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
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*Last Updated: 02/28/2025*

February 15, 1984

This is a copy of the original report which was received from Dallas Dende of the House Parliamentarian's Office this morning by Ron Geisler.

  
Dan Marks

LEBANON REPORT: February 13, 1984

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Served by U.S. Participation in the MNF

U.S. foreign policy interests remain as stated in the report of December 12, 1983. The Government of Lebanon (GOL) requested the return of the Multinational Force (MNF) to the Beirut area following the tragedy of Sabra/Shatilla. The presence of the MNF was requested specifically to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby to further efforts of the Lebanese Government to assure the safety of persons in the area and to bring an end to the violence. The MNF remains in Lebanon to help provide the Lebanese Government and Lebanese communities an opportunity to reach agreement on broadening the government and to negotiate the withdrawal of foreign forces. The presence of U.S. forces is a critical part of a shared effort with our Western allies -- the British, French and Italians -- in the Multinational Force. They are as committed as we to assisting the Lebanese to restore peace and stability to their country. The presence of this Multinational Force further symbolizes Western support for Lebanon's efforts not only to withstand external pressure but to enter serious negotiations with Syria on troop withdrawals.

In order to use U.S. assets in Lebanon most effectively, on February 7 the President announced several changes in the orientation of our political and military resources, all of which are consistent with the existing mandate of the MNF. First, in order to enhance the safety of MNF personnel, authority has been given to U.S. naval forces offshore to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon firing into the greater Beirut area, as well as against any units directly attacking MNF or U.S. personnel and facilities. Second is more intensified support and training for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), including counter-terrorism training and an increase in our exchange of intelligence information. Third, we have decided that the large contingent of Marines dug in at the Beirut Airport is no longer the most effective way of maintaining an MNF presence. They have become a target in an area that is no longer under government control. Their redeployment to ships offshore will take place in phases based on an assessment of the situation, but with a tentative goal of completion within 30 days, as discussed later in this report. Military personnel will remain on the ground for the purpose of protecting our remaining personnel including those engaged in training and equipping the LAF.

The intention is to redeploy our military resources in a way that can best help the Lebanese, without signalling a lessening in our resolve. The United States will remain fully engaged. We will continue our intensive efforts to bring all sides to the bargaining table. We will continue to press the Lebanese government and the opposition alike to move toward political accommodation.

Until stability is at hand, Lebanon will be a flashpoint for conflict between Israel and Syria and therefore potentially between the United States and the USSR. Instability in Lebanon affects Israel's security directly. Indirectly, the ability of the Government of Lebanon to deal with its security problems, aided by the U.S. and other responsible members of the international community, will affect the confidence of the moderate Arab governments. Our relationship with those governments will be strongly affected by our record in Lebanon, as will the prospects for a wider peace in the area.

#### Situation in Lebanon: Level of Fighting and Status of Ceasefire

There was an extensive breakdown in the security situation at the end of this reporting period which resulted in the LAF's losing control of West Beirut. Fighting intensified throughout the greater Beirut area involving both heavy exchanges of fire between the LAF and opposing forces on the ground and extensive barrages of artillery and rocket fire. Two Navy A-6 aircraft conducted strikes against artillery positions in response to firing endangering the U.S. MNF or diplomatic facilities. During the course of this fighting the LAF lost effective control of West Beirut, and was experiencing difficulty in maintaining discipline and morale. The LAF re-established its lines along the "Green Line" dividing East and West Beirut. Indications are that although some units suffered significant personnel losses through surrender, desertion, or refusal to fight, the bulk of the force remains intact and loyal to the Government of Lebanon.

February 8 was marked by extensive use of naval gunfire. USS NEW JERSEY and USS CARON conducted naval gunfire throughout the day against artillery and rocket positions in Syrian controlled portions of Lebanon which were firing on Beirut. A large number of hostile shells fell in the vicinity of the Ambassador's residence at Yarze. The two ships fired a total of 790 rounds (340 16-inch and 450 5-inch).

On February 9 naval gunfire was again employed to respond to hostile fire received from Syrian-controlled portions of Lebanon. The area around Yarze, which contains

U.S. diplomatic and MNF personnel, was deliberately fired upon. Recurring artillery and small arms duels continue to spill over into U.S. MNF areas. Occasionally the U.S. MNF is directly targeted. The threat and incidence of terrorist attack on individuals and units of the MNF continues.

In addition to the substantial use of naval gunfire in early February, there were three other instances -- on December 13, 14 and 18 -- of Syrian or Syrian-backed firing on U.S. reconnaissance planes; in each instance U.S. naval gunfire was used to respond to the sources of fire. The USS NEW JERSEY's 16-inch guns were used for the first time on December 14. We were forced to use naval gunfire to silence batteries used to shell Marine positions in an outbreak of fighting in mid-January. On January 8, one Marine assigned to chancery protection duties was killed by small arms fire at a helicopter pad not far from the Embassy. Two Marines were killed on January 30 in fighting at the airport. The U.S. airman captured on December 4 was released by Syria on January 2 at the request of the USG and the Reverend Jackson.

Two important security problems were resolved during this reporting period. The first of these was the lifting of the siege of Dayr al-Qamar pursuant to an agreement that provided for the safe exodus of thousands of refugees, the withdrawal of a 2,000-man militia and the insertion of government forces into the town to maintain order and keep the peace. The operation was completed in mid-December; all sides have respected the agreement, and the Christian population of Dayr al-Qamar is living in peace. That agreement was an encouraging development; Lebanese government and militia leaders negotiated in good faith and both Syria and Israel were also involved in various ways in ensuring that the agreement could be implemented. It is this kind of political compromise that is being worked on for other areas of Lebanon.

In addition, Saudi Arabia mediated an agreement between Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Arafat and Syria that halted the fighting in the Tripoli area between pro- and anti-Arafat factions and permitted the evacuation from Lebanon of Arafat and 4,000 of his troops. The United States supported on humanitarian grounds the consensus in the UN Security Council for the use of UN flags on the evacuation ships, and we urged both publicly and privately the safe departure from the port of Tripoli, which began on December 20. The issue from our perspective was not to support any particular party involved, but the brutality of the shelling of Palestinian camps and the city of Tripoli by Syrian and Syrian-supported Palestinian forces needed to be stopped as a humanitarian matter.

On December 24, a French MNF unit withdrew from a position it had been occupying at an United Nations Relief and Works Agency school adjacent to the Sabra/Shatilla camp area. As the Lebanese Armed Forces moved in to take over this position, it met some resistance from the camps, sparking fighting which drew in the Shi'a Amal the next day. This Christmas fighting ended in the LAF succeeding in sealing off the camp area as a terrorist infiltration route from the southern suburbs into downtown Beirut.

#### Responsibilities, Activities and Composition of the MNF

Under its mandate, which remains unchanged, the MNF provides a multinational presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the LAF in the Beirut area. The MNF is not authorized to engage in combat, but may exercise the right of self-defense. The U.S. MNF follows a policy of active self-defense in response to attacks and to improve its security. In order to enhance the safety of MNF personnel, authority has been given to U.S. naval forces offshore to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon firing into greater Beirut, as well as against any units directly attacking MNF or U.S. personnel and facilities.

The MNF is currently composed of the following units which perform the functions indicated at the request of the Lebanese government. Their precise functions within the MNF mission have varied over time and continue to be subject to adjustment in light of changing circumstances.

- One U.S. Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) is ashore at Beirut International Airport as a 1400-man force which also provides external security troops at U.S. diplomatic facilities in the greater Beirut area. Additional elements of the MAU in reserve, mainly combat support and combat service support elements, are aboard amphibious ships offshore Beirut. Pending the conclusion of consultations with the GOL and our MNF allies, this force will be redeployed as soon as conditions warrant, with a tentative goal of completion within 30 days. As noted above, U.S. military personnel currently with the MNF will remain on the ground for the protection of our remaining personnel.
- Two Italian battalions are in a 1400-man force in southwest Beirut and also help protect the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. The Italian government has nearly completed the four-month process of returning the size of its force to that level from a high of 2200 men. The Italians announced on February 8 their intention to



withdraw further forces, but to leave a portion of their MNF contingent to protect the camp areas.

- The French battalions serve as a force in and near the port of Beirut. The French have returned approximately 460 personnel from the MNF to the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon, which leaves them at a level of 1600 men, well above their original troop commitment.
- One British motorized reconnaissance company of 100 men withdrew from their position east of Beirut International Airport on February 8 and embarked in a Royal Navy ship offshore until the situation clarifies.

In addition, each contingent of the MNF has naval and/or air support forces in the region.

#### Estimated Cost of U.S. Participation in the MNF\*

##### MNF Deployment:

#### U.S. Marine Corps (FY 1984 estimated costs)

Operations and Maintenance	\$12.1 million
Military Personnel	<u>5.5 million</u>
TOTAL	\$17.6 million

\* This estimate encompasses all of Fiscal Year 1984 to the present.

##### Support for the MNF:

#### U.S. Navy (FY 1984 estimated costs)

Ship Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean	36.1 million
Augmentation Resupply	3.9 million
Cargo Handling	.7 million
Medical Support	2.1 million
Other Support	<u>\$ 2.0 million</u>
TOTAL	\$44.8 million

#### MNF Military Casualties

The following military casualties have occurred since the MNF deployed to Beirut in September 1982 and since the last report to Congress:

	KILLED IN ACTION		WOUNDED IN ACTION		CAPTURED	
	Total	Since 12/12/83	Total	Since 12/12/83	Total	Since 12/12/83
U.S.	264	14	134	4	1 (released)	0
Italy	2	0	26	8		
France	77	2	60	4		
UK	0	0	1	0		

#### Efforts to Reduce the MNF

The Marines are in Lebanon as part of a broadly based international peacekeeping effort to help keep the peace. Together with our MNF partners and the troop contributors to UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, the U.S. is one of a dozen nations that provide forces for this purpose.

Despite the changing situation on the ground, our basic strategy to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for the MNF remains unchanged and continues to center on our diplomatic efforts to encourage reconciliation among Lebanese factions, help expand the control of the Lebanese government over the territory of Lebanon, and create circumstances that will lead to removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. At the President's direction, the number of men ashore will be reduced in phases and redeployed to ships offshore, with a tentative goal of completion within 30 days, as discussed herein. It is not possible at this time to predict the exact duration of the need for the MNF. We will continue to assess this question in the light of progress toward the objectives of national reconciliation and establishment of Lebanese government control.

Meanwhile, the possibility of supplementing or replacing the MNF with a UN peacekeeping operation is also being kept open, although this can be accomplished only if the Lebanese situation calms sufficiently to permit progress in the political dialogue among the parties concerned. We have carried out consultations with the UN Security Council members, the UN Secretariat and our MNF partners to assess prospects for an expanded UN peacekeeping role in various parts of Lebanon. France has informally raised in the Security Council the idea of replacing the MNF with a UN presence. The outlook for a UN role in Beirut remains uncertain; deployments anywhere in the country would depend on agreement of the UN Security Council, the parties on the ground, and potential contributing states.



Our long-term goal in Lebanon remains the same, but should not be confused with the mission of the MNF. The MNF is not a permanent or long-term force. It is not intended that it remain until the U.S. achieves its long-term goals in Lebanon.

#### Contributions to Lebanon by MNF Members

In addition to their contributions of troops to the MNF, members of the MNF are providing military and economic assistance to Lebanon. The U.S. is providing \$150 million (no year funds) in economic assistance, which it plans to have fully obligated by the end of FY 84. France has reportedly offered \$256.6 million in 1983/84, mostly in commercial credits, while Italy is providing \$142 million, largely in soft loans, over the next 3-4 years. The UK has provided \$3 million, but it and the others are channeling additional contributions to Lebanon through the European Economic Community.

The Administration is considering a substantial supplemental funding request in 1984 in grants or credits for military equipment and training as part of our concerted effort to reconstitute the LAF and make it a strong arm of the central government's authority. The difficulties the Lebanese Army is now experiencing will be closely watched in this context. We plan to expend \$46.8 million in FY 84 funds (\$15 million appropriated for Lebanon and \$31 million in reprogrammed FMS funds). Italy is supplying armored personnel carriers to Lebanon. France has provided 30 AMX tanks, 40 APCs and 10 light helicopters. In addition, the French are training units of the LAF and the Internal Security Force (ISF).

#### Progress in Training the Lebanese Armed Forces

Our training efforts have focussed on four general areas: logistics, maintenance and supply; operational deployment of U.S.-supplied equipment; and, management and operations planning, all conducted by mobile training teams. We have sent 37 training teams -- ranging in size from one person to 26 members -- to Lebanon since January 1, 1983; 25 have completed their missions and have departed. There are now 118 trainers in Lebanon, near our average of 100 trainers in Lebanon at any one time. Ten more teams may be scheduled for deployment over the next few months. All of this training has been provided under Foreign Military sales (FMS) procedures and paid for by the Lebanese. We are also conducting some training within the U.S. funded partly through International Military Education and Training funds and partly through FMS. Since the security situation in Lebanon precludes the sending of many LAF officers to the

U.S., for 1984, the GOL has chosen to focus its training in the U.S. on individual programs like helicopter and fighter pilot training. The French have provided some training in logistics and operations for the LAF brigade equipped with French-origin heavy equipment.

Given recent events, reflected above, it is not possible to gauge when the LAF will be capable of maintaining internal security in Lebanon. As reflected in the President's announcement of February 7, a vigorous acceleration of training, equipping and support of the LAF is planned to enhance LAF effectiveness.

#### Progress Toward National Reconciliation

Progress toward national reconciliation was set back by the serious deterioration in the security situation in Beirut in early February. We are working with the Lebanese, Syrians, Israelis and Saudis to try to find a formula for a negotiated solution, and the Saudis have recently sent a senior emissary to Damascus to follow up these efforts.

#### Progress in Negotiations Toward Political Settlement

Negotiations on a security plan had been underway for some time when the attacks on West Beirut brought them to a halt. Political level contacts continue behind the scenes. The United States continues to press for a political dialogue between the government and leaders of Lebanon's communities. This in turn would pave the way for an expanded, broadly representative government able to deal with fundamental questions of political, social and economic reform and the withdrawal of foreign forces. If Syria and others are convinced of the resolve of the MNF partners to remain in Lebanon until progress is made, it would have a positive effect on reconciliation.

February 15, 1984

This copy of the report shows the differences between the originally released copies and what actually was transmitted.

  
Dan Marks

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Negotiations on a security plan had been underway for some time when the attacks on West Beirut brought them to a halt. Political level contacts continue behind the scenes. The United States continues to press for a political dialogue between the government and leaders of Lebanon's communities. This in turn would pave the way for an expanded, broadly representative government able to deal with fundamental questions of political, social and economic reform and the withdrawal of foreign forces. If Syria and others are convinced of the resolve of the MNF partners to remain in Lebanon until progress is made, it would have a positive effect on reconciliation.

February 15, 1984

NOTE: This is a bad copy of the report which was released by the White House Press Office last evening at 4:35 p.m. Good copies were provided this morning.

  
Dan Marks



LEBANON REPORT: February 13, 1984

*no good  
Keep for folder  
This is the copy  
released by USIA  
per office on 2/14*

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Served by U.S. Participation  
in the MNF

U.S. foreign policy interests remain as stated in the report of December 12, 1983. The Government of Lebanon (GOL) requested the return of the Multinational Force (MNF) to the Beirut area following the tragedy of Sabra/Shatilla. The presence of the MNF was requested specifically to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby to further efforts of the Lebanese Government to assure the safety of persons in the area and to bring an end to the violence. The MNF remains in Lebanon to help provide the Lebanese Government and Lebanese communities an opportunity to reach agreement on broadening the government and to negotiate the withdrawal of foreign forces. The presence of U.S. forces is a critical part of a shared effort with our Western allies -- the British, French and Italians -- in the Multinational Force. They are as committed as we to assisting the Lebanese to restore peace and stability to their country. The presence of this Multinational Force further symbolizes Western support for Lebanon's efforts not only to withstand external pressure but to enter serious negotiations with Syria on troop withdrawals.

In order to use U.S. assets in Lebanon most effectively, on February 7 the President announced several changes in the orientation of our political and military resources, all of which are consistent with the existing mandate of the MNF. First, in order to enhance the safety of MNF personnel, authority has been given to U.S. naval forces offshore to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon firing into the greater Beirut area, as well as against any units directly attacking MNF or U.S. personnel and facilities. Second is more intensified support and training for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), including counter-terrorism training and an increase in our exchange of intelligence information. Third, we have decided that the large contingent of Marines dug in at the Beirut Airport is no longer the most effective way of maintaining an MNF presence. They have become a target in an area that is no longer under government control. Their redeployment to ships offshore will take place in phases based on an assessment of the situation. Military personnel will remain on the ground for the purpose of protecting our remaining personnel including those engaged in training and equipping the LAF.

The intention is to redeploy our military resources in a way that can best help the Lebanese, without signalling a lessening in our resolve. The United States will remain fully engaged. We will continue our intensive efforts to bring all sides to the bargaining table. We will continue to press the Lebanese government and the opposition alike to move toward political accommodation.

Until stability is at hand, Lebanon will be a flashpoint for conflict between Israel and Syria and therefore potentially between the United States and the USSR. Instability in Lebanon affects Israel's security directly. Indirectly, the ability of the Government of Lebanon to deal with its security problems, aided by the U.S. and other responsible members of the international community, will affect the confidence of the moderate Arab governments. Our relationship with those governments will be strongly affected by our record in Lebanon, as will the prospects for a wider peace in the area.

#### Situation in Lebanon: Level of Fighting and Status of Ceasefire

There was an extensive breakdown in the security situation at the end of this reporting period which resulted in the LAF's losing control of West Beirut. Fighting intensified throughout the greater Beirut area involving both heavy exchanges of fire between the LAF and opposing forces on the ground and extensive barrages of artillery and rocket fire. Two Navy A-6 aircraft conducted strikes against artillery positions in response to firing endangering the U.S. MNF or diplomatic facilities. During the course of this fighting the LAF lost effective control of West Beirut, and was experiencing difficulty in maintaining discipline and morale. The LAF re-established its lines along the "Green Line" dividing East and West Beirut. Indications are that although some units suffered significant personnel losses through surrender, desertion, or refusal to fight, the bulk of the force remains intact and loyal to the Government of Lebanon.

February 8 was marked by extensive use of naval gunfire. USS NEW JERSEY and USS CARON conducted naval gunfire throughout the day against artillery and rocket positions in Syrian controlled portions of Lebanon which were firing on Beirut. A large number of hostile shells fell in the vicinity of the Ambassador's residence at Yarze. The two ships fired a total of 790 rounds (340 16-inch and 450 5-inch).

On February 9 naval gunfire was again employed to respond to hostile fire received from Syrian-controlled portions of Lebanon. The area around Yarze, which contains

U.S. diplomatic and MNF personnel, was deliberately fired upon. Recurring artillery and small arms duels continue to spill over into U.S. MNF areas. Occasionally the U.S. MNF is directly targeted. The threat and incidence of terrorist attack on individuals and units of the MNF continues.

In addition to the substantial use of naval gunfire in early February, there were three other instances -- on December 13, 14 and 18 -- of Syrian or Syrian-backed firing on U.S. reconnaissance planes; in each instance U.S. naval gunfire was used to respond to the sources of fire. The USS NEW JERSEY's 16-inch guns were used for the first time on December 14. We were forced to use naval gunfire to silence batteries used to shell Marine positions in an outbreak of fighting in mid-January. On January 8, one Marine assigned to chancery protection duties was killed by small arms fire at a helicopter pad not far from the Embassy. Two Marines were killed on January 30 in fighting at the airport. The U.S. airman captured on December 4 was released by Syria on January 2 at the request of the USG and the Reverend Jackson.

Two important security problems were resolved during this reporting period. The first of these was the lifting of the siege of Dayr al-Qamar pursuant to an agreement that provided for the safe exodus of thousands of refugees, the withdrawal of a 2,000-man militia and the insertion of government forces into the town to maintain order and keep the peace. The operation was completed in mid-December; all sides have respected the agreement, and the Christian population of Dayr al-Qamar is living in peace. That agreement was an encouraging development; Lebanese government and militia leaders negotiated in good faith and both Syria and Israel were also involved in various ways in ensuring that the agreement could be implemented. It is this kind of political compromise that is being worked on for other areas of Lebanon.

In addition, Saudi Arabia mediated an agreement between Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Arafat and Syria that halted the fighting in the Tripoli area between pro- and anti-Arafat factions and permitted the evacuation from Lebanon of Arafat and 4,000 of his troops. The United States supported on humanitarian grounds the consensus in the UN Security Council for the use of UN flags on the evacuation ships, and we urged both publicly and privately the safe departure from the port of Tripoli, which began on December 20. The issue from our perspective was not to support any particular party involved, but the brutality of the shelling of Palestinian camps and the city of Tripoli by Syrian and Syrian-supported Palestinian forces needed to be stopped as a humanitarian matter.

On December 24, a French MNF unit withdrew from a position it had been occupying at an United Nations Relief and Works Agency school adjacent to the Sabra/Shatilla camp area. As the Lebanese Armed Forces moved in to take over this position, it met some resistance from the camps, sparking fighting which drew in the Shi'a Amal the next day. This Christmas fighting ended in the LAF succeeding in sealing off the camp area as a terrorist infiltration route from the southern suburbs into downtown Beirut.

#### Responsibilities, Activities and Composition of the MNF

Under its mandate, which remains unchanged, the MNF provides a multinational presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the LAF in the Beirut area. The MNF is not authorized to engage in combat, but may exercise the right of self-defense. The U.S. MNF follows a policy of active self-defense in response to attacks and to improve its security. In order to enhance the safety of MNF personnel, authority has been given to U.S. naval forces offshore to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon firing into greater Beirut, as well as against any units directly attacking MNF or U.S. personnel and facilities.

The MNF is currently composed of the following units which perform the functions indicated at the request of the Lebanese government. Their precise functions within the MNF mission have varied over time and continue to be subject to adjustment in light of changing circumstances.

- One U.S. Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) is ashore at Beirut International Airport as a 1400-man force which also provides external security troops at U.S. diplomatic facilities in the greater Beirut area. Additional elements of the MAU in reserve, mainly combat support and combat service support elements, are aboard amphibious ships offshore Beirut. Pending the conclusion of consultations with the GOL and our MNF allies, this force will be redeployed as soon as conditions warrant. From a purely military standpoint the redeployment can be accomplished in a matter of weeks. As noted above, U.S. military personnel currently with the MNF will remain on the ground for the protection of our remaining personnel.
- Two Italian battalions are in a 1400-man force in southwest Beirut and also help protect the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. The Italian government has nearly completed the four-month process of returning the size of its force to that level from a high of 2200 men. The Italians announced on February 8 their intention to



withdraw further forces, but to leave a portion of their MNF contingent to protect the camp areas.

- The French battalions serve as a force in and near the port of Beirut. The French have returned approximately 460 personnel from the MNF to the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon, which leaves them at a level of 1600 men, well above their original troop commitment.
- One British motorized reconnaissance company of 100 men withdrew from their position east of Beirut International Airport on February 8 and embarked in a Royal Navy ship offshore until the situation clarifies.

In addition, each contingent of the MNF has naval and/or air support forces in the region.

#### Estimated Cost of U.S. Participation in the MNF\*

##### MNF Deployment:

#### U.S. Marine Corps (FY 1984 estimated costs)

Operations and Maintenance	\$12.1 million
Military Personnel	<u>5.5 million</u>
TOTAL	\$17.6 million

\* This estimate encompasses all of Fiscal Year 1984 to the present.

##### Support for the MNF:

#### U.S. Navy (FY 1984 estimated costs)

Ship Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean	36.1 million
Augmentation Resupply	3.9 million
Cargo Handling	.7 million
Medical Support	2.1 million
Other Support	<u>\$ 2.0 million</u>
TOTAL	\$44.8 million

#### MNF Military Casualties

The following military casualties have occurred since the MNF deployed to Beirut in September 1982 and since the last report to Congress:

	KILLED IN ACTION		WOUNDED IN ACTION		CAPTURED	
	Total	Since 12/12/83	Total	Since 12/12/83	Total	Since 12/12/83
U.S.	264	14	134	4	1 (released)	0
Italy	2	0	26	8		
France	77	2	60	4		
UK	0	0	1	0		

#### Efforts to Reduce the MNF

The Marines are in Lebanon as part of a broadly based international peacekeeping effort to help keep the peace. Together with our MNF partners and the troop contributors to UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, the U.S. is one of a dozen nations that provide forces for this purpose.

Despite the changing situation on the ground, our basic strategy to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for the MNF remains unchanged and continues to center on our diplomatic efforts to encourage reconciliation among Lebanese factions, help expand the control of the Lebanese government over the territory of Lebanon, and create circumstances that will lead to removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. At the President's direction, the number of men ashore will be reduced in phases and redeployed to ships offshore. It is not possible at this time to predict the exact duration of the need for the MNF. We will continue to assess this question in the light of progress toward the objectives of national reconciliation and establishment of Lebanese government control.

Meanwhile, the possibility of supplementing or replacing the MNF with a UN peacekeeping operation is also being kept open, although this can be accomplished only if the Lebanese situation calms sufficiently to permit progress in the political dialogue among the parties concerned. We have carried out consultations with the UN Security Council members, the UN Secretariat and our MNF partners to assess prospects for an expanded UN peacekeeping role in various parts of Lebanon. France has informally raised in the Security Council the idea of replacing the MNF with a UN presence. The outlook for a UN role in Beirut remains uncertain; deployments anywhere in the country would depend on agreement of the UN Security Council, the parties on the ground, and potential contributing states.

Our long-term goal in Lebanon remains the same, but should not be confused with the mission of the MNF. The MNF



is not a permanent or long-term force. It is not intended that it remain until the U.S. achieves its long-term goals in Lebanon.

#### Contributions to Lebanon by MNF Members

In addition to their contributions of troops to the MNF, members of the MNF are providing military and economic assistance to Lebanon. The U.S. is providing \$150 million (no year funds) in economic assistance, which it plans to have fully obligated by the end of FY 84. France has reportedly offered \$256.6 million in 1983/84, mostly in commercial credits, while Italy is providing \$142 million, largely in soft loans, over the next 3-4 years. The UK has provided \$3 million, but it and the others are channeling additional contributions to Lebanon through the European Economic Community.

The Administration is considering a substantial supplemental funding request in 1984 in grants or credits for military equipment and training as part of our concerted effort to reconstitute the LAF and make it a strong arm of the central government's authority. The difficulties the Lebanese Army is now experiencing will be closely watched in this context. We plan to expend \$46.8 million in FY 84 funds (\$15 million appropriated for Lebanon and \$31 million in reprogrammed FMS funds). Italy is supplying armored personnel carriers to Lebanon. France has provided 30 AMX tanks, 40 APCs and 10 light helicopters. In addition, the French are training units of the LAF and the Internal Security Force (ISF).

#### Progress in Training the Lebanese Armed Forces

Our training efforts have focussed on four general areas: logistics, maintenance and supply; operational deployment of U.S.-supplied equipment; and, management and operations planning, all conducted by mobile training teams. We have sent 37 training teams -- ranging in size from one person to 26 members -- to Lebanon since January 1, 1983; 25 have completed their missions and have departed. There are now 118 trainers in Lebanon, near our average of 100 trainers in Lebanon at any one time. Ten more teams may be scheduled for deployment over the next few months. All of this training has been provided under Foreign Military sales (FMS) procedures and paid for by the Lebanese. We are also conducting some training within the U.S. funded partly through International Military Education and Training funds and partly through FMS. Since the security situation in Lebanon precludes the sending of many LAF officers to the U.S., for 1984, the GOL has chosen to focus its training in the U.S. on individual programs like helicopter and fighter

pilot training. The French have provided some training in logistics and operations for the LAF brigade equipped with French-origin heavy equipment.




Given recent events, reflected above, it is not possible to gauge when the LAF will be capable of maintaining internal security in Lebanon. As reflected in the President's announcement of February 7, a vigorous acceleration of training, equipping and support of the LAF is planned to enhance LAF effectiveness.

#### Progress Toward National Reconciliation

Progress toward national reconciliation was set back by the serious deterioration in the security situation in Beirut in early February. We are working with the Lebanese, Syrians, Israelis and Saudis to try to find a formula for a negotiated solution, and the Saudis have recently sent a senior emissary to Damascus to follow up these efforts.

#### Progress in Negotiations Toward Political Settlement

Negotiations on a security plan had been underway for some time when the attacks on West Beirut brought them to a halt. Political level contacts continue behind the scenes. The United States continues to press for a political dialogue between the government and leaders of Lebanon's communities. This in turn would pave the way for an expanded, broadly representative government able to deal with fundamental questions of political, social and economic reform and the withdrawal of foreign forces. If Syria and others are convinced of the resolve of the MNF partners to remain in Lebanon until progress is made, it would have a positive effect on reconciliation.

<b>THE WHITE HOUSE</b> <b>REQUISITION FOR DUPLICATING</b>		<b>DATE</b> 2/15/84
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<b>NAME</b> Ron Geisler		<b>MULTILITH</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>DIVISION AND UNIT</b> Exec Clerk	<b>PHONE</b> 2226	<b>KIMEDYGRAPH</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>ROOM NO.</b> 5	<b>BLDG.</b> 0600	<b>XEROX</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<b>APPROVED</b>  Authorized Reproducing Officer		<b>LATEST DELIVERY DATE POSSIBLE</b> 
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120 Copies given to Press Office  
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TO The Hon. Thomas P. O'Neil, Jr.  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

2/14/84

(Date)

RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE:

Ltr. fm. the President dtd. 2/13/84, together w/ a further rpt.

w/ respect to the situation in Lebanon

Delivered by

*[Signature]*

Received by

Time

4:45 pm

TO The Hon. Strom Thurmond

2/14/84

President Pro Tempore of the Senate  
Room 218  
Russell

(Date)

RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE:

Ltr. fm. the President dtd. 2/13/84, together with a further rpt.

w/ respect to the situation in Lebanon

Delivered by

*Kathleen Zeltz*

Received by

4:51

Time

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE CLERK  
TRACKING SHEET FOR PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

TITLE:

Report on Lebanon

TYPE DOCUMENT:

PROCLAMATION

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS/SENATE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

SIGNING STATEMENT

LETTER (S)

OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVED:

2 / 14 / 84

Time:

8:10 a.m./p.m.

SENT TO CORRESPONDENCE FOR TYPING IN FINAL:

Date:

/ / 84

Time:

a.m./p.m.

*NSC originals  
ok*

TO RICHARD DARMAN'S OFFICE:

Date:

2 / 14 / 84

Time:

8:30 a.m./p.m.

INFO, INCLUDING STENCIL, TO PRESS OFFICE:

Date:

2 / 14 / 84

Time:

4:15 a.m./p.m.

NOTIFICATIONS:

duy  
(initial)

NANCY PALMER NOTIFIED AT 4:30 PM, 2/14/84  
On any major transmittals to the Congress, and in  
every instance when draft legislation is sent,  
notify Lynn Skolnick (ext. 2230).

LJM  
(initial)

N.S.C., when appropriate (Brian Merchant, ext. 2585)

*2/15 3p*

OTHER INFORMATION:

*Copy to Paul Thompson, NSC, Pm. 372  
before noon 2/15/84*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

February 14, 1984

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE  
PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND  
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

February 14, 1984

Dear Mr. Speaker:

(Dear Mr. President:)

I am providing herewith a further report with respect to the situation in Lebanon and the participation of the United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force. This report, prepared by the Secretaries of State and Defense and covering the period from December 12, 1983 to February 13, 1984, is consistent with Section 4 of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution. This report also includes the information called for by the House version of the Resolution and is submitted consistent with its more restrictive time limits.

Congressional support for our continued participation in the Multinational Force remains critical to peace, national reconciliation, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. We will continue to keep you informed as to further developments with respect to this situation.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

# # # # #