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SECURITY AFFAIRS

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U.S. Navy Takes First Steps Toward Worldwide Holocaust Programming

By Rabbi Arnold E. Resnicoff

Ed. Note: Rabbi Resnicoff is a Chaplain in the U.S. Navy. He was the Jewish Chaplain in Beirut immediately following the Marine barracks bombing in 1983, and accompanied the President to the Rerikavsk summit meeting in 1986. Honored at a JINSA dinner in 1984, Rabbi Resnicoff has been pursuing a goal of having the U.S. military services educate their members about the Holocaust.

Following the direction of the President and with the encouragement of the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the United States Navy has committed itself to remember the Holocaust.

"Horror and Hope: Americans Remember the Holocaust" is a workbook and resource packet prepared by the Navy's Chaplain Resource Board for

commands served by full-time Jewish chaplains.

The Program Commences

In 1984, following a visit to the chaplains of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, then USHMC Director Rabbi Seymour Siegel suggested that the military come "onboard." Given the fact that the President was commander-in-chief, he reasoned, it made sense for the armed forces to develop programs similar to those within the civilian sector, thereby creating a truly national effort. After a visit to the Sixth Fleet flagship, where we met, he decided to raise the issue with the Department of Defense.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger responded to the idea with a memorandum to the heads of all branches of the military. Especially mindful of the fact that it was our nation's military forces



Holocaust-related materials developed for use by the U.S. Navy.

"Our nation, and our military personnel, were among those who liberated the death camps. We know the truth."

the more than eleven hundred Rabbin, Priests, and Ministers serving as Navy chaplains throughout the world. These study materials, which include articles by theologians, readings for classes on ethics and morality, and prayers for ceremonies linked to the annual national "Days of Remembrance for Holocaust Victims" will support programs on ships, and stations around the globe.

National efforts to remember the Holocaust are not new. In 1980, the United States Holocaust Memorial Council (USHMC) was established by law. Its responsibilities include support of an annual, national commemoration, and encouragement of local observances throughout the United States.

But, although many states followed the lead of the nation's capital in establishing Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremonies, military observances were often limited to the few scattered

which first witnessed evidence of the Holocaust, he directed that military commands begin to consider ways to remember the event in a way which would reaffirm our commitment to the values for which we stand.

In December of 1986, Navy Chief of Chaplains (Rear Admiral) John R. McNamara spoke at the annual meeting of the USHMC. Sharing the Navy's Holocaust project with those assembled, he made the point that it was especially appropriate for the military to take a stand. It was, he said, the responsibility of being a witness. As a witness to the Holocaust, the armed forces now must accept the challenge to bear witness to the evil that we refer to as "Holocaust."

The Need to Bear Witness

It is this idea which the Admiral stresses in his opening letter in "Horror and Hope": "Already some spread the lie that the Holocaust did not occur at

all, that it is a hoax of some sort, that no death camps or ovens or crematoria existed, that no special effort was made to erase the Jewish presence from the earth."

"Our nation, and our military personnel, were among those who liberated the death camps. We know the truth. And now our country has reaffirmed its commitment to remember the Holocaust, to ensure that it will not be forgotten, to vow that it will not happen again."

In his speech, Admiral McNamara, a Roman Catholic Priest, noted another reason for the military to make a special effort to remember the Holocaust. "The young men and women in the military," he said, "make sacrifices and take risks in a very special way, to support the dreams of our nation. It is sometimes necessary to remember the nightmares, to remind ourselves how precious are the dreams."

The Project

When Chaplain McNamara approved the concept of a Holocaust workbook, I was named Project Editor. From Newport, I worked with the staff of the Chaplains Resource Board as they began to collect and sift through the hundreds of books and articles they would consider.

The problem was not that material was unavailable to chaplains interested in creating services or classes. On the contrary, the problem was that the material was overwhelming. Chaplains did not know where to start when they wanted to put together a program.

What makes this resource packet unique is the fact that the resources in one three-ring binder provide materials for every conceivable program. A chaplain can use this packet to compose a short prayer or an entire service, to

write one sermon or lecture, or to put together a course or a mini-series of courses tied together by theme.

"Horror & Hope"

"Horror and Hope" is divided into five sections: I) Introduction; II) Programming; III) Education; IV) Theology; and V) Resources.

The introduction deals with definitions: what the Holocaust was, and what it was not. It was not, the introduction emphasizes, the terrors of war in some abstract sense, or the deaths of all those who fell victim to World War II. It was "a separate war... aimed not merely at killing Jews, but also at dehumanizing them in life, and degrading and denying their memory, in death."

Using the report of the 1979 Presidential Commission which led to the establishment of the USHMC, it quotes Elie Wiesel in his role as Chairman of that commission, defining the Holocaust as, "The systematic, bureaucratic extermination of six million Jews by the Nazis and their collaborators as a central act of state during the Second World War, as night descended, millions of other peoples were swept into this net of death."

Also included in Section I are special notes about the concept of resistance. According to this section, Nazi propaganda spread the myth that Jews did not resist — as another "proof that Jews lacked worth." Noting the many instances of heroism on the part of the Jews, however, this section notes that such events are only a small part of the story.

"But physical resistance — Jewish partisans, ghetto heroes — was only one small part. For there was resistance of another kind: a resistance of the

(Cont. pg. 6)

The Officers and the Board of JINSA

wish our members and friends
a happy and healthy
Passover Season

Report on a Visit to Central America: February 1987

By Edith U. Fierst

Ed. Note: Mrs. Fierst is an attorney in Washington. Her article "Visits With Rejuvenation in the USSR," appeared in the September 1986 "Security Affairs."

During February 1987, I traveled to five Central American countries — Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica — as part of a group of 12 persons studying the crisis in that region. We met with representatives of all five governments and the leading opposition parties in each country, our own embassies, journalists, university administrators, church officials, spokesmen for human rights groups, prominent women, and an assortment of individuals. I had personal access to Jewish leaders in two of the countries. In Nicaragua most of our time was scheduled by the Sandinista government.

This paper is a summary of my reactions.

First a caution. Opinion in and about Central America is both polarized and impassioned. That makes it very hard to consider the situation there with an open mind. This is true for everybody, including me, although I tried. Before

The relationship between pluralism and true democracy is a key one for the countries that border on Nicaragua.

reading this, therefore, you should know my mind set when I left home. I was and am not inclined to think favorably of a communist regime. I believe the lack of personal freedom, the corruption that inevitably accompanies absolute power, and the disincentives to produce economically make an unhappy environment for the people who must live under these regimes. Nothing I saw or learned about Nicaragua dissuaded me from these deeply held convictions.

However, as to the rest, I believe I was open minded. Specifically I was uncertain whether the United States should assume an obligation to secure freedom and democracy for the people of Nicaragua. I knew we had some responsibility for the Somoza tyranny under which they lived for 40 years, as we have had some responsibility for corrupt governments in other of the Central American countries. I was open to persuasion that it was time for us to leave these countries to determine their own fate. When I started, I had little feeling for the way Central Americans are reacting to the Nicaraguan government.

I was also uncertain of the extent to which human rights abuses were continuing and if they were, whose fault it was and what we could or should do about it.

Here is what I found:

Are the Sandinistas Communists?

The Sandinistas claim that they are Marxists rather than communists. Among the similarities is belief in the class struggle, which promotes enemy among groups within the populace. By

contrast, candidates for office in a democracy try to find a middle road on which all can agree or at least compromise. This discrepancy makes for a fundamental difference in the sort of public discourse.

However, the Sandinistas cite two differences between themselves and Soviet-type communists which they regard as significant.

The first is their "pluralism". To them, pluralism means the legal tolerance for more than one party — which they have. It does not, however, necessarily mean equal access to the electorate for all parties — and the Sandinistas have not provided that. The Sandinista spokesman was frank to admit that during the recent national election campaign the Government did not permit any of the opposition parties to have more than 15 minutes a week of broadcast time. Leaders of the principal opposition party told us that thugs regularly came to beat up those who attended their meetings.

The Sandinistas have, as everyone knows, stopped publication of *La Prensa*, the leading newspaper of Managua, and, as everyone may not know, closed down the Catholic Church's radio, television and newspaper. The Sandinistas offer two explanations for these breaches of free speech: the first is that they are in a war, and that even the United States wouldn't let the Nazis publish or broadcast during World War II. To make the comparison closer, they charge that *La Prensa* received money from the CIA. The second is that "the revolution is irreversible." This seems to mean that opponents of the revolution will not be allowed to win an election.

The relationship between pluralism and true democracy is a key one in the views of the countries that border on Nicaragua. The latter fear the instability of a country in which the people have no legitimate way of changing its policies or leadership. They regard such a government as a recipe for subversion and revolution.

The Economy

The second difference between Nicaragua and the USSR cited by the Sandinistas is that only the former has a mixed economy in which public and private ownership co-exist. It is true that privately owned businesses continue to operate. However, they are strictly limited in their freedom to function. For example, while some coffee plantations remain in private hands, the only market for their crop is the government. As another example, the government has severely limited the independence of the women who used to sell farm produce in the market in Managua.

Indeed, whether private enterprise will be allowed to continue at all is unclear. One rumor we heard is that Castro had advised Ortega to move slowly in nationalizing industry as well as in eliminating opposition parties in order to diffuse internal opposition and retain the flow of economic aid from several western European countries



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that do not send aid to Cuba.

Business is, of course, very nervous and making no private investments. Productivity has plunged, and the growth rate in 1985 (the last year for which we have figures) was a negative 5.9 percent. Unemployment that same year was 22.3 percent. The devastation caused by the earthquake of 1972 is still obvious in the center of the capital city, as well as elsewhere. Indeed conditions in Managua are so bad that the water is turned off for two 12-hour days a week, including in the Intercontinental, the best hotel in town.

Another indication of conditions came inadvertently from Mrs. Violeta Chamorro, a member of the original Sandinista junta who is not in the opposition. She is also the widow of the editor of *La Prensa* whose assassination triggered the revolution. In answer to a question about divided loyalties in her family (two of her children are part of the Sandinista government, while two are against it, including one son who is a leader of the contras), she told us that her personal relationship with her San-

Public Opinion

Most of Central America is palpably afraid of the Sandinistas. I felt this fear everywhere. A more objective clue to the fear comes from Gallup-type polls. In Guatemala, for example, a recent poll asked people whether they believe conditions in Central America are worse than two years ago — 75 percent do; and whether they think they will get even worse in the future — 53 percent do. The pollster said he used these questions to warn the respondents because he knew previous polls that they would be the easiest for people to answer. From the same history, he knew people perceive the situation to be worsening, despite the replacement of military government by an honestly elected democracy and a substantial reduction in violence (as to which, see below) because of the Sandinistas. The polls showed that 79 percent regard the U.S. as a friend, compared to 14 percent for Nicaragua, 9 percent for the USSR, and fewer for Cuba.

Similar polls have been taken in the

The lack of personal freedom, the corruption that inevitably accompanies absolute power, and the disincentives to produce... make an unhappy environment. Nothing I saw or learned about Nicaragua dissuaded me.

dinista son — who publishes a pro-Government newspaper — are unchanged. In evidence she said that he had phoned her the night before to make sure she had enough to eat!

The Sandinistas blame their economic woes on the war with the contras. Other believe the lack of productivity that plagues all communist countries is equally at fault.

The Government has made recent concessions, such as permitting peasants to farm for their own use a small plot on the state or cooperatively owned lands where they work. The question is whether these concessions are permanent. Some think they will be revoked as soon as the regime is solidified and the food shortage lessens in severity. Others think the loosening may be permanent. The Sandinistas say we should deem them innocent until proven guilty.

other democracies, and all show that the similar results. Many people told us that if the Sandinistas take over in Central America, there will be a mass migration to the United States, which we cannot exclude short of building a Berlin Wall across the Mexican border. The figure usually cited was 25 million refugees.

Terrorism and Human Rights Abuses

The major cause of the fear is Sandinista support of terrorism in their countries. Leftist guerrillas have been active, especially in Guatemala and El Salvador, and citizens in all the countries fear for the future.

The violence is not all attributable to left-wing guerrillas. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the military governments of El Salvador and Guatemala were guilty of widespread abuse, and caused many thousands of killings by death

squads and similar military units. Major improvements have occurred in both countries, partly as the result of efforts by the United States government, including the withholding of aid from Guatemala for several years before the election of a civilian president, and Vice President Bush's warning to El Salvador in 1984.

Some disappearances and human rights abuses are continuing. The controversy concerning the continuing kidnappings and killings has been highly politicized in both Guatemala and El Salvador. In both countries the current democratic governments have taken remedial action. In both the good faith of the governments' efforts is being challenged by human rights organizations headed by charismatic women.

In Guatemala, the leader is Nineth de Garcia, the dynamic young wife of one of the disappeared, who heads an organization called the GAM. In El Salvador, she is Maria Julia Hernandez, who runs the Turista Legal, an agency of the Catholic Church. Both of these heads of human rights organization, refuse to meet with the government agency trying to improve human rights — whose sincerity they doubt. Their dispute is similar to one in Argentina, where a group of mothers of the disappeared has split off from the main Mothers of the Plaza, saying that the leadership of the latter is more interested in opposing the government than in finding the disappeared.

The disagreement on the sincerity of government efforts is important, not only because of the desirability of finding the disappeared and remedying government policies which permit human rights abuses, but also because the disagreement on human rights forms the basis for raising funds from well-intentioned humanitarians. Nineth de Garcia, for example, raises money in Europe which her opponents use to give arms for the terrorists. We heard similar and repeated charges about the misuse for military material of contributions by well-meaning Americans (intended for medical and other humanitarian purposes).

Military Worries

In addition to guerrilla warfare, the Central American democracies are worried about the military build-up in Nicaragua which began in 1979, almost immediately after the revolution. Enormous shipments of armaments (estimated value from the beginning is about \$900,000,000) have been received from the Soviet bloc. The Sandinista spokesman admitted construction at Puerto Barrios of a very large airport suitable for MiGs with a range that includes the West Coast of the United States. However, he said they do not plan to use it for offensive purposes. (It is widely reported the United States has warned the Nicaraguans that we will bomb the airport if they bring in MiGs.) According to the State Department, the Nicaraguan military includes 70,000 on active duty, plus another 54,000 reservists and internal security forces. In addition, they have Cuban, Russian and other Soviet Bloc nationals assisting and advising them.

By comparison Guatemala's military numbers 33,000; Honduras's, 16,750; and El Salvador's, 52,000 including police. Costa Rica, of course, has no armed forces (it has 6,000 rural and

civil guards). All of these forces have been either increased or better prepared since the rise of the Sandinistas.

American military personnel in Honduras number between 800 and 1100 on permanent assignment, plus national guardsmen who come for two weeks of training, and from time to time other units that come for special exercises. The Pentagon says that the maximum number of American military in Honduras at any one time is 4,500; the Sandinista spokesman said 6,000. Estimates of the number of contras range from 10,000 to 20,000.

American military aid goes primarily to El Salvador which in 1986 received \$122 million, compared to just under \$60 million to Honduras in the same year. Almost all aid to Guatemala, including military aid, was discontinued from 1977 to 1985; in 1986 we gave them five and a half million dollars in military assistance, mostly in trucks of various kinds, spare parts for helicopters and medical supplies, and training military personnel. (Aid to the contras is in addition to these figures).

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Nicaragua's Fear of the United States
From the beginning of the Sandinista regime, Nicaragua has proclaimed great fear of military invasion by the United States, citing the five occasions Americans have taken over their country. Twice in this century the U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua. Sandino, the hero of the Sandinistas from whom they took their name, made his reputation fighting to expel them.

Because of this record the Sandinistas may well have feared invasion by the United States. While there was no serious discussion in this country of invading Nicaragua at the start of their regime (nor is there now), they may discount that fact as there was no public discussion of invading Grenada before we did so. On the other hand, at the time alarms began to be sounded, the United States was still giving substantial aid to the Sandinistas. Eighty-five million dollars had been appropriated; but only \$10 million of this was actually distributed. The final ten million was withheld because the Sandinistas would not discontinue their active support for guerrillas outside the country. The



The Miskito Indian community was removed from its ancestral homeland in Nicaragua and forcibly relocated into camps.

contras did not organize or start to receive U.S. funds for some years thereafter.

Some observers think the real function of Sandinista announcement of imminent invasion was to rally Nicaraguan public opinion against an outside threat. This would be analogous to the use by Stalin or Trotsky as a threat described in Orwell's *Animal Farm*. Now, of course, the contras and our aid to them provide a realistic outside threat.

Attitudes Toward the United States and the Revolution

The American dream has taken hold in Central America, even in Nicaragua. At the back of their minds, rich and poor alike think of crossing the border to the Promised Land if the trouble at home becomes too great. Their slogan might be: "Yankee go home and take me with you!"

Many of those we saw thought the United States did not appreciate or adequately fear the risk we run in being inundated with refugees that allow the Sandinistas to take over Central America. As mentioned above, the number cited most often was 25 million refugees, roughly the population of Central America. (It is not clear whether the entire population is expected to seek refuge in the United States or whether the figure includes some Mexicans. Everyone agrees that if the five Central American countries go communist, the effects would surely be felt in Mexico.)

The dream of coming to America may be planted even among the Sandinista leadership. We met a number of young Sandinistas from upper class

white families. Mrs. Violeta Chamorro, the widow of the editor of *La Prensa* described above, spoke of the revolutionaries as "young boys." I believe she was talking about her son (and daughter) and the children of her friends who are leaders of the revolution. Examples would be several of the attractive young people escorted or addressed as during the 28 hours we were guests of the Sandinista government. Most had been educated in the United States and had parents or other close relatives who are escaping the revolution in Miami. The representative of the Nicaraguan foreign office who talked with us in his beautiful family home for two hours has a PhD from Harvard, where, he told us, he learned his Marxism.

Most of these young Sandinistas were part of the sixties generation; I kept comparing them with their contemporaries who joined the Weathermen. What would have happened if the Weathermen had succeeded in taking over the United States, or the Red Brigade in mastering Italy? Are the kidnappings in Guatemala and El Salvador similar to the bank hold-ups and the like of Kathy Boudin and her friends, planned to raise money for the revolution? I thought I was great similarities. We met one man in El Salvador who told us that the million dollar ransom he was forced to pay for his father's life went to leftist guerrillas.

And won't these young people get tired of poverty and the revolution when so many of them could come up to Miami and join the middle class? Our translator, an attractive young blond, told us she is paid \$20 a month, but that her father lives in Miami and

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stays at the Managua Intercontinental when he comes for a visit. She has recently married. What will happen when she has children? She is on the Sandinista side, but at the back of her mind, I would guess she treasures the option of coming to the United States whenever things get too rough. This may be playing at revolution.

From the perspective of the Central American democracies... the most popular action the U.S. could take would be to oust the Sandinistas for them.

The contrast between these attractive young aristocrats and other Sandinistas was highlighted at a luncheon in Managua which they and a woman Comandante hosted for us. The personality of the latter was totally different from that of the other Sandinistas at the luncheon; no upper class party manners, and no background in a chic society, no apparent wish to ingratiate herself with us. I kept thinking of the group that kidnapped Patty Hearst, and the rough crook who was the leader of the Symbianese Liberation Army, and wondering if we were in the midst of limousine revolutionaries.

Most of this crowd will probably drop active revolution when they come here, but not necessarily all, particularly if they come soon for personal reasons rather than because of disillusion with the revolution. In fact, one, a beautiful young poet who talked a fierce revolution, is marrying an American and moving to the Dupont Circle area in Washington, D.C. next month. Of course, one can take the parallel to the student revolution and the counter-culture too far. I do not think most Sandinistas are upper-class whites or as rough as the Comandante appeared. We met a few others who were pleasant, of mixed ancestry, from proletarian backgrounds, and who are undoubtedly committed Marxists.

The Role of the United States

From the perspective of the four Central American democracies, I believe the most popular action the United States could take would be to oust the Sandinistas for them. (Shocked? I was.) The example of our successful removal of the communists from Grenada figured here. It was suggested that an alternative approach would be for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union to get rid of the Sandinistas. At least one proponent of this idea thought we could have peace in Central America if we would agree to stop helping the rebels in Afghanistan!

If neither of the options is implemented as I expect, the Governments of the four democracies will have to decide what to do. They are not certain. A major reason seems to be a lack of confidence in American resolve, and the fear that they will be abandoned to face the guerrillas. They remember Vietnam, Hungary and, especially, the Bay of Pigs where we abandoned Cubans on the beaches and provided no air support. The last of the prisoners taken on that day has only recently emerged from prison. They follow our debates about the contras, and conclude it is dangerous for anyone to stick his neck out in reliance on the United States.

Guatemala, which does not border directly on Nicaragua, worries about Mexico on its northern borders where 46,000 Guatemalan refugees remain, some of them sympathetic to the Sandinistas. A deal seems to have been struck that if Guatemala maintains a stance of active neutrality, Mexico will not allow these refugees to become leftist guerrillas marauding into Guatemala.

Without Guatemala, it is hard for the other countries to take a firm position. They are trying hard to bring Guatemala into a united stance. The Costa Rican initiative of February 15 included a Central American parliament, an idea in which hardly anyone but the Guatemalan president has faith, but which was included to enforce his country into a united front. Even so, Gua-

temala is dragging its heels.

Conclusion

I see no possibility that the United States with its diverse points of view and vigorous democracy will invade Nicaragua or that it is now ready to provide the reliability and assurance that Central America wants. Only if those countries take some responsibility will the American public go along. If they want our help, the four democracies must persuade our public that this is not another Vietnam in which anti-communist Americans want to fight their battle on Central American turf and at the expense of the Central American populace. It must be seen as Central America's battle as well as, much as ours, as indeed I believe it is.

The Governments of the four countries are all now honestly elected democracies, many of them newly installed. We heard many times how fragile the new democracies are. They are fragile because the underlying social and economic problems facing them are enormous (high unemployment and underemployment, lack of modern medical care and welfare programs, lack of private investment, widespread corruption in some governments, as well as the continuing threat of guerrilla activity), and because they do not have a well-established tradition of accepting the loss of an election by laying plans to win the next time.

This was a reminder that the United States has an almost unique tradition under which no matter how unhappy the Democrats were at the victory of Reagan or the Republic at the victory of Carter there was serious talk of overthrowing either of them. The courageous level of discourse in the United States Congress is a marvel for the world, and I believe an important factor in enabling our representatives to work with each other despite issues on which they disagree profoundly. Yet even we had a civil war before we reached a national consensus that a bad Administration is better than a revolution.

U.S. advice to the Central American countries has had a major impact for the better. This is partly because we offer the carrot of substantial economic aid, and the stick of withholding it. This year the Administration is seeking \$300 million in funds for non-military purposes. I hope it will get every penny. The economies of all these countries are bad; in at least two the threat of guerrilla activity discourages needed private investment. Indeed, there has been a major export of capital from all these countries to the United States, countered to some extent by remittances from their nationals now working in the United States. El Salvador's economy is probably the worst. The October 1986 earthquake was devastating, and poor economic policies of the Duarte government which are frightening to business investment seem to be making things worse. The high birthrate in all the countries exacerbates the poverty.

Funding is also needed for continued training now being provided to Central American militaries in the supremacy of civilian governments and in methods of investigating crimes that do not in-

volve confessions obtained through torture.

Meanwhile in Mexico, the population explosion, the lack of employment for its citizens, poverty, debt and lack of internal democracy (Mexico has not elected a president of the opposition party in living memory, and succession is by one President choosing the next) make that country another time bomb.

As for the military situation, the Costa Rican plan offers some hope for the emergence of a united Central American leadership. If it solidifies, which I profoundly hope it will, it will give U.S. policy makers some guidance from those most immediately affected.


A clue as to what guidance it would be was offered our group just after Costa Rica presented its plan to the other Central American presidents. The next morning, our group met with the Chief of Staff to the Costa Rican Foreign Minister. In response to my inquiry whether he thought the United States should continue to fund the contras, he said we should until such time as the Sandinistas come to the table and show a willingness to negotiate in good faith. He said pressure from the contras was needed to persuade the Sandinistas to negotiate, and that a withdrawal of United States support for the contras now would not be seen by the Nicaraguans as an indication of good faith. He said either as a sign of American weakness. I would follow this advice and continue funding the contras until the Sandinistas meet his test.

At the same time the United States government must exert its influence on the contras to reform their operation, aiming for a repeat of our success in persuading the military of Guatemala and El Salvador to accept the paramountcy of civilian government and the need to respect human rights.

Will the Sandinistas negotiate seriously? I believe there is hope if the pressure keeps up, not only pressure from the contras, but also economic and moral pressure. Europe seems to be changing its attitude, and has begun to withdraw economic aid. This trend is likely to continue.

The most encouraging idea I heard was from a Peruvian hydrologist I met in the lobby of the Intercontinental. He was in Managua consulting with the Agriculture Ministry on irrigation. I asked him whether the recent change in land reform under which the peasants may now farm a portion of the land owned by the cooperatives was a temporary ruse such as used by the Soviets at various times in Russia, or a genuine change of heart. He said there were real rights going on inside the Ministry. So long as that continues, there is hope that the non-communists will win Nicaragua is not contiguous to the USSR, and therefore may be able to throw the rascals out. They are not as free as was Egypt when it did so, but perhaps the example is not wholly frivolous.

At best I anticipate a long period when the issue is unresolved. Neither side in Nicaragua is likely to give up easily. Neither should the United States. I do not think life in the United States would be unattractive if Central America goes communist.



Always poor, the economy of El Salvador has worsened as the guerrillas attack the infrastructure.

NEWSBRIEFS

NO STOCKINGS? A reporter for the London Observer Service tells the story. Recently a reporter of the magazine "Nedziya" went to discover why tights (heavy women's stockings) have almost disappeared from the shops. She found that the Ministry of Trade had underestimated the quantity required from the Ministry of Light Industry, which in turn had failed to secure the necessary raw material from the Chemical Industry Ministry.

Consequently, there will be only two pairs a year per user until 1990, and 100 million Soviet women have been told to wear their tights "more carefully."

EGYPT AS A "MAJOR NON-NATO ALLY"? An official Egyptian military source categorically denied reports that one pier in the Egyptian Navy docks has been assigned to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The source affirmed that there is "no foreign military presence in Egypt in any form whatsoever." He added that units of the U.S. Navy had entered Egyptian Navy docks in Alexandria for repair, but that the work had been paid for in hard currency and that the docks belong to the Egyptian Ministry of Industry, not the Ministry of Defense.

SOVS RESCHEDULE ONLY PART OF EGYPTIAN DEBT: The recent accord between the Soviet Union and Egypt covers only military debts, which were frozen in 1977. The Soviets agreed to a 25-year rescheduling with a 6-year grace period, and the debt will be repaid with commodities agreed to through the existing trade protocol.

ABL NIDAL "EXECUTIONS"? The Abu Nidal terrorist group announced from Lebanon that it had killed two people in Jordan during March. The statement said the two were Jordanian agents and were killed in retaliation for the death of an Abu Nidal member, and that the two bodies could be claimed through the Red Cross.

MEANWHILE IN JORDAN: The vice president of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was in Amman at the invitation of the Speaker of the Jordanian House of Representatives. Orlov observed that the Middle East has been in a continual state of war and tension for the past 2 decades, which makes it imperative for Soviet and Jordanian parliamentarians to work jointly with peace-loving forces for peace. He said Israel and those who back it always

oppose the international community's will and obstruct the prevalence of justice and the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

FRG AID TO WEST BANK: According to Jordanian sources, the West German government has decided to increase its annual aid to residents of the West Bank from DM7.5 million to DM12 million.

PRC AND ISRAEL: The Chinese ambassador to Jordan told an Israeli radio correspondent in Paris that although there are no official relations between the PRC and Israel, China distinguishes between the Israeli government and Israeli citizens. In the framework of its policy of openness, he said, "We allow Chinese scientists and experts to meet their Israeli counterparts in international conventions. According to international norms of behavior, we allow Israelis to come to China to take part in such conventions."

ISRAEL TALKS TO MALTA: The Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry met with Malta's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a one-day visit to the island. Israel and Malta have diplomatic relations. (Israeli representation is through the Israeli Embassy in Rome) but Malta is strongly influenced by its neighbor Libya.

SOVS IN VIETNAM & PHILIPPINES: U.S. monitors in the Philippines have been watching Soviet activities at Cam Ranh Bay, in Vietnam, "700 miles from the South China Sea. They suggest it has become a base for Soviet intelligence-gathering vessels disguised as fishing trawlers operating around the Philippines."

The Soviets are also putting up a three-story building described as a "staff house," overlooking a vital Philippine military communications center and located near several large embassies, including that of the U.S.

Philippine sources say it is equipped with sophisticated listening devices, has a two-story basement and is situated on a prime lot that was acquired under "mysterious circumstances" during the Marcos regime. The Soviet Embassy is located in another part of town.

SOVS IN OTHER PLACES: Soviet members of the Soviet-Moroccan Friendship Association met with the

Secretary General of the Moroccan Ministry of Cultural Affairs in Rabat and signed a cultural cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for "consolidation of relations" and exchange of delegations to enable their members and "the Moroccan and Soviet peoples at large to better know each other's cultural, economic, scientific and technological specialties."

A Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Sudan to boost trade and further develop bilateral ties.

See Jordan above.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PANEL PROPOSED: Senator Dan Quayle proposed legislation to replace the Senate and House intelligence committees with a joint panel on oversight, saying, "one of the key causes" of the Iran-Contra affair was the lack of trust between the executive and legislative branches of government. "Such a breakdown in trust is something we in Congress can and should address by modifying our own institutions. Establishment of a joint committee on intelligence oversight would go a long way toward depriving the executive of any serious excuse for not confiding in Congress."

UNDERWRITING THE SANDINISTAS: For every dollar in U.S. assistance provided to the Contras, the Sandinistas have received much more — from Sweden alone. According to Rep. Jim Cooper (R-NC), between 1979 and 1986, Sweden provided the Sandinistas with \$100 million in aid, com-

pared to \$65 million from the U.S. to the Contras. Sweden is also a benefactor of Vietnam, Cuba, Angola and SWAPO. Furthermore, 70% of the Netherlands total aid to the Central American region went to Nicaragua: 67% of the total French aid, 63% of Danish aid, 53% of Italian aid and 41% of Belgian aid to the region went to Nicaragua, according to the U.S. State Department.

BOOBY IN CHAD? According to Western diplomats in the Chadian capital, the military equipment abandoned by Libyan soldiers retreating from northern Chad may be worth up to half a billion dollars. The Libyans are reported to have left planes, helicopters, tanks, missiles and armored personnel carriers.

LIMITS SUGGESTED FOR EAST-EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS: The former chief of the French counter-intelligence agency, DST, said in an interview that the Soviet Union and East Bloc countries should be restricted in the number of diplomats they are able to post in Paris. Jean Rochet warns that the KGB "carries out its most profitable spying activities" in France and that hundreds of KGB agents posing as diplomats have to be watched by French authorities. This surveillance decreases the resources available for potential drug or terrorism-related problems.

RIISING MILITARY SPENDING IN INDIA: Indian Prime Minister Gandhi raised military expenditures by 43%, while freezing other budget items.

Letters to the Editor

To The Editor:

We recently received your Feb. 27 issue which, as always, we found most informative.

One article, in particular, caught our attention regarding the International Red Cross. Like thousands of others, we receive requests for donations from the American Red Cross and we wonder if this organization is involved in the rejection of Israel's Red Star of David (Mogen David Adom) and is, in fact, anti-Israel and anti-Jewish. Does our confusion stem from thinking the American Red Cross and International Red Cross are one and the same as far as policies go?

Harry and Muriel Kaplan
Los Angeles, CA

Ed Note: It is our understanding that the American Red Cross advocates the admission of the Mogen David Adom as a full member of the International Red Cross. In a recent interview, Joe Handelman, chairman of the MDA's American support group said, "The reaction of the American Jewish community should not be to withdraw support from the American Red Cross, which supports the MDA. . . The American Red Cross is the Mogen David Adom's best friend."

And read on. . .

To The Editor:

I note on page 5 (of our February issue) you reprinted an article by Mr. Lipson about the efforts of Mogen David Adom of Israel to be admitted as a member of the International Red Cross.

I want to thank you for giving this matter the attention you did. I hope that you will consider printing an in-depth article about the outrageous situation in which the International Red Cross approves of the blackmail of Arab countries, and because of this, Israel is kept out of the Red Cross organization.

Even the Red Cross officials themselves agree that Israel fulfills nine of the ten criterion for admission. Fair minded citizens understand that Israel should not be forced to use the Christian Cross or the Arab Red Crescent as its emblem. This issue weakens the International Red Cross movement, and many leaders around the world are beginning to question the humanitarianism, universality and brotherhood of the Red Cross movement.

Rabbi Rubin R. Dobkin
International Chaim, Operation Recognition

To The Editor:

As a monitor for the "socialist" European states more welfare than totalitarianism (Jan. 87): how about "social pluralism"?

The "socialist" in deference to their inspiration and perhaps (yet) their ideal: "socialism." The "pluralism" for recognition of how they've fallen, fortunately, short of their goal.

A very fine article, by the way, Mr. Guiraud — as was the speech by Amb. Keyes. Joseph A. Miller
Cleveland, OH

Security Affairs

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

Officers: President — Lawrence Goldmont; Chairman — Herbert A. Fiers; Vice Presidents — Morris J. Amity, Elliot H. Cole, Peter Gilbert, Nathan Golden, Bryan Littlefield; Executive Director — Shoshana Bryen.

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WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

NATAN SHARANSKY (Commenting on reports that the Soviet Union will allow emigration for a certain number of Jews in exchange for trade concessions from the West: "We must set up a program of graduated responses to ensure that this first step does not become a disaster, and that it will not be the last train out of Moscow." He added that he was concerned that Israel might make concessions on issues such as Soviet participation in the Middle East peace process, while the Soviet Union in exchange allows only 10,000 Jews to emigrate. Sharansky estimated that 400,000 Soviet Jews want to emigrate.

'ABD AL-RAHIM AHMAD (PLO Executive Committee member, following Shimon Peres' meeting with Palestinians in Israel): We have rejected such dialogue . . . because we believe the Israelis committed to the presence of Israel with all its racist, colonialist, and Zionist inclinations cannot be democratic. As a Palestinian I do not allow myself to trust a person who seized my home and land and who is living on my ruins. The place of the real progressive person who rejects oppression, racial discrimination and occupation should not be in the Israeli community.

RAIM HERZOG (President of Israel, commenting on U.S.-Israel relations in the wake of the Pollard affair): No doubt relations are disturbed. If it had to happen, however, it is better that it happened now, not earlier. Now a special relationship has developed between the two countries. Earlier that relationship was based on emotions; today

it is based on strategy and self-interest. That is the most important basis. Therefore, I believe the incident is most regrettable, and the whole thing is a shame. I have the feeling, however, that eventually the strategic interests of the Americans — just as ours — will make an improvement in relations inevitable.

We have had long years of intelligence cooperation. As a former intelligence chief, I assume that the balance will be to our advantage. In other words, it may turn out that we were more helpful to the United States that it was to us. In the long run, everyone has his own interests. It has caused damage now, but the pressure of events and daily needs will turn out to be stronger in the end.

GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN (USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command): We who wear a uniform in the U.S. can be very proud of our history. We opened the West, we built the railroads, we built the Mississippi River system. We built every port — we still run the ports. We control 600 lakes. But we've never asked for one ounce of political clout.

We opened Wyoming as a territory, but no military man ever governed the territory or the state. That kind of military is important in the development of democracy.

The problem in Central America is that governments have traditionally had weak infrastructures. You'll find the military involved in everything.

I'm not sure we want to say because the military is among and the infrastructure is weak, that we ought to weaken the military. We ought to bring

up the other through training and development.

I don't think we do enough of this in our economic assistance. I think we should do more.

THE HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK (Member of the JINSA Board of Advisors and former U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.): During the early years of the Reagan administration, the question of El Salvador dominated the Central American debate: Was the triumph of the FMLN guerrillas inevitable? Were they really Marxist-Leninist or only a broad front of indigenous revolutionaries? Were Salvadorans "ready" for democracy or were we and they forced to choose between murderous right- and left-wing groups? Would the traditional right permit Napoleon Duarte to win an honest election, to take power, to govern? Was U.S. military aid to the government of El Salvador merely prolonging the killing? Shouldn't we shut off assistance and try even at this late date to develop a constructive relationship with the "revolutionary forces"?

The Senators and Congressmen who only a few years ago argued that the FMLN was invincible proclaim today

Navy

(Cont. from p. 1)

mind — and of the heart; a resistance of the spirit, which kept humanity alive."

In the section labeled, "Programming," chaplains are provided with a complete book of services, *Liturgies on the Holocaust*. Produced by the Anne Frank Institute of Philadelphia, this volume contains prayers for Jewish, Catholic, or Protestant services, as well as material for interfaith or civic observances.

The "Education" section includes more than two hundred pages of readings from selections ranging from Elie Wiesel's *Night* to Simon and Garfunkel's "Sounds of Silence." Published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith under the title, "The Holocaust and Genocide: A Search for Conscience," this anthology of readings includes excerpts from World War II documents which help the student learn about the time. But through other readings — and questions in support of the readings — it raises universal issues of prejudice, hatred, discrimination, and the horrors of religion misused, and faith run wild.

Eight articles by Jewish and Christian ethicists and theologians make up the "Theology" section, a collection of writings provided for chaplains themselves — for individual study or group discussion. With these materials, chaplains may struggle with issues of faith posed by the Holocaust — and issues of conscience raised by the actions, and the failings, of organized religious groups during this period.

The final packet, currently being distributed to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands now served by Navy chaplains, is the product of more than five years of work.

Support from the Civilian Side

When the idea for such a packet was first discussed, civilian scholars were quick to agree that the idea was sound. Responding to the special link of the military as liberators to the memory of the Holocaust, scholar Yaffa Eliaich of Brooklyn's Holocaust Research Institute has noted that it was, in fact, the

the "inevitable" defeat of Nicaragua's contras.

MUAMMAR KHADDAFI (Libyan strongman, speaking by satellite hook-up to a Geneva-based conference on terrorism): There is another tool which causes great fear to mankind, which comes after the nuclear bomb: the AIDS virus. I mention this virus because someone is responsible for it. This virus did not come from the jungle or from monkeys . . . the United States made this virus. U.S. intelligence conducted tests on germs with a view to using them in germ warfare and this virus emerged as a result.

The most notorious terrorists in the world now are the Yankees and the Israelis.

Most citizens of the states of the world suffer from the terrorism of their own governments. When the British people stage a demonstration, they are trampled under the feet of the horses of the police; boiling water is poured over them. This exists in several Western states . . . When citizens want to express their feelings in Western European states, they are terrified because they know these tools of terrorism will be used against them.

military which first used the term, "Holocaust" to describe the Nazi horror. The word was used in an Army report sent to General Eisenhower, to describe the terror our soldiers confronted as the camps were first liberated.

Many civilian organizations lent their support. Rabbi David Lapp, Director of the JWB Jewish Chaplains Council (the JWB is the organization which supports the work of all Jewish Chaplains in the military) helped with material. Dr. Dennis Glick of the International Center for Holocaust Studies (ADL), and Marcia Littell, Director of the Anne Frank Institute of Philadelphia, immediately agreed to add their energies to the project.

It was the USHMC itself which helped emphasize that remembering the Holocaust enabled us to remember other horrors as well: other dreams of genocide; other attempts to deny duty, dignity — even humanity — to those we consider "other." Throughout the resource packet, this idea is affirmed: we remember the Holocaust as a specific event, but we draw lessons from it which must be applied in universal ways.

The distribution of this resource packet is one more step toward the time when the military as a whole will join the civilian sector in reaffirming our national commitment to remembrance. It is hoped that the Army and Air Force will soon produce materials for their services — or at least arrange for the distribution of the Navy's materials to their commands.

Remembering

The importance of remembering cannot be overemphasized. As the Navy's packet emphasizes, the time for remembering is now.

Admiral McNamara writes, in his introduction:

[At first] "silence may have been the only possible response — for there were no words which could be found to describe such indescribable events . . ."

[Now] the time for silence has passed. May this workbook aid us all as we struggle together to speak."

JINSA

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U.S. Navy Takes First Steps Toward Worldwide Holocaust Programming

By Rabbi Arnold E. Resnicoff

Ed. Note: Rabbi Resnicoff is a Chaplain in the U.S. Navy. He was the Jewish Chaplain in Beirut immediately following the Marine barracks bombing in 1983, and accompanied the President to the Reykjavik summit meeting in 1986. Honored at a JINSA dinner in 1984, Rabbi Resnicoff has been pursuing a goal of having the U.S. military services educate their members about the Holocaust.

Following the direction of the President and with the encouragement of the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the United States Navy has committed itself to remember the Holocaust.


"Horror and Hope, Americans Remember the Holocaust" is a workbook and resource packet prepared by the Navy's Chaplain Resource Board for

commands served by full-time Jewish chaplains.

The Program Commences

In 1984, following a visit to the chaplains of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, then USHMC Director Rabbi Seymour Siegel suggested that the military come "onboard." Given the fact that the President was commander-in-chief, he reasoned, it made sense for the armed forces to develop programs similar to those within the civilian sector, thereby creating a truly national effort. After a visit to the Sixth Fleet flagship, where we met, he decided to raise the issue with the Department of Defense.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger responded to the idea with a memorandum to the heads of all branches of the military. Especially mindful of the fact that it was our nation's military forces



Holocaust-related materials developed for use by the U.S. Navy.

"Our nation, and our military personnel, were among those who liberated the death camps. We know the truth."

the more than eleven hundred Rabbi Priests, and Ministers serving as Navy chaplains throughout the world. These study materials, which include articles by theologians, readings for classes on ethics and morality, and prayers for ceremonies linked to the annual national "Days of Remembrance for Holocaust Victims" will support programs on ships and stations around the globe.

National efforts to remember the Holocaust are not new. In 1980, the United States Holocaust Memorial Council (USHMC) was established by law. Its responsibilities include support of an annual, national commemoration, and encouragement of local observances throughout the United States.

But, although many states followed the lead of the nation's capital in establishing Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremonies, military observances were often limited to the few scattered

which first witnessed evidence of the Holocaust, he directed that military commands begin to consider ways to remember the event—in a way which would reaffirm our commitment to the values for which we stand.

In December of 1986, Navy Chief of Chaplains (Rear Admiral) John R. McNamara spoke at the annual meeting of the USHMC. Sharing the Navy's Holocaust project with those assembled, he made the point that it was especially appropriate for the military to take a stand. It was, he said, the responsibility of being a witness. As a witness to the Holocaust, the armed forces now must accept the challenge to bear witness to the evil that we refer to as "Holocaust."

The Need to Bear Witness

It is this idea which the Admiral stresses in his opening letter in "Horror and Hope": "Already some spread the lie that the Holocaust did not occur at

all, that it is a hoax of some sort, that no death camps or ovens or crematoria existed, that no special effort was made to erase the Jewish presence from the earth."

"Our nation, and our military personnel, were among those who liberated the death camps. We know the truth. And now our country has reaffirmed its commitment to remember the Holocaust, to ensure that it will not be forgotten, to vow that it will not happen again."

In his speech, Admiral McNamara, a Roman Catholic Priest, noted another reason for the military to make a special effort to remember the Holocaust. "The young men and women in the military," he said, "make sacrifices and take risks in a very special way, to support the dreams of our nation. It is sometimes necessary to remember the nightmares, to remind ourselves how precious are the dreams."

The Project

When Chaplain McNamara approved the concept of a Holocaust workbook, I was named Project Editor. From Newport, I worked with the staff of the Chaplains Resource Board as they began to collect and sift through the hundreds of books and articles they would consider.

The problem was not that material was unavailable to chaplains interested in creating services or classes. On the contrary, the problem was that the material was overwhelming. Chaplains did not know where to start when they wanted to put together a program.

What makes this resource packet unique is the fact that the resources in one three-ring binder provide materials for every conceivable program. A chaplain can use this packet to compose a short prayer or an entire service, to

write one sermon or lecture, or to put together a course or a mini-series of courses tied together by theme.

"Horror and Hope"

"Horror and Hope" is divided into five sections: (I) Introduction, (II) Programming, (III) Education, (IV) Theology, and (V) Resources.

The introduction deals with definitions of what the Holocaust was, and what it was not. It was not, the introduction emphasizes, the terrors of war in some abstract sense, or the deaths of all those who fell victim to World War II. It was "a separate war," aimed not merely at killing Jews, but also at dehumanizing them in life, and degrading and denying their memory, in death.

Using the report of the 1979 Presidential Commission which led to the establishment of the USHMC, it quotes Elie Wiesel in his role as Chairman of that commission, defining the Holocaust as, "The systematic, bureaucratic extermination of six million Jews by the Nazis and their collaborators as a central act of state during the Second World War; as night descended, millions of other peoples were swept into this net of death..."

Also included in Section I are special notes about the concept of resistance. According to this section, Nazi propaganda spread the myth that Jews did not resist—as another "proof" that Jews lacked worth. Noting the many instances of heroism on the part of the Jews, however, this section notes that such events are only a small part of the story.

"But physical resistance—Jewish partisans, ghetto heroes—was only one small part. For there was resistance of another kind: a resistance of the

(Cont. on p. 1)

The Officers and the Board of JINSA

wish our members and friends
a happy and healthy
Passover Season

Report on a Visit to Central America: February 1987

By Edith U. Flester

Ed. Note: Mrs. Flester is an attorney in Washington. Her article "Visits With *Rejuvena* in the USSR," appeared in the September 1986 "Security Affairs."

During February 1987, I traveled to five Central American countries — Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica — as part of a group of 12 persons studying the crisis in that region. We met with representatives of all five governments and the leading opposition parties in each country, our own embassies, journalists, university administrators, church officials, spokesmen for human rights groups, prominent women, and an assortment of individuals. I had personal access to Jewish leaders in two of the countries. In Nicaragua most of our time was scheduled by the Sandinista government.

This paper is a summary of my reactions.

First a caution. Opinion in and about Central America is both polarized and impassioned. That makes it very hard to consider the situation there with an open mind. This is true for everybody, including me, although I tried. Before

The relationship between pluralism and true democracy is a key one for the countries that border on Nicaragua.

reading this, therefore, you should know my mind set when I left home. I was and am not inclined to think favorably of a communist regime. I believe the lack of personal freedom, the corruption that inevitably accompanies absolute power, and the disincentives to produce economically make an unhappy environment for the people who must live under these regimes. Nothing I saw or learned about Nicaragua dissuaded me from these deeply held convictions.

However, as to the rest, I believe I was open minded. Specifically I was uncertain whether the United States should assume an obligation to secure freedom and democracy for the people of Nicaragua. I knew we had some responsibility for the Somoza tyranny under which they lived for 40 years, as we have had some responsibility for corrupt governments in other of the Central American countries. I was open to persuasion that it was time for us to leave these countries to determine their own fates. When I started, I had little feeling for the way Central Americans are reacting to the Nicaraguan government.

I was also uncertain of the extent to which human rights abuses were continuing and if they were, whose fault it was and what we could or should do about it.

Here is what I found:

Are the Sandinistas Communists?
The Sandinistas claim that they are Marxists rather than communists. Among the similarities is belief in the class struggle, which promotes enemy among groups within the populace. By

contrast, candidates for office in a democracy try to find a middle road on which all can agree or at least compromise. This discrepancy makes for a fundamental difference in the tone of public discourse.

However, the Sandinistas cite two differences between themselves and Soviet-type communists which they regard as significant:

The first is their "pluralism." To them, pluralism means the legal tolerance for more than one party — which they have. It does not, however, necessarily mean equal access to the electorate for all parties — and the Sandinistas have not provided that. The Sandinista spokesman was frank to admit that during the recent national election campaign the Government did not permit any of the opposition parties to have more than 15 minutes a week of broadcast time. Leaders of the principal opposition party told us that thugs regularly came to beat up those who attended their meetings.

The Sandinistas have, as everyone knows, stopped publication of *La Prensa*, the leading newspaper of Managua, and, as everyone may not know, closed down the Catholic Church's radio, television and newspaper. The Sandinistas offer two explanations for these breaches of free speech: the first is that they are in a war, and that even the United States wouldn't let the Nazis publish or broadcast during World War II. To make the comparison closer, they charge that *La Prensa* received money from the CIA. The second is that "the revolution is irreversible." This seems to mean that opponents of the revolution will not be allowed to win an election.

The relationship between pluralism and true democracy is a key one in the views of the countries that border on Nicaragua. The latter fear the instability of a country in which the people have no legitimate way of changing its policies or leadership. They regard such a government as a recipe for subversion and revolution.

The Economy

The second difference between Nicaragua and the USSR cited by the Sandinistas is that only the former has a mixed economy in which public and private ownership co-exist. It is true that privately owned businesses continue to operate. However, they are strictly limited in their freedom to function. For example, while some coffee plantations remain in private hands, the only market for their crop is the government. As another example, the government has severely limited the independence of the women who used to sell farm produce in the market in Managua.

Indeed, whether private enterprise will be allowed to continue at all is unclear. One rumor we heard is that Castro had advised Ortega to move slowly in nationalizing industry as well as in eliminating opposition parties in order to diffuse internal opposition and retain the flow of economic aid from several Western European countries



During the recent election campaign the Government did not permit any of the opposition parties more than 15 min. of broadcast time. . . (and) thugs came to beat up those who attended (opposition) meetings.

that do not send aid to Cuba.

Business is, of course, very nervous and making no private investments. Productivity has plunged, and the growth rate in 1985 (the last year for which we have data) was a negative 5.9 percent. Unemployment that same year was 22.3 percent. The devastation caused by the earthquake of 1972 is still obvious in the center of the capital city, as well as elsewhere. Indeed conditions in Managua are so bad that the water is turned off for two 12-hour days a week, including in the international, the best hotel in town.

Another indication of conditions came inadvertently from Mrs. Victoria Chamorro, a member of the original Sandinista junta who is now in the opposition. She is also the widow of the editor of *La Prensa* whose assassination triggered the revolution. In answer to a question about divided loyalties in her family (two of her children are part of the Sandinista government, while two are against it, including one son who is a leader of the contras), she told us that her personal relationship with her San-

Public Opinion

Most of Central America is palpably afraid of the Sandinistas. I felt this fear everywhere. A more objective clue to the fear comes from Gallup-type polls. In Guatemala, for example, a recent poll asked people whether they believe conditions in Central America are worse than two years ago — 75 percent do; and whether they think they will get even worse in the future — 53 percent do. The pollster said he used these questions to warn up the respondents before he knew the answer.

Most people perceive the situation to be worsening, despite the replacement of military government by an honestly elected democracy and a substantial reduction in violence (as to which, see below) because of the Sandinistas. The polls showed that 79 percent regard the U.S. as a friend, compared to 14 percent for Nicaragua, 9 percent for the USSR, and fewer for Cuba.

Similar polls have been taken in the

The lack of personal freedom, the corruption that inevitably accompanies absolute power, and the disincentives to produce. . . make an unhappy environment. Nothing I saw or learned about Nicaragua dissuaded me.

dinista son — who publishes a pro-Government newspaper — are unchanged; in evidence she said that he had phoned her the night before to make sure she had enough to eat!

The Sandinistas blame their economic woes on the war with the contras. Other believe the lack of productivity that plagues all communist countries is equally at fault.

The Government has made recent concessions, such as permitting peasants to farm for their own use a small plot on the state or cooperatively owned lands where they work. The question is whether these concessions are permanent. Some think they will be revoked as soon as the regime is so stabilized and the food shortage lessens in severity. Others think the loosening may be permanent. The Sandinistas say we should deem them innocent until proven guilty.

other democracies, and all show that the similar results. Many people told us that if the Sandinistas take over in Central America, there will be a mass migration to the United States, which we cannot exclude south of building a Berlin Wall across the Mexican border. The figure usually cited was 25 million refugees.

Terrorism and Human Rights Abuses

The major cause of the fear is Sandinista support of terrorism in their countries. Leftist guerrillas have been active, especially in Guatemala and El Salvador, and citizens in all the countries fear for the future.

The violence is not all attributable to left-wing guerrillas. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the military governments of El Salvador and Guatemala were guilty of widespread abuse, and caused many thousands of killings by death

squads and similar military units. Major improvements have occurred in both countries, partly as the result of efforts by the United States government, including the withholding of aid from Guatemala for several years before the election of a civilian president, and Vice President Bush's warning to El Salvador in 1984.

Some disappearances and human rights abuses are continuing. The controversy concerning the continuing kidnappings and killings has been highly politicized in both Guatemala and El Salvador. In both countries the current democratic governments have taken remedial action. In both the good faith of the governments' efforts is being challenged by human rights organizations headed by charismatic women.

In Guatemala, the leader is Nineth de Garcia, the dynamic young wife of one of the disappeared, who heads an organization called the GAM. In El Salvador, she is Maria Jajia Hernandez who runs the Tutela Legal, an agency of the Catholic Church. Both of these heads of human rights organization, refuse to meet with the government agency trying to improve human rights — whose sincerity they doubt. Their dispute is similar to one in Argentina, where a group of mothers of the disappeared has split off from the main Mothers of the Plaza, saying that the leadership of the latter is more interested in opposing the government than in finding the disappeared.

The disagreement on the sincerity of government efforts is important, not only because of the desirability of finding the disappeared and remedying government policies which permit human rights abuses, but also because the disagreement on human rights forms the basis for raising funds from well-intentioned humanitarians. Nineth de Garcia, for example, runs the GAM in El Salvador which her opponents say goes for arms for the terrorists. We heard similar and repeated charges about this misuse for military material of contributions by well-meaning Americans intended for medical and other humanitarian purposes.

Military Worries

In addition to guerrilla warfare, the Central American democracies are worried about the military build-up in Nicaragua which began in 1979, almost immediately after the revolution. Enormous shipments of armaments (estimated value from the beginning is about \$900,000,000) have been received from the Soviet bloc. The Sandinista spokesmen admitted construction at Punta Huerta of a very large airport suitable for MiGs with a range that includes the West Coast of the United States. However, he said they do not plan to use it for offensive purposes. (It is widely reported the United States has warned the Nicaraguans that we will bomb the airport if they bring in MiGs). According to the State Department, the Nicaraguan military includes 70,000 on active duty, plus another 54,000 reservists and internal security forces. In addition, they have Cubans, Russians and other Soviet Bloc nationals assisting and advising them.

By comparison Guatemala's military numbers 33,000, Honduras's, 16,750, and El Salvador's 52,000 including police. Costa Rica, of course, has no armed forces (it has 6,000 rural and

civil guards). All of these forces have been either increased or better prepared since the rise of the Sandinistas.

American military personnel in Honduras number between 800 and 1100 on permanent assignment, plus national guardsmen who come for two weeks of training, and from time to time other units that come for special exercises. The Pentagon says that the maximum number of American military in Honduras at any one time is 4,500; the Sandinista spokesman said 6,000. Estimates of the number of contras range from 10,000 to 20,000.

American military aid goes primarily to El Salvador which in 1986 received \$122 million, compared to just under \$60 million to Honduras in the same year. Almost all aid to Guatemala, including military aid, was discontinued from 1977 to 1985; in 1986 we gave them five and a half million dollars in military assistance, mostly in trucks of various kinds, spare parts for helicopters and medical supplies, and training military personnel. (Aid to the contras is in addition to these figures)

We heard repeated charges about the misuse for military material of contributions by well-meaning Americans.

Nicaragua's Fear of the United States
From the beginning of the Sandinista regime, Nicaragua has proclaimed great fear of military invasion by the United States, citing the five occasions Americans have taken over their country. Twice in this century the U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua: Sando, the hero of the Sandinistas from whom they took their name, made his reputation fighting the U.S. Marines.

Because of this, the United States well have feared invasion by the Sandinistas. While there was no discussion in this country of invading Nicaragua at the start of their regime nor is there now, they may discount that fact as there was no public discussion of invading Grenada before we did so. On the other hand, at the time alarms began to be sounded, the United States was still giving substantial aid to the Sandinistas. Eighty-five million dollars had been appropriated; all but \$10 million of this was actually distributed. The final ten million was withheld because the Sandinistas would not discontinue their active support for guerrillas outside the country. The



The Miskito Indian community was removed from its ancestral homeland in Nicaragua and forcibly relocated into camps.

contras did not organize or start to receive U.S. funds for some years thereafter.

Some observers think the real function of Sandinista announcements of imminent invasion was to rally Nicaraguan public opinion against an outside threat. This would be analogous to the use by Stalin of Trotsky as a threat described in Orwell's *Animal Farm*. Now, of course, the contras and our aid to them provide a realistic outside threat.

Attitudes Toward the United States and the Revolution

The American dream has taken hold in Central America, even in Nicaragua. At the back of their minds, rich and poor alike think of crossing the border to the Promised Land if the trouble at home becomes too great. Their slogan might be: "Yankee go home and take me with you!"

Many of those we saw thought the United States did not appreciate or adequately fear the risk we run of being inundated with refugees. For all the Sandinistas' talk to take over Central America. As mentioned above the number cited most often was 25 million refugees roughly the population of Central America. (It is not clear whether the entire population is expected to seek refuge in the United States or whether the figure includes some Mexicans. Everyone agrees that if the five Central American countries go communist, the effects would surely be felt in Mexico.)

The dream of coming to America may be planted even among the Sandinista leadership. We met a number of young Sandinistas from upper class

white families. Mrs. Violeta Chamorro, the widow of the editor of *La Prensa* described above, spoke of the revolutionaries as "young boys." I believe she was talking about her son (and daughter) and the children of her friends who are leaders of the revolution. Examples would be several of the attractive young people who escorted or addressed us during the 28 hours we were guests of the Sandinista government. Most had been educated in the United States and had parents or other close relatives in Miami. The representative of the Nicaraguan foreign office, who talked with us in his beautiful family home for two hours, has a PhD. from Harvard, where, he told us, he learned his Marxism.

Most of these young Sandinistas were part of the sixties generation. I kept comparing them with their contemporaries who joined the Weathermen. What would have happened if the Weathermen had succeeded in taking over the United States, or the Red Brigade in mastering Italy? Are the kidnappings in Guatemala and El Salvador similar to the bank hold ups and the like of Kathy Boudin and her friends, planned to raise money for the revolution? I thought I saw great similarities. We met one man in El Salvador who told us that the million dollar ransom he was forced to pay for his father's life went to leftist guerrillas.

And won't these young people get tired of poverty and the revolution when so many of them could come up to Miami and rejoin the middle class? Our translator, an attractive young blond, told us she is paid \$20 a month, but that her father lives in Miami and

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stays at the Managua Intercontinental when he comes for a visit. She has recently married. What will happen when she has children? She is on the Sandinista side, but at the back of her mind, I would guess she treasures the option of coming to the United States whenever things get too rough. This may be playing at revolution.

From the perspective of the Central American democracies... the most popular action the U.S. could take would be to oust the Sandinistas from them.

The contrast between these attractive young aristocrats and other Sandinistas was highlighted at a luncheon in Managua which they and a woman Comandante hosted for us. The personality of the latter was totally different from that of the other Sandinistas at the luncheon: no upper class party manners, and no background in a class sorority, no apparent wish to ingratiate herself with us. I kept thinking of the group that kidnapped Patty Hearst, and the rough crook who was the leader of the Symphonie Liberation Army, and wondering if we were in the midst of limousine revolutionaries.

Most of this crowd would probably drop active revolution when they come here, but not necessarily all, particularly if they come soon for personal reasons rather than because of disillusion with the revolution. In fact, one, a beautiful young poet who talked a fierce revolution, is marrying an American and moving to the Dupont Circle area in Washington, D.C. next month.

Of course, one can take the parallel to the student revolution and the counter-culture too far. I do not think most Sandinistas are upper-class whites or as rough as the Comandante appeared. We met a few others who were pleasant, of mixed ancestry, from proletarian backgrounds, and who are undoubtedly committed Marxists.

The Role of the United States

From the perspective of the four Central American democracies, I believe the most popular action the United States could take would be to oust the Sandinistas for them. (Shocked? I was.) The example of our successful removal of the communists from Grenada figured here. It was suggested that an alternative approach would be for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union to get rid of the Sandinistas. At least one proponent of this idea thought we could have peace in Central America if we would agree to stop helping the rebels in Afghanistan!

If neither of these options is implemented (as I expect), the Governments of the four democracies will have to decide what to do. They are not certain. A major reason seems to be a lack of confidence in American resolve, and the fear that they will be abandoned to face the guerrillas. They remember Vietnam, Hungary and, especially, the Bay of Pigs where we abandoned Cubans on the beaches and provided no air support. (The last of the prisoners taken on that day has only recently emerged from prison.) They follow our debates about the contras, and conclude it is dangerous for anyone to stick his neck out in reliance on the United States.

Guatemala, which does not border directly on Nicaragua, worries about Mexico on its northern borders where 46,000 Guatemalan refugees remain, some of them sympathetic to the Sandinistas. A deal seems to have been struck that if Guatemala maintains a stance of "active neutrality", Mexico will not allow these refugees to become leftist guerrillas marauding into Guatemala.

Without Guatemala, it is hard for the other countries to take a firm position. They are trying hard to bring Guatemala into a united stance. The Costa Rican initiative of February 15 included a Central American parliament, an idea in which hardly anyone but the Guatemalan president has faith, but which was intended to entice his country into a united front. Even so, Gua-

temala is dragging its heels.

Conclusion

I see no possibility that the United States with its diverse points of view and vigorous democracy will invade Nicaragua or that it is now ready to provide the reliability and assurance that Central America wants. Only if those countries take some responsibility will the American public go along. If they want our help, the four democracies must persuade our public that this is not another Vietnam in which anti-communist Americans want to fight their battle on Central American turf and at the expense of the Central American people. I must be seen as Central America's battle as least as much as ours, as indeed I believe it is.

The Governments of the four countries are all now honestly elected democracies, many of them newly installed. We heard many times how fragile the new democracies are. They are fragile because the underlying social and economic problems facing them are enormous (high unemployment and underemployment, lack of modern medical care and welfare programs, lack of private investment, widespread corruption in some governments, as well as the continuing threat of guerrilla activity), and because they do not have a well-established tradition of accepting the loss of an election by losing plans to win the next time.

This was a reminder that the United States has an almost unique tradition under which no matter how unhappy the Democrats were at the victory of Reagan, or the Republicans at the victory of Carter there was no serious talk of overthrowing either of them. The courteous level of discourse in the United States Congress is a marvel for the world, and I believe an important factor in enabling our representatives to work with each other despite issues on which they disagree profoundly. Yet even we had a civil war before we reached a national consensus that a bad Administration is better than a revolution.

U.S. advice to the Central American countries has had a major impact for the better. This is partly because we offer the carrot of substantial economic aid, and the stick of withholding it. This year the Administration is seeking \$300 million in funds for non-military purposes. I hope it will get every penny. The economies of all these countries are bad, in at least two of the three guerrilla activity discourages needed private investment. (Indeed there has been a major export of capital from all these countries to the United States, countered to some extent by remittances from their nationals now working in the United States.) El Salvador's economy is probably the worst. The October 1986 earthquake was devastating, and poor economic policies of the Buarque government which are frightening to business investment seem to be making things worse. The high birthrate in all the countries exacerbates the poverty.

Funding is also needed for continued training now being provided to Central American militaries in the supremacy of civilian government, and in methods of investigating crimes that do not in-

volve confessions obtained through torture.

Meanwhile in Mexico, the population explosion, the lack of employment for its citizens, poverty, debt and lack of internal democracy (Mexico has not elected a president of the opposition party in living memory, and succession is by one President choosing the next) make that country another time bomb. As for the military situation, the Costa Rican plan offers some hope for the emergence of a united Central American leadership. If it solidifies, which I profoundly hope it will, it will give U.S. policy makers some guidance from those most immediately affected.

A clue as to what that guidance will be was offered our group just after Costa Rica presented its plan to the Central American presidents. The next morning, our group met with the Chief of Staff to the Costa Rican Foreign Minister. In response to my inquiry whether he thought the United States should continue to fund the contras, he said we should until such time as the Sandinistas come to the table and show a willingness to negotiate in good faith. He said pressure from the contras was needed to persuade the Sandinistas to negotiate, and that a withdrawal of United States support for the contras now would not be seen by the Nicaraguans as an indication of good faith, but be rather as a sign of American weakness. I would follow this advice and continue funding the contras until the Sandinistas meet his test.

At the same time the United States government must exert its influence on the contras to reform their operation, aiming for a repeat of our success in persuading the military of Guatemala and El Salvador to accept the primacy of civilian government and the need to respect human rights.

Will the Sandinistas negotiate seriously? I believe there is hope if the pressure keeps up, not only pressure from the contras, but also economic and moral pressure. Europe seems to be changing its attitude, and has begun to withdraw economic aid. This trend is likely to continue.

The most encouraging idea I heard was from a Peruvian hydrologist I met in the lobby of the Intercontinental. He was in Managua consulting with the Agriculture Ministry on irrigation. I asked him whether the recent change in land reform under which the peasants may now farm a portion of the land owned by the cooperative was a temporary ruse such as used by the Soviets at various times in Russia, or a genuine change of heart. He said there were real fights going on inside the Ministry. So long as that continues, there is hope that the non-communists will win. Nicaragua is not contiguous to the USSR, and therefore may be able to throw the rascals out. They are not as free as was Egypt when it did so, but perhaps the example is not wholly frivolous.

At best I anticipate a long period when the issue is unresolved. Neither side in Nicaragua is likely to give up easily. Neither should the United States. I do not think life in the United States would be unaffected if Central America goes communist.



Always poor, the economy of El Salvador has worsened as the guerrillas attack the infrastructure.

NEWSBRIEFS

NO STOCKINGS? A reporter for the London Observer Service tells the story: Recently a reporter of the magazine "Nedelya" went to discover why tights (heavy women's stockings) have almost disappeared from the shops. She found that the Ministry of Trade had underestimated the quantity required from the Ministry of Light Industry, which in turn had failed to secure the necessary raw material from the Chemical Industry Ministry.

Consequently, there will be only two pairs a year per user until 1990, and 100 million Soviet women have been told to wear their tights "more carefully."

EGYPT AS A "MAJOR NON-NATO ALLY": An official Egyptian military source categorically denies reports that one pier in the Egyptian Navy docks has been assigned to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The source affirmed that there is "no foreign military presence in Egypt in any form whatsoever." He added that units of the U.S. Navy had entered Egyptian Navy docks in Alexandria for repair, but that the work had been paid for in hard currency and that the docks belong to the Egyptian Ministry of Industry, not the Ministry of Defense.

SOVS RESCHEDULE ONLY PART OF EGYPTIAN DEBT: The recent accord between the Soviet Union and Egypt covers only military debts, which were frozen in 1977. The Soviets agreed to a 25-year rescheduling with a 6-year grace period, and the debt will be repaid with commodities agreed to through the existing trade protocol.

ABU NIDAL "EXECUTIONS": The Abu Nidal terrorist group operating from Lebanon that it had killed six people in Jordan during March. The statement said the two were Jordanian agents and were killed in retaliation for the death of an Abu Nidal member, and that the two bodies could be claimed through the Red Cross.

MEANWHILE IN JORDAN: The vice president of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was in Amman at the invitation of the Speaker of the Jordanian House of Representatives. Onov observed that the Middle East has been in a continual state of war and tension for the past 2 decades, which makes it imperative for Soviet and Jordanian parliamentarians to work jointly with peacemaking forces for peace. He said Israel and those who back it always

oppose the international community's will and obstruct the prevalence of justice and the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

PRG AID TO WEST BANK: According to Jordanian sources, the West German government has decided to increase its annual aid to residents of the West Bank from DM7.5 million to DM12 million.

PRC AND ISRAEL: The Chinese ambassador to France told an Israeli radio proposed legislation to replace the Senate with a joint panel on oversight, saying, "one of the key causes" of the Iran-Contra affair was the lack of trust between the executive and legislative branches of government. "Such a breakdown in trust is something we in Congress can and should address by modifying our own institutions. Establishment of a joint committee on intelligence oversight would go a long way toward depriving the executive of any serious excuse for not confiding in Congress."

ISRAEL TALKS TO MALTA: The Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry met with Malta's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a one-day visit to the island. Israel and Malta have diplomatic relations, (Israeli representation is through the Israeli Embassy in Rome; but Malta is strongly influenced by its neighbor Libya.

SOVS IN VIETNAM & PHILIPPINES: U.S. monitors in the Philippines have been watching Soviet activities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, 700 miles across the South China Sea. They suggest it is a major base for Soviet intelligence gathering vessels disguised as shipping travelers operating around the Philippines.

The Soviets are also putting up a three-story building described as a "staff house", overlooking a vital Philippine military communications center and located near several large embassies, including that of the U.S.

Philippine sources say it is equipped with sophisticated listening devices, has a two-story basement and is situated on a prime lot that was acquired under "mysterious circumstances" during the Marcos regime. The Soviet Embassy is located in another part of town.

SOVS IN OTHER PLACES: Soviet members of the Soviet-Moroccan Friendship Association met with the

Secretary General of the Moroccan Ministry of Cultural Affairs in Rabat and signed a cultural cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for "consolidation of relations" and exchange of delegations to enable their members and "the Moroccan and Soviet peoples at large to better know each other's cultural, economic, scientific and technological specifics."

A Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Sudan to boost trade and further develop bilateral ties.

See Jordan above.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PANEL PROPOSED: Senator Dan Quayle proposed legislation to replace the Senate and House intelligence committees with a joint panel on oversight, saying, "one of the key causes" of the Iran-Contra affair was the lack of trust between the executive and legislative branches of government. "Such a breakdown in trust is something we in Congress can and should address by modifying our own institutions. Establishment of a joint committee on intelligence oversight would go a long way toward depriving the executive of any serious excuse for not confiding in Congress."

UNDERWRITING THE SANDINISTAS: For every dollar in U.S. assistance provided to the Contras, the Sandinistas have received much more — from Sweden alone. According to Rep. Jim Cooper (R-NC), between 1979 and 1986, Sweden provided the Sandinistas with \$100 million in aid, com-

pared to \$65 million from the U.S. to the Contras. Sweden is also a benefactor of Vietnam, Cuba, Angola and SWAPO. Furthermore, 70% of the Netherlands total aid to the Central American region went to Nicaragua: 67% of the total French aid, 63% of Danish aid, 53% of Italian aid and 41% of Belgian aid to the region went to Nicaragua, according to the U.S. State Department.

BOOTY IN CHAD: According to Western diplomats in the Chadian capital, the military equipment abandoned by Libyan soldiers retreating from northern Chad may be worth up to half a billion dollars. The Libyans are reported to have left planes, helicopters, tanks, missiles and armored personnel carriers.

LIMITS SUGGESTED FOR EASTERN DIPLOMATS: The former chief of the French counter-intelligence agency, DST, said in an interview that the Soviet Union and East Bloc countries should be restricted in the number of diplomats they are able to post in Paris. Jean Rochet warns that the KGB "carries out its most profitable spying activities" in France and that hundreds of KGB agents posing as diplomats have been watched by French authorities. This surveillance establishes the resources available for potential drug or terrorism-related problems.

RISE IN MILITARY SPENDING IN INDIA: Indian Prime Minister Gandhi raised military expenditures by 43%, while freezing other budget items.

Letters to the Editor

To The Editor:

We recently received your Feb. 87 issue which, as always, we found most informative.

One article, in particular, caught our attention regarding the International Red Cross. Like thousands of others, we receive requests for donations from the American Red Cross and we wonder if this organization is involved in the rejection of Israel's Red Star of David (Mogen David Adom) and is, in fact, anti-Israel and anti-Jewish. Does our confusion stem from thinking the American Red Cross and International Red Cross are one and the same as far as policies go?

Harry and Muriel Kaplan
Los Angeles, CA

Ed Note: It is our understanding that the American Red Cross advocates the admission of the Mogen David Adom as a full member of the International Red Cross. In a recent interview, Joe Handelman, chairman of the MDA's American support group said, "The reaction of the American Jewish community should not be to withdraw support from the American Red Cross, which supports the MDA. The American Red Cross is the Mogen David Adom's best friend."

And read on...

To The Editor:

I note on page 5 (of our February issue) you reprinted an article by Mr. Lipson about the efforts of Mogen David Adom of Israel to be admitted as a member of the International Red Cross.

I want to thank you for giving this matter the attention you did. I hope that you will consider printing an in-depth article about the outrageous situation in which the International Red Cross operates of the blackmail of Arab countries, and because of this, Israel is kept out of the Red Cross organization.

Even the Red Cross officials themselves agree that Israel fulfills nine of the ten criterion for admission. Fair minded citizens understand that Israel should not be forced to use the Christian cross or the Arab Red Crescent as its emblem. This issue weakens the International Red Cross movement, and many leaders around the world are beginning to question the humanitarianism, universality and brotherhood of the Red Cross movement.

Rabbi Rubin R. Dobkin
International Chaim, Operation Recognition

To The Editor:

As a monitor for the "socialist" European states more welfare than totalitarianism (Jan. 87): how about "social pluralism?"

The "social" in deference to their inspiration and perhaps (yet) their ideal: "socialism." The "pluralism" for recognition of how they've fallen, fortunately, short of their goal.

A very fine article, by the way, Mr. Guinard — as was the speech by Amb. Keyes Joseph A. Miller
Cleveland, OH

Security Affairs

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WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

NATAN SHARANSKY (Commenting on reports that the Soviet Union will allow emigration for a certain number of Jews in exchange for trade concessions from the West): "We must set up a program of graduated responses to ensure that this first step does not become a disaster, and that it will not be the last train out of Moscow." He added that he was concerned that Israel might make concessions on issues such as Soviet participation in the Middle East peace process, while the Soviet Union in exchange allows only 10,000 Jews to emigrate. Sharansky estimated that 400,000 Soviet Jews want to emigrate.

'ABD AL-RAHIM AHMAD (PLO Executive Committee member, following Shimon Peres' meeting with Palestinians in Israel): We have rejected such dialogue . . . because we believe the Israelis committed to the presence of Israel with all its racist, colonialist, and Zionist inclinations cannot be democratic. As a Palestinian I do not allow myself to trust a person who seized my home and land and who is living on my ruins. The place of the real progressive person who rejects oppression, racial discrimination and occupation should not be in the Israeli community.

HAIM HEZKOG (President of Israel, commenting on U.S.-Israel relations in the wake of the Pollard affair): No doubt relations are disturbed. If it had to happen, however, it is better that it happened now, not earlier. Now a special relationship has developed between the two countries. Earlier that relationship was based on emotions; today

it is based on strategy and self-interest. That is the most important basis. Therefore, I believe the incident is most regrettable, and the whole thing is a shame. I have the feeling, however, that eventually the strategic interests of the Americans — just as ours — will make an improvement in relations inevitable. We have had long years of intelligence cooperation. As a former intelligence chief, I assume that the balance will be to our advantage. In other words, it may turn out that we were more helpful to the United States than it was to us. In the long run, everyone has his own interests. It has caused damage now, but the pressure of events and daily needs will turn out to be stronger in the end.

GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN (USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command): We who wear a uniform in the U.S. can be very proud of our history. We opened the West, we built the railroads, we built the Mississippi River system. We built every port — we still run the ports. We control 600 lakes. But we've never asked for one ounce of political clout. We opened Wyoming as a territory, but no military man ever governed the territory or the state. That kind of military is important in the development of democracy.

The problem in Central America is that governments have traditionally had weak infrastructures. You'll find the military involved in everything.

I'm not sure we want to say because the military is strong and the infrastructure is weak, that we ought to weaken the military. We ought to bring

up the other through training and development.

I don't think we do enough of this in our economic assistance. I think we should do more.

THE HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK (Member of the JINSA Board of Advisors and former U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.): During the early years of the Reagan administration, the question of El Salvador dominated the Central American debate: Was the triumph of the FMLN guerrillas inevitable? Were they really Marxist-Leninist or only a broad front of indigenous revolutionaries? Were Salvadorians "ready" for democracy or were we and they forced to choose between murderous right- and left-wing groups? Would the traditional right permit Napoleon Duarte to win an honest election, to take power, to govern? Wasn't U.S. military aid to the government of El Salvador merely prolonging the killing? Shouldn't we shut off assistance and try even at this late date to develop a constructive relationship with the "revolutionary forces"?

The Senators and Congressmen who only a few years ago argued that the FMLN was invincible proclaim today

the "inevitable" defeat of Nicaragua's contras.

MUAMMAR KHADDAFI (Libyan strongman, speaking by satellite hook-up to a Geneva-based conference on terrorism): There is another tool which causes great fear to mankind, which comes after the nuclear bomb: the AIDS virus. I mention this virus because someone is responsible for it. This virus did not come from the jungle or from monkeys . . . the United States made this virus. U.S. intelligence conducted tests on germs with a view to using them in germ warfare and this virus emerged as a result.

The most notorious terrorists in the world now are the Yankees and the Israelis.

Most citizens of the states of the world suffer from the terrorism of their own governments. When the British people stage a demonstration, they are trampled under the feet of the horses of the police; boiling water is poured over them. This exists in several Western states. When citizens want to express their feelings in Western European states, they are terrified because they know these tools of terrorism will be used against them.

Navy

(Cont. from p. 1)

mind, and of the heart; a resistance of the spirit, which kept him healthy."

In the section labeled, "Programming", chaplains are provided with a complete book of services, *Liturgies on the Holocaust*. Produced by the Anne Frank Institute of Philadelphia, this volume contains prayers for Jewish, Catholic, or Protestant services, as well as material for interfaith or civic observances.

The "Education" section includes more than two hundred pages of readings from selections ranging from Elie Wiesel's *Night* to Simon and Garfunkel's "Sounds of Silence." Published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith under the title, "The Holocaust and Genocide: A Search for Conscience," this anthology of readings includes excerpts from World War II documents which help the student learn about the time. But through other readings — and questions in support of the readings — it raises universal issues of prejudice, hatred, discrimination, and the horrors of religion misused, and faith run wild.

Eight articles by Jewish and Christian ethicists and theologians make up the "Theology" section, a collection of writings provided for chaplains themselves — for individual study or group discussion. With these materials, chaplains may struggle with issues of faith posed by the Holocaust — and issues of conscience raised by the actions, and the failings, of organized religious groups during this period.

The final packet, currently being distributed to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands now served by Navy chaplains, is the product of more than five years of work.

Support from the Civilian Side

When the idea for such a packet was first discussed, civilian scholars were quick to agree that the idea was sound. Responding to the special link of the military as liberators to the memory of the Holocaust, scholar Yaffa Eliaich of Brooklyn's Holocaust Research Institute has noted that it was, in fact, the

military which first used the term, "Holocaust" to describe the Nazi horror. The word was used in an Army report sent to General Eisenhower, to describe the terror our soldiers confronted as the camps were first liberated.

Many civilian organizations lent their support. Rabbi David Lapp, Director of the JWB Jewish Chaplains Council (the JWB is the organization which supports the work of all Jewish Chaplains in the military) helped with materials. Dr. Dennis Klein of the International Center for Holocaust Studies (ADI), and Marcia Little, Director of the Anne Frank Institute of Philadelphia, immediately agreed to add their energies to the project.

It was the USHMC itself which helped emphasize that remembering the Holocaust enabled us to remember other horrors as well: other dreams of genocide; other attempts to deny duty, dignity — even humanity — to those we consider "other." Throughout the resource packet, this idea is affirmed: we remember the Holocaust as a specific event, but we draw lessons from it which must be applied in universal ways.

The distribution of this resource packet is one more step toward the time when the military as a whole will join the civilian sector in reaffirming our national commitment to remembrance. It is hoped that the Army and Air Force will soon produce materials for their services — or at least arrange for the distribution of the Navy's materials to their commands.

Remembering

The importance of remembering cannot be overemphasized. As the Navy's packet emphasizes, the time for remembering is now.

Admiral McNamara writes, in his introduction:

[At first] "silence may have been the only possible response — for there were no words which could be found to describe such indescribable events. . . . [Now] the time for silence has passed. May this workbook aid us all as we struggle together to speak."

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During the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Israel faced a life-threatening impasse: without military resupply from abroad, she could not defend herself against Arab nations. At the time her chief ally, the U.S., was critically short of readily available munitions. The resulting resupply effort left the U.S. itself dangerously short of urgently needed equipment.

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programs

"SECURITY AFFAIRS"—JINSA's newsletter, is sent to all members and other selected individuals and organizations around the world. This publication is so noteworthy that its articles have been reprinted in the Department of Defense's CURRENT NEWS and entered into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. SECURITY AFFAIRS has a history of reporting strategic developments months—and in some cases years—before the popular media.

As a member, you'll receive SECURITY AFFAIRS ten times each year.

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some "SECURITY AFFAIRS" firsts...

- Reported the PLO build-up of heavy weapons in Lebanon in 1981.
—Confirmed in June 1982
- Reported early PLO involvement with Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka.
—Confirmed by PLO officials in 1987
- Reported Libyan military training of South Pacific islanders in 1987.
—Australia closed Libyan embassy six months later citing Libyan subversion on the islands

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TRIPS TO ISRAEL—Every year JINSA sponsors a trip to Israel for eligible U.S. military officers and JINSA members. Because of the unique itineraries and the outstanding speakers that JINSA is able to obtain, all participants return to the U.S. with a deeper understanding of Israel's capabilities and needs.

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To be effective, JINSA must continue to grow. Each new JINSA member shows our government and military leaders that concern for America's security and a strong bond with Israel exists in the Jewish community. JINSA's programs provide important interaction with members of the U.S. military and is often the only opportunity for many of them to hear this particular message.

- Published the first story on government massacres in the Syrian city of Hama.
—Reached national news one year later
- Reported an agreement between the PLO and Salvadoran guerrillas.
—Became a national news story two years later
- Wrote of PLO involvement in Cuba and Nicaragua as well as El Salvador in 1983.
—Article received national attention throughout the summer and autumn
- Wrote of an impending crisis in Afghanistan and predicted Soviet involvement.
—The Soviet invasion occurred five months later



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NEWSBRIEFS

NO MEDIA FOR BRIGHT STAR: Egyptian officials cancelled media access to the Egyptian-American military exercises called Bright Star. The biannual event includes joint land, sea and air maneuvers by approximately 9,000 Americans and an equal number of Egyptians. Media coverage was cancelled by Egypt to avoid provoking Iran, which has called for retaliation against the U.S. and "its lackeys" for recent rioting in Saudi Arabia.

NO GLASNOST FOR AMERICA: Since the announcement of glasnost as an element of Soviet policy, the following statements about the U.S. have received prominence in Soviet media:

The Defense Department developed the AIDS virus;

The CIA was behind the 1978 suicide of 914 Americans at Jonestown, Guyana;

President Nixon was ousted by the Pentagon;

Indian Prime Minister Chandra's assassins received "ideological inspiration" from the CIA; and

Samantha Smith, the Maine schoolgirl who visited the Soviet Union and wrote to Soviet leaders about peace, was murdered by U.S. intelligence agents.

FRANCE SAYS NO: According to reports from Paris, France will not help to rebuild Iraq's nuclear reactor, destroyed by Israel in 1981. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac told Israel's Ambassador to Paris that the letter he sent to Saddam Hussein of Iraq concerned Iraqi payments for French arms shipments, and that he, Chirac, upon becoming PM had undertaken not to renew discussions about the reactor with Iraq.

(Cont. pg. 5)

The Soviet Air Force View of The Bekaa Valley Debacle

by Marshall Lee Miller

EA Note: Since 1982, and in particular on the fifth anniversary of Operation Peace for Galilee, numerous attempts have been made to determine "lessons" from the operation. The Soviets, no less than the Israelis, the Syrians and the Americans, have been reviewing the battles and the performance of their hardware. By using the available literature, Mr. Miller shows us some of the Soviet conclusions. This article appeared in the 21 July 1987 issue of the "Armed Forces Journal International," and is reprinted with permission.

Have you ever wondered what it would be like to be in the locker room of a football team that had just lost 80-0? If this team happened to be the farm club of the top team in the nation losing to the farm club of its chief rival, you could bet that there would be a blistering critique of what went wrong.

Well, that's what happened when the Israeli and Syrian air forces clashed over Lebanon's strategic Bekaa Valley in 1982. Israeli aircraft repeatedly penetrated a dense network of Soviet-made and -directed missile defenses and shot down over four-score Soviet-made Syrian aircraft without losing a single one of their own fighters in the dog-fights. This has got to have rung alarm bells in Moscow!

It's true that the Syrians were the farm team, not the major league. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Leonard Perotti, recently cautioned against underestimating Soviet



Col. Dubrov claimed in his article that there was little new in Israeli tactics. He asserted (wrongly) that air tactics today are little different from those during WWII.

weapons merely because the Syrians mishandled them: "The Syrians used mobile missiles in a fixed configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills because they didn't want to dig latrines — seriously." His conclusion may indeed be right, although I'm still puzzled why Syrians can't have bowel movements on the top of mountains.

Setting the Stage

Let's recall what happened in 1982. The civil disorder in Lebanon led to Palestinian shelling, the intervention of Syrian and other Arab "peacekeeping" troops, Israeli air strikes at terrorist strongholds, and the deployment of Soviet-made Syrian SA-5 surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon. Israel had warned that the SA-5s were intolerable, and finally launched a well-practiced surprise air attack on the Syrian air defenses. Within a few minutes virtually all of the 19 SA-5 batteries were destroyed. Syrian MiG-21s and MiG-23s rose to challenge the assault and fell victim to waiting Israeli fighters. Almost 40 Soviet-made Syrian planes were downed in the first two days, and over the next two months another 40 to 45 were shot down.

The Soviets were alarmed. They immediately dispatched a senior fact-finding mission to Syria headed by a senior general and followed with a visit to Damascus by the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshall N.V. Ogarkov. They also made a faltering effort to

stem adverse news reports of the clash, for third world arms customers and military commentators around the globe loudly speculated whether Soviet arms were grossly inferior to those of the West. The Russians first tried to attribute the Israeli success entirely to surprise attack, then claimed in the Red Army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* on July 18th that the Syrians had succeeded in shooting down a total of 67 Israeli F-15, F-16 and other fighters. Other articles gave graphic details about Syrian air victories that occurred only in the writers' imagination.

Reading the Russians

Nevertheless, our focus here is not on the real performance of either the Syrians or Soviet weaponry, but rather on the Russians' locker room analysis of the Bekaa debacle. Our peephole is a two-part series (September and October 1983) in the Soviet Union's leading aviation magazine, "Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika." Ironically, the author who had to explain the failure of the aerial game plan was the same officer, Col. V. Dubrov, who had exposed it in such detail a few years earlier.

That seven part series, entitled "How Aerial Combat has Changed" in "Aviatsiya" (March-September 1978), had discussed technological and tactical developments but essentially reiterated the Soviet doctrine of tight ground control of air operations that the Syrians tried to follow with such disastrous results.

(Cont. pg. 5)

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EDITORIALS

If The Tankers Are Ours

Shaykh Sa'ud al-Sabah, Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, made the following statements during an interview published in London in Arabic:

However, the decision to provide protection is a U.S. decision. Kuwaiti arrangements were nothing more than the reorganization of ships in the United States. The ships are now American. Protection is American, and the question of protection or response (in case of attack) concerns the U.S. alone. As for the question of how much (protection), it is being raised within U.S. circles. The U.S. administration must have laid down plans and measures to protect its warships. The important point now is that the ships are not Kuwaiti, and any measure to be taken would therefore be American and not Kuwaiti.

That being the case, we propose that the U.S. sell the reflagged tankers to the highest bidder and pocket the profits.

Let's Benefit from the Lavi

Cancelling the Lavi fighter program surely ranks as one of the most difficult decisions taken by the government of a democratic country. Emotional, economic and political factors came to weigh as heavily as security factors. In the end, even deciding to decide took political courage.

Now that the Israeli government has acted, the U.S. can and should help ensure that their decision will not be regretted later. There are mutually beneficial possibilities that merit serious exploration.

One is a role for Israel in producing a future advanced version of the U.S. F-16. Economies of scale are too small to warrant Israeli co-production of the very planes Israel plans to buy. Rather, the work might be a direct offset in which Israel produces a portion of the plane for all of the planes produced — as the Europeans presently do. Israeli experience with the present version of the F-16 has generated valuable information that surely will be incorporated into future models. Israel surely could produce some of those modified parts.

Another way to work with Israel's aircraft industry is to make use of Israel's specific expertise in developing a ground attack aircraft (that was to culminate in the Lavi). The Israeli Air Force had concluded that survivability of a tactical aircraft required a very maneuverable, high speed plane with a high degree of automation and integration of its flight control, weapon delivery, threat detection and electronic warfare systems. The Lavi has independently maneuverable canards closely coupled to its delta wing, a high thrust-to-weight ratio, low drag through internally stored fuel and advanced self-contained countermeasure equipment, all adding to survivability.

The West, not only the U.S., needs a new ground attack close-support plane. Sweden, France, and Great Britain — with their JAS-39 Gripes, Rafales and EAP (Experimental Aircraft Program) — and others have also recognized the survivability problems posed by the modern battlefield. The U.S. has concentrated exclusively, until very recently, on the ATF, a potential advanced air superiority fighter. The U.S. Tactical Air Force has been offered only crumbs, a reengineered A-7 and a more agile F-16. The A-7 has a 1960 airframe, and is an attempt at a quick solution to the A-10 obsolescence that probably solves nothing. The F-16 is a superb aircraft, but its agile version will not fare as well in the ground attack/close air support role as an aircraft specifically designed for this purpose. The U.S. is sponsoring some studies on new aircraft specifically designed for this role; however, these aircraft will not be available until the late 1990s at the earliest. And it is unclear that these aircraft will be much better than the Lavi.

Is this realistic? There is ample precedent. The F-16 has a successful multinational program with Norway, Belgium, Holland and Turkey participating. The U.S. can take the lead in developing an international ground support aircraft for tactical air forces of the West. In that context, the Lavi program has something to contribute, even if the plane as originally conceived is never produced.

Security Affairs

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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A New Definition of Chutzpah

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey met recently with officials in Vietnam to attempt to determine the fate of U.S. soldiers missing in action since the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, were meeting with us in an attempt to determine how far they would have to go to get U.S. aid.

Vietnamese arrogance should make it clear that we do not have much common ground. "For the last 12 years, we have handled humanitarian issues for the United States. I think now the United States must — has already made a start to — deal with the humanitarian issues of Vietnam," said their chief spokesman.

Vietnamese "handling" of humanitarian affairs includes their refusal to consider the fate of the children of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam, some of whom are now old enough to be drafted by Hanoi. They refused to allow Americans to determine the fate of MIAs until long after evidence of their location could be covered by the forces of nature in the jungles. To this day we have to rely on their "findings" of wreckage, dotted out to keep us interested in further "negotiations."

It is clear that Vietnam has a great need for American money, which — unrelated to anything they might call their own "humanitarian concerns." In their humanitarian desire to build a united Vietnam after 1975, they wrecked the once productive economy of the south: forced thousands of people into concentration camps euphemistically called "reeducation centers," some of whose inmates have been reeducated for over a decade; massacred thousands of others (a systematic attempt to determine how many people were killed after the fall of Saigon was conducted by researchers who reached shocking conclusions); created conditions whereby over a million Vietnamese fled the country in boats, braving the seas, the pirates and an indifferent world (with some notably generous exceptions, including Israel and the U.S.) to get out of the socialist workers' paradise created by the men in the black pajamas.

Vietnamese international humanitarian gestures include 75,000 soldiers in Cambodia, providing only marginally more effective government for the people than the Khmer Rouge, and an army that far exceeds the percentage of population at arms anywhere else on the Indochinese peninsula.

Perhaps if they freed the prisoners, unified the economy and returned their soldiers to productive enterprise inside their own borders, Vietnam would not be one of the poorest countries in the world.

Under no circumstances should we finance the continuation of their abhorrent policies, and it would be ghastly for the U.S. to ransom information about MIAs.

There Are Enough Weapons In The Gulf — Ours

The Administration should abandon its proposal to sell Saudi Arabia \$1 billion worth of new arms.

We continue to support U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia sufficient to ensure Saudi stability, balancing such sales with Israel's security against a combination of Arab threats. Saudi Arabia with a conservative monarchy suits American, Western and Israeli interests better than Saudi Arabia in the hands of religious fundamentalists or radical secularists. Saudi Arabia able to help defend the Gulf is better than Saudi Arabia unable to do so.

The Saudis are already supplied with American equipment. They are training, flying and shooting with American arms. Thus far, however, they are unable or unwilling to defend the smaller states that look to them for protection. The Saudis do not need more Western weapons to not use. They can just as well not use Soviet weapons.

The big guns in the region are American. For the time being, at least, the fate of the Saudi king is in our hands, and we will not (or should not) let him fall. Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and the Emirates will have to rely on the U.S. as well if the war spreads to their territory. That is not a happy thought for us, but that is the unspoken military responsibility we assumed when we went in there.

The Saudi problem is not lack of weapons. It is political. They have been attempting to appease Iran by allowing the price of oil to rise; by allowing Iranian "pilgrims" to demonstrate in Mecca (this was the third year Iranians had permission to have political demonstrations during the Haj and the Saudis had not expected it to get out of hand); by not taking military action in the Gulf; by not being overly close to the U.S.; by financing Iran's purchase of American weapons through the offices of Adnan Kashoggi. But appeasement won't work because the Iranians are driven by centuries-old religious rivalries.

The American position in the Gulf is complicated by the fact that we are NOT the driving factor either in the Iran-Iraq war or in the Sunni-Shiite confrontation — we are simply a convenient place for everyone to place blame. We cannot hope to improve the situation by dropping more weapons into Saudi Arabia as a cover for the lack of Gulf policy from which we, and the Saudis, suffer.

If the Saudis have begun to worry about their security in a practical way, there are steps they should take. One is to accede at last to overt operational cooperation with the U.S. Another is to suggest Kuwait and Bahrain do the same. All of the Gulf states claim to suffer now for their perceived association with the U.S. Without repaying the security benefits of a real association. Recognizing that not all cooperation has to be public, the time has come to work together to utilize American military strengths in the area, balance American shortcomings, and protect the states that want and need protection.

Safeguarding Technology: A Primer on What Must Be Done

by Dr. Stephen D. Bryen

Ed. Note: Dr. Bryen is Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy.

When I was asked six years ago to head an effort in the Pentagon to stop the Soviet Union from stealing technology from the Western industrial world, I had only a partial idea of just how far reaching and difficult the problem of diversion was. But it did not take me much time to learn, thanks to a French-run agent inside the Soviet Union who gave us information on the full scope of the Soviet program to acquire Western technology.

The Soviet Union needs technology from the West to assure the success of its military program which, despite huge investments, will not be able to compete with the West in the 1990's. This is the inevitable result of the Soviet Union's sterile economic system. New technology has not emerged in the USSR nor in any of the Warsaw Pact countries even though there is good science and a very large number of engineers compared to the West.

"A French-run agent inside the Soviet Union . . . gave us information on the full scope of the Soviet program to acquire Western technology . . . the (export control) list we use is the Soviet list!"

In order to upgrade existing weapons in the Soviet arsenal and introduce new systems the Soviets now either buy or steal manufacturing equipment, production lines, designs, scientific and engineering information, and hardware which meet their requirements. In addition, the Soviets have taken shortcuts that include direct copying of American and European weapons systems and subsystems.

Procurement Cycles

We need to keep in mind in pondering this important development that the procurement cycle in the United States and throughout NATO for a new system or for a major refurbishing of an older system is rarely less than seven years and usually between nine and twelve years. In addition, systems are not as frequently improved in the West because improvements are less economically attractive and politically popular than building new systems. On the other hand, more or less free from political and market-type economic problems, the Soviets capitalize on our long lead times to import or clone our technology in upgrading their systems. When we see this in the context of a very much larger Soviet military force and keep in mind that we are dealing with a nation whose international "responsibilities" are far smaller than ours, the Soviets have the possibility of enhancing their geostrategic aims provided their force structure is credible. (Having more than 80 of their jet fighters shot down in Lebanon by Israeli pilots flying U.S. aircraft is not a plus, nor is having a German student land a Cessna in Red Square.)

This is why the Soviets and their

Warsaw Pact allies have a far reaching program for technology acquisition. It ranges from employing the KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence) and their sister agencies in Eastern Europe to hiring shrewd businessmen in Western Europe and in the Far East. Literally thousands are out collecting against a shopping list whose main purpose is to reindustrialize the Soviet military-industrial infrastructure.

The List

Much has been said about our own American lists of embargoed items that are not to be sold to the Soviet Union or the other Warsaw Pact countries. For example, The Washington Post editorialized recently that the Pentagon "doggedly" pursues the idea of making the export control list longer rather than streamlining it which The Post and others would like so that American companies could sell more to the Soviet bloc. We in the Pentagon are targeted as the "bad guys" who are preventing a potential trade bonanza for American companies.

Of course I do not agree with The Washington Post. The list we use is the Soviet list! That is how we determine what needs to be controlled and how we gauge what is really important to Soviet military planners. It is an entirely inductive approach grounded in empirical reasoning — in this case Soviet reasoning.

And we think our way of doing things is working and can be made to work better.

The Program

Since 1981 when we started to restructure the program at the Pentagon we have managed to make the Soviet task of diverting technology much more difficult. We have resisted countless efforts by many well-meaning individuals who wanted to take our technology for some short-term political gain or who even, from time to time, wanted to throw some technology at the Soviet Union as a good will "gesture." Such gestures are terribly dangerous and tend to earn disdain, not respect. Most importantly, we have stopped the transfer from the United States and from many of the key NATO countries of the sale of turn-key facilities that could augment Soviet military capabilities.

The most impressive example of our program has been in the areas of microelectronics and computers where we emphasized the great importance both play in the long range ability of the Soviet military to compete in the 1990's. In 1981 we found that the Soviet Union had narrowed our lead in microelectronics to between one and two years. In computers they were about seven years behind us. And our information showed



Cooperation among Western countries is working to deny high technology to the Soviets. These computers were stopped by the Swedish and West German governments and returned to the U.S.

that if their acquisition program was not blunted in some way, they would soon equal us at least in those areas most pertinent to military competitiveness.

Clearly there are two different kinds of competitiveness. Commercial competitiveness exists almost entirely within the Western industrial community. Military competitiveness is world-wide. The technology base for both is overlapping and commercial developments are vital to military capability. But the cycles are markedly different because of the lead times associated with military hardware and due to radically different market conditions. Military purchases are made by nations and not by individuals — they take longer to make in most cases and there is far less of a market effect involved.

Because of the national security implications, military competitiveness is the key to an environment supportive of free trade and free enterprise.

Our objective to maintain America's military competitiveness might not succeed without limiting the Soviets in key areas. I can report, with some pride, that the Soviets have not progressed well in the computer area and may have lost ground rather than gained any since 1981. Our estimates show that they may be ten to fifteen years behind us now, thanks largely to our export control program. This means they will not be in a position to produce their missile defenses. Perhaps most important of all, they will have great difficulty achieving the reliability needed for modern weapons systems. Even more important than the increasingly high level of computer capability available thanks to higher density circuitry now being produced is the much higher reliability of computers due to dramatic improvements in manufacturing techniques.

The same can be said in the area of microelectronics where the Soviets seem to have failed to develop effectively in the third generation. For example, the USSR despite trying hard, has not manufactured any substantial number of chips equivalent to the micro-

processor in the IBM-type PC. This means they are eight or more years behind the West including small, but technologically aggressive, countries such as Korea, Singapore and Israel. Again this points to the success of our program.

Kongsberg & Toshiba

But there are some real failures too. The most unhappy of all was the discovery that grew out of work done, in part, in my organization in the Pentagon that two premier companies, one in Norway and one in Japan, had helped the Soviets to quiet their nuclear submarines and thus evade detection from our own naval forces.

This is a major defeat for NATO and has negative consequences for our naval programs. Billions of dollars will have to be spent to try and "fix" the problem, but we will never entirely regain the position we held.

The two companies involved were Toshiba of Japan and Kongsberg of Norway. Both are highly respected companies. Kongsberg is owned by the Government of Norway and has a long history as a weapons manufacturer. Toshiba is a multi-billion dollar corporation which has, as one of its subsidiaries, a machine-building company which manufactured at least eight highly specialized machines that were shipped to the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad so that special quiet propellers, that look a little like egg beaters, could be manufactured for Soviet submarines. Kongsberg built the computer equipment and did the software to run the Toshiba machines.

This affair is more than an accident. Premier companies do not conduct themselves this way unless they perceive an environment supporting such trade activities. What we see in this instance is two companies that believed they would not be interfered with by their governments and, in the case of Kongsberg might have had the impression that their government was actually backing them.

My reasoning is as follows. For at least
(Cont. pg. 4)

Let's Not "Write-Off" Nicaragua

by Jim Guirard, Jr.

Ed. Note: Mr. Guirard is a consultant in governmental affairs and a frequent contributor to "Security Affairs."

Recently, this writer pointed out the then-nameless policy of most congressional Democrats toward Nicaragua labeled "The Write-Off Doctrine" — since it would inevitably write off that country to the Soviet Empire. The name is gradually catching on, simply because it is true.

Some thought was given to naming this isolationist-pacifist policy after House Speaker Jim Wright: "The WRIGHT-Off Doctrine." But there was still hope that the Texas Democrat might desert the pseudo-liberal "left" wing of his party and join those seeking to liberate Nicaragua from Soviet and Cuban colonialism.

For a fleeting instant, Mr. Wright did seem to tilt away from his "write-off" colleagues. He even proposed — jointly with President Reagan, no less — a plan which, while seriously defective, placed at least some real pressure for reform on Nicaragua's "Stalinist" dictatorship.

But, almost immediately, the Speaker ruled his own plan out of order, in favor of the far weaker "Arias Plan 43." The designation #43 for this proposal by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias is, incidentally, the result of its having been twice rewritten to satisfy Nicaraguan and Cuban requirements — such as immediately ending U.S. aid to the freedom fighters but permitting unlimited Soviet and Cuban aid to the Stalinists.

So where does this leave President Reagan, who set aside his own liberation doctrine to accommodate Speaker Wright? In limbo, halfway between the now defunct Wright-Reagan plan and the retrograde Arias-Wright plan — endorsed now by none other than Fidel Castro!

Bluntly speaking, it leaves the President's famous "keester" fully exposed to those in Congress and in the media whose wishful thinking and whose appetite for surrender do, indeed, promise to abandon Nicaragua to Castroite tyranny.

But there is a way out. Now that the Speaker and his band of "Wright-wingers" (Reps. Bonior, Coelho, Alexander, et al.) have unilaterally abandoned Wright-Reagan, the President should do the same. Certainly he should not feel bound by any associated "agreements and understandings" — such as not to lambast congressional Democrats, not to vilify the Stalinists and not to seek more freedom-fighter aid before September 30 — when those to whom he had made such commitments have long ago jumped ship. Instead, the President must clear the cobwebs of appeasement and retreat from his mind and reactivate those powerful "doctrines" by which a long succession of American Presidents — and Congresses — have fought to keep European colonialism, and particularly communist colonialism, out of the Western hemisphere.

***MONROE DOCTRINE:** "...the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as

subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

***ROOSEVELT COROLLARY TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE:** "...the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

***TRUMAN DOCTRINE:** "...I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

***KENNEDY DOCTRINE:** "...Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

The Reagan version of these policies (all authored by "classical-liberal" Democrats) was at one time very clearly stated:

***"REAGAN DOCTRINE:"** "...we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives — on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua — to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth."

And, contrast these all with the doctrine of the Democratic party as expressed in H.J. Res. 175:

***"WRITE-OFF DOCTRINE:** would impose a never-ending "...moratorium on additional assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance until...the Congress has determined, by enacting a joint resolution, that the President has fully and adequately accounted for

(1) any proceeds from the sales to Iran of military equipment provided by the United States...regardless of whether the assistance was received by the resistance;

(2) the \$27 million that was appropriated (in 1985) for "humanitarian assistance"...and

(3) any assistance...regardless of whether the assistance was received by the resistance...that was encouraged by the Government or any officer or employee of the Government."

The highly-principled statement of the Reagan Doctrine was made when "Reagan was Reagan" — before certain "pragmatic" advisors led him away from himself and into the camp of those who speak incessantly of "peace" but who become highly uncooperative when they hear someone insisting on FREEDOM and LIBERTY as well.

Before his Presidential term is too far gone to permit his helping to liberate Nicaragua, Ronald Reagan must recognize what normally results from such "peace plans" as he is currently embracing and "welcoming." Almost without exception, they produce something more correctly spelled p-i-e-c-e — the tragic write-off of yet another piece of the planet and another piece of humanity to the Soviet Empire.



Halting the export of computers such as this has increased the U.S. lead in computer technology to 10-15 years.

Technology (Cont. from pg. 3)

ten years. The Government of Norway assisted Kongsberg in its effort to get Soviet contracts and to get approval for sales to the Soviet Union of products that fall under the embargo program. Such activity was, of course, entirely legal and above board. But when you realize that a major weapons manufacturing company involved in some of the West's most sensitive program including the F-16 fighter coproduction, was being encouraged to promote sales in the Soviet Union, it is no wonder that the company lost its common sense and went ahead with the sale of computers to the Baltic shipyard. Of course, Kongsberg did not tell this to the Norwegian government which, had it known about it, would have put a stop to it immediately.

But the people in charge of trade in Norway, including many who were hawking Kongsberg's products in Russia, are not involved in national security issues. Generally, they know little or nothing about weapons systems and probably never have been briefed on Soviet objectives in acquiring Western technology. So they only did what they were programmed to do — promote trade.

A similar condition prevailed in Japan in the same time period. Business is business and need not be complicated by national security issues. The list of controlled goods was merely a list. It need not be taken seriously where profits are involved.

Prevention

This was definitely not a question of the list being too long. This was, rather, a situation stimulated by the environment that existed in both countries. Where

governments do not lead their business community then the exigencies of the business community will lead the governments. And the result will be little or no regard for national security — only a demand for more and more trade with increasingly sensitive goods and technologies going to the Soviet Union.

One of the main tasks now facing the Government of Japan and the Government of Norway is to clean up the situation. Both are trying hard to do so.

But this is not enough. A great deal has to be done in the Western industrial community to assure that we can defend our free institutions.

We need better enforcement of the trade embargo system and more professional handling within governments on handling this issue. We need better enforcement against those who seek to divert our technology. We need common standards in effect throughout the Western industrialized world so that a crime in one country of this nature is a crime in all. Malefactors should be ostracized and should not be allowed to continue to operate in the business community of free countries. We need to establish the idea that there is a right to trade and that right can be withdrawn if a company or an individual choose to break the law. In particular we need to ban such companies and individuals from being allowed to buy or sell any goods to the government or to any government-owned entity if they violate the trade embargo and this ban should be reciprocal within the free world.

The Soviet challenge to our security through trade diversion where, I believe, we can make substantial progress on realizing this goal.

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Soviet Air Force (Cont. from pg. 1)

It is therefore particularly interesting what lessons Col. Dubrov draws from the Bekaa debacle, for his account is the most detailed description that most Soviet Air Force personnel will ever have of this epic clash between their frontline fighters and those of their imperialistic foes.

The series opens inauspiciously with the traditional propaganda ("The rapacious attack of the Israeli militarists on Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps in June 1982 seized the attention of all progressive mankind"), but thereafter the series is comparatively free of ideological bombast.

What He Said

Col. Dubrov then emphasized the following points:

- Israel used AWACS-type aircraft, the E-2C Hawkeye and a converted Boeing 707 jetliner, to provide tight radar coverage over the battle area and to direct the swarms of fighter aircraft.
- Israel's use of fighters not tied to escorting bombing aircraft, as in the Second World War, but arrayed in combat air patrols (COP or aviatsionny zashchita), helped them gain air supremacy.
- Remotely piloted vehicles (RPV, or bespilotny samolet razvedchik) played a crucial role for reconnaissance, laser target designation, decoying, and for "exhausting the opponents' air defense lines."
- Low flying Israeli fighter-bombers would then suppress these defenses with cluster bombs, precision guided weapons, and with the "Wolf" (Hebrew: Ze'ev) surface-to-surface missile with a 40 km range.

• The Israelis perfected a tactic of attacking from behind and head on, using advanced AIM-7 and AIM-9 American missiles, instead of needing the traditional tail chase. This all-aspect attack (vserakursnaya ataka) was a "new element in dogfighting tactics" and promised to be the wave of the future.

Col. Dubrov's account, when so cursorily summarized, might seem relatively straightforward. It is not.

What He Didn't Say

First, Col. Dubrov never hints that the radar, missile defense, and aircraft confronting the Israelis were all Soviet equipment. Instead, he concentrated entirely upon the Israeli tactics and their American weaponry. Of four photographs run with the articles, two were Israeli RPVs; the other two were American-made Israeli F-15 and a pair of Israeli Kfir fighters. No Soviet-made equipment is depicted.)

Second, he doesn't mention that the Soviet equipment came off second best in the ensuing air battles. That is, after all, the very reason the Bekaa episode is so relevant for us. To ignore this crucial fact is like describing the Titanic's maiden voyage without mentioning the iceberg.

Third, the Israelis' opponent — Syria — is not identified; rather, the articles imply that the battle involved the Lebanese armed forces, except for one vague reference to "combined Arab forces" located on Lebanese soil in accord with an agreement and the statement that Syrian air space wasn't violated.

Fourth, even if one presumes that somehow the above unmentioned facts were all known by the colonel's readers, it is unlikely in the secretive Soviet

society that they were aware of the lopsided score. That too is highly relevant to the conclusions we might make about the clash.

And fifth, Col. Dubrov goes to great lengths to claim there is little new in Israeli air tactics. He contends that they are basically the same as U.S. tactics in Vietnam, although that is not correct, and that air tactics today are little different from those used almost a half century ago.

All the basic theoretical and practical propositions of group maneuvering combat formulated in the period of the Second World War are well known. Each subsequent generation of fighters has added to and perfected these propositions, but the main ones remain unchanged. Searching for some sort of essentially new approaches in the way of training, in the opinion of experts, is a waste of time.

In short, Col. Dubrov is unwilling to admit the seriousness of the Syrian, and hence Russian, setback, even if this means that their military personnel might not be adequately prepared for opposition they will face in the future. Instead, he repeatedly stresses that nothing new was involved in the Bekaa episode which would necessitate changes in traditional Soviet military doctrine and tactics.

"The Russians, I believe, may identify not with the Syrian air combat strategy, but with the Israeli one."

This is an extraordinarily narrow military view that does nothing to explain the humiliating Syrian losses or to suggest how to avoid such a fate in the future. It also contains a number of significantly erroneous or misleading conclusions. The question is, are these merely errors of information or interpretation, or do they reflect something much more serious?

The Rand Corporation looked into this question for the U.S. Air Force and, in an excellent September 1984 study by Benjamin S. Lembrech, concluded:

Either the Soviets have failed to comprehend some of the major tactical lessons suggested by Israel's air combat results over Lebanon, or they are intentionally misrepresenting those results to their aviators for a variety of reasons that we can only guess at. Either interpretation offers ground for guarded encouragement among American fighter pilots.

A Caveat

Soviet journals, however, unlike ours, tend to be more reassuring that the leadership has matters well in hand, rather than to be gadflies in pointing out where doctrine or practice has proved wanting. After such a traumatic defeat of Soviet arms, reassurance was probably deemed preferable to shock and paralysis. Furthermore, this was only single game by a farm club with a string of losses, and arguably not an accurate reflection of what the big leagues would do with the same footballs and helmets. Although the Soviets can often be hidebound and inclined to self-deception, it would be a mistake to conclude from Col. Dubrov's articles that the Russian military leaders were too sclerotic to learn from the mistakes of their Arab protégés. In fact, they have



Israeli equipment and tactics were discussed. Soviet equipment and tactics were not.

learned a great deal from previous clashes in the Middle East and elsewhere.

1967, 1970 and 1973

From the 1967 war they noted the benefit of the surprise Israeli wave attacks on opposing air bases, which effectively won the Six Day War in the first hour. In 1970, in the War of Attrition on the Suez, they learned (though from the Egyptians) that surface-to-air missile batteries can compensate for the lack of skilled pilots in the defense of a low-density battlefield. From the 1973 Yom Kippur War the Russians discovered, however, that these missile batteries were vulnerable to ground raids, as shown by General Ariel Sharon's daring armor thrust across the Suez.

1982

Now, look at the likely lessons of the 1982 Lebanese air war. One reason for Israel's success was its almost perfect intelligence about Syrian airfields and operations. As soon as Syrian fighters moved to a take-off position, Israeli sources reported by radio to an offshore "talk bird" the type of plane and even the tail numbers of the opposing aircraft, which could then either be intercepted or targeted by long-range air-to-air missiles. Some of the Syrian losses in "dogfights" were hit almost before they retracted their landing gear.

The Russians also have realized their "Mos" and "Mainstay" AWACS-type aircraft, implicitly regarded in the West as a defensive weapon, nevertheless may be more valuable for the offensive. And while the Israelis would have won anyway, the Russians also could not have overlooked that "little" Israel had a substantial numerical superiority over "Goliath" Syria in most of the air battles, and that out of six Arab-Israeli conflicts, this was the third which began with an Israeli surprise attack.

Implications for the West

We in the West may have misread the lessons of the Bekaa even more than

Col. Dubrov, because of a crucial but erroneous assumption: We assume that because the Arabs use Soviet-made aircraft and generally follow their rigid air defense tactics, the Arab performance is a proxy for the Soviets. On the contrary, the Russians, I believe, may identify not with the Syrian air combat strategy but with the Israeli one.

Consider which side is more likely to utilize the lessons of the Bekaa. Is the Warsaw Pact, or NATO, more likely to have covert radio observers around enemy air bases, to launch overwhelming aerial wave attacks, to hit command and communications facilities with saboteurs and Spetsnaz troops, to thrust armored units directly against forward air bases, not to mention employing numerically superior forces and utilizing a surprise attack? Remember, NATO's Central Front has less than 200 dedicated interceptors ready for immediate employment; if their bases are hit with thickened sodium nerve gas and the phosphorus tar "Russian fire," by sabotage or by armor and artillery fire, how many sorties are these planes likely to make?

Even the oft-mentioned contrast between the Soviet's automation ground control system and the West's individualistic "top gun" dogfighters is now blurring. Israeli fighters were directed by flying command posts, albeit with less authority than Col. Dubrov suggests, and most of their kills were made not by cannon in swirling dogfights but by missiles at considerable range. Soviet pilots, moreover, are not all the leashed, undertrained robots which we have stereotyped them; approximately a third of each Russian fighter regiment is composed of "aerial snipers," older and more experienced pilots with flight time and skills equal to their hostish Western counterparts.

The Syrian and Russian setback in the Bekaa is comforting, as is the Soviets' failure to admit what went wrong, but the Russians may be able to apply those lessons better than we.

NEWSBRIEFS (Cont. from pg. 1)

SURPLUS ARMS AS AID: The Administration is offering the governments of Turkey, Greece and Portugal surplus U.S. military equipment as compensation for cuts in aid funds. Congress will need to approve the plan, which includes exporting tanks, aircraft engines, patrol vessels, heavy artillery and transport vehicles. A common practice for the Soviets and the Chinese, export of surplus equipment will be a new venture for the U.S.

COST OF THE PROPELLER BLADES: According to published reports, a classified Pentagon study estimates that developing new technology to re-establish America's edge in tracking Soviet submarines will cost at least \$3 billion over the next decade. The new technology is required because a Japanese and a Norwegian firm sold the Soviets the Western technology to make very quiet propeller blades.

MIG PILOTS: Intelligence reports indicate that a total of 60 Nicaraguan pilots and mechanics have received training in the operation and maintenance of MiG-21 jet aircraft. The pilots were initially trained in Bulgaria, but have been reassigned to the Cuban air base at San Julian. Nicaragua was to have received MiG-21s in 1984, however, owing to American objections, the planes were sent to Cuba instead.

RELATED: An unconfirmed report says Managua has already taken possession of Chinese manufactured MiGs, and is holding them in a secret installation.

PLO SUBS? According to Kuwaiti sources, the PLO is negotiating with the Peoples Republic of China and East bloc countries for small submarines. The sources say the subs will attack Israeli

coastal areas and may be used for suicide raids.

RELATED: The Peoples Republic of China has cancelled an agreement with Israel allowing Israelis to comprise 20% of tourists on organized American trips to China. PRC officials claim the announcement of the tourism agreement by an Israeli newspaper was the cause of suspending the grant of visas to Israelis.

RELATED: The PRC recently purchased Israeli medals stamped by the Israeli Government's Medals and Coins Company. The medals include those stamped for Independence Day, Jericho and Exodus.

JORDANIAN OFFICIALS IN ISRAEL: Senior-level Jordanian officials visiting the West Bank recently also went to Yafa to study the renovation of a mosque there. Several Arab countries, including Jordan, are taking part in the restoration. The officials also helped arrange the visits of Israeli Arabs to holy places in Saudi Arabia.

AND MIGS IN JORDAN? The authoritative Janes Defense Weekly reports that Jordan is negotiating with the Soviet Union for the purchase of the MiG-29, codenamed Fulcrum by NATO. If the sale goes through, it will mark the first time the Jordanian Air Force has had Soviet planes in its inventory.

AND ISRAELIS IN MOSCOW? According to Jerusalem Radio, an environmental education delegation from Israel will attend an international congress on the subject in Moscow. The congress will also be attended by representatives of Arab states.

NICARAGUAN TERROR THREATS: Nicaraguan President Ortega has announced that he will attack Puerto

Rican terrorist organizations as well as Haitians and Chileans. American counterterrorism experts point out that there is evidence that the Sandinistas have armed the Colombian M-19 terrorists who destroyed the Colombian Palace of Justice in 1985, and provided arms and training to the Americas Battalion terrorist coalition.

CHAD BOOTS FOR U.S.: According to Western diplomatic sources in Chad, U.S. representatives were able to obtain two Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopters left behind by Libyan troops in Chad. The Chadians themselves have captured material estimated to be worth over \$1 billion, including 132 tanks, 178 armored personnel carriers, 148 anti-aircraft pieces, 40 rocket launchers, 228 trucks and about 400 jeeps. They did it using French guns mounted on Toyota trucks.

RUSTY MARINES? A recent report indicates that only 4,400 Marine officers out of a total of 20,000 on active duty have been in combat only 172 of those since the Vietnam War ended 12 years ago.

FROM YUGOSLAVIA, WITH LOVE:

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

SHAYKH SA'D AL-'ABDALLAH al-SABAH, Prime Minister of Kuwait, responding to a question about why the U.S. was protecting Kuwaiti shipping in the Gulf. For the sake of cooperation between us and the state, we responded and we think that is the chartering some of their oil tankers.

"As to what benefit this would be, what is the meaning of friendship and cooperation among the states of the world? When we talk about friendship it should be translated into a tangible action. And this is what has happened."

JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN and Member of JINSA's Board of Advisors: "I would have no problem if the President had asserted at the time of the Bolland Amendment, 'We regard this prohibition to be unconstitutional.' Or with regard to the last extension of the requirement of prior notification of covert activities, if he had said, 'I regard this as unwarranted usurpation of Presidential authority and I will therefore not honor these requirements.'"

"He could then have sought to bring about a judicial test, as a conscious policy decision, for which the President took clear responsibility. I think that would have been appropriate, and, as a matter of fact, a very good thing to do."

BRENT SCOWCROFT, Former National Security Advisor, commenting on the Iran-Contra hearings: "One of my problems with these hearings is that they by and large have not focused on (the) constitutional issue. The committees are setting themselves up as an impartial judge of the executive branch instead of seeing themselves as part of the problem. They have focused on individual mistakes, not on the larger policy issues."

MOSHE ARENS, Israeli Minister Without Portfolio. "The Soviets arm Israel's most implacable enemies. Soviet military personnel have actually participated in military action against Israel. The Soviets have a hand in starting hostilities against Israel and Soviet leaders have in the past threatened Israel with nuclear attack. We have our own barom-

eter of what glasnost means, and that barometer is the situation of Soviet Jewry. If Soviet Jewry were allowed to come to Israel. That would be a sign of real change."

CASPAR WEINBERGER, U.S. Secretary of Defense. "Prior to the 1983 speech of the President announcing the launching and creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative, any suggestion of defenses against Soviet missiles was actually out of the box. There were a few scholars who wrote some obscure articles about the need for defense. One or two would point out that we did not have any defense."

"When we took a poll recently, we found that 60% of the people think we do have a defense against Soviet missiles. And we have none."

"Occasionally, an odd political figure would even have a kind word to say about civil defense or shelters. But really, there was simply no debate in America about strategic defense. There was no open dialogue about the long-term future of mutual vulnerability as a form of deterrence."

"One speech changed all that. It was probably, perhaps, one clear sentence in that speech that began our SDI program that compelled all of us to consider seriously the question of strategic defenses. Said the President, 'What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?'"

YOSSI BEILIN, Political Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, on the subject of alleged harassment of American Arabs entering Israel. "The U.S. demands a visa from every Israeli who arrives in the United States. We do not demand a visa from Americans who arrive in Israel. Consequently, when the Americans reach Israel, we only make those checks which the Americans themselves generally make before they grant a visa to anyone traveling to the United States."

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Introduction to JINSA

JINSA is a non-profit, non-partisan educational organization with a dual purpose: to inform the American Jewish community of the vital necessity of a strong U.S. defense posture for our security here at home and for Israel's safety; and to educate the American defense community about the key role Israel can and does play in preserving Western interests.

To these ends, we publish a monthly newsletter, "Security Affairs", and hold meetings and seminars around the country. We have had a series of intensive seminars at the Pentagon to meet with the highest echelon of our security establishment. Annually, we take retired American Flag Officers to Israel to spend time with the Israel Defense Forces and visit Israeli military industries. We hold a series of monthly luncheon meetings to keep abreast of current defense issues. In the past few months we have had speakers on the subject of terrorism, the invasion of Grenada and Central America.

Our 15,000 members represent broad political, economic and social strata, but share a serious and informed concern for U.S. security.

All of our activities are designed to increase awareness among our constituent groups of the relationship between the security of Israel and the security of the United States, and the things we can and must do to preserve that security.

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The Future of Israel's Naval Power

Ed. Note: *The Levi, Israel's new fighter aircraft, dominates discussions of Israel's future military capability. However, naval modernization is of increasing importance to military planners. In 1982, Israel entered into discussions with the Department of Defense about production of submarines and missile boats.*

To upgrade its naval capabilities, Israel plans to acquire four new missile corvettes and three diesel electric submarines. The American stake in the project, aside from financial assistance for Israel, is that Israel plans to have an American shipyard build the missile boats and oversee construction of the submarines in Israel and a European country, presumably Germany.

Among the problems that remain to be worked out are 1) whether the missile boats or the submarines are the most pressing requirement, and therefore built first, and 2) the method of payment for work done in Europe. The U.S. has suggested Israel arrange offset sales of goods and services, while Israel would prefer to have the U.S. pay a European company directly.

To provide some insight into the decision-making process, JINSA has requested the unclassified Executive Summary of the U.S. Government DOLPHIN/SAAR study. We present here excerpts of that study and a press conference given in Israel by U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim.

The Executive Summary

This report addresses the mission requirements, acquisition strategy, technology transfer implications and costs of the Israeli Navy's (IN) force modernization plans for the late 1980s and 1990s. The two primary elements of the IN's program are the procurement of four new LAHAV missile boats (SAAR V class) and three new diesel-electric submarines (DOLPHIN class). The program was initially proposed by the Government of Israel in 1982.

Recognizing that the potential cost of the entire program dictated reliance upon external military assistance, the Ministry of Defense of Israel (MOD/I) initiated a series of discussions with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) on all aspects of the program. This study represents a collaborative effort by staffs from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Navy, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council, under the overall direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources.

Although this report would not have been possible without the close ongoing cooperation of the IN and MOD/I, THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE THOSE OF THE PARTICIPATING U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ONLY (emphasis added).



In Operation Peace for Galilee, Israel made extensive use of her naval forces off the coast of Lebanon. The navy is vital to the protection of Israel's Western border — the sea.

The Program

THE SUMMARY: 1. The proposed IN modernization program is extremely ambitious in terms of the capabilities it seeks to add to the Israeli fleet, the Navy's proposed acquisition strategy, and the overall cost of the program relative to projected available Israeli and U.S. military assistance financing.

ZAKHEIM: The program, which essentially was suggested by the Israeli Navy under circumstances that appeared politically and technically, does appear to be a sensible program. Similarly, with respect to cost, I think we are all rather pleased that the cost estimates are as close to each other as they are. (Israeli estimate: \$1.25 billion. Pentagon estimate: \$1.35 billion.)

(A reporter asked whether the U.S. favored delaying submarine construction in favor of the surface ships.)

ZAKHEIM: The decision to build is Israel's decision. What we did was look at several factors. First, "Were all the details on the submarine so scintillating that it made sense to start (construction of the hulls) immediately?" Our answer was, "No, it didn't make sense."

There are (program planning) elements that have to get going early on. But, the construction could be delayed — we recommend that it be delayed from the point of view of a viable acquisition strategy, with a view to allowing the offset effort to generate some cash early on, and finally, for overall cashflow purposes.

The missile boat, we believe, could start earlier. If, as an example, the government of Israel was to decide to begin the entire program immediately, then a two-year slip in the submarine construction — not the program, but

the construction — would be warranted.

Threat Analysis

THE SUMMARY: 2. There is considerable uncertainty about the ability of Arab navies to operate and maintain their more numerous forces. The projected growth in the Arab threat to Israel renders the IN's desire for significant modernization understandable. Nevertheless, there appears to be a relatively more compelling requirement for surface ship modernization, while submarine construction could be delayed for about two years after the start of the surface ship program without any significant degradation of IN fleet capabilities.

ZAKHEIM: If one wants to do a program analysis properly, one begins with the mission and the threat. We were briefed by the Israeli Navy, and it was on the basis of that that we concluded the kind of acquisition strategy we are talking about.

We were sufficiently convinced that one couldn't wait ten years for a surface ship or fifteen years for a submarine. Had we disagreed in principle with the Israeli Navy's assessment of the relative threat... we wouldn't have gone to all the trouble of trying to figure out acquisition strategies.

As to reversing the submarine and surface ship program, in our view the surface ship program is a more immediate requirement... In addition, we believe that without a surface ship program, you will not have an American shipyard involved. Without an American shipyard you will not have any European interest in selling (Israel) submarines. (Cont. pg. 6)



The Levi, Israel's proposed new fighter plane, had its first test flight in January.

EDITORIALS

Reassurance, Not Offensive Threats

We understand the notifications of Middle Eastern arms sales that the Administration has sent to Congress at this time. Many countries question American reliability and sometimes are entitled to uneasiness. Furthermore, conservative Arab states have developed heightened security concerns as the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war becomes less predictable.

Nevertheless, the Administration should not compound its difficulties by reassuring friendly Arab countries in such a way as to make large-scale changes in the military balance between Israel and Arab countries which will not even enter peace negotiations.

Specifically, JINSA has no objection to Bahrain having F-16s or Saudi Arabia having Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Both can be understood in the context of regional defense for Gulf States against the possibility of an Iranian attack. On the other hand, making the presently-cement-based HAWK missiles in Jordan mobile — as had been proposed — is not stabilizing.

When the Administration proposed selling Jordan mobile HAWKS last year, it was clear that mobile HAWKS are not required for the defense of Jordan and do pose as an offensive threat to Israel. The military situation has not changed, nor has King Hussein made overtures toward Israel that materially change the political situation. The upgrade has been postponed, but it surely will arise again.

We oppose, too, the sale of electronic warfare upgrades to Saudi Arabia on the grounds that they can be used as part of an offensive threat against Israel and are not needed against Iran.

The overlap of interest between Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Iran-Iraq war, and the arrangements between Israel and Jordan for improving life on the West Bank, are important. Those trends can and should be strengthened politically, not by sales of arms that endanger Israel.

Furthermore, the consensus among conservative Arab leaders appears to be that their chief fear is instability that could threaten their regimes. It might be a spillover from the Iran-Iraq war, or it might be the sort of domestic turmoil that arises from poor economic circumstances. Certain arms sales address only the first cause of tension. Yet across the region, Arab economies range from bad to awful and unnecessary arms purchases exacerbate the economic problems of the region.

Egypt's problems are well known. In Jordan, King Hussein has raised economic expectations on the East and West Banks with his five-year multi-billion-dollar development program. At the same time Jordan fears an influx of oil field workers returning from the Gulf who find no available jobs. Kuwait fears that laid off oil field workers WON'T return home, but will remain in Kuwait and cause trouble. Other Gulf states face the same problem.

Radical Arab states face even greater economic difficulties. Syria is bankrupt. The only thing that saves it is that the Soviets have not called in their \$15 billion debt.

The Iran arms sale should not be construed as a shift in American policy. It is something between a mistake and a crude attempt at an establish dialogue. Conservative Arab states should not feel "betrayed" by U.S. "duplicitous," which is the tone of some of their rhetoric.

The U.S. government has not concluded that the Iranian model is the "wave of the future" for the Gulf region. We tried to save the Shah and failed. Our present overture to Iran is an attempt at dialogue and stabilization in the region, not an attempt to undercut our Arab friends by arming their adversary. The U.S. government must be clear on this point, because conservative Arab states have already begun posturing in order to make the U.S. more forthcoming with "reassurance" (i.e., military and economic aid). Some of their concerns are real, some are less than compelling. The U.S. will have to make delicate distinctions to support friendly Arab countries without threatening Israel.

Security Affairs

JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Ed. Note: We are pleased to share the opinions of our readers, and encourage you to comment on articles in "Security Affairs" or items you believe would be of interest to JINSA members. The Editors reserve the option of shortening letters for space considerations.

To The Editor:

All of us in the USO family appreciate your review of our efforts to promote American-Israeli cooperation through our Haifa fleet operation.

As you have so ably stated, Haifa has become a key port-of-call for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. No one can pick up a newspaper or turn on the television without knowing how critical the peacekeeping role of the Fleet is, especially in the Mediterranean.

Being on hand to provide support, and ease the tension and stress for those who serve our defense, is what USO is all about. We have had a special role for 46 years as the unofficial-but-effective link between American military and civilian communities wherever we operate.

The USOs around the world can only continue to do their good work, however, with the help and support of private citizens and organizations everywhere. Our services are increasingly mobile, increasingly complex... and naturally there is price tag attached. USO literally has its own army of volunteers — the tremendous cooperation and reception USO has received since we opened our operation in Haifa is just one example.

We hope that your readers will remember what they have learned about USO — perhaps recall some of their own experiences — and translate that into the support that USO needs to continue building and expanding its activities. The relationship between the U.S. and Israel has always been a unique one, and in these times of increasing danger to uniformed service people in both nations, USO must work harder than ever to be a bridge of understanding.

I personally would be delighted to send readers information about how you can help USO. Just drop me a note at USO Headquarters, 601 Indiana Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20004.

Gen. George S. Blanchard, USA (Ret.)
President

To The Editor:

I have been enjoying and learning from "Security Affairs" for a couple of years. JINSA's role in promoting American and Israeli security is an important one. While usually hitting a bulls-eye with your articles and editorials, I have noticed a minor, yet consistent sloppiness with some writing that is inconsistent with such a serious periodical.

Examples: the phrase "or inability" (to assist the U.S. in securing the release of hostages, referring to Syria's position in Lebanon) is inappropriate. "Complicity in taking hostages" is what you mean. Also referring to the U.N. vote to condemn the U.S. for the liberation of Grenada, Israel and El Salvador: "were the only two who voted with the U.S. in the U.N." What? Was that in the Security Council? No, Israel does not belong, but about half a dozen Caribbean U.N. member island-nations joined us in Grenada's liberation and must have voted with us in the U.N.

These are small points, but do nonetheless tarnish somewhat the dignity you deserve. Please try to improve the already excellent job you are doing. I especially appreciate the reports on Israel's technological advances, such as the Lavi.

Steve Falk
St. Paul, MN

Ed. Note: Thank you. Certainly there is Syrian complicity in the disintegration of Lebanon by allowing terrorist groups to operate freely in Syrian-controlled zones. On the U.N. vote, we stand corrected. Eight other countries voted with the U.S., including six Caribbean states. Israel and El Salvador were the only non-Caribbean countries to join the U.S.

To The Editor:

(In reference to the article "A Report Card" by Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Dec/Jan Re: the Pollard Case...) "Israel has continued to commit itself that activities of this kind in and against the U.S. are absolutely ruled out by our friendship?" Israel and the U.S. had an agreement by which each was to SHARE with the other information of vital interest to the other. The U.S. violated this agreement and Israel obtained the information to which it was entitled. Where in this was there activity AGAINST THE U.S.?

(And) why are these unnamed "observers" in Israel that view production of the Lavi as a "major economic and military mistake"? I can understand U.S. "observers" thinking so, for the Lavi is a much better plane than anything produced by the U.S. and would undercut sale of these U.S. planes by the U.S. Why should there be "alternatives" to the Lavi... if the U.S. was so interested in Israel's welfare? Nothing bought from the U.S. would be as effective and certainly nothing as inexpensive.

B. Brodsky
New York

New Technology and Biological Warfare

by Douglas J. Feith

Ed. Note: Mr. Feith is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy. He left the Pentagon in 1986 to open the law firm of Feith and Zek, P.C.

Mr. Feith notes that biological agents (i.e., live organisms) and toxins (i.e., toxic chemicals produced by live organisms) are similar in essential respects, and they will be referred to collectively as BW.

The stunning advances over the last five to ten years in the field of biotechnology — the advances that have brought into common parlance such terms as genetic engineering, recombinant DNA techniques, monoclonal antibodies and Nutrasweet — mean more than new foods, pharmaceuticals and fertilizers. They mean new and better biological weapons for any country willing to violate what the U.S. government still insists is an international norm against the possession of such weapons. New technology has exploded the standard ideas about BW that prevailed 10 or more years ago.

The Old Conventional Wisdom

Those old ideas can easily be summarized. BW was thought to be a small problem solved. It was thought: smart because BW was judged militarily in-

The technology that makes possible "designer drugs" also makes possible designer Biological Weapons. It is possible to synthesize BW agents tailored to military specifications.

significant or, at most, of highly restricted utility. Agents best suited for military use — those, for example, like snail or shellfish toxins, which disseminate well in effective concentrations and work quickly and somewhat controllably — could not be produced affordably in large quantities. Those that could efficiently be produced worked in general less quickly and spread infectious disease, with large attendant risk to the attacker as well as the target. BW was deemed a strategic weapon and, from a military point of view, far inferior to other — that is, nuclear — strategic weapons.

Lessening further BW's value was the difficulty of safely storing filled munitions or bulk agent. The dangers of BW storage were made graphic in 1979 when a leak or explosion at a Soviet BW facility in Sverdlovsk caused the release of large quantities of anthrax spores, resulting in many deaths. (The official Soviet explanation has been that the victims died from eating contaminated meat. This, however, does not jibe with the evidence. For example, the military took charge of the cleanup operations, which were the kind required for decontaminating surfaces coated by an infectious aerosol; moreover, the symptoms of many victims indicated pulmonary anthrax, which results from inhaling, not eating.)

The BW problem was thought solved because over a hundred states, including the major powers, have subscribed to the Biological and Toxin Weapons



The Soviets could inoculate their troops against their own BW agents, and avoid large-scale cleaning operations such as this.

Convention of 1972 (BWC), which makes it illegal to "develop, produce, acquire or otherwise acquire or retain" or transfer biological or toxin agents or weapons. This prohibition, it should be noted, does not extend to very small quantities of agent, possession of which is necessary for "prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes." It was obvious that a ban on tiny quantities could not be policed effectively, and, in any event, substantial stockpiles of agent were believed to be a prerequisite for an offensive BW capability.

The BWC came into being three years after the Nixon administration unilaterally destroyed all U.S. BW stocks, renounced future acquisition of BW and terminated the U.S. BW program, sparing only the facilities for BW defense. This unilateral U.S. action reflected the judgment that BW lacked military usefulness. Under the circumstances, it was not considered necessary that the treaty afford the parties any means of ascertaining each other's compliance. Accordingly, the BWC included no verification provisions. The U.S. government reasoned that it had already renounced BW unilaterally, so there could be no harm in signing an unverifiable ban.

Bio-Engineered BW

The BW picture has been radically altered by recent scientific developments. It is now possible to synthesize BW agents tailored to military specifications. The technology that makes possible so-called "designer drugs" also makes possible designer BW. States unconstrained by their treaty obligations can now produce BW agents of varying effects — different types of fast-acting incapacitants as well as lethal substances. Agents can be developed for various climatic conditions. They can be mixed to complicate identification, and their chemical structure can easily be altered to circumvent immunogens or antigens that the other side is suspected to possess.

The BW field favors offense over defense. It is a technologically simple matter to produce new agents but a problem to develop antidotes. New agents can be produced in hours, anti-

dotes may take years. To gauge the magnitude of the antidote problem, consider the many years and millions of dollars that have thus far been invested, as yet without success, in developing a means of countering a single biological agent outside the BW field — the AIDS virus. Such an investment far surpasses the resources available for BW defense work.

New technology can yield BW agents against which a state could immunize its own forces. A state could, therefore, employ BW without having to require all its own troops in the area to don cumbersome protective clothing. This would enhance BW's military advantage over chemical weapons, such as nerve agent, against which no reliable prophylaxis is available.

Yellow Rain

It has been hoped that the risk of exposure would help deter BW use, for such exposure might trigger special, undesirable consequences, which, depending on circumstances, could range from the international community's condemnation and possibly sanctions to nuclear retaliation. New technology, however, makes it easier to develop BW agents that would defy identification after use. Their effects can be symptoms of endemic diseases. If it cannot clearly be demonstrated that BW has been used — if, for example, the effects of the attack are attributable to natural causes — the risks of BW use diminish. And this concern is not just hypothetical.

Evidence of many types and from a variety of sources has established that the Soviets and their clients have, in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, used mycotoxin weapons banned by the BWC. That mycotoxins occasionally occur in nature in certain colder areas has, however, clouded the picture and made it easy for states to refuse to come to the unpleasant conclusion that BW has been used and something should be done about it. One must suppose the Soviets have drawn appropriate lessons from the heated controversy in the West about the natural occurrence theory of Yellow Rain. They can hardly have failed to observe that, at least in part because of that controversy, the

costs of BW use have proven altogether manageable, indeed virtually nonexistent.

Easy, Fast and Clean

Bio-engineered substances are now produced around the world in large quantities by various commercial ventures. The production equipment, though newly invented, is not very "high tech." The equipment can be housed in a standard industrial or manufacturing facility that offers no distinctive sign of the kind of production activity occurring within.

An example: Recent discoveries in mammalian cell culture make possible the growth of mammalian cells on the surface of minute beads, rather than on the inner surface of roller bottles. The beads provide the ideal environment for the growth of viruses. One small bottle partially filled with beads can now yield quantities of product that previously would have required much larger production facilities. This single technical advance has effectively erased the distinction between a biological agent

The Soviets have drawn appropriate lessons from the controversy in the West about Yellow Rain.

production plant and an ordinary-looking small scientific laboratory.

The new type of biological production equipment works fast. Substances suitable for BW use can be synthesized within hours — a day or two at most. Seed stock of BW agent — that is, test tube quantities — can be fermented into large production quantities in three or four weeks. After a production run, the equipment, operating more or less as self-cleaning ovens do, destroys within an hour or two whatever residue there is, thereby preventing contamination of the next production run and, incidentally, making it impossible for anyone to prove that a given substance has been produced.

The Soviet BW Program

The Soviet Union evidently appreciates the military opportunities created by the biotechnological revolution of recent years. Though U.S. policy re-

mains what it was in 1969 after President Nixon's unilateral renunciation of BW (and there is no thought within the administration to change the policy), the Soviet Union has built a large organization devoted to the development and production of offensive BW. At the very time when Soviet officials were negotiating and signing the BWC, a high-ranking Soviet defector has reported, the Politburo decided to intensify the Soviet BW program.

The Soviets retain stockpiles of BW agent produced in prerecombinant DNA days. At known biological warfare facilities in the Soviet Union, they

are designed to be effective across the spectrum of combat, including special operations and engagements at the tactical level. No field equipment has yet been developed that can detect BW agents, let alone identify them. There are no antidotes now available against many possible agents. And it is not certain that our troops' protective gear would be effective against all such agents.

The Limits of Arms Control

As for the arms control implications, these divide into two categories. The first can be labeled "crime and non-

To gauge the magnitude of the antidote problem, consider the many years and millions of dollars invested, as yet without success, in countering a single biological agent — the AIDS virus.

maintain highly-secured weapons storage facilities under military control. They have, as alluded to above, transferred BW to their clinics in Southeast Asia. They have themselves used toxins against their enemies in the Afghanistan war. And they are developing new means of biological warfare based on current bio-engineering technologies. In other words, the Soviet Union has not only violated the BWC, but every major prohibition in it.

The scale and seriousness of the Soviet BW program are formidable. There are at least seven biological warfare centers in the USSR under military control, all with unusually rigorous security. One such facility constitutes a veritable city with a large number of residents who work and live there full time, isolated from the rest of society. These residents must possess extraordinary security clearances, a requirement that excludes individuals or ethnic groups considered disloyal. The level of effort committed to research on various natural poisons — such as snake venoms — is far in excess of what could be justified to deal with such substances for purely medical or public health purposes.

Versatile BW

All of this, of course, has implications for both the military and the arms control aspects of the BW problem. The prevailing judgment of years ago that BW is not a militarily significant weapon is now quite unsustainable. BW can

punishment," the second "technology overtakes the treaty."

The systematic violations of the BWC by the Soviet Union and its clients undermine the treaty and the anti-BW norm it symbolizes. At least equally grave, however, is the international community's unwillingness to take a collective interest in the evidence of these violations. A treaty may survive breaches by some parties. But can it long survive general indifference as to whether it is violated?

What is unwholesome, I wish to emphasize, is not the failure of many BWC parties to endorse the U.S. government's conclusions about Soviet violations, but their refusal even to inquire into them or urge formal investigation. Some states explain their inaction by asserting that the U.S. government's case is not conclusive. Reasoning like Lewis Carroll's *Queen of Hearts*, they contend, in effect, that treaty parties have no responsibility to investigate charges of violations until the allegations are proved.

Many states, after dismissing violation controversies as mere "politics between the superpowers," feel justified in exhorting the U.S. government to conclude new arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. They claim standing on the grounds that they, as members of the international community, are affected by the quality of relations between the powers. They do not, in general, take this stand cynically, wryly acknowledging its irony. On the



contrary, they earnestly assert their responsibility for promoting new arms control treaties and equally earnestly assert, once a treaty has been signed, the propriety of their not heeding Soviet violations. Their earnestness notwithstanding, however, they have dimmed severely the prospects for arms control agreements ever contributing to international security.

The major arms control implication of the new biotechnology is that the BWC must be recognized as critically deficient and unfixable. A state contemptuous of international law and unconstrained by anti-BW public or parliamentary opinion could now maintain an offensive BW capability without violating any of the specific prohibitions of the BWC. (Maintaining such a capability would necessarily violate the BWC's general prohibition; the treaty's pur-

pose, after all, is to ban BW. But if a state refrains from stockpiling large quantities of agent, it would, as a practical matter, be impossible to prove any such violation.)

Given the ability to produce militarily significant quantities of BW from seed stock within a month or so, it is not necessary to stockpile agent. Such a state need only maintain in a freezer a few hundred test tubes full of seed stock and a production facility which, in the normal course of things, makes agricultural or medical products. In the unlikely event the freezer was discovered, a closed society would have little difficulty characterizing it as part of a research effort for BW defense. In fact, because seed stock can be synthesized in a matter of days, one could get by even without the freezer.

As for the rest of the infrastructure required for BW capability — such as munitions-filling equipment, aerosolization and dissemination testing, and training — it could be maintained openly. It is essentially identical to the infrastructure entailed in a chemical weapons capability.

While it is in no way excuses or belittles the importance of the Soviet Union's BWC violations, the fact is that their compliance with the treaty's specific prohibitions would not obviate concern about their BW capabilities. Because new technology makes possible a massive and rapid breakout, the treaty constitutes an insignificant impediment at best. Its principal failing, therefore, is no longer the absence of verification provisions or lack of effective complaint mechanisms, the commonly acknowledged shortcomings, but its inability to accomplish its purpose — to ensure that even states respecting its specific terms pose no BW threat.

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NEWSBRIEFS

VANUATU, KIRIBATI AND NEW CALEDONIA: In 1985, the tiny Pacific island of Kiribati signed a "fishing rights agreement" with the Soviet Union, thereby increasing the Soviets' mobility in the region. The agreement lapsed after the first year. This year, Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) signed a similar pact with the Soviets. The USSR will pay \$1.5 million for the right to have eight vessels fish in Vanuatu's 200-mile economic zone and stop in the islands for food, fuel and other supplies.

MEANWHILE: 1,500 New Caledonians forced a ship carrying the Soviet ambassador to Australia to leave the French territory without letting off its passengers. Protesters wrote "Russians out of the Pacific" on the ship's hull. The ambassador, Yevgeny Samoteyko, was the Soviet signer on the Vanuatu "fishing rights" agreement.

ISRAEL EMBASSY IN S. KOREA?: According to Israeli sources, Israel is making a concerted effort to reopen its Embassy in Seoul, S. Korea. The South Korean government to date has refused all overtures from Israel, leading Israel to ask the U.S. for assistance in the matter. The Embassy was closed in 1979 as a budget-cutting measure. South Korea, which has extensive ties with Arab states, has never had an Embassy in Israel.

HANIYE'S PLO CONNECTION: Israeli leftists had adopted A. Shalev editor Akram Haniye as a cause célèbre, claiming his deportation from Israel was the result of his politics. One of his lawyers claimed, "he isn't accused of being a terrorist, either directly or indirectly" but was being deported "because of his opinions." However, Israeli security agents submitted over 300 pages of material to the Israeli Supreme Court documenting Haniye's links to PLO terror. Haniye withdrew his appeal and agreed to be deported. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin described Haniye as being in regular contact with Abu Jihad, transferring funds from PLO headquarters in Jordan to terrorist cells in Judea and Samaria, and tied to terror squads which had carried out a number of killings.

JORDAN-ISRAEL LINKS CONTINUE: Jerusalem radio in Arabic reported that Jordanian-Israeli talks have been conducted on the issue of a free market, including a hotel and airport, near Jericho parallel to the border with Jordan. Israel presented the \$3 million project through Jericho's military governor to its mayor who conveyed it to Jordan and arranged the appropriate meeting. Israeli authorities suggested leasing the project to the municipality for 10 years. The Jordanian government agreed in principle to financing the project.

RELATED: A Tel Aviv daily adds that Egypt's President Mubarak objected to direct Jordanian-Israeli meetings. Citing Jordanian sources, the Israeli paper writes that Mubarak had personally promised PLO leadership

that he would prevent separate political talks between Jordan and Israel. Egypt considers an international conference the only proper venue for such talks. Jordan, however, has made it clear that "it is a very old Hasbami policy to occasionally hold clarification meetings with the Israeli leadership."

REPORTING ON THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT: Moroccan newspapers reported that the Moroccan delegation to the OIC had submitted a videotape to the summit proving "collusion" between Syria and Israel. The tapes were reported to give insight into alleged contacts between Rifat Assad and Ariel Sharon. The Rabat daily *L'Opinion* said the action was the result of "virulent polemics" between the Syrians on one side and the Egyptians, Moroccans and Palestinians on the other over the PLO, Egyptian-Israeli relations, and last year's meeting at Ifrane, Morocco between King Hassan II and Shimon Peres. "The tone and the remarks sometimes exceeded the limits of protocol," the newspaper said, "and the Syrian was heard calling his Egyptian opposite number a prostitute."

IN WHOM DO WE TRUST? For many years, the number one answer for Americans was the clergy. In 1986, however according to both the Harris and Gallup polling organizations, the clergy has fallen considerably. The chief institutional repository of American public trust at the end of 1986 was "the leaders of the military," outpacing leaders in medicine, universities, the Supreme Court and religion.

AND WHAT THEY ARE TELLING US: According to the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, troops there are short of the spare parts and ammunition needed to fight for a prolonged period. "Even though impressive gains have been realized in the past few years, staying power remains a serious conventional war-fighting concern," said Adm. Ronald J. Hays in Congressional testimony.

Figures provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee show that requests for ammunition and spare parts have been reduced by the Pentagon from the original requests of the services and then cut again by Congress. For example, spending for spare parts for the Navy totals \$2.14 billion, a reduction of 27% from the service's original request, and the ammunition and missile budget is \$3.5 billion, a 32% cut from the original request.

ARMS EXPORTS: According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in 1985 the Soviet Union was the number one arms exporter with 28.4% of all weapons exports from 1981 through 1984. The U.S. was second with 24.6%, followed by France with 10.7%, Great Britain with 5.2%, West Germany with 4.3% and Italy at 2.9%.

RELATED: Soviet MIG-29 Fulcrum aircraft are now being delivered to

Saddam Hussein of Iraq, reports a defense newspaper quoting administration sources. The Soviets delivered "about a squadron" of 20 planes, although it is not clear whether this is part of a larger order. The administration sources believed this to be an attempt by the Soviets to reenter the Middle East arms market, which increasingly is dominated by Great Britain and France. It may also be related to attempts by the Soviets to convince Middle East countries of the benefit of security relations with Moscow.

TECH-TRADER IN COURT: Werner Bruchhausen, a West German businessman, sent \$6 million worth of high technology and military equipment to the Soviet Union, according to prosecutors in U.S. Federal Court. Assistant U.S. Attorney William Fahey said Bruchhausen set up an elaborate scheme in 1978 to smuggle equipment out of the country and avoid detection. Moscow "desperately wanted" the technology and was willing to pay up to 10 times the value of the equipment, according to Fahey.

SOVIETS STOP JAMMING: The BBC has announced that after more than six years, the Soviet Union has stopped jamming the BBC's Russian language broadcasts. No reason was given. A BBC official welcomed the cessation of jamming and said he hoped it would be extended to the BBC's Polish language transmissions.

HOAX AT DUBAI: The Consulate General of Israel provides this report. A letter dispatch claimed Dubai, Nov. 18, 1986, reports on the 27th Chess Olympiad held there and on the presence at the meet of a "Palestinian team," led by one Emad Ghalyani. The dispatch says that Ghalyani:

"calls the Palestinian body the 'new and old' federation — it was the first Arab nation to join the International Chess Federation (FIDE) and competed in the 1935 and 1939 Olympiads."

A Palestinian chess team half a century ago? Certainly.

The names of the players who competed in the 1935 and 1939 Olympiads on behalf of that "Arab nation" were Moshe Czerniak, Joseph Porat, Zalman Kleinstein, David Enoch and Joseph Dobkin — all Jewish Palestinians. Which simply proves once again (courtesy of Mr. Emad Ghalyani, the Arab Palestinian) that Arab claim can no monopoly on the concepts of "Palestine" and "Palestinian."

AND ANOTHER HOAX?: Recently, the International Committee on the Red Cross decided to join with the Moslem Red Crescent and change its name to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent. The outright rejection of Israel's Red Star of David (Mogen David) was condemned in Israeli and Jewish press as a deliberate and blatantly hostile act of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli discrimination. A different perspective comes from Holocaust sur-

vivor Alfred Lipson. Lipson wrote recently:

"The Israelis have shown a certain ignorance and naive about the historical character of the Red Cross. They had assumed it is, as its literature states, dedicated to impartial global efforts to relieve suffering and tragedy. Neither the Israelis nor the American Jewish community ever openly challenged this myth. A perfunctory study of the Red Cross record during the Holocaust will prove that this organization was far from impartial or disinterested when Jewish victims were concerned."

"As a survivor of the Dachau concentration camp, I cannot help but recall the agony of the starved Jewish prisoners who witnessed the distribution, at regular intervals, of lifesaving Red Cross food parcels to all camp inmates except Jews. We were told that the Red Cross followed German orders to exclude Jews as recipients."

"In response to numerous agonizing appeals by rescue groups and Jewish leaders for the Red Cross to visit the known extermination sites or to grant the Jews in death camps the protected status of civilian internees, the organization's stock explanation was that the Nazi treatment of Jews constituted 'a German internal matter.'"

"A delegation of the IRC did go to Auschwitz in August 1944 — the peak weeks when 20,000 Jews were gassed daily. But the delegates only visited the Kommandant in his private quarters and did not speak to a single inmate. At one point, when the Red Cross staff encountered a train transport of Jews, they reportedly put on gloves and held their noses."

Mr. Lipson is a research associate at the Holocaust Resource Center and Archives at Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York.

WORLD CONFLICTS: An independent analytical group provides a partial list of ongoing conflicts:

Active wars: Afghan mujahidin against the Soviets; Angola against UNITA rebels; Chad against Libya; El Salvador gaining against indigenous rebels; Iran against Iraq; Kampuchea against rebels who are increasingly coordinated and receiving Western assistance; Lebanon against itself; Malaysia against pirates based in the Philippines; Morocco snipping up the remains of the Polishair, Mozambique failing to halt gains by RENAMO; Nicaragua gaining increasingly well-armed and competent Contras; Sri Lanka containing Tamil rebels, but unable to destroy them; Uganda in a three-way Civil War; West African nations of Mali and Burkina Faso renewed a decade-old border war.

Dormant (except for possible border skirmishes), but unresolved conflicts: Balkans; Beagle Channel (Argentina-Chile); Belize-Guatemala; China-Vietnam; Falklands; India-Pakistan; Korea; Laos-Thailand; Ogaden (Somalia-Ethiopia); Pacific (Peru-Bolivia-Chile).

Innocuities: Anti-government guerrilla activities are taking place in Brazil; Burma; Colombia; Ethiopia; Guatemala; Honduras; Indonesia; Namibia; Northern Ireland; Peru; Philippines; Sudan; Surinam; Timor; Zaire.

Israel's Naval Power

(from pg. 1)

Acquisition

THE SUMMARY: 3. The IN's proposed acquisition strategy for the naval modernization is both complex and ambitious. It involves a U.S. prime contractor with overall responsibility for both major elements of the program. If approval is forthcoming from the Federal Republic of Germany, a German sub-contractor would undertake construction of the lead DOLPHIN submarine and transport hull sections for the second and third boats to Israel, where they could be assembled by the Haifa firm of Israel Shipyards Limited (ISL). A second subcontract would govern combat systems integration; this task might be carried out by an Israeli firm.

Despite its complexity, the strategy appears to be the most effective course of action in light of political and technical restraints.

REPORTER: How are you going to overcome the problem of spending money in Europe? Is there any arrangement where the United States might spend money in Europe on any normal system?

ZAKHEIM: The normal program does not provide for that. It is, in fact unique to my knowledge that any country spends U.S. money in its own country. (Ed Note: Both for the *Merkava* tank and the *Lavi*, Israel was able to spend Foreign Military Sales money in Israel rather than in the U.S. as is generally the rule.) To go beyond that and provide off-shore funds to Germany would raise political problems, not just in the United States, but frankly I suspect, in Germany.

What we have recommended is that a significant portion of what would be acquired in Germany (remember, this is only a part of the submarine program, which in turn is a part of the overall program) could be funded by goods and services that Israel could provide either directly to the German (ship) yard which could acquire it for German consumption or off-load it to third country for consumption, or to an American yard.

You're not talking about finding a billion dollars in Europe (to finance submarines), but rather \$2-300 million spread over 10 years.

Offset Programs

ZAKHEIM: Classically, offsets are worked out in arrangements with countries that wish to acquire weaponry but are cash-poor. The idea would be that Israel provide goods and services to the European yard, or the American yard, which the yard (possibly through a trading company) could then sell on the world market. That has certain benefits for Israel to the extent that Israel is able to penetrate new markets. Moreover, the economic multiplier of non-defense goods is much higher than defense goods. So to the extent you are creating new markets, a new economic activity that otherwise wouldn't exist as a result of this effort, you are probably boosting your general economy as well.

This (shipbuilding program) is going

to extend for a number of years, therefore an offset arrangement could extend for as many as 10 years. When you look at . . . the size of the European purchase problem, and spread that over 10 years, you recognize that we are not really (about) talking many millions of dollars in any given year.

There will be a significant portion of a submarine built in a European yard that would, in fact consist of subsystems acquired (perhaps) in the United States. We, of course, would like Israel to acquire as many subsystems as possible in the U.S. There are certain things that for technology security reasons we won't sell to anyone, however close they are. But apart from technology security, roughly 35-40% of the submarine could be acquired in the U.S. and therefore funded from FMS credits. In addition, there is probably another 20% which theoretically could be acquired in (Israel) and therefore, if the Israeli government wanted to apply off-shore procurement funds to that portion, it could. So we are not really talking about \$150 million for a submarine (being spent in Europe).

Moreover, the Israeli Navy has proposed that only the first offshore boat be built in Europe; that the second and third . . . hull sections would be assembled in Israel. That eases the problem and is the recommendation we feel does make sense. It's a highly unusual procedure, but under the circumstances we think this can be a feasible program.

So, when you look at it in these terms, you recognize that you're not talking about finding a billion dollars in Europe in finance for that, but rather in the region of \$2-3 hundred million, spread over 10 years — a far more feasible approach.

Making Choices

REPORTER: Do you think Israel can handle all the projects together: the submarines, the missile boats, the *Lavi* and others?

ZAKHEIM: There is a finite limitation to what you can do with any amount of funding. The Israeli government can do everything within its resource levels? No, I don't. I believe Israel has to make choices. As I understand it, choices are being made all the time.

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

SHIMON PERES, Israel's Foreign Minister commenting on Israel's role in the Iran arms sale: Israel was approached in a friendly manner; we have replied as a friend, and I have no regrets to offer and no accusations to make.

Asked by a journalist, "Does Israel feel part of Europe, irrespective of geographical considerations?" Peres replied: I will answer you with another question: Would Jewish history be conceivable without Europe? Obviously not. We have a shared culture and memories that go back centuries, thousands of years. Unfortunately, many of these memories are painful, some even terrible, but this does not alter the fact that our roots are profoundly and unalterably intertwined. . . . Nevertheless, the State of Israel has its own autonomous identity. . . . Our future is there in that Middle East region where the state was born, with those peoples and neighboring states. It is there that we must find our vocation and our economic and social integration.

TAHIR AL-MASRI, Foreign Minister of Jordan: If you backtrack and observe the Palestinian issue since 1948, you will find we said at that time that the reason for the loss of Palestine was the lack of coordination between the Arab countries and the absence of true Arab solidarity. Nearly 40 years later, we are still talking about solidarity and unity. After mountains of statements and reports throughout this long period, we find ourselves as far as possible from Arab solidarity and we find the Palestinian cause retreating steadily.

MAJOR GENERAL AMOS LAPIDOT, Israel Air Force Commander and early head of the Lavi project: The Lavi is a national project and has implications which go beyond the immediate needs of the Air Force. The more difficult the financial problem becomes, the more difficult it becomes for us to accept a situation where we have to

foot the bill for something that serves needs other than those of the Air Force and the IDF. Under the present circumstances, the Lavi project has become problematic in terms of the resources allocated to it and in terms of our ability to carry it out.

HAFEZ AL-ASSAD, President of Syria, speaking at the Islamic Summit: What makes the Zionist danger the most complicated international problem is the fact that they are distinguished from other contemporary problems by their ideological, philosophical and religious bases. Zionist dangers are based on a religious belief to which its followers adhere without question. They say that their God, as mentioned in their Torah, promised them that their land would stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates and that he granted them this land and allowed them to expel the peoples who were living there or would be living there. If we study their Torah, we will learn that it mentions the peoples to be expelled from their lands and houses and to be enslaved and exploited.

The Zionist Jews relentlessly attack Nazism and cite its acts to justify their own. But there is a difference between the essence of Nazism and that of Zionism? . . . The Zionists are chasing the German people with the crimes of Nazism, blackmailing them and terrorizing their rulers. . . . The Zionists who have been seeking for 2,000 years to get from the pope and the Christians a pardon for the blood of Christ, do not forgive the German people for the crimes of Nazism.

One of the biggest lies of this age is the Jews' claim that they are Semites. . . . The world's Jews in this age are not Semites.

In their endeavor to achieve the expansionist/Torah scheme, the Zionists are defying the international community.

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The Fifth Eskadra: Soviet Maritime Power in the Med

By David E. Thaler

Ed Note: Mr. Thaler is a graduate student at Columbia University and a periodic contributor to "Security Affairs."

Soviet interest in the Mediterranean Sea is derived from a long history of perceived threats emanating from Russia's southwestern approaches. The writings of Sergei Gorshkov, formerly Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and father of the modern Soviet Navy, are a rich source of information on this subject.

Admiral Gorshkov predicated Russia's ability to prevent aggression from the southwest on her naval might in the Black Sea and, by proximity, the Mediterranean. He concluded that Russia's inability to extend her naval power beyond the shores of the Black Sea had in the past compelled Russia "to abandon the fruits of her victories, and sometimes even suffer defeat." Though successful against Turkey, the intervention of more powerful navies negated any achievements and threatened disaster for Russian interests.

Rocet Threats Perceived

In the Soviet view, similar forces also threatened aggression against the Mediterranean in modern times. By the late 1950s, carrier-based aircraft of the U.S. Sixth Fleet could launch nuclear strikes against the USSR from the eastern



The amphibious assault transport dock Ivan Rogov has two helicopter decks, helicopter hangars and a well-deck which can carry three air-cushion landing craft. It can carry a Soviet Naval Infantry Battalion — 550 men, 36 armored personnel carriers and ten tanks.

to its control of important choke points, namely the Strait of Gibraltar and the Turkish straits. Moreover, the littoral states of the Mediterranean have offered few attractive options for Eskadra operations.

CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Montreux Convention

The waterways separating the Fifth Eskadra from its mother fleet in the

prohibits the passage of aircraft carriers (CVs) through the Turkish straits. Desiring not to provoke a major confrontation with her Soviet neighbor, Turkey permitted a 37,000-ton Kiev-class helicopter carrier to pass through the straits in 1976, despite the prohibition. Officially classified an ASW cruiser by the Soviets, vertical short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft were later added to the helicopters originally deployed.

In December 1985, the Soviets launched their first full-size, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from the Nikolayev shipyards. With a displacement of 65,000 tons (roughly equivalent to the USS Midway), the carrier may deploy up to 60 conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft, possibly modified MiG-27 Floggers. Now undergoing a fitting-out period in the Black Sea, the carrier may be ready for sea trials in 1989.

Since it can hardly be assumed that the Soviets built a large aircraft carrier to remain in the Black Sea, Moscow will undoubtedly want the carrier to pass through the straits. It is unlikely the Turks will refuse, in spite of the pressure already being applied by the United States.

Port Access

Aside from choke points, another concern for the Eskadra involves port access. While replenishment of vessels on the high seas may pose few problems, extensive repair and overhaul would be impossible without the benefit of well-equipped harbors. In addition to practicality, naval presence in foreign ports can have direct and indirect political effects.

The Soviet Union consistently has taken an interest in expanding its access to shore-based installations around the Mediterranean littoral. The saliency of port access has fluctuated over time; availability has taken on various degrees of political and logistical impor-

stance. The entrance into service of ocean-going auxiliaries has alleviated the need for ports.

Today, the Eskadra is known to be using the facilities at several ports around the Straits of Syria. Moscow's closest ally in the Middle East, has granted access to Latakia and Tartus. Since being expelled from Egypt in the 1970s, the Soviets have relied on Syria as a major source of shore-based naval support.

Because of the crowded conditions, however, Syrian ports are not well-served by themselves to sustain the squadron. Moreover, it is not clear that reliance on one country would be in Moscow's long-term interests. When the Eskadra was denied access to the Egyptian port of Alexandria in 1976, it created an acute logistical problem which may have reduced Soviet military effectiveness in the Med.

Therefore, the Soviets have searched for access to other ports. Overhaul and repair work are offered on a contractual basis in Yugoslavia, Tunisia, and Greece. The possibility does exist that

(PCont. pg. 27)

Physical geography has favored the West owing to its control of important choke points . . . moreover, the littoral states of the Mediterranean have offered few attractive options for Eskadra operations.

Mediterranean. This was followed in the early 1960s by the deployment of Polaris submarines carrying submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 1500 nautical miles. Similar U.S. fleet developments occurred near other Soviet coastal areas.

The USSR responded with a ship-building program emphasizing anti-carrier warfare (ACW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), as well as a gradual extension of maritime defense zones. The Soviet Navy (Voyenno-Morskoi Flot, or VMF) was transformed from a coastal defense force to an ocean-going fleet capable of sustained out-of-area operations. For the Black Sea Fleet, this entailed the projection of power into the Mediterranean and the creation of a Mediterranean squadron, the Fifth Eskadra.

The VMF has faced an array of complex problems in deploying its assets. Western naval might in the Mediterranean has long been established. Physical geography has favored the West owing

Black Sea are controlled by Turkey, a NATO member. Transit of the Turkish straits is governed by the 1936 Montreux Convention, to which the Soviet Union is a signatory.

Provisions regarding transit of surface combatants require the USSR — and other Black Sea states — to provide Turkey eight days' advance notice. The Soviets, however, have circumvented these provisions via "contingency notifications", whereby multiple notifications are given whether or not they are used by the VMF. Thus, the Eskadra may be reinforced in an unlimited manner during times of crisis.

Restrictions on submarine transit are more severe. For this reason, submarines attached to the Fifth Eskadra are provided by the Northern Fleet. The NATO-dominated Strait of Gibraltar is therefore highly relevant to Soviet Mediterranean operations.

New Soviet Aircraft Carrier
Finally, the Montreux Convention

Inside This Issue

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EDITORIALS

Arms Control 1987

A proposal to remove intermediate-range missiles from Europe was offered to the Soviet Union by the NATO countries in 1979. It was rejected. It is in the context of the original proposal and the intervening history, that the present Soviet decision to seek an agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles independent of other arms control issues should be viewed.

Several points are clear:

- 1) Mikhail Gorbachev places considerable importance in reaching an accord with the U.S. — to help vindicate his policy on other matters;
- 2) The Soviets now believe that SDI must be dealt with on its own merits and in relationship to strategic cuts;
- 3) President Reagan has been given a chance to reestablish the credibility of his administration in foreign policy;
- 4) The Soviets do try to take advantage of opportunities to exploit what they perceive to be weaknesses in NATO over time, but are likely to seek a serious agreement after more favorable alternatives are foreclosed.

The History

It is important to understand that Administration firmness over the past six years has led to key changes in the Soviet negotiating position, bringing them closer to the original U.S. position.

In the NATO "Dual Track" Policy: It was in December 1979 that the NATO Council of Ministers (at German urging) adopted the policy calling for negotiations on limiting medium-range missiles, while preparing to deploy U.S. Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) to counter Soviet SS-20s. NATO's goal was to eliminate the Soviet missiles; their assumption was that the Soviets would not agree, in part because the West had nothing to bargain with, and NATO would have to match them. Some measure of credit goes to the allies for holding together for 7½ politically explosive years. Much credit goes to the Administration for insisting at opportune moments that the allies live up to their commitment to accept the missiles. It was especially difficult to maintain a unified alliance posture in 1983 after the first Pershings were delivered in Europe and the Soviets walked out on the negotiations for 16 months.

2) The French and British nuclear forces: In late 1980, the Soviets were insisting that British and non-NATO French nuclear forces be treated in U.S.-Soviet negotiations. The U.S. backed by the allies refused to consider the issue. In 1980, Gorbachev proposed eliminating U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles, but insisted that the French and British be constrained from modernizing their forces — a modernization that would vastly increase the threat they pose to the USSR. Again, we declined. That subject is not mentioned in the newest proposal, although the Soviets have said it must be dealt with "later."

3) Strategic Defenses: The Soviets, while pursuing more than a decade of research into strategic defense, demanded that any new arms control agreement be linked to an agreement limiting SDI to laboratory testing. The Reykjavik summit meeting broke down over the issue, leading some advocates of a "treaty-at-almost-any-price" to decry the President's unwillingness to use SDI as a lever to get an agreement on medium-range missiles. Four months later, the lever appears less necessary.

The Present

While on these items the Soviets have come closer to our original position, the facts on the ground have changed over the past seven years. It would be foolhardy to ignore the changes.

Soviet short-range intermediate missiles (SS-21, 22, 23) are numerous, accurate and could destroy European capitals from Warsaw Pact deployments. The U.S. and European short-range intermediate missiles cannot destroy the Soviet capital from NATO sites. There is, therefore, a lack of symmetry. It is also harder to verify the short-range intermediate missiles than SS-20s or Pershings.

It is almost impossible to verify the even shorter-range tactical nuclear shells, mines and missiles that would remain even after an INF agreement. These weapons are of sufficiently short range to be useful primarily against tank armies and troop formations — they are not weapons of mass destruction — and raise essential questions about the conventional defense of Europe. These questions have been largely ignored for years.

We have avoided discussion within NATO about the reliability of the U.S. commitment to European security and the allies' own responsibilities to some extent because Soviet intransigence over several key U.S. demands focussed the discussion on the "superpowers" and away from the allies. As the "superpowers" come closer to an agreement (while not minimizing the difficult negotiations yet to come), we will have to deal with allied concerns.

Gorbachev knows full well that NATO is not the Warsaw Pact; that the U.S. cannot enter an agreement with the Soviets and simply insist the allies go along. He is, most likely, counting on making the Soviets look peaceable while the Europeans squeal with us. In that way he can make headway in Soviet-European relations — including favorable trade terms and the transfer of technology, important issues for the continuation of his plans for military modernization.

The Tasks Ahead

Both allied leaders and our arms control negotiators have a number of difficult tasks to accomplish. Our negotiators must provide verification procedures to check the destruction and redeployment of the remaining SS-20s, Pershings and cruise missiles. They must help to ensure that whatever agreement is reached on the shorter-range theatre missiles results in some symmetry between the capabilities of NATO and the

Warsaw Pact. And, viewing the extraordinary difficulty of controlling and verifying tactical nuclear weapons, our leaders must help their constituencies understand that in order to maintain a balance of tactical nuclear and conventional forces, we must strengthen our capabilities.

Our objective must remain a stable military balance achieved by both arms and arms control. While the latest Soviet proposal is closer to our original proposal, we agree with the words of the chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Max M. Kampelman. "The devil is in the details."

Glasnost — How Far?

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives under the name of Glasnost are encouraging — but also troubling. Certainly it is better to have some easing of tension, some release of dissidents, some evidence of openness from Soviet officials. If there are to be significant improvements in the Soviet system, they have to begin somewhere, and it is unrealistic to expect them to begin on a large scale.

It is difficult to know what goes on inside the Kremlin and therefore to assess the risks that Gorbachev is taking. However, his loading of the Politburo and his initiatives are at least an impressive demonstration of his confidence in his own surefootedness. If he manages to make some economic and political reforms without stumbling, it may ultimately be conceded that Glasnost was more than a public relations campaign.

What is perhaps most troubling is the tendency of too many in the West to accept small beginnings as if they were major concessions. Let us remember:

1. Highly visible dissidents were released, but thousands of others remain in prison. It is in Soviet interest to release the prominent, in hopes that the West will forget the anonymous.

2. By the end of February, U.S. monitoring groups had only accounted for about 35 of the 140 prisoners the Soviets claim to have released.

3. Although the Soviets announced that 500 exit visas were granted to Soviet Jews in January, only about 125 people were permitted to leave.

4. Ina Meiman was allowed out in January, just in time to join her husband, who had been refused emigration in winter and her release was delayed.

5. Boris Yeltsin, leader of the KGB hard line administrators complaining about his continued detention and journalists trying to cover the story. Against this evidence of the limited nature of the thaw, it is disturbing that several hundred Western artists and writers could still meet with Gorbachev without raising a single skeptical voice.

Author Paddy Chayefsky, who forever ended himself to American Jews by temporarily denouncing Vanessa Redgrave's paean to the PLO at an Oscar awards ceremony, reflected the dominant feeling: "We have to give them a chance."

We disagree. We want to believe that something is happening in the Soviet Union that is good for relations between states, but are skeptical of limited releases and fancy parties. This is no time to lower our standards. While being realistic about the Soviet system and watching as events unfold, the West should not be unduly grateful for small (very small) favors. This is the time to rearticulate the standards of civilized society and to make it clear to Mr. Gorbachev as well as to world opinion that the Soviet Union has a long way to go before it enters that group.

We cannot accept what we hope is the beginning of a process as if it were attainment of the goal. Down that road lies an era of political naivete toward the Soviet Union such as we have experienced before — with unfortunate results.

Jonathan Pollard, Part III

We are saddened and angered by the Jonathan Pollard case, and have only this to say:

- 1) Israel must not spy on its foremost ally, and the Israeli government must not promote people who do;
- 2) The Israeli government must not stonewall investigations of any such spying;
- 3) Whether or not it seems reasonable that Israel should receive some of the information that was contained in the stolen documents, it remains for the U.S. to decide what information it will share with other countries and what it will not; and
- 4) Regardless of the information flow (or lack thereof), no American should spy on behalf of Israel or any other country.

One of the Many Ironies in the Morass of Lebanon

It is useful, periodically, to note the shifting alliances in Lebanon, partly to project potential future violence and partly to understand what, if any, openings exist for diplomacy. Syria, for example, is now working with Amal to pressure the PLO from reestablishing itself in southern Lebanon; is working against Hizbollah, the Iranian-sponsored Shiite movement that appears to hold U.S. hostages; and is working against the Christian communal government which is helping the PLO.

If the West were to think of things to ask Syria to accomplish in Lebanon, those mentioned above would top the list. Syria surely is acting out of self-interest, not out of a desire to be helpful to the West. But Syrian comings and goings in Lebanon bear watching with an eye toward the future.

The Fifth Eskadra

(Cont. from p. 1)

Libya could grant bribing rights to the USSR sometime in the future.

In spite of the existence of several ports-of-call for the VMF, they are not sufficient to sustain the Eskadra, and the scope and continuation of Soviet port access is held hostage to the political whims of the host governments.

Anchorage

As a consequence, vessels of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron are maintained primarily at a network of anchorages in international waters throughout the Mediterranean. The anchorages normally used by the Fifth Eskadra are: Alboran Island, 150 miles east of Gibraltar; the Gulf of Hammamet off the Tunisian coast, just south of the Strait of Sicily; Hurd Bank, south of Malta; Kithira, northeast of Crete; north of the Gulf of Sullum off the Egyptian coast; and east of Cyprus.

Anchorage is advantageous for several reasons. First, they permit refueling, resupply, and light maintenance without the limitations imposed by host governments. Second, and again without limitation, anchorages can be used to cut down on mechanical wear and tear associated with high operational rates. Lastly, they are strategically located close to Mediterranean choke

WARTIME MISSIONS

From Admiral Gorskoy's writings — and from observed operational methods — it is possible to gain some insight as to the wartime missions of the Fifth Eskadra. The primary tasks of strategic defense and diversion appear in many of Gorskoy's historical accounts as having been keys to Russian successes on the southwestern flank.

Based on this dual mission, four tasks of the Eskadra during an East-West conflict can be foreseen.

Preventing Strikes Against Soviet Soil

First, the squadron would attempt to prevent the Sixth Fleet from launching strikes against Soviet soil from the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet naval deployments have concentrated on this area as a maritime defense zone. The eastern Mediterranean is in close proximity to Soviet industrial strength, much of which is located to the south and east of Moscow.

Neutralization of enemy assets in the area would take the form of anti-carrier and anti-submarine warfare. Exercises held by the Soviets — as well as operations observed during the 1970 Jordanian civil war and the 1973 Yom Kippur War during which U.S. carriers themselves were used as simulated targets — indicated that ACW task groups will be formed around a guided missile cruiser. Accompanying the heavy



The guided-missile destroyer Sovremenniy.

face and subsurface elements, their air-to-surface missile (ASM) assets could be used to saturate carrier defenses.

The defensive gauntlet through which the bombers must pass — NATO air naval aviation forces, and probably the Israeli Air Force as well — could significantly degrade Soviet air capabilities. But NATO must also worry about possible Soviet use of aircraft pre-positioned in Libya and Syria.

Diversionary Operations

Diversionary operations comprise a second mission of the Fifth Eskadra. This task may be considered both as an offshoot and a motivation of ACW.

Indirectly, warfare in the Mediterranean could adversely affect fighting on the Central Front by diverting NATO assets from the protection of convoys ferrying men and materiel from the United States to Europe. This has led many to conclude that the Eskadra is a "one-shot throw away asset" — back would provoke the West into fighting its major battles in places of the Soviets' choosing and on more favorable terms to the USSR.

Control of the Turkish Straits

A third mission is to control the Bosphorus and Dardanelles of the Turkish Straits and support of Soviet land operations. The Eskadra would likely be used as a front line of defense against force entry into the Black Sea or mining of the straits by NATO. This would serve not only to protect the southwestern flank of the Motherland, but also to permit unimpeded resupply and reinforcement of the Fifth Eskadra.

Clearly, resupply would become important if naval warfare in the Med lasts more than a few days, e.g. the Eskadra proves itself as more than a "one-shot throw away asset." In this case, the absence of powerful allies along the littoral and the vulnerability of anchorages would necessitate increased vigilance near the Turkish straits.

The squadron could also be called on to support naval infantry landings near the straits or to bolster a Soviet-led ground offensive against Greece, Turkey, or Yugoslavia.

Denial of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)

Finally, the Eskadra would attempt to prosecute anti-SLOC operations in the Mediterranean. The object of this task would be the Suez Canal, through which vital resources such as oil pass on their way to Europe.

Disruption of SLOCs could be accomplished by a combination of naval air, attack submarines, and small surface combatants. A more complex mission to be undertaken may include keeping the canal open for inter-fleet transfers from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean squadron.

PEACETIME OPERATIONS

In general, the Fifth Eskadra conducts its daily operations at a leisurely pace

compared to its U.S. counterpart, the Sixth Fleet. As Admiral William Crowe has noted, the Soviets utilize their anchorages to "spend a lot of time just sitting."

Similarly, when the squadron's vessels are underway, speeds are kept low, probably to conserve fuel and limit damage to the propulsion plants. Observed transit speeds of surface combatants rarely exceed 12 knots, while auxiliaries usually stay at speeds below 10 knots. In contrast, U.S. speeds rarely fall below 15 knots. During exercises, of course, the speed of Soviet vessels increases.

Recent Exercises

Unlike its NATO counterparts, the VMF does not adhere to a routine schedule of naval exercises. Large-scale exercises in the Mediterranean are sporadic at best.

A two-phase exercise held in 1979 demonstrated the VMF's growing out-of-area capabilities. In the first phase, held south of Crete, unprecedented joint operations were conducted by two Kiev-class carriers. Later, the carriers split into two groups and, accompanied by guided missile cruisers and the huge anti-air group ship Ivan Rogov, prosecuted ASW exercises in the western Mediterranean. The exercise displayed sophistication in underway replenishment capabilities.

In July 1981, a joint exercise was held with the Syrians. Soviet naval infantry (marines) landed on the northern coast of Syria in the first such joint demonstration. The flotilla that deployed off the coast included some 12 Soviet amphibious ships.

In September 1983 and July 1985, activities in the Med coincided with worldwide exercises. During the earlier exercise, anti-ship tactics were executed by air and submarine assets in correspondence with anti-air and anti-submarine defense by surface combatants.

The latter activity was a transit exercise by a Kiev-class carrier group. This demonstrated the VMF's adoption of a Western naval concept, that of multi-ship, multi-role task group formations. Six or seven escorts, mostly missile and ASW ships, took up positions in a semi-circle forward of the main ship, the carrier.

Normal Deployments

The Fifth Eskadra's normal order of battle consists of about 35 vessels, more than half of which are auxiliaries. In past regional conflicts, the Soviet have "surged" combatants from the Black Sea (or subs from the Northern Fleet) in a show of force designed to send signals of interest to the parties involved and to the United States.

During the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, for instance, Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean jumped from a pre-war strength of about 60 vessels to a high of 96. The Soviets not only closely shadowed the Sixth Fleet,

The eastern Med is also within range of the Black Sea Fleet's naval aviation contingent of 100 "Badger" and "Backfire" bombers.

points. From these areas, the VMF can monitor Western fleet movements.

Two drawbacks of anchorages come to mind. Offshoremost anchorages come in their vulnerability during wartime. Owing to their location in the open ocean, anchored vessels must be protected on all sides from possible attack. Consequently, it would be difficult to sustain the squadron's combat operations from these areas. In addition, there is a greater need for support vessels to ferry supplies to the combatants; such auxiliaries can comprise one-half to two-thirds of the Fifth Eskadra's order of battle. When considering force levels, therefore, distinctions must be drawn between the total force level (combatants plus auxiliaries) and the "teeth" (combatants only) of the squadron.

cruiser would be several destroyers, cruise missile and torpedo submarines, and ASW ships.

The difficulty of tracking subs in Mediterranean waters would hinder Soviet ASW operations, but the same would be true of NATO ASW — making the Soviet subs the most potent threat to the CVs. In recent years, however, the introduction of long-range Trident SLBMs into the U.S. arsenal has decreased the likelihood of SLBM strikes originating from the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet ASW exercises conducted in the western Med in 1979 are a case in point.


The eastern Med is also within range of the Black Sea Fleet's naval aviation contingent of 100 "Badger" and "Backfire" bombers. In conjunction with sur-

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The Soviet navy has been transformed from a coastal defense navy to a blue-water one.

but also conducted a resupply of Syria. VMF force levels there have never again reached those of October 1973.

Also included in the Eskadra's order of battle are intelligence-gathering ships, or AGIs, which are usually travelers carrying electronic devices. One AGI normally patrols off the coast of Israel, while others shadow Western fleet movements. AGIs shadowing Western vessels are known as "tail-tales" in that they provide the Soviet command with real time intelligence on the movement and targeting of enemy ships.

In times of crisis, AGIs may be replaced by destroyers. This practice signals heightened Soviet political and military interest, increases the threat to what is being monitored, and lessens the likelihood that evasion tactics can be used.

The Eskadra in 1986

As the Reagan administrations's rhetoric against Libya reached a peak following the December 1985 terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, the Soviet Union came to Libya's aid. Two Soviet warships passed through the Turkish straits to bolster the Eskadra's strength. Of greater importance was the nature of the squadron's deployment, which changed drastically.

In January 1986, the Eskadra's flagship, a submarine tender with electronic gear, entered the waters near Tripoli. The flagship's presence displayed heightened Soviet concern and expressed visible support for Moscow's Libyan ally.

Further, with help from maritime reconnaissance aircraft flying out of Libyan airfields, the Soviets provided

Libya with detailed information on U.S. fleet operations. Libyan MiG-25s which had buzzed a surveillance plane from a U.S. carrier were said to have been in direct contact with a Soviet reconnaissance aircraft.

To hedge against a possible Israeli strike, the Eskadra set up a radar picket line stretching from Libya to Syria. The Soviets also added two destroyers to the AGI stationed 30-80 miles off Israel's coast.

However, the Soviet vessels near Libya withdrew just before the U.S. raid in April. Reports indicated that the Soviets informed the Libyan Air Force of the attack in time for an evacuation of Libyan jets to Sudan. Apparently, the information did not reach Khaddafi: he was working in his tent when the U.S. F-111 is appeared overhead.

THE FIFTH ESKADRA: AN OVERVIEW

In a political sense, the Fifth Eskadra has shown itself to be of some importance in the execution of Soviet regional policies. It has been used successfully to carry out missions involving suasion in support of allies. While hardly guaranteeing a Soviet presence within littoral states (as evidenced in Egypt), the squadron has lifted the Soviet Union to the position of "Mediterranean power" in the eyes of both NATO and other countries in the region.

However, questions arise as to the viability of the Eskadra during all-out war with the West. NATO retains the advantage of geography: control of the choke points and availability of land-based (and sea-based) air power. The Fifth Eskadra's anchorages are vulner-

Washington Fairy Tales: A Budget Lesson

By Col. Minter L. Wilson, Jr. (USA, Ret.)

Ed. Note: Colonel Wilson is Editor of "The Retired Officer" magazine, from which this article is reprinted with permission.

Spending enough for an adequate defense is not the cause of our economic problems or our budget deficits. So let's get on with it and spend what's adequate.

—Gen. John W. Vessey (USA, Ret.)
Former Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

In minds of some Americans, there seems to be a belief that building defenses against the attack capabilities of potential enemies, whether it's ICBM attacks or tank attacks, is unnecessary and somehow may be immoral or unethical. This view is most prevalent among some whose fiscal agenda is tilted toward solving social problems through the federal budget.

As the 100th Congress organizes and begins to tackle President Reagan's first-ever \$1 trillion federal budget, there will be many fairy tales extant. One of the first to be put to rest is that the defense

federal budget should be balanced. While deficits were unavoidable in wartime, political parties, presidents and most members of Congress operated on the assumption that the norm would be budgetary balance or surpluses to repay debt accumulated during wars or depressions.

Keynesian economics earlier in this century led to a belief in "pump priming" during periods of subnormal economic activity. Deficits would be offset by surpluses during periods of prosperity. However, during the early Vietnam War period, this degree of fiscal discipline broke down. Federal spending mushroomed. Deficits ballooned. Reagan and the last three Congresses have presided over an exploding national debt, one that promises to be nearly triple the debt accumulated during the previous life of our republic.

Defense spending isn't the real problem. Neither is the cancerous deficit. Deficits are man-made. Believing we can limit deficits by passing a law — Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) — is another fairy tale. In the face of con-

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budget is the cause of record deficits. A quick perusal of the accompanying chart will reveal some startling facts.

Compare the defense and non-defense figures. Since the 1960s defense spending as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP), though rising in the Reagan years, has declined by more than 20 percent. Conversely, non-defense spending has virtually doubled.

It should not be ignored that the amount of the people's wealth the federal government has chosen to "manage" for them through taxes and spending has risen by 30 percent. Each president and Congress share responsibility.

Balancing the Budget

For the first 150 years of our history, the unquestioned belief was that the

gressional profligacy, the GRH budget-cutting device is impossible.

Providing for the nation's security is the president's highest responsibility. This president knows that. Difficult decisions face him. National defense and domestic spending issues are equally complex. All spending must be measured against the nation's resources and priorities.

Regardless of the fairy tales spun by political magicians, in or out of public office, there is no "magic" account from which budget balancing cuts can be taken. For the good of us all, it behooves a Democratic Congress and a Republican president to find a way to limit all government spending and avoid the lasting scandal of fatally mismanaging the nation's economy.

FY	Federal Spending as a Percentage of GNP									
	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1985	1986	
Total Spending	18.2	18.8	20.9	20.1	21.9	22.2	23.1	24.0	22.7	
Defense	9.5	9.5	9.6	6.9	5.3	5.0	6.2	6.4	6.9	
Non-Defense	8.7	8.7	11.3	13.2	16.6	17.1	16.9	17.6	16.8	

able, and its access to secure, shore-based facilities is not assured.

Further, the squadron may have to contend with a militarily potent Israel in the eastern Med. Soviet planners cannot ignore the possibility of Israeli military support and employment of Israeli forces in conjunction with those of the United States. Israel's naval and air forces are second to none in that area.

For a variety of reasons, therefore, the Soviets may be very cautious in their Mediterranean naval deployments during wartime. Even so, the Fifth Eskadra is a symbol of the USSR's aspirations for superpower status. Though by no means as powerful as its Western counterparts, the squadron complicates Western military planning and remains a political force to be reckoned with.

Armed Jewish Resistance to the Nazis: A Review

By Stefan Leader

Ed Note: Mr. Leader is a specialist in defense matters and a member of the JINSA Board of Directors.

Why were so many European Jews so passive in the face of Nazi terror? Why did so many allow themselves to be marched off to be imprisoned, to be shot, to be gassed? Why did so few resist? Why did so few fight back? Some did resist — in the Warsaw Ghetto, in Treblinka, in the Vilna Ghetto. But why some and not others?

And what would I have done in their place? I've imagined myself in one of those boxcars many times. I've seen myself breaking out and escaping and I've seen myself fighting back as many times as I've played out the scenario in my mind. But would I really have done so? These thoughts and images and a flood of others came to mind as I viewed and read two important new works on the Holocaust: *The Partisans of Vilna* and *If Not Now, When?*

These two extraordinary works of history and memoir work to expand our understanding of the Holocaust and also our empathy. They are central in their ability to shed light on the terrible choices people were forced to confront.

The Partisans of Vilna

The Partisans of Vilna is a documentary film produced by Washington Aviva Kempner. Kempner uses historical footage and interviews with survivors to describe in excruciating detail the efforts by some young Vilna Jews to organize a resistance movement against the Nazis in the Ghetto and the surrounding forests. They faced reluctance and even active hostility on the part of other Ghetto residents, community leaders, peasants in the countryside and even other partisan groups.

If Not Now, When?

The other work is a novel based on true stories. *If Not Now, When?*, by the Italian Primo Levi, describes the experiences of one band of Jewish partisans who came together in the forests and marshes of White Russia and Poland. They struggled to survive, to preserve their identity, to resist and eventually to reach safety in Italy at the end of the war.

The two works fit together and shed light on experiences that even today help shape the psyche of modern Israel and its responses to its own national security problems.

Who Were the Fighters?

Who were these resistance fighters? Were they different from other Jews? How? How did they come to organize and/or join a resistance movement? Partisans shed light on the origins of the Vilna resistance movement and the people who became part of it.

They were mostly "modern," young, single, idealistic and politically active. They were members of youth organizations associated with the various political movements of the period — Zionists, Communists, Bundists and the numerous factional permutations of all these groups. In many cases they were alienated from their families as well as from traditional Judaism.

Levi too asks who these fighters were,

but his answer is different. This "wretched aristocracy of the forest," as he calls leader Gedaliah's band of Jewish partisans, were many things: they were the strongest, the smartest, the luckiest — above all they were survivors of Lithuanian pogroms; of Kovno; of Riga; Jews of Biltza; Stomion factory workers. And Levi tells us what they were not — at least in the eyes of the Russian partisans they fought with. They were not the kind of Jews the Russians were familiar with. They were armed fighters — like the British and the Americans.

The Transformation

What is also clear from both Partisans and *If Not Now, When?*, is that they did not start out that way. Indeed, both works describe transformations. They show how people were changed by their experiences. As Levi says of the partisans, "They had found a new freedom unknown to their fathers and grandfathers."

For many, the freedom came from the destruction of families killed by the Nazis and from the certain belief that they, too, would be killed.

Partisans describes the transformation at length. It began with insight. Some in Vilna came to recognize quite early what the Nazis were up to. They saw not a pogrom that would come and go, but a systematic effort to exterminate the Jews by first killing Jewish leaders and subsequently the entire community. They came to this conclusion not only because they had information on mass executions of Jews in the woods outside Vilna, but also because they had a frame of reference with which to evaluate this data. In particular, they seem to have been influenced by a book about a group of Armenians who made a stand against the Turks. In short, they concluded that there was no place to run and in the words of one young leader, Abba Kovner, "the only answer to murder is self-defense."

Insight led to action. Meetings were held, cells were organized, leaders chosen and quickly a united partisan organization formed. Underground political activity was familiar to many of the organizers in the Vilna Ghetto, although weapons and knowledge of how to make and use them were much more scarce. Indeed, the lack of such knowledge and experience is lamented in the film by one leader as the "tragedy of the Jewish people." In time, weapons were smuggled in at great risk (at the cost of lives) and people learned to use them. Often, the choice was between food and weapons. Even Jewish scholarship yielded some benefits. A pamphlet found in a Vilna research library showed how to make explosive devices.

Their Goals

Forays were made outside the Ghetto to contact partisans in the forests around Vilna, to sabotage railway lines, to plant incendiary devices. But the goal of the Vilna partisans (at least initially) was not to resist from the forest, but to organize an uprising in the Ghetto. When the time came, however, not only did the "masses" not join the uprising, they, along with the acting leader of the Jewish community, turned in a resistance leader to appease the Gestapo.

We need to understand that people were struggling desperately to survive and preserve families and as some semblance of normal life in the face of Nazi terror. Liquidation of the Ghetto had not yet been ordered. And, although many people had been killed, some ghetto residents clung to the hope that if they stayed out of trouble they might survive. Mere survival required a pragmatic effort.

Moreover, Nazi policy, at least in many times, was to kill entire families of anyone involved in partisan activities.

In the Forest

In the end, the uprising failed and many of the surviving partisans fled to the forests. The lesson — that armed resistance was a choice available to only some — had been a costly and painful one. In Partisans, one resistance leader emotionally recounts how his mother came to him in the middle of the fighting to ask what she should do. He was forced to make the kind of choice no person should ever have to make. He could not protect his mother and continue to be an effective fighter and leader, and she

could not become a partisan. All he could do was tell her to hide. It was not much to offer and he knew it. His mother did not survive.

If Not Now, When? continues the story in the forest with the experiences of Levi's fictional band of partisans paralleling closely those described in the film. What the Vilna survivors and others like them found was that few partisan bands welcomed Jews, and fewer welcomed armed Jews. Polish, Lithuanian and Russian partisans expressed the same anti-Semitism as their fellow countrymen. A Jewish partisan had to worry about "comrades" at his back as much as Wehrmacht soldiers in front, although there were exceptions.

The solution for most Jewish partisans was to find and join the existing Jewish bands or organize their own. And many did so, fighting with skill and courage and even taking a measure of revenge against the Nazis. For a time, the Russians encouraged the creation of Jewish partisan bands and provided material support. Later, in a change of policy, the Russians decided to discourage Jewish bands since the Russians argued there was no Jewish nation as there were Polish, Lithuanian or Russian nations. They even disarmed some Jewish units. In Partisans, one Jewish veteran describes the humiliation of being disarmed and relegated to kitchen work, while seeing weapons, often paid for in blood, given to non-Jewish peasants who's will to fight was dubious at best. A similar experience is shared by part of Gedaliah's band in *Levi's story*.

The End of the War

If Not Now, When? ends with Gedaliah's band, somewhat reduced in number, in Italy, although there is little doubt that Palestine is their destination. In similar fashion, many of the survivors of Vilna found their way to Palestine. The experiences described in both works provide a fascinating window on the roots of Israeli defense policies. Although one partisan in *Levi's story* notes with considerable irony that they are "fighting for three lines in the history books," these two works ensure a more substantial legacy.

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NEWSBRIEFS

DEFENDING OUR ALLIES/BUT NOT ISRAEL??: A new poll for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations indicates that a majority of Americans would favor sending U.S. troops to defend Western Europe or Japan from a Soviet attack. Further, 70% of the public in the poll believed that we should support the same or increased levels of military commitment to NATO; and when asked to choose between leaving U.S. troops in Europe or withdrawing over the next five years and letting Europe provide for its own nuclear as well as conventional defense, 82% chose to maintain the status quo.

However, majorities of the public were opposed to the use of U.S. troops under other circumstances, including if North Korea invaded South Korea; if the Arab states cut off oil shipments to the U.S.; if Nicaragua invaded Honduras to destroy rebel bases; if the government of El Salvador were about to fall to the guerrillas; or if Arab forces invaded Israel.

EGYPT AND THE SOVIETS: (PART 1)

The Egyptian minister of economy and foreign trade said the Soviet Union this month to continue trade talks that began in December. The talks will deal with the settlement of Egypt's debt to the USSR and the conclusion of a 5-year agreement that will increase trade by a projected 15%. There is also expected to be a new protocol on technical cooperation.

(PART II) Egypt's minister for foreign affairs and the director of the African Studies Institute in Moscow

both participated in an Egyptian-Soviet sponsored symposium on Africa. Anatoly Gromyko, the director said there are practical reasons and good opportunities to promote and further develop Egyptian-Soviet relations at a high level. He expressed his country's readiness to further strengthen bilateral ties, because "Egypt is a strong, developing and nonaligned country and plays a positive role in the region."

(PART III) The director of the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent four days in Cairo with a delegation to "discuss important Middle East issues and ways to resolve them."

KUWAIT LENDS TO USSR: The chairman and managing director of the Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company announced that a \$150 million medium-term loan has been signed for the Soviet Union. The deputy chairman of the board of the Bank for Foreign Trade noted that the event is an important milestone in the development of Soviet-Kuwait economic relations, and bound to bring the two nations closer.

AND THE USSR GIVES TO JORDAN: According to an Abu Dhabi newspaper, the Jordanian Armed Forces recently received shipments of Soviet SAM-8, SAM-13 and SAM-14 anti-aircraft missiles. The paper further reports that Jordan will be receiving Spanish-made military aircraft, including

range military transport planes, co-produced with Indonesia.

CONTACT WITH THE PRC?: Unnamed Israeli sources have said contacts between China and Israel over a possible coal deal are being conducted through third parties. Israeli officials have said they would only consider the deal if it were done without intermediaries, but are interested in having Peking sell Israel coal for the Hadera power station.

PACT EXERCISES VIEWED BY NATO: The first military exercise to be held under the 1986 Stockholm agreement on security and confidence-building measures in Europe took place in Czechoslovakia and was watched by about a dozen official observers from the West. The Warsaw Pact has officially notified NATO of the dates, size of forces and locations for 31 other sets of maneuvers they will be holding in 1987. Eighteen of these will be held in the USSR. NATO countries have given notice of 19 major field exercises that are planned for this year, and neutral and nonaligned states have given notice of 5 — in Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia.

STINGERS IN AFGHANISTAN: Western diplomats in Pakistan confirm that U.S. Stinger missiles have been delivered to Afghan resistance fighters and that they have been quite effective against Soviet aircraft. The diplomats estimate that aircraft losses have been a day and a half for Soviet and Afghan

planes and helicopters were shot down in the first week of February.

PLO OPERATES DC-8s? Israeli intelligence reports that the PLO has bought four DC-8 transport jets and is operating them under false colors and registration to operate in airspace that might otherwise be closed to them. The report, as yet unconfirmed, said the PLO calls its unit "Force 14" and uses it to move equipment and personnel around the Mediterranean basin.

SYRIANS IN LEBANON: Israeli military sources said the Syrians initially placed a 10,000-man force in Beirut, including commando and armored units, but with no ground-to-air missile batteries. The same sources said it is likely the Syrians will reduce the force soon because such a large deployment is difficult to maintain. Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Levy said the numbers were approximately what Israel had expected.

RELATED: Concurrent with the Syrian deployment, Beirut Voice of Lebanon Radio announced that kidnappings were taking place on a wide scale throughout the city, and that security forces estimated that over 100 people had been kidnapped. Syrian General Ghazi Kuran, chief of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, issued a strong warning to the militias.

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING

Concerning Syrian Intervention in Lebanon
(Based on news reports carried in Israel)

SHIMON PERES, Foreign Minister of Israel, told an American group in Israel that the Syrian deployment in Beirut has added tension to the region but stressed that Israel has no interest in Lebanese politics or Lebanese territory. He said Israel has left Lebanon and has no intention of returning. "It is an attempt by the Syrians to deepen not only their presence, but also their occupation of Lebanon against the legitimate position of the president of Lebanon."

YITZHAK RABIN, Defense Minister of Israel: We object to any deeper Syrian military involvement in Lebanon. We are following everything that is happening in Lebanon with the help of the intelligence means at our disposal. We reserve the right to exercise full freedom of operation should Israel's direct defense interests be harmed, if at all. At this stage, nothing has happened that would demand we make a decision beyond what I have said.

ABIE SHARON, Minister of Trade and former Minister of Defense of Israel: said Israel must react to the entry of the Syrian army into Beirut, and said he was particularly concerned about the possibility that the army would move southward and deploy itself along the coastal road south of the Sidon area. Israel, in his opinion, must warn the Syrians against moving south for such a Syrian move would constitute a significant change in the balance of power in Lebanon and contain danger for the future. He said he

believes the Syrians will cover up for terrorist organizations, will protect them, and will encourage terrorist activity against Israel's northern border.

EZER WEITZMAN, Cabinet Minister and former Minister of Defense of Israel: said he believes one should not rush to make warnings.

RASHID KARAMI, Prime Minister of Lebanon, commenting on a cease fire plan in Lebanon, as Beirut television reported over 150 people killed and 350 wounded in a single day of fighting: It suffices to congratulate the people on the fact that God has graced us after 4 intense and painful days. We can now call for a halt to the fighting between brothers and allies. If (the militias) respond, we thank them — for what? For all of the evil they have done to these people, who placed their confidence in them.

And Other Issues

YITZHAK RABIN, on prisoner exchanges with terrorists: I have never considered it a matter of principle not to give in to terrorists if I do not have a military option, especially when we are speaking about IDF soldiers missing since June 1982. If there is no military option after half a year, a year, and sometimes even 2 or 3 years, I cannot say in principle I am against a deal. No Israeli government has ever been against this and this attitude has been implemented.

ENCLOSURE
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100-101-102-103-104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111-112-113-114-115-116-117-118-119-120-121-122-123-124-125-126-127-128-129-130-131-132-133-134-135-136-137-138-139-140-141-142-143-144-145-146-147-148-149-150-151-152-153-154-155-156-157-158-159-160-161-162-163-164-165-166-167-168-169-170-171-172-173-174-175-176-177-178-179-180-181-182-183-184-185-186-187-188-189-190-191-192-193-194-195-196-197-198-199-200-201-202-203-204-205-206-207-208-209-210-211-212-213-214-215-216-217-218-219-220-221-222-223-224-225-226-227-228-229-230-231-232-233-234-235-236-237-238-239-240-241-242-243-244-245-246-247-248-249-250-251-252-253-254-255-256-257-258-259-260-261-262-263-264-265-266-267-268-269-270-271-272-273-274-275-276-277-278-279-280-281-282-283-284-285-286-287-288-289-290-291-292-293-294-295-296-297-298-299-300-301-302-303-304-305-306-307-308-309-310-311-312-313-314-315-316-317-318-319-320-321-322-323-324-325-326-327-328-329-330-331-332-333-334-335-336-337-338-339-340-341-342-343-344-345-346-347-348-349-350-351-352-353-354-355-356-357-358-359-360-361-362-363-364-365-366-367-368-369-370-371-372-373-374-375-376-377-378-379-380-381-382-383-384-385-386-387-388-389-390-391-392-393-394-395-396-397-398-399-400-401-402-403-404-405-406-407-408-409-410-411-412-413-414-415-416-417-418-419-420-421-422-423-424-425-426-427-428-429-430-431-432-433-434-435-436-437-438-439-440-441-442-443-444-445-446-447-448-449-450-451-452-453-454-455-456-457-458-459-460-461-462-463-464-465-466-467-468-469-470-471-472-473-474-475-476-477-478-479-480-481-482-483-484-485-486-487-488-489-490-491-492-493-494-495-496-497-498-499-500-501-502-503-504-505-506-507-508-509-510-511-512-513-514-515-516-517-518-519-520-521-522-523-524-525-526-527-528-529-530-531-532-533-534-535-536-537-538-539-540-541-542-543-544-545-546-547-548-549-550-551-552-553-554-555-556-557-558-559-560-561-562-563-564-565-566-567-568-569-570-571-572-573-574-575-576-577-578-579-580-581-582-583-584-585-586-587-588-589-590-591-592-593-594-595-596-597-598-599-600-601-602-603-604-605-606-607-608-609-610-611-612-613-614-615-616-617-618-619-620-621-622-623-624-625-626-627-628-629-630-631-632-633-634-635-636-637-638-639-640-641-642-643-644-645-646-647-648-649-650-651-652-653-654-655-656-657-658-659-660-661-662-663-664-665-666-667-668-669-670-671-672-673-674-675-676-677-678-679-680-681-682-683-684-685-686-687-688-689-690-691-692-693-694-695-696-697-698-699-700-701-702-703-704-705-706-707-708-709-710-711-712-713-714-715-716-717-718-719-720-721-722-723-724-725-726-727-728-729-730-731-732-733-734-735-736-737-738-739-740-741-742-743-744-745-746-747-748-749-750-751-752-753-754-755-756-757-758-759-760-761-762-763-764-765-766-767-768-769-770-771-772-773-774-775-776-777-778-779-780-781-782-783-784-785-786-787-788-789-790-791-792-793-794-795-796-797-798-799-800-801-802-803-804-805-806-807-808-809-810-811-812-813-814-815-816-817-818-819-820-821-822-823-824-825-826-827-828-829-830-831-832-833-834-835-836-837-838-839-840-841-842-843-844-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852-853-854-855-856-857-858-859-860-861-862-863-864-865-866-867-868-869-870-871-872-873-874-875-876-877-878-879-880-881-882-883-884-885-886-887-888-889-890-891-892-893-894-895-896-897-898-899-900-901-902-903-904-905-906-907-908-909-910-911-912-913-914-915-916-917-918-919-920-921-922-923-924-925-926-927-928-929-930-931-932-933-934-935-936-937-938-939-940-941-942-943-944-945-946-947-948-949-950-951-952-953-954-955-956-957-958-959-960-961-962-963-964-965-966-967-968-969-970-971-972-973-974-975-976-977-978-979-980-981-982-983-984-985-986-987-988-989-990-991-992-993-994-995-996-997-998-999-1000-1001-1002-1003-1004-1005-1006-1007-1008-1009-1010-1011-1012-1013-1014-1015-1016-1017-1018-1019-1020-1021-1022-1023-1024-1025-1026-1027-1028-1029-1030-1031-1032-1033-1034-1035-1036-1037-1038-1039-1040-1041-1042-1043-1044-1045-1046-1047-1048-1049-1050-1051-1052-1053-1054-1055-1056-1057-1058-1059-1060-1061-1062-1063-1064-1065-1066-1067-1068-1069-1070-1071-1072-1073-1074-1075-1076-1077-1078-1079-1080-1081-1082-1083-1084-1085-1086-1087-1088-1089-1090-1091-1092-1093-1094-1095-1096-1097-1098-1099-1100-1101-1102-1103-1104-1105-1106-1107-1108-1109-1110-1111-1112-1113-1114-1115-1116-1117-1118-1119-1120-1121-1122-1123-1124-1125-1126-1127-1128-1129-1130-1131-1132-1133-1134-1135-1136-1137-1138-1139-1140-1141-1142-1143-1144-1145-1146-1147-1148-1149-1150-1151-1152-1153-1154-1155-1156-1157-1158-1159-1160-1161-1162-1163-1164-1165-1166-1167-1168-1169-1170-1171-1172-1173-1174-1175-1176-1177-1178-1179-1180-1181-1182-1183-1184-1185-1186-1187-1188-1189-1190-1191-1192-1193-1194-1195-1196-1197-1198-1199-1200-1201-1202-1203-1204-1205-1206-1207-1208-1209-1210-1211-1212-1213-1214-1215-1216-1217-1218-1219-1220-1221-12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