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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE,
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Box/OA#: ~~Box 90902~~ *RAC Box 16*
File Folder: Thatcher Visit November 15, 1986 (2)

Archivist: kdb/kdb
FOIA ID: F97-013/2, Cull

Date: 02/16/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (8128)	Peter Sommer to John Poindexter, re President's meeting with Thatcher (w/notations), 1p <i>R 5/11/01 NLSF97-013/2 #76</i>	11/12/86	P1, F1
2. briefing memo	from Poindexter, re meeting with Thatcher (w/notations), 4p <i>R 5/11/01 " #77</i>	n.d.	P1, F1
3. memo (8179) (8634957)	George Shultz to RR, re Thatcher visit (w/notations), 5p <i>P 10/13/00 NLSF97-013/2 #78</i>	11/12/86	P1, F1
4. bio	(p 1 only), 1p	n.d.	P1, P3, F1, F3
5. talking points	for meeting with Thatcher, 6p <i>R 5/11/01 NLSF97-013/2 #80</i>	n.d.	P1, F1
6. talking points	for meeting with Thatcher, 6p <i>R 5/11/01 " #81</i>	n.d.	P1, F1
~~7. cable~~	~~180313Z NOV 86 (w/notations), 1p <i>R 10/13/00 NLSF97-013/2 #82</i>~~	~~11/18/86~~	~~P1, F1~~
8. talking points	re prebrief, 1p <i>R 5/11/01 " #83</i>	n.d.	P1, F1
9. memo (8128)	same memo as item 1, w/different notations, 1p <i>R 5/11/01 " #84</i>	11/12/86	P1, F1
10. briefing memo	unannotated copy of item 2, 4p <i>R 5/11/01 " #85</i>	n.d.	P1, F1
11. memo (8179) (8634957)	unannotated copy of item 3, 5p <i>P 10/13/00 NLSF97-013/2 #86</i>	11/12/86	P1, F1
12. bio	complete copy of item 4, 2p	11/6/86	P1, F1, P3, F3
13. talking points	same as item 5, 6p <i>R 5/11/01 NLSF97-013/2 #88</i>	n.d.	P1, F1
14. talking points	same as item 6, 6p <i>R 5/11/01 " #89</i>	n.d.	P1, F1
~~15. cable~~	~~140204Z NOV 86 (w/notations), 2p <i>R 10/13/00 NLSF97-013/2 #90</i>~~	~~11/14/86~~	~~P1, F1~~

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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 F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
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 F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Transcript from JAMES LEE at COI, LONDON.

PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS. THATCHER,
IN WASHINGTON, ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1986

=====

File
Thatcher
Visit

PRIME MINISTER:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

As you know, the main point of my visit here was to have talks with the President, especially on arms control matters.

I have also seen last evening Mr. George Shultz and Mr. Cap Weinberger, and this morning I had breakfast with Vice-President Bush; and I have also seen Mr. Poindexter, who was with us at Camp David, as was Mr. Shultz and Mr. Regan.

I think it would be better if I dealt with the main subject. I have prepared a small statement, which will be handed to you afterwards. Shall I perhaps read it and then you can cross-examine me on it.

'The President and I discussed the way forward on arms control after Reykjavik. We agreed that priority should be given to an INF agreement with restraints on shorter-range systems; a 50% over five years in United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons; and a ban on chemical weapons. In all three cases, effective verification would be an essential element.

We also agreed on the need to press ahead with the SDI research programme, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

We confirmed that NATO's strategy of forward defence and flexible response would continue to require effective nuclear deterrents based upon a mix of systems. At the

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same time, reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities.

Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation, given the need for stable overall balance at all times.

We were also in agreement that these matters should continue to be the subject of close consultation within the alliance.

The President reaffirmed the United States intention to proceed with its strategic modernisation programme, including Trident. He also confirmed his full support for the arrangements made to modernise Britain's independent nuclear deterrent with Trident.'

That is the end of that statement.

I thanked the President for what the United States had done on Syria, and we discussed the Middle East and had a brief discussion on South Africa and the President reaffirmed to me the views which he had taken in the statement which he gave on Iran.

May I make it quite clear that the statement on arms control which I read out is an agreed statement between the President and myself.

-----oOo-----

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QUESTION (INTELLIGENCE REVIEW):

Did you clarify your position with regard to the so-called zero option?

PRIME MINISTER:

The zero option to me means the INF zero-zero Europe option with 100 missiles in the Far East on the Soviet side and 100 in the United States also. I tried to make it clear in the statement that we support that option, subject always to two things: effective verification and subject also to proper balance deals being included with the short-range missiles, and when the short-range missiles are stationed in the satellite countries, Britain of course is within their range.

QUESTION (IRISH TIMES, DUBLIN):

Prime Minister, I wonder since today is the first anniversary of the Anglo-Irish if this subject came up at Camp David and secondly, what are your own thoughts on the Agreement one year later?

PRIME MINISTER:

No, the subject was not discussed at Camp David. My thoughts on the Agreement are the same as they were when I made the Agreement. We thought it was necessary to come to that Anglo-Irish Agreement; we felt that it would help to reconcile the two communities to live together the better in Northern Ireland; that it would also help to enhance cross-border security, which is in the interests of all the people in Northern Ireland.

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QUESTION (CBS):

You mentioned that you and the President discussed his statement on Iran. Can you give us your view of US policy on Iran, specifically the overtures.....delivery of arms to Iran. Does that strike you as a wise policy?

PRIME MINISTER:

I am not really going to add to what the President said in his own statement to the great American people on Iran. He made his views absolutely clear.

We too have diplomatic contacts with Iran. We recognise the importance of Iran as a country. We too would like to see the end of the Iranian-Iraq war; we too are neutral in that war, and we pursue a policy of not delivering lethal weapons to either side. So that is the view we take.

JOHN CONNELL (SUNDAY TIMES):

Prime Minister, did you raise the question of the SALT 2 treaty and the possibility of America breaching the limits of that treaty?

PRIME MINISTER:

No, not on this occasion. I really was on the wider question this time and, as you can see, there is a pretty extensive statement on the wider arms control issues. We did not discuss SALT 2 on this occasion. We have previously.

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QUESTION (ABC NEWS):

Do you believe that the President's actions have in any way weakened the United States ability to pursue a policy of not dealing with terrorists?

PRIME MINISTER:

I have nothing to add to what the President said in his very clear statement on Iran - nothing to add at all.

I believe implicitly in the President's total integrity on that subject.



QUESTION (JOHANNESBURG STAR):

Prime Minister, could you give us a sense of how your discussion went on South Africa? Did you discuss the question of economic sanctions, for instance?

PRIME MINISTER:

The President and I share the same views on economic sanctions: that they would not help to achieve our ultimate aim, which is the ending of apartheid in South Africa and therefore, a system of government which enables all South Africans to take part, including very obviously the black South Africans.

It is a question, I am afraid, where one poses the problems and states one's views very clearly. It is not always easy for outside people to find a way through, and I think we take very much the view that the formula put by the Eminent Persons - namely, that there should be a negotiation and there should be undertakings really on both sides to the negotiation. On the side of the Government of South Africa, the release of Nelson Mandela and the

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unbanning of the ANC; and on the side of those who have indulged in violence, an agreement to suspend violence, that being the condition for the start of negotiations.

We still think that that formula is possibly the best way forward but, of course, the impetus has to come from within South Africa.

MICHAEL WHITE (THE GUARDIAN):

Did you cover, Prime Minister, the circumstances in which a conventional or chemical force reduction would enable the British Trident purchase to become negotiable in arms control terms, and does your communique imply that you have acceded to the Administration's so-called 'broad' interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

PRIME MINISTER:

Look! I will give you a copy of this. I think it is really very clear, if you look, from what we have said. Right now one has to remember that there have been no arms reductions at all. There have been suggestions for negotiations - very extensive suggestions for negotiations. Effective verification will be absolutely fundamental to those. Now, until those negotiations start to produce a different situation from that we have now, then we carry on as now. We are determined to have the security of the West, determined on the strength of the West, because that, we believe, is the best way to pursue further negotiations.

So we have got a position where there have been certain proposals. There are no changes, and we shall carry on as we have in the past with the same policy under NATO, as I have made quite clear.

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We believe that the INF Agreement, I think, would possibly be the first one to go ahead with, believing that that could be decoupled from SDI. Whether it will be is a matter for the Soviet Union.

We have also been negotiating under chemical weapons, but as far as Britain is concerned, Trident will be our independent nuclear deterrent, following Polaris. It is vital that we continue to have an independent nuclear deterrent and, as you have heard from the statement - let me just read the relevant paragraph out again -

'The President reaffirmed the United States intention to proceed with its strategic nuclear modernisation programme, including Trident. He also confirmed his full support for arrangements made to modernise Britain's independent nuclear deterrent with Trident.'

QUESTION (SPANISH NEWS AGENCY):

I want to make two questions. First of all, if you talked with Mr. Reagan about the Falkland issue and the second question is that President Alfonsin said recently that he is willing to meet with you any time, anywhere, if you are willing or you agree to discuss the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.

PRIME MINISTER:

I explained to the President the view we had taken on the question of fisheries round the Falklands. I told him that in April 1985 we approached the Food and Agriculture Organisation to try to get a multi-lateral agreement on fisheries. We have been working through the Food and Agriculture Organisation, for a multi-lateral agreement for over 18 months. Argentina was not cooperative.

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Indeed, towards the end of that time, she made her own bilateral arrangements with other countries over fisheries that were within 200 miles of the Falklands and therefore technically were within our area, although we only have the Falkland Islands protection zone to 150 miles.

Also, as you will know, Argentina shot a Taiwanese boat and killed some people in a fishing boat there. We were appalled at that incident.

It was only following these matters that we, being unable to get anywhere with our efforts to have a multilateral agreement, decided that we too must reassert our position and we have reasserted it over the conservation of fisheries within 150 miles of the Falklands.

I am not prepared to discuss the sovereignty of the Falklands at all. The view we have taken is that the sovereignty is British; that the people of the Falkland Islands, their wishes are paramount in this matter.

JULIA LANGDON (DAILY MIRROR):

Mrs. Thatcher, as a result of your visit, returning to the West topic, has anything actually changed? Was your visit here actually necessary?

PRIME MINISTER:

I think it was necessary and I am glad you came along too thinking it was necessary. Nice to have you with us. Did you come with us on the plane or did you get here separately? On the plane. We will take you back!

Yes, it was necessary because, as you know, some people were

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attempting to cast doubt on the future of the Trident programme. I felt myself that there would be no doubt about the future of the Trident programme. There is no doubt about the future of the Trident programme, but I wanted to discuss with the President the talks in Reykjavik and I think we have a very very good result.

Let me go through it again:

We support the President absolutely on continuing with SDI research. I believe that that research has to be taken up to feasibility. Research is not complete until the system on which you are researching is feasible.

Secondly, we support the INF Agreement, subject to effective verification. Verification is not going to be easy, you know. The Soviet Union is such a large place. And also, that agreement would have to include not only the intermediate weapons, but short-range nuclear weapons, because those are stationed in such positions that they can fall upon England and Wales.

Thirdly, that we supported the position that he had taken and indeed had tabled on the 50% cut over five years in United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons.

Fourthly, a ban on chemical weapons.

Now, if we get all that, it will be the greatest step forward in our armament reductions that has occurred, I should think, ever. It is a massive programme.

We also confirmed the other things: NATO strategy, flexible response and so on, and that the matter should continue to be the subject of close consultation. It really was a very valuable talk and many of the things which people cast doubt on are made absolutely clear in this communique, particularly with regard not only to our own Trident programme but to the United States

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determination to continue to modernise its own strategic nuclear weapon system.

QUESTION (CHICAGO TRIBUNE):

Prime Minister, both in your official statement and subsequently, you have been silent on another aspect of the President's proposal in Geneva, which was the elimination of all ballistic missiles. Do we take this silence to mean that you do not approve of that element of his arms control proposals?

PRIME MINISTER:

I think I answered that question in a previous reply. If we get as far as this indicates, it will be the biggest advance for years. Right now, there have been no armaments control agreements following Reykjavik, and so the first thing one has to say is that there is at the moment no change in the arms control position.

What is in this communique will require very extensive and very long consultations. Verification itself will be difficult and, of course, nothing would be entered into unless it could be effectively verified.



In my view, this is a very very large programme and I think if that goes ahead and we got the agreements set out there, it would be an enormous ~~question~~, but that of itself will take a considerable time.

But at the moment nothing has changed. There are some proposals. We have tried to set out the kind of priority, I think, with the intermediate nuclear weapons, believing that that could perhaps be detached from the Russians' attempted constraint on SDI.

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QUESTION (WASHINGTON NEWS AGENCY BUREAU):

What is your evaluation of the situation in Northern Ireland.....second question: I hear that you have received a message from Secretary Gorbachev quite recently concerning aspects of the problem of armaments. What is your reaction to this message please?

PRIME MINISTER:

There is no change in one's evaluation of the system in Northern Ireland nor the situation in Northern Ireland.

As you know, the majority of the people there wish to remain part of the United Kingdom. They have demonstrated they wish to remain part of the United Kingdom by a poll to that effect, and their position is absolutely entrenched: that there will not be a change in the status of Northern Ireland unless the people of Northern Ireland wished it and the Parliament at Westminster agreed. So there is no change in that at all.

Mr. Gorbachev sent a message by Ambassador Seniatin (phon.) which reached me the day before I came here, setting out his views on the Reykjavik agreement. I was very grateful to receive it. As you know, Mr. Gorbachev has asked me some time to go to Moscow - an invitation which I hope one day to take up.



QUESTION: (PAPER ARGENTINA):

Did President Reagan or Secretary Shultz consult you on any new proposals for negotiating with Argentina, considering that my country has.....multilateral proposal for negotiating the....

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PRIME MINISTER:

The Argentine did not pursue our wish to negotiate multilaterally on fish through the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Therefore, we have taken the steps we have taken temporarily.

We hope there will be a multilateral arrangement. It is difficult to find one, but we will continue to look for one, because it is our wish to have one, and we are sad that the Argentine refused to negotiate multilaterally. We will try to look for one. There are various other possibilities, but we are not able to say quite what should be the way ahead at the moment.



QUESTION (SAME MAN):

Excuse me, Prime Minister, my question was if there was any new proposal presented to you, you were consulted on it.

PRIME MINISTER:

There are various other ideas under discussion, but none has been worked out or worked through yet.

QUESTION:

Does the President agree with your views on Syria's role in international terrorism and were punitive measures against Syria discussed between you?

PRIME MINISTER:

No. As you know, the United States has taken and announced its very effective measures against Syria. I think they were headline news in our newspapers this morning.



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I expressed our gratitude to the President for his swift and decisive action and we are very grateful to have his support on this following the revelations in the Hindawi case in London.



QUESTION:

Do you have any reason to believe that the Soviet Union is ready to decouple anything from arms control on SDI like INF and so on?

PRIME MINISTER:

Do I have any reason? No. If politics only had reasons, it would be rather less interesting than it is.

You asked if I have any reason. One has a little bit of hope. That is not always the same as reason.



You will recall that after the first Geneva talks between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, there was a statement about INF and it seemed to be indicated that, almost alone among the statements on nuclear weapons, INF had not quite the same linkage to SDI as the other matters.

A few months later, we queried whether that was the case, but at least there was a certain amount of doubt about it and therein, I think, lies the hope that that one might be the easiest one to detach from SDI.

We would also believe that we think that the Soviet Union would like to have an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces.

You asked for a reason. I have just given you a hint of a reason and a hint of hope, but you know, in this you have got to go on trying. I always thought that those people who negotiated in our arms control sessions at Geneva and at Vienna where the

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negotiations on conventional forces have been going on for about 12 or 13 years, must be the world's most patient, diplomatic and hopeful people that ever exist, because even when they do not get anywhere they still come up with newer proposals - and we just have to go on trying, and we shall.

QUESTION:

On South Africa.....do you have any plans to meet with President Botha or any President in that region and are you concerned about the whole stability of southern Africa at this moment?

PRIME MINISTER:

I have no plans to meet with President Botha in South Africa or elsewhere.

Of course, one is concerned, particularly in view of the new situation following upon the death of President Machel of Mozambique, with whom we had fairly close contacts, arising really from the time when he was very helpful indeed ~~when~~ we were doing the negotiations on Rhodesia, which eventually became Zimbabwe. He played a very practical, constructive and helpful role in that and ever since then we had quite close contacts, and when he was in need of help with food because the situation in Mozambique was very difficult, we tried to give help. He needed technical help and we tried also to give that.

But there is of course a new situation there and any changes, of course, in the southern African region always introduce a new unknown there. But in answer to your first question, I have no plans to meet with President Botha.

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QUESTION:

Prime Minister, you said earlier that some people had cast doubt on the future of the Trident missile system.

I think it would be correct to say that some people, particularly in West Germany, among the political leaders, cast doubt on the nature of the INF agreement which was tentatively put together in Reykjavik.

Was there a sort of tacit point..is there a deal between you and the President that you give support to the INF agreement in return for a restatement by him on Trident?

PRIME MINISTER:

No. I do not think you can have kept up with the statements that I have already made on this subject.

As you know, twice I have indicated in the House of Commons, before I came to Washington, that we would support the INF Agreement - twice, both at Question Time.

We also supported the previous arrangements tabled by President Reagan at Geneva, which were for a global settlement on the INF question - reached I think then over three years.

It is not very different from the one that is before us now, and we were in support of that one.

What we were very wary of, and quite rightly so, was any settlement which merely moved back the SS20s and would have enabled them to be moved forward again. Obviously, that would not have been an effective settlement and could not possibly have been entered into, but I do not believe that that is the settlement which is before us, which is the SS20s all out of Europe and the Cruise

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and Pershings out, and then there are to be a hundred intermediate ones in the Far East on the part of the Soviet Union and a hundred in the United States, possibly based in Alaska. So that is a global settlement. But I have already announced our agreement with that before coming here.

QUESTION: (AUSTRALIA):

.....earlier..policy of not delivering weapons to either side in the Iran-Iraq war. Does that mean that although you believe implicitly in the President's total integrity in this matter, you disagree with what he did?

PRIME MINISTER:

No. We do not deliver lethal weapons, either to Iran or Iraq, because we try to be neutral when we have combatants during war.

We had, as you know, some problems with some contracts which stem from the time when the Shah was there. They were particularly for two ships, but they were not warships, they were auxiliaries, and they had no guns on them. Eventually, those were delivered, and there have been other very small items, but none of them lethal weapons, and that is the policy which we pursue.

QUESTION:

Could you explain what you mean by 'researching the SDI to the point of feasibility'? Does this include testing in space outside the laboratory? Is that compatible with continued adherence to the ABM Treaty?

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PRIME MINISTER:

I will give my interpretation of research and development.

I think you are still researching when you are going right up to feasibility, because if you do not know whether a system can work, you still research to find out, and that is my own interpretation of research, which I have made very clear also to the Soviet Union, and I do not think you can have any less. They are trying to have a much much more restricted level.

This statement says 'research as permitted by the ABM Treaty'. You then go into various interpretations of the ABM Treaty, which I myself am not going to get into.

You know the ABM Treaty not only had articles, but at the end it also had signed at the same time, under official understandings which are adhered to the Treaty, and among those understandings is an arrangement that where you are dealing with new anti-ballistic missile systems and problems arise as to the interpretation, that there should be a particular committee in which those problems should be resolved, and that you will find at the end of the Treaty, so there is a mechanism for resolving the problems.

QUESTION:

....Syria..would you comment on M.Chirac's....

PRIME MINISTER:

No, I should not dream of commenting on M.Chirac..on a colleague.

QUESTION:

(very faint, but re criticism)

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PRIME MINISTER:

Well, no-one should criticise our decision about fishing. No-one should criticise it. We tried to negotiate multilaterally. It was the Argentine that refused to negotiate multilaterally. We started those negotiations in April 1985. We are now in November 1986.

Have I got the wrong question? I thought I heard Argentine, negotiations, fisheries, multilateral.

QUESTION:

..about the US support given to the solution at the OAS.

PRIME MINISTER:

I have no change to make on our position with regard to Argentina. We do not discuss sovereignty of the Falklands - will not discuss sovereignty. We do not recognise a dispute over sovereignty.

We would like otherwise to normalise relations with the Argentine. We in fact started to import goods from the Argentine long before the Argentine opened up any of her markets again to us and we still continue to import goods from the Argentine.

We would like more extensive commercial relations. The fact we are not able to get them is not due to us. We have tried to do everything we can. We will not discuss sovereignty.

QUESTION:

The US vote supporting the.....

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PRIME MINISTER:

Are you asking me to carry on criticising the United States?

I have made our own position on the Argentine very clear.

QUESTION:

Mrs. Thatcher, could you talk a little more about your message from Soviet leader Gorbachev? Did you discuss it with President Reagan....

PRIME MINISTER:

I told President Reagan that I had had a message from Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Gorbachev had set out his view of the Reykjavik Treaty.

QUESTION:

Would any of that view differ from the impression the President already had?

PRIME MINISTER:

I do not think so.

QUESTION:

Is that one reason that you are optimistic that SDI might be split off...

PRIME MINISTER:

No. I found nothing in that particular statement which would encourage me in the belief that the INF might be coupled from SDI, but I believe nevertheless that is the most hopeful way forward. Otherwise, you just stop.

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I do not think anyone would wish one to stop after Reykjavik. There were after all there discussions about arms reductions as distinct from arms control and I am sure you would not wish one just to stop trying, so various things have been tabled at Geneva.

As you know, the Geneva negotiations ended, I think on November 12 - it was some time last week - and they re-convene again in January, so the teams from both sides will be negotiating. They will continue and undoubtedly the probing of whether SDI can be decoupled from INF will continue there, but you can only negotiate in detail at Geneva, and I am sure you would not wish us to stop trying - would not wish the United States to stop trying. I would not. The United States is doing everything it can to try to reach.....

QUESTION:

...(inaudible)...by what you heard.....

PRIME MINISTER:

I have nothing fresh to say about Secretary Gorbachev's views, nothing that would come as fresh to you at all.

QUESTION:

....break ranks on the aids policy..can you articulate the British....

PRIME MINISTER:

I am not aware that we are breaking ranks. We are spending a good deal of money trying to see that people know all about it and how to avoid it, because as you know, there is no cure, so the

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best policy is one of doing everything you can to prevent it.

QUESTION (SAME MAN):

...screening...

PRIME MINISTER:

I think you should not just toss out these things before you attempt to work out their practicality.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT) NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

8128

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

November 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting with Mrs. Thatcher, Saturday,
November 15, 10:45 a.m. - 1:40 p.m.

*File Thatcher
Visit*

Attached is your briefing memo for the President in preparation for his meeting at Camp David with Mrs. Thatcher. It is intended to complement Jackie's background paper on the US-UK-Argentine relationship and Linton Brooks' background paper on the strategic implications of eliminating ballistic missiles. Given the importance and complexity of the issues -- and the President's long, private meeting with Mrs. Thatcher -- my briefing paper and talking points are longer than usual.

As you are aware, the British are continuing to push for more time at Camp David and to replace the informal cocktails with a more formal sit down meeting. Besides red carpet Camp David treatment, I think the fact that she is meeting separately with Shultz and Weinberger on Friday evening is an added reason for us not to go back to Scheduling.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I briefing memo to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

As for
Linton Brooks, Jackie Tillman, Howard Teicher, Craig Coy, Sven Kraemer, Bill Burns, Clark Murdock, Alex Platt and Frank Lavin concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
 Tab A Shultz' Memo and Thatcher's bio
 Tab B Talking Point cards
 Tab C Talking Points on Arms Control

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-013/2 #760
BY HOJ NARA, DATE 6/7/01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8128

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

DATE: November 15, 1986
LOCATION: Camp David
TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 1:40 p.m.

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

- I. PURPOSE: To continue your close, personal consultations with Mrs. Thatcher, with a focus on arms control.
- II. BACKGROUND: You last met with Mrs. Thatcher at the Tokyo Summit. She is nearing her 12th year as leader of the Conservative Party -- the last 7½ years of which she has been Prime Minister. While her Parliamentary majority remains secure, her uncompromising personal style, long tenure in office, and continuing economic problems -- especially high unemployment (over 11 percent) -- have led to much criticism.

Nonetheless, after trailing Labor for more than a year by 4 to 6 percentage points in the polls, Mrs. Thatcher and the Tories are all of a sudden riding high -- neck and neck, or even slightly ahead of Labor. There is thus much speculation that she will call elections next Spring, though her mandate runs to June 1988.

While she remains one of your most ardent supporters, Mrs. Thatcher is concerned about the strategic implications of your Reykjavik proposals. She requested this meeting well before your meeting with Gorbachev. But Mrs. Thatcher is clearly coming to seek reassurances about Reykjavik: in particular, that strategic reductions (especially the elimination of ballistic missiles) will not undercut deterrence and will not overlook the conventional imbalance in Europe; and reassurances that our negotiating proposals will not put in question the UK Trident program and undermine her reelection chances.

You will recall she spoke to you on the phone about her concerns, the day after Reykjavik. Specifically, she questions whether we can have effective deterrence without ballistic missiles. She does not believe it prudent to make major reductions without redressing conventional and chemical weapons imbalances. Mrs. Thatcher also fears that elimination of ballistic missiles will undercut her domestic political position. Her main rival, Labor -- under Neil Kinnock -- advocates that Britain give up its independent nuclear force and remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from British soil. This would deal a severe blow to NATO. We,

and our Allies, need to speak out with one voice and one theme on the adverse consequences of Labor's security policies. How we do it, however, is a delicate matter.

Earlier in the week, I sent you a background paper that addressed Mrs. Thatcher's special concerns in some detail. I have also enclosed (at Tab C) full talking points that explain your Reykjavik proposals and respond directly to her concerns. We also have incorporated their central thrust in your talking point cards (at Tab B).

Some of Mrs. Thatcher's concerns are shared by other European Allies. You will recall that Kohl raised similar points. Indeed, there are reports that the British, French, Germans, and Italians have launched a new effort to better coordinate their arms control positions. Therefore, it would be useful for you to stress to Mrs. Thatcher that you have no intention of abandoning nuclear deterrence, which will not be altered by the elimination of ballistic missiles. Our remaining strategic nuclear retaliatory forces -- although smaller and of a different composition -- would be facing a much smaller Soviet threat without fast flying ballistic missiles and, therefore, would be a stronger deterrent. As long as the Soviets lead in ballistic missiles, and we retain our technological lead in bombers and cruise missiles, eliminating ballistic missiles -- while maintaining the nuclear deterrent -- is to our advantage.

You will, as well, want to emphasize that prospects for cuts in nuclear arms make it all the more important to pursue conventional force reductions on a sound basis. You will recall there is a disagreement over the best forum for any new "Atlantic-to-the-Urals" negotiations. We and our European partners want to include the French -- they are not involved in the current, more limited MBFR talks. But while we believe the negotiations must be Alliance-to-Alliance, with instructions decided by NATO, the French -- with some European support -- desire negotiations under the far less structured CSCE framework. We are working with Allies, like Mrs. Thatcher, to move the French to an acceptable compromise.

On other arms control matters, Mrs. Thatcher has been critical of the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty and of our plans to exceed the SALT II numerical sublimits. The press prematurely reported that we would break out of SALT numerical constraints this week. We do not, however, expect her to spend much time on ABM and SALT, given Soviet violations.

Earlier this week, I sent you a background paper addressing the complexities and competing interests in our trilateral US-UK-Argentine relationship. Our relations with Britain --

and your close personal relationship with Mrs. Thatcher -- in a broad sense stand in the way of our efforts to strengthen Argentina's burgeoning democracy. While Mrs. Thatcher recognizes the benefits of a democratic Argentina, she has been unyielding on entering any negotiations that conceivably could address sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas. She also has steadfastly refused to approve the transfer of major arms to Argentina.

Britain's recent unilateral declaration of a fisheries protection zone around the Falklands -- and Argentina's strong reaction -- offer an opportunity for you to stress the importance we attach to democracy in Argentina. While we clearly do not want to make things more difficult for her domestically, you will want to tell Mrs. Thatcher that we cannot continually put off how best to nurture Argentina's democracy. And that sooner rather than later, we will want to return to the question of military aircraft for Argentina. You should expect a typical Thatcher barrage.

Terrorism will likely also be high on her agenda. This is an area in which our "special relationship" takes on a true meaning -- there is real cooperation and commonality of views. On Monday, the EC -- except for Greece -- announced, at British urging, joint measures against Syria. We are announcing our measures against Syria November 14. You will want to applaud her strong stance against terrorism and stress the need for similar cooperation from other Europeans.

There are indications that she may wish to discuss briefly the Middle East and South Africa. In both areas, the thrust will be on the need to continue to work closely together as we look for ways to promote peaceful progress. George's scope paper (at Tab A) addresses these issues and provides additional insights on other aspects of the agenda.

Unlike some of your earlier meetings, there is no burning bilateral matter (e.g., civil aviation). She did, however, just write you to express concern over increased protectionist pressures in the U.S. Specifically, she objected to the provision in the Superfund legislation which introduces differential tax treatment between domestic and imported oil. Britain, of course, is an oil exporter. You will want to acknowledge her letter.

Visits like Mrs. Thatcher's form the essence of consultations to which we and our partners attach such significance. In this regard, you will recall that on her last visit to Camp David (December 1984) she obtained our agreement to make four points -- in her press conference -- characterizing common views about the purpose of SDI. They were: 1) we do not seek superiority; 2) SDI deployment is a matter for negotiation; 3) our objective is to enhance deterrence; and 4) negotiations with the Soviets (which were about to resume)

are aimed at achieving security at reduced levels of offensive systems. Given her concerns today, and the changed climate since December 1984, the last point, in particular, sounds somewhat hollow.

Nonetheless, she may make a similar effort this year. We have queried the British, and her top aides insist she has no plans to propose a joint statement. However, they leave the door slightly ajar, by saying that should discussions lead to the development of common points for public use, they would not object. We, however, have found that in most cases -- even with friends like Mrs. Thatcher -- that joint statements, which are usually a compromise, do not serve our policy interests. Hence, we are watching this carefully and will give you an update at the prebrief. Just in case, State and my staff are preparing contingency points.

III. PARTICIPANTS: Informal Cocktails and Working Lunch

U.S.

The President
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Ambassador Charles Price
Asst. Secretary Rozanne L. Ridgway
Peter R. Sommer, NSC

U.K.

Mrs. Thatcher
Ambassador Antony Acland
Private Secretary Powell

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House photographers at appropriate points during Camp David schedule. Pool press coverage of Mrs. Thatcher's arrival.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

10:45	Camp David	Mrs. Thatcher arrives
10:50-11:50	Aspen Cabin	Private meeting with Mrs. Thatcher
11:50-12:00		Walk from Aspen to Laurel Cabin
12:06-12:11	Laurel Cabin	Make weekly radio address from Conference Room, with Mrs. Thatcher present
12:15-12:30	Laurel Cabin	Informal cocktails all participants
12:30-1:30	Laurel Cabin	Working lunch -- all participants
1:40		Mrs. Thatcher departs

Attachments

Tab A Shultz' scope paper and Thatcher's Bio
Tab B Talking Points
Tab C Detailed Arms Control Talking Points

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer


THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

November 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*SUBJECT: Visit of UK Prime Minister Thatcher
November 15, 1986

I.

- 
- o The UK is now in a pre-election phase in anticipation that Mrs. Thatcher will call elections sometime in 1987, although her mandate runs to June 1988.

- 
- o Labor had been leading in public opinion polls, but last week two polls showed the Conservatives had regained a small lead.

- 
- o On the economic front,  high level of unemployment, 11.6%. However, a small drop in September may indicate the start of a downward trend.

- o Overall the economy is behaving rather well. Growth this year will be in the two percent range, with many predicting brighter prospects next year. Inflation is at its lowest rate in 20 years - three percent.

Arms Control/East-West Relationso ~~SECRET~~

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KEY
POINT

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- 3 -

- o We hope to announce a set of our own measures before Mrs. Thatcher arrives. We will want to consult with her on the 15th about further steps.

Middle East


- o We do not foresee any breakthroughs in the Middle East peace process in the coming months.
 - o King Hussein, however, has announced a \$750 million development plan for the West Bank and Gaza. We asked the UK on November 4 to consider funding the program.
 - o Plan would give Palestinians a greater economic stake in a peace settlement and strengthen King's hand in the West Bank and Gaza
- 

Southern Africa

- o UK, US, and FRG Africa experts (Assistant Secretary Crocker for the U.S.) met in London October 30 to consult on Western policy toward South Africa.
- o In Mozambique, Foreign Minister Chissano was chosen to succeed Machel as President.
- o We have heard that Zimbabwe and Zambia may be planning to implement sanctions against South Africa agreed to by Commonwealth. Would lead to certain SAG retaliation.

Argentina/Falklands

- o The Falklands may be raised because of the strong Argentine reaction to the UK's unilateral declaration on October 29 of a 150-mile Falklands fishing zone.

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Northern Ireland

- o November 15 is the first anniversary of the Anglo-Irish agreement and will be the culmination of Unionist demonstrations in Northern Ireland against the agreement.
- o Unless there are dramatic and unexpected developments, we do not expect Mrs. Thatcher to raise this topic.

II. WHAT DO WE WANT

- o To obtain Mrs. Thatcher's understanding of and support for all parts of your arms control objectives, including SDI research, the zero-zero INF solution for Europe and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles within the ten-year time frame discussed at Reykjavik.
- o To indicate our strong support for Mrs. Thatcher and HMG policies on defense, specifically nuclear modernization and increased expenditures for defense.
- o In doing so, to ensure that she returns to London [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reassured about the direction of our policies.
- o To obtain British agreement to continuing strong measures against international terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and particularly against Syria, and for lining up international support for such measures.
- o To review proposals on the Middle East [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

III. WHAT DOES MRS. THATCHER WANT

- o Generally to strengthen her pre-election position by bringing U.S. and UK positions on arms control into harmony.
- o To obtain a strong U.S. endorsement of HMG's positions on defense and nuclear weapons, specifically the continuing

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- 5 -

need for Tridents, nuclear weapons, and offensive ballistic missiles as long as a non-nuclear imbalance exists in Europe.

o

[REDACTED]

- o To obtain assurance that we will consult with her and other NATO leaders as we pursue our new arms control agenda and that we will take account of European concerns about the Soviet conventional advantage in Europe.

o

[REDACTED]

IV. WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED FROM THIS VISIT

- o Strengthen Alliance cohesion and support by reconciling your commitment to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles within ten years with Mrs. Thatcher's commitment to deploy UK Tridents within the same time frame.
- o Similarly, to find a mutually acceptable formula [REDACTED] that drastic nuclear reductions such as the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles are inadvisable as long as conventional and chemical weapon imbalances exist in Europe.
- o Obtain restatement of strong British support for our positions on INF, SDI, and strategic nuclear reductions.
- o Combine these understandings in a strong agreed press treatment of US/UK unity on arms control matters supportive of U.S. positions [REDACTED]
- o Endorse a common, concerted approach toward Syria.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

TALKING POINTS FOR MRS. THATCHER

- EAST-WEST: Welcome. As I said on phone after Reykjavik, appreciate your public support. Western solidarity essential to progress. That is why I so highly value sessions like today's at Camp David. Know you also have some concerns -- will address them in a minute.

- Had hoped George's meeting with Shevardnadze in Vienna would mark beginning of serious Soviet effort to come to grips with issues, rather than continuing to link all to ABM/SDI. Soviets, however, insisted on limiting discussions to this one issue, and that all issues have been settled except for strategic defense testing. This suggests they are primarily interested in gaining propaganda advantage.

- We intend to press ahead with Soviets on arms control and other areas. There are some signs Soviets may be starting to move now in Geneva. Are planning follow-up arms control expert talks and the next Geneva round will begin on January 15.

- REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS: Would like to explain why I believe proposals -- that took into full account advice we received from you and others -- serve our interests. Have also sent Paul Nitze and other top experts to brief in London. Told

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BY WDS, NARA, DATE 6/7/01

Gorbachev willing to consider any proposal that did not compromise our security and that of our Allies.

- You are familiar with our proposals, and importance we attach to continuing SDI research. Want to emphasize that proposals we put forward are bilateral (US-Soviet) -- we do not intend now or in future to negotiate for third countries or to accept constraints on your systems.
- We, of course, would support you and French entering negotiations following deep US and Soviet reductions and in context of redressing conventional imbalance -- but this is clearly your decision. We will not push you.
- BALLISTIC MISSILES: Elimination is not a new objective and must be put in context. Emphasis on destabilizing, fast-flying missiles has been central arms control theme for years. When I announced Strategic Defense Initiative did so with specific objective of making offensive ballistic missiles obsolete.
- Eliminating offensive ballistic missiles has long been studied and repeatedly discussed among Allies -- most recently in conjunction with my July letter to Gorbachev.
- By calling for elimination of offensive ballistic missiles we have in one step addressed the problem of last 100 Soviet

SS-20 warheads in Asia (concern of our Asia Allies) and remaining SRINF (concern of our European Allies, especially the Germans).

- DETERRENCE: We are not abandoning nuclear deterrence. Remaining strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, though smaller and of different composition, would deter an attack. Doing away with destabilizing fast-flying systems, would drastically reduce Soviet first-strike capability.
- With the Soviet lead in ballistic missiles and our significant technical lead in air-breathing systems, elimination of ballistic missiles is clearly to our benefit.
- Elimination would actually strengthen deterrence because slower bombers and cruise missiles make their effective use in first-strike more difficult -- increasing an attacker's uncertainty and risk and thus enhancing deterrence.
- NATO STRATEGY: US offer to eliminate ballistic missiles is not contingent on improving conventional or chemical balance, though it will be essential to continue -- hopefully accelerate -- NATO conventional improvement initiatives.
- Our contribution to NATO's triad (strategic, non-strategic nuclear, and conventional) will continue even if ballistic

missiles eliminated. Our nuclear artillery and weapons carried by aircraft would continue to fill twin deterrent roles of helping to offset Soviet conventional superiority and serving as link to strategic forces.

- Eliminating ballistic missile threats should increase credibility of US commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend NATO.
- Have every intention of retaining sufficient nuclear forces to maintain deterrence -- which is heart of NATO strategy.
- TRIDENT: Not clear whether Soviets will eventually accept Reykjavik proposals. Their reaction negative so far. We will not alter our modernization programs in hope or anticipation of Soviet acceptance. In December, will announce a decision on basing second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. Next budget continues procurement of Trident subs and D-5 missiles, along with increased SDI funding. Hope this resoluteness will ease internal UK pressures to curtail your Trident program -- which we strongly support.
- PATH AHEAD: Have asked JCS to provide a plan for safe transition to future without ballistic missiles. Directed JCS to base plan on existing NATO strategy. Believe we can move to a safer world if Soviets have will to join us.

Alliance cohesion remains fundamental to progress. Your personal help continues to be vital.

- INTERIM RESTRAINT: Truly mutual constraint would be beneficial -- but this has been one-way street with no Soviet traffic. No interim restraint formula can substitute for an agreement on deep, verifiable reductions. While we will no longer base modernization decisions on strategic force structure based on SALT, remain committed to restraint. Will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than Soviets.
- TERRORISM: Congratulations on your firm response to Syrian supported terrorism. Pleased to follow your strong lead. We just announced measures of our own. Need to monitor Syrian activities closely; future steps may be necessary to increase pressure and isolate Syria. Pleased you were able to bring EC along as far as you did. Cooperative steps by many nations are essential, if we are to combat terrorism.
- MIDDLE EAST: Need to focus on encouraging economic growth and prosperity, which would help create more favorable political climate for re-energized peace process.
- King Hussein has launched an ambitious but expensive development plan for West Bank and Gaza. We believe Shamir

will continue quiet cooperation with Jordan that Peres started. Kohl is interested in supporting Jordanian effort financially. Hope you will also help and take lead in encouraging others in EC to increase funding for West Bank. Even small amounts of assistance will help Hussein demonstrate that he can deliver positive results for Palestinians.

- SOUTHERN AFRICA: You and I agree that sanctions are not the answer. Need to consider together what West can accomplish in highly polarized situation.
- Prospects for restarting negotiations appear poor at this time, but there may be things we can do to regain initiative and hold off pressures for more sanctions.
- Understand our African experts had good session in London. Want to work closely with you.
- ARGENTINA/FALKLANDS: Know this is delicate subject. But am deeply concerned about democracy in Argentina. Our interests in maintaining Argentine democracy and preventing further Soviet penetration of our hemisphere, require development of security relationship with Alfonsin government. We need to return sooner rather later to question of military aircraft for Argentina.

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PRESIDENTIAL TALKING POINTS WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

- I appreciate the public support you have given to the proposals I made to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, especially since I know some aspects of them concern you.
- I understand you are concerned with the conventional balance between the Warsaw Pact and the West, with the nature of deterrence in a world free from ballistic missiles, and with the possible effect on your own strategic modernization program which, as you know, we fully support.
- Would like to explain why I believe the proposals set forth in Iceland are in both our interests.

The Proposal in Reykjavik

- I know that, in addition to our telephone conversation on the subject, your government has been briefed in detail on the events in Reykjavik. Want to be certain that the discussion of eliminating ballistic missiles is put in context.
- At Reykjavik I told Gorbachev that we would be willing to consider any approach as long as it did not compromise our security and that of our allies or our hopes for a more stable future through increased reliance on defenses that threaten no one.
- I specifically proposed that:
 - The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the Treaty, coupled with agreement that:
 - Within the first five years (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides be reduced by 50 percent.
 - During the following five years, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States would be eliminated.
 - At the end of the ten year period, either side could deploy advanced defenses.

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BY LoJ NARA, DATE 6/7/01

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- The proposals we put forward were, of course, bilateral proposals, applying only to U.S. and Soviet systems. In our public and private descriptions of them we are now making it clear that we do not propose to negotiate, now or in the future, for third countries.
- We would, naturally, support you should you and the French elect to enter future negotiations, following deep U.S. and USSR reductions, on the level of British and French national nuclear forces in the context of agreements redressing the conventional imbalance which now favors the Warsaw Pact.
- The General Secretary responded to our proposal with an unacceptable counter-proposal which:
 - sought to have the U.S. accept restrictions on the SDI program well beyond those specified in the existing ABM Treaty,
 - redefined the conditions for the subsequent five-year period to involve the elimination of all strategic forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and
 - did not include a positive commitment that, following the ten-year period, either side could then deploy advanced defenses.
- Despite my efforts, the Soviets persisted in holding everything we had agreed to hostage to U.S. willingness to accept restrictions on the SDI program well beyond the existing treaty restrictions. The Soviets have persisted in this stance since Reykjavik, including during the Vienna meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Eliminating Ballistic Missiles

- At the heart of the proposal I made at Reykjavik was a willingness to join a bilateral agreement to delay any deployment of U.S. and Soviet advanced defenses against ballistic missiles until after the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles.
- The ten-year period (through 1996) was chosen because I will not permit the possibility of the U.S. moving to a more stable deterrent, unilaterally if need be, to slip further into the future. Foregoing the benefits of strategic defense is neither in our interest nor in yours.
- The elimination of offensive ballistic missiles is not a new objective for the U.S.
 - Emphasis on the destabilizing characteristics of fast-flying ballistic missiles has been a central theme of our arms control position for some years.

- In START, our position has long been that while each side may need nuclear forces for some time to deter conflict and underwrite its security, neither side needs fast-flying, non-recallable offensive ballistic missiles for this purpose.
- In the INF negotiations, we have also kept the focus on missiles, avoiding, for example, discussion of dual-capable, tactical aircraft.
- In 1983, when I announced the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative, I did so with the specific objective of making offensive ballistic missiles obsolete. Here again our focus has been on eliminating the threat posed by these fast-flying missiles.
- Eliminating ballistic missiles has been repeatedly studied and discussed both within the U.S. government and with our allies, most recently in the deliberations that led to my July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev.
- At the end of the ten-year period specified in our offer, if the Soviets fully comply, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would possess any offensive ballistic missiles. Maintaining a robust SDI program will help ensure such reductions are actually carried out.
- Further, when effective advanced defenses are deployed, they should provide insurance against the return or covert retention of such missiles.
- By calling for the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges, we also, in one step, addressed the problem of eliminating both the last 100 Soviet SS-20 warheads in Asia (a concern of our Asian allies) and the remaining shorter-range INF missiles that still would threaten our European allies, remedying the specific concern of the Germans as well as removing any remaining SRINF threat to the United Kingdom.
- Should the Soviets accept, we would face a substantially different future. I believe, however, it would be a safer future for both our nations and for the world.
- To make it so, we need to be able to answer three questions:
 - Can we have adequate strategic deterrence without United States ballistic missiles?
 - Given Soviet conventional superiority, can we maintain an adequate deterrent against Soviet conventional attack without ballistic missiles?

- Can we resist the domestic political pressure to anticipate success and curtail vital strategic modernization programs in the near term because of the possibility of future arms control agreements?
- I believe the answer to all three questions is yes.

Strategic Deterrence without Ballistic Missiles

- Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, although smaller than today and of a different composition, would remain and would retain their essential role in ensuring U.S. and allied security.
- These forces would consist exclusively of bombers and cruise missiles. Our technical lead over the Soviets in cruise missiles is significant. Indeed, with the Soviet lead in ballistic missiles and our technological lead in air-breathing systems, it appears self-evident to me that elimination of ballistic missiles is clearly to our benefit.
- Unlike today, both U.S. and Soviet forces would be covered by agreements that would reduce these forces to equal levels. These equal forces will, therefore, provide a sufficient strategic retaliatory capability to deter attack on the United States or its allies while eliminating the crisis stability problems inherent in the short time of flight ballistic missiles.
- The basic concept of nuclear deterrence will not be altered by the elimination of ballistic missiles. Deterrence can best be achieved by maximizing an aggressor's uncertainty that he can achieve political objectives by force, and the certainty that he will face grave risk to things that he values most should he try.
- Elimination of ballistic missiles on both sides would, however, drastically reduce the Soviet first strike potential. Ballistic missiles are uniquely suited to be employed by an aggressor for several reasons:
 - The time between the detection of a ballistic missile attack and its arrival is so short that it reduces the options of the party attacked so that they can be largely anticipated by an aggressor.
 - Facing no defenses, there can be little doubt that, if ballistic missiles function reliably, they will arrive on target.
 - Finally, predicting the specific levels of damage they can inflict on a target is largely a matter of physics. Their effectiveness does not depend on human skill, courage or training, but only on the system's technological reliability.

- The elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would, in fact, actually strengthen nuclear deterrence because the slower pace associated with the employment of bomber and cruise missile forces makes their effective use by an aggressor in a first strike much more difficult. The effects of such an attempt are also much more uncertain. Both factors increase an attacker's risk and thus enhance deterrence.

Detering Attack on NATO Without Ballistic Missiles

- The strategic nuclear systems remaining after elimination of ballistic missiles would continue to provide the U.S. nuclear umbrella over NATO which has been one of the pillars of NATO's strategy for decades.
- The United States presently contributes to all legs of the "NATO triad": conventional forces, non-strategic nuclear forces, and strategic forces. That contribution would continue even if ballistic missiles were eliminated.
- Nuclear artillery and nuclear weapons carried by aircraft would continue to fill the twin deterrent roles of helping offset Soviet conventional superiority and serving as a link to strategic forces.
- I recognize your concern with our ability to defend against the Soviet cruise missile threat. But that threat is likely to be less severe than the existing ballistic missile threat, against which we currently have no defenses. Furthermore, while our research focus is on defense against ballistic missiles, we hope the technologies being explored for SDI will have applications against cruise missiles in the future.
- The elimination of the ballistic missile threat to the United States and to NATO should increase the credibility of the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in support of the alliance and thus of NATO's ability to execute its strategy.
- In view of this, I do not believe our offer to eliminate U.S. ballistic missiles need be made contingent on improving the conventional balance in Europe, although it will be essential to continue (or accelerate) current NATO initiatives to redress the conventional imbalance, both by improving NATO's conventional capability and by seeking equitable and stabilizing conventional arms reductions agreements.
- I assure you I have every intention of retaining sufficient nuclear forces (both strategic and non-strategic) to permit the United States and its allies to maintain the deterrence which is the heart of NATO's strategy.

Not Anticipating Arms Control Agreements

- At this time, it is not clear whether the Soviet Union will accept the U.S. proposal which I made in Reykjavik. The main thrust of our national security planning and military programming cannot and will not be altered now in anticipation of such an uncertain possibility.
- If we were prematurely to adjust our current military plans and programs for either the modernization of our own ballistic missile forces or to limit the scope of our SDI program, the Soviet Union would certainly attempt to pocket these actions without a reciprocal response on their part. Unilateral action of this sort would be counterproductive and dangerous, reducing our security and that of our allies.
- Thus I have no intention of stopping or slowing essential strategic programs. I will make and announce a decision on basing the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles in December. My next budget will continue procurement of TRIDENT submarines and the D-5 missile, along with increased SDI funding.
- I will resist any suggestion by anyone -- including our Congress -- that we curtail strategic modernization in the fond but false hope that arms reductions agreements will make it unnecessary when, in fact, the reverse is true.
- I believe this resoluteness should ease any internal pressure on you to curtail your TRIDENT program, which, as you know, we strongly support.

The Path Ahead

- To ensure that we are prepared to exploit, fully and safely, our proposal should the Soviet Union be willing to join us in pursuing such sweeping reductions, I have requested our Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide a plan which would permit a safe transition to the alternative future I have proposed.
- In preparing this plan, I directed the JCS to assume that, while eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, the United States will not abandon the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence and that the NATO strategy embodied in MC 14/3 will remain in effect and be fully supported by the United States.
- Thus I believe we can move to a safer world if the Soviet Union has the will to join us. We can reach that world, however, only by continuing to demonstrate the alliance cohesion we have shown over the past few years.