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Withdrawer

RBW 12/11/2018

File Folder PRESIDENT/NSC CHRON 01/20/1986-01/28/1986

FOIA

M6933

Box Number 36

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
225759	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR R 1/28/2020 M6933/1	1	1/21/1986	B1
225760	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR R 1/28/2020 M6933/1	1	1/22/1986	B1
225761	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR R 9/26/2022 M6933/1	1	1/24/1986	B1
225762	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES R 9/26/2022 M6933/1	6	1/24/1986	B1
225763	LETTER	P.W. BOTHA TO RR R 1/28/2020 M6933/1	8	1/24/1986	B1
225764	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR R 6/11/2024 M6933/1	1	1/27/1986	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1986

PR

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

WPS

1. Whitehead Talks. The Greeks and Turks told John Whitehead this weekend they are with us against terrorism but fear US actions may drive Qadhafi into the hands of the Soviets. Both were defensive about economic ties to Libya, and offered to mediate between us and Tripoli. John suggested that Turkey ban military sales to Libya, end training of naval cadets, and buy less Libyan oil. Greek officials cited their three-year \$1.1 billion pact to buy oil and sell various Greek products to Libya. John urged them to reduce the quantities involved and thinks they may do so. When the Greeks said they do not and will not sell arms to Qadhafi, John urged them to say so publicly--they said they would. (SENSITIVE)

2. Ceasefire in Uganda Crumbles. Anti-government guerrillas probed defenses around Kampala January 18-20, but withdrew or were beaten back by government forces. Although Museveni does not now have the strength to assault Kampala directly, more fighting is likely. All Americans are reported safe, but we are considering drawing down further the already short staffed embassy. About 150 private American citizens and 18 official Americans are in Uganda now. (C)

3. Lesotho Government. After five days of military and political maneuvering, Major General Justin Lekhanya, commander of the Lesotho Paramilitary Forces, ousted the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan in a bloodless coup. The situation in Lesotho is calm, and at no time during these events were any American citizens in danger. In consolidating power, General Lekhanya will move cautiously, but he probably will be able to mend Lesotho's fences with South Africa. Lekhanya is a person with whom we can deal, and we expect US/Lesotho relations will improve over the ups-and-downs we experienced with Jonathan. We are examining the options for moving forward in a more moderate and realistic environment. (C)

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SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1986 *RR*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *405*

1. G-7 Proposal. Allen Wallis and David Mulford of Treasury have briefed Ambassadors Gotlieb and Petrignani on our proposal at last Saturday's G-5 meeting to form a G-7 group of finance ministers including Canada and Italy. Jim Baker advocated this step unequivocally to the G-5, with the condition that the EC be excluded from participation, even as an observer. The G-5 agreed to consider the issue further and we expect it to be resolved at the Tokyo Economic Summit. The French finance minister apparently mentioned the proposal to the press this morning, breaching the agreement in London not to discuss this matter in public. There will now be added pressure to resolve the issue quickly. (SENSITIVE)

2. EC Enlargement. This evening I will attend a reception celebrating Spain and Portugal's entry into the European Community (EC) on January 1. Enlargement has altered the Community significantly: its population has increased by 50 million to 320 million. While its GNP has risen to \$2.91 trillion, per capita GNP has dropped from \$9,918 to \$9,090. The enlarged Community may eventually surpass Canada as our leading trade partner. However, the US could sustain trade losses due to a realignment of the EC's common external tariff, elimination of intra-EC taxes, and restrictions on Iberia's agricultural imports. While continuing to support Spanish and Portuguese entry, we will insist on appropriate compensation for any trade losses. (C)

3. India Update. During a recent conversation with Ambassador Dean, Prime Minister Gandhi noted progress in India-Pakistan relations and expressed hope that this would ultimately lead to a reduction in US arms sales to Pakistan. Ambassador Dean reminded him that we are aiding Pakistan largely because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Gandhi indicated his continued suspicion of Pakistan's nuclear intentions. He also registered disappointment with the current pace of high technology transfers to India and urged more open Indo-US discussion on this issue. (C)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *MPS*

PR

1. Philippine Acting Foreign Minister's Visit. Minister Pacifico Castro asserted in his meeting with me today that the Marcos Government has acceded to key demands to insure a fair election, particularly the accreditation of the citizen poll watchers group NAMFREL, and access to the media by the opposition. I stressed to Castro that if the Philippine people view the elections as legitimate, they will be more likely to accept the difficult reforms and recovery policies which will be required by any post-election government. (C)

2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Philippine Elections. Paul Wolfowitz told the Committee he saw many arguments in favor of sending an official high-level observer delegation to the Philippine elections. Lugar registered Congress's concern about the potential for election fraud in the Philippines and the importance of fair elections. Paul noted that the presence of US observers could underscore US interest in and support for free and fair elections. Lugar later told us privately that he will announce tomorrow that US observers are a good idea, and that he would like to serve on the delegation. (C)

3. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees Hearing on Liberia. Chet Crocker gave our assessment of the October 1985 elections and human rights practices in Liberia. His testimony acknowledged the shortcomings of Doe's Government but appealed for Congressional support which would give us the necessary leverage with the Liberians in pursuit of our interests there and in support of human rights. The subcommittees postponed action for a week on a proposed resolution calling for suspension of military aid until there are new elections. While the full Committee could regroup and ultimately pass its original resolution, we are working urgently with key Congressmen to obtain a resolution which would maintain our diplomatic flexibility. (C)

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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *WPS*

RR

1. Japanese Permit for United Airlines. Ambassador Matsunaga told me Friday that Japan's cabinet had decided in principle to accept the succession of United Airlines to Pan American's full rights under our bilateral aviation agreement. Your comments to Finance Minister Takeshita were critical to resolution of this issue. Matsunaga asked for our understanding on relaxation of restrictions on Nippon Cargo Airlines in the talks which resume in early March. I replied that we would negotiate with an open mind, but added that the US could not offer any commitment regarding the outcome of the revision talks. The Japanese have asked us not to reveal their decision on United until their delegation now in Washington has been instructed to initial the agreement. (S)

2. Spanish Opposition on NATO Referendum. Dick Allen was unsuccessful in his efforts on your behalf to enlist the support of conservative opposition leader Manuel Fraga in Spain's NATO referendum. Although Dick argued that NATO and Spanish interests dictate a reversal of Fraga's call for abstention, Fraga insisted his supporters' votes were not needed. Despite the disappointing results, our effort to change Fraga's mind should strengthen our position with Prime Minister Gonzalez. We already have aided his referendum campaign by agreeing to begin preliminary negotiations soon on renewing our base agreement. Both initiatives will help us make our case if we have to argue against implementation of a possible no vote on NATO. (C)

3. Security Council Debate on Jerusalem. The Council resumes debate Monday on Arab complaints against Israel for recent incidents on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The Arabs have circulated a toned-down but still unacceptable draft resolution. We have given a few selected governments an informal text of positive elements we could support. The reaction was mixed. Westerners were pleased, Jordan and some others indicated they would prefer a veto to watered-down language and Israel urged that we not support any resolution. We intend to leave the negotiation of language to others, and are informing Israel that we will veto any text we find unacceptable. (C)

4. Uganda: Update. The National Resistance Army guerrillas may take full control of Kampala this weekend. Ambassador Houdek and the 20 other Embassy employees are safe in their houses, although their partial evacuation planned for Friday had to be cancelled due to the fighting. The approximately 150 private US citizens in Uganda are reported safe and we are reviewing options to evacuate them once the fighting subsides. (C)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RR

January 24, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities (U)

Congressional Activities: We are finalizing the Congressional hearing schedule on the FY 1987 Defense budget. I am scheduled to lead off the testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 4. I will be joining the House Armed Services Committee for an informal breakfast on February 5 to discuss the FY 1987 program, with a formal hearing to be scheduled in mid-March, just before they markup the Defense Bill. The Senate and House budget committee hearings will be February 6 and 7, respectively, with appropriations committee hearings scheduled to follow the Washington Birthday recess. I am hopeful that during these hearings, we can convince the Congress to return to the path of sustained, real growth in our defense effort so that we can complete your revitalization program and secure our national security objectives. (U)

Meeting with President-Elect Azcona of Honduras: Last Friday I met with President-elect Jose Azcona of Honduras. The meeting focused on the threat posed by Nicaragua and the necessity for immediate change in Sandinista behavior. The President-elect commented on the growing military capabilities of Nicaragua and the threat to the region. He agreed that we must work together in maintaining pressure on the Sandinistas.

President-elect Azcona believes that direct U.S. military intervention is not necessary. He sees a program of continued pressure as capable of effecting real changes in Sandinista behavior. We discussed the need to take our case to the people so that they would see the Sandinista regime for what it really is.

We also discussed the military exercise program with emphasis on the civic action and humanitarian assistance aspects. The President-elect stated emphatically that this was the kind of activity that brought about a strengthening of the bonds between our two countries as the Honduran people could see tangible benefits to the U.S. military presence. He praised

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and asked for a continuation of exercises involving public health measures and road construction activities, and suggested an exercise involving dredging the Aguan River on the north coast of Honduras.

The meeting was very cordial. The President-elect seemed sincere in his support for our mutual objectives in the region. (S)

Update on our Security Assistance Programs: This week I received an update briefing on our Security Assistance programs. We have worked hard over the past few years in the interagency to develop a coordinated security assistance policy that works to the benefit of the recipients and also furthers our own national security interests and goals. We think that it is on the right track.

The record shows that security assistance programs in concert with other foreign policy tools have helped achieve some remarkable results, most notably preserving peace in the Middle East, improving the security situation in Central America, preventing the Iran-Iraq War from spreading, deterring Libyan adventurism, securing Thailand against challenges from Vietnam, maintaining the security of the Republic of South Korea, and strengthening the posture of our friends and allies in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Since 1981, the Administration has initiated or greatly expanded programs in a number of countries. Of special note are the new programs for Pakistan, increases in funding for Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, and a vigorous response to requests for assistance from our friends in Central America. We have found that sometimes it is the intensity of the effort that counts, not the volume. One of the best programs is one of the smallest: the training of foreign military officers who sometimes become leaders of the countries and who almost always develop strong ties with the U.S. during and as a result of the training.

The challenges we face in the coming year are, indeed, significant. We know that Congress will be looking for ways to cut numerous programs to satisfy a variety of other priorities. If substantial worst-case adjustments are made to meet Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets for FY 1987, we could be vulnerable to cuts as large as one-third from your FY 1987 Security Assistance request, and would be 16 percent below FY 1985 levels. Security assistance, along with the rest of foreign assistance, is in the non-Defense portion of the Federal Budget and will be competing with domestic and other programs as Congress attempts to reach the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings target for deficit reduction in FY 1987.

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Our message to Congress next month will be that while we are sensitive to the need for budgetary prudence, the world around us is threatening and full of troubles we cannot control or stop while we solve internal budgetary problems. We need the help of our allies and friends around the world. We must do our best to convince Congress that if we were forced to police the world's trouble spots ourselves, the cost would be far greater than our relatively modest security assistance budget. We simply cannot do the job alone. (U)

FY 1988-1992 Defense Guidance Published: I recently approved, after extensive editing and rewriting, the sixth Defense Guidance since I became Secretary. This document is our forward-looking plan for the development of the military capabilities needed to assure the nation's security.

It is a strategic plan for future military operations that may be needed, and also guidance for the DoD management system for the preparation of the programs and budgets of all parts of the Department. In accordance with our established participatory management principle, the plan has benefitted from the step-by-step contributions of the members of the Defense Resources Board and the professional military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, increasingly, of the Unified and Specified Commanders.

This Defense Guidance starts a biennial strategic planning process as a first step toward two year programming and budgeting. I believe that issuing the plan every other year will improve our utilization of staff resources by freeing up time next year for deliberate and thorough study of some of our major unresolved issues. We have been asked by the Congress to submit our next budget to cover a two year period. I hope that the Congress will in turn enact two year budget appropriations and authorizations. Other achievements of note in this year's Defense Guidance are a comprehensive review and update of the Policy and Strategy sections, a rigorous reduction in length of the text and more attention to style and readability to make the document more succinct and useful, and an improvement in stating our five year objectives.

As we enter a period of increasing fiscal austerity, achievement of our national security objectives will require, to an unprecedented degree, excellent management of our resources and close cooperation among all DoD Components in planning and fielding the weapons and manpower essential for deterring aggression. In the coming years, I hope and believe this Defense Guidance will be a help to all in the Department, and possibly to some in Congress, as we strive to reach our national security objectives. (U)

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Air Force Flying Safety Record is a Record: The Air Force Flying Safety Record for FY 1985 is the best in its history--1.49 accidents per 100,000 hours, which is 14 percent lower than the previous record of 1.73 mishaps per 100,000 flying hours set in 1983. With 1984's rate of 1.77, the Air Force completes the third consecutive year with rates below 2.0, which is an extremely low rate considering the number of flights, and the complex systems the aircrues operate.

We attribute this year's record to exceptional accomplishments in virtually every facet of the flying operation. Notable among these were the all-time low number of logistics-related mishaps, the zero-mishap rate for the bomber force, and for the sixth consecutive year, a record-setting low fighter/attack aircraft accident rate. While compiling the 1985 record, the Air Force flew more hours of realistic training than any previous year, yielding higher levels of combat readiness. Significantly, this record occurred while flying nearly 3.5 million hours.

For purposes of comparison, in 1978 the major flight mishap rate was 3.16. Had that rate continued, an additional 230 aircraft would have been lost over the last seven years at a cost of over \$1.3 billion, not to mention the major implications in terms of loss of life, decreased combat capability, and impaired national security. (U)

Civilian Mobilization Exercise in California - Part of PORT CALL 86: During exercise PORT CALL 86, we conducted our first mobilization test of our recently fielded Joint Deployment System. The exercise tested our decision-making process--how well we coordinate the many complex issues that would have to be presented for decision during a mobilization. Among the specific policies and procedures evaluated were the draft, retiree recall, retention of critical civilians, adequacy of the support forces, and civilian availability.

Concerning civilian availability, during PORT CALL 86, the Department tested its ability to expand its civil service work force during mobilization by conducting a regional exercise in the San Francisco/Sacramento area. We learned much about the need to improve civilian mobilization planning throughout the Department. The test was a success due, in large part, to help from the California Employment Development Department (CEDD). In an actual crisis, we would rely upon the CEDD and other state employment security agencies to find most of the new civilian hires we would need.

The support of the CEDD staff during the exercise was totally voluntary and was in addition to their normal heavy workload,

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which has been made more difficult in recent years by staff reductions. I recently wrote Governor Deukmejian expressing our appreciation for the assistance provided by the CEDD. (U)

Navy Commissions Another Guided Missile Cruiser-VALLEY FORGE (CG-50): Last Saturday we commissioned the guided missile cruiser VALLEY FORGE (CG-50). The ceremony was held at Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Mississippi. Will Taft was the principal speaker and Mrs. Taft served as the ship's sponsor.

VALLEY FORGE is the fourth AEGIS-equipped cruiser of the TICONDEROGA-class built to provide the primary protection for the Navy's battle forces well into the next century. The ship is 563 feet long, 55 feet wide, and displaces 9,600 tons.

VALLEY FORGE's AEGIS weapon system, the heart of her fighting capability, represents a significant advance in fleet anti-air warfare. Four fixed array radar antennas, mounted on the four sides of the ship's superstructure, replace conventional rotating radars, enabling the ship and her crew to "see" in all directions simultaneously. The AEGIS weapons control system can simultaneously fire and direct more missiles at more targets, with greater accuracy, than any other system. Our fleet Commanders continue to report spectacular increases in operational capabilities as a result of the AEGIS system. (U)

Exercise KINDLE LIBERTY 86: On Tuesday U.S. military forces and the Panama defense forces commenced KINDLE LIBERTY 86, the annual combined/joint Panama Canal defense exercise on the Atlantic coast of Panama.

The exercise, sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command, is the latest in the continuing series of combined training activities of the two nations that share in the defense of the strategic Panama Canal. Ground, air, and sea operations by U.S. and Panamanian servicemen culminate with the tactical employment of forces from both nations. The Field Training Exercises will be conducted in the Donoso district of Colon province, approximately 35 miles southwest of the city of Colon. Incidental humanitarian assistance activities will be conducted by both forces in several remote villages in the Donoso district.

Most of the participating U.S. forces will be from the U.S. Southern Command in Panama and its component Services--the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama), the U.S. Air Force Southern Air Division, and the U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command. They will be augmented, as in past years, by stateside units and personnel of the U.S. Readiness Command and the

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Atlantic Command. In all, approximately 2,000 U.S. and Panamanian military personnel are scheduled to take part. The exercise will be commanded and controlled by a combined Panamanian-U.S. Task Force. KINDLE LIBERTY 86 will end on February 22. (U)

-Sgt-

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Tuynhuys
Cape Town

24 January 1986

Dear Mr President

Thank you for your letter of 4 January 1986 which Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester Crocker, handed to me on 13 January 1986.

I was struck by the tone of your letter and the spirit in which it was written. Your letter shows an understanding for the complexities of our situation as well as the problems with which my Government wrestles. May I assure you of my appreciation. It will be helpful to me in carrying my Government's reform programme forward.

You ask again that I take bold and dramatic action to get the process of negotiation on track. No Government of South Africa at any time in the history of this country, has taken decisions as dramatic and far-reaching as those which I intend to reiterate and announce in my opening address to Parliament on 31 January 1986. Arrangements will be made for a copy of my opening address to be handed to you, or your office, shortly before it is delivered. We have no illusions as to what this foreshadows for the country. I

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accept that there are momentous steps of a legislative and executive nature which I am able to take and which I indeed intend to take during the forthcoming months but clearly there is a point beyond which political realities will not allow me to go. As a politician with experience of negotiations, you will know what I mean. We understand, better than most, the need for urgency in bringing about political power sharing. The transition to a new era can only be achieved by negotiation but I see little pressure on the advocates of violence in this country or even on the moderate Black leadership to engage in negotiations on the basis of a suspension of violence and resort to serious discussions.

The pressure is focused only on the South African Government. I cannot force communities to negotiate with us. I can only encourage and I hope that the initiatives which I have in mind will have this effect. But I am concerned that expectations are once again building up which I shall not be able to satisfy. I am concerned that demands will grow to a point where only total capitulation will satisfy our adversaries.

A complicating factor in the challenges confronting us in South and southern Africa is to reconcile and accommodate the same values which you cherish, alongside Third World circumstances which continue to exist in my country and in the region. These disparities not only manifest themselves in the political sphere but are more clearly discernable in the economic sphere. I, therefore, consider it to be an equally important task to concentrate on the socio-economic upliftment of all the peoples of South Africa. In order to achieve this goal we need to develop and to upgrade the Third World component of our economy and to synchronise it with the industrialised First World economy which exists mainly in the urban areas of South Africa.

The process of reform in South Africa is not new. It is often forgotten that until the signing of the Statute of Westminster some fifty five years ago, South Africa was controlled by a colonial power. The process of reform and the internal debate on the political and socio-economic evolution of the country, has since that time been pursued. In recent years, however, the pace of reform has been accelerated and although I have great appreciation for what my friends in the Western world have done to ameliorate the worst consequences of the political, economic and diplomatic onslaught against South Africa, it is precisely at this time that I would have expected a greater effort to encourage the people of South Africa towards negotiated political structures acceptable to all who believe in democracy and justice. I can encourage them to enter into negotiations but so long as the international community persists with punitive action as the primary target, so long will Black leadership be reticent about engaging in negotiations. And threats of further sanctions to come is the most effective disincentive to become involved in negotiations which the international community could provide. This will not deter me from probing all opportunities that might arise for dialogue with as wide a range of leaders as possible since I am aware that delay will play into the hands of the radicals. I am considering a variety of initiatives but the time has come for the international community to face up to and correct the stultifying effect its actions have had on the negotiating process. What South Africa needs at this time is for Western leaders of stature to call publicly for a moratorium on punitive action against my country and to allow South Africa to state its case in the forums of the world.

Regarding the process of reform, it must be borne in mind that we have a constitutional instrument, Parliament, and the repeal and/or amendment of legislation needs to go

through the full parliamentary process before it becomes binding in law. I am sure, Mr President, that you would not want the South African Government to act unconstitutionally in bringing about reform.

Political realities apply in South Africa as much as they might apply elsewhere and I am not unaware of the political considerations which lay behind your Executive Order of last year. In this regard may I just mention that the suggestion by Chairman William H Gray, following his recent visit with a group of his Congressional Colleagues, that further limited sanctions may be in the offing is cause for concern. What effect must this not have on Black leaders already hesitant to be seen to be negotiating with us? We are having to contend with an escalating sanctions campaign, as if the international community believes that it is only in the face of such action that we as a Government will be prepared to reform.

I welcome the emphasis you place in your message on the need to restore peace in this region. This is one of my greatest concerns and I should like to share a few thoughts with you on this subject.

It is clear that violence must end if we are to succeed in our efforts to negotiate a system of Government in which all our communities will have a fair say. Western Governments have denounced violence whenever an incident has occurred in South Africa but it is remarkable that the South African Communist Party and its affiliate, the ANC, are seldom, if ever, called to account even when the ANC has claimed or admitted responsibility for the most reprehensible forms of violence. By contrast, the South African Government is consistently denounced. Why is this so? Why is the South African Government alone the object of representations and appeals and condemnation?

Violence is a two-way affair. Your own confrontation with the Soviet Union exemplifies this point. It cannot be eliminated by one side only backing away. It is imperative that all the organisations, internal as well as external, presently engaged in committing acts of violence in South Africa as a matter of policy, should become the object of a concerted international campaign aimed at ending their policy of violence and terror. It has struck me forcibly that not a single Western Government, to the best of my knowledge, has reacted unequivocally to the recent announcement of the ANC that it planned to intensify its campaign of violence and terror in South Africa.

It is the scourge of terrorism, Mr President, which has pervaded other parts of the world as much as South Africa, which remains the greatest threat to peace and stability in southern Africa. We all need to work together to eliminate terrorism. If the present spate of terrorist activity continues or escalates in South Africa, it will become increasingly difficult for me to appease my own people. The overwhelming majority of South Africans will simply not tolerate the killing and maiming of innocent people through bombs placed in shopping complexes and other areas where civilians congregate or move about. Responsible leaders of all South Africa's communities have expressed their abhorrence of these acts in the strongest terms.

It is of interest that the Commonwealth Accord of last October called for the initiation of a process of dialogue "in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides". We are fully in agreement that a suspension of violence is a requirement for dialogue and we are ready to match any decrease or termination of violence on the part of the advocates of violence both within and outside South Africa, by a commensurate lifting of the partial State of Emergency.

The imposition of the State of Emergency in certain districts and its continued maintenance is not and was not a step which I took lightly and without careful prior consideration.

But it should be pointed out that the Executive Order under which the State of Emergency was promulgated states specifically that it was instituted to protect the safety of the public and the maintenance of public order. Moreover, in the period that it has been in force the incidence of violence has decreased substantially. I am, however, aware of the damage which distorted exploitation of this issue has caused South Africa overseas and the pressure on your and other Administrations which it has brought to bear. I should like to remove it from the news headlines but I hope you will appreciate, from your own experience, that unilateral action on my part will not resolve the problem.

You write of the need to release politically prominent prisoners and detainees. I am ready to do so provided those persons renounce violence. Mr Nelson Mandela and others have refused to do so. Mr Mandela has also publicly renounced negotiations as a course of action. At the same time, the organisation he espouses is stepping up its campaign of violence with innocent civilians as a primary target. The very recent bomb outrages in Durban and Amanzimtoti testify to this. I might add at this point that these terrorist actions are planned and executed from neighbouring states where the perpetrators find refuge.

While their acts of terror continue to afflict this country, how can I release from prison a person who is not only seen as a titular head of the organisation claiming responsibility for those acts, but is himself an advocate of such violence? Nevertheless, if my Government could be given an assurance that Mr Mandela and others like him would

not personally be involved in the planning or implementation of violence in South Africa and if our concern regarding the continuation of violence affecting all South Africans could be dispelled, we would be prepared to consider their release on humanitarian grounds.

Regarding the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, and an agreement on Cuban withdrawal from Angola, my Minister of Foreign Affairs recently had the opportunity of receiving a first-hand report from Dr Crocker on his discussions in Luanda as well as his views on how he sees the road ahead. Although I am not, at this stage, overly optimistic about the chances of success, I believe that the discussions in Cape Town were useful.

You also refer to Mozambique. I remain committed to the success of the Nkomati Accord. You will be aware of the substantial funds, relative to the size of our economy, which we have made available for development in Mozambique and of the efforts which we have made to bring about reconciliation between the Frelimo Government and Renamo. The responsibility for the lack of success of our efforts on more than one occasion cannot however, be laid at South Africa's door. But one point which must be made very clear is that South Africa does not harbour any terrorists operating inside Mozambique or in any of our neighbouring States. We do not train them, we do not fund them, we do not encourage them nor do we give them refuge. We do, however, possess incontrovertible evidence that the African National Congress is still operating from Mozambique territory.

While I have been obliged to draw attention to the adverse impact which international sanctions are having on the negotiating process, I wish again to acknowledge with appreciation on behalf of all South Africans the consistency with which you have sought to resist Soviet encroachment and

promote peace and stability in this region. I welcome the commitment spelt out once again in your letter to work with us and others in this region to end Soviet influence here.

May I warmly reciprocate the kind personal sentiments which you expressed in your letter. It is my hope that you will maintain your health and strength in 1986 to continue to guide your country and the free world.

Yours sincerely



P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M6933 #225764

BY PW MARA DATE 6/11/2024

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

January 27, 1986

19

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *93*

RR

1. Libya. UK Ambassador Wright, under instructions from London, called on John Whitehead Saturday to urge that we consult with or at a minimum notify Britain before taking any military actions against Libya. Wright intimated Britain would neither endorse nor support such actions. John responded that while we would bear British concerns in mind, it was often difficult to consult in advance on such operations where complete secrecy was required for success. John assured Wright that any US action would be proportionate to the provocation. On Monday, a British Embassy officer called to express HMG's concern that some British nationals could be trapped in Libya if the Qadhafi regime bars departure of employees of US firms until accounts receivable are paid. He said the HMG would come under sharp criticism if British citizens become de facto hostages because of US policy actions. (SENSITIVE)

2. South Yemen. Events on the ground indicate the continued possibility of a civil war, but the forces loyal to President Ali Nasir will need to move soon against rebel-controlled Aden to maintain their credibility. They are receiving diplomatic and supply support from the Government of North Yemen, but not major weapons systems. The US is supporting North Yemen's effort. We are giving the Saudis and North Yemenis intelligence and radio equipment and supporting their efforts to thwart the Aden regime's effort to gain diplomatic recognition. (SENSITIVE)

3. Portugal. Portugal's two winning presidential candidates in Sunday's first round, former Deputy Prime Minister Freitas do Amaral (46% of the vote) and Socialist leader Mario Soares (25%) have long pro-US, pro-NATO records and are impassioned anti-Communists. Freitas and Soares will face each other in a February 16 runoff election. Portugal faces some tough economic problems and still has to come up with a governing parliamentary majority. Whoever becomes president, we can expect continued US-Portuguese cooperation on important issues. (C)

4. Japan Trade: Allen Wallis's Call on Senator Danforth. Danforth, discussing his recent trip to Japan, said that Nakasone made all the right noises, but the question is whether this will lead to action. Danforth believes the Administration must retaliate in order to change Japanese behavior, and that our piecemeal approach to resolving Japan trade issues is like cleaning up the beach one grain of sand at a time. Allen said we will add new MOSS sectors but since our trade imbalance with Japan is rooted in macroeconomic forces, we are starting to shift our emphasis to structural issues like de-regulation and tax policy. Danforth said that there is no support for a new trade round except in the Administration, and he will oppose granting us negotiating authority unless the trade bill includes his measures delegating many decisions on trade disputes to STR. (C)

5. Uganda. The National Resistance Army (NRA) is firmly in control of Kampala and outlying areas and continues to expand its authority to other regions. NRA Commander Museveni has assured Ambassador Houdek that foreign diplomats will be protected and allowed to leave if they desire. Museveni is a fervent nationalist but realizes good relations with the West are essential to economic development. (C)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1986

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

1. Shuttle Explosion. Over a dozen foreign leaders, as well as the NATO and UN Secretaries General, have sent messages of condolence regarding the Challenger tragedy. We are preparing appropriate responses. (U)

2. Nicaragua: Meeting with UNO. I met Tuesday with the leaders of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo, who presented a copy of UNO's Statement of Principles and Objectives. I emphasized the need for UNO to convince Congress of its democratic orientation and noted that this outline of a comprehensive political program should help overcome congressional reluctance to assist them. I also underscored the importance of maintaining an active diplomatic track to help ensure continued congressional support. The UNO leaders stressed the need to be aware of Sandinista tricks which could turn such negotiations into a trap. They will be meeting with key members of Congress during the next two days. (C)

3. Security Council Continues Jerusalem Debate. I have written to the foreign ministers of western UNSC countries--Australia, the UK, France, Denmark, Thailand and Venezuela--urging that they oppose the current unbalanced Islamic draft resolution, or any similar variation. The UK and France are pushing an alternative draft. They are concerned that a US veto would cripple the peace process and unleash anti-Western reactions in the Islamic world. We find the UK-French text unacceptable because it goes beyond the Temple Mount incidents to criticize Israel's occupation policy, settlements, and role in Jerusalem. While no resolution has been formally tabled, a vote could come as early as tomorrow. (C)

4. Lantos Delegation. I met Tuesday with members of Congressman Tom Lantos' delegation who have recently returned from meetings with European Parliament leaders in Ireland and a visit to Berlin. Lantos stressed his delegation's bipartisan support for our stand against terrorism and urged equal firmness in our implementation of economic sanctions against Libya. He believes the European people are ahead of their leaders in supporting action against terrorism. The delegation found East German leader Honecker conciliatory, anxious for better relations, particularly in trade, and confidently in charge of his government. They urged that this more open East German facade displayed during their meetings be tested for evidence of concrete actions. In meetings with the Irish, Lantos suggested attracting American private sector assistance as a complement to potential congressional aid. (U)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

CONTINUING

23

TEMPLE MOUNT

Jock Cooley ✓

Howard Teicher WT

JR

RR

THE TEMPLE MOUNT/HARAM AS-SHARIF:
Heart of the Jerusalem Problem

- It is the most emotionally-charged place in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- For Jews it is the site of Solomon's Temple, destroyed for the last time by the Romans in 70 A.D. A section of the compound's Western Wall (formerly called the Wailing Wall) is the holiest site in modern Judaism.
- The Mount has been occupied for centuries by two Muslim shrines: Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest after Mecca and Medina; and The Dome of the Rock from which Muhammed ascended into heaven. The same rock is, for Jews, the place where God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Issac.
- Ironically, the very holiness of the Mount for Jews has served to mitigate conflict over the place. Under Jewish law, all Jews were forbidden to enter the Holy of Holies, the inner sanctum of the Temple where the Ark of the Covenant was kept. After the Romans destroyed the Temple, the precise location of the Holy of Holies could not be known. Therefore the Chief Rabbis prohibited observant Jews from entering the Temple Mount lest they inadvertently violate the Biblical injunction.
- For the same reason, the Israelis, after capturing all of Jerusalem in 1967, left authority over the Mount in the hands of the Muslim religious trust, the Waqf. The Israeli Government's handling of the situation over the years has been exemplary.
- The status quo has remained essentially in place until recently. While most orthodox Jews obey the Rabbinical prohibition, some ultra-nationalists (including some Knesset members) have tried to hold prayers or plant the Israeli flag on the Mount. They have been egged on by a small faction of Jewish zealots who believe that Israel's mission is to rebuild the Temple.
- The latest incidents have been quickly put down and condemned by the Government of Israel. But the area is a flash point. Last year, the Israeli Government broke up a secret ultra-nationalist plot to bomb the Dome of the Rock that could have enflamed the entire Middle East. The plot had received backing from some extreme American Christian fundamentalists (who believe that the Second Coming of Christ cannot occur until the Jews have rebuilt their Temple).

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HEBRON

- The Israelis have been less judicious in handling a similar situation in the town of Hebron, south of Jerusalem.
- The Mosque in Hebron also is sacred to both Jews and Muslims. It covers the Cave of Machpelah, supposedly the burial site of the Patriarch Abraham. The Jewish people consider themselves the descendants of Abraham through his son Issac (born of Abraham's wife, Sarah). The Muslims consider themselves the descendants of Abraham through his son Ishmael (born of Abraham's consort Hagar).
- Unlike the Temple Mount, there is no religious prohibition on Jews entering this site. In 1968 the Israeli military government of the West Bank authorized the holding of Jewish prayers in one small room of the Mosque.
- Over the years, that beachhead has been steadily expanded through the militant efforts of hard-line settlers and sympathetic military governors. At the same time, Israeli settlers have steadily increased their presence into the center of Hebron. The result has been frequent violent but low-level clashes between Jews and Muslims.
- Although the Labor Government tries to hold the line on Hebron, fanatic settlers regularly test the limits. These continuous efforts to encroach into an area under Muslim control for centuries provide tinder for a conflagration that could be ignited virtually without warning.

Jerusalem-Holy Places

