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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
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File Folder CO001-09 (020000-038999)

Box Number 23

Withdrawer

DLB 1/28/2010

FOIA

S10-306

SYSTEMATIC

128

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
83658	MEMO	ROGER FONTAINE TO RICHARD ALLEN, RE: THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE <i>R 4/16/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS</i>	2	2/11/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MATHENY

FROM: ROGER FONTAINE

SUBJECT: Caribbean/Central American Action

The State Department description of C/CAA is accurate as far as it goes. But the Vice President should be aware of the following:

-- It was the consensus of Reagan-Bush campaign advisers working on Latin America that C/CAA was formed very late in the Carter Administration for political purposes.

-- Many businessmen refused to join although they were pressured to do so.

-- One CEO recently told me he and others wanted to know which organizations should they pay attention to -- the Rockefeller Jamaica group or C/CAA?

-- If C/CAA is to continue, the leadership needs to be changed.

-- The Vice President should listen to Governor ⁺Graham. *Bob*
but make no commitments.

Dr. Robert V. West
Ogden Reid
Peter Johnson

NSC #8102092

C.F.

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FB006-12

Point Paper
on
Posse Comitatus

As a follow-up to the discussion of Posse Comitatus Act restrictions on military assistance to drug enforcement efforts during your trip to Florida last month, the following facts have been ascertained.

- Posse Comitatus Act of 1876 prohibits use of the Army or the Air Force to execute US laws, except as authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress.
- Posse Comitatus Act prohibitions have been extended to the Navy by Navy regulations. These could be revoked or amended by the Secretary of Defense.
- Examples of prohibited military assistance to law enforcement:
 - arrest
 - search and seizure
 - surveillance
 - pursuit of criminal suspect
- Several specific statutes permit use of the military for certain law enforcement functions, but no statute yet permits drug enforcement actions by the military.
 - A bill -- S. 441 -- is currently pending to amend the Posse Comitatus Act to permit military assistance to Federal drug enforcement efforts, provided it does not affect military training or readiness.
- Posse Comitatus Act does permit military assistance to law enforcement incidental to military exercises, but does not allow exercises to be scheduled for law enforcement purposes.
- Act also permits a variety of indirect military assistance to law enforcement, including:
 - loans and purchases of military equipment (communications, sensors, aircraft, weapons)
 - training
 - some transportation

- specialized research and development of sensors
- intelligence, maps, and charts
- The Military Services are currently providing drug enforcement assistance in each of these categories.
- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Customs, in particular, want more extensive Defense assistance:
 - Airborne surveillance aircraft
 - Air defense identification and tracking of intruding aircraft
 - Air interception
 - Scheduling of exercises to provide border surveillance
 - Communications intercept and direction finding
- DEA is faced with an almost impossible problem of trying to stem the drug flow in the absence of almost any barriers. It is convenient for DEA to help explain their limited success in terms of a lack of military assistance.
- Defense is reluctant to provide the assistance DEA wants in view of the obvious potential drain on resources. It is also not clear whether the gain in reduced drug traffic would be worth the cost.
- It appears that Defense could provide more assistance within current law and guidelines. We are working to identify highest leverage contributions.
- Suggest you continue to take a positive, cautious approach toward greater Defense assistance without committing yourself to specific actions.

Prepared by: G. Philip Hughes
April 16, 1981



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Paper for Vice President
on Caribbean/Central American Action

Attached is requested background information on Caribbean/Central American Action (C/CAA) for the Vice President's meeting with Dr. Robert V. West, Jr., Governor Bob Graham, Ogden Reid, and Peter Johnson this week.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

CARIBBEAN/CENTRAL AMERICAN ACTION

Caribbean/Central American Action is a non-profit, non-governmental organization designed to harness private sector resources to meet development needs in the Caribbean and Central America, build friendship and cooperation between the people of the region, and strengthen the role of private sector institutions in development of democratic societies.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Robert V. West, Jr., following consultation with the Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, formed the Committee for the Caribbean in 1977.

Recognizing the utility and importance of a more energetic private sector/business focus on the Caribbean, President Carter asked the Committee's Board of Trustees to consider expanding their focus to cover a broader variety of private sector activities and to include Central America. The Board reconstituted itself into Caribbean/Central American Action under the primary condition that it would remain an unqualifiedly non-political, non-governmental organization dedicated to strengthening the private sector in the region.

Governor Bob Graham of Florida assumed the Chairmanship and Dr. West became Treasurer. Later in 1977, Dr. West was also elected President of the organization. A number of distinguished Americans, including Ogden Reid, were added to the Board of Trustees.

The Department of State has strongly supported C/CAA's efforts in the region and has cooperated in two highly successful conferences on the Caribbean held in Miami. A number of Caribbean heads of state and other ranking officials have attended.

C/CAA activities cover ten project areas in 1981:

- Agricultural Development
- Development Through Business Cooperation
- Puerto Rico Cooperation
- Humanitarian Response
- Sports Development Projects
- Investment Booklets
- Hispanic Corps for Central America
- Agricultural Education Exchange
- Alternative Energy Projects
- Educational Internships

Attached is the group's latest Newsletter describing these target areas with a progress update on each.

~~CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM~~

N-12, 1980

TO: President-Elect Ronald Reagan
Defense and Foreign Policy Transition
The Honorable David Abshire

DETERMINED TO BE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect. 3.3(c)
BY NARA *db* DATE *1/24/10*

FROM: Ogden Reid, Former U.S. Ambassador and Member of Congress

Following the election of Edward Seaga as Prime Minister in Jamaica the week of November 3, the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica invited a group of trustees of Caribbean Central American Action and United States business leaders to visit Kingston on November 7 and 8. This memorandum reflects specifics raised at several seminars and reports on a private meeting with Prime Minister Seaga on November 8.

1. Election Results:

Preliminary returns with one seat in doubt indicated that Seaga's Jamaican Labour Party defeated Michael Manley's People's National Party and captured 52 out of the 60 seats in Parliament. On November 7 Prime Minister Seaga (who retained personally the portfolios of Minister of Finance and Planning, and Minister of Mining and Energy named the following to his cabinet:

The Right Honorable Hugh Shearer	Deputy Prime Minister Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade
Dr. the Honorable Ronald Irvine	Minister without Portfolio
The Honorable Bruce Golding	Minister of Construction
Dr. the Honorable Percival Broderick	Minister of Agriculture
The Honorable Winston Spaulding	Attorney General and Minister of National Security and Justice
The Honorable Pearnel Charles	Minister of Local Government
The Honorable J.A.G. Smith	Minister of Labour and the Pub. Service
The Honorable Alva Ross	Minister of Pub. Utilities and Transport
Dr. the Honorable Mavis Gilmour	Minister of Education
The Honorable Douglas Vaz	Minister of Industry
The Honorable Errol Anderson	Minister of Youth and Community Development
The Honorable Anthony Abrahams	Minister of Tourism
Dr. the Honorable Kenneth Baugh	Minister of Health

2. Meeting with the Prime Minister

We congratulated the Prime Minister on his victory and noted that the results

had been very hopefully received in the United States. Specifically, I indicated my belief that President-Elect Reagan and his new administration would look forward with interest to working with Jamaica and the Prime Minister's new government. I noted that the President-Elect had indicated clearly that he should not intrude in any sense within the prerogatives of the Carter Administration and powers of the Presidency until he himself officially took office. Nonetheless, I indicated I would report back to the President-Elect's Transition Administration on matters that could be appropriately considered in the interregnum pending the Administration's taking office. Further, on current matters, I indicated I would do what I could through the Caribbean Central American Action to facilitate private sector business interest and investment, and apprise the Department of State relevantly thereof.

Further, on behalf of the Caribbean Central American Action, we extended an invitation for the Prime Minister to speak at the Miami Conference on the Caribbean at the Sonesta Beach Hotel, Key Biscayne, Florida on November 24. In addition, I indicated I would endeavor to facilitate a meeting between the Prime Minister and President-Elect Reagan should schedules permit and if the Prime Minister welcomed the idea. He asked specifically whether it was wiser to meet with the President-Elect prior to his assuming office or after. I noted that while the President-Elect was not meeting heads of government in the main at this time, I believed that because of the importance of the election in Jamaica and the broader implications thereof to the Caribbean, it could be useful to have an earlier meeting for preliminary thinking purposes, rather than in the busy days of a new administration.

Prime Minister Seaga said he concurred with this thinking and would welcome an earlier meeting. (Embassy Kingston has apprised us that an invitation has been tendered by Senator Howard Baker to meet with the President-Elect on November 28, 1980.

Current Priorities for the Balance of 1980:

a. Food

Prime Minister Seaga indicated the critical importance of an early US-Jamaica PL-480 Agreement, Titles 1 and 2, in the amount of approximately \$16 million to provide essential food for thousands before Christmas. Parenthetically, the Prime Minister noted areas of high unemployment (30%-60%*depending on group) that he hoped to deal with soon, but not in the immediate future. Therefore, the P.M. stressed the criticality of the one thing that can be done before Christmas: the provision of food. (Certain of these details were reported by Embassy Kingston and Ambassador Laurence, but the P.M. underlined the need for these food stuffs to arrive by the end of November. Otherwise, distribution could not be affected by Christmas.) Specifically, the P.M. asked the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Douglas Vaz, to provide the details, which he did in a hand-written note to be followed by a detailed itemization through the Embassy.

Jamaica would hope the PL-480 shipments would include:

Bulk corn	\$2 million
Rice	1.2 million
Soya beans	1.7 million
Soya oil	350,000
Tallow	500,000
Frozen meat	1 million
Chicken backs	1.4 million
Biscuit flour	500,000
Cheese	550,000
Butter	350,000
Tinned foods (assorted)	1 million

Subject to the terms, Title 1 food stuffs would be distributed through the Jamaica National Holdings Company to the private sector. Approximately \$2 million would be requested under the Title 2 program in the form of grant food stuffs for the Kingston ghetto to be distributed by voluntary agencies.

*60% unemployed for those under 25 years of age; 50% of population 18 or under, and 70% of population under age 30.

b. Foreign Exchange

The Prime Minister indicated that a government of Jamaica team would

be meeting on or about Tuesday, November 11 with the International Monetary Fund to further negotiations with the Fund which had been totally opposed and made an election issue by former Prime Minister Manley. The Prime Minister said that he was looking for a three year balance of payment loan agreement which would be on the order of \$750 million and that specifically he hoped to obtain credits of \$300 million from the International Monetary Fund in 1981. The Prime Minister inherited a debt of approximately \$1.3 billion from the previous government and less than one day's reserves (\$5 million) upon assuming office. Seaga indicated that a new agreement for \$50 million in oil credits had been concluded by his government under a Venezuelan/Mexican plan which would provide the Caribbean countries with 30% of the oil-import costs in development loans. The Prime Minister noted that the governor of the Bank of Jamaica had indicated that previously closed credit lines in private banks had reopened and that tourism bookings were up about 20%. Embassy Kingston advised that the government of Jamaica's debt service was on the order of \$½ billion for 1981 and that Jamaica faced a potential operating deficit if changes were not made of \$700-\$800 million. This could leave a deficit of \$200-\$300 million (after known potential financing) which would have to be closed by exports, foreign investment, and bi-lateral trade negotiations.

The Prime Minister indicated that Jamaica would have to "earn its way out of present financial difficulties, not borrow its way out." Certain rescheduling of the debt obviously will be necessary to provide time.

c. Defense and Security Matters

Prime Minister Seaga's first official act was to declare the Cuban Ambassador Estrada persona non grata. Estrada, aside from his diplomatic hat, was Deputy Director of the Cuban Intelligence Service, DGI, and reportedly was in charge of the Americas Section. In recent months, some 2,000 Jamaicans had been variously trained in Cuba. Some of these "brigadistas" were encouraged by Cubans to enter the construction trades upon their return to Jamaica. Aside from various kinds of indoc-

trination, the Prime Minister indicated that these individuals had received weapons training. Certain arms have been recovered, including an M-16 traced by the USG to Vietnam. The Prime Minister indicated that at the Youth Conference Against Imperialism in July 1980, key Cubans had addressed the encampment even though it was a national holiday in Cuba attesting to the importance attributed by Havana to the gathering. Sub-machine guns were found subsequent to the meeting, but the Prime Minister did not give any details.

He indicated that for Security purposes and to keep crime and violence down, particularly on the north coast and in the Montego Bay area, he needed approximately 100 vehicles, plus certain spare parts, radios and flak vests. While violence was down since the election, nonetheless, necessary patrolling without new vehicles was not possible and that this obviously could impact any resurgence of tourism. (Reportedly tourism accounts for \$180-\$200 million in foreign exchange. The Honorable Abe Issa, former Chairman of the Jamaican Tourist Board, believes that tourism could double or triple if another 10,000 beds were constructed in additional hotels, new flag lines encouraged to fly into Jamaica and improved taxi and bus facilities were provided at airports).

I noted that it appeared to me the Prime Minister can be an especially important voice in the Caribbean and I asked him how he visualized Jamaica's broader role. While his pre-election manifesto "Change Without Chaos" stresses non-alignment; "balanced in sensitivity and outlook, bearing in mind the diverse character of Jamaica's external involvement" - it is clear that from the Prime Minister's response he will emphasize a third principal - strength "in regional interests."

Seaga noted for somewhat different reasons, that neither Prime Minister J.M. (Tom) Adams in Barbados, or Prime Minister Eric Williams in Trinidad could exercise the fullest leadership that events seem to suggest is required. The Prime Minister envisions playing an appropriate role in a new Caribbean entity which would appear is only partly formulated in his mind. (He noted the activities of the Socialist International in the Caribbean and Latin America funded allegedly by two German foun-

dations. My impression is that the Prime Minister is interested in not only how the private sector and trade can encourage stability in this region, but also how moderate political authorities can strengthen themselves against overt or discreet intervention from outside countries in question, especially Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. He again noted that the Cubans had sent their "number 2 team" to the July 7 Youth Conference Against Imperialism mentioned above.)

The Prime Minister stressed that he believed in playing a role in the Caribbean affairs, especially as this was in the clear self-interest of Jamaica.

d. Caribbean Central American Action

I was accompanied to the meeting with the Prime Minister by Deputy Chief of Mission, Roy Haverkamp and Mr. Rolando Bunster, Vice President of Gulf and Western International. The Prime Minister had expressed an interest in meeting one of the C/CA business leaders who was prepared to take definite steps in the near future. Mr. Bunster indicated Gulf and Western would consider forthwith the possible acquisition of a sugar mill provided the necessary cane was available and indicated that he would forward a private report on Jamaica's sugar industry prepared by Gulf and Western which indicates substantial disarray therein. Bunster mentioned the possibility of a major gasahol industry and that in addition, Gulf and Western this week was prepared to provide fishermen on the north coast with nets and wiring for traps that had been lost or damaged in the recent hurricane.

3. Private Sector Organization of Jamaica

The PSOG held seminars with American business leaders on investment opportunities: manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, commerce; infra structure: financing, shipping and port facilities, free zone, exports, insurance; and general matters: taxation, education and training, industrial relations, human resource development, energy. Participants (the list is enclosed) included Carlton Alexander, President of the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica; Winston Mahfood, President,

Jamaican Manufacturing Association; Ronald Sasso, President of Jamaican Bankers Association; Oliver Clarke, Chairman, Gleaner Company Ltd.; Bruce Rickards, President, Jamaican Chamber of Commerce, President, Imports and Distributors Association; Tony Hylton, Chairman and Chief Executive of the Port Authority of Jamaica; Byron Lewis, General Manager, Kingston Free Zone.

4. Embassy Kingston

At my request, Embassy Kingston provided a check list on "How the U.S. Can Be Helpful to Jamaica Now":

1. Economically

- a U.S. \$10 million PL-480 sale;
- decide to build up bauxite stockpile;
- grant FCA insurance
- restore EXIM supplier credits;
- help promotion campaign for winter tourist season by telling people "looks fine there now";
- encourage potential investors to go down and have a look;
- early in the new administration, set up a Joint Committee between selected Cabinet officials (Secretaries of State, Treasury and Labour and their counterparts).

2. Defense Forces

- grant token non-lethal assistance such as combat rations;
- seek concessionary terms for the sale of vehicles (jeep-type and troop carrying trucks), spare parts for vehicles, planes and helicopters and communications equipment.

3. Political

- As soon as possible after the new administration takes office arrange for meetings or visits at the PM-President and Secretary of State-Foreign Minister levels. This way the follow up can be by telephone.

5. Comment

While Caribbean Central American Action can be of assistance in the private sector area, early action by the new administration can be critical. For the first time in years, Jamaicans seem to be smiling. It would appear the Prime Minister Seaga has the potential of becoming a major leader in the Caribbean with obvious repercussions for Cuba and Castro. Clearly, Cuba invested heavily in Manley's reelection and Seaga's potential defeat. Seaga's victory can reassure English speaking areas in the Caribbean, potentially Haiti and Santo Domingo and possibly some countries in Central America. Equally developing Jamaican/Mexican relations can have wider implications. A strong Embassy/country team in Jamaica backed closely by the White House and an appropriate inter-departmental committee can make a critical difference to the future of the Caribbean and the course of freedom in the months ahead.

Action:

1. Word as appropriate should be sent to Prime Minister Seaga re possible meeting with President-Elect Reagan prior to his arrival in the U.S. on November 24 for Miami Conference on the Caribbean. The Prime Minister would welcome meeting either before or after inauguration at the President-Elect's convenience.

2. PL-480 food shipments and certain Foreign Military Sales equipment (radios, flak vests, spare parts, and vehicles) should arrive by the end of November 1980.

MEMORANDUM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ db 1/17/10

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

Memo No. 616-81

April 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Nancy Bearg Dyke *MSD*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Bob West, et al, 4:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab A is a memo from Roger Fontaine (who will join you at the meeting) which raise some good questions for your consideration. At Tab B is a brief summation of what we have learned about Defense's ability to support federal and state law enforcement concerning drug traffic into Florida.

The refugee issue has not changed substantially from when you met with the Attorney General in Florida during your visit there. There have been meetings since that time, but firm policy options have not yet been formulated. The report to the President is due May 4. Until then, we suggest you stick only to the fact that we are involved in an intensive study of this important issue and intend to proceed shortly with our policy.

In spite of the above, we believe you should keep the meeting short and to the point of its original intention: an update on the activities of the Caribbean/Central American Action group.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

URGENT

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8102092

RECEIVED 16 APR 81 11

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 15 APR 81

022603

KEYWORDS: CARIBBEAN

CENTRAL AMERICA

WEST, ROBERT V

AVP

GRAHAM, BOB

REID, OGDEN

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR VP MTG W/ CARIBBEAN/CENTRAL AMER ACTION (C/CAA)

ACTION: MEMO ALLEN TO VP

DUE: 17 APR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

FONTAINE

TYSON

COMMENTS MEMO INDICATES MTG IS THIS WEEK BUT NO SPECIFIC DATES HAVE
BEEN FURNISHED. THANKS.

REF# 8112111

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WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

81 04 130

Name of Correspondent:

Howard W. Cannon

☒ MI Mail Report

User Codes:

(A)

LAASR

(B)

(C)

Subject:

Requests information regarding the
Administration is thinking regarding
the stability of the political & security
situation in Central & Latin America.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
LA	Frie	ORIGINATOR ^{CH}	81/05/01	MF	A	81/06/22 ^{MG}
NSC	Secretariat	R	81/06/28 ^{MG}		C	81/06/29 ^{TO}
99	DOS	R	81/06/29		B	

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comments
D - Draft Response
F - Fact Sheet

I - Info Copy/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

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Prime Subject Code: CO 001-09 Secondary Subject Codes: CO 121 _____
EO 003-01 _____
EO 009 _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

CPn - Presidential Correspondence
 n - 0 - Unknown
 n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
 n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 n - 3 - Ron
 n - 4 - Dutch
 n - 5 - Ron Reagan
 n - 6 - Ronald
 n - 7 - Ronnie

CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Nancy
 n - 3 -

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

B - Box/package
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 G - Message
 H - Handcarried
 L - Letter
 M - Mailgram
 O - Memo
 P - Photo
 R - Report
 S - Sealed
 T - Telegram
 V - Telephone
 X - Miscellaneous
 Y - Study

053008



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

022808

1210

CO 001-00

JULY 30 1981

Dear Senator Cannon:

Thank you for your letter of April 23 to President Reagan on the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977. As indicated in Mr. Friedersdorf's interim reply of June 22, the Department of State has been asked to prepare a response on behalf of the President.

The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 entered into force on October 1, 1979. Since then the Canal has continued to serve world commerce and handle record volumes of cargo. Today the Canal is not the issue of conflict and confrontation between the United States and Panama that it once was. Problems remain, but they are being approached through normal diplomatic channels and through the institutional mechanisms established by the Treaties to handle such problems. All the clarifications to the Treaties made by the Senate when it gave its consent to their ratification have been accepted by the Government of Panama which has affirmed its assent in the Instruments of Ratification.

The Canal has been and will continue to be the unique element affecting our bilateral relationship with Panama. Prior to October 1, 1979 the United States operated the Canal and exercised jurisdiction over a Zone which bisected Panama; since the entry into force of the new Treaties, the United States has continued to operate the Canal in accordance with United States laws, but with Panamanian participation in anticipation that Panama will assume responsibility for operation of the waterway in the year 1999.

For a more detailed response to your inquiry about the Canal, may I refer to my letter to you

The Honorable
Howard Cannon,
United States Senate.

ID 8103905

of May 18 which was in reply to essentially the same question, but which you had directed to the Secretary of State. I have enclosed a copy of my letter for your convenience.

I hope that this information will be of assistance to you.

Sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

ARA/PAN:JJMullin
7/14/81 x24985

CLEARANCES: ARA/PAN:RRWyrough *RW*
ARA/CHP:MNudell
L/ARA:JBolten *JB*
H:JMcBride

S/S# 8119561

Date July 31, 1981

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Richard V. Allen
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: The President FROM: Senator Cannon
DATE: April 23, 1981 SUBJECT: Panama Treaty

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 6/29/81 NSC# 8103905

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☐ A draft reply is attached.
- ☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- ☐ A translation is attached.
- ☒ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- ☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- ☐ Other

REMARKS:

for William Montgomery
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

REFERRAL

DATE: 29 JUN 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8119561

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRES

SOURCE: CANNON, HOWARD

DATE: 23 APR 81

KEYWORDS: PANAMA

CENTRAL AMERICA

LATIN AMERICA

SUBJ: REQUESTS INFO RE ADMIN POSITION RE PANAMA & IMPACT OF TREATY ON LATIN

REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY

DUE DATE: 08 JUL 81

COMMENTS:



FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

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FOR INFO FONTAINE

BAILEY

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1/1/81 MJD

2000

RECEIVED 29 JUN 81 13

TO PRES

FROM CANNON, HOWARD W

DOCDATE 23 APR 81

FRIEDERSDORF, M

22 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: PANAMA

CENTRAL AMERICA

LATIN AMERICA

CO

SUBJECT: REQUESTS INFO ON ADMIN POSITION RE CURRENT SITUATION IN PANAMA &
IMPACT TREATY HAS HAD ON CENTRAL & LATIN AMERICA

ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY DUE: 29 JUN 81 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

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STATE

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COMMENTS

REF#

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RECEIVED 29 JUN 81 13

TO PRES FROM CANNON, HOWARD W DOC DATE 23 APR 81
FRIEDERSDORF, M 22 JUN 81
BREMER 31 JUL 81

KEYWORDS: PANAMA CENTRAL AMERICA
LATIN AMERICA CO

SUBJECT: REQUESTS INFO ON ADMIN POSITION RE CURRENT SITUATION IN PANAMA &
IMPACT TREATY HAS HAD ON CENTRAL & LATIN AMERICA

ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY DUE: 29 JUN 81 STATUS C FILES WH

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	2 7/31	Rec'd by S/S		FO, NB
		direct reply		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

June 22, 1981

Dear Senator Cannon:

Let me apologize for the delay in responding to your April letter to the President in which you requested information on the Administration's position concerning the current situation in Panama and the impact the Treaty has had on the stability of the political and security situation in Central and Latin America.

You can be assured that the President very much appreciated knowing of your concerns regarding these matters. Please know that I have taken the liberty of directing your correspondence to the President's foreign policy advisers for thorough review and consideration. I am sure they will be contacting you in the near future with a complete assessment.

With cordial regard, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Howard W. Cannon
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MLF:CMF:ASR:asr

cc: w/copy of incoming, NSC Secretariat, for DIRECT response.
(Please send copy of response to Charlie Ponticelli,
White House Legislative Affairs.)

June 22, 1981

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Sincerely,

Max B. Friedlander
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Howard W. Cannon
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MLP:GMP:ASR:asr

cc: w/copy of incoming, NSC Secretariat, for DIRECT response.
(Please send copy of response to Charlie Ponticelli,
White House Legislative Affairs.)

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 23, 1981

022808

Mr. President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President

Owing to a continuing interest which I have in the stability of the political and security situation in Central and Latin America, I wonder if you could furnish me with some information on current Administration thinking in certain specific areas.

I would like to know whether the situation in Panama is working out as forecasted by Treaty supporters or whether the Administration still views the Treaty as a negative or destructive instrument leading to the weakening of our security and other arrangements vis-a-vis Central and Latin America.

Are there plans to abrogate or alter in any way the conditions of the Treaty or do these benefits seem to outweigh previous doubts and concerns relative to the Treaty?

These questions will be most important in shaping my own viewpoint regarding the turmoil which periodically strikes in the countries south of Mexico, and I would appreciate your expeditious response.

Sincerely,


HOWARD W. CANNON

HWC:CBS:ja

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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CD001-09

FG038
FG006-12

WS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

Authority NSC State Waivers

February 11, 1981

BY dr NARA DATE 4/16/2019

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

ROGER W. FONTAINE RF

SUBJECT:

The Vice President and
the Western Hemisphere (U)

Background

1. The Reagan Administration has clearly indicated that the Western Hemisphere is to be given higher priority than it has been in the last 10 years, and it is to be dealt with on principles sharply different from the ones accepted in the last four. (C)
2. New policies take time to implement, but important and appropriate symbols of our concern can signal that shift in policy. This is particularly the case in South America as opposed to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean where serious changes in policy must be carried out immediately. (e)
3. The Vice President can play a unique role in implementing these changes. He can serve as the President's eyes and ears: he can be the direct point of contact for our friends in the region; he can provide the follow-up necessary to keep the bureaucracy honest in carrying out policy. (C)
4. The Vice President can assume this role provided he has and is perceived as having direct access to the President. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid the high profile Mondale-in-charge-of-Africa precedent which raised and then did not meet expectations. (C)

Recommendations

The Vice President should therefore build his contacts and acquire the expertise to handle this portfolio. A high profile "coordinator" out of the White House would lead again to exaggerated expectations, and probably confusion and resistance at the State Department. (C)

1. The Vice President could begin with a series of unpublicized meetings with key ambassadors and visiting high ranking officials to discuss their principal concerns and problems. The emphasis would be on listening and reporting to the President. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review February 11, 1987

NSC#8100424

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

2. These meetings could be supplemented by a trip of the Vice President's or a special envoy reporting back to the Vice President. The first trip should include the countries of South America: Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. All have suffered at the hands of the previous administration and are eager for improved relations. A trip could be built around General Viola's inauguration on March 29. This would be preceded by a visit to Brazil and followed by a trip to Chile. In the case of the Brazilian and Argentine presidents, they would be extended invitations to the U.S. (C)

A second trip could take in the northern tier of South American states: Colombia and Venezuela; Peru and Ecuador. (C)

The meetings should be informal, get-acquainted sessions in which the Vice President or the special envoy would convey the new administration's intentions in the region, and in particular how we plan to conduct relations with the major countries of the region. (C)

The Vice President's success depends on keeping the meetings as low profile as possible. This will minimize problems with State. Moreover, the Latin Americans will quickly pick up on the importance of such meetings with the Vice President and would welcome quiet, but effective contact with the White House. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To Richard Allen:

This paper is in response to your telephone request on February 9 regarding a possible role for the Vice-President in hemispheric Affairs.

Henry Nau has reviewed it & likes the idea. He suggests a special envoy to the southern cone. I would like the Vice-President to go.

(unrelated to this project, Dick Steve has expressed a wish to be the President's special representative to Argentine President Videla's inauguration March 29.)
Rogen

UNCLASSIFIED / ON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

db 1/27/10

RECEIVED 12 FEB 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 11 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA

MEXICO

CARIBBEAN

SUBJECT: THE VP & RELATIONS W/ THE WESTREN HEMISPHERE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 FEB 81 STATUS X FILES

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1981

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FG006-12

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Caribbean Basin Plan

Explaining the Caribbean Basin Plan frequently gets one embroiled in earlier policies and plans.

Attached is a brief overview of the Monroe Doctrine, the Alliance for Progress and the President's tentative ideas on the Caribbean Basin. We emphasize the differences.

Attachments

cc: The Vice President
James Baker
Larry Speakes
David Gergen
Frank Ursomarso
Mort Allin

6/16 delivered / sent copy to all
1030
JP

N50 #8103413

I. Monroe Doctrine

The Doctrine, first announced by President James Monroe in a message to the Congress in December 1823, was a unilateral declaration which attempted to meet the perceived security needs of the United States in this hemisphere and the Caribbean in particular. The U.S. resisted in the 19th century all attempts to multilateralize the Doctrine. The Doctrine as announced by Monroe and framed by his Secretary of State, John Q. Adams, consisted of two principles. First, the U.S. would oppose any transfer of Spanish possessions (e.g., Cuba) to a third European party. Second, the U.S. would oppose the imposition of the "European political system" on any part of this hemisphere. The Doctrine which the U.S. was unable to enforce unilaterally in the 19th century was revived and expanded by Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. Roosevelt's corollary asserted that the U.S. exercised "an international police power" to prevent chaos in Latin American countries, thus preventing unwanted European intervention.

II. Alliance for Progress

The Alliance, an initiative of the Kennedy Administration, was a high profile, crash program that was intended to transform politically, economically, and socially, the entire hemisphere south of the Rio Grande in a decade. Heavy emphasis was placed on unilateral U.S. public funding that would be forthcoming in heavy amounts to those governments who carried out social and economic reforms agreed to by the 20 American republics in the Punta del Este Charter. The sum of \$20 billion over the ten year period was widely discussed although the Kennedy administration estimated that sum would be the combined total of U.S. (and other) public and private capital flows. Low keyed was a corollary policy of providing security assistance stressing counter-insurgency and civic action programs for those countries under attack by Cuban-sponsored guerrillas. The Alliance, in fact, did expend enormous sums of money, but political instability and reluctance to embrace radical social reforms in Latin America forced U.S. policy makers to deviate from the aid-for-reform-which-would-spur-economic-growth strategy to an aid policy that underwrote social services (housing and literacy campaigns).

III. Caribbean Basin Plan

The Caribbean plan is a broad cooperative effort aimed at the Caribbean Basin (the insular Caribbean, Central America, and the small north coast South American nations).

The U.S. will join other donors like Mexico, Canada, Venezuela, Western Europe and Japan in the plan. (Thus, it is not an Alliance for Progress or a Marshall Plan which emphasized a unilateral U.S. public assistance effort.) The focus is on economic development stimulated by multilateral one-way trade concessions and incentives for foreign investment. Some increase in bilateral aid programs is envisioned, but such programs need to be re-worked for the needs of small economies. Spurring economic development is designed to reduce Soviet and Cuban opportunities in the region, and reduce migration to the U.S. It will also serve as a positive backdrop for U.S. security assistance and other measures designed to contain if not eliminate altogether Cuban and Soviet adventuring in the region.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROGER FONTAINE *RF*

SUBJECT: Monroe Doctrine, Alliance for Progress and the Caribbean Basin Plan

At your request, attached at Tab A are the distinguishing features of the Monroe Doctrine, Alliance for Progress and the Caribbean Basin Plan.

Attachments

Memoranda for Ed Meese

cc. *OP*
JAB
Larry Speakes
David Byrne
Frank Wilton
Mark Allen

*cy
att's*

Caribbean Basin Plan

Attached is a short description of explaining the Caribbean Basin Plan frequently gets one embroiled in earlier policies and plans. It is a brief overview of the Monroe Doctrine, the Alliance for Progress and the President's tentative ideas on the Caribbean Basin. We emphasize the

12 P4: 17

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Dick - You asked

for this info.

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RECEIVED 12 JUN 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 10 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: CARIBBEAN

SUBJECT: DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF MONROE DOCTRINE / ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS /
& CARIBBEAN BASIN PLAN AS REQUESTED BY RVA

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

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FOR COMMENT

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: ALLEN J. LENZ *ajl*

MG

SUBJECT: State Reactions to Proposed Congressional Resolutions

031505
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 C0001-09
 C0046
 C0060
 C0020
 C0038
 LE

State's detailed responses to the Administration's position on three House resolutions dealing with El Salvador, Guatemala and Bolivia are proper and adequate responses to three pieces of ill-conceived legislation.

FG011
 FG006-12

 Staff initial

NSC#8103232



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

June 1, 1981

NSC/S

~~3232~~

3232

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
Department of Defense
National Security Council ✓

SUBJECT: State proposed report on resolutions relating
to El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cuba.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than June 29, 1981.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710),
the legislative analyst in this office,

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures
cc:
Jim Barie



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to your request of April 20 for the views of the Department of State concerning H.Con.Res. 67, H.Res. 65, H.Res. 101 and H.J.Res. 136.

With regard to H.Con.Res. 67, a resolution expressing concern over the situation in El Salvador, the Department opposes any country-specific resolution which restricts the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Department also opposes the resolution because the goal of our assistance is to facilitate the transition of an elected government and to block left-wing guerrillas, armed and advised from abroad, from overthrowing a government committed to reform. A number of Eastern European Communist countries, Vietnam and Ethiopia joined Cuba to intervene in an essentially domestic conflict in Central America. These efforts to impose a military solution have failed to gain popular support in El Salvador. Our failure to respond adequately to this attempt to overthrow a government committed to reforms and to electoral solutions would make it more likely that other countries seeking domestic solutions to domestic problems would find their efforts thwarted by externally-supported guerrillas. The objectives of our military assistance are limited: to help the Government of El Salvador with its problems of training, equipment repair and maintenance, mobility and re-supply. We believe the measured steps we have taken are reasonable and responsible. They are carefully designed to encourage insurgents to see the futility of violence, to help the government defend and implement its reforms and to influence the Salvadoran military to control abuses of authority.

The reference to the "negotiated settlement" in the resolution, while praiseworthy, is unclear. If what is meant by "negotiated settlement" is the establishment of a government in El Salvador by negotiation, we oppose it because it does not allow the people of El Salvador to choose their own leaders. If, on the other hand, what is implied is that the conditions and procedures for elections are to be worked out among Salvadorans,

The Honorable

Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman,
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
House of Representatives.

then we support such a concept. The resolution does not make a reference to elections, a means by which all who have been fighting with arms may test their strength before their own people in a non-violent, democratic manner. The Salvadoran Government has already begun to implement the political process which is expected to lead to elections for a Constituent Assembly in 1982.

The Department strongly opposes the resolution's call for a suspension of military aid to El Salvador pending the issuance of certain reports by the Congress. Strengthening the forces of moderation, completing the investigations in the murder of our citizens, and implementation of the agrarian reform are all goals shared by both the United States and the Government of El Salvador. Success in achieving many of these objectives is not wholly dependent upon the Salvadoran Government, but also depends on the violent actions of leftist and rightist extremists who would both benefit by the aid suspension contemplated in the resolution. The aid suspension would not advance the objectives listed in the resolution.

With regard to H.Res. 65, a resolution calling for certain policy actions toward Bolivia, we oppose, as a matter of principle, any country-specific legislation which restricts the ability of the President to conduct foreign affairs. This resolution prescribes a fixed formula for promoting our interests in a country in which the political situation historically has been quite fluid, requiring a flexible approach. We do not believe enactment of the resolution would advance our interests and serious concern in Bolivia about protection of U.S. citizens and property, the commitment of the Bolivian Government to restoration of democratic and constitutional rule with protections for individual freedom, and the full cooperation of the Bolivian Government in bringing an end to narcotics traffic from Bolivia to the U.S.

Our relations with Bolivia have been cool since the current government came to power in a coup on July 17, 1980. The military assistance program remains suspended, development aid continues to be curtailed and the American Embassy in La Paz is headed by a Chargé instead of an Ambassador.

Following a recent policy review, the Chargé was instructed to review with Bolivian Government officials the status of our relations and to seek improved performance in areas of interest to the United States, particularly effective action to combat narcotics trafficking.

With regard to H.Res. 101, a resolution concerning Guatemala, we do not believe that the enactment of this resolution would contribute to the goal which we all share of reducing violence in Guatemala. We also oppose this resolution as country-specific legislation which restricts the ability of the President to conduct foreign affairs.

Furthermore, the resolution is one-sided. It neither acknowledges that there is an armed insurgency in Guatemala, nor the fact that the violence has escalated as Cuban support for guerrilla and terrorist activities aimed at overthrowing the Government of Guatemala has increased.

If we are to have any positive influence on what happens in Guatemala, we are going to have to establish a more constructive relationship with the Guatemalan Government than has been the case in the past. To achieve this objective, the President must retain his prerogatives in the foreign affairs area that this amendment seeks to curtail.

With regard to H.J.Res. 136, a resolution concerning Cuba, the Department believes that passage of such a resolution would not be helpful to the conduct of an effective and comprehensive policy towards Cuba. Soviet military use of Cuba is of serious concern to this Administration and must be regarded in the context of the entire pattern of Cuban domestic and foreign military deployments and support of subversion. Cuban/Soviet military collaboration has been highly destabilizing and injurious to world peace and order.

On behalf of the Department of State, I wish to thank the Committee for this opportunity to present our views on these matters.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

RECEIVED 03 JUN 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 01 JUN 81

031505

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

BOLIVIA

GUATEMALA

CUBA

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: STATE PROPOSED REPORT ON RESOLUTIONS RE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO LENZ TO PETERSON DUE: 25 ~~MAY~~ 81 STATUS S FILES
~~JUNE~~

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FOR INFO

FONTAINE

STEARMAN

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no comment

COMMENTS

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