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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

DLB 1/28/2010

FOIA

S10-306

SYSTEMATIC

129

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
83659	MEMO	BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM - COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE RIO TREATY R 4/16/2019 DEPT. OF STATE WAIVER, 11/6/2015	9	3/19/1982	B1
83660	LETTER	REAGAN TO PM EDWARD SEAGA/JAMAICA R 4/16/2019 NSC/DOS WAIVERS	2	8/16/2010	B1
83661	LETTER	DRAFT OF #83660 R 4/16/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS	1	ND	B1
83662	LETTER	PM EDWARD SEAGA TO REAGAN R 4/16/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS	3	7/5/1982	B1
83663	LETTER	NSC DRAFT RESPONSE VERSION FOR #83660 R 4/16/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS	2	8/4/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C.F.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 5, 1982

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FE011
FE006-12

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE *RF*

SUBJECT: State Department Background Memorandum:
"Collective Security and the Rio Treaty"

Attached at Tab A is a lengthy State Department memorandum analyzing the Rio Treaty as an instrument for collective security.

It is a good piece of work. Unless you specifically requested it, I do not recommend you read it at this time. NSC staff will rely on it in preparing strategy papers regarding Central America.

RECOMMENDATION

That you do not read this State memorandum at this time.

Approve *RF* _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A State Department Background Memorandum

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Review on April 5, 1988

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *ds*, DATE *1/22/10*

NSC #8202303

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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April 1, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

W
SITU 14

Subject: Collective Security and the Rio Treaty

Attached for your information and the use of your staff is the background memorandum by the Department on the Rio Treaty and its collective security provisions which I believe Bill Middendorf mentioned to you earlier. The memorandum deals with the advantages of utilizing the Rio Treaty provisions for collective security rather than the OAS Charter; the pertinent provisions of the Treaty; the mechanism; some of the history of previous Rio Treaty applications; and finally the Department's views on the attitudes of signatories today toward a possible Treaty invocation.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Background memorandum on
Rio Treaty

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY 110 NARA, DATE 1/27/10

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GDS 3/24/88

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United States Department of State

*United States Permanent Mission to the
Organization of American States*

Washington, D. C. 20520

March 19, 1982

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Authority State Waver 11/6/15
BY db NARA DATE 4/16/2019

Collective Security and the Rio Treaty
BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM

Introduction and Summary

This administration has taken care to assure regional leaders that our approach to threats to hemispheric peace is rooted in the collective security concept. Ad hoc collective security actions by a group of like minded States which agree on objectives probably are possible. However, a formal base and an effective domestic rationale for collective security action are found in both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty, although as a practical matter such formal action is more difficult to orchestrate. Past lessons (most recently the 1979 defeat of the abortive White House-dictated Nicaraguan peace force proposal) underscore the need for quiet testing of member reaction to any proposals we might make to invoke the Charter or Rio Treaty mechanisms. Utilization of either, of course, occurs in a parliamentary proceeding where we must win votes to be successful. Therefore, compelling evidence, careful preparation, and high level representations in host capitals to muster the necessary votes are important for success.

From a US standpoint, the Rio Treaty is preferable to the Charter as a basis for collective action. Unlike the Charter, the Rio Treaty provides for collective measures which are binding on all member states. Moreover, the voting pattern is generally more favorable under the Treaty. In recent years Latins have been reluctant to invoke the Treaty, since it had come to be viewed as an instrument for imposing US policy on our neighbors. We believe, however, in light of the climate of concern in the hemisphere today that consideration of use of the Rio Treaty is possible --and legitimate--at such time as policymakers judge it a useful adjunct to US policy. The following brief study of the Rio Treaty deals with why it is preferable to action under the Charter, the pertinent provisions, the mechanisms, something of the history of previous Rio Treaty applications, and finally, USOAS' views on the reactions today of members to a Treaty invocation.

The Rio Treaty vs the OAS Charter

Both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty provide for measures which can be taken when two-thirds of

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the membership consider that a threat to peace and security exists. Almost all American States (except Canada, Guyana and Belize) are parties to the OAS Charter but in addition to the three non-OAS members, nine OAS members (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname) have not joined the Rio Treaty. While any American state can seek help under the Rio Treaty, non-signatories are excluded from participating and voting.

Thus, on a potentially divisive issue of major proportions the Treaty offers a smoother route to possible action. The math involved in getting a two-thirds vote under the Charter and under the Treaty is simple. With Bahamas now a member, the OAS participating membership is 30 and 20 votes are needed to implement security measures. There are 21 Rio Treaty signatories. Two-thirds of 21 is 14. The Rio Treaty signatories are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (Technically, Cuba remains listed as a signatory but in 1962 the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers, convened under the Rio Treaty, resolved that Cuba by its acts and by its adherence to Marxism-Leninism, which is incompatible with the inter-American system, was excluded from participation in that system. Cuba thus was excluded from the Council of the OAS, its committees and its organs by a subsequent decision of the OAS Permanent Council.)

The Rio Treaty--What It Is

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, was signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security held in Rio de Janeiro in 1947. It was the first Inter-American initiative on collective security to gain widespread support. The treaty establishes a mechanism for considering and responding to cases of armed aggression and threats to the peace of the Americas on a regional basis.

Article 3 of the Treaty deals with armed attack. Under it the parties have agreed that an attack by any state against any American state shall be considered an attack against all American states and each has undertaken to assist in meeting the attack. In such cases the signatories are to meet "without delay" so that measures to be taken of a collective character can be considered. Pending a decision on collective

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measures, each party may, at the request of the state attacked, determine the immediate measures it may take in fulfillment of this obligation, consistent with the right of individual and collective self-defense.

Article 6 of the Treaty provides for collective action in other cases of aggression*/ and "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America." The current Cuban techniques of financing and/or training subversives (either local or imported) could be considered such a fact or situation by a like-minded two-thirds majority of the Organ of Consultation as was such Cuban action with respect to Venezuela in 1964. Article 6 does not expressly provide for independent action by individual signatory states which are parties to the Treaty prior to a decision on collective measures but would not preclude such reactions otherwise permissible under the UN Charter and international law to aggressive or hostile acts. In their references to "an American state" and "any American state," Articles 3 and 6 also clearly envision providing the same protection, in the cases covered, to countries in the region that are not among the 21 signatories.

Article 7 of the Treaty deals with cases of conflict between two or more American states. We believe "conflict," in the context of this particular Article, must be defined as "armed conflict"--i.e., hostilities between the countries in question, presumably ruling out the applicability of this Article to cases of covert subversion not involving use of force by one state against another.

Article 8 of the Treaty sets out a range of measures which can be employed. They are: recall of diplomats, breaking of diplomatic and consular relations, partial or complete interruption of economic relations, shut down of communications and/or transportation links, and use of armed force. Decisions on these measures are binding on all signatories with one exception -- no state may be required to commit armed forces without its consent. In the case of a conflict between two or more member states, the Rio Treaty signatories would first call for a suspension of hostilities and restoration of the status quo before hostilities started.

*/ "Aggression" is defined in Article 9 as including unprovoked armed attack or invasion by military forces, as well as other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression. The US has consistently rejected suggestions that actions not involving the use of force could be considered aggression.

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Thereafter, the Rio Treaty mechanism is also empowered to take all other necessary measures to reestablish or maintain inter-American peace and security. The UN Charter, Chapter VI and VII mechanisms, remains potentially applicable to any matter dealt with under the Rio Treaty. Any measures by Rio Treaty members in individual or collective self-defense must be reported to the UN Security Council.

The Treaty Mechanism--How It Works

Article 13 provides, generally, that any party to the Treaty may initiate a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System (a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers or MFCM) in Article 3, Article 6 and Article 7 cases by making a request to the OAS Permanent Council. The requesting party is usually the State that has been attacked or the most directly aggrieved. In acting to convene consultations, the Permanent Council can decide procedural questions by a majority vote of Treaty parties.

The Permanent Council of the OAS may act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation until Foreign Ministers can assemble. In a number of Rio Treaty cases Permanent Council action as the Organ has been sufficient; the Foreign Ministers have not had to meet.

Decisions of the Organ of Consultation or the Permanent Council as such, are made by an affirmative two-thirds majority of the signatory states. Decisions are binding on all signatories, with the already noted exception of commitment of armed forces. *(See footnote --page 9).

The Organ of Consultation, under the Rio Treaty, would be comprised of the twenty-one signatories, making 14 the number theoretically needed for a two-thirds vote. However, the parties directly involved in the dispute are excluded from voting in the Organ of Consultation although they can participate in its meetings. A decision on who may vote is taken either by the Permanent Council or by the Organ. Exclusion of at least two members would correspondingly reduce the number of votes needed for a two-thirds majority for action. For example, in a dispute between say Nicaragua and Costa Rica, neither could vote so only 13 votes would be needed for decisions on the measures to be taken by the Rio Treaty participants.

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Past Applications of the Treaty

The Rio Treaty has been invoked some 16 times since its ratification. (Attached is a summary listing of the meetings and their accomplishments.) The first meeting, in 1948, dealt with a Costa Rican charge that Nicaraguan forces had invaded its territory. As a result of mediation by the Treaty signatories the two governments signed a Pact of Amity in 1949. The most recent deliberations of an Organ of Consultation convened under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, and under Article 26 of the Charter, again dealt with the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border. At this 18th MFM in December, 1978, Costa Rica expressed its fear of Nicaraguan fomented violence along the border. The Rio Treaty mechanism, as a result of this MFM, established a civilian committee of observers which functioned through the spring of 1979. The Nicaraguan Government of President Somoza had this MFM reconvened in June, 1979 and again in July to hear charges that the border was being used freely for passage of subversives and arms.

Events in Central America or the greater Caribbean, including Venezuela, have dominated the attention of the 16 Meetings convened under the Treaty. The Organ of Consultation has discussed the situation of Cuba five times, relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua four times, relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti twice, and, in 1969, the Honduras/El Salvador border dispute.

Cuba--A Special Source of Treaty Concern

Dominating more meetings than any other single problem, concern with Cuba has taken a number of turns over the years. In 1959, Panama brought to the Organ of Consultation its accusation that the new Castro Government was sponsoring an invasion of Panamanian territory; the Organ's investigating committee ultimately was able to obtain the unconditional surrender of the invaders. In 1961-62 at the 8th Meeting of Consultation called at the request of Colombia, the Cuban Government was excluded from participation in the inter-American system, due to the actions of the Cuban Government and the Meeting's finding that Marxism-Leninism was

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incompatible with the inter-American system. In 1962 at the request of the United States, the Permanent Council acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation dealt with the Cuban missile crisis, taking steps to impede Soviet delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba. In effect, the US received the approval of the Rio Treaty signatories for an almost unilateral quarantine of Cuba. (Only Argentina sent warships, although Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Haiti and the Dominican Republic offered basing facilities.) In 1963-64 Venezuela denounced to the 9th Meeting of Consultation Cuba's acts of intervention and aggression. The Organ, on the basis of its investigation, found Cuba guilty of attempting to subvert and overthrow the Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault and guerrilla warfare. The Rio Treaty members imposed strong sanctions, binding on the Treaty signatories, including suspension of sea transportation, trade, and diplomatic and consular relations. Mexico voted against sanctions and consistently refused to observe them in violation of its obligations under the Charter.

By the mid-1970's times and the climate of opinion had changed. By then Castro had embarked on his short-lived policy of cultivating his hemispheric neighbors. Some of the member states which originally had supported the sanctions were coming to regret their loss of diplomatic flexibility caused by the sanctions' binding nature. Some professed to be concerned with possible erosion of the Rio Treaty due to the efforts of some members to circumvent the sanctions. And, US calculations had shifted from whether we had the two-thirds majority needed for action to whether we could maintain a blocking one-third to impede a dismantling of the Cuban sanctions.

Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela in 1974 at the 15th MFM failed in their effort to muster the votes needed to challenge the sanctions. The next year, at the 16th MFM, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, with US support finally, succeeded in having a resolution passed which left the parties free to have with Cuba the sort of relations desired by each individual state. Following this

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freeing of the member states, a number, including Peru, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama, moved to establish relations. Today, of course, outside the English-speaking Caribbean only a very few states -- Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama -- have relatively normal relations through resident Ambassadors in Havana.

Invocation of the Rio Treaty Today

Times, the sentiments of the member governments represented in the OAS, and perceptions of the issues, change. The OAS of 1982 is quite different from the OAS of 1962 when we got approval to act almost unilaterally in blockading Cuba. The idea of non-intervention is strong within the OAS; it is reflected throughout the OAS Charter. It represents the traditional efforts of the OAS membership to control the US exercise of its power. Nagging reservations among some member states about US policy and the seriousness of the binding nature of the Treaty measures would lead each member to weigh its vote very carefully. In the 1975 Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty, such reservations led to the new provision that sanctions shall be lifted by majority, rather than two-thirds, vote. (To date only seven states, including the US, have ratified this amendment; ratification by two-thirds of the signatories is needed before it will come into force.) Members also remember the White House-directed abortive effort in 1979 to take the OAS by surprise and establish a peacekeeping force in Nicaragua. However, US use of the Rio Treaty option is a possibility when circumstances are sufficiently compelling. Moreover, the Rio Treaty provides us with both a legal framework for our actions and a persuasive rationale to use domestically and internationally, as was the case in the Cuban missile crisis and in the imposition of sanctions against Cuba.

The changes for the worse in Nicaragua, our increasing strong evidence of pervasive Cuban support of subversion, and concern with events throughout Central America have caused increased dismay among a significant number of Latin American governments. These governments seem more willing to consider the desirability of collective action or, at the least, to cooperate in providing us with a multilateral umbrella for our actions. However, given their concern with respect to the binding nature of the Rio Treaty and its use in the past, it is likely that we may have to take

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into account a residue of sentiment favoring collective action under Article 59 of the Charter, which provides for convening a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers "to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States..." Unlike the Rio Treaty, the Charter contains no provision on the measures such a Meeting might take.

The recent OAS General Assembly 22-3 vote in favor of the El Salvador resolution is one indication of this sentiment in the region. Another recent indication of growing consensus is the widely heralded formation by Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras of the Central American Democratic Community with its commitment, strongly and publicly supported by Colombia, Venezuela and the US, to the collective security principle. With such a consensus forming the Rio Treaty could become what a strong and determined majority want to make of it. Therefore, Rio Treaty collective reaction to aggression short of armed attack, as set out in Article 6, can be flexibly implemented by a two-thirds voting majority to deal with any demonstrable threat to the peace if consistent with the UN and OAS Charters and international law. Lining up the votes would depend on: (a) obtaining firm commitments by engaging in thorough consultation with member states; (b) the existence of a compelling factual and legal case; and (c) the extent to which a two-thirds majority of the members feel a sense of direct threat to their national interests.

These days many Latin American leaders are sounding more worried, and more supportive of US initiatives, and the situation in Central America may get much worse before it gets better. Provided we are able to monitor carefully possible member reactions to serious policy options which we have under consideration these developments make consideration of the invocation of the Rio Treaty possible -- and legitimate -- at such time as policy-makers judge it a useful adjunct to US policy.

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*Footnote: (page 4) Some of the present provisions of the Rio Treaty would be altered by a pending amendment to the Treaty. The Protocol of Amendment, signed by all the signatories to the Rio Treaty in 1975, requires ratification by two-thirds (14) of them to come into force; to date, only seven, including the US, have ratified the amendment.

The most important substantive changes bear on measures agreed upon by the Organ of Consultation. New Article 23 would explicitly authorize adoption of non-binding recommendations, as well as binding decisions, on measures to be taken under Article 8. In addition, new Article 20, while retaining a two-thirds vote requirement for adoption of decisions or recommendations, would reduce the requirement to a simple majority for recision of such measures. Among other changes, the Protocol would also include stronger language on "non-intervention." A new Article 12 would state that nothing in the Treaty is to be interpreted as impairing "the principle of non-intervention and the right of all States to choose freely their political, economic and social organization." A new Article 6 would prohibit the Organ of Consultation from providing assistance to a state without the consent of that state.

Attachment: Summary of Past Rio Treaty Applications

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APPENDIX

APPLICATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE

1948-1972

Year	States Directly Concerned	Requesting State	Reason for the Request	Action Taken or Results
1948-49	Costa Rica - Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Costa Rica alleged that its territory had been invaded by armed forces proceeding from Nicaragua.	Signature of a Pact of Amity between the two governments on February 21, 1949, in the presence of the Council of the OAS. The Pact entered into force on July 15, 1949.
1950	Haiti-Dominican Republic (Case A) and Haiti, Dominican Republic and Cuba (Case B)	Haiti and latter Dominican Republic	Haiti charged that the Dominican Republic threatened to use force and the Dominican Republic cited various acts that threatened the sovereignty and political independence of the Dominican State.	Initiative by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation to perfect inter-American instruments, such as the Havana Convention of 1928 on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, and negotiations by the Investigating Committee of the Council carried out on the site.
1954	Guatemalan situation	Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and the United States	Intervention by the international communist movement in Guatemala	(The convocation of the Organ of Consultation was cancelled in view of the change of government that took place shortly after it had been made.)

Year	States Directly Concerned	Requesting State	Reason for the Request	Action Taken or Results
1955	Costa Rica - Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Facts similar to those which motivated the request for application of the Treaty in 1948.	Agreement between both countries in compliance with Article IV of the Pact of Amity of 1949, and Agreement on the functioning of the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation established in accordance with the Pact of Bogotá (both signed in the presence of the Council of the OAS).
1957	Honduras - Nicaragua	Honduras and later Nicaragua	Honduras charged violations of its territory and Nicaragua made similar charges (area in dispute).	Agreement of July 21, 1957, signed in the presence of the Council of the OAS, by which the parties agreed to take the matter before the International Court of Justice. The border in dispute was later demarcated in accordance with the decision of the said Court and, at the request of both parties, with the collaboration of the Inter-American Peace Committee.
1959	Panama	Panama (For the first time no accusation was made against another state)	Invasion of Panama by foreign elements proceeding from Cuba.	Initiative by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation and negotiations carried out by the Investigating Committee of the Council on the site, with the approval of the Government of Panama, to obtain the unconditional surrender of the invaders and the deposit of their arms.

Year	States Directly Concerned	Requesting State	Reason for the Request	Action Taken or Results
1959	Nicaragua	Nicaragua (no accusation against another state)	Invasion of Nicaragua, by air, by nationals of various countries proceeding from Costa Rica and threat of invasion by land and sea.	Initiative by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation and negotiations carried out on the site by the Committee appointed by said Organ to collect additional information regarding the situation that had motivated the complaint.
1960	Venezuela - Dominican Republic	Venezuela	Attempt against the life of the Venezuelan Chief of State.	Sending of an Investigating Committee by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation and holding of the Sixth Meeting of Consultation in San José, Costa Rica. Measures were taken against the Government of the Dominican Republic and later were extended by the Council. Said measures were lifted by the Council on January 4, 1962.
1961-62	Cuban situation	Colombia	Consideration of the threats to the peace and political independence of the American states and the possible measures to be adopted for the maintenance of peace and security, in case said threats or certain acts occurred.	Exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from participation in the Inter-American System and other measures adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, Punta del Este, Uruguay, 1962.

Year	States Directly Concerned	Requesting State	Reason for the Request	Action Taken or Results
1962	Cuban situation	United States	Establishment on Cuban territory, by extracontinental powers, of offensive weapons with nuclear capability.	Measures taken by the Member States, based on the resolution approved by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, to impede the delivery to Cuba of offensive weapons and to cause the withdrawal from Cuba, by the Soviet Union, of missiles and military personnel. The provisional action of the Council as Organ of Consultation has not been cancelled.
1963	Dominican Republic-Haiti	Costa Rica and later Haiti	Statement by the Dominican Republic that its Embassy in Port-au-Prince was broken into by members of the Haitian public force and denunciation by Haiti of certain facts relative to an armed invasion by a group of Haitian exiles from Dominican territory.	Recommendations to the parties by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation and negotiations carried out on the site by the Investigating Committee of the Council in order to solve the problem. The asilees eventually left both countries; the governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic began formal negotiations under the Committee's auspices and, finally, renewed diplomatic relations.
1963-64	Venezuela.-Cuba	Venezuela	Denunciation by the Government of Venezuela of acts of intervention and aggression by the Government of Cuba.	Sending of an Investigating Committee to the site by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation and report by the Committee. This report was submitted to the Ninth Meeting of Consultation, Washington, D. C., July 1964, and on that basis the said Meeting decided to apply certain measures to the present Government of Cuba and made a Declaration to the Cuban people.

Year	States Directly Concerned	Requesting State	Reason for the Request	Action Taken or Results
1964	Panama - United States	Panama	Denunciation by the Government of Panama of acts of aggression by the United States in connection with the events that occurred in Panama on January 9, 10 and 11, 1964.	Establishment of a General Committee by the Council of the OAS acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation and sending of a five-member Delegation by the Committee to investigate and concillate. On April 3, 1964, the Representatives of both parties signed a Joint Declaration that established the bases of an agreement between them. On September 24, 1965, the Presidents of the United States and Panama issued a joint declaration on the progress in the negotiation of new treaties. These negotiations still continued, with occasional interruptions, at the date of publication. The provisional action of the Council as Organ of Consultation has not yet been cancelled.
1969	El Salvador Honduras	Honduras and El Salvador	Political and military crisis between El Salvador and Honduras, in which there was a series of mutual accusations of acts of aggression, and which culminated when Salvadorean troops occupied part of Honduran territory and the Government of El Salvador invoked the right of self defense.	The Council acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation named a Special Committee which traveled immediately to the area in conflict. The Thirteenth Meeting of Consultation was held; it achieved establishment of a cease-fire, troop withdrawal, prisoner exchange, and guarantees for Salvadorean citizens residing in Honduras.

Year	States Directly Concerned	Requesting State	Reason for the Request	Action Taken or Results
1969	El Salvador - Honduras	Honduras and El Salvador		The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also cooperated, as well as groups of civilian and military observers organized by the Special Committee. The General Secretariat also fulfilled all the mandates it received from the Meeting of Consultation and the Special Committee.

APPENDIX C

SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE

1973-1976^{1/}

Year	States Directly Involved	Requesting State	Reason for Request	Action Taken or Results
1969	El Salvador-Honduras	Honduras and El Salvador	Political and military crisis between El Salvador and Honduras in which there was a series of mutual accusations of acts of aggression and which culminated when Salvadorian troops occupied part of Honduran territory and the Government of El Salvador invoked the right of self-defense.	On October 6, 1976 the Foreign Ministers of El Salvador and Honduras signed an agreement under which disputes arising from the armed conflict that took place in 1969 will be submitted to mediation. ^{2/} The activities of the Organ of Consultation have not yet been terminated.
1974	Situation of Cuba	Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela	That the Permanent Council convoke a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs serving as Organ of Consultation so that, taking into account the change in the international political situation that existed when the measures were taken in 1964 against the Government of Cuba, it may decide	The Fifteenth Meeting of Consultation was held in Quito, Ecuador from November 8 to 22, 1974. The draft resolution presented at that meeting by the delegations of Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela proposing that the application of Resolution I of the Ninth Meeting

1. For the period 1948-72 see Volume II, pp. 379-385.

2. See summary of the actions taken from 1969 to 1972 in Volume II, p. 385.

Year	States Directly Involved	Requesting State	Reason for Request	Action Taken or Results
			whether there is justification for discontinuing the application of Resolution I of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation	of Consultation be discontinued did not obtain the majority of votes required for approval.
1975	Situation of Cuba	Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela	To convoke a meeting of the Organ of Consultation to consider the following matter: "Freedom of Action of the States Parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to Normalize or Conduct Their Relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in the form that each State deems Advisable".	The Sixteenth Meeting of Consultation was held in San José, Costa Rica, on July 29, 1975. The Meeting adopted a resolution reaffirming the principle of non-intervention and leaving the States Parties to the Rio Treaty free to normalize or conduct, in accordance with the national policy and interests of each, their relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in the form that each State deems advisable.
1978	Costa Rica-Nicaragua	Costa Rica	To convoke a meeting of the Organ of Consultation "to take necessary measures for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent" in the light of statements by the President of Nicaragua and other circumstances "which imply a serious threat to the peace of the Central American region and to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Costa Rica."	The Organ of Consultation (18th MFM) meeting December 29, 1978, and reconvened June 4, 1979, June 11, 1979, and July 12, 1979, adopted, among other actions, a resolution asking the Government of Nicaragua to refrain from threats directed against Costa Rica and mandated the dispatch of a Committee of Civilian Observers to the Costa Rican/Nicaraguan border.

National Security Council
The White House

Package #

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SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTION

John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>R</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

STAFF	C/O
Clark	02 APR 1 P10:34
McFarlane	
Poindexter	C
Merchant	O
NSC S/S	

Time Stamp

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NSC/S
FOR STAFFING

C : Copy

O : Original

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 02 APR 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 01 APR 82

KEYWORDS: OAS

CUBA

UN

LATIN AMERICA

TREATIES

SUBJECT: COLLECTIVE SECURITY & RIO TREATY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 06 APR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FONTAINE

GUHIN

NAU

CHILDRESS

SHOEMAKER

COMMENTS

REF# 8205674

LOG 8200525

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Clout X *4/5* *for decision* *4/6*
4/5 *Pondexter approved* *FO*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

W H (C)
OC

April 21 1982

01247

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 1 TRUNCATED BY 4 CHARACTER(S)

On behalf of President Reagan, I wish to extend to you a most cordial invitation to attend a luncheon to be held at the White House on April 28, 1982 at 11:45 A.M. The luncheon will be followed by a briefing immediately afterwards in the East Room. Please enter the Southwest Gate and RSVP to 202/456-7707 with social security number and date of birth.

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 4 TRUNCATED BY 2 CHARACTER(S)

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 5 TRUNCATED BY 2 CHARACTER(S)

Southwest Gate and RSVP to 202/456-7707 with social security number and date of birth.

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 8 TRUNCATED BY 2 CHARACTER(S)

The luncheon and briefing are in regard to a new program, announced

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 9 TRUNCATED BY 2 CHARACTER(S)

by the President at the Organization of American States, to promote

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 10 TRUNCATED BY 2 CHARACTER(S)

self-sustaining growth among the strategically located countries

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 11 TRUNCATED BY 1 CHARACTER(S)

the Caribbean and Central America. The success of the President's

Caribbean Basin initiative will hinge on strengthening market-

oriented economies in the area and encouraging their vigorous

participation in the international economy. Increased U.S. trade

and investment are crucial elements of the program, and growth in

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 16 TRUNCATED BY 1 CHARACTER(S)

the Caribbean will benefit everyone, with American exports finding new markets.

*** (20) ERROR *** LINE 19 TRUNCATED BY 2 CHARACTER(S)

We sincerely hope that you will be able to attend this luncheon and briefing.

The Social Secretary

The White House

**** 9 ERRORS ON THIS PAGE **** NO PREVIOUS ERRORS

** END OF FORMATTING, 9 ERRORS ***** LAST ERROR ON PAGE #1

IN=EDITOR YORKFILE, TEXT FROM SS0428T1

OUT=MAILGRAM

Mr. Joseph Alibrandi
 CEO
 Whittaker Corporation
 10880 Wilshire Blvd.
 Los Angeles CA 90024
 @
 Mr. W. J. Amoss, Jr.
 CEO
 Likes Brothers Steamship Co
 Likes Center
 300 Poydras Street
 New Orleans LA 70130
 @
 Mr. James R. Barker
 CEO
 Moore, McCormack Resources, Inc.
 1 Landmark Square
 Stamford CT 06901
 @
 Mr. John Chamberlain
 CEO
 Genox Inc.
 3190 Princeton Pike
 Lawrenceville NJ 08648
 @
 Mr. John Cox
 CEO
 Insurance Co. of No. America
 1600 Arch Street
 Philadelphia PA 19103
 @
 Mr. John W. Hanley
 CEO
 Monsanto
 800 W. Lindbergh Blvd.
 St. Louis MO 63141
 @
 Mr. Russell Hanlin
 CEO
 Sunkist Growers, Inc.
 P O Box 7888
 Van Nuys CA 91409
 @
 Mr. Raymond J. Hill
 CEO
 Ball Agricultural Systems
 92 West 108 Circle
 Westminster CO 80020
 @
 Mr. Thomas L. Holton
 CEO
 Peat, Marwick Mitchell & Co.
 345 Park Avenue
 New York NY 10154
 @
 Mr. Edward G. Jefferson
 CEO
 E. J. Du Pont de Nemours
 1007 Market Street
 Wilmington DE 19801

@
W Mr. L. Patton Kline
T CEO
O Harso & McClennan, Inc.
A 1221 Avenue of the Americas
A New York NY 10020

@
W Mr. Duane Kullberg
T CEO
O Arthur Anderson & Co.
A 69 West Washington St.
A Chicago IL 60602

@
W Mr. Carl E. Meyer, Jr.
T CEO
O TWA
A 605 3rd Avenue
A New York NY 10158

@
W Mr. Lee Morgan
T CEO
O Caterpillar Tractor Co.
A 100 W.E. Adams Street
A Peoria IL 61602

@
W Mr. Arthur M. Sackler
T CEO
O International Publisher
A 461 E. 57th Street
A New York NY 10022

@
W Mr. William S. Sneath
T CEO
O Union Carbide
A 270 Park Avenue
A New York NY 10017

@

** END OF FORMATTING, NO ERRORS
IN=EDITOR WORKFILE, TEXT FROM SS0428A1
OUT=MAILGRAM

#J10; #093 * MAILGR
#J10; #093 * MAILGR
#J10; #093 * MAILGR

#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM
#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM
#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM

#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM * WED, APR 21, 1982
#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM * WED, APR 21, 1982
#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM * WED, APR 21, 1982

#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM * WED, APR 21, 1982, 5:38 PM
#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM * WED, APR 21, 1982, 5:36 PM
#J10; #093 * MAILGRAM, WH.TT; MAILGRAM * WED, APR 21, 1982, 5:38 PM

080311

ID #

C0001-09

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

82/05/26

FAN

Name of Correspondent: AL CARDENAS☒ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Requesting AN Interview with the President

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
PL	Quin	ORIGINATOR	82/05/26			82/06/17
PL	ZUNI	Referral Note:				
Presidential Scheduling		A 82/05/26				C 82/06/17
SC Fred Ryan		Referral Note:				
		D 82/06/12		ER		A 82/06/16
		Referral Note:				
			1 1			1 1
		Referral Note:				
			1 1			1 1
		Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

ER

Please send to office of Public Liaison
Liaison - Note Infact. Wp. 146 - Draft Response on
Copy of your reply - thank you

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.

Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).

Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.

Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 1140 4640

Prime Subject Code: CO 001-09 Secondary Subject Codes: ND 016 EG 355
CO 167
PR 007

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

CPn - Presidential Correspondence
 n - 0 - Unknown
 n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
 n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 n - 3 - Ron
 n - 4 - Dutch
 n - 5 - Ron Reagan
 n - 6 - Ronald
 n - 7 - Ronnie

CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 0 - Unknown
 n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Nancy
 n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

B - Box/package
 C - Copy
 D - Official document
 G - Message
 H - Handcarried
 L - Letter
 M - Mailgram
 O - Memo
 P - Photo
 R - Report
 S - Sealed
 T - Telegram
 V - Telephone
 X - Miscellaneous
 Y - Study

June 16, 1982

Dear Mr. Alba:

Mr. Cardenas brought to our attention the letter of May 19 which he received from you about an interview with the President for Vision News Television News Service.

We are very sorry indeed that the President's busy schedule to date has not made it possible to honor your request and that a time is not foreseen when an interview could be arranged in view of the continuing heavy demands upon him.

Please be assured that your interest and thoughtfulness in asking for an interview are appreciated, nevertheless, and that you have our best wishes.

Sincerely,

Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
Deputy Director
Presidential Appointments
and Scheduling

Mr. Nelson Alba
Executive Director
Vision News Television
News Service
Suite 106
7100 Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, FL 33138

✓ WHcc: Alberto Cardenas, Esq.
Barron, Lehman, Cardenas & Picken
2nd Floor
888 Bricknell Avenue
Miami, FL 33138

✓ cc: Rose Infanti, Rm 196, EOB

FJR/MHR/mdh-B-39

VISION NEWS

TELEVISION NEWS SERVICE

REGRET
DATE 6/7
FS

MR. ALBERTO CARDENAS
MIAMI, FLORIDA.

MAY 19, 1982

DEAR MR. CARDENAS:

A NUMBER OF COMMUNITY LEADERS HAVE SUGGESTED WE CONTACT YOU FOR ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE IN ONE OF OUR PROJECTS.

I AM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF VISION NEWS, A COMPANY DEDICATED TO NEWS COVERAGE FOR TELEVISION MEDIA AND SERVE AS THE UNITED STATES NEWS BUREAU FOR EIGHT SOUTH AMERICAN TELEVISION NETWORKS. OUR JOB IS TO COVER AND INTERPRET NEWS EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES FOR MOST OF THE SPANISH SPEAKING VIEWERSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICA.

SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE MALVINAS OR FALKLANDS CRISIS MOST OF OUR CLIENTS HAVE EXPRESSED A NEED AND DESIRE FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO THESE TWO BASIC ISSUES. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE SEEK YOUR HELP IN CONTACTING THE WHITE HOUSE TO SEE IF AN INTERVIEW COULD BE ARRANGED. THIS INTERVIEW WOULD BE PRESENTED IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: VENEVISION, VENEZUELA NATIONAL TELEVISION NETWORK, TELEMUNDO CANAL 2 SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, TELEVISION COLORES ARGENTINA, CANAL 7 BUENOS AIRES, NOTICOLOR, COLOMBIAN TELEVISION NETWORK, TELEVISORA PANAMERICANA CANAL 5 LIMA PERU, TELEPRENSA CANAL 11 GUATEMALA, SPANISH INTERNATIONAL NETWORK.

OFFICES:


7100 BISCAYNE BLVD. SUITE 106 ■ MIAMI, FLORIDA 33138 ■ TELFS.: (305) 573-4095 — 553-1573

PAGE TWO:

AS YOU CAN SEE, THIS REPRESENTS A VERY LARGE AUDIENCE IN SOUTH AMERICA MAKING IT A VERY IMPORTANT PROJECT. THE CONDITIONS FOR THE INTERVIEW CAN BE ADJUSTED TO THE NEEDS OF THE PRESIDENT.

IF YOU CAN HELP US PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CONTACT US AT YOUR CONVENIENCE. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN READING THIS LETTER AND HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU SOON.

YOURS TRULY,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Nelson Alba", written in dark ink.

NELSON ALBA

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

RD:MA

MAY 26 RECD 112

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

BARRON, LEHMAN, CARDENAS & PICKEN

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

RONALD M. BARRON
ALBERTO R. CARDENAS
ROGER S. GOLDMAN
RICHARD S. LEHMAN
ANDREW J. MARKUS
GREGORY C. PICKEN
LESLIE A. SHARE
BRUCE JAY TOLAND

888 BRICKELL AVENUE
2ND FLOOR
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131

TELEPHONE (305) 374-4747
BROWARD 524-0655

CABLE: TAXBAR
TELEX: 51-5017

May 21, 1982

080311

The Honorable Elizabeth Dole
Assistant to the President for
Public Liaison
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mrs. Dole:


First I want to congratulate you and your staff for the fine support that you are providing from the White House to those of us in Presidential Advisory Boards and Committees involved in areas of concern to your office.

I am enclosing herewith a letter addressed to me from the folks at Vision News. I personally know these people and they have been extremely helpful to us in communicating the Administration's view points to South America in a concise, professional manner.

I would very much appreciate this request being given the appropriate attention that your office and staff always gives these matters.

Thank you in advance for your office's attention to this request.

Kindest regards,



AL CARDENAS

AC:ef
encl.
cc: Ms. Judy Pond

JV

080928

#3258

1228

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1982

00001-09

FO003-0

FB036-12

FB006-12

LE

Dear Orrin:

Thank you for your recent letter on the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

You are absolutely correct in stating that this legislation is personally important to the President. I will call Bob ~~Dole~~ to emphasize the need for timely Senate consideration and passage.

Thank you for your continuing support of the President on this and other important matters.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

✓
Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
Chairman, Committee on Labor
and Human Resources
U. S. Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

NSC #87,037 50

170

Package # 7258

02 MAY 10 P 8: 41

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

MW

#3258

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 10, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*
SUBJECT: Letter from Orrin G. Hatch

SIGNED

Senator Hatch has written concerning CBI (Tab II). (Although dated April 28, Hatch's letter was not received in your office until last Friday, May 7). Hatch's basic message is that we need to energize Bob Dole to have any chance for CBI success in the Senate. Hatch is right on target. Dole's Finance Committee staff told me today there has been no "clear message" sent to Dole on the importance of the CBI legislation, and thus it will continue to languish for the foreseeable future.

To pass CBI in this short legislative session, we need to be working both sides of the Hill right now. Our House efforts are well underway, and I believe a call from you to Dole would start the Senate ball rolling. At Tab I is a proposed response to Hatch indicating that you will call Dole.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you (1) sign the letter at Tab I and (2) call Bob Dole to stress the importance the President attaches to early consideration and passage of CBI legislation.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Proposed reply
Tab II Hatch letter

cc: Nau, Fontaine, Childress

ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH, CHAIRMAN

ROBERT T. STAFFORD, VT.
DAN QUAYLE, IND.
PAULA HAWKINS, FLA.
DON NICKLES, OKLA.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
GORDON J. HUMPHREY, N.H.
JEREMIAH DENTON, ALA.
JOHN P. EAST, N.C.

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS.
JENNINGS RANDOLPH, W. VA.
HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., N.J.
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MO.
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., MICH.
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO

GEORGE W. PRITTS, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
RENN M. PATCH, STAFF DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL
LAWRENCE C. HOROWITZ, M.D., MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
HUMAN RESOURCES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 28, 1982

Honorable William Clark
National Security Adviser
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I know the Caribbean Basin Initiative is important to you and the President personally so I wanted to express my disappointment to you that it appears to be dead in the water here in the Senate for the time being. As you may know, Senator Bob Dole has declined to hold hearings on the bill and prefers to let it meander through the House for a few weeks or longer before the Senate takes it up. This may cause some problems because the Democratic-controlled House Committees and Subcommittees which now have jurisdiction over the bill can be expected to be highly critical of the Caribbean Basin Initiative on partisan grounds.

My impression is that Bob Dole will not reverse his stand until the Budget discussions have made progress, but I hope that you and some of us here in the Senate may be able to persuade him otherwise because of the importance of early progress on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to our policy in Latin America. I would appreciate knowing if you agree on this point.

Sincerely,

Orrin G. Hatch
Chairman

OGH:mpa

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8203258

RECEIVED 07 MAY 82 12

TO CLARK

FROM HATCH, ORRIN G

DOCDATE 28 APR 82

KEYWORDS: CBI

CCO

DOLE, ROBERT J

SUBJECT: BUDGET DISCUSSIONS RE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

ACTION: PREPARE REPLY FOR CLARK SIG DUE: 12 MAY 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NAU

FONTAINE

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Man	5/7	Transfer to Kimmit		
Clark	x 5/10	Signature	5/11	
	5/12	Clark signed ltr		RR/HN/FO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

WH (C)

83460

C.F.

081338
3100
C0001-09

LE
C0077
F6006-12

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/DOS Waivers
BY dh NARA DATE 4/16/2019

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1982

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciate very much your concerned letter about the prospects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative legislation currently before Congress. I am fully aware of our deep mutual interest in this legislation and the valuable support which you and your government have been providing during the course of the Congressional deliberations.

As you well know, my personal commitment to this program has never flagged. Public attention in this country was riveted from March until June of this year on the budget issue and the European trip. As soon as Congress returned in July, however, we mobilized an effort to refocus public attention on the Caribbean Basin Initiative. I have had a series of meetings with private groups, as well as foreign officials, to boost the legislation. We had a very successful Caribbean evening at the Organization of American States on July 21. During the same period, you made another important contribution speaking to Members of Congress. I think we are succeeding in developing some public momentum in support of this legislation.


Your continuing efforts are vital in this endeavor. As you point out, we need to make it clear to Congress that this Caribbean Basin program is much larger than the U.S. program alone. It involves not only other donors, but also most importantly, participating countries such as your own which are poised to exploit the benefits of this program.

08133855

NSC #82D48DD

I am always encouraged by our friendship and cooperation on these vital matters. I am mindful of what you said to us when we were in Jamaica in April. Our countries are tied to one another not only by our personal friendship, but also by the policies of our government, and most importantly, by the historic friendship of our peoples. I look to these deep and abiding relationships for encouragement and new enthusiasm to achieve our common goals.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent "R" at the beginning.

The Right Honorable
Edward P.G. Seaga, P.C. M.P.
Prime Minister of Jamaica
Kingston

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 AUG 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: SEAGA, EDWARD

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 16 AUG 82

KEYWORDS: JAMAICA

HS

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO SEAGA RE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 20 AUG 82

COMMENTS:

FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER

STAFF SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

August 14, 1982

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Prime Minister Seaga

Facts

You are responding to a July 5th letter from Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica, stressing the importance of the CBI legislation and pledging him your active support.

Discussion

Your reply assures him of your determination to see this legislation passed and thanks him for his efforts on behalf of the legislation.

RECOMMENDATION

OK

No

WPC _____ That you sign the reply at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A - Presidential Letter to Seaga

Prepared by:
Henry Nau

'82 AUG 14 A10 :26

60453

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

HENRY NAU

HRD (per GA)

SUBJECT:

Response to Letter from Prime Minister Seaga

Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica wrote the President on July 5 (Tab II). Your memo at Tab I transmits a reply from the President for his signature.

The response has been delayed by the following sequence of events. The letter was delivered to the White House by the Jamaican Embassy on July 13. We requested a draft from State by COB, July 22. The State draft was completely inadequate. I requested a rewrite, but received minor changes (see Tab III). I then rewrote the draft myself and cleared it with Fontaine and the Speechwriters.



Fontaine concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve ☒Disapprove ☐

Attachments

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
 - Tab A - Presidential Letter to Seaga
- Tab II - Incoming from Seaga
- Tab III - State's Rewrite

Henry -

Mr. Dehmlow from State (calling back for Penfold) telephoned with the following changes to the letter you had requested be changed. Will they do????

Paragraph #1

2d line	A period after the word "initiative" -- Delete the words "and thanks also to" -- replace with "I am very appreciative of the support of."
3rd line	Delete the words "your support of."
4th line	Replace the word "we" with "I".

Paragraph #2

1st line	Replace first two words "we are" with "I am".
3rd line	Period after initiative. Delete "and we are" -- replace with "I and my staff are".

Paragraph #3

3rd line	Replace "we are" with "I am".
----------	-------------------------------

Jeanne

Contact:

Mr. Dehmlow
632-4100



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 22, 1982

4800
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8220875

82 JUL 22 P10 41


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Response to letter from Prime Minister Seaga

Attached is a proposed response to the July 5, 1982 letter from Jamaica's Prime Minister Edward Seaga to President Reagan.

In his letter Seaga expressed his concern about the prospects for the CBI and urged the President to continue his efforts to secure Congressional passage this term.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab 1 Proposed response
Tab 2 Letter from Prime Minister Seaga

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY NARA, DATE 1/27/10
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EXDIS
(UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT ATTACHMENT)

4b
1/27/10

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

83661

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NSC/State Waivers
BY dh NARA DATE 4/16/2019

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of July 5, 1982 regarding the Caribbean Basin Initiative and thanks also to you and members of your government for your support of this important effort. We share your concern about the impact on the region should the legislation not be enacted during this session of Congress.

We are confident, however, that the legislation will be passed this session. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has acted positively on the aid component of the Initiative and we are working closely with Congressional leaders to underline the importance of all the elements of the package and to urge quick action.

The Right Honorable

Edward Seaga, P.C.M.P.,

Prime Minister of Jamaica,

Kingston.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ / EXDIS
RDS-3 07/22/02

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The efforts of your government, and others in the Caribbean, will help to assure legislators that the Initiative is supported by those it is designed to assist. We are glad to be able to count on your support.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8220875

ACTION(ARA)

July 17, 1982

Copies to:

S
D MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
P Executive Secretary
T Department of State
ARA
EB SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica
H
S/S
S/S-S
TEAM A Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica has written the President
S/S-S(SL) concerning the CBI legislation. Could you provide an
RF appropriate draft response by close of business Thursday,
July 22.

Carolyn J. Cleveland
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

*Received in S/S-T
7/19 at 10:59 A.M. (CJ)*

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NSC/State Waivers
BY db NARA DATE 4/16/2019



Office of the Prime Minister

Jamaica House
Kingston

5th July, 1982

Dear President Reagan,

In order to assist Members of the Congress to better understand the implications for the Caribbean in the provisions of the Caribbean Basin Initiative legislation now before the Congress, several delegations from the Jamaican Private Sector have recently visited Washington to hold talks with Members of the House of Representatives, the Senate and their Aides.

The delegations report to me that they were warmly received by all the parties concerned in these meetings and that there is great interest shown in the arguments and data presented by them.

However, in the overall, it is their view that there is a significant body of opposition to the C.B.I. building up which could endanger the possibility of passing the legislation at an early date, or if an early time frame is possible, substantial amendments may be expected.

Acting on these reports, I have spoken with a few key Congressional leaders and I am of the view that, particularly in respect of the House of Representatives, much of the early enthusiasm for the C.B.I. is waning.

I am advised that there may be moves to defer the legislation till December.

I am deeply concerned that the enthusiasm which you generated for the C.B.I. may disappear if urgent steps are not taken/

The President,
The White House,
Washington



Office of the Prime Minister

Jamaica House
Kingston

2.

taken to secure early passage while there is still the possibility of sufficient interest to approve the Bill without major modifications on the trade or investment sections. I am aware that there is likely to be significant modification to the Aid provisions.

In line with this, other Jamaican delegations will visit Washington just prior to the key mark-up in the House Ways and Means Committee to offer further assistance.

Further, Deputy Prime Minister Hugh Shearer will lead a Caribbean-wide delegation of Trade Unionists to speak with the A.F. of L. - C.I.O. at that time. Mr. Shearer will do so in his capacity as the most respected Trade Union leader in the English speaking Caribbean, but he will stay on for further discussions with key Congressional leaders as well.

I wish to assure you that we are giving as much support as is possible from our end to enable Congressional leaders to understand the full implications of the C.B.I. to the Caribbean. It concerns us, for instance, that there is little apparent awareness, that in respect of the 4 Nations which met at the Nassau - 4 at the instigation of the United States, Venezuela and Mexico have already made substantial support available to the Region to the extent of some \$350 million each, and Canada has announced the doubling of its Aid Programme to the Region over the next 5 years.

These initiatives by 3 of the Nassau - 4 countries which are already in operation, highlight the need for the United States programme to be effected by legislative approval at an early stage. Otherwise, I fear a growing misunderstanding in the Region of the U.S. intentions when reflected against the actions already taken by less able countries.



Office of the Prime Minister

Jamaica House
Kingston

3.

I trust that it will be possible for you to give this matter your own attention in keeping with the great hopes which your visit to the Caribbean recently generated.

The problems of the Caribbean and their solution addressed by the C.B.I. is the most important attempt made to provide a comprehensive programme of assistance to the Region.

Our fervent hopes and best wishes are with you in the successful adoption of this programme.

Yours very Sincerely
Samuel Jones

The Embassy of Jamaica presents its compliments to the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the President and has the honour to request that the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister of Jamaica be delivered to the President of the United States of America.

The Embassy of Jamaica avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the President the assurances of its highest consideration.



EMBASSY OF JAMAICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM

4800

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 16, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL WHEELER

FROM: HENRY R. NAU *LRN*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter from Prime Minister
Seaga of Jamaica

The attached note requests State to provide a draft response to Prime Minister Seaga's letter to the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached note to Bremer.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1982

JP:

Pat Bye from Deaver's office brought down the attached this morning. There is a CBI meeting scheduled for 1200 today in the cabinet room with the President. Should this be sent to him before meeting?

YES _____

NO ✓

K

*Send to staff for prompt
answer*

J

AB approved
8/9/82
3:45
pm

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Speechwriters:

Clearance/comments on
Presidential letter to Seaga
at Tab I. Please call when
complete.

Thank you.

Jeanne Hickie
NSC
X6961

DRAFT
Henry Nau - 8/4/82

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC/State Waivers
BY db NARA DATE 4/16/2017

83663
AB approved
8/9/82 - 3:45pm.

Prime
Dear Mr. Minister:

I appreciate very much your concerned letter about the prospects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative legislation currently before Congress. I am fully aware of our deep mutual interest in this legislation and the valuable support which you and your government have been providing during the course of the Congressional deliberations.

As you well know, my personal commitment to this program has never flagged. Public attention in this country was riveted from March until June this year on the budget issue and the European trip. As soon as Congress returned in July, however, we mobilized an effort to refocus public attention on the Caribbean Basin Initiative. I have had a series of meetings with private groups, as well as foreign officials, to boost the legislation. We had a very successful Caribbean evening at the Organization of American States on July 21. I think we are succeeding in developing some public momentum in support of this legislation.

*During
on the
at the
same
period,
You made
a most important
contribution by
speaking to members
of Congress.*

Your continuous ~~ing~~ ^{ing} efforts ~~will~~ ^{are} be vital in this endeavor. As you point out, we need to make it clear to Congress that this Caribbean Basin program is much larger than the U.S. program

alone. It involves not only other donors, but also most importantly, participating countries such as your own which are poised to exploit the benefits of this program.

I am always encouraged by our friendship and cooperation on these vital matters. I am mindful of what you said to us when we were in Jamaica in April. Our countries are tied to one another not only by our personal friendship, but also by the policies of our governments, and most importantly, by the historic friendship of our peoples. I look to these deep and abiding relationships for encouragement and new enthusiasm to achieve our common goals.

National Security Council The White House

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RECEIVED

Package # 4800

82 AUG 10 9:01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>8/11</u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>MW 17</u>	<u>D</u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

 I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

1800

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 17, 1982

NSC/S:

Okay to dispatch.

C. Cleveland

RECEIVED 13 JUL 82 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SEAGA, EDWARD

DOCDATE 05 JUL 82

BREMER

11 JUL 82

WHEELER

17 JUL 82

KEYWORDS: JAMAICA

CBI

CONGRESSIONAL

HS

SUBJECT: CONCERN RE LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 22 JUL 82 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FONTAINE

LEVINE

NAU

SAPIA-BOSCH

KIMMITT

WHEELER

STATE

COMMENTS

REF#

8219684

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NSCIPID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Fontaine	7/14	Track record & Name		
State	7/17	Update and memo	7/22	mail to
	7/17	Prepare and response	7/22	
	7/23	Recd's Draft reply		FO, LE, SB, RK, MW
Board at 7/23	7/23	Prepare memo for Clark	7/26	WHEELER IV
Clark	x 7/16	Encl to Pres for Sig		
Pres	P 8/14	For signature		
	8/16	For sig & ltr		
Wheeler	S 7/16	For Review	8/16	
State	C 8/17	for dispatch		HW, FO
DISPATCH	7/27	mail		W/ATTCH FILE W/4 (C)