Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Ronald Reagan Library

Case:1118 Archivist: Sherrie Fletcher

DOC	TYPE	DATE	PAGES	CLASS.	CLOSED
1	Letter	10-29-1985	4		11-14-2002
	~~Subject: Approach for November meeting with Gorbachev~~				
	To: Richard Nixon From: Ronald Reagan	R 6/22/06 M05-008 # 6363			
	~~Restriction : FOIA(b)1~~				
2	Letter	10-29-1985	4		11-14-2002
	Subject: Approach for November meeting with Gorbachev (identical to Docid 3263, except for personalization)				
	To: Gerald Ford From: Ronald Reagan	R 7/14/06 FOZ-126#2			
	~~Restriction : FOIA(b)1~~				
3	Letter	10-29-1985	4		11-14-2002
	Subject: Approach to November meeting with Gorbachev (identical to Docid 3265, except no personalization)				
	To: Jimmy Carter From: Ronald Reagan	R 7/14/06 FOZ-126#3			
	~~Restriction : FOIA(b)1~~				

COLLECTION: ~~Executive Secretariat, NSC: System File~~ APNSA Chron File

SERIES:

TITLE: 8508407

OA/ID NUMBER: 90730 BOX NUMBER: Folder #: 1 of 1

Restriction Codes

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information.
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute.
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donors' deed of gift.
PRM. Closed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
F-1 National security classified information. (b)(1)
F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. (b)(2)
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute. (b)(3)
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information. (b)(4)
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. (b)(6)
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes. (b)(7)
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions. (b)(8)
F-9 Release would disclose geological of geophysical information concerning wells. (b)(9)

8407 chron

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1985

Dear Dick:

As my November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev draws near, I would like to review with you what I believe is the Soviet game plan for Geneva and my own approach to this critical meeting.

I have read and reread your thoughtful overview of where we stand with the Russians going into this meeting and appreciate your providing me with one of the most informed and thoughtful analyses of contemporary Soviet behavior I have read (if that sounds like a little overkill, it's because I agree with you).

The Soviet aim clearly is to focus Western public opinion exclusively on arms control, ignore important regional and human rights issues, and try to place the responsibility for any lack of progress in our relations solely on the United States -- specifically, on our determination to move ahead with our Strategic Defense Initiative. Gorbachev's statements in Paris, his Time interview and a variety of statements to Congressional and Cabinet officials all point in this direction. Gorbachev's relaxed manner and forceful speaking style lend themselves well to the media exposure such a strategy requires.

The latest Soviet counterproposals--which by any measure are one-sided--are clearly designed to continue the Soviet effort to strike at NATO unity by driving wedges between the U.S. and Europe. They are also aimed at permitting the Soviets to pursue key elements of their strategic force build-up while curtailing our own modernization program.

The major provisions of the recent Soviet counterproposal tabled in Geneva include: a ban on development (including "scientific research"),

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

URTS 3263

testing and deployment of space-strike arms; a 50 percent reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles capable of striking the US and USSR; a limit of 6,000 nuclear charges on the permitted delivery vehicles, no more than 60 percent of which can be on any one force component; a ban on long-range cruise missiles; a ban or severe limitation on new types of delivery systems; and deep reductions in medium-range systems, based on "equality and equal security."

Under the Soviet counterproposals, depending on how "new types" of systems are defined, the US might have to forego Midgetman, D-5 and the ATB bomber, while the USSR could deploy the mobile SS-X-24 and 25 ICBMs, the SS-NX-23 SLBM, and the Blackjack bomber. Their counterproposal gives them the flexibility to maintain a substantial number of SS-18 heavy ICBMs and, probably, to deploy a follow-on to the SS-18 and other ballistic missiles as "modernized" systems. Moreover, the inclusion of our FBS in strategic limits would constrain US ability to provide extended deterrence.

The Soviet delegation can be expected to exploit the "linkage" issue, although agreement on "space strike arms" is no longer a precondition for discussion of reductions in strategic offensive arms. In Paris, Gorbachev said that it was possible to reach a US-Soviet accord on "medium-range nuclear missiles" in Europe without the "direct link with the problem of space and strategic armaments." However, in the Geneva negotiating sessions, the Soviets strongly suggest that some sort of linkage between START and Defense & Space issues remains.

Gorbachev also proposed separate talks be held with the UK and France on medium-range systems and announced that the USSR would remove SS-20s opposite Europe from alert status and dismantle their "stationary installations" over the next two months.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva made a further informal proposal regarding "intermediate steps" which might be resolved in my meeting with Gorbachev. In the first, they offered to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar if the US would halt construction of its radars at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, England. In the second, they proposed

an INF agreement that would involve a freeze on deployments, followed by phased reductions. Elimination of all US LRINF missiles from Europe, however, remains the ultimate Soviet objective.

My own approach to Geneva will be quite different. I plan to engage the Soviets in a broad dialogue, including all major issues on our agenda: arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral problems, and human rights. In my public statements I will stress the need to work for a safer future and promote democratic ideals, and will point out that it is precisely the Soviets' willingness to use force in the international arena which is a major underlying cause of much of the world's tension. In my view, we must not lose sight of these broader questions when pursuing agreements in individual areas--no matter how important those areas may be.

Another key objective in Geneva, of course, will be to probe Soviet intentions and see if Gorbachev is prepared for a more cooperative relationship. If he is, he will find us responsive. I will present Gorbachev with a series of specific, innovative proposals in the area of bilateral exchanges which would dramatically improve communications between our two societies. As I outlined in my October 24 speech to the UNGA, I will also be bringing to Geneva new initiatives to address longstanding regional and bilateral problems that have prevented improved relations. I will also be raising questions of human rights directly with Gorbachev.

At the same time, I do not think that progress at Geneva should be measured only in terms of agreements signed. It is equally important that we and the Soviets try to set a realistic, mutually acceptable agenda for future discussions that will help us manage the relationship over the coming months in as constructive a manner as possible.

As you know, my key advisers and I are engaged in an intense series of pre-Geneva consultations with our Allies to ensure that Allied views are factored into our discussions with the Soviets. I also consider it of the utmost importance that I have the chance to talk directly with you and hope you can meet with me at the White House on November 8th to

discuss various aspects of my meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. I have also invited Presidents Carter and Ford to join us.

In the meantime, I would welcome any comments you might have on our reading of Soviet intentions and my own approach to the meeting.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Richard Nixon
Federal Building
New York, New York 10278

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1985

Dear Jerry:

As my November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev draws near, I would like to review with you what I believe is the Soviet game plan for Geneva and my own approach to this critical meeting. The Soviet aim clearly is to focus Western public opinion exclusively on arms control, ignore important regional and human rights issues, and try to place the responsibility for any lack of progress in our relations solely on the United States -- specifically, on our determination to move ahead with our Strategic Defense Initiative. Gorbachev's statements in Paris, his Time interview and a variety of statements to Congressional and Cabinet officials all point in this direction. Gorbachev's relaxed manner and forceful speaking style lend themselves well to the media exposure such a strategy requires.

The latest Soviet counterproposals--which by any measure are one-sided--are clearly designed to continue the Soviet effort to strike at NATO unity by driving wedges between the U.S. and Europe. They are also aimed at permitting the Soviets to pursue key elements of their strategic force build-up while curtailing our own modernization program.

The major provisions of the recent Soviet counterproposal tabled in Geneva include: a ban on development (including "scientific research"), testing and deployment of space-strike arms; a 50 percent reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles capable of striking the US and USSR; a limit of 6,000 nuclear charges on the permitted delivery vehicles, no more than 60 percent of which can be on any one force component; a ban on long-range cruise missiles; a ban or severe limitation on new types of delivery systems; and deep reductions in medium-range systems, based on "equality and equal security."

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

URTS 3265

Under the Soviet counterproposals, depending on how "new types" of systems are defined, the US might have to forego Midgetman, D-5 and the ATB bomber, while the USSR could deploy the mobile SS-X-24 and 25 ICBMs, the SS-NX-23 SLBM, and the Blackjack bomber. Their counterproposal gives them the flexibility to maintain a substantial number of SS-18 heavy ICBMs and, probably, to deploy a follow-on to the SS-18 and other ballistic missiles as "modernized" systems. Moreover, the inclusion of our FBS in strategic limits would constrain US ability to provide extended deterrence.

The Soviet delegation can be expected to exploit the "linkage" issue, although agreement on "space strike arms" is no longer a precondition for discussion of reductions in strategic offensive arms. In Paris, Gorbachev said that it was possible to reach a US-Soviet accord on "medium-range nuclear missiles" in Europe without the "direct link with the problem of space and strategic armaments." However, in the Geneva negotiating sessions, the Soviets strongly suggest that some sort of linkage between START and Defense & Space issues remains.

Gorbachev also proposed separate talks be held with the UK and France on medium-range systems and announced that the USSR would remove SS-20s opposite Europe from alert status and dismantle their "stationary installations" over the next two months.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva made a further informal proposal regarding "intermediate steps" which might be resolved in my meeting with Gorbachev. In the first, they offered to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar if the US would halt construction of its radars at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, England. In the second, they proposed an INF agreement that would involve a freeze on deployments, followed by phased reductions. Elimination of all US LRINF missiles from Europe, however, remains the ultimate Soviet objective.

My own approach to Geneva will be quite different. I plan to engage the Soviets in a broad dialogue, including all major issues on our agenda: arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral problems,

and human rights. In my public statements I will stress the need to work for a safer future and promote democratic ideals, and will point out that it is precisely the Soviets' willingness to use force in the international arena which is a major underlying cause of much of the world's tension. In my view, we must not lose sight of these broader questions when pursuing agreements in individual areas--no matter how important those areas may be.

Another key objective in Geneva, of course, will be to probe Soviet intentions and see if Gorbachev is prepared for a more cooperative relationship. If he is, he will find us responsive. I will present Gorbachev with a series of specific, innovative proposals in the area of bilateral exchanges which would dramatically improve communications between our two societies. As I outlined in my October 24 speech to the UNGA, I will also be bringing to Geneva new initiatives to address longstanding regional and bilateral problems that have prevented improved relations. I will also be raising questions of human rights directly with Gorbachev.

At the same time, I do not think that progress at Geneva should be measured only in terms of agreements signed. It is equally important that we and the Soviets try to set a realistic, mutually acceptable agenda for future discussions that will help us manage the relationship over the coming months in as constructive a manner as possible. Jerry, I believe this is not unlike the situation you faced with Brezhnev in Vladivostok. That is, while there is no little likelihood we will conclude a final agreement, there is a reasonable possibility of establishing a framework for the future resolution of these issues.

As you know, my key advisers and I are engaged in an intense series of pre-Geneva consultations with our Allies to ensure that Allied views are factored into our discussions with the Soviets. I also consider it of the utmost importance that I have the chance to talk directly with you and hope you can meet with me at the White House on November 8th to discuss various aspects of my meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. I have also invited Presidents Nixon and Carter to join us.

In the meantime, I would welcome any comments you might have on our reading of Soviet intentions and my own approach to the meeting.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Gerald Ford
Post Office Box 927
Rancho Mirage, California 92270

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1985

Dear President Carter:

As my November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev draws near, I would like to review with you what I believe is the Soviet game plan for Geneva and my own approach to this critical meeting. The Soviet aim clearly is to focus Western public opinion exclusively on arms control, ignore important regional and human rights issues, and try to place the responsibility for any lack of progress in our relations solely on the United States -- specifically, on our determination to move ahead with our Strategic Defense Initiative. Gorbachev's statements in Paris, his Time interview and a variety of statements to Congressional and Cabinet officials all point in this direction. Gorbachev's relaxed manner and forceful speaking style lend themselves well to the media exposure such a strategy requires.

The latest Soviet counterproposals--which by any measure are one-sided--are clearly designed to continue the Soviet effort to strike at NATO unity by driving wedges between the U.S. and Europe. They are also aimed at permitting the Soviets to pursue key elements of their strategic force build-up while curtailing our own modernization program.

The major provisions of the recent Soviet counterproposal tabled in Geneva include: a ban on development (including "scientific research"), testing and deployment of space-strike arms; a 50 percent reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles capable of striking the US and USSR; a limit of 6,000 nuclear charges on the permitted delivery vehicles, no more than 60 percent of which can be on any one force component; a ban on long-range cruise missiles; a ban or severe limitation on new types of delivery systems; and deep reductions in medium-range systems, based on "equality and equal security."

~~SECRET~~
~~Declassify~~ on: OADR

HATS 3267

Under the Soviet counterproposals, depending on how "new types" of systems are defined, the US might have to forego Midgetman, D-5 and the ATB bomber, while the USSR could deploy the mobile SS-X-24 and 25 ICBMs, the SS-NX-23 SLBM, and the Blackjack bomber. Their counterproposal gives them the flexibility to maintain a substantial number of SS-18 heavy ICBMs and, probably, to deploy a follow-on to the SS-18 and other ballistic missiles as "modernized" systems. Moreover, the inclusion of our FBS in strategic limits would constrain US ability to provide extended deterrence.

The Soviet delegation can be expected to exploit the "linkage" issue, although agreement on "space strike arms" is no longer a precondition for discussion of reductions in strategic offensive arms. In Paris, Gorbachev said that it was possible to reach a US-Soviet accord on "medium-range nuclear missiles" in Europe without the "direct link with the problem of space and strategic armaments." However, in the Geneva negotiating sessions, the Soviets strongly suggest that some sort of linkage between START and Defense & Space issues remains.

Gorbachev also proposed separate talks be held with the UK and France on medium-range systems and announced that the USSR would remove SS-20s opposite Europe from alert status and dismantle their "stationary installations" over the next two months.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva made a further informal proposal regarding "intermediate steps" which might be resolved in my meeting with Gorbachev. In the first, they offered to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar if the US would halt construction of its radars at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, England. In the second, they proposed an INF agreement that would involve a freeze on deployments, followed by phased reductions. Elimination of all US LRINF missiles from Europe, however, remains the ultimate Soviet objective.

My own approach to Geneva will be quite different. I plan to engage the Soviets in a broad dialogue, including all major issues on our agenda: arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral problems,

and human rights. In my public statements I will stress the need to work for a safer future and promote democratic ideals, and will point out that it is precisely the Soviets' willingness to use force in the international arena which is a major underlying cause of much of the world's tension. In my view, we must not lose sight of these broader questions when pursuing agreements in individual areas--no matter how important those areas may be.

Another key objective in Geneva, of course, will be to probe Soviet intentions and see if Gorbachev is prepared for a more cooperative relationship. If he is, he will find us responsive. I will present Gorbachev with a series of specific, innovative proposals in the area of bilateral exchanges which would dramatically improve communications between our two societies. As I outlined in my October 24 speech to the UNGA, I will also be bringing to Geneva new initiatives to address longstanding regional and bilateral problems that have prevented improved relations. I will also be raising questions of human rights directly with Gorbachev.

At the same time, I do not think that progress at Geneva should be measured only in terms of agreements signed. It is equally important that we and the Soviets try to set a realistic, mutually acceptable agenda for future discussions that will help us manage the relationship over the coming months in as constructive a manner as possible.

As you know, my key advisers and I are engaged in an intense series of pre-Geneva consultations with our Allies to ensure that Allied views are factored into our discussions with the Soviets. I also consider it of the utmost importance that I have the chance to talk directly with you and hope you can meet with me at the White House on November 8th to discuss various aspects of my meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. I have also invited Presidents Nixon and Ford to join us.

In the meantime, I would welcome any comments you might have on our reading of Soviet intentions and my own approach to the meeting.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
Post Office Box 350
Plains, Georgia 31780

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letters to Former Presidents concerning the Geneva Talks

Issue

SIGNED

To sign the letters at Tabs A, B and C.

Facts

Your letters to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter are designed to inform them of our approach to the Geneva meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev and what we believe to be the Soviet strategy for the run-up to that meeting. Your letters also ask the former Presidents for their thoughts and invite them to meet with you in the White House prior to the Geneva meeting.

Discussion

The letters provide a detailed analysis of the Soviet arms control proposals and contrast them with your approach. You point out that you will attempt to engage the Soviets in a broad dialogue, including all the major issues on our agenda. The letters are similar in substance, but the letters to Presidents Nixon and Ford have been personalized.

Recommendation

OK	NO	
____	____	That you sign the letters to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter at Tabs A, B, and C, respectively.

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Nixon
Tab B Letter to President Ford
Tab C Letter to President Carter

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

MSG FROM: NSWFM --CPUA TO: NSCLM --CPUA
10/23/85 16:53:22 To: NSCLM --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --
NOTE FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN
Subject: Former President Luncheon, Nov. 8
Pls. watch for this. Tx.
*** Forwarding note from NSTC --CPUA 10/23/85 16:46 ***
To: NSWRP --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 10/23/85 16:41
NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb
Subject: Former President Luncheon, Nov. 8
Right. We sent the modified letters in. Bill should have them shortly. They were changed to reflect the Nov 8 date. Also, they put his reference to the UNGA in the past tense ("As I said at the UN on October 24....), so we need to make sure they are not signed the same day, or worse, today).

cc: NSWFM --CPUA

Log # 8407

In other words, these ~~dates~~ letters should be dated Oct 25 or later when signed by the President.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

October 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: TYRUS COBB

SUBJECT: Letter to Former Presidents

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding letters to former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. The text of the letters is similar; however, the letters to Nixon and Ford have also been personalized in accordance with your instructions.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Matlock, Linhard, Steiner and Sommer

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Nixon
Tab B Letter to Ford
Tab C Letter to Carter

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR