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# **The Reagan Record on National Defense and Arms Reduction**

**White House Office of Public Affairs**



# The Reagan Record

July 11, 1988

## The Reagan Record

on

### NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMS REDUCTION

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## NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMS REDUCTION

### SUMMARY STATEMENT

President Reagan's resolve in pursuing a national defense policy based on strength, realism, and dialogue has paid dividends in the form of significant progress toward a brighter future and a safer world for all people.

The President has maintained three clear objectives for national defense strategy throughout his term of office:

1. Rebuilding and modernizing our defenses -- nuclear, conventional, and chemical. To keep peace, we must still rely on deterrence;
2. Pursuing deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms and redressing imbalances favoring the Soviet Union in conventional forces and chemical weapons; and
3. Seeking, through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a safer and morally preferable means to deter nuclear war by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance U.S. and allied security.

### HIGHLIGHTS

The INF Treaty -- The historic INF Treaty, signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987 and ratified by the United States Senate in May 1988, will eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force missiles. The INF Treaty was the first arms control treaty to be approved by the Senate and put into effect in 16 years.

For the first time ever, the levels of nuclear arms will actually be reduced, rather than having caps placed on their growth. These missiles will not simply be moved elsewhere or put in storage -- they will be destroyed. The INF Treaty includes the most stringent verification measures in the history of arms control including, for the first time, extensive on-site inspections.

Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization -- To redress the dangerous nuclear imbalance created by the unprecedented Soviet buildup of the 1970s, President Reagan began in 1981 a comprehensive five-part strategic modernization program which has included modernization of our intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces and our strategic bomber force, improvement in strategic command, control, and communications systems, and investigation of the feasibility of effective strategic defenses.

Conventional Force Modernization and Readiness -- The Reagan Administration's conventional force modernization program has produced a fundamental improvement in our national defense posture. Capabilities have been substantially rebuilt by enhancing maintenance and spare parts support, by purchasing modern weapons and equipment, and by increasing force levels. Overall ship readiness, for example, increased 125 percent from 1981 to 1987. Overall Navy squadron readiness increased fully 264 percent during the same period.

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) -- President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative is a research and technology program to demonstrate, by the early 1990s, the feasibility of effective defense against ballistic missiles. SDI offers our best hope of a truly safer world -- where our security would no longer rest on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons, but also on defenses which threaten no one.

The potential benefits of SDI far outweigh the dollar costs. Expenditures for SDI from fiscal years 1984 through 1988 will amount to about \$13 billion, or approximately \$11.00 per year for each American citizen -- a small price to pay for a safer future.

Our Men and Women in Uniform -- Improvements in military pay and benefits under the Reagan Administration along with strong efforts to improve the public's perception of military service have greatly boosted morale and have provided us, once again, with a high-quality fighting force. For example, between 1980 and 1987, the percentage of high school graduates enlisting in the armed forces jumped from 68 percent to 93 percent, and retention of experienced personnel increased from 55 percent to 65 percent.

START Treaty -- The Reagan Administration has made significant progress toward an equitable and effectively verifiable START agreement with the Soviet Union, which would reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. Included in this category are the most dangerous and destabilizing of all nuclear weapons -- large, inter-continental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

## THE RECORD

Rebuilding America's Defense Capability

- o By the time President Reagan took office in 1981, our national defense capability had been seriously weakened through years of neglect. At the same time, the Soviet Union was in the midst of an unprecedented expansion of its military forces.
- o From 1970 to 1981, U.S. defense spending declined nearly 20 percent in real terms. In 1981, we had one-third fewer nuclear weapons in our stockpile than we had in 1967. We had built no strategic bombers since 1962. We had not introduced a new intercontinental ballistic missile system (Minuteman III) since 1970.
- o U.S. planes could not fly and U.S. ships could not sail because they lacked spare parts and ammunition, and enough personnel sufficiently trained to operate them. Low pay and declining morale in our armed forces was discouraging trained personnel from re-enlisting -- and bright young men and women from enlisting -- to the point of posing a serious threat to continuation of an all-volunteer military.
- o During the 1970s, the Soviets moved from a position of relative parity with the United States to a position well ahead in significant measures of military capability. U.S. ability to deter aggression and to retaliate effectively after an attack was threatened.
- o In response to the weakened national defense posture he inherited in 1981, President Reagan began aggressive programs to rebuild our nuclear and conventional deterrent and to restore the military balance by modernizing our forces across the board.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

- o Efficient, up-to-date strategic nuclear weapons systems are necessary to deter nuclear attack. They also allow us to negotiate nuclear arms reductions from a position of strength. The U.S. strategic "Triad" is comprised of nuclear weapons systems which can be launched from land, sea, or air.

- o In October 1981, President Reagan announced a comprehensive five-part strategic modernization program which included modernization of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), sea-launched missile, and strategic bomber forces; improvement in our strategic command, control, and communications systems; and investigation of the feasibility of effective strategic defenses.
1. ICBM Modernization -- The President sought to develop and produce an effective and cost-efficient ICBM force to augment the increasingly aging Minuteman ICBMs.
    - o The urgency was highlighted by the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission), whose recommendations were implemented.
    - o The new Peacekeeper (MX) missile force, first deployed during the Reagan Administration, will have the accuracy and warhead numbers required to threaten important Soviet targets, including strengthened missile silos and other military targets.
    - o Fifty ten-warhead Peacekeepers will be deployed in existing Minuteman silos by the end of 1988. In addition, development continues on a rail-garrison basing for the Peacekeeper, which would allow more survivable mobile deployment in the early 1990s.
    - o At the recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission, development was begun on a new small ICBM for possible deployment in the 1990s.
  2. Sea-Launched Missile Modernization -- Sea-launched missile forces form a vital part of our strategic Triad. They are highly survivable because they are carried on moving platforms, including submarines, which can hide under the ocean's surface. The strategic modernization program has addressed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and Trident submarines.
    - o The decision to deploy nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) was made in response to the Soviet SLCM capability which had existed since the early 1960s. The Soviets employ six nuclear SLCM systems.
    - o Cruise missiles are small, jet-propelled vehicles with an advanced guidance system which makes them highly accurate. They can be deployed on both surface vessels and submarines (as well as on aircraft and ground vehicles). The U.S. began deployment of nuclear SLCMs in July 1984.



- o The Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) has been developed under the Reagan Administration and will be deployed starting in 1989. In the past 16 years, the U.S. has deployed only one new SLBM system, while the Soviet Union has deployed five new SLBM systems in the same period. The Trident II combines increased range and accuracy, providing enhanced survivability and flexibility to our sea-based forces.
  - o In 1982, the U.S. began deploying Trident missile submarines. The Trident is much larger, more serviceable, and can carry more missiles than previous ballistic missile submarines. Between 1967 and 1981, the U.S. did not deploy a single new ballistic missile submarine. The Soviets deployed 62 new strategic submarines during the same period.
  - o The USS Tennessee, the ninth Trident built and the first to be deployed with the Trident II missile, is scheduled to begin its first patrol at the end of 1989.
3. Strategic Bomber Modernization -- When President Reagan took office, our entire strategic bomber force consisted of some 316 aging B-52 bombers, an aircraft designed in the 1950s. The last B-52 was built in 1965. By the 1980s, our B-52s were often older than the pilots that flew them.
- o The Soviets, meanwhile, had begun deploying modern strategic Backfire bombers in the mid-1970s. By the mid-1980s, the Soviets had deployed about 270 Backfires and were building them at a rate of about 30 a year. Their total strategic bomber force had risen above the 450 level.
  - o To modernize our bomber forces, President Reagan ordered resumption of development of the B-1 bomber (the project had been cancelled by the previous administration) and deployment of 100 B-1Bs by the end of 1988.
  - o The B-1B is an advanced, supersonic, multipurpose aircraft capable of delivering a wide variety of nuclear and conventional munitions and cruise missiles, surviving a surprise Soviet attack, and penetrating the advanced air defense weapons now being deployed by the Soviet Union. The first B-1B squadron was deployed in 1986 and all 100 B-1Bs will be deployed on schedule by the end of this year.



- o The Reagan Administration is developing the Stealth advanced technology bomber (ATB) to complete the basic modernization requirements of the strategic bomber force for the 1990s and beyond. Stealth is designed to escape detection by the extensive Soviet radar defense system.
4. Improvement in Command, Control, and Communications Systems -- Absolutely vital elements of our national security are the abilities to ensure timely warning of attack and to immediately and effectively pass retaliatory orders to our strategic forces. Many experts have expressed doubts as to how well our systems can perform under enemy attack.
- o The Reagan Administration is developing improved radar and satellite systems to enhance early warning capabilities and to assess more accurately and reliably the size and scope of a Soviet missile attack. To ensure that the President's orders can be passed from command centers to commanders in the field, new satellite communications systems are being developed and deployed.
5. Investigation of the Feasibility of Effective Strategic Defenses -- Strategic defenses defend against ballistic missile or bomber attack. These consist of anti-ballistic missile defenses, of which the U.S. has none; surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, of which the U.S. has none; and interceptor aircraft, of which the U.S. has about 300. By comparison, the Soviets have up to 100 anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated equipment including radars, more than 9,000 surface-to-air missiles, and more than 2,000 interceptor aircraft.
- o The Reagan Administration has taken short-term steps to improve U.S. strategic defenses such as procurement of airborne warning and control (AWACS) aircraft and transfer of three squadrons of F-15 fighter interceptor aircraft. In addition, 270 F-16 air defense aircraft will be provided by 1992.
  - o To ensure effective defenses in the future, President Reagan proposed his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on March 23, 1983.

## Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

- o President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a research and technology program to determine, by the early 1990s, the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for intercepting an attacker's missiles in all phases of their flight -- boost, mid-course, and terminal.
- o SDI will be strictly a defense system. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union already have nuclear offense systems far superior to any offensive weapon which could cost-effectively be derived from SDI technology.
- o SDI offers our best hope of a safer world -- where our security and that of our allies would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons, but also on defenses which threaten no one.

Benefits -- The potential benefits of SDI far outweigh the dollar costs. Expenditures for SDI from fiscal years 1984 through 1988 will amount to about \$13 billion, or approximately \$11.00 per year for each American citizen -- a small price to pay for a safer future.

- o Through SDI, we seek a defensive means of deterring aggression based on systems protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.
- o SDI helped to bring the Soviets back to the nuclear arms negotiating table in early 1985, after their late-1983 walkout.
- o SDI underwrites the integrity of any new arms agreements by diminishing Soviet incentives to cheat. The record of Soviet violations of past arms control agreements makes this especially important.
- o SDI can provide incentives to the Soviets to agree to the President's proposal to reduce strategic nuclear arms (START) by 50 percent by reducing the military utility of ballistic missiles.
- o Even if 50 percent strategic arms cuts are achieved, SDI will remain essential in persuading the Soviets to reduce further and to protect the U.S. and our allies from those strategic nuclear weapons which remain.
- o SDI is insurance against an accidental missile launch or possible future ballistic threats -- nuclear, conventional, or chemical -- from outlaw countries.

Soviet Strategic Defense Programs -- In contrast to our own far more modest expenditures, the Soviets have spent roughly \$200 billion on their strategic defense programs over the last ten years, roughly the same as they have spent on their strategic offensive forces. The Soviets' programs include:

- o The world's only anti-ballistic missile defenses surround Moscow -- the Galosh system with up to 100 deployed missiles, which the Soviets are steadily improving;
- o Construction of a large, phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and
- o Research, development, and testing, including a \$1 billion annual program on laser weapons -- employing some 10,000 skilled scientists and engineers.
- o Possessed by both sides, strategic defense systems can be stabilizing and reduce the threat of war. Possessed by the Soviets alone, such systems would threaten peace by undermining the credibility of our deterrent. This would be devastating to Western security.
- o Our commitment to SDI is firm. As the President has stated: "SDI is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990s and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we'll deploy it."

### Conventional Forces

- o Conventional forces remain our first line of deterrence, and an essential means of supporting U.S. interests in crises short of general war. These forces deter and counter non-nuclear threats to the United States.
- o The Reagan Administration's conventional force modernization program has produced a fundamental improvement in our national defense posture. Capabilities have been substantially rebuilt by enhancing maintenance and spare parts support, by purchasing new equipment, and by increasing force levels.

Army -- Army combat equipment and munitions have been significantly improved. The Army has procured M-1 Abrams tanks, which are far superior to tanks they are replacing. M-2 Bradley armored personnel carriers have been procured, with much greater firepower and mobility than their predecessors.

- o Army units have been provided with AH-64 attack helicopters, which can operate at night and fire laser-guided missiles, and with Patriot air defense missiles to protect ground forces from enemy aircraft.
- o The size of the army has increased by two active divisions (to 18) and by two National Guard divisions (to 10).

Navy and Marine Corps -- From 1980 to 1987, the Navy fleet grew from 479 ships to 568 ships. Fighter and attack aircraft capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps have increased with procurement of additional A-6, F-14, F/A-18, and AV-8B aircraft.

- o Navy combat readiness also has been improved by cutting the number of ships past due for overhaul from more than 70 in 1975, to zero in 1985, 1986, and 1987. Navy ship readiness increased 125 percent from 1981 to 1987.

Air Force -- The Air Force has increased the number of fighter and attack aircraft squadrons and has made existing squadrons more combat-ready with better maintenance and more aircraft, including F-15 and F-16 fighters.

- o The Air Force has also begun developing a new aircraft, the advanced tactical fighter. Our ability to carry troops and cargo abroad has been enhanced by purchasing 50 new C-5B cargo aircraft and 60 new KC-10 combination cargo/tanker aircraft.

### Chemical Weapons

- o The United States ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969. The Soviet Union took advantage of our unilateral restraint by modernizing and expanding its chemical weapons arsenal into what is, by far, the world's largest stockpile. The U.S. stockpile, with many of our weapons upwards of 40 years old, became largely unusable and lost much of its deterrent value against first use of chemical weapons.
- o In an effort to restore our chemical deterrent after five years of Soviet refusal to eliminate its chemical weapons, President Reagan ordered resumption of chemical weapons production in July, 1986. These new binary chemical weapons are much safer to handle and store than the old unitary weapons, which will be destroyed. They are comprised of two non-lethal agents, stored in separate tanks, which must be combined to form a lethal agent.

- o Many other countries have or are capable of having chemical weapons. The U.S. has taken the lead in multilateral negotiations to achieve a truly comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Until that goal is achieved, the U.S. must maintain a chemical weapons deterrent capability.

#### Our Men and Women in Uniform

- o One of the most important national defense accomplishments of the Reagan Administration has been the restoration of a dedicated, high quality, and productive force of service men and women.
- o By 1981, military pay had fallen well below comparable private sector compensation. The Administration responded with large catch-up pay raises of 11.7 percent in 1981 and 14.3 percent in 1982. There were also increases in special and incentive pays, travel reimbursements, and other benefits.
- o Improvements in pay and Administration efforts to improve the public's perception of military service have boosted morale and have yielded significant results. Between 1980 and 1987:
  - The percentage of men and women enlisting in the armed forces who are high school graduates jumped from 68 percent to 93 percent;
  - The percentage of high-aptitude recruits increased from 69 percent to 95 percent -- significantly higher than the 69 percent of the youth population in general who are rated high-aptitude;
  - Retention of experienced personnel increased from 55 percent to 65 percent; and
  - Applications to the service academies, which had fallen off considerably, have rebounded to record or near-record levels.



### Arms Reduction

Arms reduction is not an end in itself but a key element in President Reagan's strategy to enhance our national security. The President's arms reduction efforts are guided by four principles:

1. Reductions -- The President's highest priority is to achieve militarily significant reductions, particularly in offensive nuclear weapons -- not agreements that merely freeze arms at existing levels or place caps on future growth, as most previous agreements have done.
2. Equality -- In order to enhance stability, arms reduction agreements must result in balanced or roughly equal levels of force capabilities on both sides. An inequitable arms reduction agreement, leaving one side with a significant unilateral advantage, would create instability and increase the risk of conflict.
3. Stability -- The President seeks arms reduction agreements that will actually reduce the incentives to attack first during a crisis. Any negotiated reductions must leave each side's retaliatory force secure enough to survive if the other side strikes first. Even roughly equivalent nuclear forces might not provide an adequate deterrent if a significant portion of them were vulnerable in a surprise attack.
4. Verifiability -- The President will not accept limitations on our military forces unless we can effectively verify Soviet compliance with these same limitations. The evidence of Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements makes effective verification absolutely essential.

### The President's Resolve

The road to progress in arms reduction has not been an easy one. But President Reagan's long-term resolve on arms reduction is paying dividends for peace.

- o At the outset, the President established as one of his highest priorities the achievement of deep, equitable, stabilizing, and effectively verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.



- o On November 18, 1981, the President first proposed his "zero option" plan for intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the basis for the present agreement. He was prepared to cancel deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles in Europe if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles.
- o On May 9, 1982, the President announced his plan for significant reductions in strategic nuclear forces (START). The U.S. has proposed 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces.
- o While many applauded the President's arms reduction initiatives in those early days, some skeptics viewed his proposals as too extreme or as mere "propaganda ploys," advanced only because the President "knew" the Soviets would "never" accept them.
- o President Reagan held fast to his belief that his was the course that would lead to meaningful arms reductions.
  - He understood that a "freeze" on deployment of nuclear weapons, as was proposed by some in Congress in 1982, would merely have preserved certain dangerous imbalances of nuclear forces in favor of the Soviets at the time.
- o The Soviets walked out of the INF talks in 1983 and refused to set a date for resumption of the recessed START talks. It was not until January 1985, when they finally became convinced their ploy would not work, that the Soviets agreed to return to the talks.
  - Two key factors contributed to the Soviet return to the negotiating table: NATO unity on INF and the U.S. SDI program.
- o At the Geneva Summit of November 1985, President Reagan's perseverance began to pay off. General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to the principle of an interim agreement on INF and to the principle of a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms (START).
- o Further progress was achieved at the October 1986 meeting of President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. The U.S. and the Soviet Union made major progress toward an INF agreement and also agreed on certain key aspects of a 50 percent strategic nuclear arms reduction agreement (START).



- o The INF Treaty was signed at the Washington Summit in December 1987 and approved by the United States Senate in May 1988 -- the first arms control treaty approved in 16 years.
- o At the Moscow Summit in May-June 1988, progress continued toward a START agreement.
- o These important steps in our efforts to build a safer world are clearly the result of President Reagan's vision and resolve.
  - The President established clear objectives and held to them.
  - By modernizing our strategic deterrent, keeping our strong commitment to SDI, and strengthening NATO's posture of deterrence and defense, the President has provided the basis for significant progress in other areas as well.

#### The INF Treaty

- o The INF Treaty will eliminate -- for the first time in history -- an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles. The treaty is based upon the "zero option" proposal that President Reagan first put forward in 1981.
- o Under the agreement, the Soviets are required to remove missiles capable of carrying almost four times as many deployed nuclear warheads as will the U.S. This treaty will provide the most stringent verification regime in the history of arms control negotiations.
- o Elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles, a proposition many believed the Soviets would never accept, reaffirms President Reagan's position of negotiating from strength.
- o Main Provisions -- The INF Treaty is consistent with long-held U.S. positions in key areas of the negotiations:
  - Elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles (range: about 300-3400 miles) within three years after the treaty enters into force;



- For the Soviets: Eliminate SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 intermediate-range missile systems and SS-12 and SS-23 shorter-range missile systems. Those now deployed are capable of carrying over 1600 nuclear warheads;
  - For the U.S.: Eliminate Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Those now deployed are capable of carrying some 400 nuclear warheads. (The U.S. has no shorter-range INF missile systems deployed.); and
  - A ban on all production and flight testing of systems limited by the treaty, all related training of personnel, and all repair, storage, or deployment of missiles and launchers after elimination is completed.
- o Major Benefits -- The INF Treaty is the first agreement in history to reduce, not simply limit, the buildup of nuclear weapons.
- The Soviets will eliminate systems capable of carrying over 1600 deployed nuclear warheads versus about 400 for the U.S. Both sides will also destroy hundreds more non-deployed INF missiles and launchers;
  - Eliminations are global in nature; they do not simply transfer the Soviet threat from one region to another. Asia, as well as Europe, will be more secure; and
  - The treaty affirms the principle of asymmetrical (unequal) reductions to achieve equal U.S. and Soviet levels, which is an important precedent for future arms reduction negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional fields.
- o The INF Treaty will not undermine NATO's strategy of flexible response, nor impede efforts to redress the imbalance in conventional forces.
- NATO will still have robust nuclear and conventional deterrent forces assigned to Europe, including ground-based nuclear systems as well as those carried by aircraft and submarines;
  - British and French independent nuclear deterrent forces will not be affected;
  - The treaty will actually improve NATO's ability to reinforce its conventional forces by eliminating Soviet intermediate-range forces which could be armed with nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads and could attack NATO's ports and airports; and



- The agreement enhances the credibility of the NATO alliance as a whole by demonstrating to the Soviets that it has the political will to make -- and stand by -- the tough decisions necessary to ensure its security.
- o Verification -- The INF agreement does not rely on Soviet promises, but on the most stringent verification regime in the history of arms control -- including several kinds of on-site inspection.
  - The INF verification regime is designed to deter possible Soviet violations of the treaty by making it costly and difficult for them to escape detection. It will also allow for detection of possible violations in a timely manner so that the U.S. can respond to any new threat to our security, or that of our allies, if the Soviets cheat.
  - Key elements of the INF verification regime include:
    1. Exchange of comprehensive data on treaty-limited systems;
    2. Initial "baseline" on-site inspections to check number of missiles and launchers;
    3. On-site inspections to verify elimination of treaty-limited systems, and verify that INF-related activity has ceased at declared sites;
    4. Short-notice, on-site inspection of declared INF facilities suspected of illegal activity during the three-year reductions period and for ten years afterward; and
    5. A prohibition on interference with verification by satellite photography (national technical means [NTM]).
  - For up to 13 years after the INF Treaty enters into force, the U.S. will continuously monitor, with permanent on-site American personnel, the factory where Soviet SS-20 missiles have been assembled and where the Soviets now assemble SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are similar in some ways to SS-20s; and the Soviets must, on short notice, open to NTM former SS-20 bases used for SS-25s.



### Strategic Nuclear Arms (START)

- o President Reagan places the highest priority on efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviets for a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms (START).
- o Deep reductions do not, in and of themselves, guarantee enhanced stability or reduce the risk of war. Some weapons are more dangerous and destabilizing than others because they are better suited for first-strike missions. The key, therefore, to reducing the risk of war is to ensure that strategic reductions result in force structures that reduce incentives to strike first.
- o For this reason, since the beginning of the START talks in 1982, the President has insisted on negotiating sublimits (specific limits on particular weapons within the overall reductions) on the most threatening categories of strategic weapons -- especially large, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads.
- o At the 1985 Geneva Summit, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle to a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms. At Iceland in 1986, the two leaders reached major new areas of agreement on the nature of a strategic reduction regime. However, Soviet insistence on linking strategic arms reductions to measures that would cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) prevented an agreement.
- o On May 8, 1987, the U.S. presented a draft treaty at the START negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. draft treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland and provides for roughly 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arsenals to equal levels for both sides.
- o At the December 1987 Washington Summit, both sides agreed to a sublimit of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads within a total of 6,000 nuclear warheads. This was a very important step because it meets a longstanding Reagan Administration requirement for strict limits on these systems.



- o At the May-June Moscow Summit, progress was achieved in the vital area of verification. The two sides have completed joint draft texts of an inspection protocol, a conversion or elimination protocol and a memorandum of understanding on data. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating on them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START.
- o President Reagan believes a START agreement could be reached this year. The Soviet Union must, however, drop its insistence that we accept measures which would kill or cripple the SDI program.
  - The President has made it clear that because of the importance of SDI to the future security of the U.S. and our allies, the program will move forward.
- o President Reagan remains firm in his position that no agreement is better than a bad agreement. He will refuse to sign a START agreement, or any other agreement, unless it is in the best security interests of the United States and our allies.

#### Defense and Space

- o At the Defense and Space talks, the U.S. has endeavored to discuss with the Soviet Union how, should effective strategic defenses prove feasible, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could jointly manage a stable transition to a deterrence based increasingly on defenses which threaten no one, rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons.
- o At the Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to instruct their negotiators "to work out an agreement that would commit the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the Treaty, and not to withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period of time."
- o In January 1988, the U.S. put a draft Defense and Space treaty on the table at the Geneva negotiations. The two sides are working on a joint draft text of a separate Defense and Space agreement, based on the agreement reached at the Washington Summit.



- o In the effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on Defense and Space, the U.S. has made a number of constructive proposals, including a proposed "predictability package" providing for exchange of data and other measures to enhance confidence in the nature, pace, and scope of the strategic defense activities undertaken by each side.
- o It is important to note that, after long refusing to acknowledge the facts, the U.S.S.R. has been actively engaged in its own strategic defense programs. General Secretary Gorbachev admitted this last fall.
- o Many differences continue to separate the two sides, however, including Soviet efforts to place restrictions on the SDI program. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not accept any restrictions on SDI beyond those actually agreed to in the ABM treaty.

#### Verification and Compliance

- o Effective verification and compliance with agreements are essential elements of arms reduction. The primary systems of verification are the National Technical Means (satellite photographic capabilities) of each side. U.S. verification capabilities have improved since the late 1970s.
- o In the future, arms reduction accords will continue to rely on National Technical Means as an essential verification tool, but will also require an extensive exchange of data and on-site inspection. The INF Treaty sets important precedents for this.
- o President Reagan's December 1987 Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance and U.S. attempts to resolve the issues.
- o The principal Soviet violation is construction of a large, phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk, which violates the ABM Treaty provisions concerning the siting, orientation, and capability of such radars. The U.S. has made it clear that we will not sign new strategic arms agreements until the violation is corrected.
- o In addition to the ABM Treaty, the President's report addressed Soviet noncompliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons. A report released in March 1988 assessed Soviet compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.



### Conventional Forces

- o At their Iceland meeting in June 1987, NATO foreign ministers set as a priority the effort to redress the serious imbalances in conventional forces.
- o Western security has long been threatened by Warsaw Pact conventional superiority -- based primarily on massive, forward-deployed, offensively configured Soviet armored forces in Eastern Europe and in western U.S.S.R. The conventional imbalance derives not only from Eastern numerical superiority in key categories of combat capability, but also from geographic and other non-quantitative advantages.
- o The Reagan Administration is addressing this concern by seeking U.S. and NATO force improvements and by pursuing the East-West Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna. There, U.S. and NATO negotiators are seeking Warsaw Pact agreement on a mandate for new conventional stability negotiations covering, for the first time, the entire area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.
- o The United States and the Soviet Union have both agreed to work with their respective allies to move forward with dispatch in the Vienna talks on the mandate for new conventional stability negotiations, which we hope can begin by the end of 1988.

### Chemical Weapons

- o President Reagan's goal is an effective, verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons.
- o Today, as a result of the unilateral restraint exercised by the U.S. and the intensive Soviet chemical weapons modernization program, there is a serious East-West imbalance in these weapons. Other states also possess or are capable of having nuclear weapons.
- o The Soviet Union possesses a formidable, modern arsenal including what is by far the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile, while the U.S. capability -- largely unusable and dating, in part, from the 1940s and 1950s -- has lost much of its deterrent value against first use of chemical weapons.



- o The U.S. decision to begin restoring our chemical deterrent by producing binary chemical munitions has clearly spurred the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on chemical weapons. Substantial progress has been made on U.S.- Soviet bilateral chemical weapons data exchange. Both sides have recognized the goal of a global ban, but serious difficulties remain, especially in the vital area of verification.

#### Nuclear Testing

- o President Reagan is committed to seeking effective and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations which could strengthen security for all nations.
- o In September 1987, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued a statement agreeing to begin full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing before December 1, 1987. The first round of these negotiations was held in Geneva from November 9-20, 1987; the second from February 15 to June 28, 1988.
- o As a first step in these negotiations, the two sides will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible for the U.S. Senate to ratify the U.S.- Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Explosions Treaty of 1976. These treaties would limit underground explosions for military and peaceful purposes, respectively, to 150 kilotons. Negotiators are currently working on draft texts of verification protocols for these treaties.
- o At the Washington Summit, the two sides also agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) to facilitate agreement on verification provisions for these treaties. The JVE is being conducted this summer at our Nevada test site and at the Semipalatinsk test site in the Soviet Union.

#### Defense Assistance to Foreign Countries

- o Most of the assistance the U.S. provides to foreign countries is in the form of economic development and humanitarian aid. We cannot, however, rely solely upon our own military forces to deal with threats to U.S. interests posed by the Soviet Union and other countries.



- o The U.S. complements our military strength and increases the pool of human and material resources available for the defense of the free world by helping friendly nations acquire the means to defend themselves.

- o U.S. defense assistance is comprised of the following programs:

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program -- Provides loans to finance purchases of U.S. military equipment, spare parts, and training by eligible countries;

Military Assistance Program (MAP) -- Provides grant assistance for defense purchases by less economically developed countries;

International Military Education and Training (IMET) program -- Offers professional military training on a grant basis to future military leaders of friendly countries;

Economic Support Fund (ESF) -- Provides grant and loan aid to developing countries of strategic interest to the United States; and

Peacekeeping Operations Fund (POF) -- Helps to support multilateral peacekeeping activities in the Sinai and Cyprus.

- o Under the Reagan Administration, U.S. defense assistance programs have made vital contributions toward:
  - The progress of Central American governments toward democracy and more stable political processes;
  - Stability and the quest for peace in the Middle East through our sizable assistance to Israel and Egypt and our peacekeeping support in the Sinai; and
  - Helping redress the military imbalances between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.



