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Records

Folder Title: The Vatican: Pope John Paul II
(8107378-8200051)

Box: 41

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Last Updated: 02/11/2025

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: HEAD OF STATE FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 4/19/2011

File Folder THE VATICAN: POPE JOHN PAUL II (8107378-8200051)

FOIA

M10-347

Box Number 41

STUMMVOLL

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
108383	LETTER	REAGAN TO POPE <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #34</i>	3	ND	B1
108384	DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO POPE (ANNOTATED) <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #35</i>	3	ND	B1
108385	MEMO	JAMES NANCE TO REAGAN RE SEC HAIG RECOMMENDS LETTER TO THE POPE ON POLAND <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #36</i>	1	12/29/1981	B1
108386	MEMO	HAIG TO REAGAN RE LETTER TO THE POPE ON POLAND <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #37</i>	1	12/28/1981	B1
108387	DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO POPE <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #38</i>	3	ND	B1
108388	MEMO	COPY OF ITEM 108385 <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #39</i>	1	12/29/1981	B1
108389	MEMO	COPY OF ITEM 108386 <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #40</i>	1	12/28/1981	B1
108390	DRAFT LETTER	COPY OF ITEM 108387 <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #41</i>	3	ND	B1
108391	DRAFT LETTER	COPY OF ITEM 108387 (ANNOTATED) <i>R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #42</i>	3		B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
108392	MEMO	COPY OF ITEM 108386 (NOT DATED) R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #43	1	ND	B1
108393	DRAFT LETTER	COPY OF ITEM 108387 R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #44	3	ND	B1
108394	MEMO	LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO HAIG RE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO THE POPE ON POLAND R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #45	1	12/28/1981	B1
108395	MEMO	JAMES RENTSCHLER TO NANCE RE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO THE POPE R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #46	1	12/29/1981	B1
108396	MEMO	NANCE TO REAGAN RE MESSAGE TO THE POPE R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #47	1	ND	B1
108397	DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO POPE R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #48	3	ND	B1
108398	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO REAGAN RE REPLY FROM POPE ON POLAND R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #49	1	1/11/1982	B1

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3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
108399	LETTER	POPE TO REAGAN (SAME TEXT AS 43303) D 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #50; D 5/11/06 NLRRM04-010 #5; D UPHELD 6/27/2013 M347/1	4	1/4/1982	B1
108400	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR TO CLARK RE POPE'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT R 7/18/2000 NLSF99-010 #51	1	1/7/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: National Security Council Executive Secretariat: PA:
Head of State File
File Folder: The Vatican: Pope John Paul II (8107378-8200051)

Archivist: dlb
Date: 1/6/99

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC Casefile #8107378			
1. Letter	Reagan to Pope John Paul II, 3 p. <i>R 7/18/00 NLSF99-010 #34</i>	n.d.	P1/FT
2. Draft Letter	Reagan to Pope John Paul II (annotated), 3 p. <i>R 1 " #35</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
3. Memo	James Nance to Reagan, re: Secretary Haig Recommends Letter to the Pope on Poland, 1 p. <i>R " " #36</i>	12/29/81	P1/FT
4. Memo	Alexander Haig to Reagan, re: Letter to the Pope on Poland, 1 p. <i>R " " #38</i>	12/28/81	P1/FT
5. Draft Letter	Reagan to Pope John Paul II, 3 p. <i>R " " #38</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
6. Memo	Copy of Item #3, 1 p. <i>R " " #40/39</i>	12/29/81	P1/F1
7. Memo	Copy of Item #4, 1 p. <i>R " " #40</i>	12/28/81	P1/F1
8. Draft Letter	Copy of Item #5, 3 p. <i>R " " #42</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
9. Draft Letter	Copy of Item #5 (with slight annotations), 3 p. <i>R " " #42</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
10. Memo	Copy of Item #4 (not dated), 1 p. <i>R " " #43</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
11. Draft letter	Copy of Item #5, 3 p. <i>R " " #44</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
12. Memo	Lawrence Eagleburger to Haig, re: Presidential Letter to the Pope on Poland, 1 p. <i>R " " #45</i>	12/28/[81]	P1/FT
13. Memo	James Rentschler to Nance, re: Presidential Message to the Pope, 1 p. <i>R " " #46</i>	12/29/81	P1/F1
14. Memo	Nance to Reagan, re: Message to the Pope on..., 1 p. <i>R " " #47</i>	n.d.	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: National Security Council Executive Secretariat: PA:
Head of State File
File Folder: The Vatican: Pope John Paul II (8107378-8200051)

Archivist: dlb
Date: 1/6/99

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC Casefile #8107378, cont.			
15. Draft Letter	Reagan to Pope John Paul II, 3 p. R 7/18/00 NLS+99-010 #48	n.d.	P1/F1
NSC Casefile #8200051			
16. Memo	William Clark to Reagan, re: Reply from the Pope on Poland, 1 p. R 11 11 #49	1/11/82	P1/F1
17. Letter	Pope John Paul II to Reagan, 4 p. D 7/18/00 NLS+99-010 #50	1/4/82	P1/F1
18. Memo	Dennis Blair to Clark, re: Pope's Letter to the President, 1 p. R 7/18/00 NLS+99-010 #51	5/11/06 M04-010 #5 1/7/82	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RECEIVED 29 DEC 81 07

TO

PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 28 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: VATICAN

POLAND

JOHN PAUL II

USSR

HS

CM

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO POPE ON POLAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR NANCE

DUE: 29 DEC 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

PIPES

BAILEY

COLSON

LENZ

STEARMAN

CLEVELAND

COMMENTS ****CABINET LEVEL — 3 HR TURNAROUND REQUIRED*****Adm. Poindexter would like this ASAP!*

REF# 8137463

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

12/31 some suggestions
netal for Rostok's eye
- 12/28 Nance approved memo
State C 12/28 for dispatch via LOx cc, RE, WB, LZ, RP

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE **PA** (C)UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)*8/13/11/10/11*

7378

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-010 #34
BY C45 NARA, DATE 7/18/00

Your Holiness:

The tragedy in Poland, which has saddened us both so intensely, may be approaching another decisive moment. Since my last message to you on December 17, it is clear that the military repression in your native country has failed, and the passive resistance of the Polish people is growing. Thus, the Soviet Union may well soon have to reassess its strategy.

In all likelihood, the Soviets will prefer to intensify the repression, for that is their historic response to those who challenge their hegemony. If they do not do so with Soviet troops, they will do so through increased pressure on those within Poland who are willing to do their bidding. In either case, the Polish people will suffer more, and their hopes for a more open society may well be extinguished.

The United States will not let the Soviet Union dictate Poland's future with impunity. I am announcing today additional American measures aimed at raising the cost to the Russians of their continued violence against Poland.

I have decided on these steps only after the Soviet Union and Polish regime have had every opportunity to show their readiness to moderate their conduct. In fact, my direct appeal to President Brezhnev received a most unpromising and uncompromising response.

I am encouraging our allies to join with us in taking concrete steps. If we can achieve Western unity on such a program,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I believe it is still possible to convince the Soviets to reconsider their basic strategy. The steps the United States is taking will leave the Soviets in no doubt that they cannot escape responsibility and sanction by using others to oppress the people of Poland for them. Lech Walesa has rightly said that while the Russians may kill countless Poles, the Polish people cannot be compelled to work. In the same spirit, the Russians must know that the costs to them will increase if repression continues. They may yet draw back and permit a process of reconciliation within Poland to begin, if they see that only thus will they find relief from the measures we are taking.

Unfortunately, if these American measures are not accompanied by corresponding actions by other Western countries, the Russians may decide to pursue repression, hoping to provoke a rupture within the Western world, while escaping the consequences of our measures. This would be a tragedy for all who stand for social justice throughout the world. I therefore ask your assistance in using your own suasion throughout the West in an attempt to achieve unity on these needed measures. At the same time, I also hope that you will use your influence with the Church in Poland to help persuade the Polish authorities promptly to lift martial law, release all detainees, and resume the dialogue with Solidarity.

If we are to keep alive the hope for freedom in Poland, it lies in this direction. Those who urge only patience and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

understanding for the Jaruzelski Regime condemn the Polish people to a military dictatorship which, whatever its motives, has shown only the face of harsh oppression to its own people. Those who call for drastic unilateral actions by the United States endanger Western unity and undermine what incentives there may be for the Russians to draw back from their crime.

I hope you will do whatever is in your power to stress these truths to the leaders of the West.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7378

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: ADM POINDEXTER

John, attached as per our phone exchange. The speechwriters, Norm Bailey, Allen Lenz, and Dick Pipes are all on board with the clean retyped version at Tab B (the work sheet is at Tab A).

Jim R.

7378

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 29th

NSC/S

Attached (copy of State's draft with pencil changes along with cleanly typed draft) was hand-carried to Adm. Poindexter, who had it "dacommed" to California.

Jim Rentschler said the package should go "to files;" but it may be that it will be returned to us from California-- or dispatched from California.

At any rate, the 3-hr turnaround was observed.

Janice

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7378?

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

5

IMMEDIATE

RACOM

32

RELEASER

QD

PRIORITY

DEX

#

1981 DTG

29

05

ROUTINE

TTY

#

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT TOR/29/16/82 DEC 81

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

*Let sent
action
taken
date? 12/29?*

81 DEC 29 11:25
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

Your Holiness:

The tragedy in Poland, which has saddened us both so intensely, may be approaching another decisive moment. ^{Since my last message to you on December 17, it is clear that} The military repression in your native country has failed, and the passive resistance of the Polish people is growing. Thus, the Soviet Union may well soon have to reassess its strategy.

In all likelihood, the Soviets will prefer to intensify the repression, for that is their historic response to those who challenge their hegemony. If they do not do so with Soviet troops, they will do so through increased pressure on those within Poland who are willing to do their bidding. In either case, the Polish people will suffer more, and their hopes for a more open society may well be extinguished.

The United States will not let the Soviet Union ^{dictate} [decide] Poland's future with impunity. I am announcing today additional American measures aimed ^[both] at raising the cost to the Russians of their continued violence against Poland. ~~and~~

I have decided on these steps only after the Soviet Union and Polish regime have had every opportunity to show their readiness to moderate their conduct. In fact, my direct appeal to President Brezhnev received a most unpromising and uncompromising response.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS 699-010 #35
BY CTS NARA, DATE 7/18/00

I am encouraging our allies to join with us in taking [such] concrete steps. If we can achieve Western unity on such a program, I believe it is still possible to convince the Soviets to reconsider their basic strategy. The steps the United States is taking will leave the Soviets in no doubt that they cannot escape responsibility and sanction by using others to oppress the people of Poland for them. Lech Walesa has rightly said that while the Russians may kill countless Poles, the Polish people cannot be compelled to work. In the same spirit, the Russians must know that the costs to them will increase if repression continues. They may yet draw back and permit a process of reconciliation within Poland to begin, if they see that only thus will they find relief from the measures we are taking.

Unfortunately, if these American measures are not accompanied by corresponding actions by other Western countries, the Russians may decide to pursue repression, hoping to provoke a rupture within the Western world, while escaping the consequences of our measures. This would be a tragedy for all who stand for social justice throughout the world. I therefore ask your assistance in using your own suasion throughout the West in an attempt to achieve unity on these needed measures.

~~also in Poland with Januszki Program~~
~~from that to.~~ At the same time, I also hope that you will use your influence with the Church in Poland to help persuade the Polish authorities promptly to lift martial law, release all detainees, and resume the dialogue with Solidarity.

If we are to keep alive the hope for freedom in Poland, it lies in this direction. Those who urge only patience and understanding for the Jaruzelski Regime condemn the Polish people to a military dictatorship which, whatever its motives, has shown only the face of harsh oppression to its own people. Those who call for drastic unilateral actions by the United States ~~[or other Western countries]~~ endanger Western unity and undermine what incentives there may be for the Russians to draw back from their crime.

I hope you will do whatever is in your power to stress these truths to the leaders of the West.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To staff for clearance
ASAP. The following
should see this.

BAILEY

LENZ

PIPES

RENTSCHLER

A handwritten signature in red ink, appearing to be a stylized 'H' or 'R'.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT

Dec 29, 1981

PLEASE NOTE:

Urgent action item in box for
Mr. Rentschler. Poindexter wants
back ASAP. Log #7378 -- Pres
ltr to Pope on Poland. Please
bring to Mr. Rentschler's attention.
Thanks.

URGENT

Cathy
NSC Secretariat

N.

FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

ID 8107378

RECEIVED 29 DEC 81 07

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 28 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: VATICAN

POLAND

JOHN PAUL II

USSR

HS

CM

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO POPE ON POLAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR NANCE

DUE: 29 DEC 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

PIPES

BAILEY

COLSON

LENZ

STEARMAN

CLEVELAND

*I concur on
sending esp.
because of second-
to-last BTT*

COMMENTS **CABINET LEVEL — 3 HR TURNAROUND REQUIRED**

URGENT

*Adm. Poindester would like
this ASAP!*

REF# 8137463

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

dlb 1/8/95

The President has seen _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

December 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *Bud*

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig Recommends Letter to the
Pope on Poland

Al recommends that you send another letter to the Pope requesting his assistance in exerting influence on the Western leaders. The proposed letter is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed letter to the Pope.

Approve ✓ *BN*

Disapprove _____

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 199-010 #36
BY CAS NARA, DATE 7/18/00

NODIS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8137463

December 28, 1981

81 12 28 P10:46

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AK*

SUBJECT:

Letter to the Pope on Poland

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

In parallel with announcing your decisions with regard to sanctions on the Soviets, I recommend that you appeal to the Pope to exert influence throughout the West to support our efforts. A proposed letter is attached.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F99-010 1437

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NODIS

RDS-3 12/28/91

BY CAS NARA, DATE 7/18/00

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F99 010 #38
BY CAS NARA, DATE 7/18/00

Your Holiness:

The tragedy in Poland, which has saddened us both so intensely, may be approaching another decisive moment. The military repression in your native country has failed, and the passive resistance of the Polish people is growing. Thus, the Soviet Union may well soon have to reassess its strategy.

In all likelihood, the Soviets will prefer to intensify the repression, for that is their historic response to those who challenge their hegemony. If they do not do so with Soviet troops, they will do so through increased pressure on those within Poland who are willing to do their bidding. In either case, the Polish people will suffer more, and their hopes for a more open society may well be extinguished.

The United States will not let the Soviet Union decide Poland's future with impunity. I am announcing today additional American measures aimed at raising the cost to the Russians of their continued violence against Poland.

I have decided on these steps only after the Soviet Union and Polish regime have had every opportunity to show their readiness to moderate their conduct. In fact, my direct appeal to President Brezhnev received a most unpromising and uncompromising response.

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Unfortunately, if these American measures are not accompanied by corresponding actions by other Western countries, the Russians may decide to pursue repression, hoping to provoke a rupture within the Western world, while escaping the consequences of our measures. This would be a tragedy for all who stand for social justice throughout the world. I therefore ask your assistance in using your own suasion throughout the West in an attempt to achieve unity on these needed measures.

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I hope you will do whatever is in your power to stress these truths to the leaders of the West.

MEMO TO:

Dick Pipes

Norm Bailey

Allen Lenz

SUBJ: Another Presidential Message to the Pope .
(Soviet Sanctions)

Haig proposes sending the attached text to the Pope. Do you have any problems with the substance or tone?

John Poindexter has asked me to staff this on a crash basis. I am clearing with speechwriters and doing up a covering memo, which will incorporate any significant items you may have. But I need these within the hour.

T_x,

8
Jim Rentschler

MEMO TO:

Donner

Dick Pipes
Norm Bailey
Allen Lenz

SUBJ: Another Presidential Message to the Pope,
(Soviet Sanctions)

Haig proposes sending the attached text to the Pope. Do you have any problems with the substance or tone?

John Poindexter has asked me to staff this on a crash basis. I am clearing with speechwriters and doing up a covering memo, which will incorporate any significant items you may have. But I need these within the hour.

T.
x.

J
Jim Rentschler

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS~~

December 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *Bvd*

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig Recommends Letter to the Pope on Poland

Al recommends that you send another letter to the Pope requesting his assistance in exerting influence on the Western leaders. The proposed letter is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed letter to the Pope.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

*Approved
date?*

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS~~

.81 DEC 30 11:42

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-010 #39

BY CAS NARA, DATE 7/18/00

NODIS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8137463

December 28, 1981

81 DEC 28 P10: 46

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *R*

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT:

Letter to the Pope on Poland

In parallel with announcing your decisions with regard to sanctions on the Soviets, I recommend that you appeal to the Pope to exert influence throughout the West to support our efforts. A proposed letter is attached.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-010 #40

BY C4S 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NODIS

RDS-3 12/28/91

Your Holiness:

The tragedy in Poland, which has saddened us both so intensely, may be approaching another decisive moment. The military repression in your native country has failed, and the passive resistance of the Polish people is growing. Thus, the Soviet Union may well soon have to reassess its strategy.

In all likelihood, the Soviets will prefer to intensify the repression, for that is their historic response to those who challenge their hegemony. If they do not do so with Soviet troops, they will do so through increased pressure on those within Poland who are willing to do their bidding. In either case, the Polish people will suffer more, and their hopes for a more open society may well be extinguished.

The United States will not let the Soviet Union decide Poland's future with impunity. I am announcing today additional American measures aimed at raising the cost to the Russians of their continued violence against Poland.

I have decided on these steps only after the Soviet Union and Polish regime have had every opportunity to show their readiness to moderate their conduct. In fact, my direct appeal to President Brezhnev received a most unpromising and uncompromising response.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F99-010 #41
BY CAS NARA, DATE 7/18/00

I am encouraging our allies to join with us in taking such concrete steps. If we can achieve Western unity on such a program, I believe it is still possible to convince the Soviets to reconsider their basic strategy. The steps the United States is taking will leave the Soviets in no doubt that they cannot escape responsibility and sanction by using others to oppress the people of Poland for them. Lech Walesa has rightly said that while the Russians may kill countless Poles, the Polish people cannot be compelled to work. In the same spirit, the Russians must know that the costs to them will increase if repression continues. They may yet draw back and permit a process of reconciliation within Poland to begin, if they see that only thus will they find relief from the measures we are taking.

Unfortunately, if these American measures are not accompanied by corresponding actions by other Western countries, the Russians may decide to pursue repression, hoping to provoke a rupture within the Western world, while escaping the consequences of our measures. This would be a tragedy for all who stand for social justice throughout the world. I therefore ask your assistance in using your own suasion throughout the West in an attempt to achieve unity on these needed measures.

If we are to keep alive the hope for freedom in Poland, it lies in this direction. Those who urge only patience and understanding for the Jaruzelski Regime condemn the Polish people to a military dictatorship which, whatever its motives, has shown only the face of harsh oppression to its own people. Those who call for drastic unilateral actions by the United States or other Western countries endanger Western unity and undermine what incentives there may be for the Russians to draw back from their crime.

I hope you will do whatever is in your power to stress these truths to the leaders of the West.

Your Holiness:

The tragedy in Poland, which has saddened us both so intensely, may be approaching another decisive moment. The military repression in your native country has failed, and the passive resistance of the Polish people is growing. Thus, the Soviet Union may well soon have to reassess its strategy.

In all likelihood, the Soviets will prefer to intensify the repression, for that is their historic response to those who challenge their hegemony. If they do not do so with Soviet troops, they will do so through increased pressure on those within Poland who are willing to do their bidding. In either case, the Polish people will suffer more, and their hopes for a more open society may well be extinguished.

The United States will not let the Soviet Union ^{*dictate*} decide Poland's future with impunity. I am announcing today
? additional American measures aimed ~~at~~ at raising the cost to the Russians of their continued violence against Poland.

I have decided on these steps only after the Soviet Union and Polish regime have had every opportunity to show their readiness to moderate their conduct. In fact, my direct appeal to President Brezhnev received a most unpromising and uncompromising response.

DECLASSIFIED / 2E / EASED
NLS F99-010 #42
BY GAS NASA DATE 7/18/00

I am encouraging our allies to join with us in taking ~~such~~ [?] concrete steps. If we can achieve Western unity on such a program, I believe it is still possible to convince the Soviets to reconsider their basic strategy. The steps the United States is taking will leave the Soviets in no doubt that they cannot escape responsibility and sanction by using others to oppress the people of Poland for them. Lech Walesa has rightly said that while the Russians may kill countless Poles, the Polish people cannot be compelled to work. In the same spirit, the Russians must know that the costs to them will increase if repression continues. They may yet draw back and permit a process of reconciliation within Poland to begin, if they see that only thus will they find relief from the measures we are taking.

Unfortunately, if these American measures are not accompanied by corresponding actions by other Western countries, the Russians may decide to pursue repression, hoping to provoke a rupture within the Western world, while escaping the consequences of our measures. This would be a tragedy for all who stand for social justice throughout the world. I therefore ask your assistance in using your own suasion throughout the West in an attempt to achieve unity on these needed measures.

such steps

If we are to keep alive the hope for freedom in Poland, it lies in this direction. Those who urge only patience and understanding for the Jaruzelski Regime condemn the Polish people to a military dictatorship which, whatever its motives, has shown only the face of harsh oppression to its own people. Those who call for drastic unilateral actions by the United States or other Western countries endanger Western unity and undermine what incentives there may be for the Russians to draw back from their crime.

I hope you will do whatever is in your power to stress these truths to the leaders of the West.

S. D.
Gendron

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

RECEIVED

STAFF

C/O

DEC 20 8:51

Allen

Nance

Colson

Poindexter

C

C

C

USE
SITUATION ROOM

NSC S/S

C

C = Copy

O = Original

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

0010023 PA 6 51

DO

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

RECEIVED

DEC 28 10:51

TELETYPE ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 001095 CLASSIFICATION ~~Confidential~~ Nodis No. Pages 5
FROM: Jerry Bremer S/S 22540 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Presidential Letter to the Pope on Poland

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Admiral Nance	456-2255	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By 116 NARA, Date 1/8/99

S/S Officer: Jerry Bremer
OK

crosshatch

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *K*
SUBJECT: Letter to the Pope on Poland

In parallel with announcing your decisions with regard to sanctions on the Soviets, I recommend that you appeal to the Pope to exert influence throughout the West to support our efforts. A proposed letter is attached.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-D10 #43

BY *AS*

7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-3 12/28/91

Your Holiness:

The tragedy in Poland, which has saddened us both so intensely, may be approaching another decisive moment. The military repression in your native country has failed, and the passive resistance of the Polish people is growing. Thus, the Soviet Union may well soon have to reassess its strategy.

In all likelihood, the Soviets will prefer to intensify the repression, for that is their historic response to those who challenge their hegemony. If they do not do so with Soviet troops, they will do so through increased pressure on those within Poland who are willing to do their bidding. In either case, the Polish people will suffer more, and their hopes for a more open society may well be extinguished.

The United States will not let the Soviet Union decide Poland's future with impunity. I am announcing today additional American measures aimed both at raising the cost to the Russians of their continued violence against Poland.

I have decided on these steps only after the Soviet Union and Polish regime have had every opportunity to show their readiness to moderate their conduct. In fact, my direct appeal to President Brezhnev received a most unpromising and uncompromising response.

DECLASSIFIED (RECAST)
NLS F99-010 #44
BY GIS NARA, DATE 7/18/00

I am encouraging our allies to join with us in taking such concrete steps. If we can achieve Western unity on such a program, I believe it is still possible to convince the Soviets to reconsider their basic strategy. The steps the United States is taking will leave the Soviets in no doubt that they cannot escape responsibility and sanction by using others to oppress the people of Poland for them. Lech Walesa has rightly said that while the Russians may kill countless Poles, the Polish people cannot be compelled to work. In the same spirit, the Russians must know that the costs to them will increase if repression continues. They may yet draw back and permit a process of reconciliation within Poland to begin, if they see that only thus will they find relief from the measures we are taking.

Unfortunately, if these American measures are not accompanied by corresponding actions by other Western countries, the Russians may decide to pursue repression, hoping to provoke a rupture within the Western world, while escaping the consequences of our measures. This would be a tragedy for all who stand for social justice throughout the world. I therefore ask your assistance in using your own suasion throughout the West in an attempt to achieve unity on these needed measures.

If we are to keep alive the hope for freedom in Poland, it lies in this direction. Those who urge only patience and understanding for the Jaruzelski Regime condemn the Polish people to a military dictatorship which, whatever its motives, has shown only the face of harsh oppression to its own people. Those who call for drastic unilateral actions by the United States or other Western countries endanger Western unity and undermine what incentives there may be for the Russians to draw back from their crime.

I hope you will do whatever is in your power to stress these truths to the leaders of the West.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to the Pope on Poland

We should try to engage the Pope in our effort to get other Western nations to act in parallel with us vis-a-vis the Soviets and the Polish regime. Attached is a proposed Presidential letter, with a cover memo from you. I would hope it could be forwarded without delay, in hopes of getting the letter out tomorrow.

Recommendation:

That you initial the attached memorandum to the President with a proposed letter to the Pope.

CONFIDENTIAL

RDS-3 12/28/91

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-010 #45
BY CAS NARA DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

7378

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

December 29, 1981

Not used

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD NANCE

FROM: JIM RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Pope (U)

Al Haig's memo (Tab B) recommends another Presidential message to the Pope as an accompaniment to the announcement of the Soviet sanctions decision. (C)

We seem to be overloading the Vatican circuits of late, but on balance I think this particular message is a good idea. The text at Tab A has been cleared, as per John Poindexter's instructions, with Dick Pipes, Norm Bailey, and Allen Lenz. In addition, I checked back with State and obtained their clearance for the changes (relatively minor) we want. The speechwriters have also approved it. (U)

I am not sure if you can move this message on your own hook, but I have attached an appropriate transmittal memo at Tab I if you need direct Presidential authority. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I (or clear release on your own authority).

Approve _____ As amended _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to President
A Message to Pope

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review 12/29/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 1999-010 #46
BY CAS
NADA DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE

SUBJECT: Message to the Pope on Soviet Sanctions ~~(C)~~

Secretary Haig recommends that you send a message to the Pope to coincide with the announcement of your Soviet sanctions decision. ~~(C)~~

I agree that this could be a useful step, and even at the risk of overloading our current circuits with the Vatican, it will continue the special consultation with the Holy See which is warranted by the Church's unique role in the present crisis. ~~(C)~~

The text at Tab A has been cleared by the speechwriters, State, and the NSC Staff. ~~(B)~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve release of the message to the Pope at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Msg to Pope

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review 12/29/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 799-010 #47

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 599-010 #48
BY 045, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

Your Holiness:

The tragedy in Poland, which has saddened us both so intensely, may be approaching another decisive moment. Since my last message to you on December 17, it is clear that the military repression in your native country has failed, and the passive resistance of the Polish people is growing. Thus, the Soviet Union may well soon have to reassess its strategy.

In all likelihood, the Soviets will prefer to intensify the repression, for that is their historic response to those who challenge their hegemony. If they do not do so with Soviet troops, they will do so through increased pressure on those within Poland who are willing to do their bidding. In either case, the Polish people will suffer more, and their hopes for a more open society may well be extinguished.

The United States will not let the Soviet Union dictate Poland's future with impunity. I am announcing today additional American measures aimed at raising the cost to the Russians of their continued violence against Poland.

I have decided on these steps only after the Soviet Union and Polish regime have had every opportunity to show their readiness to moderate their conduct. In fact, my direct appeal to President Brezhnev received a most unpromising and uncompromising response.

I am encouraging our allies to join with us in taking concrete steps. If we can achieve Western unity on such a program,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I believe it is still possible to convince the Soviets to reconsider their basic strategy. The steps the United States is taking will leave the Soviets in no doubt that they cannot escape responsibility and sanction by using others to oppress the people of Poland for them. Lech Walesa has rightly said that while the Russians may kill countless Poles, the Polish people cannot be compelled to work. In the same spirit, the Russians must know that the costs to them will increase if repression continues. They may yet draw back and permit a process of reconciliation within Poland to begin, if they see that only thus will they find relief from the measures we are taking.

Unfortunately, if these American measures are not accompanied by corresponding actions by other Western countries, the Russians may decide to pursue repression, hoping to provoke a rupture within the Western world, while escaping the consequences of our measures. This would be a tragedy for all who stand for social justice throughout the world. I therefore ask your assistance in using your own suasion throughout the West in an attempt to achieve unity on these needed measures. At the same time, I also hope that you will use your influence with the Church in Poland to help persuade the Polish authorities promptly to lift martial law, release all detainees, and resume the dialogue with Solidarity.

If we are to keep alive the hope for freedom in Poland, it lies in this direction. Those who urge only patience and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

understanding for the Jaruzelski Regime condemn the Polish people to a military dictatorship which, whatever its motives, has shown only the face of harsh oppression to its own people. Those who call for drastic unilateral actions by the United States endanger Western unity and undermine what incentives there may be for the Russians to draw back from their crime.

I hope you will do whatever is in your power to stress these truths to the leaders of the West.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



#7377

31--25 P1:42

STATE

WH
SITUATION

URGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO. SRO CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. PAGES 3

FROM BUD NANCE (Name) (Extension) (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MESSAGE TO POPE

<u>TO (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Dept/Room No.</u>	<u>Extension</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>JERRY BREMER</u>		

REMARKS: THIS IS CLEARED VERSION OF MESSAGE TO POPE. YOUR PEOPLE
AT WORKING LEVEL HAD CLEARED CHANGES.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 1/8/97

RECEIVED 07 JAN 82 18

TO CLARK

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 07 JAN 82

JOHN PAUL II

04 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: VATICAN

POLAND

HS

SUBJECT: PRES REPLY TO POPE JOHN PAUL LTR RE SITUATION IN POLAND

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 09 JAN 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

8107378
8106715

NSCIFID

(B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
--------------------	----------	-----------------	-----	-----------

Pres

IP

1/11

for info

~~DB~~

C

1/12

Noted by

Pres

DB

DISPATCH

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

CH 1/18/89

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

0051

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

RR
The President has seen 1/11/82

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: Reply from the Pope on Poland

You sent the Pope two letters concerning Poland in the past two weeks: On December 17 you asked him to urge General Jaruzelski to hold a meeting with Archbishop Glemp and Lech Walesa. On December 29 you wrote to explain the measures you took against the Soviet Union, and requested the Pope to urge other Western countries to join us.

The Pope's reply to your two letters is attached. The Pope's anguish over the situation in Poland is eloquently stated. He makes it clear that he supports your measures against the Polish government and the Soviet Union and considers them complementary to the moral pressure which he is bringing to bear.

The Pope's reply is especially important in view of public comment that the Vatican does not approve of our "tough" approach to Poland. The German government in particular has been describing its policy as aligned with the Vatican's rather than Washington's. The Pope's letter makes it clear that he supports our policies and shares our goals.

I have underlined the most important passages in the letter for your reference. We do not need to send an individual reply to this message, but can acknowledge it on our next message to the Pope on Poland.

85 JAN 11 1982
Attachment

Tab A Pope's Reply

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-010 #45
BY CAS NARS DA 7/10/00

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # 0051

82 JAN 6 A 9.03

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u>JB</u>
BUD NANCE	<u>✓</u>	<u>lh</u>
JOHN POINDEXTER	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
JACQUE HILL	<u>✓</u>	<u>g</u>
JUDGE CLARK	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>

DISTRIBUTION

CY TO VP	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO BAKER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO DEEVER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
OTHER	<u> </u>		

COMMENTS

Why did we not obtain earlier
sentiment / in Vietnam 2000
to avoid bad press? wpc

Pope (8107374)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 17 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0051 *at*

CONFIDENTIAL

January 7, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS *DB* BLAIR

SUBJECT: Pope's Letter to the President

The Pope replied last evening to the President's two letters of December 17 and December 29. Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding the Pope's letter.

As your memorandum to the President says, the letter from the Pope is a very helpful one -- it fully supports our sanctions against Poland and the USSR. It explains that while the Vatican can act only on the "moral plane," the United States acts on the "political plane." When he delivered the letter to us, Cardinal Silvestrine, the Vatican Foreign Minister, was even more explicit, saying that the reports that the Holy See disapproved of the U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland "were false."

No individual reply to this letter is necessary. We will be sending other messages to the Pope concerning Poland and will acknowledge this letter when we do.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *Clark*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Clark Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter from the Pope to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

F99-010 #51

CAS

DATE 7/18/00

15051

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dennis Blair

for WPLC note

ja

1/11/82

copy of phy sent
to Dennis Blair / JCP