983 regional breakdown of countries, UN General Assembly Resolution 37/125 lists Nicaragua as a "Communist State" and South Africa as an "Industrial Democracy"? Or that Egypt is not considered an "Arab State" but Cyprus is?

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Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

I received the June/July issue of the *Newsletter* about two weeks ago and because of various pressures didn't have a chance to read it until I was on a plane for the West Coast last Thursday. It is a truly effective and valuable issue. With such items as Gen. Earle Wheeler's Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on "Safe Borders for Israel"; the page on Central America and Andrei Sakharov's statement on the MX missile, one can only walk away saying "fantastic!"

Herschel Auerback
Chicago, IL

To the Editor:

The question "Who Stands With Sakharov?" was quite properly raised (June/July) and not only with regard to the MX missile. While it is quite true that "emotional support for Sakharov has resonated through the US," there seems to be remarkably little public evidence of that today. Maybe Soviet citizens care little whether the General Secretary disappears for months on end, but Americans ought to be quite a bit more impatient. Sakharov disappeared from public view early in May, has reportedly been recently psychologically abused for the purpose of breaking his will to resist, and his wife, Yelena Bonner, seems likely soon to go on trial on charges of defaming the state. American grass-roots public response to such serious Soviet will-testing has been frankly underwhelming. There ought to be a serious public outcry, especially from the psychiatric and psychological communities. But these ought only to be the leading edge of a rising crescendo of protest.

Richard A. Wilkins
Syracuse, NY

To the Editor

America has returned the canal to Panama. It is time to return the bananas. The idea that Russia or Cuba can do as much good for Central America as the nations of the region can do for themselves is not weighty. It is entertained by the leftist Junta only as a last resort because America is fomenting counter-revolution again, as it did in Guatemala and Chile.

If we call off our dogs, the game collapses. This is not Central Europe with a Red Army in place on the ground. If a Cuban model government replaces the present ones in a dozen lands, and the United States treats them as it treats China, or Russia, or Yugoslavia, or Libya, there will be no harm done to our security.

Each radicalized nation will be jealous of its own territory and honor. Each will compete economically. There is no reason to suppose that we would be compelled to tolerate Russian bases

on their territory quicker than we would on Cuba's own territory.

Where does all this leave Central America, Israel, and the PLO? More or less, alone, left to their own solutions. Central America will develop prosperity on a mixed Cuban-US model. Israel will negotiate with Palestinians to establish in Gaza an independent entity. In time, federation with autonomous areas on the West Bank may allow Gaza to evolve into a friendly Palestinian nation. Israel's conflict with Syria may continue for centuries. The whole of the Middle East may come under Russian influence, with Israel the most independent state in the region. The PLO may survive and be part of the aforesaid friendly Palestinian state. Any geopolitical outcome no worse than these would be acceptable. Continued mass murder in Central America so preserve the status quo is not.

John Gelles
California

To the Editor:

I found your *Newsletter* interesting. However, I suggest an improvement in readability, larger type. The only type large enough was that used in your editorial.

Victor Metropolski
New York

To the Editor

Just received my June/July issue (in August?).

Page 1—excellent

Page 2—no good (you are repeating Near East Report—leave the political-political to NER)

Page 3—Editorial—fine. Newsbriefs—some items belong in NER. Your editorial I'd pass a military-political, and I guess I see "JIN(Security)" (it should lean toward military) as you do; you emphasize the Pentagon Fly-In.

Page 4—no good; strictly political-political

Page 5—excellent; I see this as your area, some belongs to NER

Page 6—excellent

Page 7—excellent

Page 8—half and half: some your area, some belongs to NER

Remember—many of us (like me) also get the *Jerusalem Post*. Therefore, you need to be careful not to "print plain copy" like the local Jewish newspapers will often do. Your "Coming Soon" says what you should be about.

Shalom. Glad you exist.
Paul Davis
California

The Editors reserve the right to shorten all letters received. We welcome your comments.

Presidential Tribute to Henry Jackson



President Reagan and Mrs. Jackson at the White House ceremony.

(Opp. Page, The White House)

Editor's Note: The following is excerpted from remarks by President Reagan at the posthumous presentation of the Medal of Freedom to Henry M. Jackson, June 26, 1984.

Scoop Jackson was convinced that there's no place for partisanship in foreign and defense policy. He used to say, "In matters of national security, the best politics is no politics." His sense of bipartisanship was not only natural and complete—it was courageous. He wanted to be President, but I think he must have known that his outspoken ideas on the security of the nation would deprive him of the chance to be his party's nominee in 1972 and 1976. Still, he would not let his convictions to fit the prevailing style.

Scoop Jackson believed in a strong defense for only one reason: Because it would help preserve the peace by deterring military violence.

He believed in arms control because he wanted a more secure world. But he refused to support any arms control initiative that would not, in his judgment, serve the security interests of the nation and ensure the survival of the West. His command of the facts and his ability to grasp detail were legendary. At Congressional hearings, people often learned more from his questions than they did from anyone else's answers.

And, it was very much like Scoop to see that there was a growing problem in Central America—and to see that the challenge of protecting freedom and independence there would require the

commitment of Democrats and Republicans alike. He conceived the Bipartisan Commission on Central America and became one of its most active leaders.

He knew that stable, democratic institutions cannot be achieved in that region without the security that American assistance can provide. He saw the Commission's work completed, and, if he were alive today he would be working tirelessly to get its recommendations accepted by the Congress.

Scoop helped shape national policy on dozens of complex issues—on strategic planning and arms control, on the Soviet Union and Central America, on human rights, and Israel, and the cause of Soviet Jewry.

His support for Israel grew out of his knowledge that political decisions must spring from moral convictions. It wasn't some grand geopolitical abstraction that made him back the creation of Israel—it was seeing the concentration camps first hand at the end of the war. At Buchenwald he saw the evil, as he said, "written on the sky"—and he never forgot.

He said the Jews of Europe must have a homeland. He did everything he could to strengthen the alliance between the United States and Israel, recognizing that we are two great democracies, two great cultures, standing together. Today both nations are safer because of his efforts.

He never stopped speaking out against anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. And he was never afraid to

speak out against anti-Semitism at home. And he—Scoop Jackson just would not be bullied.

He conceived and fought for the Jackson Amendment in the Trade Act of 1974. There's hardly a soul among the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews who later found freedom in the West who was not sustained in the struggle to emigrate by the certain knowledge that Scoop was at his side.

Scoop Jackson was a serious man. Not somber, or self-important, but steady and solemn. He didn't think much of the cosmetics of politics. He wasn't interested in image. He was a practitioner of the art of politics, and he was a personage in the affairs of the world. But there was no cause too great or too small for his attention.

And, now, I am deeply honored to present to you, Mrs. Helen Jackson, the Medal of Freedom in honor of your husband, Senator Henry Jackson of the State of Washington.

Let me read the citation: "Representative and Senator for more than four decades, Henry Martin Jackson was one of the greatest lawmakers of our century. He helped to build the community of democracies and worked tirelessly to keep it vigorous and secure. He pioneered in the preservation of the nation's natural heritage, and he embodied integrity and decency in the profession of politics. For those who make freedom their cause, Henry Jackson will always inspire honor, courage and hope."



JINSA was honored to present Sen. Jackson with the Distinguished Service Award in 1983.

LEBANON

(Continued from page 3)

Estimates show that between 1,400 and 4,000 persons have been declared kidnapped, and their relatives are demanding government action. This is the third day of such demonstrations.

Also in Beirut: 1) Hezbollah fought and the Army's 6th Brigade fought in the UNESCO area of the city; 2) a Syrian officer was killed by unidentified gunmen; and 3) the As-Sadr Brigade Organization announced it was responsible for the kidnapping of the head of the Alayla Peoples Bureau.

In the South, a Katyusha rocket was aimed at an Israeli position from outside Jubb Jamin, and an explosive charge went off outside the town of Shihur, near Tyre.

In the Bekka Valley, the Syrians installed 130mm guns in the Sa-ad Nayil plain.

10 July

The Mayor of As-Sarrafand township in the South, Jawad Khalaf, was killed when his car exploded. The National Resistance Front claimed to have planned the bomb.

In Tripoli there were clashes between the Islamic Unification Movement and the Arab Democratic Party. The IUM rejects any government-sponsored security plan for Tripoli and says it will keep the city's airport and shipping port closed. There was also fighting between the IUM and the Alawite Red Knights in the neighborhoods of A-Qubba, Hayy Ash-shaykh and Tal al-Umar.

In Beirut, the Syrians were reported, but there was shooting in the neighborhoods of UNESCO, Jall al-Bahr and Wata al-Munassar, the reason for which remains unclear.

In the South, one civilian was killed and two wounded in Jibzib, during a clash between the Israel Defense Forces and the National Resistance Forces. There was also intensive gunfire traded between local forces in the towns of Baaloun and Haraa Baaloun. Civilian neighborhoods were affected. There was also shooting on the Jibzib Road.

The Syrians today banned the establishment of training camps in the Bekka Valley, presumably a reference to the four Iranian Revolutionary Guard camps set up on 6 July. Also in the Bekka, there was an attempt on the life of the Hezbollah Party leader in Ba'alabak, and Soviet military experts were reported seen in Shwarah and near the Syrian-Israeli confrontation line.

11 July

In Beirut, in an attack claimed by the As-Sadr Brigades, a bomb exploded in the Libyan Brotherhood Bureau. There was also an arson fire in the Ministry of Information.

There was fighting in the wheat market in Tripoli today, and Al Maradha gunmen opened fire on members of the Syrian National Party in Dahr al-Ain, south of the city.

12 July

As a result of the slipping incident yesterday, fighting broke out in numerous villages south of Tripoli between members of Al-Maradha and the Syrian National Party. Since dawn, the towns of Amoun, Bachmezzin, Ain Ikrit, Kfar Ayqa, Kfaray, Kfar al-Had and Barsa have all been under attack. Shortly thereafter, fighting began in the towns of Dahr al-Ain, Ra's Maqas and Al-Nahlah. Scores have been killed or wounded.

In Tripoli itself, there was sniper fire in the wheat market again in the continuing battle between the Islamic Unification Movement and the Alawite Red Knights. Roadblocks have been set up

and reinforcements brought in.

In the Bekka Valley, Iranians from Ba'alabak continue to move to centers in Basky under Syrian pressure.

In the south, Israeli troops turned control of posts near An-Nabatiyah over to the Army of South Lebanon under the command of General Antoine Lahd. The IDF will continue to patrol in the area and supervise the Army of South Lebanon.

At noon, in Tyre, a huge explosion was heard in the vicinity of an Israeli patrol, while earlier, an Israeli armored personnel carrier was attacked on the Shabiba Road.

13 July

Fighting between Al-Maradha and the Syrian National Party in the towns south of Tripoli continue despite attempts by Prime Minister Karami to obtain a ceasefire. Attacks and counter-attacks continued throughout the morning, and reports from the Bekka Valley indicate that the SNP has sent 300 gunmen to fight in the north.

The Islamic Unification Movement and the Communists have joined the fighting on the side of the SSNP, and pro-Syrian Palestinians in Jibal Turtal (southeast of Tripoli) are shelling Al-Maradha positions in Zgharta—including the French family quarters. Dozens are said to have been killed and wounded in today's fighting, which also spread to the towns of Baddah, El', Kfar Hata and Kilhas.

In separate fighting, there were battles between the Islamic Unification Movement and the Alawite Red Knights in Tripoli itself.

14 July

In the south, Lebanese National Resistance Forces donated charges near IDF patrols near Al-Ghaziyah and on the road between Tyre, Dabbah and Ma'alaka.

15 July

In Beirut, there was an exchange of heavy caliber machine gun fire between the neighborhoods of Kfarchina and Choueifat. Fighting continued through most of the day, and the Bouda Highway highway came under attack during the artillery shelling of Kfarchina.

Also in Beirut, the body of Jewish community leader Raul Mitrani was found near Beirut airport. The 47-year-old merchant appeared to have been tortured. His brother, living in Beirut, said Mitrani had been warned by Amal to break off his ties with Israel.

Following sporadic fighting between Al Maradha and the SSNP, quiet prevails in Beirut.

17 July

In the south, the National Resistance attacked a patrol of the Army of South Lebanon near An-Nabatiyah.

18 July

In Beirut, there was machine gun fire, RPGs and hand grenades in the areas of Samra, Ghalib, Za'atar and Al-Sanab. The suburb of Kfarina was subjected to machine gun fire emanating from Choueifat.

In the south, National Resistance Forces attacked a patrol of the Army of South Lebanon near the Haroul crossroad with rockets and machine guns. They also attacked IDF vehicles near Jall al-Bahr and near Al-Qualayah.

19 July

Following yesterday's increased Syrian state of alert in the Bekka Valley, Syrian positions opened 130mm artillery fire. The Israelis returned fire with 120mm guns.

At the same time, the Syrians in the Bekka surrounded the Palestinian refugee camp of Al-Jall. Wawayl after discovering a pro-Arafat trend there. The Syrians also expelled Hezbollah groups from Ba'alabak to special camps



Southern Lebanon: Sporadic attacks took place against the IDF and the Army of S. Lebanon

away from the city. In Beirut, Amal gunmen have appeared in certain areas of West Beirut and the southern suburbs. There has been gunfire on the contact lines between Choueifat, Kfarchina and Samra-Ash Shihay.

In the north, following two days of quiet, the Al-Karaki district was again the scene of fighting between Al Maradha and the SSNP. It is reported that Syrian troops are deployed outside Al-Qayri and opposite the Al-Batroun neighborhood.

There was fighting with heavy caliber weapons between the IUM and the Alawite Red Knights in Tripoli itself. The fighting was concentrated in the wheat market, in Al-Qubba and Haraa al-Saydah.

In the south, there were isolated rocket attacks against the IDF and the Army of South Lebanon in Jawraya, Antariyah and Adfim, and in and near Sidon and Tyre.

In political news, Lebanese Interior Minister Joseph Sheh confirmed that "more than 4,000-5,000 people" have been reported kidnapped or missing by their relatives, but the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had reported seeing "fewer than 300 of them." Also, a senior officer of the pro-Syrian As-Saiqa Organization arrived in the south to attempt to organize the cadres of Palestinians in camps near Tyre.

20 July

An RPG-7 fired from a gas station caused damage to the Soviet embassy. A member of As-Sayf al-Had (the Sharp Sword Organization) said the group had carried out the attack because "the Soviet Embassy had become an espionage center." He added that the

group, not heard of before, "could reach every Soviet in Lebanon" and that "the will that forced the Americans and the French to withdraw can make the earth shake under the Soviet's feet." Al Maradha applauded the attack.

In addition to Amal gunmen noted yesterday, Phalangite gunmen have been seen on the Damour road, and both sides are setting up roadblocks in Beirut. The neighborhood of Al-Musayyibah came under machine gun attack from Al-Amerikan and there was sniper fire in the Ash-Shihay neighborhood.

In the south, the IDF reduced its presence in the A-Dawl Bridge area, and handed control of the 'Alman Bridge and surrounding area over to the Army of South Lebanon.

There was sniper fire exchanged between unidentified groups in Tripoli near the playground circle. In the Bekka Valley, a Syrian tank convoy has taken up positions in the Al-Yammunah hills, and Syrian forces were seen transporting Soviet advisers near Shwarah. Also, a group has set up a new center near Ba'alabak, with machine guns, rocket launchers, 106mm artillery pieces and mortars. Also, a Syrian Brigadier General was reported killed by a shot to the head.

In political news, pro-Arafat Palestinians have been meeting in Beirut and the suburbs to consider a course of action.

22 July

Daily fighting continued between the Islamic Unification Movement and the Arab Democratic Party, despite pleas from Prime Minister Rashid Karami. Rockets and snipers were involved. There was also sniping at the Lebanese Army in Suq a-Gharb outside Tripoli.

23 July

In Beirut, depots have been set up to collect weapons from various militias, including Amal, PSP, the Communists, the Lebanese Forces, Jundallah and Harbulah. But, in the city, Amal militiamen set up new check points and roadblocks, while sniping from Kfarchina to Choueifat escalated into machine gun fire.

In Tripoli, fighting increased between the Islamic Unification Movement and the Arab Democratic Party, in the areas of Ash-Shaykh al-Jallal, Al-Tall and Ash-Zahrayah.

In the south, the IDF handed over control of the Kfar Tibn-Armoun-An-Nabatiyah triangle to the Army of South Lebanon. This follows the Lahd army's taking responsibility for the 'Alman Bridge affair. Since February, the ASL has been deployed in Haabiyah, Jazir, An-Nabatiyah and Sidon. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Resistance Front claim to have killed two Israelis on the Sidon-Jazir road. In Amal, an attempt was made on the life of an ASL commander. There were no injuries.

The Syrians have set up a radar device in Baalun at-Tallah in Qabb Ilyan in the Bekka Valley to watch Israeli positions in Amal.

In political news, the Syrian Social National Party has, for the first time, elected a Syrian national as its leader. 'Ismail Mahgoubi was unanimously selected by the SSNP Higher Council. The SSNP is banned in Syria.

24 July

Despite yesterday's gun collection at Beirut, a Progressive Socialist Party position in Tallat-al-Khayyat was attacked with rockets and machine guns, after the Jundallah forces refused to dismantle a roadblock. There was also gunfire in the Al-Musayyibah neighborhood, and Al-Maradha gunmen were seen in the area of the Arab University of Beirut. Sniper fire continued from PSP positions in Choueifat into Kfarchina.

Fighting continued in Tripoli between the Islamic Unification Movement and the Alawite Red Knights, after the inability of the Internal Security Forces to interpose itself along the line of separation.

25-26 July

In Tripoli, clashes between IUM and the Arab Democratic Party expanded to the Ash-Qubba chapter to the south from the Zgharta Road, the wheat market, Haraa al-Saydah and the Nahr Abu Al-Hir. Scores have been killed or injured.

Fighting continued through the night and into the 26th, in the neighborhoods of Ash-Shar'ani, As-Saydah, Al-Qubba, Al-Tabbassah, Ca'i Muhit, Al-Hayy al-Jadid, and in the Al-Azz and Al-Jaysh Streets. An artillery duel in Al-Qubba and Al-Tabbassah left 15 dead and 60 wounded.

On the morning of the 26th, all roads to Tripoli were reported cut, and the artillery emplacements of Palestinians in the Al-Baddaki Camp began shelling IUM positions.

There was also fighting in Beirut at Al-Maradha claimed with the Lebanese Army's 6th Brigade. Weapons from Libya are being distributed to the Al-Maradha members.

Epilogue

Reports continuing into August indicate continued fighting between the IUM, the PSP and the PSP and Al-Maradha; Amal and SSNP; the Lebanese Army and unidentified gunmen in Beirut; and Amal and Hezbollah, among others.

Refugees were seen leaving Tripoli for the south.

with the local authorities, as well as the civilian and military authorities, all of

JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK (US Ambassador to the United Nations, at the Republican National Convention): "What would become of Europe—if the Afrikaners came under Soviet control? What would become of Israel if surrounded by Soviet client states? [Look

YASSER ARAFAT (Chairman of the PLO, at an African-Arab solidarity conference): "True Arab solidarity with..."

INTERVIEW

SULLIVAN: I resent full-grown kids still wanting an allowance, and older friends still free-lancing—when they are no longer too young or too destitute to care for themselves. One can argue about the true value of the “free” rate that the Europeans provide for raising our forces, or about the taboos of accommodating foreign troops or inviting them so close to the Soviet threat. None of these rank with the real costs to both the US and the West of forcing the US to overpay on our collective security. It is the Europeans’ arms; spending too little.

then surely are spending too much money on the military. The resistance to change comes from a truly monumental constituency on both sides of the Atlantic. Virtually all the American people, and almost all the European people, support their own military, active and retired, and most of the living Western diplomatic community, save the status quo. At taxpayer's expense, Americans let's continue to play the Great White Father role, and the Europeans can continue to over-rely on their social programs while enjoying the luxury of elevating their status. It is appealing to watch the NATO issues being dug up by the US diplomats, and the Europeans' counterpoints, from "stealing" or "boycotting" Western diplomats, hitting daily about "sending the wrong message" to the Soviets. There is real trauma now that the Europeans finally realize their nuclear security blanket has been yanked.

We need to look objectively at realistic divisions of responsibility for, say, the year 2000, and then begin the gradual realignments required to achieve both regional and global security.

Yes, I would certainly expect that such a reassessment would result in a gradual reduction of active American forces in West Europe. Hospitality replaced by reserve European forces replacing manpower-intensive weapons deployment and built in Europe. This would be accompanied by a gradual increase in US forces capable of deployment to those other parts of the world genuinely threatened to credible and appreciable "strategic" interests. But there would be a relatively small US active air force, a small US active ground force, and a very small US active navy. Cooperation of allies and friends would benefit from the Weimers way of life. But these force realignments should not be misread as a penalty for Europe's poor performance. A Krutner and Toman have independently warned. To

URI LUBRANI (Israeli Coordinator of Lebanese Affairs): "The closing [of the Israeli liaison office in Lebanon] is final; it is impossible to predict what

SULLIVAN: I see several problems. One is the issue of serious attention. Nobody really backs off and asks "what if we would like NATO to look like, say, ten or fifteen years hence. Instead, we keep arguing for the near-term status quo, despite the staggering changes in the overall superpower balance over the last two decades. The Soviet over-

The basic question seems to be this: Is there a real chance of Europe, who isn't the only player in the game, being able to be configured to fight from the standpoint of interoperability, sustainability, availability, and battlefield preparation? If there isn't any real preparation for the future, the military will be almost 4% of its own GDP just to defend Western Europe. If the risk to Western Europe stems from superpower confrontation and mutual annihilation, there's no way to win that war. The only way to win is to lose other people's wars, or to lose them before they start.

NEWSLETTER

JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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NEWSBRIEFS

DOD CUTS MARY WARHEAD FUNDS: Secretary of Defense Weinberger has cut \$50 million from the FY1985 defense budget, that was to have funded the first year of advanced development of a maneuvering reentry warhead (MARY). The MARY would have the capability to change direction in its fall toward Soviet targets, and thus avoid interception from a Soviet anti-ballistic missile system. Warheads that are currently in the US arsenal fall along a defined path and are therefore easier to track and target. The cut was made despite Administration claims that the Soviet Union will have an ABM system in three to five years.

FRANCE, GERMANY TO PRODUCE HELICOPTER: French President Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Kohl signed a contract, worth \$2.5 billion, to jointly produce over 400 combat helicopters, which will be designed for both anti-tank and military support operations. The move is politically significant in that it will strengthen France and Germany's political ties within NATO and will encourage other West Europeans to take more responsibility for creating their own defense systems. The helicopters allocated to France will be used to protect the French Rapid Ac-

tion Force, which is a special unit which will be deployed to forward positions in Germany in event of a war. The Rapid Action Force and the helicopter contract indicate France's movement toward greater cooperation with NATO's integrated military command, despite France's withdrawal from the command in 1966, under Charles de Gaulle.

JAPAN TRANSFERS HIGH-TECH: Although Japan and West Germany are among the US's strongest allies in political and military policies, Pentagon intelligence has reported to Congress that Japanese industry is the worst offender in terms of leaking high technology to the Soviet Union. The sale of high-tech items is often accomplished through subsidiaries of Japanese companies, usually located in Malaysia and Singapore. The Soviets have bought micro-electronic equipment, machine tools, computers and other components which can be used in Soviet military systems. Although the Japanese government has begun to limit Soviet access to their technology, they have little legal authority to halt export-control violations, other than bringing to bear informal pressure on firms who deal with the Soviets.

(Continued on page 3)

Ed. Note: Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union has engaged in a determined, steady buildup of nuclear and conventional weapons programs. Although this buildup exceeds legitimate defense needs, it met little opposition in the United States where the policy of détente restrained enlarging and improving its own forces.

During the past decade, US efforts were largely spent in the area of research and development rather than procurement and deployment. The Soviets matched heavy investments in research and development with larger expenditures expanding the quality and quantity of their full range of forces. While new Soviet deployments of conventional weapons increased the existing imbalance between East and West forces, of greater consequence was the steady deployment of more powerful and increasingly accurate strategic missile systems. As the 1970s ended, the strategic balance between the US and USSR shifted with the Soviets gaining advantages in significant measures of strategic nuclear strength, thus undermining the credibility of US deterrence. The formula credited with preserving superpower peace since World War II was endangered. Clearly, the unrestrained increase in Soviet capabilities presented growing insecurity to the US and its allies.

It was in an atmosphere of the "rallying" of defense, heightened Soviet aggressiveness, and decreasing US strength that the Reagan administration took office. The new administration committed itself to reversing the relative decline of US military strength and to arresting the widening imbalance between US and Soviet military capabilities.

by Jeffrey Malar

Public acceptance of the dilemma aided the Reagan Administration in gaining congressional passage of two supplemental DoD authorizations—\$8 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1981 and \$18.1 billion in FY 1982. Although subsequent FY 1983 and 1984 budgets met some Congressional opposition and were reduced, defense spending steadily increased. The proposed FY 1985 DoD authorization, now under Congressional review, is nearly 50 percent higher than the last defense budget under President Carter. The result of Administration efforts is the first sustained, peacetime military growth in US history.

After more than three years of increased funding, US military capability and readiness shows gains in every major area. A May 1984 DoD report, prepared at the request of Sen. John Tower, R-Texas, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stresses quantifiable, across-the-board improvements in US military capability.

Improvements in readiness posture result from advances in personnel recruitment and retention; training quality and quantity; procurement of munitions, spares and repair parts; and mobility—strategic airlift procurement.

Aggressive modernization efforts enhance the level and quality of the force structure within each military service. The Army fields 2,929 M-1 Abrams tanks—34 missed in 1980. Its helicopter fleet grew by 171 aircraft, and 2,200 Bradley armored personnel carriers represent a new capability acquired since 1980. The Navy's count of deployable warships rose from 479 in 1980 to 525 in 1984 and aims to reach a target fleet of 600 vessels. Air Force and Navy increases in tactical fighters

aircraft—F-15s, F-16s, F-14s and F-18s added over 1,300 new aircraft to the DoD inventory. The Marine Corps supplied its forces with 430 light armored vehicles, over 1,000 armored amphibious vehicles and 3,000 Stinger missiles. Many defense experts agree that the US military in 1984 is more mobile, has more firepower and can sustain operations longer than at any other point in the last decade. This picture will improve as initial Reagan defense investments come to fruition.

An appraisal of the Reagan program, entering its fourth year, reveals clear accomplishments in restoring military vitality, but also sparks questions about how strong public and Congressional support will remain under fears and pressures to reduce growing federal deficits.

The Reagan Program
Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger characterizes the administration's defense tasks as "double duty." First, the readiness and staying power of US forces needs invigorating. Second the investment in future defense—extensive research and development, and modernization of the basic conventional and strategic nuclear force structure demands attention.

The most critical area in the Reagan program is strategic nuclear weapons improvements. This area lags behind Soviet developments due to incredible restraint shown by previous US administrations. The "détente" decade of the 1970s lulled US policy makers into excessive reliance upon Soviet "good faith," without carefully examining Soviet policy. Strategic nuclear forces represent the cornerstone of Soviet security and military policy. The USSR

(Continued on page 7)

Welcome

We have been actively engaged in a drive for membership over the past five months, and are deeply gratified by the enthusiastic response from around the country.

The Board of Advisors and the Board of Directors are pleased to welcome the nearly 5,000 new members of JINSA.

We look forward to meeting you personally at our meetings, seminars, the Pentagon Fly-In or on our trip to Israel. We look forward to your active participation in our endeavor and a long association.



The M-1 Abrams Tank

EDITORIALS

The New Memorandum of Agreement

We applaud the recently signed Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel. This five-year agreement, covering military research, development and procurement, replaces one that expired in the spring. Although the document is not yet complete (an Annex is still being negotiated), it is clear that the Memorandum satisfies a number of concerns for both countries.

The MOA performs a service to the defense industries and the military services of both the US and Israel. Aside from the actual provisions of the memorandum, the tone and the stated intention provide a point of reference to open, as far as possible (recognizing US defense industrial base requirements) the door to Israeli firms in the US market.

In the past, for example, Israeli companies were restricted to bidding for contracts with the Department of Defense to produce only those items specified on a previously compiled list. Adding an item to the list was a case-by-case, selective process (often so slow that the contract was awarded to others before the addition could be made) and dependent in large measure on the willingness of an individual Military Department Secretary to entertain the addition. The new MOA reads:

The absence of an item from Annex B [the list] is without prejudice to the authority of the Secretary of the Military Department to determine in any individual case, that application of the restriction of the Buy American Act to that item would be inconsistent with the public interest.

The absence of an item from Annex B should not be used as a basis for refusing Israeli industry an opportunity to be placed on the bidders list, furnished a solicitation, and provided access to pre-bid conference.

The "public interest" mentioned above can be read as looking for the most cost-effective way to satisfy an American defense requirement—a benefit for US taxpayers. The Memorandum reflects economic realities for both countries in other sections as well:

Noting that Israel will continue to purchase large quantities of defense equipment from the United States and desiring to ameliorate the ensuing imbalance in defense trade...

In order to promote the cost effective and rational use of funds allocated to defense...and mutually benefit from selected research and development programs which satisfy each nation's defense needs in a cost effective manner...

There is a provision for control of the information exchanged between Israel and the US. This is important to Israel in ensuring that her enemies don't benefit from US-Israel exchanges followed by US-Arab contracts. It is important to the US in protecting sensitive military technology from ending up in undesirable hands via third party transfers. The section reads:

Each Government will also undertake its best efforts to ensure compliance with the foregoing provisions [for control of information]...In no event shall such technical information...be transferred to any third country or any other third party transferee without the prior written consent of the originating Government.

The negotiations were not always easy, but the final product reflects the codification of an attitude of cooperation and facilitation:

Both Governments will provide appropriate policy guidance and administrative procedures within their respective defense procurement organizations to facilitate achievement of improved defense cooperation.

The significance of such language was apparent in a recent "test case". Two years ago, the Israeli Tadiran Corporation won a contract for the provision of radios to the US Army (see JINSA Newsletter, May 1982). E-Systems, a US company, disputed the award and took the Army and the contract to court. The case was resolved in favor of Tadiran after a long and expensive fight. E-Systems was then awarded a second-year contract. Recently, the Army decided to take bids on spare parts for the radio, and E-Systems prevailed upon the Army to require domestic bidders only—disenfranchising Tadiran and putting the American taxpayer at risk.

Senator Rudy Boschwitz (a member of the JINSA Board of Advisors) and Senator William Cohen pointed out to the Army the inconsistency of such a domestic production requirement in light of the cooperative language of the new MOA, particularly since the Army itself had declared that awarding the original contract to Tadiran would not affect the domestic industrial base.

The Army reversed its decision, opening bidding to all sources, and everyone's interests are better served:

- 1) Tadiran has a chance to bid on a contract, which, if won, will provide Israel with dollars earned, not more Foreign Aid;
- 2) The US introduces competition into this contract for spare parts, resulting in DoD receiving the best price and American taxpayers paying less for a necessary element of our defense;
- 3) E-Systems is required to compete in an open marketplace, presumably increasing its efficiency.

Oil & The Persian Gulf

While oil tankers are burning in the Persian Gulf, oil prices have declined. One year ago, Saudi Light sold on the spot market at its officially posted price of \$29.00/barrel. A few weeks ago, it was approximately \$27.60/barrel, \$1.40 under the official price. Nigerian (OPEC) Bonny Light was \$1.10 and (non-OPEC) North Sea oil was \$1.90 under their official prices.

The Iran-Iraq war and its recent escalation have caused no panic in the marketplace for a number of reasons: the rapidity with which other OPEC countries have increased production; greater reliance by industrial nations on non-OPEC sources; conservation investments over the past decade; and fuel switching to coal, gas, nuclear and other energy sources. At this time, less than 15% of the world's oil is shipped through the Gulf. Furthermore, the strategic and commercial petroleum reserves of the industrialized countries are at an all time peak.

US interests in the Iran-Iraq war are best served at this time by being neutral. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General David Jones said that, "In the Gulf itself, our biggest concern was the danger of a spillover." The war reminded him of what Air Force General Curtis LeMay said when somebody asked him who he wanted to win the Army-Navy football game, "I hope they both lose."

Should either Iran or Iraq dominate the Gulf, the US would have to take countermeasures. But, for the moment, we should do as little as possible, except plan and prepare to avoid such domination by either Iran or Iraq.

**The Board of Advisors
and the Board of Directors
offers congratulations and best wishes
to JINSA past-president
Ambassador Richard Schifter
as he assumes the position of
US Deputy Representative to the
United Nations Security Council.**

NEWSLETTER

The Jewish Institute is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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EDITORIAL

The MX Missile: Who Stands With Sakharov?

Andrei Sakharov is, for freedom-loving people, a symbol of strength in the face of oppression. He is a symbol of the struggle for human rights and personal dignity. Emotional support for Sakharov has resonated throughout the United States, including the Congress.

But he is more than a symbol; he is a man knowledgeable in the field of modern arms and arms control. He has warned the US not only about the danger of nuclear war, but also about the price of appeasement and capitulation to the Soviet Union. He supports strategic parity and, specifically, production of the MX missile. On the subject of Soviet superiority in silo-based missiles, Sakharov smuggled out this advice for the US, "If it is necessary to spend a few billion dollars on MX missiles to alter this situation, then perhaps this is what the West must do."

What did Congress do? Members, who cite Sakharov only on issues they care to, failed even to consider his words (printed on this page) as guidance in the debate. There is room for an honest difference of opinion on the military merits of the MX. But there seems to have been a disturbing, anti-military pattern among some Congressmen who idolize Sakharov but ignore or disregard his advice. Included in this group are many Jewish Members of Congress who have been stalwarts in the struggle for the rights of Soviet Jewry.

Three recent Congressional votes on MX provide cases in point. The first was to place a moratorium on all funds for the MX. It failed by six votes, but among Jewish members, it passed by a 4:1 margin.

The second, calling for the building of 15 missiles next April unless the President reports progress in arms control negotiations, passed narrowly. Among Jewish members, however, even this modest compromise failed by a 4:1 margin.

The third reduced the effectiveness of the compromise by stating that no money would be appropriated next April, even if the conditions were met, without a joint resolution of Congress. This amendment, taking the future of the MX out of the hands of the President and leaving it with Congress, passed by only 2 votes. Among Jewish members, it passed by a nearly 6:1 margin.

A slim majority in Congress has used every opportunity to weaken the MX missile. President Carter proposed 100; that was reduced to 40; that was reduced to 15. Even the 15 can only be built following a joint resolution of Congress.

It is not necessary to agree with Sakharov's position on all of the issues to respect his role as champion of human rights. However, Congress clearly has chosen to support the sentimental symbol of Sakharov, while too many of its members ignore or reject his substantive advice in a crucial area.

The Editorial Review Committee welcomes the many new readers of our Newsletter. We solicit your comments concerning the substance and style of our pages. We would be pleased to publish your comments as a "Letters to the Editor" column.

Andrei Sakharov on the Strategic Balance

Ed. Note: The following is excerpted from a recent open letter appearing in the journal "Foreign Affairs" this spring. Andrei Sakharov, director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, is a member of the Soviet Union, and that party must be respected.

The restoration of strategic parity is only possible by investing large resources and by an essential change in the psychological atmosphere in the West. There must be a readiness to make certain limited economic sacrifices and, most importantly, an understanding of the necessity of the situation and of the necessity of some restructuring. In the final analysis, this is necessary to prevent nuclear war, and war in general. Will the West's politicians be able to carry out such a restructuring? Will the press, the public, and our fellow citizens help them (and not hinder them as is frequently now the case)? Can they succeed in convincing those who doubt the necessity of such restructuring? A great deal depends upon it—the opportunity for the West to

conduct a nuclear arms policy that will be conducive to the lessening of the danger of nuclear disaster.

Precisely because an all-out nuclear war means collective suicide, we can imagine that a potential aggressor might consent on a lack of resolve on the part of the country under attack to take the step of leading to that suicide, i.e., it could count on its victim capitulating for the sake of saving what could be saved. Given that, if the aggressor has a military advantage in some of the variants of conventional warfare or which is also possible in principle—in some of the variants of partial (limited) nuclear war, he would attempt to use the fear of further escalation to force the enemy to fight the war on his (the aggressor's) own terms. There would be little cause for joy if, ultimately, the aggressor's hopes proved false, and the aggressor country perished along with the rest of mankind.

Of course I realize that in attempting not to lag behind a potential enemy in any way, we condemn ourselves to an arms race that is tragic in a world with so many critical pro-

blems admitting of no delay. But the main danger is slipping into an all-out nuclear war with the probability of such an outcome could be reduced at the cost of another ten or fifteen years of the arms race, then perhaps that price must be paid, while, at the same time, diplomatic, economic, ideological, political, cultural and social efforts are made to prevent a war...

In view of the above, it seems very important to me to stress the possibility of powerful silo-based missiles at the talks on nuclear disarmament. While the U.S.S.R. is the leader in this field, there is very little chance of its easily relinquishing that lead. If it is necessary to spend a few billion dollars on MX missiles to alter this situation, then perhaps this is what the West must do. But, at the same time, if the Soviets, in deed and not just in word, take significant verifiable measures for reducing the number of land-based missiles (more precisely, for destroying them), then the West should not only abolish MX missiles (or not build them) but carry out other significant disarmament programs as well.

NEWSBRIEFS

(Continued from page 1)

ENLISTMENT QUOTAS FULL: The Department of Defense has announced that the armed forces will stop recruiting for the rest of fiscal 1984 some this month. After that time, candidates can enlist for service but will not be trained or report for duty until fiscal year 1985 begins on October 1. The recruits now include the highest number of high school graduates (93%) since the end of World War II. In addition, the quotas for the Navy and Air Force were both reduced because of those services' success in retaining more skilled and experienced personnel than in previous years.

GUERRILLAS SEIZED HOSTAGES IN SALVADOR: On the same day that Jose Napoleon Duarte successfully completed his bid for the Salvadoran presidency, a band of guerrillas held 73 hostages in a supermarket in San Salvador. This event was not reported extensively in the American press, although the national police granted the guerrillas safe passage out of Salvador and the crisis passed with no one being killed. Also, for the first time, the military high command weakened its resistance to prisoner exchanges, and released 10 jailed guerrillas for an army colonel who had been held by the rebels for two years.

WHO BELONGS TO THE NUCLEAR CLUB? A study of worldwide nuclear weapons concluded that it must be assumed that India, South Africa and Israel possess nuclear arms in addition to the five declared nuclear powers (the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China). Eleven other countries were cited as having the potential to build nuclear arsenals by the end of the century (Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Taiwan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Korea, Nigeria and Chile).

US STUDYING ISRAELI RPV: The Pentagon is involved in an evaluation of the Israeli Masruf remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), which is built by Tel Aviv, an Israeli electronics firm. The US has purchased some of the RPVs and is assisting Israel in its development of the Saar VI missile attack boat.

IRONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: As has been reported extensively in the press, Saudi Arabia has asked the United States to supply it with advanced weapons in order to protect itself and the rest of the Gulf from the spillover of the Iran-Iraq war, which threatens shipping in the Persian Gulf. The US has sent the Saudis Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, ammunition, spare parts and special fuel tanks that will extend the range of the F-15 fighter planes already in the Saudi Air Force. The irony is that the fuel tanks were manufactured in the United States, but were conceived and designed by Israel.

LIBYA SEVERS RELATIONS: The Government of Muammar Qaddafi has suspended diplomatic relations with Liberia and Zaire because those two countries have resumed ties with Israel. In other foreign policy matters, Libya has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, thereby promising not to develop nuclear weapons.

LIBERIA ASKS ISRAELI HELP: The Liberian national defense minister is seeking Israeli assistance in fighting subversive activity headed by anti-government forces. Israeli military advisors are in Liberia, advising President Samuel Doe, but the Liberians would also like to purchase Israeli arms, cargo aircraft and small-scale fighting equipment. Israel has also sent agricultural and aviation experts, partially in thanks to Doe for resuming diplomatic relations with Israel, even in the face of Arab pressure.

ARABAT WANTS REBIRTH OFFICE: Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, has appealed to the new Lebanese government of Bashid Karame to reopen the PLO office in Beirut, "in accordance with the Charter and resolutions of the Arab League."

EGYPT-SOVIET RELATIONS IMPROVE: President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt recently announced that relations between his country and the Soviet Union are so good that the two countries will soon exchange ambassadors. Relations between the two have not existed on the ambassadorial level since President Sadat expelled thousands of Soviet advisors in 1972.

SYRIA WITHDRAWS FROM JERUSALEM COMMITTEE: The Syrian Foreign Ministry has announced that Syria will withdraw from the ICO Jerusalem Committee, which is chaired by King Hassan II of Morocco because of the recent Jewish conference held at Babat, which an Israeli delegation attended. The Foreign Ministry wrote that the participation of Israeli constitutes a "flagrant challenge to the sentiments of the Islamic peoples, whose sacred shrines are being exposed to the continuous violation of the usurping Zionist entity."

SRI LANKA RENEWS RELATIONS: Israel has opened an office at the American embassy in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo since Sri Lanka has renewed its relations with Israel. Relations between the two nations were broken off 14 years ago. Israel is offering the government with agricultural advice, and according to some reports, Sri Lanka has asked Israeli intelligence to help it fight the Tamil guerrillas in northern Sri Lanka.

JINSA Sponsors Meeting on Terrorism

Terrorism and the Western Response



Dr. Michael Ledeen

Ed. Note: Dr. Michael Ledeen, Senior Fellow in International Affairs at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and member of the JINSA Board of Directors, joined with Dr. Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies at CSIS in a JINSA-sponsored common discussion on terrorism in Washington, DC. The meeting was held on the occasion of the annual elections of the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, attended by over 300 people.

"What do all games have in common?"

"The unasked question is, 'Do they have anything in common?'"

"The answer is, 'Maybe they do and maybe they don't,' but we all seem to recognize one when we see one."

With that, Dr. Ledeen began to define the parameters of terrorism and trace a great deal of today's terrorist activity to the Soviet Union.

"It is sometimes said that the evidence of Soviet involvement is circumstantial. More often it is simply caught up in legalisms. For example, the PLO itself says its members have been trained in the Soviet Union and this has been documented. But—the PLO also claims to be a 'national liberation movement.'"

Then, according to Ledeen, the USSR can claim to be assisting a legitimate liberation group. When the PLO then trains other terrorist groups (as was proven to be the case in Lebanon in 1982), they can say it was simply support for liberation and the Soviet Union was not involved.

"The Soviets interpose someone between themselves and the terrorists, and legislatively if they are removed," he added.

Soviet involvement in international terrorism is different, however, from the new notion of "state sponsored terrorism". In a departure from common acceptance of that term, Dr. Luttwak said, "There is no such thing. When someone talks to you about 'state sponsored terrorism', he is pulling a fast one.

"Terrorism is when you don't know who did it. A terrorist must be by himself. It is his strength and his weakness. One of the great problems of terrorism is that the terrorist has no address. When a state sends him, we know who did it, he has an address—we can find him."

"What we have today is countries who have launched aggression against us. We don't want to admit it and respond, so we say it is a new phenomenon and we have to study it."

"Normal aggression [which is what he considers the bombing of the French and US Headquarters building in Beirut to have been], requires a normal response. This time, there was no desire by the US to take on Syria; we were worried about the Druse. The US didn't want to confront the issue."

"I'm not saying that we should have attacked Syria, just that that is what happened. We should have been honest."

Ledeen agreed that the attack in Beirut was not a case of terrorism. "The central feature of terrorism is that it is aimed against civilians. Beirut was part of a civil military conflict."

Why DO they do it?
Why DO we tolerate it?

According to Ledeen, terrorism is a tool of the weak. "There is more terrorism in history than we tend to remember, and it generally comes in waves—there was a great deal of terrorism in the 19th century. This is another wave."

"Farther back in history, during the Roman Empire, the Jews were terrorists. They did it because they couldn't field an army against the Romans. Now, the enemies of the Jews use terrorism because they are weak."

"In a confrontation between the state and terrorists, technology favors the state. We tend to think of it the other way—that new, small weapons favor terrorists, but when the terrorists find a weak link in the state, the state has the resources to fix it."

While terrorism may be the tool of

weak organizations, they are supported by the power of the Soviet Union. "The Soviets support it because it is a cost-effective weapon to use against the United States," said Ledeen.

"At one time, Gromyko told the Spanish government that the Basques (Spanish separatists) would remain quiet if Spain didn't join NATO. We know that a lot of what the Soviets say is bluff, but it is hard for countries with varying degrees of trouble to ignore them. And the West doesn't offer them much help."

Luttwak added, "The Soviet Union was opposed to terrorism until the 1960s, when they saw themselves losing the 'broad support of the masses'. They didn't want to turn to terror; they wanted to win on ideology. Now that they are in it, they are not discriminating—they will support anyone who is to do damage to the West."

In agreement with Ledeen, he said, "This is all symptomatic of a larger problem. The West is unwilling to deal with a world that has become very rough."

Central America

The question and answer session allowed the discussion to turn to other parts of the world, including Central America. Asked the difference between the CIA role in Nicaragua and "state sponsored terrorism", Ledeen was apologetic when he replied, "What is the difference between what we do and what they do? The difference is between what happens when we win and what happens when they win. The difference is enormous and important."

"When we win, the democratic experiment continues. When they win, it's all over."

"It is more than that," added Luttwak. "The Sandinistas do the one thing we cannot tolerate: they set up shop to export revolution. The US wants them to stop. We asked them. We asked them publicly, then we put pressure on them, then we coordinated mining the harbors. This is not the USSR supporting anyone who wants to do it."

"The US tried to woo the Sandinistas, but they have shown that they want to be revolutionaries and pose for cameras."

"Finally, we are not attacking civilians."

Depending on the charge that basic social injustice had created the civil war in El Salvador, Luttwak said, "I have been in Central America. Conditions in El Salvador are very bad, but conditions did not create this level of violence. That was created by the availability of weapons."

"Take the conditions in Salvador: approximately 90 countries have the same level of poverty. One could reasonably expect violence in all 90 of them. They don't have insurgency problems though, because the Soviets are not there. Many of those 90 countries oppose what we do in El Salvador because they are afraid to oppose the Soviet Union. They know that the Soviets will arm their opposition, creating more El Salvadors. It is a problem of construction."

"There is no such thing (as state sponsored terrorism)...What we have today is countries who have launched aggression against us. We don't want to admit it and respond, so we say it is a new phenomenon and we have to study it."

—Dr. Edward Luttwak

Luttwak added, "There is only terrorism, by the way, where there is enough freedom to operate—an inbred dictatorship, in a democracy. Conditions are appalling in the Soviet Union and in China, but there is no terrorism."

Prevention

The question arose as to the effectiveness of terrorism in achieving their aims, and the prevention of acts of terrorism.

Luttwak stressed the need to protect civilians and keep the fight among legitimate combatants. "You can't protect against all levels of terrorism, and you can't protect against all potential terrorists. You can try to make it difficult for terrorists to hit you."

"In that sense, Beirut was appalling, although it wasn't a true act of terrorism. We made it easier. We are still

making it easier. We are challenged and we don't respond. That encourages more of the same. Beirut recalled Iran—we were challenged there and didn't respond."

"We can't really even take protective measures in advance—we can't investigate until a crime is done. Foreign countries give us very little in the way of intelligence because our laws forbid us to return information."

All of these things, he said, provide encouragement to terrorists.

"We are doing some things. In some cases there is money in the Defense Budget for useful programs," said Luttwak. "However, we have a problem with commensurate types of operations. It is a craft, and we don't do crafts well," stressing that the US is best equipped to deal with larger-scale defense.

Public opinion and media treatment of terrorism differentiate between terror of the left and terror of the right. The final questioner wanted to know how

the public could appreciate the magnitude of Soviet involvement in terrorism if the media "soft-pedaled" the issue.

"The problem is that we don't like to think of ourselves as favoring right wing regimes," answered Ledeen. "We fought the last big war against the right wing. We want to consider ourselves progressive," which leads in some cases to a failure to recognize the danger on the left.

The meeting ended on a slightly more optimistic note, however, with Ledeen's observation that "terrorism doesn't usually achieve its objectives. It was tried in Italy, Turkey and Spain and didn't work. In Italy, there has been a resurgence in democracy since 1977, the height of the Red Brigades."

Returning to historical analogy, he said, "The Romans won, we will win."

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Safe Borders For Israel

Ed. Note: The disposition of territory held by Israel since 1967 has become a highly emotional issue among Israel's supporters and her detractors. It is also a strategic issue of the greatest magnitude.

For an analysis of the territory required to provide militarily defensible borders for Israel, we turned to a document prepared by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1967—before the brunt of political fallout was felt. The Memorandum was declassified many years later, but has rarely been seen in print.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(29 June 1967)

Subject: Middle East Boundaries

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 19 June 1967, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without regard to political factors, on the minimum territory, in addition to that held on 4 June 1967, Israel might be justified in retaining in order to permit a more effective defense against possible conventional Arab attack and terrorist raids.

2. From a strictly military point of view, Israel would require the retention of some captured territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders. Determination of territory to be retained should be based on accepted tactical principles such as control of commanding terrain, use of natural obstacles, elimination of enemy-held salients, and provisions of defense in-depth for important facilities and installations. More detailed discussions of the key border areas mentioned in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto. In summary, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding these areas are as follows:

a. *The Jordanian West Bank.* Control of the prominent high ground running north-south through the middle of West Jordan generally east of the main north-south highway along the axis Jenin-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then southeast to a junction with the Dead Sea at the Wadi el Daraja would provide Israel with a militarily defensible border. The envisioned defensive line would run just east of Jerusalem; however, provision could be made for internationalization of the city without significant detriment to Israel's defensive posture.

b. *Syrian Territory Contiguous to Israel.* Israel is particularly sensitive to the prevalence of terrorist raids and border incidents in this area. The presently occupied territory, the high ground running generally north-south on a line with Qnaitra about 15 miles inside the Syrian border, would give Israel control of the terrain which Syria has used effectively in harassing the border area.

d. *The Gaza Strip.* By occupying the Gaza Strip, Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for eight. Configured as it is, the strip serves as a salient for introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel's military advantage.

e. *The Negev-Sinai Border.* Except for retention of the demilitarized zone around Al Awja and some territory for the protection of the port of Eilat, discussed below, continued occupation

of the Sinai would present Israel with problems outweighing any military gains.

f. *The Negev-Jordan-Aqaba Strait of Tiran Area.* Israel's objectives here would be innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and protection of its ports at Eilat. Israel could occupy Sharm ash-Shaykh with considerable inconvenience but could rely on some form of internationalization to secure free access to the gulf. Failing this, Israel would require key terrain in the Sinai to protect its use of the Strait of Tiran. Eilat, situated at the apex of Israel's narrow southern tip, is vulnerable to direct ground action from Egyptian territory. Israel would lessen the threat by retention of a portion of the Sinai Peninsula south and east of the Wadi el Geraf then east to an intersection with the Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 29°20' north latitude

3. It is emphasized that the above conclusions, in accordance with your terms of reference, are based solely on military considerations from the Israeli point of view.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Signed
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix DISCUSSION OF KEY ISRAELI BORDER AREAS

a. Threat. The Jordan-Israel border is 330 miles in length extending from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba. Since 1948, hence following the armistice, the Jordanian army has been in a demarcation line with the Jordan River to the Syrian frontier. This border area has been traditionally harassed by the Jordanian military forces, and defended by a small number of troops. The Jordanian military, of small, widely separated outposts and patrols and, therefore, affords an area where launching of guerrilla activities is easier. This border is relatively easy. During the period January 1965 to February 1967, a total of 53 incidents of sabotage and mining were reported in this border area. These activities resulted in three killed, 35 wounded, and damage to houses, roads, bridges, railroads, and water and electric power lines. The Jordanian army has a large quantity of small arms fire occurred quite frequently. The majority of these events took place from the Mount Hebron and Aravah areas where the Jordanian army did not take sufficient measures to protect against line losses and saboteurs. The high ground running north-south through the Jordanian desert was not taken by Israel's north midsection and offers a route for a thrust to the sea which would split the country in two parts.

b. **Requirements.** A boundary along the commanding terrain overlooking the Jordan River from the west could provide a shorter defense line. However, at a minimum, Israel would need a defense line generally along the axis Bardala-Tubas-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then to the northern part of the Dead Sea. This line would widen the narrow portion of Israel and provide additional terrain for the defense of Tel Aviv. It would provide additional buffer for the air base at Beersheba. In addition, this line would give a portion of the foothills to Israel and avoid interdiction by artillery in the Israeli villages in the lowlands. This line would also provide a shorter defense line than the border of June 1967 and would reduce the

Jordanian-salient into Israel. It also provides adequate lines of communication for lateral movement.

a. *Threat.* The border between Syria and Israel extends approximately 43 miles. It extends from a point on the Lebanese-Syrian border east to the vicinity of Baniyas, south to Lake Tiberias, then south along the eastern shore of the lake to the Syrian-Jordanian border. During the period


scene of intermittent trouble over the years as both Jordanians and Israelis have been illegally cultivating lands in the area between the lines. Only one serious incident occurred in this area during the period January 1965 to February 1967.

b. *Requirement.* To defend the Jerusalem area would require that the boundary of Israel be positioned to the east of the city to provide for the organization of an adequate defensive position. On the other hand, if

Palestine Liberation Army.

a. *Threat.* This area has not presented any border problems since the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1957. The demilitarized zone around Al Awja, containing the main north-south, east-west road junction in eastern Sinai and the major water sources in the area, is the principal feature providing military advantage.

b. *Requirement.* Except for an ad-



Map accompanying the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
of 29 June 1967 on Middle East boundaries

January 1965 to February 1967, a total of 28 sabotage and terrorist acts occurred along this border. In addition, there were numerous shellings of villages from the high ground overlooking the area southeast of Lake Tiberias. Casualties were seven killed and 18 wounded. Control of the dominant terrain affords Syria a military route of approach into northern Israel; however, the greatest threat in this sector is from terrorism and sabotage.

dary of June 1967 which overlooks the Galilee area. To provide a defense in depth, Israel would need a strip about 15 miles wide extending from the border of Lebanon to the border of Jordan. This line would provide protection for the Israeli villages on the east bank of Lake Tiberias but would make defending forces east of the lake vulnerable to a severing thrust from Jordan to the southern tip of the lake. The Israelis would probably decide to accept this risk. As a side effect, this line would give the Israelis control of approximately 25 miles of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline.

3. The *lactosylam-Lactose* 4-ase

a. *Throat*. These areas have been the

Jerusalem were to be internationalized under the United Nations, a boundary established west of the city could be defended in accordance with the concept in paragraph 1. above.

4. *The Gaza Strip*
a. *Threat.* During the period 1949-1956, prior to the Suez war, numerous infiltrations and terrorist raids were mounted by Egypt from the Gaza Strip. However, with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1957, based in the Gaza Strip and along the Sinai border, the situation has been quiet. Only three events of sabotage occurred in this area during the period January 1965 to February 1967. The Strip, under Egyptian control, provides a salient into Israel a little less than 30 miles long and from four to eight miles wide. It has served as a training area for the Palestine Liberation Army and, despite the few incidents arising in this area of late, it is significant to note that one of the major reasons for the truce in the recent conflict was to seal off the area from the Strip.

b. *Requirement.* Occupation of the Strip by Israel would reduce the hostile border by a factor of five and eliminate a source for raids and training of the

justment of a portion of the boundary tied to the defense of Eilat, discussed below, and retention of the demilitarized zone around Al Awja, no need is seen for Israeli retention of occupied territory in the Sinai.

6. *The Negev-Jordan-Aqaba Strait of Turan Area*

a. *Threat.* There were only five incidents of sabotage in this area during the period January 1965 to February 1967. Israel's chief concern in this area is free access through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and protection of Eilat, Israel's chief oil port and trade link with the West African countries. Eilat, being at the apex of Israel's southern tip, is vulnerable to interdiction from Egyptian territory.

b. *Requirement.* To provide Israel with sufficient depth to protect the port, the boundary should be established at approximately 20 miles to the west along the Wadi el-Gerafi, south to its headwaters, then east to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 39°20' north latitude. In the event an international guarantee for free passage of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba is not provided, Israel would feel compelled to occupy key terrain in order to control the entrance to the Strait.

7. See attached map.

BUDGET

(Continued from page 1)

is not likely to hold its policies hostage to negotiations which require trust and good intentions, but leave capability intact. Throughout a decade of negotiations and agreements, the expansion and improvement of Soviet nuclear forces continued unabated, and is this fact which drives current US efforts to upgrade its own aging forces.

The US is now engaged in upgrading all three legs of its strategic triad. Twenty-one of the programmed 100 Peacekeeper, or MX, missiles are funded and a heavy research and development program is underway to provide a small ICBM by the early 1990s. The bomber leg of the triad gains added punch: the aging B-52 fleet with the air launched cruise missile and new electronic warfare modifications, acquisition of the first 18 of 100 B-1B bombers, and vigorous development of the advanced technology bomber (ATB)—the strategic bomber of the 21st century. New sea-based systems include the fielding of three Trident-class nuclear submarines, completed procurement of the Trident II SLBM, scheduled deployment of submarine launched cruise missiles, and the full scale development of the Trident II SLBM. US strategic goals remain to possess a flexible system balanced between responsiveness and control, survivability and effectiveness.

The FY1985 Defense Budget

The proposed FY1985 DoD authorization continues to follow the administration's emphasis on rapidly rebuilding military strength, and also attempts to recapture some prior year Congressional cuts. The originally requested \$304 billion reflects 13 percent real growth over the 1984 authorization which Congress held to a 3.7 percent growth level.

The FY1985 request seeks a 26 percent increase in research and development, a 25 percent increase in procurement, 14 percent increase in the operations and maintenance account, and a 60 percent jump in military construction. A 9 percent hike for military personnel was appropriated to cover a 5.5 percent military pay raise, and to support manpower growth of 32,000–39,000 for active duty and 32,000 for Reserve and National Guard.

Congressional opposition to the FY1985 defense budget came from both parties and centered on two major issues—impact on the federal deficit and arms control policy.

Growing demands to reduce the level of the federal deficit (\$200 billion projected in FY1984) caused intensive scrutiny of this year's proposed defense budget. Following President Reagan's request for a modest one year "downpayment on the deficit," both

discount the importance of defense spending, especially to local economies, should note Congressional infighting to maintain defense programs within specific states and districts.

Major weapons program cuts generally increase long-term defense costs. Pro-



AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, carrying eight Hellfire antitank missiles.

the House and Senate began forging budget reduction plans. While both plans adopted spending cuts and some form of tax increases, characteristically, they differ along party lines. The Democratic House shields domestic programs, increases some margin taxes and closes loopholes, while calling for substantial reductions in defense spending. The Republican Senate protects defense spending, calling for modest tailoring, and focuses on reductions in domestic spending. In spite of differences, there is widespread support for some levels of defense cutting.


Defense Spending and Deficits

While defense spending impacts on the economy, it is not apparent that even dramatic defense reductions would sharply raise deficit levels. The value of using defense spending to manage federal spending suffers due to major weapons system costs being spread over several years. Large cuts in procurement funding translate into smaller reductions in annual spending. The contribution of defense spending to GNP, employment and tax revenue mitigate cuts in defense spending affecting federal deficits. As a result, only a portion of each dollar cut shows up as a deficit reduction. Anyone who would

deduction and procurement decisions reflect assessments of threats to US security. Budget pressures induce postponement of new programs or stretching out of existing ones, not eliminating programs designed to counter threats. Reductions in current outlays will fuel increased spending in future years since procurement of fewer systems each year generally raises unit cost and requires more time to reach program goals.

Defense spending in the President's FY1983 budget will amount to a smaller share of the federal budget than it captured in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1970s, US concern focused more sharply on domestic rather than national security needs. Defense spending, as a percentage of the GNP, declined from 9 to 11 percent in the early 1960s to a low of 5 percent in 1978 and 1979. Between 1970 and 1979, the real purchasing power of the defense budget declined about 25 percent. After deflation for inflation, the FY1979 budget was \$58 billion less than it was in 1969. The current administration has reversed this trend, and the FY1985 defense budget represents 6.8 percent of the GNP—within affordable levels.

Budget Shares



The DoD Budget as a Percentage of the Federal Budget and the GNP

The Revised Program

Despite strong arguments supporting defense spending, Congressional solidarity on reducing spending led to the DoD submitting a revised budget with \$11.9 billion in reductions. Secretary of Defense Weinberger feels that the new package is the minimum level which can be sustained without seriously damaging national security programs. Reductions are achieved by cutting procurement of readiness items, such as munitions, spares and repair parts, deferring maintenance on major systems, and reducing the numbers of new weapons being built. DoD program goals remain viable driving additional expenditures in future years and stretching out programs now designed to meet economic production targets.

The \$291.1 billion budget (a 7.8 percent real growth rate) won support in the Senate, but the House is targeting both the total cut and individual items of the bill. In the House, substantial opposition to the administration's defense and arms control policies led to a passed budget authorization of 6.5 percent real growth—below the administration's request and with significant program changes. House Democratic leadership actions against the strategic modernization plan were partially successful—resulting in stopping FY1985 procurement of the MX missile until after Congressional review in April 1985, banning testing of the anti-satellite missile (ASAT) against objects in space unless the Soviets begin to conduct similar tests, and preventing deployment of submarine launched cruise missiles until the US and USSR agree on methods to distinguish between conventional and nuclear weapons. The House attempts to influence Soviet strategic developments by providing "incentives" in this case, US willingness to unilaterally halt some of its modernization efforts if the Soviets indicate willingness to negotiate on arms reduction and halt the strategic push in space.

The Senate is less critical of administration policies. They will vote on a defense authorization bill early June and are expected to approve a defense program similar to the President's revised request—7.5 to 7.8 percent increase. Although some program changes were made, such as reducing MX procurement from 40 to 21 missiles (consistent with the FY1984 program Congressional actions), the basic programs are left intact. The Senate supports President Reagan's arms control program—although requiring the President to seek negotiations with the Soviets on items that can be verified. The Admin-

istration is relying on strong support from Senate defense advocates to achieve authority for continuation of critical strategic programs. Defense analysts predict a compromise in conference to permit a 6 to 6.5 percent real growth and some arms control restrictions on strategic systems.

The results of the Authorization Conference will set the ceiling for FY1985 defense expenditures. Both the House and Senate must then examine actual FY1985 outlays during the appropriations cycle later this summer. Electioneering should keep the deficit issue at the forefront of the defense spending debate, and further, cuts are likely. Some big ticket procurement items will be significantly reduced in the FY1985 appropriations process to achieve short-term cost savings.

Conclusion

Recent events suggest that the world is still a dangerous place. The security of the US and its allies depends upon a strong military and a commitment to deterring hostile actions. This administration seeks to preserve peace through building and protecting US strength. The current defense program is aimed at correcting deficiencies in military capabilities and returning America to a position of recognized parity in military capability and readiness with its adversaries. Arguments over how to achieve defense goals are legitimate and are welcomed in a democracy. Unfortunately, the preeminent issue tends to be the cost rather than the content of defense.

The furor of the current public debate indicates that national security continues to be assessed as an economic issue—not a matter of national need. The defense budget should not be used as a tool to achieve fiscal policies, particularly during charged election years when US consistency is necessary to assure allies and restrain the Soviets. While the extent that military preparedness and US resolve will deter the Soviet Union from war and adventurism is open to question, recent history asserts that unilateral restraint has not paid off.

Safeguarding US security is inevitably an expensive proposition, and requires a consensus of American voters to sustain the current level of effort. The American Jewish community possesses a keener understanding of security needs and the ultimate costs of failure, than other segments of US society. It is the responsibility of the Jewish community to share its unique experience and insight and to be a leading voice for a strong defense in the growing political debate.

The battleship USS Iowa

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

CONGRESSMAN JACK KEMP (Member of JINSA's Board of Advisors, on terrorism at the Jonathan Institute in Washington, DC):

"For the most part, the Western democracies have taken a 'business as usual' approach to the sources of terrorism.

"In much the same way the Soviet Union's military power benefits from Western technology, required through both legal and illegal means, so too is international terrorism sustained to a degree largely unappreciated through Western capital and business enterprises. We are not only supplying the rope with which to hang us, in Lenin's memorable phrase; we're supplying the fragmentation bombs, the plastic explosives, the sniper's bullets. And by refusing to sit on a common and resolute stance, the democracies are also supplying the long-sought 'legitimacy' that terrorists so eagerly covet, which allows their spokesmen and front men to walk unhindered through the capitals of the West, to exploit the opportunities that to our free societies can provide, and to champion through word and slogan and disinformation the very objectives terrorism's masters seek to attain.

"Those who refuse to recognize the Soviet Union's role in international terrorism, despite the far reaching and ever growing evidence of it, remind me of those who refused to acknowledge the reality of what Nazi Germany was doing to the Jews of Europe. Walter Laqueur speaks of this phenomenon as 'the denial of reality, the psychological rejection of information which for one reason or another is not acceptable.' The reasons for this self-deception are all the more mysterious, he says, 'if the issues at stake are not events of marginal importance...but very real dangers to the survival of one's group or oneself.' " (24 June)

AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK (recipient of JINSA's Distinguished Service Award in March, 1984, on terrorism at the Jonathan Institute in Washington, DC): "The level of confusion has grown very deep and very serious. Yet we know it cannot be that terror wreaked on a civilian population by a revolutionary movement is liberation, while violence committed by a government responding to a guerrilla threat is repression. It cannot be that national liberation movements have the right to use violence against civilians, economies, societies and governments, and that those societies have no right to defend themselves—that violence conducted in the name of revolution is legitimate, while violence used by governments and societies to defend themselves against guerrillas is illegitimate. The distinction between terror used in defense of society and terror used to destroy society is really not so difficult. Many, however, have become confused by the semantics of totalitarianism, by the specialists in propaganda." (25 June)

IRVING KRISTOL (Professor of social thought at New York University, as written in *Commentary*): "If American Jews truly wish to be noninterfering, they have to cease being so concerned with Israel, with Jews in the Soviet Union, or indeed with Jews anywhere else. To demand that an American government be interventionist exclusively on behalf of Jewish interests and none other—well, to state that demand is to reveal its absurdity. Yet most of our major Jewish organizations have ended up maneuvering themselves into exactly this position. They cannot even bring themselves openly to support the indispensable precondition for the exercise of American influence on behalf of Jewish interests in the world: a large and powerful military establishment that can, if necessary, fight and win dirty, little (or not so little) wars in faraway places. It is the winning or losing of such wars that will decide the kind of world our children inherit—not striking poses or exuding moralistic rhetoric." (July 1984)

JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL (noted French political commentator, as written in *Commentary*): "The practical conclusion Communist leaders draw from Western military and economic power is that they can go right on doing what they have been doing. Jean-François Deniau, a former cabinet minister under Giscard d'Estaing, quoted a high Soviet official as having told him: 'We took Angola and you took not even saw that you could have beaten us in Angola—the government was on our side, but it was within an ace of giving up—and that you did nothing to win; on the contrary. And when, to save ourselves, we sent in 30,000 Cuban soldiers, Ambassador Andrew Young, a member of the American cabinet, said it was a positive step and an element of stability. All right, we noted the fact and included it in our analyses. Then we took Mozambique. Forget it, you don't even know where it is. Then we took Ethiopia, a key move. There again we noted that you could have repelled via Somalia or Eritrea or both. No reply. We noted that and put it into our analyses. Then we took Aden and set up a powerful Soviet base there, Aden! On the Arabian peninsula! In the heart of your supply center! No response. So we noted: we can take Aden.' " (June 1984)

EUGENE V. ROSTOW (Member of JINSA's Board of Advisors, regarding the War Powers Resolution): "Until we face the Vietnam question squarely and reach broad agreement on what its lessons really are, two fundamental objectives of national policy will elude us. It will be impossible for us to restore a solid bipartisan consensus on an effective foreign policy. And we shall remain distracted from more serious problems by an irrelevant and endless constitutional debate about the ways in which government conduct of foreign affairs is divided between Congress and the Presidency.

"The War Powers Resolution should be repealed promptly and decisively, so that we can return to the strong and active presidency anticipated by the Constitution of 1787 and created by the example of our best presidents—Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and Lincoln. And we need a vigilant, active Congress as well, fully participating in the foreign policy process as legislator, grand inquisitor and maker of public opinion.

"I wish to be very clear in this regard. I am no friend of unlimited presidential power...And I have not been impressed by any proposals I have seen for improving our foreign policy by reorganizing the government.

"A final lesson of the Vietnam experience in foreign affairs is the primacy of substance over procedure. We look around for procedural solutions for problems that Vietnam because our leaders have not achieved a national consensus about the kind of foreign policy the safety of the nation requires at this stage of world history...

"Democracy will not deserve to survive unless it takes foreign affairs seriously, for in that realm the price of error is death. We cannot, we must not escape from the demanding but manageable task of accepting reality by retreating into the insoluble and dangerous realm of myth about the nature of the world and our Constitution." (27 June)

BUTRUS GHALI, Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, "Egypt's policy is based on discouraging diplomatic relations from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, not only because of its occupation from an OAU member state, Egypt, but also because of Israel's aggressive policy and the denial of the Palestinian people's rights. This aggressive policy is continuing, and Israel's denial of the Palestinian people's rights is continuing as well. Therefore, there is still a need for the African countries to break off their relations with Israel.

"The return of the Israeli Labor Party is still assumption and speculation. Whatever the case, Egyptian diplomacy does not wager on this or that political party coming to power in Israel. Egyptian diplomacy's long experience with Israeli politics has shown that the difference between the Likud and the Labor party is probably one of method, not objective."

YITZHAK SHAMIR, Prime Minister of Israel, "I do not regard the renewal of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union as any sort of turning point or change in Egyptian policy.

"I do not think that this will influence Egypt to move away from the Camp David agreements, because having diplomatic relations with any country whatsoever does not make it imperative to accept that country's line."

AMBASSADOR RICHARD STONE (former special envoy to Central America, on the PLO involvement in Latin America): "The PLO may try to assert that they are not against Jews, they're only against those who support Israel or Zionists. That's a pretty broad brush and they paint their hate with blood. I stayed in a hotel room in Guatemala several years ago. When on one night the Banco del Café was blown up and the next morning the Chamber of Industry was blown up by car bombs. Something that's new to Central America but not new to Beirut, not new to the PLO." (30 May)

JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR (Secretary General of the United Nations, concerning Israel in the UN): "I am against expelling Israel from the United Nations, and not because the United States threatened to leave the United Nations if this happens. This is the democratic game. At present, the General Assembly is against you, but you sometimes vote with the majority, as, for example, on the issues of Afghanistan, or South East Asia...Your diplomacy should be more active, and should attempt to raise the support of other countries. You are a country that needs strong and convincing diplomacy." (31 May)

JESSE JACKSON (Democratic candidate for the US Presidency, concerning the PLO): "Arafat is educated, urbane, respectable. I think his commitment to justice is an absolute one. [Arafat is] a wise man. The PLO is not just an organization in the Middle East. It's a spirit, it's the bed in the children. And it's not just a military arm—it's hospitals, it's industry, it's education. It's a way of life." (January-April 1984)

Coming soon:

- Information about JINSA's 6th Pentagon Fly-In program
- Egyptian military movement in the Sinai desert
- More on US-Israel strategic cooperation

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Travel Log: A Look Inside the Israeli Defense Establishment

By BGen. Harry T. Hagaman, USMC (Ret.)

*Just
JINSA*

BGen. Harry T. Hagaman, USMC (Ret.), former Director of Intelligence, AFCEA, recently completed a fact finding tour of Israel as a guest of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). JINSA is a 13,000 member nonprofit association. The association works to educate the public on the importance of a strong U.S. defense posture, a budget adequate to support that posture and the U.S./Israeli security relationship.

The following is a day by day account of Gen. Hagaman's trip. The comments and observations are those of the author.

APRIL 28, 1985—The military guests on the JINSA trip were Gen. Volney Warner, USA (Ret.), VAdm. George Steele, USN (Ret.), BGen. Richard Sweet, USA (Ret.), BGen. Harold Morgan, USAF (National Guard), and I. There were 15 other Jewish Americans on the trip. En route to Israel, we were given reading material on Israel, and we listened to an informative tape, which presented updated news of the previous week.

April 29, 1985—The first briefing was in Tel Aviv conducted by Col. Yehuda Levy, a reserve member of the Israeli Army paratroopers. He was assigned to be our guide for the week. Col. Levy presented an excellent briefing on the geographic, political and strategic aspects of the state of Israel. The briefing centered on the threats to Israel from the south, east and north and the problem of terrorism. After the briefing, we drove through south-

ern Tel Aviv through the town of Jaffa to visit the Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI). I was fascinated by the amount of arable land being cultivated. An orange and lemon industry is flourishing, and there is a great deal of vegetable cultivation. As we approached the Ben Gurion Airport, I noted a communications station with directional/nondirectional antennas surrounded by a very strong field of concertina wire. The security and check points around the airport are evident, but not oppressive. Another point of interest was the fuel farm at the Ben Gurion Airport. It contained a number of 100,000 gallon fuel tanks, and it was surrounded by a high steel fence and covered by concertina wire. The tanks were skillfully camouflaged so that they would blend in with the ground area. This protective security is very important because communication stations and fuel farms would be primary targets for incoming enemy aircraft or terrorists should they want to neutralize the airport. As we drove through IAI's main gate, we were advised that no cameras would be allowed.

IAI was founded in 1953. The organization expects to earn \$800 million in exports in 1985. IAI is a major contributor to the Israeli economy. There is a very fine balance between civil and military products in IAI. Its products include aircraft, naval weapons, electronic systems, aircraft maintenance, avionics for airlines and military technical services for the improved F-4, etc. IAI briefed us on the Lavi—a new initiative on behalf of IAI to build an Israeli fighter/attack dual mission aircraft. Israel's high-low aircraft mix in the 1990s possibly will be the F-15 and F-16, and the Lavi, with variants of

the F-18, F-15 Echo or F-16E being considered. The Lavi's primary mission is air-to-ground; however, it also will have a short-range air defense fighter capability. IAI is making one two-seater for every four one-seaters produced. The aircraft has a small variable pitch canard; it will weigh 19,000 pounds when empty with 23,000 pounds of thrust; and it will have a 1.8 Mach capability. The engine is the Pratt and Whitney 1120.

Again, the man conducting the briefing emphasized the Lavi's extremely small size. In an effort to keep costs down, the Israelis strive for no bells and whistles, no fancy "nice to have" items and no engineering change proposals. The Lavi is 20 percent surface composite epoxy, and the wing and tail sections are composite to make it lightweight and strong. It will have a 30 mm gun to kill tanks. It will be able to carry all types of ordnance including smart weapons. It will have a landing speed of approximately 130 to 150 knots. IAI is expecting to build between 300 and 400 of these airplanes, and it is trying to keep the cost between \$12 million and \$15 million per copy in 1984 dollars. I questioned the exportability of this low mix, relatively unsophisticated fighter. If IAI is successful in developing this aircraft and in keeping the price competitive, later models might be competitive on the world market.

After leaving IAI, we drove to Israel's fighter base at Hatzor where we were met by Col. Goren, the base Commander and Commander of the wing at Hatzor. Col. Goren briefed us on the history of Hatzor and the airplanes that had flown out of that base. Hatzor was Israel's first air base following statehood in 1948. Col. Goren list-

ed some of the aircraft that operated at Hatzor: the Messerschmitt, purchased by the Israelis in 1948; the Spitfires in 1949; the P-51s, which flew between 1948 and 1956; the Mosquito light bomber; the French Mystir 1; the Mystir 2; the Mystir 4; the Super Mystir; the Mirage 3; the A-4. During our visit we observed the F-4 and the Kfir, which were flying training missions at the base that day. Col. Goren gave an interesting and very straightforward air threat briefing and then escorted us to visit the 101st Fighter Squadron where we were briefed by a major. This briefing centered on the Israeli philosophy on flying. The Israelis believe in realistic training to maximize air-to-air and air-to-ground combat training. The Israelis try to fly between 25 and 35 hours per month per pilot. They cut down on maintenance requirements as much as possible, and they have few problems with corrosion on the aircraft skin due to the dry weather.

The Israelis do have a big problem with early warning; it is approximately 130 nautical miles from Hatzor to Cairo, and it is not much farther to Damascus. The Israeli air training operating area is very small, so much of their training is done over the sea. With the return of the Sinai to Egypt, the Israelis have a very severe problem with air-to-ground targets because of the small size of their country. The West Bank, near the Dead Sea, has some air-to-ground targets for training, and I observed some low-level bombing practice in that area.

Following the briefing by Col. Goren and the visit to the squadron, we went to the base mess hall and had an interesting lunch consisting of native dishes. The squadron provided pilots and staff officers to sit with our group to answer questions while we ate.

On the way back to Tel Aviv, we visited a paratroop memorial. This memorial is dedicated to the paratroopers of the Israeli forces who have given their lives for their country since World War II. It is an impressive stone structure. The names of each of the paratroopers are carved in Hebrew on brass plates on the wall of the memorial.

We visited another very interesting area on the trip back to Tel Aviv. It was an area called Kibbutz Yad Mordechai. This kibbutz is six miles south of the town of Ashqelon. It has a population of approximately 375, of which 180 are children. The Yad Mordechai Kibbutz was established in 1936, and it was


one of the first that fought during the war for independence. In 1948, the people of the kibbutz delayed the attack of the Egyptian Army long enough to give the Israelis in Tel Aviv a chance to fortify the city and keep it from falling. The kibbutz had the battleground laid out so we could see the area where the battle took place. We also visited a museum that described the Warsaw ghetto; the break out of the ghetto; and the Holocaust treatment and the terrible plight of the Jews during World War II. The Yad Mordechai memorial and museum were erected in 1968, and every year on Israeli Independence Day thousands of people come from all over Israel to pay honor to those who died. The drive back from the southern area, which was within a mile of the Gaza Strip, took about an hour. I noticed a sign that said 70 km to Tel Aviv.

April 30, 1985—We drove from the hotel to the Tadiran Corporation. It took about 35 minutes through the very heavy traffic in Tel Aviv. We pulled into the Tadiran headquarters building and received an excellent briefing by

MGen. Yehoshua Segui (Ret.), former Director of Israeli intelligence. He is now Assistant General Manager and Marketing Manager of Tadiran. Gen. Segui presented a 25 minute briefing and a 15 minute movie on the Tadiran Corporation. Tadiran is the largest private corporation in Israel. It will do approximately \$620 million in sales in 1985, and it employs 12,000 people. The commercial business area constitutes 29 percent of Tadiran's efforts; military communications is 20 percent; and various other percentages involve the company's subdivisions. Tadiran has six divisions: electronic operations, electronic systems, communications (tactical), components, telecommunications and consumer products. Fifty percent of its products are exported. It is a stock company: 64 percent is owned by Koor, which is made up of a majority of the labor party; GTE-Sylvania owns 25 percent; and the employees have 11 percent of the stock.

The remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) that did so well in the Bekka Valley were made by Tadiran, and we requested permission

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Figure 1. Water is more precious than gold in northern Israel.

to see the RPV production facility. Some interesting comparisons were made between the U.S. produced Lockheed Aquila drone and the Tadiran RPV. The Israeli Program Manager, Ehud Orgil, pointed out that the Aquila was a fine RPV, but it was designed for a more sophisticated requirement than the Tadiran RPV was designed for. He stated that Aquila is considered the eyes of headquarters command while the smaller Tadiran drone is considered the intelligence gatherer for the tank commander. The Tadiran RPV is a relatively inexpensive tactical system for target acquisition, yet it is a very effective piece of equipment. Some specifics of the RPV: It is made of plastic with a minimum amount of metal and wooden prop; it weighs between 115 kilos or 230 pounds when it is filled with fuel; it has a seven hour duration; 100 knot MAX speed, and it will loiter at 70 knots; 100 km radius, radio controlled, down-looking camera and a large 10 power zoom lens. Many specifics from the briefing are not included in this report, but Tadiran was very pleased that the U.S. Marine Corps evaluated their drone from an amphibious ship. The RPV has many wartime applications, and it was designed to meet Israel's requirements. It will loiter at 10,000 feet over the desert battlefield. At that altitude, the RPV is immune from enemy light

arms or SU 23/24 crew served weapons, and it is very difficult to hit. The RPV can sit over the target for six to seven hours and data link real time data and various CRT soft copy imagery areas back down to the battalion commander.

The Israelis continually are trying new ideas to improve their tactical intelligence. One comparison between the Aquila and the Tadiran RPV is that the Aquila was designed to fly under low cloud coverage (a common weather condition in Central Europe during the winter) with high G maneuverability to keep it from being shot down. The Israeli RPV does not have that capability and specifically was designed for the war in the desert and operations at high altitudes. Aquila is a much more sophisticated RPV. The Israeli drone cost around \$250,000, and the Aquila costs approximately \$800,000 to \$900,000. Following the briefings, we drove back to the hotel and prepared to visit with Yitzhak Rabin, the Minister of Defense.

Our scheduled meeting with Rabin lasted 45 minutes. Rabin was asked for his reaction and concerns following the Israeli pull out of southern Lebanon, which was in process at that time. Rabin took 10 minutes to explain why Israel had gone into Lebanon. He emphasized the Israeli priorities of protecting the lives of Israeli citizens and sheltering them from the continuous

terrorist bombings and attacks that took place from southern Lebanon prior to last year's invasion. Rabin pointed out that there have been no known Syrian units filling the void of the departing Israelis. He had hoped that the Israeli Army would be able to strengthen the Lebanese Army, thereby allowing the Lebanese to fill the void of the departing Israelis in the next few months. He also pointed out that the Israelis probably would be tested, and one could not tell what would happen in the area. If the Israelis had to go back into southern Lebanon to guarantee Israeli border security, they would not hesitate to do so. The discussion pertained mainly to Israeli security issues, relations with the United States, relations with U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the ability of Israel to maintain the security of its territory while surrounded by a very strong Arab world.

At the conclusion of our meeting with the Minister of Defense, we took the bus back to the hotel where we had a meeting with LTGen. David Ivry (Ret.), former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force and the incoming Chairman of the Board of Tadiran Corporation. He was one of the top men in the Israeli Air Force, and he has done a tremendous job of building up the Air Force in recent years. He spent an hour with our group giving us some of his thoughts concerning the Israeli Air Force and answering aviation questions. I asked Gen. Levy if the Israel Air Force had considered the possible future application of vectored thrust (V-stall). Gen. Levy said vectored thrust had great potential, but it is too expensive for Israel's limited defense budget.

May 1, 1985—We departed Tel Aviv at 7 a.m. and headed for the northern border. It was a beautiful drive across the country. The weather was clear and the sky was blue as we entered the rocky hills of Tiberias and Judea. As we traveled through heavy Israeli/Arab populated country and across the new aqueduct that runs from the Sea of Galilee and into southern Israel, it was pointed out that most of the fresh water that is used in Israel comes from the Sea of Galilee. Israel has a very unique watering system that pumps water out of the Sea of Galilee, and gravity causes it to flow down to the southern region. Once Israel puts water on the desert, the desert blooms, and Israel has become one of the bread baskets for Europe providing the continent with Israeli products

year round. The most popular are the melons, apples and bananas for northern Europe during the cold winter months. A very ambitious project completed in the late 1960s has brought water to the southern region, and it has been the key to the development of the Israeli agricultural industry (Figure 1).

At 10:30 a.m. we arrived at Metullah, which is the northern most Israeli town, and we visited the Good Fence area and looked into southern Lebanon. U.N. troops have been stationed in this area for many years. We talked to some Norwegian troops. They were bored with the inactivity and had very little to do. Good Fence symbolically flies the flags of both south Lebanon and Israel. It is the site where the Israelis helped wounded Lebanese Christians who were oppressed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Lebanese Christians would cross the fence and ask for medical assistance, and it would be provided by the Israeli Army. This was done for a long time as a humanitarian way of helping the Christian Lebanese who were being harassed constantly by the PLO. As the Israelis withdraw from south Lebanon, the area again will become more significant. It has set up gun positions, heavy concertina wire protection, underground bunkers and many artillery observation posts. The high ground and the areas of approach are well surveyed, and the area could be used again as a jumping off place should the Israelis have to go into Lebanon again.

Departing Metullah, we headed across the northern access route to the Golan Heights along the Hebron mountain area. The area is covered tactically with Israeli defensive fortifications, and there are many camps along the side of the road, both tents and permanent fixtures. As we moved through the Golan Heights, it was interesting to see pieces of armor at areas where Israeli and Syrian tank units fought. There are memorials throughout the area to honor specific Israeli units who fought during the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars. Whoever controls the high ground in the Golan Heights, thereby controls the entire area. Since the last war, the Israelis have controlled the high ground. They can look down into Syria and monitor the movements of the Syrian armored units (Figure 2). The high ground is the most important area strategically, and this is very obvious when you drive through it. The



Figure 2. An Israeli position on the Golan Heights overlooking the Plains of Damascus.

tops of some hills are well fortified and covered with intelligence collection communications equipments such as radars and transmitting communications antennas.

The Israelis hope to prevent a surprise attack, like the one they experienced the night of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, through the use of adequate early warning. Most of the area that is not covered by rock in the valley and on the plateau of the Golan Heights is cultivated. Many sheep are found in the area with shepherds tending their flocks. There also are abandoned buildings that were built earlier by the Syrian Army, and before it by the British. It is evident that the Syrians built up a heavy concentration of force in this area and decided to maintain that force prior to the Yom Kippur War. We passed the headquarters command of the Canadian U.N. forces. The area is well positioned to look into Syria. The next stop was to meet and have lunch with the armored brigade on the border. I noticed the familiar mine field symbols throughout the area—the area is very heavily mined with both anti-tank and antipersonnel mines. Mining limits the area of approach for armor and personnel, thus channeling the flow of enemy forces into convenient killing zones.

We arrived at the headquarters of the First Armored Brigade at noon. We were introduced to the

Deputy Commander of the Fifth Armored Battalion, and we spent an hour looking at Merkava Tank Mark I in the field during maneuvers. The tank demonstrated the ability to traverse a rough area with a stabilized gun. I was impressed with the field demonstration. They did some subcaliber firing of the 105 gun and showed us how they could create smoke for screening. Following the demonstration, a tank commander, who participated in the Bekka Valley fight and the 1973 war, discussed with us the merits of the Merkava tank and how well the tank performed against the Soviet T 72.

Besides being of great strategic importance to Israel, the Golan Heights area is one of the very fertile farming areas in Israel. A great deal of the land is cultivated. Areas that once were strictly nomad's lands and were dominated by Syrian gun positions, now bloom with vegetables and grain products.

After finishing our visit with the Fifth Armored Battalion, we drove down through a beautiful valley. We went to a kibbutz called Kfar Blum. It is one of the older settlements, approximately 700 families live there. The families are mostly farmers. This kibbutz was farming about 1,200 acres of land of cotton, apples, and pears. The families have fish ponds and cattle, which supply milk and cheese. They are

almost self-sufficient. These people also are doing some modern technology work because the work produces more money for them. They are producing electronic circuit boards for battery operated computers. They also produce the controls for a sprinkler system, which is timed to allow just the right amount of water. They make and sell clothing for women and children. They have a handicraft shop where they sell homemade gift products to visitors.

I was very impressed with the peacefulness of this area, but the ever present underground bunker provided a constant reminder of less peaceful times. The bunker we visited also was equipped to accommodate a dance class.

We continued to Haifa, a port city built on sandstone rocky hills. Most of the buildings in Haifa are a soft yellow-gray color. It is interesting to note that most of the buildings have multiple television antennas on top. The architectural style and the television antennas offer a contrast of the past and the present. As we drove into the city, we could see the University of Haifa on the crest of a hill with its tall tower projecting into the sky. Haifa is built out of the rocks. The city is a series of hills and valleys with houses, buildings, schools, shops and hotels hanging off the cliffs. The city, the third largest in Israel, looks very much like San Francisco. It also has the largest port and houses the main headquarters of the Israeli Navy.

May 2, 1985—We drove to the Israeli Navy headquarters where we were briefed by Capt. Peres, the Deputy Commander of the port of Haifa. He indicated that the port of Haifa was commanded by a commodore. The visit included a detailed briefing on the Israeli Navy's primary mission: training for war. The Navy's secondary mission is coastal surveillance and antiterrorist activities. The briefing on how the Navy conducts its coastal surveillance was very interesting. They have four lines of defense: the first is radar; the second is patrol boats; the third is swift boats; and the fourth is deep penetration protection from patrol planes conducting air-to-sea surveillance.

After the briefing, we visited the dockyard facilities and went aboard a missile patrol boat and a gun patrol boat. We also visited the Israeli Navy Submarine Fleet. The missile patrol boat had about 38 crew, 10 officers, and it was gunned with two 75 mm cannons,

five Gabriel missiles and four harpoons. It is one of the heaviest armed missile patrol boats in the world. We were given the opportunity to walk through the ship. It has a very modern fire control system. The second visit was on a patrol boat manned by eight men and one officer. We discussed their mission and looked over the boat. Our third visit was to the submarine force, which is composed of three attack submarines. All three submarines are German designed and built in England. Each submarine has eight torpedos. The submarines' mission is for surveillance and interdiction; they are all attack boats. The Israelis have an all volunteer Navy. An item of interest on the Israeli Navy's terrorist interdiction campaign: It very proudly reported that there has been no successful interdiction of the Israeli coastline in six years. Some terrorists have reached the beach, but every one either has been killed or has surrendered. The last attempt, a day before Israel's Independence Day, failed when 28 terrorists were killed attempting to infiltrate into the Tel Aviv area to cause destruction and havoc. The terrorists were launched from an intercoastal trawler in rubber boats that came in from the major shipping lanes 40 to 60 miles west. When they were interdicted, the terrorists fired first at the Israeli patrol boat. The rest of the story is history.

The next stop on our trip was the Merkava tank plant where we were briefed by the plant Director Col. Razi Ben Yakov. The Merkava plant is a very large organization that handles third and fourth echelon maintenance for all the armor in Israel, including the captured Soviet T-55 and T-62 type tanks. Here they modernize and upgrade the Soviet tanks, British Chieftains, U.S. Pattons and many different types of Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers. The tank company is run by the Israeli Army. Senior management positions are held by Army officers, and the workers are civilians. The Army Director reports to the Chief of Logistics, who is on the Ministry of Defense Staff. He decides how many tanks will be produced or modified and what the plant's budget will be.

A new technique the plant is using is robotic arc welding. According to a plant spokesman, no other known tank facility in the world is using this technique. The plant has a high versatility machine shop for armor. Its computer driven cutting jigs are of German de-

sign. The plant runs all its tanks through 20 to 30 miles of proving ground before it releases the tanks to armored units. The Merkava Mark II is an improvement over the Mark I with new hydraulic shocks, better wheels, new pins in the tracks and stronger treads for rocky countryside. The rubberized tank wheels that the United States uses will not perform in Israel more than a few weeks; the terrain is too rough.

Israel has been buying or trying to buy new tanks for years. For many reasons it was able to get only secondhand types and upgrade them. The Israelis have developed a unique method of repairing and modifying captured enemy tanks. Some of these modified vehicles are used in Israeli units today. Israel tackled the problem of procuring a first line armor capability in an effort to gain independence from other tank producing nations. Israel made a decision in 1970 to make its own tanks. It was a critical decision, and it took Israel nine years to make its first tank. Even though it has independence and it is producing the Merkava I and II, 16 percent of Israel's tank components come from the United States. These components and materials include engines, transmissions and a special forged steel used for turrets and outer wall protection. To avoid any problems with the import of strategic materials, the Israelis have stockpiled a very high level of spare engines and special forged steel for future building. The cost of the Merkava I is \$1.5 million; the Merkava II costs \$1.8 million because the Merkava II has upgraded infrared capability, night vision and better CBR protection. The Israelis claim that this tank has better crew survivability than any other tank in the world. It has the engine in front, a unique rear entry and exit for crew or infantry passengers, a very small frontal area and a very low silhouette. The tank has no ammunition in the turret; all the ammunition is down below in the chassie. This was designed to protect the crew further from enemy hits on the turret. It is a heavy tank weighing 60 tons, and the Israelis admit that it is underpowered and undergunned, but they are working on that. Gen. Warner suggested to the factory manager that they adopt the 120 mm gun versus the 105 mm gun. The Israelis indicated they are planning to upgrade the gun and the engine in the near future. Gen. Warner also was told that the Israelis were considering developing

their own 120 mm gun, rather than purchasing the gun from abroad. This will be a major R&D undertaking by the Israelis, but they have the skill to develop their own gun. And if they have the will and the investment, they can do it.

After the briefing at the Merkava plant, we had a chance to get in a new Merkava II and examine it. The Merkava tank is an excellent weapons system that has been designed to fill Israeli requirement, and does it quite well.

Following the tank factory visit, we drove to the Ministry of Defense where we were briefed by Mechanam Meron, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense. For more than an hour, Meron answered our questions concerning Israel's deficit, the U.S. deficit impact on Israel, etc. Meron also talked about the strategic impact of the withdrawal from Lebanon. He discussed the percentage of the Israeli defense budget that had been required to support the Lebanon operation. It was a very frank and straightforward discussion. When asked what his greatest worry was, Meron answered that the Soviet equipment upgrade being provided to the Syrians continues to improve with time. He said that if Israel continued to have military conflicts with the Arabs, attrition will increase, and the Israelis have fewer people to lose than the Arabs have. Meron was questioned on the possible use of nuclear weapons. He dismissed the question by saying that, "if nuclear weapons were brought into the area it would be a disaster." He said he hoped it would never happen.

We also met with Uri Lubrani, a coordinator of Lebanese affairs. He gave a very informative briefing on the reasons behind the Israelis entry into southern Lebanon and the reasons for the pull out. This briefing was followed by a very active and interesting question and answer period covering many aspects of military and political interest.

At 7 p.m. we boarded our bus and proceeded to Jerusalem. As we climbed into the mountainous area on the road to the Holy City, I noticed a few relics of the 1948 war along the sides of the road. Left behind were improvised armored vehicles that the Israelis built to run the Arab blockades to get into Jerusalem. I asked why these derelict vehicles were not removed. I was told they were left purposely to remind all people of the early sacrifice.

May 3, 1985—At 7:30 a.m. we




Figure 3. A visit to the Wailing Wall and the Dome of the Rock.

had a breakfast in Jerusalem with David Ben-Dov, Director of the Human Rights Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ben-Dov discussed the Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian strategic political issues in detail. One of the questions asked of Ben-Dov was why Israel does not do more to advise the world through the media of Israeli concerns over Lebanon and the vacuum that will exist when the Israelis pull out of Lebanon. Ben-Dov said the conditions that existed in Lebanon that allowed terrorists to harass Israel's northern border may start again, and Israeli retaliation must be swift and sure. It was the general consensus of the group that Israel has a credibility problem with the media, and Israel should do all it can to prepare the media for the retaliation that will come if Israel's northern border is shelled following the withdrawal from Lebanon.

May 4, 1985—The group joined an official tour guide and spent four hours touring the city of Jerusalem. We visited the Wailing Wall, the Points of the Cross and the Dome of the Rock, where the Moslems believe Mohammed transitioned from earth to heaven (Figure 3). We also visited the Holy Sepulchre where some believe Christ was crucified and went to heaven. There were crowds of people everywhere.

The Wailing Wall was one of the high points of the visit. We visited the western wall of the Temple of

Solomon. (It is interesting to note that the wall is still divided with one-third for women and two-thirds for men.) The wall is an amazing sight. People stand in front of it chanting and placing small pieces of paper with special prayers and the names of friends in the cracks of the wall for prayers and blessings. I was permitted to walk to the wall to observe the religious ceremonies as long as I had a cap on my head. The impressions I have of that visit to Jerusalem are too numerous to mention. It was fascinating to see large numbers of Arabs, Christians and Jews worshipping side by side, visiting their holy sites. They are interlocked; however, separated by an imaginary line. It is evident that this city must be an open city. It can never be closed by one religion or another; if the city is closed it will cause continuous strife. Jerusalem is the holiest city in the world for the Moslem, Christian and Hebrew faiths. There has been no progress in bringing together Arab and Jewish communities living in Jerusalem; however they do respect each other's religious rights. The Israelis control access in and out of the city. Israelis are stationed at the entrances and gates to most of the holy places; they examine handbags and packages for weapons and explosives. Israeli patrols quietly patrol the streets.

Adm. Steele, Gen. Sweet, a guide and I took a cab to Bethlehem, which is 20 minutes away.




Figure 4. Approaching the Central Command Headquarters building.

We visited the Nativity, the cave where some believe Christ was born. There were crowds of people kneeling, worshiping and praying at the Nativity. The religious commercialism was interesting. The Dome of the Rock is controlled by

the Arabs. They charge \$2.50 for a look at the spot where Mohammed supposedly departed from earth. In Bethlehem, there was no charge to visit the Christian and Hebrew holy sites. Bethlehem is controlled by the Israelis, but 99 percent of its




Figure 5. A close up of the Central Command Headquarters building.

inhabitants are Arabs.

May 5, 1985—We departed for the Central Command Headquarters area north of Jerusalem. There we met with MGen. Amnon Shachat, Commanding General, Central Command, who briefed us for an hour on his area of responsibility, (which covers from the Dead Sea north to Gallilee and both Judea and Samaria). He discussed the importance of the high ground, the importance of the western bank, the settlements, Israeli-Arab relations, threats to Israeli-Arab intelligence.

As we approached the Headquarters of the Central Command, I was impressed with the imposing military appearance of the headquarters building (Figure 4). Situated on the high ground, the building was covered with a multitude of antennas and microwave towers to expedite the movement of command information throughout the region (Figure 5). Although we did not visit any of the command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) facilities in Israel, it was apparent that these facilities were internettted with various communications systems to provide intelligence for instant, near real time decision making.

Good and secure communications and intelligence must be at the heart of the Israel military system. As one travels, it becomes obvious that Israeli C³I is the key to all tactical coordination. Due to the country's size and its geographic position in an Arab world, early warning is a must for Israel, and the country has taken every precaution to ensure it can accurately anticipate any potential threat to its interest.

Departing from the Central Command Headquarters, we drove to a small town about five miles away to meet BGen. Ben-Tov, Commanding General of an Israeli tank division and pre-positioned war storage area. Gen. Ben-Tov told us he had 240 regulars who maintain the ready condition of the equipment and the spare parts for mount out by the regulars and the reserves. We also visited some storage sites where tanks and APCs were stored. They were in the open, but they were covered by rubber bags that were sealed, dehumidified and cooled; a unique method of protecting tanks (Figure 6). This equipment is in dry storage, and it keeps very well over a period of two years. There is no corrosion and no damage. The tanks are loaded and ready to go with fuel oil and ammunition, and

they can be unzipped and ready to move in about 15 minutes. The cost per storage unit is approximately \$1,200.

We then drove to the Dead Sea, which is 1,500 feet below sea level. The Jordan River flows into the Dead Sea, and we visited the southern most crossing into Jordan called Allanby Bridge. At the bridge, we observed the movement of vehicles and passengers, mainly Arabs coming west to work and then proceeding back into Jordan. We also observed the methods used by the Israelis to inspect both the trucks and the people to ensure that neither was carrying contraband and detonator devices for terrorist bombs.

We had an in-depth briefing of the defensive area from the river westward (four lines of defense), which is controlled by Israeli outpost units. This area is very sensitive. The Jordanians officially are still at war with Israel, however, they trade enormous amounts of produce. Israel sells to Jordan, and the Jordanians pay in dinars (the Jordanian monetary unit). The money is changed to shekels when it is brought back into Israel. The Israelis constantly are evaluating their procedures along the border to examine every person coming into Israel from Jordan. Everyone is strip searched for detonators.

We drove back to Tel Aviv where we had a meeting with LTGen. Moshe Levy, Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. Also with him was MGen. Dan Shomron, Deputy Chief of Staff. Gen. Shomron was the overall commander of the raid at Entebbe, Uganda. Gen. Levy was a candid, straightforward Israeli officer. Gen. Levy visited the U.S. last year as guest of Gen. John Vessey, Jr., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He asked us to question him concerning Israel's military forces rather than him trying to brief us. I asked him, "What was the most important thing he would like to have from the United States?" He said it would be continued cooperation and the improvement of contacts between Israel and the United States. He hoped for continued close contacts on all aspects of military involvement including tactics, equipments and training. As technology improves into the 1990s, he is looking for technology minded commanders. He talked about the importance of the individual soldier and how the technology must fit the man and the environment. The man must be able to handle the technol-



Figure 6. Tanks stored and ready for action.

ogy and make it work for him. He used the Israeli submarine fleet as an example. He believes the Israeli submarine fleet faces more varied threats than does the U.S. submarine fleet (in the eastern Mediterranean) because the United States is concerned mainly with the Soviet Union. He sees threats to the Israeli submarine fleet and to its missile control boats from a variety of different types of eastern and western equipments. Gen. Levy said he needs more electronic counter countermeasures to overcome the threat peculiar to his area. He talked about cuts in the Israeli budget and their affect on the military. He knew it was going to be tough, and there would be some cut backs, but the military will live with them and make them work he said. He was questioned on relations with Syria following the Israeli pull out of Lebanon. Gen. Levy noted that at this time, there was nothing to indicate that the Syrian forces were moving farther south into Lebanon, but he said that the Syrians can use Lebanese forces against Israel if the Syrians believe it is in their best interest. He indicated that the PLO and other factions in Lebanon will not hesitate to use heavily populated areas to launch their terror campaign. This makes it difficult for Israeli retaliation. He clearly stated that, if the terrorism and killing start again from across the northern bor-

der, Israel will strike back quickly with the level of intensity that is required.

Gen. Levy was asked about a growing sense of professionalism among the Israeli corps of officers. The Israelis do not have a military academy, but he said that he believed there was a growing professionalism within the service. There is very close cooperation between the services because of universal military training. All men have a service obligation until age 55. Regulars and reserves work closely together. Many reserves are leaders in industry, and they bring that experience and technology with them to the military. The Israelis are making an effort to train their bright young officers in foreign service schools and foreign technical schools where they earn engineering degrees. These efforts are attempting to improve the quality of the Israeli corps. Gen. Levy also stated that the West Bank was essential to the security and survival of Israel.

Following the briefing by Gen. Levy, our group drove back to Jerusalem, packed and readied for departure the next morning from Ben Gurion Airport. It had been an excellent trip.

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