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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name GREEN, MAX: FILES

Withdrawer

MJD 10/19/2011

File Folder COMMITTEE ON SDI & ISREAL 10/1/86 (2)

FOIA

F03-0020/06

Box Number

THOMAS

29

DOC NO	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	LISTS	OF PARTICIPANTS	3	ND	B6
2	NOTES	RE PARTICIPANTS	2	ND	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Chuck Knobel
NSC

Big Calender
for 176 of the



Brody
Jers
Guy Rosenberg
Mankin NSC

Sam Cohen
Rose
Sam Moriochen
AIPAC



DEFENSE NEWS

Vol. 1, No. 17

May 12, 1986

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\$2.00

Charles D. Brooks

Israeli SDI Participation Benefits U.S. and Israel

In March 1983, President Reagan formally announced a pioneering defensive strategy predicated on the notion that it is better to save lives than avenge them. The president's plan, called the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI), was designed to replace the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a dangerously obsolete and immoral doctrine of holding civilian population centers hostage to nuclear attack.

In Israel, a nation faced with the ultimate challenge of ensuring self-survival, the president's vision and the invitation to U.S. allies to participate were met with great interest. After preliminary discussions, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin formally responded to the American invitation agreeing "in principle" to participate in the initial research and development

Charles Brooks is the outreach director for the National Jewish Coalition in Washington, D.C., and also serves as a liaison for High Frontier to the Jewish community. He was educated at DePauw University in Indiana, The Hague Academy of International Law and holds a master's in international relations from the University of Chicago.

phases of the SDI program.

The strategic, economic and political implications of Israeli involvement in SDI are significant. The most immediate benefit to Israel will be the development of missile interception technologies. The invitation sent to the allies specifically states that the program will "examine technologies with potential against shorter-range ballistic missiles," and antitactical missile technologies are likely to be among the first to be developed.

The use of surface-to-surface missiles against major cities in the Iran-Iraq war has alerted the Israeli defense establishment to the urgent need for such technologies. Syria, Israel's foremost adversary, has already deployed highly accurate and lethal SS-21 missiles capable of reaching Israeli population centers, air bases, storage depots and other vital facilities.

Gen. Dan Graham, USA (Ret.), founder and director of High Frontier, the organization from which many of the concepts for SDI arose, has noted these implications for Israeli defense planning. Obtaining defenses against SS-21s, he said, "would enable Israel actually to defend itself . . . rather than simply deter attack by threat of retaliation."

While the threat of retaliation has served Israel well in the

past, this option may no longer be effective in light of the changing realities of modern warfare and the increasingly fanatical character of Israel's enemies. Such threats are unlikely to deter enemies whose scant regard for human life is reflected in suicide bombings in Lebanon and the use of poison gas in the Gulf war. To guard against the growing ballistic missile threat, Israel must move beyond deterrence to develop a defense against missile attacks if she is to survive.

In a paper presented in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, W. Seth Carus, a military analyst for the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), called attention to Israel's growing vulnerability to missile attack. Carus pointed out that by 1990 Arab armies will possess large numbers of surface-to-surface missiles armed with sophisticated warheads. As the Arab inventory of SS-21 missiles grows, he noted, a missile attack on vital Israeli installations would leave the country dangerously vulnerable. In addition, he wrote, existing technologies alone would be insufficient to defend against such attacks, even if Israel knew of them in advance.

Dr. Robert O'Neil, director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Stud-

ies, has also pointed out the inherent benefits of Israeli participation in SDI. O'Neil believes that Israel's involvement will allow Israel to remain abreast of the technologies central to a tactical missile defense.

Avram Schweitzer, a journalist with Israel's respected *Ha'Aretz* newspaper, perhaps best describes the benefits of SDI interception technologies:

"To be in on this kind of technology . . . could mean the purchase of peace for Israel, or more realistically, the imposition, by non-aggressive means, of a permanent state of non-belligerence along its borders."

Besides the utilization of missile interception technologies, Israel will also benefit in other ways from participation in SDI. Israel's industrial future will be greatly enhanced by being at the forefront of the SDI technological revolution while spinoffs could include new computer systems, energy sources, communication devices, medicines and consumer products. Research funds from SDI will help revitalize the universities and the Israeli scientific community.

SDI cooperation will be of critical importance to the Israel defense industrial base that will otherwise be subject to foreign aid cutbacks generated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction bill. In particular, SDI will provide jobs and revenues to defense-related industries who have already been forced to cut back on research and development activities because of lack of funds.

America will also benefit from

Israeli involvement in SDI. Israel's high state of technological and scientific capability can be utilized in SDI research. The Israeli Defense Forces demonstrated an unforeseen mastery over command, control and communications by downing more than 80 Syrian jet fighters with no losses during the recent Lebanon conflict. Their expertise in battle-tested technologies would immensely enhance development of weapon systems. In addition, the Israelis are known for their rapid turn-around times from research and development to making weaponry operational. Israeli involvement can serve to catalyze the entire SDI program by accelerating the pace of the effort.

Israel's acceptance of Reagan's invitation to participate in SDI should yield invaluable dividends particularly in the critical area of development of ballistic missile interception technologies. Unable to match the quantitative advantage in weaponry accumulated by her numerous adversaries, Israel's involvement in SDI should enable her to maintain a qualitative edge necessary for survival.

Israel can only be part of this strategic, technological, economic and political revolution if SDI is funded and promoted by Congress. With the help of Israel's friends in America, SDI may prove to be the most important project ever undertaken by the two allies.

Fri 6/27

Committee on Israel & Strategic Defense

→ Major White House Event w/ Cabinet level officials leading

→ to still impact on floor vote

Time — by September

100 or more people invited

media event

WH invitation

room 450

80 for POTUS or VICE PRES. / cabinet / technical

Congress back in by Sept 8

Former people, academics, experts

[find out how the Shanon

BIPARTISAN, LEADERSHIP

Educational committee to disseminate info.

scholar LEON WALK, HUGO, DAVID SIDOROVICH, ELLIOT COHEN, LASHON STONOW SEIBER

High Frontier in Europe ^{small} Japan

SDIO → contract architecture study for theatre defense (in Europe [will help Israel] as well)

ATBM: amendments in Congress

SDIO tends to shy away from it (SDIO afraid it will → APPROVED)

FIND OUT:

ATBM → ^{NO} ABM TREATY PROBLEM (ISRAEL NOT COVERED BY ABM Treaty)

Benefit to Israel ~

" " U.S. to build later on

(ABZ TO SABRE TO PERS COME IN NY.)

Theater Head connection ^{may} carry SD
something to replace Troops in Europe

(JEFF: SDI ISRAEL MTG)

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

July 3, 1986

TO:

FROM: MARI MASENG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE
OF PUBLIC LIAISON

ROD McDANIEL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REQUEST: For the Secretary of Defense and Director of
SDIO to address private sector supporters of
SDI - with a particular interest in the
Israeli participation in the research effort.
The meeting would be with members of
Committee on SDI and Israel.

PURPOSE: To mobilize support for SDI.

BACKGROUND: Since the President's March 1983 speech on
SDI, the public image of the research program
has been diminished by an organized
opposition. Among many of the criticisms of
opponents of the SDI is the issue that the
program has divided opinions among our Allies

regarding their participation in the research. This meeting will afford the Administration a prime opportunity to bolster the public image of SDI as the group consists of members who are supportive of the program and aware of the benefits to such nations as Israel - one of three nations who have signed a formal agreement to participate in SDI.

PREVIOUS

PARTICIPATION: None

LOCATION: Indian Treaty Room

DATE: September 17, 1986

DURATION:

PARTICIPANTS: Members of Committee on SDI and Israel - a Washington based coalition of supporters of the missile defense program who are also concerned and very supportive of the Israeli participation in the research effort.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS:

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE:

RECOMMENDED BY: Mari Maseng, Rod McDaniel

PROJECT OFFICER: Max Green x6270

(Israel & SDI)
12 August 1986

TALKING POINTS OPPOSING THE
GLENN AMENDMENT RESTRICTING ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH

- The amendment would prohibit the award of future SDI contracts to foreign firms unless those contracts were specifically for research, development, test or evaluation in connection with antitactical ballistic missile systems, or unless the Secretary of Defense certified to the Congress that the work of the contract could not reasonably be performed by a U.S. firm.
- All SDI contracts to allied firms are granted strictly on the basis of technical merit. Consistent with U.S. laws and regulations, sole-source awards may be made where unique capabilities exist, but the vast majority of contracts are awarded through competitive procurement.
- Allied participation in SDI research -- brought about through technical merit and rigorous competition -- is of great benefit to the United States. It enables us to accomplish SDI research objectives as quickly as possible, with work of the highest quality, and at the lowest cost. *To do otherwise would cheat the U.S. taxpayer.*
- This amendment would seriously restrict the ability of the United States to award SDI contracts through open, competitive procurement. As such, it would risk raising the overall costs of the SDI program and increasing the time required to pursue the research, as well as jeopardize our ability to achieve our technical objectives fully.
- Moreover, this amendment would be utterly contrary to the spirit and purposes of the Memoranda of Understanding on SDI participation we have signed with the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel.
- When he first announced the SDI in March 1983, President Reagan made it clear that the program was designed to enhance allied as well as U.S. security. Consistent with that mandate, many of the technologies being examined under the SDI hold promise for defense against shorter-range as well as strategic ballistic missiles.
 - Limited to work pursued specifically for ATBM purposes, the ATBM exception in this amendment would severely restrict allied ability to perform such dual-use SDI research projects. Therefore, it would jeopardize U.S. and allied ability to develop an effective defense against the growing threat posed by Soviet shorter-range ballistic missiles -- a need about which the Congress has shown increasing concern.
- The only reasonable approach to SDI contracting is that which has been followed thus far, based firmly on the principle of genuine competition.

12 August 1986

TALKING POINTS OPPOSING THE
AUCOIN AMENDMENT RESTRICTING ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH

- The proposed amendment would prohibit SDI research contracts to foreign firms which exceeded \$100,000.
- Such a prohibition would directly contravene the basic principle of competition in Federal Government contracting -- a principle on which the Congress has long insisted.
- All SDI contracts to allied firms, are granted strictly on the basis of technical merit. Consistent with U.S. laws and regulations, sole-source awards may be made where unique capabilities exist, but the vast majority of contracts are awarded through competitive procurement.
- Allied participation in SDI research -- brought about through technical merit and rigorous competition -- is of great benefit to the United States. It enables us to accomplish SDI research objectives as quickly as possible, with work of the highest quality, and at the lowest cost. *To do otherwise would cheat the U.S. taxpayer.*
- By seriously restricting competition for SDI contracts, the proposed amendment would deny us the opportunity to take advantage of the expertise of allied firms. It would thereby raise the overall costs of the SDI program, increase the time required to pursue the research, and jeopardize our ability to achieve our technical objectives fully.
- In addition, any such provision would almost certainly inspire counterpart legislation in allied countries, closing vital high technology markets to U.S. firms. Given the far greater role US defense enterprises play in our allies' markets relative to their firms' influence in ours, such a development would be profoundly contrary to our interests.
- Moreover, this amendment would be utterly contrary to the spirit and purposes of the Memoranda of Understanding on SDI participation we have signed with the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Dickinson:

I understand that Representative AuCoin has proposed an Amendment that all SDI contracts over \$100,000 be subject to "buy American" provisions. I am writing to explain to you why the State Department strongly opposes this legislation.

Ever since President Reagan announced the SDI program, on March 23, 1983, a fundamental tenet of our SDI policy has been that U.S. and allied security are indivisible. We have committed ourselves to consult with our allies on the SDI research program, and we will continue to work closely with them to ensure that, as our research progresses, their views are carefully considered.

In March, 1985, Secretary Weinberger invited our allies to participate in SDI research because it is manifest that the SDI program and Western security as a whole will be strengthened by taking advantage of allied excellence in many research areas relevant to SDI. Allied contributions could reduce both the schedule and cost of research. Allied participation could also provide access (not now available to the U.S.) to existing facilities and special teams of researchers with special experience. Finally, the Allies can offer unique insights into theater defense architecture studies. Thus, it has been our policy that allied participation should be considered when it means that a project can be completed more effectively, at less cost, or more quickly than if performed by a domestic contractor.

Since Secretary Weinberger's invitation, we have received expressions of interest in participating in the SDI program from a number of allied countries. We already have concluded formal SDI Memoranda of Understanding with the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Israel, and expect other allies to take similar steps soon. Even those countries which have indicated they do not want to participate directly in the program have not ruled out the involvement of their private research institutions or individual companies.

The Honorable
William L. Dickinson,
House of Representatives.

In our discussions with allies we have emphasized that participation in the SDI program will be on the basis of technical merit. There will be no set-asides or guarantees of research contracts, and most contracts will be granted through competitive procurement. Moreover, all of our agreements contain provisions restricting and governing military and commercial uses by the allies of the research findings and will ensure the full protection of controlled technical data.

We strongly believe, therefore, that our policy of providing the widest possible basis for allied participation consistent with U.S. laws, regulations, and policies is a sound one. If the amendment proposed by Representative AuCoin passes, it would restrict severely our ability to take advantage of allied technical expertise, would slow progress in the SDI research program, would increase the costs of SDI, and would damage the shared U.S. and allied security interests upon which the SDI program has been built.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

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Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

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To MG
Date 9/10 Time 1:00

WHILE YOU WERE OUT

M Col Anderson
of Pentagon
Phone 695-8733

Area Code	Number	Extension
TELEPHONED		PLEASE CALL
CALLED TO SEE YOU		WILL CALL AGAIN
WANTS TO SEE YOU		URGENT

RETURNED YOUR CALL

Message S.B.I.O

Conference for Oct.

→ Copy of invitation →
→ audience

Operator



AMPAD
EFFICIENCY®

23-020

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Max Hugel

Ivan Boesky

Paul Borman

Edward Luttwark

David Meizelman

Daniel Pipes

Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz

Rabbi Victor Weissberg

Emmanuel Winston

Herb Zweibon

Gordon Zacks

Chris Gersten

Rabbi Samuel Dresner

Rabbi Josh Haberman

Jean + Rael Isaac

Sam Kane

Rabbi Herzl Kanf

Ed Levy

Bill Lowenberg

Committee
on
S.D. and
Israel

Howard Magnus

Bob Mayer

Michael Hedeen

Marshall Bregor

Abel Berland

Dr. Petr Beckman

Rabbi David Ben Ami

Fabian Kolkor

R. Alvin Rabinstein

David Vessel

September
17

Indian Treaty Rm

press Conference

April

John

Winters

abim

POV

351 done as of 9/22/86 Part 3 of 3

REQUEST FOR MULTIPLE MAILING

9-17-86

(Date)

I. TO: White House Administrative Office, Room 1, OEOB

FROM: MAX GREEN Ext. 6270

Description of Request: (Attach text of letter, copy of mailing list, sample of enclosure(s) etc.)

Names + addresses marked by a red X^{or} need to be entered into the computer and letters sent out. a.s.a.p (9-18/9-19 best) List approx 200 names.

We would like an R.S.U.P list back and a list of names for the files. The list should be stored in the computer for future use.

This is an invitation inviting ~~the~~ Administration Supporters of SDI and Israel to a briefing about SDI and Israel.

Approved: [Signature]

Disapproved: _____

(Cost Estimate: 9/18)

II. TO: Biff Henley, Room 80

FROM: White House Administrative Office

Attached mailing has been approved and is to be entered into Name/List Service if appropriate

Rec'd 9/18/86 4:45
Sent to Sup 6 9/22
PT 1 rec'd in Rm 62 @ 3:00 p.m.

III. TO: Maureen Hudson, Room 60

FROM: Records Management

☒ List MM13 is being transmitted for attached request

☐ Attached does not qualify for Name/List Service

Part 3 of 3 this

Abel - Zola to Matt 9/23
2:45
pm

September 18, 1986

Dear Mr. _____:

I am pleased to invite you to a White House briefing on SDI and Israel at 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, October 1, 1986. Our speakers that day will be the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Lt. General James A. Abrahamson, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, Frank Gaffney.

If you can attend, please call (202) 456-6411 by 5:00 p.m. on Monday, September 29, and provide your social security number, date of birth, and phone number. Also, please verify the exact spelling of your name as it appears on your personal identification.

Please arrive at 1:30 p.m. on October 1 at the Pennsylvania Avenue Entrance of the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB), which is at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. Remember to bring your photo identification (driver's license or current passport.) This invitation is not transferable and parking will not be provided.

I hope you can join us for what I know will be a very informative briefing.

Sincerely,

Max Green
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison