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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jerusalem
Hilton

King David

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/12

Max, re: Israel Trp

Leave National 3/14 6:35 pm
Pan Am #594

Arrive JFK 7:40 pm

EL AL Flight 008 Departs 10:40 pm
- You need to check in 2 hours before flight leaves.
- You are on the highest priority to get into Business Class. Calling supervisor to pull strings (WH, MAbram, etc.)

March 23, 1987

Depart Tel Aviv 1:00 am
El Al Flight 001

Arrive JFK 6:00 am

Depart JFK 8:15 am Pan Am flight 781

(Lobos via 6:30, 7:00, 7:30, 8:00 am)
Arrive National 9:30 am

NOTE: Israel Bonds Briefing 10:00 am 450 OEOB
ADL 3 pm
Agudath Israel 4:30 pm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MARI MASENG

FROM: MAX GREEN

Subject: Trip to Israel, per Johnathan Miller request

I plan to leave for Israel on Saturday, March 14, and return Sunday March 22.

My expenses will be reimbursed by the Jewish Policy Center.

Both NSC and State have been informed that I will be going and the purpose. I have consulted with Dennis Ross of NSC and Phil Wilcox of the Israeli Desk at State who is working out many of the arrangements.

I will be leaving with Morris Abram, the Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations. I will also be visiting the West Bank with him on Monday, March 16. This is being arranged by the U.S. Consul General. I will also be attending most sessions of the President's Conference conference, where virtually all the top Israeli leaders will be speaking. In addition I will be going with Morris Abram to private meetings with Israelis, whom State thinks Abram ought to meet.

There are many reasons for my going on this trip. One, it will give me the opportunity of being with the leaders of virtually all the major Jewish organizations for a full week, during which time I intend to explain to them the importance of SDI to Israeli security, why Israel must adopt economic reforms at a faster pace than it has, etc. In other words I will be explaining American policy to them.

Moreover, I have and continue to influence the itinerary. Largely due to my input the group will see an F-16 fly-in. Similarly, largely due to my efforts Morris Abram will be visiting the West Bank, which is something both NSC and State want him to do.

Third, during and after the sessions with Israeli leaders I will raise the appropriate questions and make the appropriate comments. This is in fact why the President's Conference has invited me to participate.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/12

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Conference of Presidents
Of Major American Jewish Organizations

(212) 752-1616 • 515 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022 • Cable Address: COJOGRA

February 27, 1987

TO: MISSION PARTICIPANTS

FROM: BOB ASHER
MORRIS B. ABRAM

RE: UPDATED MISSION SCHEDULE

Plans for the Mission program for the forthcoming trip to Israel are progressing well. We enclose an updated tentative program for your information. Under separate cover you will also be receiving background materials to help prepare for the sessions. We also would like to remind you about the background briefing with Dr. Dov Zackheim on the Lavie which will be held on Thursday, March 5 at 3:30 pm at 515 Park Avenue.

If you have not sent in your full payment for the Mission we ask that you do so immediately. Should you have any questions regarding arrangements please contact Susan Goldberg.

A number of people have asked about inviting guests from Israel. For those sessions that are not closed a very limited number of guests will be permitted but it will be necessary for them to register and pay for the individual sessions.

We look forward with great anticipation to a worthwhile and exciting experience.

BA
MBA

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR ISRAELI MISSION

Tuesday, March 17

7:30 am	Arrival, Ben-Gurion Airport/Press conference Departure to Hilton Hotel
12 noon	Lunch with Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem and other dignitaries
1 - 4:30 pm	"Inside Jerusalem" tour led by Teddy Kollek (onsite discussion of inter- and intra-group issues; meeting with religious leaders; visits to special sites, etc.)
5:30 pm	Mission Reception - Hilton Hotel
6:30 pm	Hadassah Gala Dinner - Binyani Ha'Ooma

Wednesday, March 18

8 - 9:00 am	Breakfast with Minister of Absorption Tzur
9:15 - 11:30 am	Knesset - meeting with Foreign Relations and Security Committee; Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel
12 - 1:30 pm	Dialogue with Prime Minister Shamir - Hilton [not lunch]
1:30 - 3:30 pm	Lunch - panel on Economic Affairs Bruno, Keysar, Lautman - Hilton
3:30 - 4:30 pm	Minister of Finance Nissim - Hilton
5:30 pm	Reception hosted by President Herzog at President's House
8:30 pm	Home hospitality With "future leaders" of Israel

Thursday, March 19

8 - 9:00 am	Breakfast with Yossi Beilin, Director General, Foreign Ministry
9 - 10:00 am	Dialogue with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
11:00 am	Defense and intelligence briefings on Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, West bank, Syria, etc. Shachak, Lubrani, Goren

(Thurs. continued)

12:30 - 2:00 pm	Lunch with Minister of Defense Rabin
2 - 3:30 pm	Briefing by Director General, Ministry of Defense Ivri, "Flyby" of Lavie and briefing; IAI, etc.
4 - 6:00 pm	Special Event on US - Israel strategic cooperation
8:30 pm	"Jerusalem Extravaganza" hosted by Mayor Kollek in Tzidkiyahu's Cave

Friday, March 20

8 - 9:30 am	Breakfast with Yosef Ben Aharon, Director of Prime Minister's office and Eli Rubenstein, Government Secretary
9:30 - 11:00 am	International Terrorism - Yariv and Merrari
11 - 12:00 pm	Director General of Ministry of Health and Director General of Social Welfare
12 - 1:30 pm	US - Israel Relations: issues in the relationship with Minister Moshe Arens and Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
1:30 - 2:30 pm	Small meetings with key Arab personalities Afternoon Free
7:00 pm	Kabalat Shabbat at Kotel Shabbat dinner - The Future of Soviet Jewry - King David. Essas, Fabricante, Scharansky
	(Arrangements have been made for services at local synagogues.)

Saturday, March 21

FREE	
8:00 pm	Reception given by US Ambassador to Israel Thomas Pickering - Embassy Residence

Sunday, March 22

8:00 am	Leave for tour of Negev sites with Foreign Minister Peres
1:00 pm	Lunch with Foreign Minister Peres at Sde Boker marking the centennial of David Ben-Gurion's birth
Afternoon	Leave directly for Eilat or return to Jerusalem/Tel Aviv

After the Lavi

Gerald Steinberg

EVEN FOR its critics, the first flight of the Lavi was exciting. The little Jewish state has successfully designed and, with some American help, produced a highly sophisticated, state-of-the-art aircraft. There was collective pride in watching it fly over Tel Aviv with the Magen David and the insignia of the Israel Aircraft Industries. Israel has entered a highly exclusive club, which, heretofore, had included only the Americans, the Soviets, and a few others.

The thrill of the test flight, however, should not be allowed to interfere with a careful appraisal of the future of the Lavi project. For some time, the plane's enormous cost was justified as a move towards independence. This argument was heard less frequently as it became clear that half of each Lavi will be imported, including the engine and wings.

More important, even if the Lavi project is continued, and IAI eventually supplies 200 to 300 planes to the IAF for use as "second line" aircraft, whatever limited "independence" is achieved will be short-lived.

The Lavi is the first and, for the foreseeable future, likely to be the last advanced aircraft designed and produced largely in Israel. As work on the Lavi proceeds, the Americans, Soviets, and some Europeans have already begun work on the aircraft that will enter service by the year 2000. Using "stealth" technology, these aircraft will likely have totally different configurations than those of the F-15s, F-16s, and even the Lavi. Given the ever increasing costs of these military research and development programmes, it is clear that Israel will not be able to afford to enter the next generation of aircraft design and production. In 20 years, if not before, the IAF will again be forced to rely entirely on imported designs and aircraft.

IT IS not the Lavi itself, but the future of IAI and other defence industries that is really the central issue. These industries began to grow after the 1967 Six Day War and French (and British) refusal to sell weapons to the IDF. In a span of a decade, Rafael, Ta'as (Israel Military Industries), Soltam, Elbit, IAI, and more recently tens of smaller subcontractors and related firms, came to constitute the largest and most successful industrial sector in the country.

In the past few years, however, this sector has been beset by a number of difficulties. Rafael, Soltam, Beit Shemesh Engines, and other firms have been forced to lay off hundreds of workers. The export orders on which they relied have declined, or, in some cases, failed to grow to match increasing costs.

By the mid-1980s, the Lavi had become the centrepiece of the Israeli defence industries. In addition to IAI, numerous subcontractors have become dependent on the continuation of the project.

As already noted, there will be no new indigenous aircraft project after the Lavi. Once their work is finished in a few months or years, the aircraft designers at IAI will have little to keep them occupied. In other words, continuation of the Lavi in its present format, even if it were financially possible, will not solve the basic problems of the defence industries in general, and IAI in particular.

Thus, policy making regarding the Lavi must begin with an assessment of the possible ways of salvaging the entire defence industrial sector. In recent years, exports have shifted increasingly to the U.S. and to a

lesser degree, other Western countries. This is economically desirable, because it provides more stable markets, and politically and morally preferable because we can avoid selling to the world's pariahs and murderers.

In its current form, the Lavi is not likely to help Israeli defence industries to penetrate the American and European markets. Congress and the Pentagon do not favour major weapons systems produced outside the U.S. (Even the British Harrier, the only "foreign aircraft" purchased by the U.S. is being produced by McDonnell Douglas.)

The U.S. Marine Corps agreed to lease a few Kfirs for training purposes, but this was largely a political move, and did not greatly help IAI. Furthermore, any suggestion of significant foreign sales of IAI's Lavi are illusions. No Nato country can be expected to buy the Lavi, and the Pentagon has made it clear that, as in the case of the Kfir, it will not approve sales readily.

THE FUTURE of Israeli military exports lies in the design and production of small-scale weapons not made in the U.S. such as the mini-RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) and components for U.S. weapons, and in research and development which can be carried out less expensively in Israel and exploit Israeli knowledge and expertise.

To date, however, such activities have been limited. Despite various formal agreements, Pentagon offi-

cials and rules do not make it easy for Israeli firms to compete for contracts. Even when successful, contracts are signed on an individual project-by-project basis, and provide little stability.

To change this situation, it is necessary for Israeli firms to develop long-term links with major U.S. defence firms. In the past, and now with the Lavi, most American firms view IAI and other Israeli companies as competitors. The U.S. firms often complain to their congressional representatives when an Israeli company wins a Pentagon contract.

These same firms, however, also recognize Israeli capabilities and experience. Many recognize the mutual benefits which could be realized if Israeli firms could become subcontractors and long-term partners in research and development programmes. While perhaps limiting independence to some degree, as well as potential profits, such arrangements could provide a secure, long-term source of export income.

The American partners would be responsible for marketing and sales, and when successful, their Israeli subcontractors would benefit as well. Of course, there are likely to be some problems with such a relationship, and Israeli firms must maintain sufficient independence of action to avoid exploitation by the American giants. But these dangers can be recognized and limited.

The Lavi programme works in the opposite direction, but the current review provides an opportunity to find a new direction. The object of the Lavi effort should be to lay the

foundation of such cooperation between Israeli and American firms, to replace the competition which now exists.

UNFORTUNATELY, the proposals prepared by the Pentagon and presented recently by Dov Zackheim do not address this central issue. Rather, the alternatives focus on the narrow issue of the Lavi itself.

While proposing Israel production of the F-16, for example, Zackheim has offered no incentive to General Dynamics to develop a long-term, cooperative relationship with IAI. Thus, even if this alternative is, in the short-term, militarily acceptable and economically superior to the current Lavi programme, it will not solve the long-term problems of the IAI and military industries in Israel.

One potential solution, apparently not considered by Zackheim, would be an agreement between IAI and Grumman for joint production and marketing of a Lavi-type aircraft, perhaps renamed the F-25 for the purposes of foreign sales. Grumman already plays a major role in the Lavi, providing the wings and other structural elements. Extended cooperation in production and sales would establish a solid foundation for a continued relationship after the Lavi.

Instead of focusing on the narrow issue of the production and procurement of a second-line aircraft to replace ageing Skyhawks and Kfirs, both the Pentagon and the Israel Defence Ministry should be exploring ways in which this project could be used to further cooperative relationships. Zackheim could play an important role in supporting and encouraging this type of partnership.

The writer teaches public policy at the Hebrew University.

LAST WEDNESDAY afternoon, while Pentagon official Dov Zakheim and his team were meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir on the future of the Lavi, Menahem Shmul, the plane's test pilot, was waiting in the cockpit to take off on his second test flight. Strong winds dictated yet another postponement.


This disappointment came at a time when the battle between Israel Aircraft Industries, the Lavi's prime contractor, and Dr. Zakheim, the man charged by the Pentagon with persuading Israel to change its decision to spend an estimated \$8 billion on building its own fighter, had reached a peak. Since Monday, Zakheim and his team had been meeting with top government officials, offering 19 alternatives to the Lavi, including one which would allow Israel to build 300 F-16s over the next decade, at the cost of \$475 million a year.

In a well-researched and professionally presented lecture, Zakheim and his specialists outlined their proposals and the reasons why Israel would not be able to afford to build the plane. In separate sessions crowded into three days, they briefed Prime Minister Shamir, Foreign Minister Peres, Defence Minister Rabin, Finance Minister Nissim, the military, some key figures in the Israel defence industries and the press. While there was much scepticism as to the viability of some of the American's suggestions, especially the one regarding the building of F-15s, F-18s and Harrier aircraft in Israel, Zakheim's remarks on the economic impossibility of the Lavi fell on many a sympathetic Israeli ear.

The Treasury, long an opponent of the Israel fighter, was pleased to add elements of Zakheim's analysis to its arsenal of anti-Lavi arguments, while many general staff officers including senior air force personnel, had their growing doubts about the plane re-inforced. By the time Zakheim and his team left Israel at the end of the week, the Lavi's future had never looked bleaker.

Though Zakheim had arrived in Israel just days after the Lavi's successful maiden flight, he had come at a time when the plane was beginning to look like an unobtainable dream to even its staunchest supporters. It was three months behind schedule in its development and, due to a high shekel exchange rate to the dollar, labour costs on the plane had jumped from \$22 to around \$37 an hour. Clearly, it would not be possible to build 24 of the planes for the planned \$550 million a year. Furthermore, projections of the overall size of the Israel air force by the turn of the century made it clear that the IAF would not need 300 Lavis, as originally thought, but probably half that number, making the unit production cost per fighter much higher.

Even the most cautious projections point to the fact that, by the end of this decade, the Lavi programme, even if production was cut to 20 fighters per year, would require at least \$100m. more than the \$550m. originally allocated. Zakheim



Answers to

The Jerusalem Post's Defence Correspondent H
Israel stop the Lavi project in favour of alternative

could not have been more explicit, telling his Israeli listeners that this additional cost would not be borne by the Americans and that Israel should not hope for an increase in the military aid package beyond its current level of \$1.8b. per year. Israeli military planners, faced with an ever-decreasing local military budget, are equally emphatic that the money cannot come from local defence resources, not to mention those in the Treasury who, given half the chance, would cut the defence budget further.


AT ISRAEL AIRCRAFT Industries, where many of the people closest to the Lavi have been working 20-hour days trying to reduce the development delays, the week's events have been watched with a mixture of trepidation and disgust. Though they would be the chief beneficiaries of any decision to build F-16s or any of the Pentagon's other alternatives, they remain dedicated to the Lavi. Zakheim's proposals, they feel, are nothing short of a convenient smokescreen for those short-sighted Israelis who prefer cash for current needs to an investment in the future.

"You know how much this country has

invested in bank shares?" Moshe Keret, the IAI's chief executive asked when we met recently, answering himself before any response could be made. "Seven billion dollars. That's how much. Just lying there as so much useless, unproductive paper. Seven billion is equal to the entire Lavi programme. Don't let them tell me that there's no money. It is just a question of priorities and as far as I'm concerned we have ours all mixed up," he said.

Though Keret's voice may be a lonely one these days, his arguments cannot be discounted. He points out, correctly, that, had Israel not gone ahead with the Lavi in the first place, Zakheim would not be in Israel with a thick file of offers to build five different aircraft in the country. Moreover, had there not been a Lavi, Israel would never have received the special Act of Congress \$300m. grant to be spent in Israel - money that many in the IDF would like to divert to other research and development projects.

For each of the arguments against the Lavi, IAI officials and those in the defence establishment who remain committed to the plane, have a counter-argument. To Zakheim's assurance that the U.S. military



Lavi critics

Irish Goodman reviews the consequences should be proposed by the U.S. administration.

aid package will not grow, they point to the last decade when the aid package was first cut when turned from a loan into a grant, and then re-established at its previous level of \$1.8 billion. Moreover, there are many ways of increasing the aid package, such as reducing interest payments on past loans.

With regard to rising labour costs due to an inflated shekel in relation to the dollar, IAI officials point out that the problem is common to all of industry. Creeping inflation has whittled profits down by as much as 25 per cent in the past year and it is clear that at some point the government is going to have to adjust the dollar-shekel rate or watch the country's industries go broke. Such an adjustment would again bring the Lavi labour and production costs into line.

Assuming that the additional \$100m. the Lavi programme is expected to cost cannot be raised from the Americans or locally, other means of financing the plane exist. These include partnerships with foreign governments and aeronautic industries, and issuing government-sponsored bonds, though the bad experience of the aborted Med-Dead Canal in the early 80s has cast a serious shadow over the willingness of

either Israelis or Jews abroad to invest in national projects.

There is also a lot of demagoguery in the Pentagon's economic arguments, they claim. Added to the projected \$475m. cost to build 300 F-16s in Israel - assuming that the plane's manufacturer, General Dynamics, would allow the plane to be built here and would agree on the Pentagon's price - one must consider the cost of closing down the Lavi project. This figure has been conservatively estimated at \$400m. for penalty payments to such suppliers as Pratt and Whitney, Grumman and Lear-Ziegler, and an additional unknown amount in compensation to the hundreds of technicians and engineers who would be laid off.

Zakheim's estimated \$475 million cost to build F-16s here is based on the assumption that 300 planes would be built. Just as the air force will clearly not be able to absorb 300 Lavis, so it will not be able to absorb 300 F-16s, thereby pushing up the local production costs of the American fighter to almost those of the Lavi. The F-16s will also be subject to the same weak dollar currently pushing up the Lavi labour and production costs, ultimately resulting in very little real saving.

The net result of all this could be that Israel will have forfeited a programme that has brought this country to the forefront of avionic, electronic and aerodynamic technology, and have sacrificed a fighter vastly superior to the venerated, but 20-year-old, F-16, for marginal economic gain. While the production side of the IAI will have work, the technological and development areas of the industry will be thwarted. While some of the "brains" may be diverted into new research and development projects generated by the modest millions freed by changing to the F-16, there will not be enough work for the more than 2,000 technicians and engineers now employed on the Lavi, not to mention the hundreds who have been laid off by Rafael, the Armaments Development Authority, and the other military industries.

The real option facing Israel is not whether the F-16 should be built here instead of the Lavi since there seems to be little to gain and much to be lost by doing so. The alternative Israel faces is whether to go ahead with the Lavi or buy a fighter in the U.S., using only the U.S. aid money to do so and thereby making the \$300m. Lavi grant available for other uses in Israel. To do so would be tantamount to the death knell for the IAI - a company that currently employs 22,000 workers and generates over a billion dollars a year in turnover, more than half in exports - and dozens of other Israel industries connected with the project.

While military planners here may gain \$300m. a year to invest in those areas of Israel's defence they feel need bolstering by killing the Lavi, it is not at all certain that the money will be effectively spent. Some will go into researching new weapons systems that, like the Lavi, could land up as white elephants or never leave the drawing boards for lack of production funds. The remainder will be dissipated to cover current military activities, such as more training for the standing army and reserves and in VAT and other indirect taxes to the Treasury (which already deducts 15 per cent of the \$300m. Lavi grant in VAT), leaving Israel with no Lavi and no real alternative project to keep Israel at the forefront of the qualitative battle against the growing arsenals of its enemies.

WHILE THE arguments against the Lavi cannot be ignored, and while any national project that will commit this country to an expenditure of around \$8 billion over the next decade has to be questioned and monitored, those advocating the Lavi's instant demise should pause and think of the deeper consequences.

Or as Moshe Keret noted: "Sure, as things look now the airforce may only need 150 Lavis by the year 2000. But what, if in three years time, the Iraq-Iran war ends. Then they will need 300 planes again, and not only won't we be able to provide them, we will have precious little to offer instead."

**THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION**

NO. 11171

Date of Request February 19, 1988

1. TRAVELER:

Name: Max Green ☒ White House Staff
Extension: 6270 Room: 196 ☐ Other: _____

2. PURPOSE(s) and DATE(s): March 16-20 to have an administration presence
and influence on this politically important trip.

3. ITINERARY: WDC-Israel and return

(List all cities where stopovers occur.)

DEPARTURE			RETURN		
Date:	Time:	Mode:	Date:	Time:	Mode:
3/16/87	am	air	3/21/87	pm	air

5. FUNDING SOURCE:

☐ OFFICIAL ☐ POLITICAL ☒ 501 (c) (3) ☐ OTHER _____


6. SPECIAL EXPENSES

☐ Commercial Car Rental ☐ Taxi
☐ Hotel
Name: _____
☐ Other: _____

TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Amount \$ _____
Recipient's
Signature: _____
Date: _____

Please See Reverse Side for Further Instructions Regarding Travel Expenses

7. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: 
(I have read and agree to the terms set forth on the reverse side.)

8. APPROVING SIGNATURES:

Office Head: _____

Approving Official
(Political or Foreign Travel): _____

Deputy Assistant to the President
for Administration: _____

9. FOR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE USE ONLY:

Control No. _____ Account: _____

ORIGINAL (Return With Voucher)

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
3. ITINERARY: WDC-Israel and return
 (List all cities where stopovers occur.)

DEPARTURE			RETURN		
Date:	Time:	Mode:	Date:	Time:	Mode:
3/15/87	6 ⁰⁰ pm	air	3/23/87	6 ⁰⁰ am	air


5. FUNDING SOURCE:
☐ OFFICIAL ☐ POLITICAL ☒ 501(c)(3) ☐ OTHER _____

SPECIAL EXPENSES	TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED
☐ Commercial Car Rental ☐ Taxi ☐ Hotel Name: _____ ☐ Other: _____	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Amount \$ _____ Recipient's Signature: _____ Date: _____

Please See Reverse Side for Further Instructions Regarding Travel Expenses

7. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: 
 (I have read and agree to the terms set forth on the reverse side.)

8. APPROVING SIGNATURES:

Office Head: 

Approving Official
 (Political or Foreign Travel): _____

Deputy Assistant to the President
 for Administration: _____

9. FOR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE USE ONLY:

Control No. _____ Account: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED OPL-WW

07 FEB 10 P 4: 39

February 10, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MARI MASENG

FROM: MAX GREEN

M. *OK MM*
The President's Conference has invited me to join its delegation to Israel. As I told you in a previous memo, I would be out of the office the week of March 16. I would be willing to use five leave days. My travel expenses could be reimbursed by a 501(c)(3) organization as per past practice.

I continue to believe that I can do good work for the Administration on the trip. But, I realize that the decision is yours and that you have many factors to consider.

Apparently, I need a decision on this by Friday. Thanks very much for your consideration of this no matter how you decide.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

NO. 11171

Date of Request February 19, 1987

1. TRAVELER:

Name: Max Green

☒ White House Staff

Extension: 6270

Room: 196

☐ Other: _____

2. PURPOSE(s) and DATE(s): March 16-20 to have an administration presence
and influence on this politically important ~~mission~~ trip.

3. ITINERARY: WDC-Israel and return

(List all cities where stopovers occur.)

4. DEPARTURE

RETURN

Date: 3/15/87

Time: am

Mode: air

Date: 3/21/87

Time: 6pm

Mode: air

5. FUNDING SOURCE:

☐ OFFICIAL ☐ POLITICAL ☒ 501 (c)(3) ☐ OTHER

6. SPECIAL EXPENSES

TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED

☐ Commercial Car Rental

☐ Taxi

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Amount \$ _____

☐ Hotel

Name: _____

Recipient's

Signature: _____

☐ Other: _____

Date: _____

Please See Reverse Side for Further Instructions Regarding Travel Expenses

7. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: _____

(I have read and agree to the terms set forth)

8. APPROVING SIGNATURES:

Office Head: _____

Approving Official

(Political or Foreign Travel): _____

Deputy Assistant to the President
for Administration: _____

9. FOR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE USE ONLY:

Control No. _____

Account: _____

TRAVELER'S COPY

Thanks,
Matt!

me

OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
February 18, 1988

1. TRAVELER: _____
Name: _____
Extension: _____

2. PURPOSE(s) and DATES: _____

3. FUNDING SOURCE: _____

4. APPROVING SIGNATURE: _____

5. APPROVING OFFICIAL: _____
(Signature of Official)

6. TRAVELER'S COPY

**THIS APPROVAL IS SUBJECT TO ALL
APPLICABLE GOVERNMENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS
AS WELL AS THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE
TRAVEL POLICIES**

1. **ADVANCES FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL ONLY**

Cash travel advances will not be provided for political trips.

Advances will not be provided to anyone with an outstanding unaccounted-for advance.

Advances over \$250 require 48-hour notice to White House Administrative Office, Extension 2500.

2. **ADVANCES TO BE REPAID FROM SALARY AFTER 15 DAYS**

Any travel advance which is neither repaid nor accounted for in full by an expense voucher within 15 days after return may be deducted from the staff member's salary.

3. **GOVERNMENT TICKETS FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL ONLY**

Government-issued tickets shall be used for official trips only (i.e., no political or personal travel). The entire cost of any government-issued tickets that are used for unofficial travel will be considered a personal travel advance and treated accordingly.

4. **TO OBTAIN REIMBURSEMENT, RECEIPTS ARE REQUIRED FOR ALL
EXPENDITURES REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT**

5. **FOR DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING TRAVEL REGULATIONS AND
POLICIES, PLEASE REFER TO THE WHITE HOUSE TRAVEL HANDBOOK**
(Additional copies available by calling Extension 2500.)

WEEKLY AND OUTWEEK SCHEDULES

(Five Week Projection)

DATE:

March 16 - 20

TIME:

PLACE:

Israel

EVENT:

President - Conference Leadership trip
to Israel.

PROJECT
OFFICER:

Max Green

SPEAKERS:

TYPE EVENT (Circle the appropriate number)

1. Presidential Participation
2. Vice Presidential Participation
3. White House Briefing
4. Photo Opportunity
5. White House Tour
6. Speeches (Local)
7. Speeches (Out-of-Town)
8. Other

List only definite events. (Do not list requested or tentative events).

ISSUED BY
אל על נתיבי אויר לישראל בע"מ
EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES LTD

SUBJECT TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON BACK OF PASSENGER COUPON

NAME OF PASSENGER

MR. H. BRACHMAN

MISCELLANEOUS
CHARGES ORDER
PASSENGER COUPON

(NOT TRANSFERABLE)

114 4010 266 720 5

TYPE OF SERVICE FOR WHICH ISSUED

ע"מ

VALUE
FOR EX-
CHANGE

AMOUNT IN LETTERS

One Hundred and ninety seven

CURRENCY

AMOUNT IN FIGURES

197.00

1

TO

AT

EL AL ISRAEL

RESERVATION DATA

REMARKS

NOT GOOD FOR PAYMENT

RATE OF EXCHANGE

DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUE

EQUIVALENT AMOUNT PAID

TAX ON MCO

TOTAL

ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH

AGENT

ENDORSEMENTS/RESTRICTIONS (CARBON)

FORM OF PAYMENT

AMERICAN

JED IN EXCHANGE FOR

REMARKS

SIGNAL AIRLINE FORM SERIAL NUMBER PLACE DATE AGENT'S NUMERIC CODE

VOID IF MUTILATED OR ALTERED

VALID ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF ISSUE

THIS ORDER IS NOT VALID AND WILL
NOT BE HONORED UNLESS PRE-
PAID BY EL AL OR ITS
AUTHORIZED TRAVEL AGENT

MAR 14 8

JFK INTERNATIONAL
NEW YORK

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. This Order and any carriage covered by it are subject to currently effective and applicable tariffs, conditions of carriage, rules and regulations of the issuer and of the carrier to whom it is directed and of any carrier performing carriage under the ticket or tickets issued in exchange for this Order.

2. Except as otherwise provided in its tariffs, conditions of carriage or rules and regulations, neither the issuer nor any carrier shall be liable to the purchaser or passenger named on the face hereof in the event of the loss or theft of this Order or if it is honored when presented by any person other than the one named hereon.

3. In Issuing this Order the issuer acts only as agent for the carrier or carriers furnishing the carriage described herein and the issuer shall not be liable for any loss, damage or delay which may be occasioned by, or occur on the lines of, any such carrier or by reason of cancellation of reservations or passage or failure to honor this Order. This Order is not valid unless properly validated by the issuer.

4. In Issuing this Order as an Order upon tour operators, hotels or other persons offering tour services or other services or facilities, the issuer acts only as agent for the tour operators, hotels or other persons upon whom this Order is drawn and the arrangements, including those with owners or contractors providing surface or other transportation, made by such tour operators, hotels or other persons and the services rendered by them are subject to any and all terms and conditions under which such arrangements are made or such services are offered or provided as well as to the laws of the country wherein they are performed. The acceptance of this Order by the person named on the face hereof, or by the person purchasing this Order on behalf of such named person, shall be deemed to be consent to and acceptance by such person or persons of the further condition that neither the issuer nor any of its subsidiary or affiliated companies shall be liable or responsible in any way whatsoever for any loss, injury, damage, or delay to, or in respect of, any person or property arising out of or in connection with such surface or other transportation, accommodations, arrangements or other services.

5. The honouring office reserves the right to obtain authorisation from the issuing office prior to honouring this Order.

- a) Sold subject to tariff regulations.
- b) Price of the services covered by this Order is subject to change prior to usage.
- c) Issued by carrier whose name is in the "Issued by" section on the face of the Order.

Price is subject to change prior to commencement of travel.

REFUND COUPON

(Not valid and not to be filled out if ticket is issued against a Government Transportation Request or Warrant or other credit contract).

Subject to the tariffs, rules and regulations of the Carriers and to all applicable laws and governmental regulations, refund will be made only to the passenger, unless another person shall have been designated below as Refund Payee, and in that event only to such Refund Payee; and in any case only upon surrender of the Passenger Coupon, all unused Flight Coupons and Excess Baggage Tickets.

(Refund Payee)

Signature of Passenger or Purchaser

פס המזחזה זה בתרגום מחייב בשפה העברית, לרבות
נאיים הנ"ל, נמצא בכל משרדי המכירות של החברה ועומד
שות כל המעוניינים.

Oriental Restaurant

"SHEMESH"

21, Ben-Yehuda st. Jerusalem

מסעדה מזרחית

"שמש"

רח' בן יהודה 21, ירושלים

טל. 222418

עוסק מורשה למע"מ מספר 000271247

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מס' לקוח

מקור

TABLE No.

Nº

חשבונית מס מס' 2425

C. C. BREAD & PICKLES

FIRST COURSE

SOUP

MAIN COURSE

WINE

DRINKS

DESSERT

COFFEE TEA

לא כולל שירות

שירות

TOTAL

חתימה

תודה ולהתראות !

17/8/87

2

15

31


10

4

3

ס"ה

$$\begin{array}{r} 8 \\ 16 \\ \hline 96 \end{array}$$



$$\begin{array}{r} 2 \\ 16 \overline{) 75} \\ 32 \\ \hline 43 \\ 120 \end{array}$$

Conference of Presidents Of Major American Jewish Organizations

(212) 752-1616 • 515 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022 • Cable Address: COJOGRA

CORRECTED VERSION

February 19, 1987

To: Max Green

From: Susan Goldberg

Your share of expenses for participation in the Presidents Conference
Mission to Israel March 16 through March 23, 1987 is as follows:

1 night extension Hilton	\$ 48.00
5 nights Hilton/King David; R/T	
airfare	\$1,000.00
1 night extension King David	\$ 68.00
single supplement	\$108.00

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE	\$1,224.00
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Kindly remit.

** Checks payable to Conference of Presidents
Attention Susan Goldberg
Must receive no later than February 27, 1987

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1987

Dear Chris,

As you requested, I have enclosed the vouchers for expenses connected with my trip to Israel. My own are for upgrading the ticket to Israel and for dinner with author Zez Chafetz. Thanks for your cooperation.

Best,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'M. Green' with a stylized flourish at the end.

Max Green
Associate Director for the
Office of Public Liaison

Chris Gersten
National Jewish Coalition
415 Second Street, NE
Suite 100
Washington, D.C. 20002