

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Raymond, Walter: Files
Folder Title: US-Soviet Exchanges
[05/01/1986-07/15/1986]
Box: RAC 11

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

US-USSR Cultural and Educational Exchanges

May 1986

Background: During the 1945-58 period there were very few cultural contacts between the US and the USSR. A significant one, however, was the 1956 agreement to exchange America magazine and Soviet Life. America, which continues to be distributed today, is the US Information Agency's (USIA) highly regarded and, among Soviet citizens, extraordinarily popular monthly magazine on American life.

Many of the programs that have come to be traditionally associated with US-Soviet exchanges took shape between 1959 and the late 1960s. Key events during this period included the first American National Exhibit in the USSR--which served as the setting for Vice President Nixon's famous "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev--the first exchanges of university graduate students and faculty, and delegation visits in the arts and professional and musical fields.

The range and size of exchange programs grew rapidly during the 1970s. New programs included the 1974 Fulbright scholars and lecturers program; direct university-to-university agreements such as that between the State University of New York and Moscow State University; joint projects in the social sciences and humanities between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences; the National Academy of Sciences interacademy agreement with the Soviet Academy of Science; the expansion of private contacts; and regular exchanges of first rank performing arts groups, such as the Bolshoi Ballet and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.

The US Government allowed the US-Soviet general exchanges agreement to expire at the end of 1979, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This led to an eventual reduction in educational exchanges and a complete cessation of government-sponsored performing arts groups and exhibitions.

The Geneva Meeting: On November 21, 1985 at Geneva, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a new general exchanges agreement marking the resumption of official academic, cultural, and performing artist exchanges between the two countries. This agreement provides for both sides to facilitate exchanges in the fields of performing arts, exhibits, television and film, publications, science and technology, and many others.

At Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev also endorsed a new, broad-based people-to-people initiative to expand direct contact between citizens of both countries, particularly the young. Known as the President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative because it was originally proposed by President Reagan in the weeks before the Geneva meeting, it is intended to promote openness, honest communications, and opportunities for the two peoples to get to know

N

each other directly. In his address to the nation on the eve of his departure for Geneva, the President proposed that both sides "find as yet undiscovered avenues where American and Soviet citizens can cooperate fruitfully for the benefit of mankind."

USIA plays key role: Responsibility for implementing the general exchanges agreement and the President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative rests with the USIA, under the leadership of Charles Z. Wick. A new office headed by Dr. Stephen H. Rhinesmith was established in January 1986 to facilitate the President's Exchange Initiative.

Funding for American projects will come from private sector sources in the US. American participation in the exchanges also will be made possible by voluntary administrative support by private exchange organizations.

Six projects under the exchange initiative, highlighted in the joint statement issued following Geneva, will be among the first to be implemented:

- Cooperation in developing educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school education;
- Annual exchanges of professors of history, culture, and economics to conduct special courses at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education;
- Creation of a US-Soviet scholarship program for the best students from each country in the natural and social sciences, humanities, and technology for an academic year;
- Promotion of Russian language studies in the US and English language studies in the Soviet Union;
- Expansion of contacts in sports, including regular meets and increased television coverage;
- Resumption of cooperation in the field of cancer research.

Goals for cultural and educational exchanges: Both sides are culturally enriched from sharing their best talent with each other and from sharing knowledge and resources in solving common problems. Exchange programs also can help break down barriers, lessen distrust, reduce the levels of secrecy, and lead toward a more open world. The US firmly believes that civilized people everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad and free as possible.

Further reference: For science and technology exchanges, see Department of State GIST "US-USSR Science and Technology Exchanges."

Harriet Culley, Editor (202) 647-1208

US-USSR Cultural and Educational Exchanges

May 1986

Background: During the 1945-58 period there were very few cultural contacts between the US and the USSR. A significant one, however, was the 1956 agreement to exchange America magazine and Soviet Life. America, which continues to be distributed today, is the US Information Agency's (USIA) highly regarded and, among Soviet citizens, extraordinarily popular monthly magazine on American life.

Many of the programs that have come to be traditionally associated with US-Soviet exchanges took shape between 1959 and the late 1960s. Key events during this period included the first American National Exhibit in the USSR--which served as the setting for Vice President Nixon's famous "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev--the first exchanges of university graduate students and faculty, and delegation visits in the arts and professional and musical fields.

The range and size of exchange programs grew rapidly during the 1970s. New programs included the 1974 Fulbright scholars and lecturers program; direct university-to-university agreements such as that between the State University of New York and Moscow State University; joint projects in the social sciences and humanities between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences; the National Academy of Sciences interacademy agreement with the Soviet Academy of Science; the expansion of private contacts; and regular exchanges of first rank performing arts groups, such as the Bolshoi Ballet and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.

The US Government allowed the US-Soviet general exchanges agreement to expire at the end of 1979, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This led to an eventual reduction in educational exchanges and a complete cessation of government-sponsored performing arts groups and exhibitions.

The Geneva Meeting: On November 21, 1985 at Geneva, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a new general exchanges agreement marking the resumption of official academic, cultural, and performing artist exchanges between the two countries. This agreement provides for both sides to facilitate exchanges in the fields of performing arts, exhibits, television and film, publications, science and technology, and many others.

At Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev also endorsed a new, broad-based people-to-people initiative to expand direct contact between citizens of both countries, particularly the young. Known as the President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative because it was originally proposed by President Reagan in the weeks before the Geneva meeting, it is intended to promote openness, honest communications, and opportunities for the two peoples to get to know

3a

each other directly. In his address to the nation on the eve of his departure for Geneva, the President proposed that both sides "find as yet undiscovered avenues where American and Soviet citizens can cooperate fruitfully for the benefit of mankind."

USIA plays key role: Responsibility for implementing the general exchanges agreement and the President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative rests with the USIA, under the leadership of Charles Z. Wick. A new office headed by Dr. Stephen H. Rhinesmith was established in January 1986 to facilitate the President's Exchange Initiative.

Funding for American projects will come from private sector sources in the US. American participation in the exchanges also will be made possible by voluntary administrative support by private exchange organizations.

Six projects under the exchange initiative, highlighted in the joint statement issued following Geneva, will be among the first to be implemented:

- Cooperation in developing educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school education;
- Annual exchanges of professors of history, culture, and economics to conduct special courses at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education;
- Creation of a US-Soviet scholarship program for the best students from each country in the natural and social sciences, humanities, and technology for an academic year;
- Promotion of Russian language studies in the US and English language studies in the Soviet Union;
- Expansion of contacts in sports, including regular meets and increased television coverage;
- Resumption of cooperation in the field of cancer research.

Goals for cultural and educational exchanges: Both sides are culturally enriched from sharing their best talent with each other and from sharing knowledge and resources in solving common problems. Exchange programs also can help break down barriers, lessen distrust, reduce the levels of secrecy, and lead toward a more open world. The US firmly believes that civilized people everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad and free as possible.

Further reference: For science and technology exchanges, see Department of State GIST "US-USSR Science and Technology Exchanges."

Harriet Culley, Editor (202) 647-1208

*POL407 05/01/86

SOVIET TEENAGERS TO VISIT U.S., WICK ANNOUNCES (1510)

(Article on Wick, Rhinesmith at National Press Club)

By Dian McDonald

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- Charles Z. Wick, director of the U.S. Information Agency, announced May 1 that the Soviet Union will send teenagers to the United States this summer as a result of the new U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Agreement signed at the Geneva summit meeting last November.

The Soviet decision is an "important" and "even momentous development" and marks the first time Soviet teenagers have participated in exchange programs in the United States, Wick said at the National Press Club's "Newsmaker Breakfast" May 1.

The Soviets also "are giving serious consideration" to sending teenage students to study at a college preparatory school in the Northeast United States, the USIA Director said.

Wick explained that the Soviet and American teenagers who will be involved in reciprocal programs might include ten youngsters under a Young Astronaut/Cosmonaut Program, ten high school student council presidents, and 12 students from the Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, in exchange for students from the high school of the Siberian Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk.

Wick also announced that the Soviets have agreed in principle to expand the Sister Cities Program -- which pairs U.S. and Soviet cities for joint cultural projects -- from six to 16 cities, with a possible increase to 25 cities over the next two years.

The Soviets, Wick emphasized, have been "proceeding diligently" and "in a very businesslike fashion and...very friendly way with our negotiations on the implementation of the exchanges agreement."

The U.S.-Soviet exchange talks have been a "constructive dialogue" that has brought "encouraging results," he said.

The recent performances in the Soviet Union by pianist Vladimir Horowitz, made possible by the new cultural accord, are among "the greatest musical events in the Soviet Union in recent memory," Wick said.

Those concerts, he added, "will no doubt have a lasting impact on U.S. relations with the Soviet musical community."

"Eventually we hope thousands of people will be involved" in U.S.-Soviet exchanges, Wick said.

He noted that the new cultural accord will extend through 1991 and broadens "the prior dimension of Soviet-American relations in a variety of ways," including the broadening of exchanges of performing artists; expanding academic and educational exchanges; increasing exchanges in the fields of art, sports, film, medicine, television and radio; developing exchanges for traveling exhibits; and expanding exchanges of civic and social organizations and encouraging tourism.

USIA has the responsibility for coordinating the new exchanges agreement, and Wick traveled to the Soviet Union in January to consult with 19 Soviet officials on the implementation of the accord. He was accompanied by Stephen Rhinesmith, coordinator of the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchange Initiative, which has its headquarters at USIA. Rhinesmith and Gregory Guroff, deputy coordinator of the Initiative, went to the Soviet Union in March for follow-up talks with the Soviets.

Rhinesmith's office is responsible for coordinating U.S. private sector interests with USIA programs and appropriate Soviet institutions, and for coordinating the U.S. government effort in cultural, educational and citizen exchanges.

To date, Rhinesmith's staff at USIA has received 210 proposals from U.S. groups and institutions interested in specific exchanges with the USSR, Wick said. Fifty-eight proposals have been presented to the Soviets, who have agreed to 20 of them and are still considering all but five of the others, Wick noted.

Also addressing the "Newsmaker Breakfast," Rhinesmith said his office is working with the U.S. Embassy staff in Moscow and with Soviet officials "to ensure that the exchanges that we undertake represent a diversity of American society and what America has to offer," thereby fostering a "fuller understanding" of Americans by the Soviet people, and vice versa.

In reference to the Soviet decision to send teenagers to the United States, Rhinesmith noted that this is an area which in the past has been a "one-way flow." American teenagers have traveled to the Soviet Union, and "it is important that this be established on a two-way basis," Rhinesmith said.

"We are interested in opening up the contacts between the two societies," Rhinesmith said. "We believe that the more citizens of this country who can have an opportunity to visit the Soviet Union and see what the Soviet Union is like...the more realistic we will be in our approach to the

Soviets over the years -- and, vice versa, the same process in terms of the United States."

While "there is certainly within this process a desire that the United States and the Soviet Union come to understand one another better, and that perhaps over a period of time we will become more like one another," Rhinesmith said, "I just want to make it clear that there is a very great reality orientation," among the staff involved, in understanding that there are tremendous differences between the two countries.

"Our emphasis is more on understanding those differences," he said, "than necessarily on trying to paste them over with some idea that we are all the same...we may be the same as human beings, but we're very different in our hopes and our aspirations and some of our policies."

Concerning the U.S.-Soviet talks on exchanges, Rhinesmith said that while there have been differences in approaches to administrative and bureaucratic details, "there has been in every case a willingness to try to see what we could do to come up with new ways of doing things that have not been done before."

Asked why a private school had been selected for the first exchange of Soviet teenagers with the United States, Rhinesmith said that the Phillips Academy had submitted a proposal to USIA. "We did not solicit proposals," he said. Wick noted that "if a public school is interested" in the program, "we would be delighted" to assist that institution.

Rhinesmith emphasized that in developing exchange programs for teenagers, "we will go slowly and carefully."

The Soviets, he added, prefer that the initial teenage exchanges be dormitory-based or camp-based experiences rather than centered in private homes.

He said he is hopeful that the teenage study program will begin in September. It will probably involve 12 students from both countries, he said, as well as one Soviet and one American teacher. The teenagers would arrive four at a time and stay for a period of ten weeks in the Soviet Union or the United States, he said.

Rhinesmith noted that discussions on media coverage of most of the exchanges under the new accord are part of the ongoing U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

This is "specifically because we are starting with small numbers," he said. "And in order to magnify the impact, we are trying to assure as much U.S.-Soviet television and press coverage as we can for these exchanges, as they take place."

Wick said the United States and Soviet Union are discussing cooperative television ventures. He cited the success of the initial U.S.-Soviet joint television effort last December featuring prominent cardiologists from both countries who were interviewed on a USIA Worldnet satellite television program. The entire program was later shown on Soviet television, he said.

"The reaction was so positive that this will offer an opportunity" for more programs, including perhaps high school debates, he said.

Citing the "enormous" impact of television, Wick said, "We hope that the Soviets will recognize that the objectives of the exchanges agreement -- that is, to promote greater understanding -- can be accelerated through the medium of television."

In reference to the recent Soviet nuclear accident, Rhinesmith noted that approximately 120 American graduate students and professors are now in the Soviet Union.

"As far as we know, none of them are in the Kiev area," he said. "They are basically in Leningrad and Moscow. We have been in touch with all of the organizations in the last 24 hours. There are no plans to evacuate any of these students. They are in day-to-day contact with the U.S. Embassy. And it's our assumption that they will remain in the Soviet Union until the end of their programs."

Wick was asked to assess the impact of the Soviets' failure to release information about the nuclear accident on the "more open and businesslike" image that Soviet leader Gorbachev has been trying to portray.

U.S. and European newspaper accounts are "highly condemnatory" of Soviet policy relative to the accident, he said, "so it's very obviously not working well."

Wick was asked if the fear of terrorist attacks or higher radiation levels in the Soviet Union would have a limiting effect on the numbers of Americans taking part in the exchange agreement with the Soviets.

"I would doubt it," he said. "There are so many people who want to go. And so few opportunities immediately."

NNNN

*TXT401 05/01/86

U.S. WILL PLAY HOST TO VISITING SOVIET TEENAGERS (750)

(Text: Wick National Press Club remarks)

Washington -- U.S. Information Agency Director Charles Z. Wick says the Soviet Union has agreed to send groups of teenagers to the United States this summer as part of the U.S.-Soviet exchanges agreement signed last November in Geneva.

"This is an important, even momentous development which we are very excited about," Wick said May 1 at the National Press Club.

"What we have had going with the Soviets since the Geneva summit is a process, one of constructive dialogue," he said. "That process has continued despite recent events. And it has already brought encouraging results."

Following is the text of Wick's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

I am delighted to be with you today to discuss our progress to date in implementing the new U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Agreement signed at Geneva last November 21. The news is very good indeed.

Before proceeding to other aspects of the agreement, I want to announce a possible breakthrough. For the first time ever, the Soviets have agreed to send groups of teenagers to the United States this summer and is giving serious consideration to sending students to study at a New England prep school.

This is an important, even momentous development which we are very excited about.

These teenagers might include:

Ten youngsters under a Young Astronaut/Cosmonaut Program;

Ten high school student council presidents;

Twelve students from the Philips Andover Academy in Massachusetts in exchange for some from the high school of Siberian Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk.

The Soviets have also agreed in principle to expand the Sister Cities Program from six to 16 cities, with a possible increase to 25 over the next two years.

The agreement signed at Geneva will extend through 1991 and expands the dimension of Soviet-American relations in a variety of ways, including:

Broadening exchanges for performing artists;

Expanding academic and educational exchanges;
Broadening exchanges in the fields of art, sports, film, medicine and radio;
Developing exchanges for traveling exhibits;
Exchanging books and larger thematic exhibits, magazines and publications between our libraries;
Expanding exchanges of civic and social organizations and encouraging tourism.

What we have had going with the Soviets since the Geneva summit is a process, one of constructive dialogue. That process has continued despite recent events. And it has already brought encouraging results.

In an address to the nation on November 14, before leaving for the summit, the president said, "It is not an impossible dream that our children and grandchildren can some day travel freely back and forth between America and the Soviet Union, visit each other's homes and study together, enjoy and discuss plays, music, television and root for teams when they compete." It is that dream we are trying to make a reality through the new exchanges agreement.

The U.S. Information Agency has the responsibility for implementing that agreement. Stephen Rhinesmith, USIA's coordinator for the effort, and I have traveled to the Soviet Union in recent months and been involved in continuing negotiations with a variety of officials.

In January, I met in the Soviet Union with 19 leaders in the fields of art, music, television and radio, theatre, sports, education and publishing.

I was very well received. The discussions were mostly friendly and only occasionally testy. Considering the strong and real differences between our systems and societies, they were very fruitful.

In the past few months, Steve Rhinesmith's office has received 210 proposals from U.S. groups and institutions interested in specific exchanges with the USSR. Steve presented 58 of these to the Soviets. They agreed to 20 of them and are still considering all but five of the others.

Among them are the means of implementing six programs decided upon at the Geneva summit. These are:

The exchange of ten professors annually;
The exchange of at least ten undergraduate students annually;
Increased language exchanges;
Cooperation in the application of computer software to elementary and secondary education;
Increased sports competitions and interchanges;

Presumption of joint cancer research.

I might add that the Vladimir Horowitz performances in the Soviet Union, in which USIA played a vital facilitative role, could also be considered part of our recent excellent progress. Those concerts were by all accounts among the greatest musical events in the Soviet Union in recent memory and will no doubt have a lasting impact on U.S. relations with the Soviet musical community.

(end text)

NNNN

F- US-Su Exchange 11

~~Judy~~

~~RR - I told
Karna "No"~~

good.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1986

NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK
WALT RAYMOND

FROM: KARNA ✓

May I have your recommendations on this one ASAP -- I think that there is some reluctance around here to have RR go out on this one --- it's more of a Ted Turner personal extravaganza, it would seem -- anyway, what do you think?

Yes, RR should do the tape for Goodwill Games

No, RR should not do the tape ✓

Many thanks.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY MCDANIEL
KARNA SMALL

FROM: TOM GIBSON *TG*

SUBJECT: Goodwill Games Statement and Taped Message

Attached are two separate requests for Presidential participation in the Turner-sponsored Goodwill Games to be held in Moscow, beginning July 5. This issue was visited briefly several months ago. A tentative NSC recommendation for a statement of support at that time was negative. The NSC recommendation may have been based, in part, on whether the games would indeed come off.

Requests for a brief statement on the games for the official program and a taped message for the games' opening ceremonies has been renewed. Turner, through CNN, has been extremely active in promoting the games and has ambitious plans for worldwide satellite coverage of the opening ceremonies. To date, other news media have paid little attention to the games.

I would appreciate your recommendation on both requests as soon as possible.

Thanks very much.

cc: Pat Buchanan

**BEAUMONT-
BENNETT/
BRANDON**

May 16, 1986

Mr. Tom Gibson
Special Assistant to the President
Room 160 EOB
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Gibson:

I phoned your office today and spoke with your secretary regarding my request for a Presidential statement about the 1986 Moscow Goodwill Games. The Secretary of Labor, Bill Brock, wrote you recently in my behalf regarding this request.

There seems to be some confusion in that you have received another, seemingly similar, request from the Turner Broadcasting Company for a statement from the President. After speaking with your secretary, I learned, that while the two requests do appear similar, they are quite different and equally necessary to have.

My request is for a written statement with President Reagan's signature affixed which can be published alongside that of General Chairman Gorbachev's in the official publication on the Games and other such publications. The other request you received from Turner Broadcasting is for a video statement from the President which can be used during the broadcast of the Games from Moscow.

As you have received quite a lot of information about the Goodwill Games already, I won't bother you with more; however, should you need additional material, please contact me directly as I will gladly make whatever is needed available.

In order to save you the trouble of having to deal with two areas of Turner Broadcasting, you may send both the written and video statements to my attention at the above address as I will be responsible to see that they are properly placed and receive the necessary attention.

All of your help in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,



Robert D. Brandon

Beaumont-Bennett/Brandon Inc.
100 Galleria Parkway—Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30339
404 953-6984/5
Telex 543575 HQ ATL

Robert D. Brandon
President

Aarhus
Amsterdam
Auckland
Bangkok
Brussels
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Chicago
Copenhagen
Detroit
Dusseldorf
Geneva
Gorinchem
Gothenburg
Halmstad
Hong Kong
Johannesburg
Lima
London
Los Angeles
Madrid
Malmo
Mexico City
Milan
Minneapolis/St. Paul
Montevideo
Montreal
New York
Oslo
Paris
San Francisco
Santiago
Singapore
Stockholm
Sydney
Tokyo
Toronto
Vienna



April 11, 1986

Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
for Communications
The White House
Washington, District of Columbia 20500

Dear Pat:

After several preliminary discussions with Tom Gibson and Elizabeth Board, I am writing on behalf of the organizers and the athletes of the 1986 Goodwill Games to cordially invite President Reagan to address our world-wide television audience via satellite during the Games' opening ceremonies which will begin in Moscow at 12:00 PM EDT on July 5. Should the President be available and agreeable to participate, we would like to televise his "live" message to our global viewers from a site most convenient to him. With full understanding of the President's severe time constraints, we would also be honored to pre-tape his remarks if he is unavailable on July 5.

It is our belief that the organization of the Goodwill Games, which is co-sponsored by Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., the USSR State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport (Soyuzsport) and the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio (Gostelaradio), and the purpose of the games, which is to bring the world's best athletes together in the spirit of friendship and peace, respond positively to two vital programs in the President's agenda:

1. The Goodwill Games are a primary demonstration of the President's private sector initiative program.
2. In doing so, the Goodwill Games exemplify the "people to people" approach to international understanding which became a significant outcome of the Geneva Summit. In line with that approach, 30 Goodwill Ambassadors, made up of Olympic Gold Medalists from nine different countries representing the Goodwill Games, have travelled to 21 cities across four continents visiting children in hospitals, orphanages, schools, and youth centers demonstrating first hand "people to people" communication through sports.

3,500 of the world's best athletes competing in 175 gold medal events in 18 sports from over 50 countries will follow our Goodwill Ambassadors on the road to Moscow. To get there, their qualifying procedures, rules, and regulations will be the same as they were for our gold-medal Ambassadors when they competed in the Olympics. As indicated by the enclosed letter, our nation's Olympic committee supports their efforts as well.

It is with great pleasure, and with utmost respect for the President's precious time, that we offer this invitation. It is our sincere view, that his message during opening ceremonies would reaffirm to the world his belief in the value of intercultural "people to people" exchanges, in this case, through the international language of sport.

I look forward very much to your response. Until then, Ted Turner and Bob Wussler join me on behalf of the 1986 Goodwill Games in expressing our sincere thanks and continued best wishes.

Sincerely yours,



Kenneth H. Bastian, Jr.
Executive Committee
1986 Goodwill Games

cc: Thomas F. Gibson
Elizabeth Board

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

cc to J. Matlock
J. Mangel
K. Smeelgans 6/11
F- US-Su Exchange

PAGE 01 USIA WASHDC 1397 DTG: 180430Z JUN 86 PSN: 011195
SIT917 TOR: 161/0434Z

DISTRIBUTION: DJER RAYM /002

ROUTINE

DE RUEHIA #1397 161043Z
R 180430Z JUN 86
FM USIA WASHDC

TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS

AMCONSUL DOUALA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
AMCONSUL BARCELONA
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMCONSUL NAPLES
AMCONSUL PALERMO
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMCONSUL TORONTO
AMCONSUL TRIESTE
AMCONSUL GENOA
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL DURBAN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ALL POLADS POSTS
NSC WASHDC
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC
XMT AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMCONSUL KRAKOW
AMCONSUL POZNAN
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS USIA 41397

USIA

WHITE HOUSE FOR DJEREJIAN AND NSC RAYMOND;

FT DRAGG FOR USIA ADVISOR AND MBFR FOR STEWART; PARIS

ALSO PASS OECD; MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER DELL

OTHER MILITARY ADDRESSES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE NO. 86-42: JULY 5-20

GOODWILL GAMES

REFERENCE: USIA 02231, JANUARY 11 GUIDANCE NO. 85-70

1. THE GOODWILL GAMES ARE SCHEDULED FOR MOSCOW JULY 5-20. REFTEL GUIDANCE REMAINS VALID. THESE GAMES, A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE INITIATIVE OF TURNER BROADCASTING, HAVE NO OFFICIAL CONNECTION EITHER TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OR TO THE U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. THEY CONTINUE TO POSE CERTAIN PROBLEMS FOR U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE-SPONSORED EVENTS AND FOR THE 1988 OLYMPIC GAMES, AS INDICATED IN REFTEL.

2. INVITATIONS TO THESE GAMES ARE IN THE HANDS OF THE USSR. IT HAS BEEN UNCLEAR FROM THE START WHAT COUNTRIES ARE BEING INVITED AND HOW REPRESENTATIVE, WORLDWIDE, THE PARTICIPATION ACTUALLY WILL BE. PUBLIC REPORTS SPEAK OF 4,000 ATHLETES FROM 56 COUNTRIES. LATEST REPORTS INDICATE THE UNITED STATES IS SENDING 586 ATHLETES. SOME TOP U.S. ATHLETES HAVE DROPPED OUT. WHETHER THE ACTUAL COMPETITION WILL TRULY BE BETWEEN THE TOP ATHLETES IN EVERY DISCIPLINE, AND THEY IN TOP FORM, REMAINS A QUESTION.

3. ATHLETES FROM ISRAEL AND SOUTH KOREA HAVE NOT BEEN INVITED. IN CONSIDERING THIS REGRETTABLE ASPECT ONE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THAT IT IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE 1988 OLYMPIC GAMES SCHEDULED FOR SEOUL TO EXACERBATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND SOUTH KOREA AT THIS TIME. THE USSR HAS ALREADY BEGUN MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS EQUATING THE GOODWILL GAMES WITH THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

4. IN A COMMERCIAL SENSE, ALL PUBLIC INDICATIONS ARE THAT IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT FOR TURNER TO SELL ADVERTISING SPONSORSHIP, AND THAT FINANCIAL GOALS PROBABLY HAVE NOT BEEN MET. THE USSR HAS REJECTED CERTAIN POTENTIAL SPONSORS. THERE HAVE BEEN STRONG DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER FINANCIAL TERMS BETWEEN THE TURNER ORGANIZATION AND SOVIET OFFICIALS.

5. THE SECOND SET OF GOODWILL GAMES ARE NOMINALLY SCHEDULED FOR A U.S. SITE IN 1990. HOWEVER, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS MAY NOT BE EAGER TO HOLD THOSE GAMES, IF THEIR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITH THE TURNER ORGANIZATION

CANNOT BE RESOLVED, AND THAT THE ATHLETES INVOLVED PREFER OTHER YEARS AND VENUES OUTSIDE THE U.S. FOR THESE REASONS, TIME AND PLACE OF A SUBSEQUENT GOODWILL GAMES MUST BE REGARDED AS UNDECIDED.

6. IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH CONTACTS ON THE GAMES, POSTS SHOULD STRESS THE PRIVATE NATURE OF THIS UNDERTAKING FROM THE U.S. SIDE. CLAIMS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT OR OF U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE INVOLVEMENT OR SPONSORSHIP ARE SIMPLY CLAIMS AND HAVE NO BASIS IN FACT.

7. P/DQ, SPORTS AMERICA, REMAINS THE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY OFFICE CONCERNING THIS ISSUE, AND CAN PROVIDE MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IF DESIRED.

WICK

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

7-01-Sm
Exchange

PAGE 01 USIA WASHDC 1397 DTG:100430Z JUN 86 PSN:011195
EOB509 AN009071 TOR: 161/0434Z CSN:EHA863

DISTRIBUTION: RAY-01 /001 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: DJER RAYM
EOB:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHIA #1397 161043Z
R 100430Z JUN 86
FM USIA WASHDC

TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
AMCONSUL DOUALA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
AMCONSUL BARCELONA
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMCONSUL NAPLES
AMCONSUL PALERMO
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMCONSUL TORONTO
AMCONSUL TRIESTE
AMCONSUL GENOA
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL DURBAN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ALL POLADS POSTS
NSC WASHDC
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC
XMT AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMCONSUL KRAKOW
AMCONSUL POZNAN
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

UNCLAS USIA 41397

USIA

WHITE HOUSE FOR DJEREJIAN AND NSC RAYMOND;

FT BRAGG FOR USIA ADVISOR AND MBFR FOR STEWART; PARIS

ALSO PASS OECD; MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BELL

OTHER MILITARY ADDRESSES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE NO. 86-42: JULY 5-20
GOODWILL GAMES
REFERENCE: USIA 02231, JANUARY 11 GUIDANCE NO. 85-70

1. THE GOODWILL GAMES ARE SCHEDULED FOR MOSCOW JULY 5-20.
REFTEL GUIDANCE REMAINS VALID. THESE GAMES, A PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE INITIATIVE OF TURNER BROADCASTING, HAVE NO

OFFICIAL CONNECTION EITHER TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OR TO THE
U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. THEY CONTINUE TO POSE CERTAIN
PROBLEMS FOR U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE-SPONSORED EVENTS AND FOR
THE 1988 OLYMPIC GAMES, AS INDICATED IN REFTEL.

2. INVITATIONS TO THESE GAMES ARE IN THE HANDS OF THE USSR.
IT HAS BEEN UNCLEAR FROM THE START WHAT COUNTRIES ARE BEING
INVITED AND HOW REPRESENTATIVE, WORLDWIDE, THE PARTICIPATION
ACTUALLY WILL BE. PUBLIC REPORTS SPEAK OF 4,000 ATHLETES
FROM 56 COUNTRIES. LATEST REPORTS INDICATE THE UNITED STATES
IS SENDING 586 ATHLETES. SOME TOP U.S. ATHLETES HAVE DROPPED
OUT. WHETHER THE ACTUAL COMPETITION WILL TRULY BE BETWEEN
THE TOP ATHLETES IN EVERY DISCIPLINE, AND THEY IN TOP FORM,
REMAINS A QUESTION.

3. ATHLETES FROM ISRAEL AND SOUTH KOREA HAVE NOT BEEN
INVITED. IN CONSIDERING THIS REGRETTABLE ASPECT ONE SHOULD
ALSO CONSIDER THAT IT IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE 1988
OLYMPIC GAMES SCHEDULED FOR SEOUL TO EXAGGERATE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE USSR AND SOUTH KOREA AT THIS TIME. THE USSR HAS
ALREADY BEGUN MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS EQUATING THE GOODWILL
GAMES WITH THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

4. IN A COMMERCIAL SENSE, ALL PUBLIC INDICATIONS ARE THAT IT
HAS BEEN DIFFICULT FOR TURNER TO SELL ADVERTISING
SPONSORSHIP, AND THAT FINANCIAL GOALS PROBABLY HAVE NOT BEEN
MET. THE USSR HAS REJECTED CERTAIN POTENTIAL SPONSORS.
THERE HAVE BEEN STRONG DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER FINANCIAL
TERMS BETWEEN THE TURNER ORGANIZATION AND SOVIET OFFICIALS.

5. THE SECOND SET OF GOODWILL GAMES ARE NOMINALLY SCHEDULED
FOR A U.S. SITE IN 1990. HOWEVER, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT
SOVIET OFFICIALS MAY NOT BE EAGER TO HOLD THOSE GAMES, IF
THEIR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITH THE TURNER ORGANIZATION

CANNOT BE RESOLVED, AND THAT THE ATHLETES INVOLVED PREFER
OTHER YEARS AND VENUES OUTSIDE THE U.S. FOR THESE REASONS,
TIME AND PLACE OF A SUBSEQUENT GOODWILL GAMES MUST BE
REGARDED AS UNDECIDED.

6. IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH CONTACTS ON THE GAMES, POSTS
SHOULD STRESS THE PRIVATE NATURE OF THIS UNDERTAKING FROM THE
U.S. SIDE. CLAIMS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT OR OF U.S. OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE INVOLVEMENT OR SPONSORSHIP ARE SIMPLY CLAIMS AND
HAVE NO BASIS IN FACT.

7. P/DQ, SPORTS AMERICA, REMAINS THE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY
OFFICE CONCERNING THIS ISSUE, AND CAN PROVIDE MORE DETAILED
INFORMATION IF DESIRED.

WICK
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8604812

RECEIVED 24 JUN 86 10

TO POINDEXTER FROM SIMON, PAUL

DOCDATE 12 JUN 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

CENTRAL AMERICA

PCO

DEFENSE BUDGET

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE US - SOVIET UNION RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 07 JUL 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

BURGHARDT

DONLEY

SESTANOVICH

SABLE

GANTT

THOMPSON

PEARSON

RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

JMP 4 8/14 In Decision 8/21
C 8/25 Bourdier Sgd JEM, WR, RFX
RKS, mad, JF

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

19

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 25, 1986

Dear Senator Simon:

Thank you for your letter of June 12, enclosing your speech on the need for increased exchanges as part of our national security strategy.

Your speech presented many thoughtful and valuable suggestions that deserve consideration. In particular, I share your underlying assumption that it is in America's long-term interest to reach out to the possible future leaders and citizens of the developing countries via exchanges and scholarships, and that we ourselves benefit from having more citizens skilled in foreign affairs and languages.

It is especially important that we try to overcome the barriers of misinformation and misperception that affect US-Soviet relations. That was the guiding principle behind the President's Geneva exchanges initiative, in which he proposed an unprecedented expansion of people-to-people exchanges to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. Indeed, as the President said in his November 14, 1985 Address to the Nation, such exchanges can "build genuine constituencies for peace" in both countries.

We are actively pursuing such exchanges and cooperative programs across a broad range of activities. Recently, a Soviet exchange delegation visited the US and concluded agreements with American counterpart organizations for thirteen new programs in the areas of education, higher education, culture, sports, and health -- the areas singled out by the President and the General Secretary for priority attention. Nineteen more programs are under active discussion, some of which may come to fruition this fall.

While these new programs, which are in addition to the scholarly, academic and cultural exchange programs carried out under the General Exchanges Agreement, also signed in Geneva, are a promising first step, we are by no means content to let the matter rest there. What the President envisioned was broad opening of contacts and travel possibilities for the citizens of both countries, especially the young people, and we will be pursuing this goal with the Soviets.

We are, however, realistic about such exchanges, and look at them as only one element of a long-term relationship that is by its nature competitive, based on very different values, political, economic and global interests. Exchanges must be a two-way street. The Soviet Government continues to place tight controls on the flow of information to and from its country, while

20

hundreds of thousands of Americans travel to, read about and independently study the Soviet Union. Unless there is a reciprocal Soviet commitment to increased contacts and genuine exchange, we cannot have the kind of understanding and dialogue you suggest. We hope that the new Soviet leadership will appreciate the benefits of such dialogue.

One of the salient features of the President's Geneva exchanges initiative was to involve the private sector more actively in such exchanges. Such involvement is particularly important at this time of severe budgetary constraints on all our foreign affairs programs. Ensuring that we can carry out existing programs at current levels -- let alone the expansion you propose -- will be a real challenge.

Your continued support for exchange programs of all kinds will be critical in the coming months, and I would welcome any thoughts or suggestions you may have.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

The Honorable Paul Simon
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 14, 1986

ACTION**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Simon on Exchanges

Attached for your signature is a suggested reply to Senator Simon, who sent you a copy of his May 21 speech, outlining his thoughts on the need for increased exchanges. He suggests:

- doubling the funding for Soviet and East European exchanges in FY '87;
- that exchanges be viewed as a strategic benefit in much the same way as our defense programs, and suggests that funds come from the Defense Department budget, the "only large discretionary pool of funds";
- the establishment of a National Endowment for International Studies to channel government funding for exchanges;
- targeting our scholarship programs on students from regions of importance to us from a national security standpoint, i.e. Central America, South Africa, etc.; and
- that we need to train more Soviet and East European specialists because we need more "understanding" of the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan.

While some of his suggestions are insightful, and address our long term need for well-informed and globally oriented citizenry, he oversells the potential for "winning hearts and minds" or directly affecting other countries' policies through such instruments as exchanges and scholarships. Moreover, the funding levels he proposes are clearly not attainable in the current climate of budgetary constraints, and undesirable from our point of view, if they are to come from Defense funds. Finally, Simon tends to attribute the difference between the US and Soviet Union to "misunderstandings" which can be corrected through more knowledge or contacts, rather than to divergent political, economic and ideological systems and interests.

2
N

The suggested reply indicates our shared interest in people-to-people and scholarly exchanges and contacts, but adds a cautionary note about the prospects for substantial increases in the near term.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Senator Simon.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____
WR *of RB* *LSS* *Don Mahley Jr.* *JFM*
Walt Raymond, Ray Burchardt, Ron Sable, Mike Donley, Jack Matlock
concur.

Attachment

Tab I Letter to Senator Simon
Tab II Background Information

PAUL SIMON
ILLINOIS

4812
COMMITTEES:
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
JUDICIARY
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 12, 1986

JUN 23 1986

Admiral John Poindexter
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20506


Dear John:

I have felt for a long time that we all have accepted too narrow a definition of national security. We make decisions about our central foreign policy and defense concern, the Soviet Union, with very little first-hand experience or expert guiding knowledge. It is no longer acceptable for the governments of the United States and the USSR to consider policy in a vacuum of misunderstanding and misperception. Too much is at stake.

We may never get the kind of relationship we desire with the Soviet Union, but we cannot afford to hide behind walls of ignorance. Equally important, we ought not let an opportunity to influence the present and future generations of Soviet leaders slip away. This holds true for other regions in the world, particularly Central America, where the battle for political values rages. A greatly expanded language training, area studies effort, and exchanges initiative is imperative.

I have outlined an initial agenda for action in these areas in a speech on the Senate floor on May 21, 1986. I would of course welcome your thoughts on this subject.

Cordially,



Paul Simon
U.S. Senator

PS/js

230 S. DEARBORN
KLUCZYNSKI BLDG., 38TH FLOOR
CHICAGO, IL 60604
312/353-4952

3 WEST OLD CAPITOL PLAZA
SUITE 1
SPRINGFIELD, IL 62701
217/492-4960

8787 STATE ST.
SUITE 212
EAST ST. LOUIS, IL 62203
618/398-7707

250 WEST CHERRY
ROOM 115-B
CARBONDALE, IL 62901
618/457-3653

24

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE

An Agenda for U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

by

U.S. SENATOR PAUL SIMON

Senate Chamber

May 21, 1986

MR. SIMON. Mr. President, since I came to Congress in 1975, I have given considerable thought to Soviet-American relations, and worked on education and exchange program legislation. Today I would like to offer, in my first detailed address before the Senate on the subject of U.S.-Soviet relations, some thoughts on the connection between our foreign policy goals and exchange programs.

When I speak on this issue, I do not do so as a partisan, because I am pleased to note the emphasis President Reagan gave to exchange programs at his Geneva meeting with Secretary Gorbachev. I particularly appreciate the leadership of Charles Wick and Ambassador Stephen Rhinesmith at the United States Information Agency (USIA) who understand the importance of exchanges and have made a significant contribution to the nation through the promotion of exchanges.

THE POWER OF IDEAS

Throughout history ideas have moved people and armies. Jesus, Marx and Jefferson have changed more lives than military conquerors. The invention of the printing press revolutionized the medieval world and laid the basis for progress in every field of endeavor. Ideas spread quickly. And centuries ago what seemed like a quick spread of ideas through books over a period of months has been changed into a spread of ideas in minutes throughout the world. That is part of the information revolution in which we find ourselves.

Information is power, and the ability to communicate effectively can alter the balance of power as surely as a squadron of fighter planes or a naval flotilla. Public diplomacy sometimes can prove more decisive than the blunt instruments of war, and we must rely on it more—one of the failures of U.S. foreign policy in recent years.

Unfortunately we still need the instruments of war as well as the instruments of diplomacy. It would be ideal to work always with friends and adversaries with logic, fairness, and common sense. This is not the state of the world, nor will it be. We must prepare for threats to our nation's security, and give assistance to others who need a shield for their defense.

But we also owe it to ourselves to examine whether these threats are real, and if they are real whether we have been given a balanced picture. We should regularly question our assumptions. We must seek balance as we allocate resources to further American foreign policy.

Today we find ourselves aboard an imbalanced ship of state, perilously close to capsizing economically, because of our excessive reliance on the military to carry out policy aims. We are losing precious cargo from that ship of state in a short-sighted quest with too heavy a military emphasis on superiority. Security can only come when we see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.

25
In my years of public life I have seen us spend more and more and more on military security and achieve greater and greater and greater insecurity, not only for ourselves but for all the world. Like a greyhound at a dogtrack, we chase the rabbit of permanent military superiority, but like that greyhound, we shall never catch it. Those in the stands observing us know that. But like the greyhound, we do not. We expend greater and greater efforts for an illusory prize. The military-industrial complex—about which President Eisenhower warned us—cheers us on, but if we want something more than those cheers we must always be thoughtful and deliberate in advancing our foreign policy objectives.

On a future occasion I will address the fundamental question which needs reexamining: What should be the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy? Today I want to discuss one aspect of implementing our current policies.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE

What I propose today is a significant expansion of our exchange programs with other countries. Our foreign policy will improve as we learn more about other countries and as others learn more about us. Americans at their best have not been content simply to learn facts; we have also wanted to understand the nature of things. That is true of others also. There is a need for other nations to understand our values, our political system, our aspirations, and our weaknesses and strengths. It is pure gain for us to learn more about others and for them to learn more about us. An understanding of their cultures, their languages, their hopes and fears will lead to less international tension.

President Reagan confirmed this with his people-to-people exchange initiative at the November summit in Geneva. I applaud his leadership on this. We need to get serious about exchanges, and the President's ideas and our tradition serve as an important start. The costs are not significant when we consider the scope of the federal budget. But they must come from somewhere. There is only one large discretionary pool of funds, and that is the Department of Defense budget. Since an exchange program serves the security interests of our country, it is a logical place to look.

When the Fulbright program was under consideration in 1946, former President Herbert Hoover was asked to comment on the undertaking. Hoover recalled that a similar program, much smaller in size, was initiated in 1920 with Belgium. The exchanges continued until World War II began. Hoover noted that many prominent Belgian graduate students and faculty studied in the U.S.; one prime minister and six cabinet members were exchangees. As a result of this program, Hoover said that he doubted "whether there is a country in Europe where the ideals and purposes of the American people are so well understood and so respected as they are in Belgium." Just before the war, Hoover argued that the old World War I European war debts ought to be converted into

provide even more support for one of the best educational opportunities available today.

A good program is the "Youth Exchange Initiative," which began with a three-year, \$10 million fund for 5,000 exchangees. The focus is on the developing world, and I believe that Mr. Wick is on the right track with this program: By the end of Fiscal Year 1986 we will have spent a total of \$14 million on these youth exchanges since we began this effort. This is exactly the kind of program we need with the Soviet Union, and in October 1985 I introduced with Senator Pell the U.S.-Soviet "Student Exchange-for-Peace Program," which closely parallels the President's November summit proposal to Mr. Gorbachev.

U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES

The U.S.-Soviet relationship is our number-one foreign policy concern. Yet in the 27 years of exchanges, we have managed to average only 600 Americans and 250 Soviet scholars exchanged each year. Contrast these numbers with an average of 14,000 per year with Japan; 5,500 with Britain; 3,600 with West Germany; 3,000 with France; and 14,000 with the People's Republic of China.

We will probably not soon reach the level of good relations with Moscow that we have with Paris, London, or Bonn, but who would have thought as late as 1968 that we would achieve the far-reaching accord with Beijing which we did following the Nixon summit? Our problems with China in the postwar years were no less real than many of our current problems with the Soviet Union.

We have a staggering task ahead of us in Soviet studies that directly affects our future relationship with Moscow. We need to build a much larger corps of Soviet and Eastern European specialists so that we can draw on a broadly based and reliable cadre of professionals to help formulate policy. While we have a few outstanding scholars and Soviet watchers in the United States, there are not nearly enough full-time Soviet experts and even fewer who have actually spent a significant amount of time studying in the Soviet Union.

For example, this year only about 200 American and Soviet scholars are being exchanged, about half the Americans through IREX, the International Research and Exchanges Board. There are many more American scholars, however, who would like the opportunity to observe the country of their studies up-close, but lack of funds blocked this avenue. The National Council for Soviet and East European Research, which advises the Department of State's Title VIII grants office, reports that they received far more applications for study grants than they could possibly absorb; they could fund only one-sixth of the applicants. There is no dearth of interest, just of means.

According to the National Council: "The central fact

remains that close to 100 promising projects by competent scholars, with a total value of some \$10 million, will not be funded . . . [These applications] provide eloquent testimony that the gap between current resources and the needs of the profession and the nation is manifest, compelling, and altogether too great."

Title VIII was given a ten-year authorization for annual funding at \$4.8 million. It already has been cut to \$4.6 million this fiscal year when the Gramm-Rudman sequester order went through March 1. Now the Office of Management and Budget, in another example of misplaced priorities, has cut back the Fiscal Year 1987 request to \$4 million. I believe this vital program ought to be doubled, but for now it should at least be restored to its original funding level of \$4.8 million in this year's budget.

There are 67 universities in the Soviet Union that are universities in the Western sense. Yet only two or three American universities, and one consortium of Midwestern universities, have set up "sister university" programs with just two Soviet schools: Moscow State and Leningrad State. Part of the problem comes from the Soviet end. The prospect of allowing high school or even college-age students to come to the United States for study frightens some of the Soviet bureaucrats charged with overseeing ideological purity within their youth organizations. But we owe it to ourselves to break down these barriers through persistent effort. Now that effort seems to be paying off. It is important for an influential segment of Soviet society to see us as we are, not as the propaganda mills portray us. And we should avoid distortions of the Soviet Union through similar on-the-scene observation.

In terms of officially sponsored exchanges, we expressed our dissatisfaction with the Kremlin by allowing the cultural exchanges accord to lapse in 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan, as we did with three of the science and technology agreements in 1982 following the imposition of martial law in Poland. The National Academy of Sciences is down to about half the number of exchanges compared to the 1979 level. The real point after Afghanistan should have been that we need greater understanding, not less understanding. I appreciate the motivation of our policymakers in canceling the cultural exchange agreements because of Afghanistan, but that action was a mistake.

Exchanges can be most valuable precisely when relations are strained. Relations grew worse between 1981 and 1985, and two-way exchanges suffered. Would it not have been better to increase direct contact with each other when hostility was on the rise? Would it not have made more sense to have our youth, scholars, and professionals engaged in routine discussion with the other super-power capable of global destruction?

Clearly, we are not going to see a far-reaching effect on U.S.-Soviet relations overnight, although I agree

tral American Program of Undergraduate Scholarships (CAMPUS) idea, an attempt to bring more students from the region to study in the United States, has 154 students in attendance this year in American universities. Clearly, we have a long way to go before we approach the Soviet and Soviet-sponsored numbers.

It is simply amazing to me that we are not putting far more money and effort into a regional exchange initiative at a time when the military battle for Central America rages unabated. Whatever the real level of Soviet military aid, the figures I cited demonstrate that Moscow is looking beyond the next move on the Central American chessboard.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, we are making the same mistake. Much has been made of the Marxist influence within the African National Congress (ANC). There are obvious reasons why the ANC and other resistance groups in southern Africa have turned to Soviet assistance; our relationship with the government of South Africa is a contributing factor. Another factor is the importance the Soviets attach to direct exchanges with African students, and not just in Angola, Ethiopia, or Mozambique.

In Mauritania and Senegal, two countries I visited recently, the comparative numbers are astonishing. There are three government-sponsored Mauritians studying in U.S. schools; there are more than 300 in Soviet schools. The figures are comparable for Senegal. While there are now almost 35,000 Sub-Saharan Africans studying in the United States, only 2.5 percent are here on U.S.-government scholarships. This means that the vast majority are here on their own resources, mostly children of the wealthy elite. As important as children of the elite are—and we welcome them—we need to reach others in the developing countries.

THE COST OF ONE FIGHTER

Where does all this leave us? My hope is that we begin to look seriously at the long-range benefits that stem from exchanges. They can contribute to our foreign policy in more ways than we can guess. When the USIA wants to spend \$152 million in Fiscal Year 1986 on exchange activities—an increase of \$29 million—and Congress balks at providing the full increase, then we need to take another look at our priorities. The increase in question, incidentally, is roughly equivalent to the cost of one F-15 fighter.

Some may ask, "Why all the fuss over a few exchange programs? Why not spend more and more on defense? Why not buy that extra F-15 instead of spending money on exchanges?" The answer is simple. Look at all we have to gain through the spread of American ideas and commerce, and consider the technical and cultural information we gain about other lands. We are building a base of understanding that can make sensible cuts in defense spending possible. The U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. stand to gain the most through exchanges, because we have the special responsibility to avoid nuclear war.

By underfunding exchanges, we cheat ourselves and others.

The entire exchange effort contributes to our foreign policy goals and to the common defense, not only defense against military threats and terrorist attacks fueled by hatred and misunderstanding, but defense against poverty and disease and the afflictions of humanity. Exchanges build a strength gained from knowledge and understanding.

AN AGENDA

As in other areas, our policy on exchanges needs a guiding strategy if it is to be effective. We must know in advance what we would like to achieve, but we also have to identify funding possibilities and realistic goals. I would like to propose several objectives that make sense as we begin the second half of the 1980s:

1. Double Title VIII funding in Fiscal Year 1987 and subsequent years. Title VIII is also known as the "Soviet and East European Research and Training Act," presently funded at \$4.8 million. An annual allocation of \$10 million per year will enable us to conduct far more Soviet research than we can today, and train a new generation of Russian and other Soviet language speakers. This will fill a critical national need. Doubling Title VIII will cost us very little, but the Administration has requested a decrease in funding. This is short-sighted. The Modern Language Association has set a goal of 100,000 Russian-speakers by 1988. That target now seems beyond our reach, but why not aim for 1990? Exchanges will only realize their fullest potential when we have mastered each other's languages.

2. Expand the Central American Program of Undergraduate Scholarships (CAMPUS) administered by USIA. We can no longer pretend that military force alone will solve our hemispheric problems. The Soviets and Cubans have a very extensive scholarship and exchange effort underway in the region, and the United States ought not to abandon the educational high ground to Moscow and Havana. A good goal to aim for would be to bring in as many exchange students from Central America as currently attend schools and universities in the East Bloc. This year, out of 154 students, only six come from Nicaragua. This number must rise if we want to spread American political values. I will propose that we increase this program by \$1.6 million, to bring the number of these scholarships up to 200. I hope that with these additional scholarships more students from the warring states of the region can be brought together in the United States.

3. Resurrect the Critical Foreign Languages Study Program enacted in the 1984 Emergency Math and Science

President's United States - Soviet
Exchange Initiative

Office of the Coordinator

F/ US-Sov Exchange



June 20, 1986

Dear Walt:

Thanks for your kind hospitality at luncheon earlier this month.

I appreciated the opportunity to bring you, Jack and Judy up to date on the U.S.-Soviet Exchange effort.

I have been doing additional research on the Soviet tours for children into the United States this summer and will have something on paper for you next week. In the meantime, a number of other exchanges are beginning to move and I will try to give you an update on the overall situation in writing so that you can keep track of our progress.

Despite occasional slumps in morale, we generally are quite positive in our feelings about the program and our prospects for its development during the course of the next year. I want you to know that I greatly appreciate your personal support and friendship and I look forward to sharing these months with you as we work to achieve a broadened program between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Best personal regards.

Cordially,

Stephen H. Rhinesmith
Coordinator

Mr. Walt Raymond
Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Room 351
Washington, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

Pl US-Sov Exchange

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0753 DTG: 241442Z JUN 86 PSN: 043303
EOB525 AND04568 TOR: 175/1457Z CSN: HCE751

PROMISING ENDEAVOR.

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 SOHM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01 /005 A2

I WILL, OF COURSE, INFORM YOU PROMPTLY WHEN
WE HAVE A RESPONSE FROM THE KOMSOMOL.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP
EOB:

SINCERELY,

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
END TEXT.
HARTMAN
BT

OP IMMED
STU7171
DE RUEHMO #0753 1751443
O 241442Z JUN 86
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6598

UNCLAS MOSCOW 10753

ALSO FOR EUR/SOV

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: LETTER TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH

wp

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR
HARTMAN TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT:

I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 10 ON JUNE 20,
TOGETHER WITH THE LETTERS FROM THE STUDENTS OF
JEFFERSON AND ENLOE HIGH SCHOOLS. I HAVE READ
THEM AND AGREE FULLY THAT THEY ARE REMARKABLY
GOOD RESPONSES TO THE LETTER YOU RECEIVED
FROM THE SOVIET KOMSOMOL MEMBERS. I THOUGHT
YOU MIGHT LIKE TO KNOW WHAT ACTION WE HAVE
TAKEN SO FAR.

FIRST, WE HAVE SENT COPIES, ALONG WITH RUSSIAN-
LANGUAGE TRANSLATIONS, TO KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA,
THE KOMSOMOL NEWSPAPER, WITH THE REQUEST THAT
THEY BE PUBLISHED AS A WAY TO RESPOND DIRECTLY
TO THE STUDENTS WHO SENT THE ORIGINAL LETTER.

SECOND, WE HAVE PROPOSED TO THE KOMSOMOL
HEADQUARTERS HERE IN MOSCOW THAT THESE TWO
LETTERS FORM THE BASIS FOR A DIRECT EXCHANGE
OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE STUDENTS
OF OUR TWO HIGH SCHOOLS AND ONE OR TWO
STUDENT GROUPS SELECTED BY THE KOMSOMOL.

WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP WITH THE KOMSOMOL TO URGE
THEM TO TAKE THE ACTION NECESSARY TO GET THIS
PROJECT UNDERWAY. PLEASE ASSURE THE
STUDENTS AT ENLOE HIGH SCHOOL WHEN YOU MEET
THEM THAT I REGARD THIS AS A VERY WORTHWHILE
INITIATIVE. WE AMERICANS DO NOT OFTEN HAVE
THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR VIEWS DIRECTLY
TO ORDINARY SOVIET CITIZENS. I SHARE YOUR
FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN OUR YOUNG PEOPLE,
AND I AM CONVINCED THEY CAN AND WILL HONORABLY
REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES IN THIS VERY

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

F-05-SN
~~F-05-SN~~

2289

July 2, 1986

RAYMOND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Charlie

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ~~CHARLES~~ Z. WICK
Director
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: USIA Support for Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting (U)

USIA's suggestions for the public diplomacy effort to build support for the next U.S.-Soviet summit were very timely and useful. As you point out, key policy decisions are still being made, and no date for the Summit has been set, so we are not yet in a position to set up the public diplomacy support mechanism that worked so effectively for our previous summits. We will, however, shortly be convening a small working group, under Jack Matlock's leadership, to implement the long-range public diplomacy strategy on U.S.-Soviet relations which was discussed at the PAO's Conference in London in February. In both of these endeavors, we will be working closely with USIA, and will draw heavily on your expertise and resources. We will also continue to rely on the public opinion polling and analyses, media surveys, and weekly highlights of Soviet propaganda which USIA produces, and which we find to be very valuable. (C)

I appreciate having your thoughts on our public diplomacy effort.
(U)

John
John M. Poindexter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority WH/DOS WAIVERS
BY WM NARA DATE 6/23/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2289

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

June 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JUDYT MANDEL *JM*

SUBJECT:

Reply to Wick on Public Diplomacy

Charlie Wick wrote to you in March to outline some of his ideas for the public diplomacy effort to build international support for the next Reagan-Gorbachev meeting (Tab II).

Since the timing for that meeting and key policy questions have not been decided, it would be premature to put into place the specific support mechanism Charlie describes. However, we are working on a long-term public diplomacy strategy for U.S.-Soviet relations designed to build broad public understanding and support for our overall approaches to the USSR and our four-part agenda, and thus lay the foundation for the Summit.

We have refined and revised the "concept paper" based on comments by the Public Affairs officers in Europe, and we will be establishing an informal working group including representatives of USIA to develop an action plan and begin drafting the key resource materials.

In the meantime, we should encourage USIA to continue its valuable public opinion polling and analysis, media surveys, and weekly highlights of Soviet propaganda.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the interim reply to Wick at Tab I.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove *WR*

Jack Macelock and Walt Raymond concur.

Attachment

Tab I Reply to Wick

Tab II Ltr fr Wick, March 18, 86, w/atch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/DOS WAIVERS

BY LM NARA DATE 6/23/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



USIA

March 18, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2289

Dear John:

USIA is circulating internally a proposed plan to help build international support for the next Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. I have attached a summary of our intended approach.

One aspect of the plan of special importance is our continuing review and analysis of international media and opinion trends and of Soviet propaganda output. We hope this will keep the inter-agency community aware of international public concerns as the preparation of informational materials proceeds. We will send you copies of these analyses immediately upon completion.

As you know, we have recommended assignment of a team of senior USIA officers to the NSC to help coordinate U.S. public diplomacy efforts for the next round. We believe this is a very important step and I would appreciate your thoughts on this as soon as possible.

Ed Feulner and the USIA Advisory Commission have already emphasized the need to get an early start on public diplomacy actions. However, since policy decisions are still being made,

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS/NSC WAIVER/5

BY LMI NARA DATE 6/23/25


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

we want to maintain close contact with you and your staff. The next summit, whenever it is held, will bring special problems and opportunities. We want to make the most of our substantial resources to help produce a successful outcome.

Of course, we shall be delighted to help in any other way.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Charles Z. Wick". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "C" and a stylized "W".

Charles Z. Wick
Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

mk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTLINE OF USIA ACTIONS TO SUPPORT SUMMIT '86

Principles to Guide USIA Output of Summit-Related Materials:

- Materials will adopt a constructive, non-polemical tone.
- We will not hesitate to treat with clarity those fundamental areas of difference between the Soviets and the Free World.
- Statements by the President and key Administration spokesmen will provide the substance and tone for our output.
- Field programming and media output will address specific issues explicitly referencing the forthcoming summit only after guidelines are available from the NSC.
- Agency programming will emphasize shared values, common interests and unity of purpose of the Free World.
- Agency output will deal with the full range of issues, drawing on our known, consistent approaches to these subject areas.

Support Activities

- The USIA Policy Guidance Office will be the central policy clearing house for summit support Activities, and will provide liaison with the NSC, the special Public Diplomacy Coordinating Team established by the NSC, the White House and other U.S. Government agencies. The Policy Guidance Office will chair a special operational working group to coordinate inputs from Agency media elements.
- Recommendations and ideas from European PAO's flowing from the March 3-4 London Conference will be incorporated into USIA programming as appropriate.
- The Soviet Propaganda Subcommittee of the IIC will begin assessing Soviet propaganda and reporting significant trends for consideration by the inter-Agency community.
- USIA will produce weekly highlights analyses of relevant Soviet propaganda.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: P - Charles Horner
Declassify or Downgrade on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS WAIVER
BY LM NARA DATE 6/23/25

35
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

--USIA will produce a weekly analysis of overseas elite opinion and media trends, as well as periodic special media reaction reports.

--The Agency will continue to conduct a series of survey research polls, including occasional telephone "flash" surveys, revealing trends in overseas public opinion.

--The Agency will develop a calendar of coming events and recommend possible key interview opportunities for the President and Secretary of State with the foreign press

--The Agency will provide services for foreign press accreditation and facilitation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WH

2289

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
Director
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: USIA Support for Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting (U)

USIA's suggestions for the public diplomacy effort to build support for the next U.S.-Soviet summit were very timely and useful. As you point out, key policy decisions are still being made, and no date for the Summit has been set, so we are not yet in a position to set up the public diplomacy support mechanism that worked so effectively for our previous summits. We will, however, shortly be convening a small working group, under Jack Matlock's leadership, to implement the long-range public diplomacy strategy on U.S.-Soviet relations which was discussed at the PAO's Conference in London in February. In both of these endeavors, we will be working closely with USIA, and will draw heavily on your expertise and resources. We will also continue to rely on the public opinion polling and analyses, media surveys, and weekly highlights of Soviet propaganda which USIA produces, and which we find to be very valuable. (C)

I appreciate having your thoughts on our public diplomacy effort.
(U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority WN/DOS WAWERS
BY LM NARA DATE 6/23/25

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



JUL 08 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC - ~~Matlock~~
~~McDonnell~~
~~Steiner~~
~~Mandel~~

F- US/SC

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter Raymond
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for International
Communication and Information
National Security Council

FROM: Marvin L. Stone
Deputy Director *ML-*

SUBJECT: Soviet Commentary on the Second Summit

Attached is a new agency analysis of Soviet public comment on a possible second summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. We hope you find it useful, and will keep you informed of other such studies as they become available.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Marvin L. Stone
Declassify or downgrade on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS/NSC WRITERS
BY LH NARA DATE 6/23/25



SOVIET COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND SUMMIT

Summary

Analysis of public statements by CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev, senior Soviet officials, and Soviet propaganda media indicates as yet no major movement toward changing the line on the second U.S.-Soviet summit. Soviet spokesmen -- including Gorbachev -- have insisted that should the meeting take place, a proper "political atmosphere" must be present and concrete agreements must be signed. This insistence on conditions for the summit is often accompanied by predictable criticism of U.S. attitude and behavior following the Geneva meeting.

A slight softening of this approach may have come in Gorbachev's June 16 speech to a Party plenum in which he did not demand concrete agreements, but instead spoke of "an atmosphere that would open up prospects for reaching real agreements".

This analysis is based on information as of July 7.

SOVIET COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND SUMMIT

Gorbachev on The Follow-on Summit

General Secretary Gorbachev has made reference to the follow-on summit in two major speeches and in meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries. In his report to the 27th CPSU Congress on February 25, Gorbachev set the party line on the follow-on summit when he declared:

In accordance with the accord which was reached in Geneva, a new meeting with the U.S. President lies ahead. We see its significance in providing practical results in the very important aspects of limiting and reducing armaments. There are at least two questions on which accord could be reached: The halting of nuclear tests and the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate range missiles from Europe. Then, incidentally, if there is a readiness to seek agreement, the question of the date of the meeting will resolve itself. We will accept any proposal on this score. But there is no point in carrying on idle conversations.

Speaking to auto plant workers in Togliatti on April 8, Gorbachev repeated this formulation:

To make the matter absolutely clear, I will repeat again: We stand for holding such a meeting. We make no preconditions for it. However, we want it to pass in accordance with what the President and I agreed on; namely, it should mark a step forward, that is, produce practical results toward ending the arms race.

Subsequently, Gorbachev appears to have added another criterion for the meeting -- the presence of the appropriate "political atmosphere". A TASS report of a meeting between Gorbachev, Armand Hammer, and Dr. Robert Gale on May 15 cited the Soviet leader as "affirming in principle" the follow-on summit meeting, but:

repeating that two simple things are required for it to take place -- readiness that it could bring a tangible, practical result, whether it be on one or two issues of worldwide concern and the appropriate political atmosphere.

Gorbachev also raised the issue of "political atmosphere" in his meeting with visiting Spanish premier Felipe Gonzalez on May 20, when -- according to TASS -- he noted that "one cannot depart from the real policy that is being pursued after Geneva" when assessing the prospects for a follow-on summit.

In a major speech to a Central Committee plenum held on June 16, Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union still "favors" a dialogue with the United States:

We are not slamming the doors shut: A new meeting with the U.S. President is possible. But, clearly, it requires an atmosphere that would open up prospects for reaching real agreements.

Gorbachev then questioned U.S. sincerity:

Do they in Washington want a new meeting? Or is the talk about it merely an attempt to delude world public opinion?

In the view of some analysts, Gorbachev's June 16 formulation constituted a slight softening of his two conditions for the meeting. Gorbachev's remarks seemed to imply that concrete agreements ready for signing may not now be a requirement for the summit. Whether this is a genuine change in the Soviet position or merely a misplaced nuance remains to be seen.

Since his June 16 Central Committee speech, Gorbachev has said almost nothing about prospects for a summit. Even when asked directly about it by a Polish television reporter during his June 30 visit to Warsaw for the Polish Party Congress, Gorbachev gave a very evasive and vague answer that did not vary from previous statements.

Increasing Complaints about U.S. Behavior

Although lower-ranking officials and commentators have not been reluctant to accuse the U.S. of violating the "spirit of Geneva" or the "Geneva accords", General Secretary Gorbachev was restrained in his public criticism of the U.S. until the end of April.

In his Togliatti speech, Gorbachev complained that "the only thing the U.S. Administration seems to have left from Geneva is talk about a new meeting..." and groused that, "shortly after Geneva, an anti-Soviet campaign was relaunched with new force in the United States, full of every type of fabrication and insult to our state." Gorbachev went on to cite U.S. restrictions on the size of the Soviet UN delegation, the U.S. naval incursion into Soviet waters in the Crimea, the Libyan raid, the Nevada nuclear test, and the rejection of the Soviet proposal for an urgent meeting in Europe on nuclear testing.

Gorbachev then asked rhetorically:

Is this how they in the United States understand the spirit of Geneva? Do they think we do not see how the just-started Soviet-U.S. dialogue is being misused to cover the implementation of military aims? All this makes one wonder, involuntarily, what content and meaning Washington is imparting to a new Soviet-U.S. meeting.

Gorbachev repeated these complaints in one form or another in subsequent public statements. During the meeting with Hammer and Gale, he noted that the atmosphere has deteriorated even more "as a result of the malicious anti-Soviet campaign Washington has whipped up over the accident at Chernobyl". And during his discussions with Spanish premier Gonzalez, TASS cited him as complaining in connection with a discussion of the follow-on summit:

There is much in the behavior of the U.S. Administration that is incompatible with political morals, worsens the international atmosphere, increases tension in Soviet-American relations and testifies to the intent to continue the policy of achieving military superiority and intensifying the arms race. There is no sign of steps taken in response to the Soviet initiatives after Geneva, there are no serious proposals concerning the possible practical results of a new summit meeting.

Lower-Level Official Commentary

Senior Soviet officials have also repeated these criticisms and conditions both at home and abroad and have speculated openly about the poor prospects for another summit.

Nikolai Shishlin, then a political commentator on Moscow television and now an aide to party Propaganda Department chief Aleksandr Yakovlev, stated in late March that "certain circles" in the U.S. apparently believe that the Soviet Union is more interested in the next summit than the United States. Shishlin characterized this as "a profound delusion".

Deputy premier Georgii Kornienko, replying to a question at a Foreign Ministry press conference on April 14, noted that the Soviet position on the follow-on summit remained as Gorbachev stated at Togliatti. Kornienko followed this by saying: "You are asking whether the meeting could take place in the current situation. Well, that's why there is no meeting today. The question is that we consider it necessary to create conditions under which it would be productive."

In a May 20 speech to workers at a heavy machine-building plant in Alma-Ata, Anatolii Dobrynin, the newly appointed CPSU International Department chief, repeated Gorbachev's conditions for a meeting -- an appropriate political atmosphere and willingness to achieve tangible results. "Otherwise, a summit would be senseless."

Valentin Falin, the director of the Soviet Novosti press agency who was in Cologne, Germany, for the late May congress of Physicians Against Nuclear War, stated that a second summit might take place "any time" provided that it served not only to

discuss general matters, but to solve concrete issues; however, "obviously, Washington was not prepared to solve concrete issues". Falin went on to note, "If that attitude does not change, then prospects are poor for this year".

Other senior officials such as head of state Gromyko, deputy foreign minister Bessmertnykh, USA Institute director Arbatov, and Foreign Ministry spokesman Lomeyko have also been openly negative about the prospects for a summit this year unless there are radical changes in U.S. behavior.

Media Commentary

Soviet media have basically followed Gorbachev's example, with the exception that they began complaining about U.S. attitudes and behavior almost immediately following the Geneva meeting in November 1985. Soviet media transformed the joint statement by the two leaders into an "accord" or "agreement" which, in their view, the U.S. was constantly violating in spirit and letter and which the Soviet Union dutifully fulfilled despite U.S. provocations.

A second element of Soviet post-Geneva media commentary was reporting on a putative "campaign" among certain circles in the U.S. to defeat the Geneva "accords" either by pressuring President Reagan to renege or by creating incidents and provocations designed to worsen the international atmosphere. Typical of this approach was an early April broadcast on Radio Moscow's North American service by Valentin Zorin:

A whole series of events in the not very distant past cannot but create an impression that somebody in Washington tries to put as many obstacles as possible in the way of a Soviet-American summit scheduled for this year.

Zorin went on to repeat the Gorbachev list of "provocations", and concluded: "All this suggests a carefully planned campaign testifying to the fact that Washington has departed from the Geneva agreements."

Finally, Soviet media unfailingly note that any follow-on summit must result in concrete agreements. Zorin, in a July 5 Radio Moscow broadcast typical of Soviet commentary, noted:

The Soviet Union believes that if Soviet-American relations are to reflect the Geneva spirit and [if] there is to be another summit, serious work is needed to decide on specific practical measures both sides would take to slow down the arms race. Just this past week the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union would only welcome it if Washington began to take a more serious and responsible attitude towards the problem of disarmament.

It hoped that the American Administration would associate itself with the Soviet initiatives and make it possible to hold a summit and hammer out the agreements that the nations hope for.

Comment

At least publicly, Soviet officials and media representatives have been absolutely consistent in their treatment of the prospects of and conditions for a follow-on summit. Rhetoric has hardened perceptibly since the end of April and conditions for the summit are being stated in starker terms. Criticism of the U.S. continues and is made at all levels of officialdom.

Foreign Media Analysis

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research

F-UI-SN



July 8, 1986

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER GLASSBORO: EUROPEAN OPTIMISM MIXED WITH CONCERN

This analysis is based on USIS reporting of the major West European press, covering June 20 through July 3, 1986. It analyzes 65 editorials and 90 commentaries and news analyses in 56 newspapers of 12 countries.

SUMMARY:

After President Reagan's Glassboro speech on June 19, the West European papers expressed hope that U.S.-Soviet relations would improve. The papers, across the political spectrum, said both sides appear to seek arms control agreements. Despite problems and posturing, both seem to want better relations. The papers suggested that chances appear to be good for a Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington at the end of this year.

However, most editorials and commentaries reflected caution as well as confusion prevalent across Western Europe. They said posturing for unilateral advantage by the two strong leaders could easily unravel all possibilities for agreement. West Europeans saw themselves caught in the middle, always vulnerable.

END SUMMARY

Personalities of President Reagan and Gorbachev of Central Importance

The press saw positives as well as negatives in what the papers described as the strong, confident personality of President Reagan. Most editorials did not appear to understand the President's popularity. They said it is too easily assumed in Western Europe that "such an accomplished politician does not know what he is doing." They said he has made Americans "feel good" about the prosperity and strength of their country, but noted Congressional opposition to his "hawkishness" (i.e. pro-SALT-II resolution, SDI budget cuts, only a narrow and still-uncertain win after a struggle on Nicaraguan "contra" aid). The press also focused on a major "hawk vs pragmatist" struggle within his Administration. The papers concluded that despite the President's popularity, there is growing opposition to his policies at home.

The papers said the President faces just as strong and confident a personality in Gorbachev. The strength and confidence of the Soviet leader was seen as illusory because of the USSR's serious economic problems and the damaging attempts to cover up the seriousness of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The European press also saw a continuing power struggle within the Kremlin, with Gorbachev in a strong position, but not yet totally in control. The flood of arms control proposals from Gorbachev was seen as an attempt to score propaganda points with international (and especially American) public opinion and with his domestic critics. "If he wants to break his opposition, he needs to show success." The papers saw Gorbachev also aiming to influence the U.S. Congress.

Alternating "Hard and Soft Lines" From Both Sides Confuse Press

The editorials often expressed deep concern over what they perceived as "contradictory" statements made by President Reagan. European editorials almost totally disagreed with the White House decision to no longer be bound by restraints in the unratified SALT-II Treaty. The conciliatory Glassboro speech was seen as an attempt to smooth over the negative domestic and foreign reaction to the SALT-II decision.

Typically, the papers said that "the more one listens to President Reagan, the more one gets confused about American intentions." There was concern for U.S. overconfidence: "Is the U.S. distrust of USSR so great that it will in the end prefer to leave the great issues unsettled in the belief it will always have technological superiority?" The papers said the problem is to find out who the "real Reagan" is: "one day pragmatic and another day ideological, alternatively conciliatory and tough." For that reason, the papers suggested, the U.S. does not appear to be able to reply promptly and effectively to Gorbachev. However, the papers said, the President himself does not seem to see contradictions in his policies.

The papers saw Gorbachev's letter to the President as positive, but were disappointed by the "tough tone and harsh words" against the U.S. in his Warsaw speech. They said Gorbachev has appeared as both a hard and a soft-liner, "the former for domestic policy and the latter for foreign policy. It is difficult to tell which is more real." The papers said that, of course, many of the Gorbachev proposals have hitches and are not acceptable, but "at least they are a substance for negotiations." The editorials said Gorbachev's intent appears to be to convince world opinion that the only real U.S.-Soviet issue is arms control. Most leftist papers agreed with giving top priority to arms control, but conservative papers generally sided with the U.S. position that regional conflicts and human rights deserve an important place on the East-West agenda.

The European papers concluded that both the U.S. and the USSR appear to be posturing in a "propaganda war" which calls the sincerity of both into question. The papers said that Soviet strategy is to press for a preliminary accord on arms control (by September, when the Geneva negotiators meet again), followed by a summit to expand on any such agreement. They said the U.S. view appears the opposite: to seek a summit whether or not there has been progress in arms control. The editorials, generally favoring the Soviet view, urged that early progress on an arms agreement precede a summit.

Continued Concern For Europe's Role

The editorials, across the political spectrum, expressed deep concern over the fate of Western Europe, wedged between the policies of the superpowers, insecure and vulnerable, too weak to exert real influence. They said Europe needs and wants detente, but is increasingly troubled by American policy. There was almost total agreement that Gorbachev's intent is to sow discord and take advantage of U.S.-West European differences. The papers took note of Gorbachev's statements in Warsaw that Western Europe should not allow itself to be "abducted" by the U.S. The commentaries added wryly that the statement was made in a country that had been abducted by Moscow.

The European papers also reflected fears that President Reagan does not want to listen to Western Europe, (as in the Libyan strike) and that the U.S. is becoming isolationist and may begin withdrawing troops from Western Europe. Many approved of calls for better relations with Moscow on the grounds that the U.S. defense commitment may not be trustworthy in a crisis.

In the context of possibilities of agreement on limiting or withdrawing intermediate-range missiles, the papers noted with approval French President Mitterrand's visit to Moscow, reportedly to reaffirm France's intent to retain and modernize its nuclear "force-de-frappe." Many papers also suggested that progress in MBFR talks is far more important to Europe because of the USSR's overwhelming conventional military superiority. They said it is doubtful the Soviets would use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe because they would not want conquered territory close to their homeland reduced to nuclear ashes. At the same time, the papers said, the Soviets must make disproportionate cuts to equalize conventional forces in Central Europe. They said that if the USSR wants a peaceful relationship with Western Europe, the first requirement is for Moscow to cease to be a military threat.

Despite Problems, Both Sides Are Seen As Wanting A Dialogue

Most West European papers concluded that both superpowers want a summit and seek arms control, despite U.S.-Soviet differences. They said the superpowers want a summit despite all the "hot and cold shower tactics" of both sides; and despite the maneuvering and propaganda war. Noting that both appear ready to make concessions, the papers concluded that real bargaining may begin soon.

Prepared by:
Vello Ederma (P/R)
485-7116

FMA-7/8/86

Approved by:
Nils H. Wessell, Director, Office of Research
485-2965

PRESS SOURCES USED

Independent

BELGIUM	<u>Le Soir</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Financial Times</u>
FRANCE	<u>France-Soir; Le Parisien</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>NRC Handelsblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Dagbladet</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>Diario de Noticias</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Expressen</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>La Suisse</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>General-Anzeiger</u>

Centrist

ITALY	<u>Corriere della Sera; La Stampa; Stampa Sera</u>
NORWAY	<u>Nationen</u>
SPAIN	<u>La Vanguardia</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Tribune de Geneve</u>

Conservative/Rightist

BELGIUM	<u>Gazet van Antwerpen</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Times; Daily Telegraph</u>
DENMARK	<u>Berlingske Tidende</u>
FRANCE	<u>Figaro; Quotidien; Les Echos</u>
ITALY	<u>Il Giornale; Il Tempo; Il Sole-24 Ore</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Telegraaf; Algemeen Dagblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Aftenposten; Verdens Gang; Vaart Land</u>
SPAIN	<u>ABC</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Svenska Dagbladet</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Neue Zuercher Zeitung; Journal de Geneve</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Welt; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</u>

Liberal/Leftist

BELGIUM	<u>De Morgen</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Guardian</u>
DENMARK	<u>Politiken; Aktuelt</u>
FRANCE	<u>Le Monde; Liberation; Le Matin</u>
ITALY	<u>La Repubblica; Avanti; Il Messaggero</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Volkskrant</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>A Capital</u>
SPAIN	<u>El Pais</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Dagens Nyheter</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Tages-Anzeiger</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Zeit; Frankfurter Rundschau; Stuttgarter Zeitung; Sueddeutsche Zeitung</u>