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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

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**Box Number** 10

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LM 6/17/2025

**FOIA**

F25-033

KUKATOVA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
263462	MEMO	TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON EXCHANGE, RE POTENTIAL FIELDS OF COOPERATION WITH THE USSR  <b>PAR 6/10/2025 NLR-815-63-6-1-6</b>	1	1/6/1986	B1
263463	LETTER	GERSON S. SHER OF THE NSF TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (TTIC) SECRETARIAT  <b>PAR 6/10/2025 NLR-815-63-6-1-6</b>	2	1/1/1986	B1
263464	PROFILE SHEET	FOR NSC 8600393	1	1/15/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

~~Cc - Judge~~ *Law*  
F - US-Sov Exch



January 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Walter Raymond, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President and  
Senior Director for International  
Communication and Information  
National Security Council

FROM : Stanton H. Burnett  
Counselor

SUBJECT : The Coordinator for the President's  
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges Initiatives

As you know, Steve Rhinesmith is among the candidates the Director will be considering for the position of Coordinator for the President's exchanges initiatives with the Soviet Union. For your information, I am attaching some biographic material on Rhinesmith along with a book on international exchanges that he authored. Please note that he headed AFS, when AFS negotiated its teacher-exchange program with the U.S.S.R.

Also attached is a draft of what we see as first steps for the Coordinator.

Attachments: As Stated

2

Requirement One: Develop an inventory of U.S. projects ready for private sector support.

We should accelerate our scanning of the exchanges horizon and immediately begin preparing a fast realistic assessment of what possibilities may exist in each of the six designated areas of the Initiatives and what private-sector organizations are best prepared to carry them out. (Later, the Coordinator should develop, in harmony with the President's own expressed wishes, areas of exchange beyond the initial six). This assessment should be readied for your Moscow trip and make your talks there more productive, if we know of a few "sure bets," and if they are in our interest to pursue. Otherwise we can leave specific proposals to a follow-up meeting by the embassy or the Coordinator.

Requirement Two: Identify potential U.S. sources of support for each of the six areas in the coming weeks.

We don't know yet what the scope of fund-raising will be, especially given the uncertainty of how much traffic the Soviets can bear. But we do suspect that a large-scale national money drive may not be required. There are funds, and legwork organizations, probably ready to undertake key exchange projects at short notice (I am told that two major foundations with endowments earmarked for U.S.-Soviet programs are looking for projects). The Coordinator's efforts during the next 6-9 months should give us a better sense of whether a direct fund-raising appeal is necessary.

Requirement Three: Provide access, facilitation, and the prestige of being participants in the President's Initiatives.

More than funds, potential exchange projects will need the imprimatur of the President's Initiatives, logistical support and our basic facilitation. The effective use of our (the President's) endorsement for participating organizations will enable them to carry out their own fund-raising efforts for projects serving the Initiatives. In this sense, the Coordinator fulfills a critical fund-raising role.

The Coordinator's links to EU and our embassy in Moscow, and through them to Soviet officialdom, will provide valuable access to U.S. organizations.



Requirement Four: Consider ready-to-launch exchange projects to showcase at the next round of Reagan-Gorbachev talks.

The Coordinator must identify potential projects which best capture the 'spirit of Geneva' as the Washington talks approach. Already, there are numerous proposals coming in. Also planned are large-scale citizen-exchange projects, for the most part with their own funding. Expanding the people-to-people exchanges, in some measure, would extend Presidential endorsement of existing or planned (and already funded) efforts. The Coordinator should not lose sight of the President's own vision of an historic jump in the numbers of people exchanged, rather than small increments to traditional programs.

#### FOLLOW-UP WITH THE SOVIETS

Conceivably, a newly-appointed Coordinator could participate in the talks in Moscow this January. Given the proximity of the trip and the Coordinator's own briefing needs before setting out on an official mission, it may be wiser to plan a follow-up visit, possibly in February. The Coordinator would then be in a position to pick up the thread and provide his Soviet counterparts with an additional assessment of U.S. private sector possibilities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Committee on Exchanges**

A Subcommittee of the Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

*Due 24 JAN 86*

COMEX OR-1-86  
6 January 1986

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Committee on Exchange

FROM:



Executive Secretary

25X1

SUBJECT: Potential Fields of Cooperation with the USSR

1. Attached is a letter from the National Science Foundation forwarding a list of "Potential Fields of Cooperation" for future US-USSR science and technology programs. COMEX and the Academic Advisory Panel have recommended that there needs to be prior planning to ensure that the US benefits from cooperative exchange programs and that illegal technology transfer be avoided. Here is our opportunity to have an input BEFORE a proposal is offered to the Soviets for consideration. (C)

2. Please review the 13 fields of study on the list, coordinating with all appropriate offices within your agency. For each, answer three questions:

What is the potential for technology loss?  
What is the potential for technology gain?  
What is the potential for intelligence gain?

Realizing that these fields are of necessity general at this stage, discuss areas of sensitivity within the fields which should be avoided in international negotiations. Where appropriate, offer questions that would need to be answered in a future review of an actual exchange proposal. (C)

3. Your responses should be returned to COMEX by 24 January at the latest so that the Secretariat may meet the NSF deadline. The resulting COMEX position paper will receive a great deal of attention by several policy organizations. I ask you to grant this request the priority handling which it deserves. (C)

25X1

ON FILE NSF RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Authority

*CREST*

BY *LM*

NARA DATE *6/10/25*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20550

DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

January 1, 1986

25X1

[REDACTED]  
TTIC Secretariat  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Jill:

As we have discussed, I am sending you a list of U.S. fields of interest with regard to a potential new cooperative program with the U.S.S.R. in basic science and engineering. The list has been compiled by the NSF's Division of International Programs (INT) from inputs received from the NSF's discipline-oriented programs, which were asked to address in their write-ups issues such as importance of the research, quality of the Soviet effort, prospects for U.S. scientific benefit, and technology transfer. The enclosed list actually represents a follow-up input to OSTP, which has requested more detail on the substantive aspects of the proposed program. For the sake of efficiency, I am sending this list to you, OSTP, and DOS (EUR/SOV and OES/SCT) in parallel.

First, however, I would like to say a few words about the nature of the envisioned program, since I think that form and substance here are integrally related.

What we have in mind is quite different from the old (1972-1982) U.S.-U.S.S.R. Science and Technology Agreement. At the May 1985 COMEX Academic Advisory Committee Meeting, I discussed some of the ways in which a new agreement would have to differ from the old framework. A more recent and pertinent version of these thoughts is incorporated into the attached piece entitled, "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Basic Sciences," which accompanied a late September 1985 letter from Erich Bloch to John McTague, which formally forwarded our proposal to OSTP for consideration. In particular, we believe that a focus on investigator-initiated joint research projects in carefully focused fields of science is more likely to ensure U.S. scientific benefit, and to avoid undesirable technology loss, than the arrangements typical of the old S&T Agreement.

The fields of science described in the enclosed list are of necessity rather generally defined. More precise definitions will come only as a result of agency-to-agency negotiations and, ultimately, scientist-to-scientist interactions with "the other side" as specific project proposals are developed. We expect to be in touch with you through all phases of this iterative process.

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Authority: CREST

BY: LM NARA DATE: 6/10/25


2.

Recent developments have caused our timetable to become a bit more pressed than when we talked at the last ICCUSA Executive Secretaries' Subcommittee. In particular, the National Academy of Sciences has recently indicated that it intends to request NSF support for its program of scientific workshops with the U.S.S.R. Academy, and is pressing for a rapid response regarding topics of interest to NSF. It is therefore critically important that the NSF's list of fields be finalized as soon as possible, as it will provide the basis for our ongoing discussions with the NAS as well as for the NSF's separate initiative with the Soviet Academy. In this light, we ask that you provide us with your response by the end of January if at all possible.

We would greatly appreciate COMEX's consideration of this list. Your detailed comments on its contents are welcomed, as are your suggestions or questions about anything that is not included that you think ought to be included. We are aware that one or two items on the list may warrant further discussion, and we are prepared to provide further information or to meet with you as necessary and appropriate. Nevertheless, in consideration of the time factor, we do ask that any additional consideration of one or more areas not affect your prompt response on the others. Your willingness to work on this basis is much appreciated.

Please let me know if you have any questions as the process moves along. With best wishes for a Happy New Year,

Sincerely yours,



Gerson S. Sher  
Senior Program Manager  
Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia  
Cooperative Research Programs

Enclosures

cc: D. Wince, OSTP  
W. Garland, DOS  
M. Robinson, DOS



U.S.-U.S.S.R. COOPERATION IN BASIC SCIENCE  
AND ENGINEERING (NSF)

Potential Fields of Cooperation

PHYSICS

- o Theoretical Physics\*, including:
  - Theoretical Nuclear Physics
  - Relativistic Astrophysics
  - Mathematical Physics
  - Theoretical Atomic, Molecular, Optical, and Plasma Physics
  - Condensed Matter Theory
- o Cosmic Ray Physics

(\* The Physics Working Group under the 1972-1982 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Science and Technology Agreement was one of the more successful efforts from that period. It focused primarily on theory, and the fields listed here are in part drawn from that group's experience.)

MATHEMATICS

The list of potential topics is extensive and is summarized below. This is clearly an area of high interest which, regrettably, was not covered under the 1972-1982 program.

- Complex analysis
- Geometry (differential, algebraic, topology) - ties to physics
- Differential equations
- Statistics and probability
- Algebraic structures
- Representation theory
- Control theory
- Dynamical systems

## CHEMISTRY

- o Molecular Environmental Catalysis (the NSF's Division of Chemistry has already funded one seminar in this area through the American Chemical Society)
- o Electrochemical Science

## NORTHERN REGIONS

This is a coordinated proposal which suggests a regional and multidisciplinary approach to research in the high latitudes. It includes contributions from a variety of NSF research programs; one section has also been coordinated with the Smithsonian Institution. The major components of the Northern Regions area would be:

- o Climatic Reconstruction and Prediction
- o Bering Strait Cooperative Research
- o Cultural and Health Exchanges
- o Studies of the Magnetospheric Cusp (Svalbard)
- o Atmospheric Chemistry
- o Permafrost
- o Biogeochemical Cycles in Northern Ecosystems

## CELL BIOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY

- o Cell Biology Research
- o Comparative Physiology (with emphasis on neuroendocrinology and reproductive physiology)

## ENGINEERING SCIENCES

- o Bioengineering
  - Bone Growth
  - Control of Physiological Motor Systems
- o Tribology

- o Biohydrometallurgy
- o Heat and Mass Transfer - one of the more successful areas under the 1972-1982 agreement. Because of vacation schedules, however, INT has been unable to get a response on this field from the relevant NSF disciplinary program.

### SCIENCE POLICY

The Science Policy Working Group under the 1972-1982 program yielded little new hard information (data) but many important insights about the Soviet scientific effort which have formed the basis for much of the current U.S. government and scholarly expertise in this area. Such a program could serve as an important vehicle for access to Soviet decision-makers and information resources of value to the U.S.'s ability to track important developments, such as the implementation of the Gorbachev regime's commitment to increased R&D investment overall and to creating more effective links between the nation's scientific research and production sectors.

### SOCIAL SCIENCES

- o Risk Analysis (a detailed submission is expected after 1/1/86; this area might also be addressed under Mathematics, if Risk Analysis does not seem warranted as a stand-alone field)
- o Social Choice Theory (under exploration - no detailed write-up available at this time)

### Other Areas

- o Microbiology - The experience of the Working Group on Microbiology under the 1972-1982 agreement was uneven at best. The NSF does not feel that resumption of cooperation in this area is warranted at this time.
- o Materials Research - Primarily for security reasons, NSF believes that it would not be wise to re-initiate cooperation here, even though the Electrometallurgy and Materials Working Group of the 1972-1982 agreement was felt to be highly successful scientifically.
- o Oceans - There are significant areas of interest in cooperative ocean research, but NSF staff believes that these can probably be adequately addressed through the NOAA-managed World Oceans Agreement, in which NSF participates. Activity under that agreement, however, is at too early a stage to be able to make any conclusive judgment.

4.

- o Economic Modeling - This area was in fact, if not in name, one of the target fields in the 1972-1982 agreement, under the rubric of "Computer Applications to Management." Some useful economic data and insights were obtained through this activity. However, NSF does not believe that the anticipated benefits of resuming cooperation in this area merit high priority.
- o Earth Sciences - Soviet work in deep continental drilling is certainly of interest, but at present the multinational ocean drilling program - with renewed Soviet participation - is probably adequate to satisfy U.S. interests. Opportunities for mutually beneficial interactions also exist in earthquake prediction, and this is being addressed through the USGS-led project under the Environmental Protection Agreement. There is less U.S. interest in cooperation in the area of basic seismological research.
- o Astronomy - Through its regular (domestic) research programs, the NSF provides funds to individual researchers who engage in one-on-one collaborations with selected Soviet astronomers. The NSF believes that this mode of collaboration is sufficient and that little would be gained through the addition of direct cooperative research projects.
- o Science Education - The Geneva summit specifically included agreement on "people-to-people" (private-sector) cooperation in computer software for education. The "people-to-people" exchanges, in which the President has a strong personal interest, are being coordinated by USIA. NSF, via INT, is following this both through its State Department contacts and directly with USIA. The educational software project, however, is a non-governmental effort being spearheaded by the Carnegie Foundation and should probably remain so.

NSF/STIA/INT:G.Sher:01/02/1986



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263464 PROFILE SHEET

1 1/15/1986 B1

FOR NSC 8600393

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12

F- us/sov  
Exch.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDYT MANDEL

FROM: WALT RAYMOND

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction for USIA Delegation

I would like you to prepare, in consultation with Max Robinson, a proposed letter of instruction for Charlie Wick and his team. I would propose to show it to Jack Matlock first thing Friday morning, make a copy of it immediately available to Charlie, and get his input and, when coordinated, send a cable to Moscow. The letter should include a lot of points that we have discussed before. The principle point of the mission will be to review USIA programs and possible new initiatives consistent with USIA activities such as the planned exhibit and a proposed American Week of Culture in the USSR.

The letter should indicate that this is not the first round in negotiations concerning the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchange Initiative. On the other hand, since Steve Rhinesmith has been identified to the Soviets as the Coordinator-Elect of this new initiative, the delegation should use the trip to explore any further Soviet thinking concerning the long list of 20 items discussed previously. Wick could note that he is not prepared to negotiate at this point but that he knows of the President's deep interest in significantly expanding contacts and exchanges and would like to know if the Soviets have given any further thoughts to the broad range of items. He is to elicit reactions, not to negotiate. He is seeking further thoughts by not seeking new ground. The point is that if he should go and only talk about the six points agreed to in Geneva he will be accepting terms of references which are very restrictive and from which there is no real reason to have Wick and his team even go to Moscow. That could be handled by Ray Benson. Thus, we are endorsing his reiteration of the President's dream of a more ambitious multi-faceted program, and we are using his trip to keep the ball rolling and to see if there is any fresh Soviet thinking on this subject. The Soviet reactions, particularly on such things as undergraduate exchanges, may be helpful in preparing for more serious negotiations which we could assure the Soviets would start in March.

Please get together with Max and work something up that encompasses the above thoughts by COB today.

Raymond

0279

F-05-Su  
Exchange.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


January 11, 1986

Dear Charlie,

I was glad to learn of your upcoming trip to Moscow. It will afford us a special opportunity to accomplish a number of tasks to follow up on the President's meetings with Gorbachev. While I understand that you plan to talk principally about the implementation of the Exchanges Agreement, your presence in Moscow could do a great deal to maintain momentum for the President's new Exchanges Initiatives. Although this is still a pre-negotiation period, it would be extremely useful if you were to emphasize the President's personal interest in significantly expanding these contacts and try to push the Soviets a little to elicit from them their reactions to the broader range of proposals we have submitted to them. If we can see if there is in fact any fresh Soviet thinking on those initiatives, it will be very helpful for our preparations for our further negotiations.

Wishing you all the success for this trip.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

Charles Z. Wick  
Director  
United States Information Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20547

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*

SUBJECT: Instructions to Wick

Per your recommendation to Walt Raymond, I have prepared a letter of instruction from you to Charlie Wick for his trip to Moscow. If you sign the letter, I will deliver it to him myself as we are traveling on the same itinerary.

*JM* *WR* *JL*  
Matlock, Raymond and Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Letter to Wick



F-01-Enrict 15  
E

INFORMATION

15 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

*Rod*

SUBJECT:

American Opinion on National Security Issues

This is an update on my 31 October 1985 memo (#8792) to you outlining public opinion on select national security issues. Major media polls (NBC/Wall Street Journal, CBS/New York Times and ABC/Washington Post) and private-source polls have been used.

Foreign Affairs Job Approval

The President's foreign affairs job performance rating peaked in polls taken immediately after the summit. While they have declined somewhat since then, most of the drop-off can be attributed to Democrats returning to their partisan positions after making a non-partisan evaluation of the summit. The performance ratings are still excellent.

Defense Spending

A review of attitudes on defense/military spending shows:

- . A sharp and steady decline in the large majority (63%) favoring increased spending when Reagan took office to a small minority (17%) today;
- . A three-fold increase among those who favor decreased spending from February 1981 (8%) to November 1985 (25%).
- . A doubling over the same time period among those who want spending kept the same (25% to 53%);
- . A steady but gentle decline from October 1981 (40%) to November 1985 (31%) among those who want us to spend for military superiority, and;
- . An ever-so-gentle rise among those who want to spend for equality (46% to 51%) and those who want to limit spending even if we fall behind the USSR (10% to 15%).

16

The reasons for these attitude changes appear to be that:

- . Most Americans now believe the U.S. is about equal to the USSR in military strength compared to the sizeable number who felt the Soviet Union was stronger at the beginning of the administration;
- . There has been a sharp rise in the number who believe President Reagan has reduced the chances of a nuclear war;
- . There has been a drop in the percentage who feel Reagan increases the chances of a nuclear war, and;
- . The gap has widened between the majority who feel that the chances of a nuclear war are unlikely in the next few years and the minority who feel such a war is likely.

The President's successes of increasing military spending and preparedness, advocating the Strategic Defense Initiative, and standing up to the Soviets and their surrogates have created the public image of strength. Hence, the public opinion environment has changed to one where it will be increasingly more difficult to realize more military spending in the months ahead.

#### SDI

All polls examined show improving and/or positive public opinion results for SDI:


- . CBS/NYT shows an increase over the past year among those who believe SDI will work (58% to 62%);
- . ABC/WPOST now shows a majority favoring SDI (55% in their November poll);
- . NBC/WSJ shows a majority saying "we should build such a system no matter what the Soviets do" (52%);
- . DMI shows nearly twice as many since July who have heard "a great deal" about SDI (19% compared to 10%), and;
- . USIA-sponsored surveys in Western Europe show solid support for SDI.

However, some reservations about SDI appear in most of the polls. The public still leans toward using SDI as a bargaining chip to reach a nuclear arms control agreement.

19

Human Rights

CBS/NYT reported a split in the population over whether (43%) or not (47%) the summit was the right time to raise the issue of human rights violations in the Soviet Union. A large majority (81%) did not believe it would lead to any real change in Soviet policy toward its citizens.

cc: John Miller  
Jack Matlock  
Walt Raymond  
Steve Steiner   
Bob Linhard  
Steve Sestanovich  
Karna Small  
Ed Djerejian  
Judy Mandel  
Ronald Lehman  
Ronald Sable

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WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING AT  
-- THE INSTITUTE OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA WITH  
-- GEORGI ARBATOV AND HIS LUNCH WITH THE  
-- INSTITUTE'S STAFF AT THE PRAGA RESTAURANT

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. DIRECTOR WICK MET JANUARY 14 WITH  
GEORGI ARBATOV, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA

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INSTITUTE OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND SEVERAL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE. THEY DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT SUBJECTS, INCLUDING THE PROSPECT OF WIDER SOVIET-AMERICAN EXCHANGES, THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND SOVIET JAMMING PRACTICES.

END SUMMARY.

2. PARTICIPANTS: DIRECTOR WICK; GEORGI A. ARBATOV, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA; RADOMIR G. BOGDANOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR; ANDREI A. KOKOSHIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR; SERGEI M. PLEKHANOV, DEPARTMENT CHIEF, DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEPARTMENT; GENRIKH A. TROFIMENKO, CHIEF, FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT; BORIS I. KRIVENKO, SCIENTIFIC SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN ACADEMIC RELATIONS; ALEKSANDR SYRODEEV, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; CHARLES E. HORNER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF PROGRAMS; STEPHEN RHINESMITH, COORDINATOR-DESIGNATE FOR PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES; MARK N. BLITZ, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS STAFF; JOHN F. KORDEK, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, USIA OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; JOHN LENCZOWSKI, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF; PATRICIA SIEMIEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR; MAX ROBINSON, SOVIET DESK OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; RAYMOND E. BENSON, COUNSELOR FOR PRESS AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, U.S. EMBASSY, MOSCOW; JAROSLAV VERNER, INFORMATION OFFICER; MARK TAPLIN, ASSISTANT CULTURAL AFFAIRS OFFICER (NOTETAKER).

3. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT THE INSTITUTE OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA FROM 1140 HOURS UNTIL 1320 HOURS JANUARY 14, 1986.

4. AFTER INTRODUCTIONS BY ARBATOV AND DIRECTOR WICK OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ENTOURAGES, ARBATOV BEGAN THE MEETING BY GIVING A BROAD OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE INSTITUTE WAS ESTABLISHED EIGHTEEN YEARS AGO AND THAT IT WAS STAFFED BY MORE THAN 360 PEOPLE. ITS TASK, HE STATED, WAS TO STUDY THE UNITED STATES, AND IT WAS DIVIDED INTO A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS DEALING WITH U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY, U.S. AND CANADIAN AGRICULTURE, U.S. DOMESTIC POLICY AND PROBLEMS, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, U.S. MILITARY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS, AND PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC OPINION, IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE. IT MAINTAINED A LIBRARY, HE NOTED, AND PUBLISHED A MONTHLY JOURNAL WITH A CIRCULATION OF 30,000. THE INSTITUTE, HE STRESSED, HAD WELL-ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIPS WITH MANY U.S. INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING UNIVERSITIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES SUCH AS BROOKINGS AND AEI. HE NOTED THAT HE WAS ALSO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT AMERICAN COUNCIL

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OF LEARNED SOCIETIES/SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
COMMISSION ON THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES WHICH  
HAD JUST RECENTLY SIGNED A TWO-YEAR AGREEMENT AND  
PROTOCOL.

5. DIRECTOR WICK SAID HE WAS VISITING THE SOVIET

UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER MANY YEARS OF FOLLOWING  
ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM AFAR, THROUGH THE COLD WAR AND

DETENTE PERIODS AND SEVERAL ARMS COONFERNCES. HE  
OBSERVED THAT DESPITE THE CRITICAL THINGS THAT AMERICANS  
SAID ABOUT SOVIETS AND VICE VERSA, IT WAS OBVIOUS ALSO  
THAT WE ARE ALL HUMAN BEINGS, EACH PRIZING PEACE AND  
A QUALITY OF LIFE FOR OUR FAMILIES AND PEOPLES. ARBATOV  
REMARKED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE AT THE SAME TIME TARGETS.  
DIRECTOR WICK REMINDED ARBATOV THAT HE HAD COME TO THE  
SOVIET UNION TO DISCUSS NOT MISSILES, BUT RATHER "HUMAN  
THINGS". IT WAS HIS DESIRE, HE CONTINUED, TO REMOVE  
PROBLEMS OF MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES,  
ASSERTING THAT THEY COULD START A PROCESS THROUGH SUCH  
MEETINGS TO BENEFIT BOTH SIDES. BOTH GROUPS, HE STRESSED,  
HAD HAD ENOUGH EXPERIENCE WITH IDEOLOGY AND NEGOTIATIONS,  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING AT

THAT THEY WOULD NOT NOW HAVE TO "PLAY GAMES". HE DID  
NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS, HE CONTINUED, TO AGREE TO ANY-  
THING NOT IN THEIR INTEREST. HOWEVER, HE SAID, HE FELT  
THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COMPROMISES  
IN CERTAIN AREAS. HE WAS EXCITED, HE STATED, BECAUSE THE  
HEADS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD GOTTEN ALONG SO WELL IN  
GENEVA, THEREBY PROVIDING THE BEGINNING, THROUGH SUCH  
EXCHANGES, TO NARROW THEIR DIFFERENCES. IT WAS  
IMPERATIVE TO DO SO, HE ARGUED, EVEN THOUGH, AS WITH  
NEIGHBORS, ONE WAS SOMETIMES NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THE  
OTHER PARTY. IN THE CASE OF NEIGHBORS, ARBATOV RETORTED,  
ONE COULD JUST MOVE, BUT IN THIS INSTANCE, HE INSISTED,  
THE TWO SIDES WERE CONDEMNED TO LIVE TOGETHER. DIRECTOR  
WICK COMMENTED IN RETURN THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE THAT

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THE TWO COUNTRIES DID NOT HAVE TO MOVE OFF THE PLANET -- OTHERWISE IT WOULD ALL BE OVER WITH.

6. THE DIRECTOR TOLD ARBATOV THAT HE HAD BEEN CURIOUS ABOUT HOW HE WOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE SOVIET SIDE SINCE HE HAD BEEN ATTACKED SO MANY TIMES IN THE SOVIET MEDIA. ARBATOV REPLIED THAT THE DIRECTOR SHOULD NOT COMPLAIN SINCE IT WAS WICK'S PROFESSION TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION. THE DIRECTOR RESPONDED BY OBSERVING THAT AS LONG AS THEIR CONFLICT DID NOT INVOLVE WEAPONS, THE TWO SIDES WERE DOING BETTER THAN THEY MIGHT OTHERWISE. IT WAS HIS HOPE, HE WENT ON, THAT THEY COULD TAKE STEPS TO DIMINISH THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS ON EACH OTHER. IF THERE WERE CERTAIN THINGS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT DOING RIGHT, HE ADDED, WE WILL LISTEN CAREFULLY TO SOVIET OBJECTIONS.

ARBATOV SAID IN REPLY THAT HE COULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE DIRECTOR'S OBSERVATIONS BUT ONLY WITH THE QUALIFICATION THAT WHAT WAS CALLED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WAS NOT ALWAYS HARMLESS. PUBLIC DIALOGUE IS AN IMPORTANT PART, HE ASSERTED, OF THE ENTIRE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, AND IF THE TWO SIDES DID NOT WANT TO BLOW EACH OTHER UP, THEY WOULD DO WELL TO ENGAGE IN CORRECT AND DECENT RELATIONS AND RECOGNIZE THAT EACH SIDE HAS ITS OWN PROBLEMS TO CONTEND WITH. THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE WORLD WAS ILLUSTRATED, HE MAINTAINED, BY THE PROBLEMS BEING OBSERVED IN UNEXPECTED PLACES. BOTH PARTIES WOULD DO WELL TO RECOGNIZE, ARBATOV STRESSED, THAT THEY COULD NOT CHANGE EACH OTHER, AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO DO SO ONLY MADE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT.

7. ARBATOV COMPLAINED THAT AMERICANS WERE ONLY ABLE TO LEARN ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH AMERICAN SOURCES, AND CLAIMED THAT DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION HE HAD NEVER HEARD THE SOVIET "FOUNDING FATHERS", INCLUDING LENIN AND BREZHNEV, CORRECTLY QUOTED BY THE PRESIDENT. HE EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS JUDGMENTS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH FALSE INFORMATION FED TO HIM BY CERTAIN ADVISORS. HE WENT ON TO STATE THAT USIA DID NOT HAVE "A FIRST-CLASS REPUTATION", CITING RADIO LIBERTY AS AN EXAMPLE. WHEN THE DIRECTOR CORRECTED ARBATOV'S CHARACTERIZATION OF RADIO LIBERTY AS A USIA ORGANIZATION, ARBATOV THEN CITED A VOA REPORT THAT HE SAID HAD DEPICTED HIM AS A LIAR WHO TRIES TO FOOL AND DECEIVE PEOPLE. THIS, HE INSISTED, WAS SIMPLY BAD MANNERS. THE TWO SIDES, HE STRESSED, COULD NOT AFFORD TO THROW WILD ACCUSATIONS ABOUT, AND NEEDED INSTEAD TO CONCENTRATE ON WIDENING CONTACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN GENEVA.

8. THE DIRECTOR, IN GIVING ARBATOV A QUICK OVERVIEW OF

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USIA'S OPERATIONS, POINTED OUT THAT ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF U.S. LAW, VOA WAS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING ITSELF AS A THOROUGHLY RELIABLE SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION, AND THAT IT CLEARLY IDENTIFIED ITS EDITORIALS AS AN EXPRESSION OF OFFICIAL USC POLICY. AFTER MENTIONING A VARIETY OF USIA PROGRAMS, THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED TO ARBATOV THAT AMERICANS LEARNED ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ACTIONS IN SUCH PLACES AS AFGHANISTAN AND ANGOLA THROUGH THE WORLD PRESS. HE CITED SOVIET JAMMING PRACTICES AS ANOTHER SOURCE OF THE UNFAVORABLE VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION HELD BY MANY

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING AT

AMERICANS. AMERICANS, HE WENT ON, FEEL THAT THEY HAVE AN OPEN SOCIETY BECAUSE THEY COULD SEE, ON SUCH TV PROGRAMS AS NIGHTLINE, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES LIKE ARBATOV, WHEREAS THERE WERE PRACTICALLY NO SUBSTANTIVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICANS TO APPEAR ON SOVIET TELEVISION. ARBATOV INSISTED THAT HIS APPEARANCES ON U.S. TELEVISION WERE ONLY PERMITTED IN "DOSED PROPORTIONS", AND MAINTAINED THAT U.S. REPRESENTATIVES FREQUENTLY APPEARED ON SOVIET TV.

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9. THE DIRECTOR POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO ONE MORE CONCERNED THAN THE PRESIDENT WITH THE QUESTION OF THE ACCURACY OF WHAT HE SAID BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZED THAT HE COULD COMMAND RESPECT ONLY BY BEING CORRECT IN HIS STATEMENTS. ARBATOV CLAIMED IN RESPONSE THAT HE HAD HEARD IN A BBC REPORT THAT REAGAN HAD CITED OSTENSIBLE LENIN QUOTATIONS FROM A 1941 PAMPHLET AUTHORED BY GOEBBELS, AN ALLEGATION THAT LENCZOWSKI DENIED. ARBATOV ALSO LISTED A RECENT INSTANCE IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD SUPPOSEDLY MISQUOTED BREZHNEV. THE DIRECTOR ASSURED ARBATOV THAT IF HE WERE TO GIVE HIM A LIST OF INSTANCES IN WHICH THE U.S. SIDE HAD ALLEGEDLY WRONGLY MISQUOTED SOVIET LEADERS, WE WOULD CAREFULLY LOOK INTO IT. THE DIRECTOR ADDED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WOULD PROVIDE ITS OWN LIST. HE PROMPTED LAUGHTER WHEN HE REPORTED AS AN

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EXAMPLE OF INACCURACY RADIO MOSCOW'S ALLEGATION THAT HE HAD GAINED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS BY RUNNING BROTHELS. BY TIMELY CORRECTIONS OF MISSTATEMENTS BROUGHT TO EACH SIDE'S ATTENTION, THIS KIND OF RHETORICAL ESCALATION COULD BE REDUCED.

10. IN RESPONSE TO THE DIRECTOR'S CHARACTERIZATION OF AMERICA'S MEDIA AS FREE AS OPPOSED TO THE SOVIET UNION'S CONTROLLED PRESS, ARBATOV REPLIED THAT THE U.S. MEDIA WAS NOT SO FREE, AND THE SOVIET PRESS NOT SO CONTROLLED AS THE DIRECTOR THOUGHT. HE MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS AN UNFORGIVABLE LEVEL OF IGNORANCE IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS. BLITZ OBSERVED THAT WHILE THERE WAS IGNORANCE IN THE U.S. ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S., AND IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR SOVIETS TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO LEARN ABOUT AMERICANS. PLEKHANOV ASSERTED IN RESPONSE THAT THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GOING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME IMPACT AS ONE DISTORTED U.S. TV PROGRAM. BENSON STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE SOVIET SIDE FOR SPEAKING ILL OF U.S. TELEVISION.

HE SAID THERE WERE NO DISTORTIONS ON THE U.S. SIDE THAT COULD EVEN COMPARE TO THOSE THAT OCCUR REGULARLY ON SOVIET TV. TROFIMENKO COMPLAINED THAT WHEN HE WAS IN THE U.S. RECENTLY AS AN IREX SCHOLAR, HE HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO HAVE A TELEVISION SET IN HIS ROOM, IMPLYING THAT USIA HAD DELIBERATELY TRIED TO KEEP HIM FROM WATCHING AMERICAN TV PROGRAMMING. THE DIRECTOR PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER, SAYING THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY PREPOSTEROUS THAT A SOVIET EXCHANGEES WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO WATCH U.S. TELEVISION. ARBATOV, NOTING THAT HE HAD NOT SEVERAL OCCASIONS SPOKEN TO GOSTELERADIO ABOUT THE NEED TO IMPROVE SOVIET PROGRAMMING ON THE UNITED STATES, SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS VERY CRITICAL OF U.S. TELEVISION PROGRAMS AND FILMS BECAUSE IT SAW IN THEM DISRESPECT AND THE FANNING OF

HATE AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. HE INSISTED LOUDLY THAT SUCH MANIPULATION AND HATE WOULD NEVER BE FOUND IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND SPOKE MOCKINGLY OF A REPORT THAT PENTAGON EMPLOYEES IN RECENT POLYGRAPH TESTS WERE BEING ASKED WHETHER THEY DISAPPROVED OF RAMBO MOVIES. WICK ET AL MADE SIGNIFICANT REBUTTAL.

11. THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED THAT AN EXCHANGE OF UNEDITED TV NEWS PROGRAMS MIGHT BE ONE APPROACH THAT WOULD BE IN SOME WAYS MORE FAIR. ARBATOV, ARGUING THAT ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT IN THE U.S. MEDIA HAD REACHED THE POINT OF

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INDECENCY, CHALLENGED THE DIRECTOR TO PROVIDE HIM A  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING AT

SINGLE U.S. PRESS ARTICLE THAT WAS FAVORABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE DIRECTOR IN TURN ASKED ARBATOV TO SEND HIM A FAVORABLE ARTICLE ABOUT THE U.S.A. FROM THE SOVIET PRESS, AND POINTED OUT THAT STEPS HAD TO BE TAKEN TO CREATE GREATER UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES. WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE ASSERTED WAS UNFAVORABLE, HE STATED, WAS ACTUALLY THE WORKINGS OF A FREE PRESS. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, HOWEVER, THE PRESS REFLECTED GOVERNMENT POLICY. ARBATOV LABELED THE DIRECTOR'S DISTINCTION AS IRRESPONSIBLE, AND INSISTED THAT THE DIRECTOR NOT "ADD ADJECTIVES", SUCH AS "FREE" AND "CONTROLLED" TO HIS REFERENCES TO THE TWO SYSTEMS. THE DIRECTOR REJECTED

THIS WITH GOOD HUMOR.

12. HORNER ASKED ARBATOV, AS ONE OF THE MOST KNOWLEDGE-ABLE SOVIETS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES, WHAT HE THOUGHT WERE THE MAJOR MISCONCEPTIONS HELD BY SOVIETS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT ROLE THE USA INSTITUTE COULD PLAY IN CORRECTING SUCH MISCONCEPTIONS. IN REPLY, ARBATOV REITERATED THAT AMERICAN CULTURE AND HISTORY WERE BETTER UNDERSTOOD BY SOVIETS THAN VICE VERSA, AND OBSERVED THAT AMERICANS TENDED TO ASSUME INCORRECTLY THAT EVERYTHING REPORTED BY THE SOVIET PRESS WAS "OFFICIAL". HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE ASPECTS OF THE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT EVEN HE DID NOT UNDER- STAND, INCLUDING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESS AND THE DELINEATIONS BETWEEN FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. HORNER SUGGESTED THAT THE USA INSTITUTE HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN CORRECTING MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SOVIET UNION. TROFIMENKO CLAIMED THAT HE HAD PREVENTED PUBLICATION OF SEVERAL SOVIET BOOKS THAT CONTAINED "GROSS INACCURACIES" ABOUT THE U.S., ALTHOUGH ARBATOV WENT ON TO ADD THAT HE FOR ONE

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COULD NOT TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BEING A CENSOR.

13. THE DIRECTOR STRESSED THAT EXCHANGES OF A FEW THOUSAND PEOPLE COULD MAKE A VIVID IMPRESSION IN BOTH COUNTRIES, AND HAD IT BEEN OTHERWISE, THE TWO HEADS OF STATE WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT. IN THAT LIGHT, RHINESMITH ASKED ARBATOV WHAT BENEFITS HE SAW IN THE EXCHANGE OF "AVERAGE" CITIZENS. ARBATOV ANSWERED THAT WHILE HE SAW SUCH EXCHANGES AS USEFUL, HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO HAVE THE MEMBERS OF THE TWO SIDES' RESPECTIVE CONGRESSES PAY SUCH VISITS AS WELL. PLEKHANOV INTERJECTED THAT IT WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT TO HAVE CONGRESSMEN VISIT COLLECTIVE FARMS SO THAT THEY COULD SEE "HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS" PEOPLE FOR THEMSELVES. THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED THAT THE EXCHANGE INITIATIVES BE LINKED TO EXTENSIVE TV COVERAGE SO THAT 270 MILLION PEOPLE COULD BE EXPOSED TO THE SAME THINGSEXPERIENCED BY THOSE ACTUALLY PARTICIPATING IN THE PROGRAM. ARBATOV ACCUSED THE U.S. SIDE OF PREVENTING BROADCAST OF THE CARDIOLOGY WORLDNET PROGRAM, AN ALLEGATION WHICH THE DIRECTOR REFUTED. ARBATOV THEN SPOKE WARMLY OF SEVERAL PAST SPACE BRIDGES, INCLUDING THE PHIL DONAHUE/VLADIMIR POZNER "CITIZENS' SUMMIT" AND THE "WAR VETERANS" PROGRAM, CHARACTERIZING THEM AS THE TYPE OF POSITIVE PROGRAMMING THAT WAS NEEDED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS.

14. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF SOVIET JAMMING OF FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS, THE DIRECTOR ASKED ARBATOV

WHY THE SOVIET UNION INSISTED ON JAMMING FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS. WHILE NOTING THAT THERE WERE "DIFFERENT OPINIONS" WITHIN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ABOUT JAMMING,

ARBATOV COUNTERED THAT AMONG MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CANADA, THERE WAS A CONCERN ABOUT "INFORMATIONAL IMPERIALISM" THAT COULD BE USED AS A TOOL TO FURTHER THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DOMINATION OF SMALLER COUNTRIES. THE PROBLEM, HE ASSERTED, HAD TO BE GOVERNED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHICH HE SUGGESTED HAD NOT BEEN UP TO THE TASK AS YET. THE DIRECTOR REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY A SIGNATORY TO SEVERAL TREATIES AND DOCUMENTS THAT PROHIBITED JAMMING, AND ITS FAILURE TO UPHOLD THEM HAD CREATED CONSIDERABLE SUSPICION AND MIS-  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING AT

UNDERSTANDING. IN WHAT HE TERMED AS A "PRIVATE" OPINION, ARBATOV SAID THAT HE WAS "ABSOLUTELY SURE" THAT IT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE SOVIET PUBLIC. HE MENTIONED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS DEVELOPING, WITH OTHER NATIONS, A UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL TELEVISION FORMAT WHICH WOULD OPEN THE DOOR FOR TV BROADCASTS OF EVERY NATION TO BE STANDARD. THE DIRECTOR NOTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS NEVERTHELESS NOT ALLOWING TELEVISION PROGRAMS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO BE BROADCAST IN THE SOVIET UNION. ARBATOV RECALLED HEATEDLY THAT HIS VISA HAD BEEN ISSUED ON TWO OCCASIONS WITH RESTRICTIONS AGAINST HIS APPEARING ON U.S. TELEVISION, AND CLAIMED THAT OTHER SOVIETS WERE GIVEN UNRESTRICTED VISAS FOR THE SAME APPEARANCES. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE FEARED THAT IF HE VISITED VANCOUVER, B.C., FROM PORTLAND ON AN UPCOMING TRIP TO THE U.S., HE WOULD BE RESTRICTED IN WHERE HE COULD REENTER. THE DIRECTOR PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THIS MATTER FOR ARBATOV.

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15. THE MEETING ENDED ON A POSITIVE NOTE, WITH BOGDANOV THANKING THE DIRECTOR FOR A VERY FRANK DISCUSSION AND ARBATOV EXTENDING THE DIRECTOR AN INVITATION TO RETURN AS A GUEST OF THE INSTITUTE. THE DIRECTOR EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR EXPANDING EXCHANGES, SOMETHING WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. HE HOPED THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT UNDERSTANDINGS THAT WOULD LESSEN THE MISTRUST THAT CURRENTLY EXISTED BETWEEN THEM.

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16. FOLLOWING THE MEETING AT THE USA INSTITUTE THE ENTIRE GROUP, EXCEPT FOR TAPLIN AND SYRODEEV, ADJOURNED TO THE PRAGA RESTAURANT, AROUND THE CORNER AND ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE INSTITUTE, FOR A LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF THE DIRECTOR HOSTED BY PAO RAY BENSON. THE GROUP WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN AND THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE: DR. ANDREY MEL'VIL, RESEARCHER; DR. EDUARD Y. BATALOV, CHIEF, IDEOLOGY SECTION; DR. VLADIMIR O. PECHATNOV, CHIEF, DOMESTIC PARTY POLITICS SECTION; DR. ALEKSANDR K. KISLOV, CHIEF, MIDDLE EAST SECTION; AND DR. YURIY A. ZAMOSHKIN, CHIEF MASS MEDIA, IDEOLOGY, AND PUBLIC OPINION DEPARTMENT.

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-- THE LUNCH BEGAN PROMPTLY AT 1330 WITH "ZAKUSKIY" BEING SERVED IN RAPID SUCCESSION. AT 1400 HOURS SHARP VODKA GLASSES APPEARED ON THE TABLE, THIS BEING THE HOUR AFTER WHICH IT IS NOW LEGAL TO SERVE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN THE SOVIET RESTAURANTS. AFTER MAKING A VERY PUBLIC POINT OF HOW POSITIVE A CHANGE THE NEW DRINKING ARRANGEMENTS WERE, ONE OF THE SOVIET GUESTS WAS OBSERVED TRYING TO GET THE WAITER TO FILL HIS WATER GLASS WITH VODKA. THE WAITER REFUSED.

17. RAY BENSON NOTED THAT TWO O'CLOCK HAD ARRIVED AND THAT TOASTS WERE IN ORDER. HE WELCOMED THE DIRECTOR AND THE OTHER IMPORTANT COLLEAGUES THAT ACCOMPANIED HIM. HE NOTED THE INTERESTING AND SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE VISIT WERE GOOD HARBINGERS FOR THE REST OF THE WEEK. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO DR. ARBATOV FOR AGREEING TO THE MEETINGS ON THE EVE OF A LONG PLANNED AND IMPORTANT TRIP AND CHARACTERIZED THE MORNING'S TALKS AT THE USA INSTITUTE AS USEFUL AND STIMULATING. GLASSES

WERE RAISED TO THE HEALTH OF THE DIRECTOR AND DR. ARBATOV.

18. THE DIRECTOR NOTED HOW PLEASED HE WAS TO BE IN MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT, FOR HIM, RUSSIA HAD ALWAYS CONSISTED OF ABSTRACT IMAGES AND IMPRESSIONS, A PLACE ON THE MAP. HE SAID BOTH SIDES HAD GOOD AND BAD IMPRESSIONS OF THE OTHER, BUT THAT THEY SHARED ONE THING IN COMMON: EACH SIDE WAS CONVINCED IT WAS RIGHT. OUR LEADERS, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, HAD AGREED THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER, CONTINUED THE DIRECTOR, TO FIND A WAY TO PEACE FOR OUR FAMILITES AND COUNTRIES.  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING AT

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WE ALL DRANK TO THAT.

19. DR. ARBATOV RESPONDED THAT HE WAS EXPRESSING THE FEELING OF ALL HIS COLLEAGUES WHEN HE SAID THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE VISIT OF DIRECTOR WICK TO MOSCOW A GOOD SIGN. THERE ARE RATHER IMPORTANT CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN POLITICAL RELATIONS, HE CONTINUED. HE SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THE VISIT WOULD BE USEFUL AND HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE MANY MORE. DR. ARBATOV CONCLUDED BY TOASTING THE SUCCESS OF THE DIRECTOR'S VISIT.

20. THERE WAS NO GENERAL LUNCHEON TABLE CONVERSATION, BUT A SERIES OF USEFUL INTERCHANGES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE TWO GROUPS. THE LUNCHEON ENDED AT 1500 HOURS.

21. ACTION ITEMS:

- (A) ARBATOV IS TO PROVIDE RAY BENSON A LIST OF ALLEGED PRESIDENTIAL "MISQUOTES" OF SOVIET LEADERS, PAST AND PRESENT. BENSON IS TO FORWARD THIS LIST TO USIA.
- (B) USIA (P) AND EMBASSY MOSCOW IS TO PREPARE A LIST OF MISQUOTES AND DISTORTIONS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN APPEARING IN THE SOVIET MEDIA TO BE GIVEN TO ARBATOV.
- (C) E TO CHECK INTO TROFIMENKO'S ALLEGATION THAT IREX PREVENTS SOVIET EXCHANGEES FROM HAVING TV SETS IN THEIR HOTEL ROOMS.
- (D) USIA AND EMBASSY MOSCOW TO FOLLOW-UP ON POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF UNEDITED TV NEWS PROGRAMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
- (E) EACH SIDE IS TO TRY TO FIND AT LEAST ONE ARTICLE PUBLISHED RECENTLY IN EACH OTHER'S MEDIA FAVORABLE TO THE THE OTHER SIDE.
- (F) EMBASSY MOSCOW IS TO CHECK INTO ARBATOV'S CLAIM REGARDING POSSIBLE REENTRY RESTRICTIONS SHOULD HE EXIT TO VANCOUVER, B.C.
- (G) ARBATOV IS TO SEND RAY BENSON A COPY OF THE INSTITUTE'S MONTHLY PUBLICATION WHO WILL FORWARD IT TO THE DIRECTOR.
- (H) THE DIRECTOR IS TO PROVIDE ARBATOV A LIST OF SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO HAVE APPEARED RECENTLY ON

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- U.S. TELEVISION.  
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- (I) ARBATOV IS TO SEND, VIA BENSON, A LIST OF  
- AMERICANS WHO HAVE APPEARED RECENTLY ON  
- SOVIET TELEVISION. HARTMAN  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00735

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING WITH  
-- AMBASSADOR YURI KIRICHENKO

1. SUMMARY: BEGIN SUMMARY: DIRECTOR WICK'S FIRST MEETING IN MOSCOW TOOK PLACE JANUARY 14, 1986, WITH AMBASSADOR YURI KIRICHENKO, CHIEF OF THE CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT EXCHANGE INITIATIVES. END SUMMARY.

2. PARTICIPANTS: DIRECTOR WICK; MR. CHARLES HORNER, USIA ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF PROGRAMS; MR. STEPHEN RHINESMITH, PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES COORDINATOR-DESIGNATE; MR. MARK N. BLITZ, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS STAFF; MR. JOHN F. KORDEK, DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; MR. JOHN LENCZOWSKI,

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NSC; MS. PATRICIA SIEMIEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR; MR. MAX ROBINSON, STATE DEPARTMENT SOVIET DESK OFFICER; MR. RAYMOND E. BENSON, PAO MOSCOW; MR. JAROSLAV J. VERNER, IO MOSCOW; MR. MARK SMITH, AIO MOSCOW (NOTETAKER); AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO; MR.

ALEXANDER CHURLIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; MR. ELDAR KULIEV, ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO; MR. ALEXANDER SYRODEEV, U.S. DESK OFFICER, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT; MR. VYACHESLAV KAYDASH, U.S. DESK OFFICER, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT; MR. ALEXANDER OBUKHOV, INTERPRETER.

3. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT THE CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM 1005 HOURS TO 1125 HOURS, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS WARM AND CORDIAL AND NON-POLEMICAL THROUGHOUT.

4. NOTING THE LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICANS PRESENT FOR THIS FIRST DISCUSSION, AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO REMARKED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO BE "WITNESSING AN AMERICAN INVASION." HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WELCOMED SUCH A "CULTURAL INVASION," AND WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT THE LEADER OF THE FIRST BATTALION WAS DIRECTOR WICK. EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE DIRECTOR AND HIS PARTY WOULD ACHIEVE "GREAT SUCCESSES" DURING THE "INVASION," KIRICHENKO PROMISED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS "BY ALL POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE MEANS."

5. KIRICHENKO TOOK A FEW MOMENTS TO SUMMARIZE THE WORK OF HIS DEPARTMENT, WHICH, HE EMPHASIZED, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING ALL CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL, AND SPORTS EXCHANGES WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED COUNTRIES, SAID KIRICHENKO; TO ENSURE THAT AGREEMENTS AND PROGRAMS WITH THESE COUNTRIES ARE IMPLEMENTED, THE CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MUST COORDINATE THE WORK OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY SOVIET MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES. IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT OF THE DIRECTOR AND HIS PARTY, KIRICHENKO CONTINUED, A PROGRAM HAS BEEN ARRANGED THAT INCLUDES MEETINGS REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR. HE CONGRATULATED THE DIRECTOR FOR CHOOSING TO MEET WITH PRECISELY THOSE SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHANGES.

6. AFTER NOTING THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY PLACED UPON THE TWO SIDES AS A RESULT OF BOTH THE SIGNING OF THE

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NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT AND THE JOINT STATEMENT ON EXPANDING EXCHANGES, HE ADDED THAT THE DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY OUR TWO LEADERS AT GENEVA DEMAND THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION. KIRICHENKO RAISED TWO POINTS CONCERNING THE LATTER. FIRST, HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT YET RESPONDED TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS REGARDING THE JOINT INITIATIVE TRANSMITTED BY THE SOVIETS TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW ON NOVEMBER 12, 1985. THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVES THE TIME HAS COME

TO MOVE TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THIS INITIATIVE. SUCH DISCUSSION WILL NO DOUBT OCCUR DURING THE DIRECTOR'S MEETING IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD, SAID KIRICHENKO, AND SO THERE WAS NO NEED TO BE HASTY IN RESPONDING; NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS DO EXPECT A REPLY TO THEIR NOVEMBER 12 PROPOSALS. SECOND, HE SAID, WHEN THE TWO SIDES CONCLUDE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING WITH

THE JOINT INITIATIVE, THESE AGREEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE RECORDED IN SOME FORM--WHETHER AS AN APPENDIX TO THE CURRENT EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, IN AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES, OR IN SOME OTHER WAY--IN ORDER TO MAKE IT EASIER TO DECIDE WHICH AGENCIES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING EXCHANGES, AND--NO LESS IMPORTANT--IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT FUNDS FOR THESE EXCHANGES WILL BE APPROPRIATED.

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7. AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO SUGGESTED THAT, UPON CONCLUSION OF THE DIRECTOR'S MEETINGS AT OTHER SOVIET MINISTRIES AND INSTRUCTIONS, IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRESENT MEETING TO GET TOGETHER ONCE MORE FOR AN EXCHANGE OF IMPRESSIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE VISIT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO MOSCOW AT THIS TIME GENERATES AN ADDITIONAL STIMULUS "FOR CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC IMPLEMENTATION."

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8. DIRECTOR WICK EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO AND HIS COLLEAGUES FOR CREATING A PLEASANT AND HOSPITABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR DISCUSSION, WHICH, HE

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ADDED, IS EVIDENCE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE SINCERE IN DESIRING POSITIVE RESULTS, AND ARE NOT MERELY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. DIRECTOR WICK APOLOGIZED FOR THE USG NOT YET HAVING RESPONDED TO THE SOVIETS' NOVEMBER 12 PROPOSALS, AND SAID HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND SOVIET FEELINGS ON THIS MATTER, SINCE HE HIMSELF HAS WAITED IN VAIN SINCE JANUARY 25 OF LAST YEAR FOR A REPLY TO HIS LETTER TO LEONID ZAMYATIN. ALTHOUGH THE FAILURE OF MR. ZAMYATIN TO RESPOND TO HIS LETTER WAS DISAPPOINTING, SAID THE DIRECTOR, THE RECENT TELEVISION EXCHANGE OF NEW YEAR'S GREETINGS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WAS AN ENCOURAGING OMEN. THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. SIDE WOULD BE DEALING WITH UTMOST CANDOR EVEN IN THE MOST SENSITIVE AREAS TO FACILITATE THE UNDERSTANDINGS HOPED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT.

KIRICHENKO EMBRACED THIS CONCEPT WHOLEHEARTEDLY. INDEED THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION WERE SO MARKED.

9. THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED THAT, FOR THE BEST IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT EXCHANGES INITIATIVE, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD SEEK THE TALENTS OF EXPERTS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHO WILL EXAMINE HOW EXCHANGES CAN BEST BE EXPANDED. ONE SUCH EXPERT, HE SAID, WAS MR. RHINESMITH, WHO HAD WORKED ON THE PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE FOR INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE BEGUN IN MAY 1982, AND HAD ESTABLISHED A FORMIDABLE REPUTATION BOTH IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD FOR HIS WORK ON EXCHANGES. THE DIRECTOR EXPLAINED THAT, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF USIA, MR. RHINESMITH WILL PLAY THE SAME KIND OF COORDINATING ROLE THAT AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO'S DEPARTMENT PLAYS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

10. MR. RHINESMITH SAID THE U.S. VIEWED THE NEW EXCHANGES PROPOSALS AS, IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WORDS, BOLD NEW INITIATIVES THAT WOULD RESULT IN THE BROADEST PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IN HISTORY. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS HAD PRODUCED A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF INTEREST AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HUNDREDS OF LETTERS WITH PROPOSALS FOR NEW EXCHANGES HAVE ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED. MR. RHINESMITH TOLD KIRICHENKO THAT THE NOVEMBER 12 SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE THEMSELVES A RESPONSE TO OUR SIDE'S ORIGINAL EXCHANGES INITIATIVES GIVEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN. THAT EXCHANGE SERVED AS A BASIS FOR THE SIDE DISCUSSIONS

IN GENEVA WHICH RESULTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON THE INITIATIVES. MR. RHINESMITH SAID WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO GIVE ADDITIONAL GENERAL RESPONSES TO THE SOVIETS' NOVEMBER 12 PROPOSALS IN PREPARATION FOR OUR FEBRUARY DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON.

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11. MR. RHINESMITH THEN SET FORTH SEVEN BASIC PRINCIPLES BY WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BE GUIDED IN PLANNING THESE EXCHANGES:

- A) THE EXCHANGE SHOULD COMPRISE BOTH PROFESSIONAL  
- - FIELDS AND COMMON CITIZENS;
- B) THEY SHOULD INVOLVE AS BROAD AN AGE RANGE  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 14, 1986 MEETING WITH

- - AND GEOGRAPHICAL AND VOCATIONAL MIX AS  
- - POSSIBLE;
- C) THEY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON AS LARGE A SCALE  
- - AS POSSIBLE, WITHIN THE LIMITS EXISTING IN  
- - BOTH SOCIETIES;
- D) THE LARGER THE NUMBERS IN ANY PARTICULAR  
- - EXCHANGE, THE SHORTER THE LENGTH OF TIME  
- - FOR THAT EXCHANGE;
- E) THEY SHOULD INVOLVE EXTENSIVE CONTACTS  
- - BETWEEN THE PARTICIPANTS AND THE CITIZENS  
- - OF THE RECEIVING COUNTRY;
- F) THEY SHOULD RECEIVE EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE;
- G) THEY SHOULD BE RECIPROCAL.

12. MR. RHINESMITH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TO DATE THE TWO SIDES HAD SPOKEN ONLY OF GENERAL AREAS OF INTEREST; CONSEQUENTLY, HE SAID THE U.S. SIDE LOOKED FORWARD TO A VISIT TO THE U.S. BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINISTRY NEXT MONTH, SO THAT SPECIFIC PROGRAMS CAN BE DISCUSSED. HE STRESSED THAT ALL PROPOSALS MADE THUS FAR BY BOTH SIDES REMAIN OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO AGREED THAT "THERE ARE NO UNRESOLVABLE ISSUES," ALTHOUGH HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ATTACHE PRIORITY TO THOSE AREAS IN

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WHICH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED.

13. THE MEETING CONCLUDED AT THIS POINT, WITH AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO SUGGESTING THAT THE DIRECTOR AND HIS PARTY RETURN LATER IN THE DAY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION.

14. ACTION ITEM:

- DIRECTOR WICK AND PARTY TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR
- KIRICHENKO AND STAFF FOLLOWING THE LENINGRAD
- PORTION OF THE VISIT TO EXCHANGE FINAL
- IMPRESSIONS. (ACTION COMPLETED. A MEETING
- HAS BEEN SET TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, AT 1400
- HOURS).

HARTMAN

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S SECOND JANUARY 14, 1986 MEET-  
-- ING WITH AMBASSADOR YURI KIRICHENKO

1. SUMMARY: BEGIN SUMMARY: DIRECTOR WICK HELD A  
SECOND MEETING IN MOSCOW ON JANUARY 14, 1986, WITH  
AMBASSADOR YURI KIRICHENKO, CHIEF OF THE CULTURAL  
RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLEMENTA-  
TION OF THE JOINT EXCHANGE INITIATIVES. END SUMMARY.

2. PARTICIPANTS: DIRECTOR WICK; MR. CHARLES HORNER,

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USIA ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF PROGRAMS; MR. STEPHEN RHINESMITH, PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES COORDINATOR-DESIGNATE; MR. MARK N. BLITZ, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS STAFF; MR. JOHN F. KORDEK, DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; MR. JOHN LENCZOWSKI, NSC; MS. PATRICIA

SIEMIEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR; MR. RAYMOND E. BENSON, PAO MOSCOW; MR. JAROSLAV J. VERNER, IO MOSCOW; MR. MARK SMITH, AIO MOSCOW (NOTETAKER); AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO; MR. ALEXANDER CHURLIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; MR. ELDAR KULIEV, ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO; MR. ALEXANDER SYRODEEV, U.S. DESK OFFICER, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT; MR. VYACHESLAV KAYDASH, U.S. DESK OFFICER, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT; MR. ALEXANDER OBUKHOV, INTERPRETER.

3. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT THE CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM 1530 HOURS TO 1700 HOURS.

4. DIRECTOR WICK BEGAN BY EXPRESSING GRATITUDE FOR AMBASSADOR KIRICHENKO'S INVITING HIS PARTY BACK A SECOND TIME. HE ASKED FOR KIRICHENKO'S COMMENTS ON THE REMARKS MADE BY MR. RHINESMITH AT THE SESSION EARLIER IN THE DAY. KIRICHENKO SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD "NO ALLERGY" TO ANYTHING MR. RHINESMITH HAD PROPOSED, BUT HE ADDED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD GO BEYOND EXPRESSIONS OF HOPE AND UNDERTAKE TO FIND SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH EXCHANGES CAN BE EXPANDED, AND WAYS IN WHICH THIS CAN BE DONE. KIRICHENKO SAID THE SOVIETS AGREED THAT EXCHANGES SHOULD BE BOTH BETWEEN PROFESSIONALS AND COMMON CITIZENS. HE SAID FURTHER THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT OBJECT TO THE INCLUSION OF ANY AGE GROUP, BELIEVING THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION IN FAVOR OF ONE SUCH GROUP OR ANOTHER. HE ALSO AGREED THAT EXCHANGES SHOULD REACH AS MANY GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS AS POSSIBLE. ON THE QUESTION OF SIZE OF EXCHANGES, KIRICHENKO AGREED WITH MR. RHINESMITH'S VIEW THAT THE ONLY LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS THE CAPACITY TO TRANSPORT AND HOUSE THEM. HE AGREED AS WELL THAT THE LARGER THE GROUP BEING EXCHANGED, THE SHORTER SHOULD BE THE PERIOD OF THE EXCHANGE. ALL THESE MATTERS, HE EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN, WILL HAVE TO BE SETTLED BY SPECIFIC AGREEMENT.

5. THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. SIDE SEEKS EXPANDED EXCHANGES NOW BECAUSE IT SENSES A NEW SPIRIT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE WAKE OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT. IN THE PAST, HE SAID, MANY PERSONS IN THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT



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WISH TO HAVE LARGE GROUPS OF FOREIGNERS VISITING THEIR COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET VIEW MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE CHANGED

SINCE THEN, BUT IN EITHER CASE, SAID THE DIRECTOR, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD RESPECT THE SOVIET POSITION, ASKING ONLY THAT THIS POSITION BE EXPRESSED OPENLY AND FRANKLY. MR. KIRICHENKO AFFIRMED THEIR PRESENT POSITION ON NUMBERS IS NOW THE SAME AS OURS.

6. MR. RHINESMITH, NOTING THAT THE U.S. SIDE WANTED, AMONG OTHER PROJECTS, A SUMMER EXCHANGE OF 500 YOUNG PEOPLE, AND, FOR EXAMPLE, AN EXCHANGE OF 300-400 FARMERS. HE ASKED WHAT THE SOVIET REACTION WOULD BE TO EXCHANGES OF THIS SIZE. EMPHASIZING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN PRINCIPLE, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC FIGURE, KIRICHENKO RESPONDED THAT PLANS FOR EXCHANGES SHOULD BE "REALISTIC" AND "FEASIBLE."

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

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WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S SECOND JANUARY 14, 1986 MEET-

7. KIRICHENKO WENT ON TO STRESS THAT ALL EXCHANGES WOULD TAKE PLACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH EACH STATE'S "SOVEREIGN RIGHTS," LAWS, AND CUSTOMS, AND ON THE BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH EACH STATE'S INTERNAL REGULATIONS -- PRINCIPLES WHICH, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN ADOPTED IN THE HELSINKI ACCORDS AND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE DIRECTOR DID NOT WISH TO BE IN A POSITION THAT WOULD AFFORD THE SOVIETS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CYNICAL EVASION AND RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE THE SOVIET SIDE "UNCOMFORTABLE," YET ASKED KIRICHENKO FOR A FEW EXAMPLES OF BEHAVIOR THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD FROWN UPON. MR. RHINESMITH ASKED WHETHER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS WOULD OBJECT TO THE IDEA OF "HOME HOSPITALITY" FOR EXCHANGE PARTICIPANTS; HE POINTED OUT THAT UNDER SUCH A PROGRAM, PARTICIPANTS MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY BE HOUSED WITH FAMILIES, BUT PERHAPS MERELY VISIT THEM.

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8. AFTER KIRICHENKO HAD GIVEN HIS ASSENT TO THE IDEA OF PUBLICIZING EXCHANGES IN THE MEDIA, THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED THAT WORLDNET SATELLITE TELECONFERENCES MIGHT BE A GOOD FORM OF PUBLICITY WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON THE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. HE SAID WORLDNET COULD HOST A BILATERAL PRESS CONFERENCE ON EXCHANGES IN WHICH QUESTIONS WERE LIMITED TO THE SUBJECT OF EXCHANGES. KIRICHENKO AGREED THAT SUCH PROGRAMS SHOULD INVOLVE CHOOSING TOPICS AND EXPLORING THEM FULLY, WITHOUT DIGRESSING TO OTHER SUBJECTS THAT MIGHT HINDER IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHANGES.

9. KIRICHENKO NEXT TOOK UP THE SUBJECT OF RECIPROCITY RAISED AT THE EARLIER MEETING BY MR. RHINESMITH, AND DISPENSED WITH IT BY ASSURING HIS AMERICAN

INTERLOCUTORS THAT RECIPROCITY FOR THE SOVIETS IS "OUR BIBLE, OUR GOD." HE THEN THANKED THE DIRECTOR AND HIS PARTY FOR THEIR AGREEMENT TO RESPOND IN WRITING TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 12, 1985, AND ADDED THAT, IF THE U.S. SIDE BELIEVED A TRIP TO THE U.S. BY THE SOVIETS WOULD BE USEFUL, HE WOULD SET TO WORK PUTTING TOGETHER A TEAM FOR SUCH A VISIT. THE DIRECTOR TOLD KIRICHENKO THAT RECIPROCITY OF THIS SORT WAS MOST WELCOME. THE TWO AGREED THAT, UPON THE DIRECTOR'S RETURN FROM LENINGRAD ON JANUARY 21, THEY WOULD MEET AGAIN TO DISCUSS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WHEN A VISIT BY THE SOVIETS WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS.

10. MR. RHINESMITH SAID THAT BEFORE DEPARTURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE DIRECTOR AND HIS PARTY TO KNOW WHICH SPECIFIC AREAS OF EXCHANGE THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS DURING AN UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON, AND THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT INVOLVE. KIRICHENKO REPLIED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING NEW PROPOSALS, CONCENTRATING INSTEAD ON WORKING OUT THE DETAILS FOR PROGRAMS ALREADY PROPOSED. THE NUMBERS AND CONDITIONS FOR EXCHANGES UNDER BOTH THE RECENTLY SIGNED AGREEMENT AND THE JOINT INITIATIVE REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT, HE SAID, AND THE SOONER THIS IS DONE, THE SOONER THE TWO SIDES CAN MOVE ON TO NEW PROPOSALS.

11. AFTER THANKING HIS HOSTS ONCE AGAIN FOR ARRANGING THIS INITIAL DISCUSSION, THE DIRECTOR ASKED KIRICHENKO FOR ADVICE ON BRINGING UP TWO SPECIFIC POINTS DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. BOTH SIDES, HE SAID, BELIEVE THAT EXCHANGES ARE IN THEIR COMMON INTEREST, BUT NEITHER WISHES TO PAY TOO HIGH A PRICE. FURTHERMORE, THE CONGRESS, ELECTED BY ALL THE PEOPLE, "SOMETIMES

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REACTS STRONGLY TO WHAT BOTHERS THEM," AND THE CONGRESS' REACTION MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE TO BE IMPROVED. AND, HE WENT ON, BOTH CONGRESS AND THE PRESS FREQUENTLY ASK WHY THE SOVIET UNION REFUSES TO OPEN A SINGLE AMERICAN BOOKSTORE. THIS PRACTICE IS CERTAINLY THE RESULT OF A HIGH POLICY DECISION, OBSERVED THE DIRECTOR. THEREFORE, HE ASKED, WHAT WOULD KIRICHENKO THINK OF OUR RAISING THIS QUESTION WITH RELEVANT SOVIET MINISTRIES AND OFFICES DURING THE VISIT.

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S SECOND JANUARY 14, 1986 MEET-

12. KIRICHENKO OBSERVED IN REPLY THAT A DIFFICULT QUESTION SUCH AS THAT OF A BOOKSTORE COULD NOT BE RESOLVED AT PRESENT. THE TWO SIDES, HE SAID, SHOULD BE REALISTIC: THE MORE THEY COOPERATE, THE MORE THEY WILL CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR RESOLUTION OF SUCH PROBLEMS. THE DIRECTOR AGAIN ASKED WHETHER THE QUESTION WAS "TOO DELICATE," AND WHETHER IT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL TO RAISE IT AT THIS TIME; KIRICHENKO ADDED THAT THE QUESTION DID NOT PERTAIN TO SOME SECRET OR PROHIBITED AREA. PERHAPS, HE SUGGESTED, THE DIRECTOR COULD RAISE IT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET BOOK PUBLISHING COMMITTEE.

13. THE DIRECTOR THEN BROUGHT UP ANOTHER DIFFICULT QUESTION -- THE JAMMING OF U.S. RADIO BROADCASTS. POINTING OUT THAT VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROHIBIT JAMMING, HE NOTED THAT BOTH THE CONGRESS AND THE U.S. PRESS ASK WHY THE SOVIETS ARE SO AFRAID OF IDEAS THAT THEY MUST RESORT TO JAMMING. THE DIRECTOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISSUE WAS A SENSITIVE ONE FOR THE SOVIETS. HE ADDED THAT, DURING PERIODS OF WARMER RELATIONS, THE AMOUNT OF JAMMING HAD DIMINISHED WHICH HELPED IN PROMOTING GOOD WILL. IN THE WAKE OF THE GENEVA MEETING, ASKED THE DIRECTOR, COULD THIS NOT BE DONE AGAIN?

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14. KIRICHENKO RESPONDED THAT THE DIRECTOR HAD IN EFFECT ANSWERED HIS OWN QUESTION: WHEN RELATIONS IMPROVE, JAMMING DIMINISHES. HE URGED THE U.S. TO BE PRAGMATIC, AND TO RECOGNIZE THAT NOT ALL PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED AT ONCE. THE TWO SIDES MUST ESTABLISH A CERTAIN LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE, TRUST, AND GOOD WILL, BEFORE MORE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS CAN BE TACKLED. EVEN THEN, OPINED KIRICHENKO, THE QUESTION OF BOOKS IS LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED EARLIER THAN THAT OF JAMMING. BOTH SIDES, HE NOTED, HAVE GOOD ARGUMENTS FOR THEIR POSITIONS: U.S. REPRESENTATIVES SAY JAMMING VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW; SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES SAY THEY MUST TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES WHEN FALSE INFORMATION IS BEING DISSEMINATED.

15. THE DIRECTOR RESPONDED THAT HE APPRECIATED KIRICHENKO'S "PRAGMATIC VIEW." HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE TO TAKE UP THE GOALS THEY WISH TO ACHIEVE "IN THE PROPER SEQUENCE," ONCE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

16. KIRICHENKO RESPONDED THAT ALL QUESTIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED, PROVIDED DISCUSSION WAS CONDUCTED CALMLY AND WITHOUT ACCUSATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT CHOOSING THE PROPER TIME IS IMPORTANT. "LET US ACCUMULATE SOME POLITICAL CAPITAL THAT WILL ALLOW US TO RESOLVE THESE DELICATE QUESTIONS," HE SAID. "WITHOUT THIS, RESOLVING THEM IS IMPOSSIBLE." HARTMAN  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH  
LEONID ZAMYATIN OF THE CC OF THE CPSU

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DIRECTOR WICK MET JANUARY 15, 1986 WITH  
LEONID ZAMYATIN, CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION  
DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST

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Authority: DOS WAIVER

BY: LM NGA DATE: 6/11/25

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PARTY AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TO DISCUSS BILATERAL INFORMATION AND MEDIA EXCHANGES. END SUMMARY.

3. PARTICIPANTS: DIRECTOR WICK; MR. STEPHEN RHINESMITH, PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES COORDINATOR-DESIGNATE; MR. CHARLES HORNER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF PROGRAMS; MR. MARK N. BLITZ, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS STAFF; MR. JOHN F. KORDEK, DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; MR. JOHN LENCZOWSKI, NSC; MS. PATRICIA SIEMIEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR; MR. MAX ROBINSON, STATE DEPARTMENT SOVIET DESK OFFICER; MR. RAYMOND E. BENSON, PAO MOSCOW; MR. JAROSLAV J. VERNER, IO MOSCOW; MR. MARK SMITH, AIO MOSCOW (NOTETAKER); LEONID ZAMYATIN, CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, CPSU AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER; VITALIY KOBYSH, CHIEF, AMERICAN DESK, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT; ALEXANDER CHURLIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; ALEXANDER SYRODEEV, AMERICAN DESK, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; ALEXANDER OBUKHOV, INTERPRETER.

4. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN MR. ZAMYATIN'S OFFICE AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUILDING, FROM 1130 TO 1250 HOURS.

5. MR. ZAMYATIN WELCOMED DIRECTOR WICK AND HIS PARTY TO THE SOVIET UNION, NOTING THAT, ALTHOUGH HE AND HIS COUNTRYMEN OFTEN DID NOT AGREE WITH THE DIRECTOR'S VIEWS, THEY WOULD NEVERTHELESS ALWAYS TREAT HIM WITH RESPECT. HE ADDED THAT THE DIRECTOR'S PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY WAS A GOOD SIGN OF THE EXPANDING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE "SENSITIVE AREA" OF INFORMATION AND MASS MEDIA.

6. THE DIRECTOR EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF THESE REMARKS, AND OBSERVED IN ADDITION THAT THE RECENTLY TELEVISED EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAD "GALVANIZED" AMERICANS, AND ENABLED THEM TO SEE THE GENERAL SECRETARY AS A HUMAN BEING. THE TWO NEW YEAR'S ADDRESSES RAISED HOPES NOT ONLY IN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, BUT IN ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

7. THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED THAT, AT PRESENT, WHAT IS NEEDED ABOVE ALL IS FRANKNESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USG ACKNOWLEDGES THE SOVIETS' UNLIMITED ACCESS TO AMERICAN TELEVISION, BUT BELIEVES THAT RECIPROCAL AMERICAN ACCESS TO SOVIET TELEVISION IS ALSO NECESSARY. THE

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SOVIET GOVERNMENT, FOR REASONS OF ITS OWN, MAY NOT SEE THE MATTER THIS WAY. IN ANY CASE, THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE FRANK ABOUT THEIR VIEWS.

8. AFTER THE DIRECTOR REMARKED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER TV EXCHANGES ALONG THE LINES OF THE RECENT CARDIOLOGY

SATELLITE TELECONFERENCE, ZAMYATIN MENTIONED THAT HE HAD MET EARLIER IN THE MORNING WITH DR. CHAZOV, A PARTICIPANT IN THE CONFERENCE, WHO HAD TOLD HIM IN DETAIL OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT "BAN" ON THE PROGRAM. THE DIRECTOR SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND USIA HAD RECEIVED NEGATIVE COMMENT ABOUT DR. CHAZOV'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM BECAUSE OF THE ANTI-SAKHAROV LETTER HE HAD SIGNED, BUT IN THE END, HE, THE DIRECTOR, DECIDED THAT THE CARDIOLOGY TELECONFERENCE WAS A SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM IN WHICH POLITICAL VIEWS SHOULD PLAY NO PART. THUS, THE CARDIOLOGY WORLDNET WENT ON AS SCHEDULED. THE PROGRAM WAS NOT SHOWN IN THE U.S. SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DISCUSSION WAS VERY TECHNICAL, SAID THE DIRECTOR, POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIETS LIKewise HAD NOT TELEVISED THE PROGRAM. NEVERTHELESS, THE DIRECTOR SAID, \*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

THE PROGRAM WAS A GREAT SUCCESS, AND ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE WELCOME.

9. ZAMYATIN AGREED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT HAD GIVEN A DEFINITE PUSH TO IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S FRANK DISCUSSION OF BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES, AS WELL AS HIS WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO THE SOVIET VIEW, HAD PLEASED THE GENERAL SECRETARY. OF COURSE, HE ADDED, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN, BUT THE DECISION TO HOLD A SECOND AND THIRD MEETING INDICATES

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THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING SUCH DIFFERENCES. ZAMYATIN SAID IT IS IMPORTANT NOW TO ESTABLISH CHANNELS FOR DISCUSSING DIFFERENCES, WHICH SHOULD BRING US CLOSER TO RESOLVING THEM. INFORMATION EXCHANGE IS OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE TO BOTH SIDES" ZAMYATIN SAID, ADDING THAT, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES AND THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION THEY CAN EXCHANGE WILL ALWAYS BE INTERRELATED. ZAMYATIN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS HAD BEEN VIEWED ON APPROXIMATELY FIFTY MILLION TELEVISION SETS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. HE MENTIONED IN ADDITION ANOTHER FORM OF TELEVISION COOPERATION, THE SO-CALLED "SPACE BRIDGES," OF WHICH THERE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN ELEVEN.

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10. ZAMYATIN SAID HE WOULD CERTAINLY REVEAL NO SECRETS BY STATING THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE WERE VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE, "QUITE APART FROM THE INFORMATION THAT CAN BE RECEIVED FROM THE EMBASSY OF AMBASSADOR HARTMAN, WHICH IS SOMETIMES ONE-SIDED." IN PRACTICALLY EVERY EDITION OF THE JOURNAL "FOREIGN LITERATURE," HE CLAIMED, THERE IS A TRANSLATION OF AN AMERICAN NOVEL. "MR. BENSON CAN PERHAPS PROVIDE YOU WITH OTHER INFORMATION," SUGGESTED ZAMYATIN, ADDING THAT BENSON'S INFORMATION "IS USUALLY FORMULATED IN A CERTAIN MANNER." ZAMYATIN POINTED OUT BY WAY OF EXAMPLE THAT EIGHT MOSCOW THEATERS, AND FORTY IN THE USSR AS A WHOLE, STAGE WORKS BY AMERICAN AUTHORS, FERTILE SOIL FOR THE GROWTH OF CULTURAL EXCHANGES EXISTS. ANY LIMITATIONS ON SUCH EXCHANGES, SAID ZAMYATIN, WOULD CONCERN PRIMARILY FILMS WHICH CANNOT BE SHOWN IN THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH FOR MORAL REASONS AND FOR REASONS OF COST.

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11. THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED TO ZAMYATIN THE TREMENDOUS POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE TO TELEVISION FOR CREATING EITHER UNDERSTANDING OR MISUNDERSTANDING. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID, TELEVISION FOOTAGE OF BOTH THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND HIS WIFE IN THE WEST HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL TO CREATE A MORE FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF THE SOVIET UNION. ZAMYATIN OBSERVED IN RESPONSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE MANY REQUESTS IT HAS RECEIVED FROM WESTERN TV NETWORKS FOR APPEARANCES BY MRS. GORBACHEV, "TAKES A VERY MODEST VIEW" OF SUCH APPEARANCES. THE DIRECTOR ASKED WHETHER, GIVEN THE POSITIVE IMAGE ENJOYED BY MR. AND MRS. GORBACHEV IN THE WEST, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A TV PROGRAM IN WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GORBACHEVS CONDUCT A TOUR OF HISTORIC PLACES IN MOSCOW. ZAMYATIN RESPONDED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WENT BEYOND THE RANGE OF ISSUES THAT COULD BE RESOLVED AT THE PRESENT MEETING; THE GENERAL

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SECRETARY WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY RESPONSE TO IT COULD BE MADE.

12. THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR JOINT TELEVISION PROGRAMS, E.G., ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH, CANCER RESEARCH, THE TEACHING OF MEDICINE, AND OCEANOGRAPHY. AFTER AGREEING THAT THERE WERE MANY SUCH PROGRAMS ON WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO COOPERATE, ZAMYATIN ADVISED THE DIRECTOR TO RAISE HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DIRECTLY WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMITTEE (GOSTELERADIO).

13. TURNING NEXT TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "SENSITIVE"  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

TOPICS, THE DIRECTOR ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ALLOW EVEN A SINGLE AMERICAN BOOKSTORE, WHEREAS THERE WERE BOOKSTORES IN THE USA FREELY ALLOWED THAT SPECIALIZED IN MATERIALS FROM THE USSR. ZAMYATIN POINTED OUT IN REPLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW PUBLISHING A 40 VOLUME HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, SUBSCRIPTIONS TO WHICH ARE UNLIMITED IN NUMBER, AND HAS IN ITS BOOKSTORES MANY BOOKS BY AMERICAN AUTHORS IN TRANSLATION. IN AMERICAN BOOKSTORES, HE ALLEGED, ONE HAS GREAT DIFFICULTY FINDING RUSSIAN OR SOVIET AUTHORS OTHER THAN THE 19TH CENTURY CLASSICS. HE ADVISED THE DIRECTOR TO MEET WITH NIKOLAY FEDORENKO, THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL "FOREIGN LITERATURE," IN ORDER TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF AMERICAN LITERATURE PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET UNION.

14. WHEN PRESSED, ZAMYATIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO BOOKSTORE WHERE AMERICAN BOOKS CAN BE BOUGHT IN THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET PENAL CODE PROHIBITS PUBLICATION OF BOOKS

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DEALING WITH PRONOGRAPHY, MURDER, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OFTEN FOUND IN AMERICAN LITERATURE, ACCORDING TO ZAMYATIN. EVEN SO, HE ADDED WITH A SMILE, THE AMERICAN BOOKS THAT ARE TRANSLATED CONTAIN MORE SEX THAN THOSE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

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15. ZAMYATIN CLAIMED THAT, DURING THE TEN YEAR PERIOD 1975-85, THE SOVIET UNION HAD PUBLISHED 2795 BOOKS BY U.S. AUTHORS, IN EDITIONS TOTALING 158 MILLION COPIES; IN THE U.S. DURING THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD APPROXIMATELY 1400 BOOKS BY RUSSIAN AND SOVIET AUTHORS WERE PUBLISHED, IN A TOTAL OF 12 MILLION COPIES, AND OF THESE THE GREAT MAJORITY WERE EDITIONS OF THE 19TH CENTURY RUSSIAN CLASSICS.

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16. THE DIRECTOR SAID IN RESPONSE THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ITS OWN WAY OF DOING THINGS, AND THAT, EVEN IF AMERICANS HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHY THERE IS NO AMERICAN BOOKSTORE IN THE USSR, APPARENTLY THE SOVIET UNION HAS ITS OWN REASONS FOR NOT HAVING ONE AND "SO BE IT." HOWEVER, THE DIRECTOR HAD RESPONDED TO ONE OF THE REASONS THAT AMERICANS VIEW THE USSR NEGATIVELY; THIS IN ANSWER TO

ZAMYATIN'S REQUEST.

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17. THE DIRECTOR THEN ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION, IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, TO WHICH IT IS A PARTY, RESORTS TO JAMMING OF WESTERN RADIO BROADCASTS. ZAMYATIN OFFERED TO RESPOND, REMARKING THAT THE REASONS WERE NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. HE EMPHASIZED FIRST THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT JAM ALL WESTERN BROADCASTS: FOR EXAMPLE, NEITHER THE ENGLISH NOR THE RUSSIAN SERVICE OF THE BBC IS JAMMED, AND EVEN JAMMING OF VOA DOES NOT OCCUR AT ALL TIMES. BUT, HE ADDED, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT "GIVES PREFERENCES TO THE VOA WHEN IT COMES TO JAMMING." IF THE DIRECTOR WISHED TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR SOVIET-JAMMING OF CERTAIN VOA BROADCASTS, SAID ZAMYATIN, HE SHOULD LOOK CAREFULLY AT WHAT VOA IS TRANSMITTING TO THE USSR.

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18. VOA PROGRAMS BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET UNION, ZAMYATIN SAID, ARE NOT CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH PRESENTING THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW ON WORLD EVENTS (WHICH,

HE ACKNOWLEDGED, WOULD BE OF INTEREST), BUT RATHER WITH TRANSMITTING THE DISTORTED OPINIONS OF THOSE AT THE RADIO STATION CONCERNING EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET PEOPLE KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN THEIR COUNTRY THAN THESE RADIO BROADCASTS, ACCORDING TO

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ZAMYATIN, AND THEY DO NOT LIKE IT WHEN THEY HEAR DISTORTED REPORTS WHICH ARE INTENDED TO SOW RUMORS, PROVOKE DISTRUST, AND CREATE OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM. OF COURSE, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, A FEW CURIOUS PEOPLE DO LISTEN ("WE CAN EVEN TELL YOU THE PERCENTAGE"), BUT THE MAJORITY IS OUTRAGED. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS, ZAMYATIN POINTED OUT, NOT INTERESTED IN ALLOWING ITS CITIZENS TO SIT BY THEIR RECEIVERS AND MAKE THEIR OWN  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

DECISION AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE PASSED ON THE AIRWAVES AND WHAT SHOULD BE REJECTED. THEREFORE, SAID HE, "WE JAM." THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT LEAVE IT TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOVIET CITIZEN TO DECIDE WHETHER TO LISTEN TO VOA OR NOT. THEY CAN SIMPLY TURN OFF THE DIAL, THE DIRECTOR SAID, IF THEY DON'T LIKE WHAT THEY

HEAR.

19. ZAMYATIN REPEATED THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT JAM FOREIGN STATIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY REPORT WHAT IS, IN SOVIET VIEW, AN INCORRECT ASSESSMENT OF WORLD EVENTS. JAMMING OF VOA AND OF RADIO LIBERTY IS CARRIED OUT "SELECTIVELY," WHEN THESE STATIONS PRESENT DISTORTED INFORMATION ABOUT EVENTS IN THE USSR AND THEREBY ATTEMPT TO CREATE OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. SHOULD POSITIVE CHANGES IN VOA BROADCASTING OCCUR, HE SAID, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO JAM. NOTING THAT HE HIMSELF LISTENS TO THE VOA SPECIAL ENGLISH PROGRAM, ZAMYATIN SAID THIS SORT OF BROADCAST CREATES NO PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE VOA WOULD TRANSMIT THE SAME PROGRAM IN RUSSIAN AS THE VOA DOES IN ENGLISH, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM OF JAMMING. ZAMYATIN CONCLUDED BY ASKING WHETHER THE U.S. FINDS ANYTHING OBJECTIONABLE IN MOSCOW RADIO BROADCASTS TO AMERICA.

20. THE DIRECTOR ASKED ZAMYATIN WHETHER HE LISTENED

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REGULARLY TO VOA, TO WHICH ZAMYATIN REPLIED THAT IN ADDITION TO LISTENING TO THE SPECIAL ENGLISH BROADCASTS HE RECEIVES A SUMMARY OF THE VOA PROGRAMMING. HAVING EXPLAINED THAT VOA IS REQUIRED BY U.S. LAW TO REPORT THE NEWS ACCURATELY AND OBJECTIVELY, THE DIRECTOR SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY EXAMPLES OF DISTORTED COVERAGE THAT ZAMYATIN COULD PROVIDE. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD HEARD A NUMBER OF GROSS DISTORTIONS ON RADIO MOSCOW'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE BROADCASTS THE PREVIOUS EVENING, AND SAID RECIPROCALLY THE USG WOULD BE GLAD TO ANALYZE RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS TO THE U.S. FOR EXAMPLES OF DISTORTED COVERAGE. ZAMYATIN RESPONDED BY RECALLING THAT SEVERAL YEARS AGO A USG OFFICIAL HAD SUGGESTED THAT RADIO MOSCOW'S TRANSMITTERS IN CUBA BE BOMBED.

21. THE DIRECTOR ASSURED ZAMYATIN THAT THIS WAS NOT THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WHICH, REGARDLESS OF WHAT RADIO MOSCOW MIGHT TRANSMIT, WOULD NEVER RESORT TO THE ILLEGALITY OF JAMMING. ZAMYATIN COMPLAINED THAT RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS ARE HEARD BY RELATIVELY FEW AMERICANS, SINCE BROADCASTS ARE TRANSMITTED BY SHORT-WAVE AND MOST AMERICANS OWN ONLY MEDIUM-WAVE RECEIVERS. THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD PURCHASE AIR TIME ON U.S. MEDIUM-WAVE RADIO, AND OFFERED TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH THE NAMES OF APPROPRIATE PERSONS TO CONTACT FOR THIS PURPOSE IN THE U.S. IN RETURN, HE SAID, WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO PURCHASE AIR TIME ON THEIR OWN MEDIUM-WAVE STATIONS. ZAMYATIN DISMISSED THE LATTER PROPOSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE U.S. IS ALREADY ABLE TO BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND IS EVEN BUILDING SIX NEW TRANSMITTERS FOR SUCH BROADCASTS.

22. AFTER THE DISCUSSION HAD CONCLUDED, ZAMYATIN'S DEPUTY, VITALIY KOBYSH, REMARKED THAT HE HAD NEVER ATTENDED A MEETING, -- "AND I HAVE BEEN ATTENDING THEM

FOR 30 YEARS" -- AT WHICH THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE WERE DISCUSSED SO BROADLY, CANDIDLY, AND THOROUGHLY. WHEN HE HAD VISITED THE U.S. WITH NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV A QUARTER-CENTURY AGO, KOBYSH SAID, THESE ISSUES HAD NOT EVEN BEEN RAISED. KOBYSH SEEMED PLEASED, AND PERHAPS EVEN A BIT ASTONISHED, THAT THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN AIRED SO FULLY AND CANDIDLY AT THIS MEETING.

23. ACTION ITEMS:  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

1.) ZAMYATIN'S OFFICE IS TO PROVIDE USIA WITH EXAMPLES  
OF ALLEGED VOA DISTORTIONS.

2.) ZAMYATIN ASKED IF THE USG FINDS ANY DISTORTIONS  
IN RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS; USIA SHOULD PROVIDE HIM  
WITH SUCH A LIST.

HARTMAN

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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LEONID ZAMYATIN OF THE CC OF THE CPSU

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DIRECTOR WICK MET JANUARY 15, 1986 WITH  
LEONID ZAMYATIN, CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION  
DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST

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Authority DOS WAIVER  
BY LM NARA DATE 6/11/85

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PARTY AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TO DISCUSS BILATERAL INFORMATION AND MEDIA EXCHANGES. END SUMMARY.

3. PARTICIPANTS: DIRECTOR WICK; MR. STEPHEN RHINESMITH, PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES COORDINATOR-DESIGNATE; MR. CHARLES HORNER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF PROGRAMS; MR. MARK N. BLITZ, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS STAFF; MR. JOHN F. KORDEK, DIRECTOR, USIA BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; MR. JOHN LENCZOWSKI, NSC; MS. PATRICIA SIEMIEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR; MR. MAX ROBINSON, STATE DEPARTMENT SOVIET DESK OFFICER; MR. RAYMOND E. BENSON, PAO MOSCOW; MR. JAROSLAV J. VERNER, IO MOSCOW; MR. MARK SMITH, AIO MOSCOW (NOTETAKER); LEONID ZAMYATIN, CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, CPSU AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER; VITALIY KOBYSH, CHIEF, AMERICAN DESK, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT; ALEXANDER CHURLIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; ALEXANDER SYRODEEV, AMERICAN DESK, CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; ALEXANDER OBUKHOV, INTERPRETER.

4. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN MR. ZAMYATIN'S OFFICE AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUILDING, FROM 1130 TO 1250 HOURS.

5. MR. ZAMYATIN WELCOMED DIRECTOR WICK AND HIS PARTY TO THE SOVIET UNION, NOTING THAT, ALTHOUGH HE AND HIS COUNTRYMEN OFTEN DID NOT AGREE WITH THE DIRECTOR'S VIEWS, THEY WOULD NEVERTHELESS ALWAYS TREAT HIM WITH RESPECT. HE ADDED THAT THE DIRECTOR'S PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY WAS A GOOD SIGN OF THE EXPANDING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE "SENSITIVE AREA" OF INFORMATION AND MASS MEDIA.

6. THE DIRECTOR EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF THESE REMARKS, AND OBSERVED IN ADDITION THAT THE RECENTLY TELEVISED EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAD "GALVANIZED" AMERICANS, AND ENABLED THEM TO SEE THE GENERAL SECRETARY AS A HUMAN BEING. THE TWO NEW YEAR'S ADDRESSES RAISED HOPES NOT ONLY IN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, BUT IN ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

7. THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED THAT, AT PRESENT, WHAT IS NEEDED ABOVE ALL IS FRANKNESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USG ACKNOWLEDGES THE SOVIETS' UNLIMITED ACCESS TO AMERICAN TELEVISION, BUT BELIEVES THAT RECIPROCAL AMERICAN ACCESS TO SOVIET TELEVISION IS ALSO NECESSARY. THE

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SOVIET GOVERNMENT, FOR REASONS OF ITS OWN, MAY NOT SEE THE MATTER THIS WAY. IN ANY CASE, THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE FRANK ABOUT THEIR VIEWS.

8. AFTER THE DIRECTOR REMARKED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER TV EXCHANGES ALONG THE LINES OF THE RECENT CARDIOLOGY

SATELLITE TELECONFERENCE, ZAMYATIN MENTIONED THAT HE HAD MET EARLIER IN THE MORNING WITH DR. CHAZOV, A PARTICIPANT IN THE CONFERENCE, WHO HAD TOLD HIM IN DETAIL OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT "BAN" ON THE PROGRAM. THE DIRECTOR SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND USIA HAD RECEIVED NEGATIVE COMMENT ABOUT DR. CHAZOV'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM BECAUSE OF THE ANTI-SAKHAROV LETTER HE HAD SIGNED, BUT IN THE END, HE, THE DIRECTOR, DECIDED THAT THE CARDIOLOGY TELECONFERENCE WAS A SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM IN WHICH POLITICAL VIEWS SHOULD PLAY NO PART. THUS, THE CARDIOLOGY WORLDNET WENT ON AS SCHEDULED. THE PROGRAM WAS NOT SHOWN IN THE U.S. SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DISCUSSION WAS VERY TECHNICAL, SAID THE DIRECTOR, POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIETS LIKewise HAD NOT TELEVISED THE PROGRAM. NEVERTHELESS, THE DIRECTOR SAID, \*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

\*\*\*\* SECTION BREAK \*\*\*\*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

THE PROGRAM WAS A GREAT SUCCESS, AND ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE WELCOME.

9. ZAMYATIN AGREED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT HAD GIVEN A DEFINITE PUSH TO IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S FRANK DISCUSSION OF BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES, AS WELL AS HIS WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO THE SOVIET VIEW, HAD PLEASED THE GENERAL SECRETARY. OF COURSE, HE ADDED, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN, BUT THE DECISION TO HOLD A SECOND AND THIRD MEETING INDICATES

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THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING SUCH DIFFERENCES. ZAMYATIN SAID IT IS IMPORTANT NOW TO ESTABLISH CHANNELS FOR DISCUSSING DIFFERENCES, WHICH SHOULD BRING US CLOSER TO RESOLVING THEM. INFORMATION EXCHANGE IS OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE TO BOTH SIDES" ZAMYATIN SAID, ADDING THAT, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES AND THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION THEY CAN EXCHANGE WILL ALWAYS BE INTERRELATED. ZAMYATIN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS HAD BEEN VIEWED ON APPROXIMATELY FIFTY MILLION TELEVISION SETS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. HE MENTIONED IN ADDITION ANOTHER FORM OF TELEVISION COOPERATION, THE SO-CALLED "SPACE BRIDGES," OF WHICH THERE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN ELEVEN.

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10. ZAMYATIN SAID HE WOULD CERTAINLY REVEAL NO SECRETS BY STATING THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE WERE VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE, "QUITE APART FROM THE INFORMATION THAT CAN BE RECEIVED FROM THE EMBASSY OF AMBASSADOR HARTMAN, WHICH IS SOMETIMES ONE-SIDED." IN PRACTICALLY EVERY EDITION OF THE JOURNAL "FOREIGN LITERATURE," HE CLAIMED, THERE IS A TRANSLATION OF AN AMERICAN NOVEL. "MR. BENSON CAN PERHAPS PROVIDE YOU WITH OTHER INFORMATION," SUGGESTED ZAMYATIN, ADDING THAT BENSON'S INFORMATION "IS USUALLY FORMULATED IN A CERTAIN MANNER." ZAMYATIN POINTED OUT BY WAY OF EXAMPLE THAT EIGHT MOSCOW THEATERS, AND FORTY IN THE USSR AS A WHOLE, STAGE WORKS BY AMERICAN AUTHORS, FERTILE SOIL FOR THE GROWTH OF CULTURAL EXCHANGES EXISTS. ANY LIMITATIONS ON SUCH EXCHANGES, SAID ZAMYATIN, WOULD CONCERN PRIMARILY FILMS WHICH CANNOT BE SHOWN IN THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH FOR MORAL REASONS AND FOR REASONS OF COST.

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11. THE DIRECTOR EMPHASIZED TO ZAMYATIN THE TREMENDOUS POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE TO TELEVISION FOR CREATING EITHER UNDERSTANDING OR MISUNDERSTANDING. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID, TELEVISION FOOTAGE OF BOTH THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND HIS WIFE IN THE WEST HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL TO CREATE A MORE FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF THE SOVIET UNION. ZAMYATIN OBSERVED IN RESPONSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE MANY REQUESTS IT HAS RECEIVED FROM WESTERN TV NETWORKS FOR APPEARANCES BY MRS. GORBACHEV, "TAKES A VERY MODEST VIEW" OF SUCH APPEARANCES. THE DIRECTOR ASKED WHETHER, GIVEN THE POSITIVE IMAGE ENJOYED BY MR. AND MRS. GORBACHEV IN THE WEST, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A TV PROGRAM IN WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GORBACHEVS CONDUCT A TOUR OF HISTORIC PLACES IN MOSCOW. ZAMYATIN RESPONDED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WENT BEYOND THE RANGE OF ISSUES THAT COULD BE RESOLVED AT THE PRESENT MEETING; THE GENERAL

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SECRETARY WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY RESPONSE TO IT COULD BE MADE.

12. THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR JOINT TELEVISION PROGRAMS, E.G., ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH, CANCER RESEARCH, THE TEACHING OF MEDICINE, AND OCEANOGRAPHY. AFTER AGREEING THAT THERE WERE MANY SUCH PROGRAMS ON WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO COOPERATE, ZAMYATIN ADVISED THE DIRECTOR TO RAISE HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DIRECTLY WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMITTEE (GOSTELERADIO).

13. TURNING NEXT TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "SENSITIVE"  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

TOPICS, THE DIRECTOR ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ALLOW EVEN A SINGLE AMERICAN BOOKSTORE, WHEREAS THERE WERE BOOKSTORES IN THE USA FREELY ALLOWED THAT SPECIALIZED IN MATERIALS FROM THE USSR. ZAMYATIN POINTED OUT IN REPLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW PUBLISHING A 40 VOLUME HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, SUBSCRIPTIONS TO WHICH ARE UNLIMITED IN NUMBER, AND HAS IN ITS BOOKSTORES MANY BOOKS BY AMERICAN AUTHORS IN TRANSLATION. IN AMERICAN BOOKSTORES, HE ALLEGED, ONE HAS GREAT DIFFICULTY FINDING RUSSIAN OR SOVIET AUTHORS OTHER THAN THE 19TH CENTURY CLASSICS. HE ADVISED THE DIRECTOR TO MEET WITH NIKOLAY FEDORENKO, THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL "FOREIGN LITERATURE," IN ORDER TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF AMERICAN LITERATURE PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET UNION.

14. WHEN PRESSED, ZAMYATIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO BOOKSTORE WHERE AMERICAN BOOKS CAN BE BOUGHT IN THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET PENAL CODE PROHIBITS PUBLICATION OF BOOKS

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DEALING WITH PRONOGRAPHY, MURDER, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OFTEN FOUND IN AMERICAN LITERATURE, ACCORDING TO ZAMYATIN. EVEN SO, HE ADDED WITH A SMILE, THE AMERICAN BOOKS THAT ARE TRANSLATED CONTAIN MORE SEX THAN THOSE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

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15. ZAMYATIN CLAIMED THAT, DURING THE TEN YEAR PERIOD 1975-85, THE SOVIET UNION HAD PUBLISHED 2795 BOOKS BY U.S. AUTHORS, IN EDITIONS TOTALING 158 MILLION COPIES; IN THE U.S. DURING THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD APPROXIMATELY 1400 BOOKS BY RUSSIAN AND SOVIET AUTHORS WERE PUBLISHED, IN A TOTAL OF 12 MILLION COPIES, AND OF THESE THE GREAT MAJORITY WERE EDITIONS OF THE 19TH CENTURY RUSSIAN CLASSICS.

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16. THE DIRECTOR SAID IN RESPONSE THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ITS OWN WAY OF DOING THINGS, AND THAT, EVEN IF AMERICANS HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHY THERE IS NO AMERICAN BOOKSTORE IN THE USSR, APPARENTLY THE SOVIET UNION HAS ITS OWN REASONS FOR NOT HAVING ONE AND "SO BE IT." HOWEVER, THE DIRECTOR HAD RESPONDED TO ONE OF THE REASONS THAT AMERICANS VIEW THE USSR NEGATIVELY; THIS IN ANSWER TO

ZAMYATIN'S REQUEST.

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17. THE DIRECTOR THEN ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION, IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, TO WHICH IT IS A PARTY, RESORTS TO JAMMING OF WESTERN RADIO BROADCASTS. ZAMYATIN OFFERED TO RESPOND, REMARKING THAT THE REASONS WERE NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. HE EMPHASIZED FIRST THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT JAM ALL WESTERN BROADCASTS: FOR EXAMPLE, NEITHER THE ENGLISH NOR THE RUSSIAN SERVICE OF THE BBC IS JAMMED, AND EVEN JAMMING OF VOA DOES NOT OCCUR AT ALL TIMES. BUT, HE ADDED, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT "GIVES PREFERENCES TO THE VOA WHEN IT COMES TO JAMMING." IF THE DIRECTOR WISHED TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR SOVIET-JAMMING OF CERTAIN VOA BROADCASTS, SAID ZAMYATIN, HE SHOULD LOOK CAREFULLY AT WHAT VOA IS TRANSMITTING TO THE USSR.

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18. VOA PROGRAMS BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET UNION, ZAMYATIN SAID, ARE NOT CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH PRESENTING THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW ON WORLD EVENTS (WHICH, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, WOULD BE OF INTEREST), BUT RATHER WITH TRANSMITTING THE DISTORTED OPINIONS OF THOSE AT THE RADIO STATION CONCERNING EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET PEOPLE KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN THEIR COUNTRY THAN THESE RADIO BROADCASTS, ACCORDING TO

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ZAMYATIN, AND THEY DO NOT LIKE IT WHEN THEY HEAR DISTORTED REPORTS WHICH ARE INTENDED TO SOW RUMORS, PROVOKE DISTRUST, AND CREATE OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM. OF COURSE, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, A FEW CURIOUS PEOPLE DO LISTEN ("WE CAN EVEN TELL YOU THE PERCENTAGE"), BUT THE MAJORITY IS OUTRAGED. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS, ZAMYATIN POINTED OUT, NOT INTERESTED IN ALLOWING ITS CITIZENS TO SIT BY THEIR RECEIVERS AND MAKE THEIR OWN  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

DECISION AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE PASSED ON THE AIRWAVES AND WHAT SHOULD BE REJECTED. THEREFORE, SAID HE, "WE JAM." THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT LEAVE IT TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOVIET CITIZEN TO DECIDE WHETHER TO LISTEN TO VOA OR NOT. THEY CAN SIMPLY TURN OFF THE DIAL, THE DIRECTOR SAID, IF THEY DON'T LIKE WHAT THEY

HEAR.

19. ZAMYATIN REPEATED THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT JAM FOREIGN STATIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY REPORT WHAT IS, IN SOVIET VIEW, AN INCORRECT ASSESSMENT OF WORLD EVENTS. JAMMING OF VOA AND OF RADIO LIBERTY IS CARRIED OUT "SELECTIVELY," WHEN THESE STATIONS PRESENT DISTORTED INFORMATION ABOUT EVENTS IN THE USSR AND THEREBY ATTEMPT TO CREATE OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. SHOULD POSITIVE CHANGES IN VOA BROADCASTING OCCUR, HE SAID, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO JAM. NOTING THAT HE HIMSELF LISTENS TO THE VOA SPECIAL ENGLISH PROGRAM, ZAMYATIN SAID THIS SORT OF BROADCAST CREATES NO PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE VOA WOULD TRANSMIT THE SAME PROGRAM IN RUSSIAN AS THE VOA DOES IN ENGLISH, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM OF JAMMING. ZAMYATIN CONCLUDED BY ASKING WHETHER THE U.S. FINDS ANYTHING OBJECTIONABLE IN MOSCOW RADIO BROADCASTS TO AMERICA.

20. THE DIRECTOR ASKED ZAMYATIN WHETHER HE LISTENED

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REGULARLY TO VOA, TO WHICH ZAMYATIN REPLIED THAT IN ADDITION TO LISTENING TO THE SPECIAL ENGLISH BROADCASTS HE RECEIVES A SUMMARY OF THE VOA PROGRAMMING. HAVING EXPLAINED THAT VOA IS REQUIRED BY U.S. LAW TO REPORT THE NEWS ACCURATELY AND OBJECTIVELY, THE DIRECTOR SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY EXAMPLES OF DISTORTED COVERAGE THAT ZAMYATIN COULD PROVIDE. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD HEARD A NUMBER OF GROSS DISTORTIONS ON RADIO MOSCOW'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE BROADCASTS THE PREVIOUS EVENING, AND SAID RECIPROCALLY THE USG WOULD BE GLAD TO ANALYZE RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS TO THE U.S. FOR EXAMPLES OF DISTORTED COVERAGE. ZAMYATIN RESPONDED BY RECALLING THAT SEVERAL YEARS AGO A USG OFFICIAL HAD SUGGESTED THAT RADIO MOSCOW'S TRANSMITTERS IN CUBA BE BOMBED.

21. THE DIRECTOR ASSURED ZAMYATIN THAT THIS WAS NOT THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WHICH, REGARDLESS OF WHAT RADIO MOSCOW MIGHT TRANSMIT, WOULD NEVER RESORT TO THE ILLEGALITY OF JAMMING. ZAMYATIN COMPLAINED THAT RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS ARE HEARD BY RELATIVELY FEW AMERICANS, SINCE BROADCASTS ARE TRANSMITTED BY SHORT-WAVE AND MOST AMERICANS OWN ONLY MEDIUM-WAVE RECEIVERS. THE DIRECTOR SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD PURCHASE AIR TIME ON U.S. MEDIUM-WAVE RADIO, AND OFFERED TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH THE NAMES OF APPROPRIATE PERSONS TO CONTACT FOR THIS PURPOSE IN THE U.S. IN RETURN, HE SAID, WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO PURCHASE AIR TIME ON THEIR OWN MEDIUM-WAVE STATIONS. ZAMYATIN DISMISSED THE LATTER PROPOSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE U.S. IS ALREADY ABLE TO BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND IS EVEN BUILDING SIX NEW TRANSMITTERS FOR SUCH BROADCASTS.

22. AFTER THE DISCUSSION HAD CONCLUDED, ZAMYATIN'S DEPUTY, VITALIY KOBYSH, REMARKED THAT HE HAD NEVER ATTENDED A MEETING, -- "AND I HAVE BEEN ATTENDING THEM

FOR 30 YEARS" -- AT WHICH THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE WERE DISCUSSED SO BROADLY, CANDIDLY, AND THOROUGHLY. WHEN HE HAD VISITED THE U.S. WITH NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV A QUARTER-CENTURY AGO, KOBYSH SAID, THESE ISSUES HAD NOT EVEN BEEN RAISED. KOBYSH SEEMED PLEASED, AND PERHAPS EVEN A BIT ASTONISHED, THAT THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN AIRED SO FULLY AND CANDIDLY AT THIS MEETING.

23. ACTION ITEMS:  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 00865

USIA FOR D, C, EU, P, VOA, T, AND E

STATE FOR EUR/SOV

WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK/NSC

LENINGRAD FOR P&C(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR WICK'S JANUARY 15, 1986 MEETING WITH

1.) ZAMYATIN'S OFFICE IS TO PROVIDE USIA WITH EXAMPLES  
OF ALLEGED VOA DISTORTIONS.

2.) ZAMYATIN ASKED IF THE USG FINDS ANY DISTORTIONS  
IN RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS; USIA SHOULD PROVIDE HIM  
WITH SUCH A LIST.

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\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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