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Mobilization Preparedness Board)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: WHORM: Subject File

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: FG378 072500 - 077999

Date: 7/16/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (072641PD)	Bennett Lewis to Board Members re National Policy Statement, 2p	6/24/82	P5 <i>12/1/40</i>
2. minutes (075932)	Emergency Communications Working Group (ECWG) meeting, 1p	4/7/82	P5
3. minutes	ECWG meeting, 2p	4/12/82	P5
4. draft fact sheet	re Information Processing Resources Issue, 2p	4/12/82	P5
5. letter	James Jellison to William Hilsman re Postal Service and ECWG, 3p	11/25/81	P5
6. minutes	EMPB, Third Board Meeting, 6p	3/31/82	P5
7. memo (075998)	Horace Russell to William Clark re minutes of Third EMP Board meeting, 1p	4/10/82	P5
8. minutes	same as item # 6 (notations), 6p	3/31/82	P5
9. memo	Darrell Trent to Lewis re draft policy statement, 1p	4/2/82	P5
10. memo	Fred Ikle to the Chairman, EMPB re proposed national emergency mobilization policy statement, 1p	4/5/82	P5
11. memo	Robert Miller to Lewis re comments on draft, 1p	4/1/82	P5
12. paper	re DOE's suggestions for draft policy statement, 1p	4/1/82	P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

RO

FG378

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 6/15/82 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: Open

SUBJECT: EMPB/ Clearance for Working Group Participants

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
HARPER	☐	☐	DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
PORTER	☐	☒	TURNER	☐	☐
BARR	☐	☐	D. LEONARD	☐	☐
BAUER	☐	☐	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BOGGS	☐	☐	GRAY	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐	HOPKINS	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐	OTHER		
FAIRBANKS	☐	☐		☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐		☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☐		☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐		☐	☐
MALOLEY	☐	☐		☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐		☐	☐
UHLMANN	☒	☐		☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐		☐	☐

Remarks:

Michael Uhlmann:

Could you make sure that all the candidates that RP and ELH finally settle on have the appropriate clearance. Thanks.

E. Rock
E. Rock

Pls let me know of clearance levels for all OPD staff members.

[Signature]
Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development
(x6515)

Please return this tracking sheet with your response.





EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20472

OFFICE OF
POLICY DEVELOPMENT

1982 JUN 15 A 10 22

JUN 10 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOARD MEMBERS

FROM: Bennett L. Lewis
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Security Clearances for Working Group Participants

Many plans and National security documents used by Working Groups and Sub-Groups in their work are classified SECRET or TOP SECRET. It is important that Working Group participants be cleared for access to these materials. Frequently, participants have been turned away from meetings because classified material was being discussed and they did not have the requisite clearance.

The August 26, 1981 memorandum to the heads of organizations chairing Working Groups asked that chairmen, alternates, and points of contact hold security clearances at least at the SECRET level with NATO access. It is now apparent that it should have stated that a similar level of clearance is necessary for all participants, to include Working Group members.

In order to get maximum effectiveness from your agency's participation in the various Working Groups, I am asking that you, as Board members, establish the requirement in your Agency that all Working Group participants have the required clearance.

cc:
Working Group Chairmen
Agency Liaison Officers
Working Group POC's

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT



1140

FG378

ND008

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 6/25/82 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: FYI

SUBJECT: National Policy Statement on Emergency Mobilization Preparedness

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
HARPER	☐	☐	DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
PORTER	☐	☐	TURNER	☐	☐
✓ BARR	☐	☒	D. LEONARD	☐	☐
BAUER	☐	☐	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BOGGS	☐	☐	GRAY	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐	HOPKINS	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐	OTHER		
FAIRBANKS	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
MALOLEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
✓ UHLMANN	☐	☒	_____	☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

Remarks:

Please return this tracking sheet with your response.

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development
(x6515)





EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20472

JUL 24 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOARD MEMBERS

FROM: Bennett L. Lewis
Executive Secretary

John R. Lilly II, for

SUBJECT: National Policy Statement on Emergency Mobilization Preparedness

The National Policy Statement is being prepared for submission to the President for decision and signature. At the adjournment of the last Board meeting on June 16, 1982, two issues remained to be resolved.

The first issue concerned the four point program for Industrial Mobilization (page 6), and whether or not references to Defense Production Act authorities were in concert with Administration policy. All Board members seemed to be satisfied with the program as written, with the exception of the Department of Energy, Office of Personnel Management, and Office of Management and Budget. Since the Board meeting, negotiations between Defense, Commerce, and FEMA on one hand, and OMB supported by Energy and OPM on the other, has ended with the first, second and fourth points being rewritten. The negotiations have narrowed the disagreement to one phrase in the fourth program point. Attached is a copy of an extract of page 6 with the phrase at issue underlined. OMB has stated that the phrase must be included to assure that DPA Title III authorities are used to ensure availability of strategic and critical materials when demonstrated to be cost effective. Defense insists that inclusion of the underlined phrase limits the potential of the Title III authorities by the imposition of a non-security related criterion for its employment which would focus subsequent issues on the definitions and measurement of cost effectiveness, rather than on the issue of how best to strengthen the national security posture and meet mission essential operational requirements of the Department of Defense. Defense states further, that statutory and procedural safeguards now in existence are more than adequate to prevent abuse of the authorities.

This marking is CANCELLED when
separation material
bearing a protective marking

The second issue concerned the earthquake policy on page 9. Department of Commerce believed that use of the word substantially associated with prediction could lead to dramatic budget increases in the search for improved earthquake capabilities, and thought Agencies could use it as a mandate for doing so. The issue has been resolved to everyone's satisfaction by eliminating the word substantially in the first sentence.

It is planned to deliver the National Policy Statement to the President for his decision concerning the phrase on use of DPA authorities. It is desired that the memorandum to the President contain each member Agency's position on the issue. With an apology for the quick suspense, it is requested that you call your decision to Mr. Green of the Secretariat at 287-0880, not later than close of business, Friday, June 25, 1982.

Attachment

cc:

Liaison Officers

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6

Industrial Mobilization

It is the policy of the United States to have a capability to mobilize industry in order to achieve timely and sufficient production of military and essential civilian materiel needed to prosecute successfully a major military conflict, to lend credibility to national strategic policy, and to respond to national security emergencies.

The program will:

- improve the capability of U.S. industry to meet current and mobilization requirements by identifying production and supply deficiencies and initiating actions to overcome them;
- increase the capability of industry and infrastructure systems, including transportation and energy, to meet national security needs through use of improved guidance on resource-claimancy, continued use of import and export controls, and appropriate use of DPA authorities in cases where the free market cannot be reasonably expected to provide the required national security capability in a timely manner;
- provide for assessment of the impact on the industrial base resulting from existing and proposed agreements for co-production of defense materiel, related offset arrangements with our allies, and other reciprocal trade agreements; and
- ensure the availability of strategic and critical materials by primary reliance on the National Defense Stockpile; DPA Title III authorities will be used in instances where stockpile acquisitions are less cost-effective and the free market cannot be reasonably expected to provide the required national security capability in a timely manner.

1 MAR 1982

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FG378

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: Jay Keyworth

Jay Keyworth

SUBJECT: Next Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board Meeting

This is to advise you that I will unavoidably be out of town on the date of our next Board meeting which is scheduled for March 10, 1982.

Your emphasis on principal Board members attending these meetings is clearly understood; however, I feel it is also necessary that my office be represented in my absence.

I request your consideration to permit Wayne Kay, our Telecommunications Policy Advisor and my Earthquakes Working Group Vice Chairman to attend Board meetings in my absence. Please advise.

NSC #8201230

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8201230

RECEIVED 01 MAR 82 14

TO

CLARK

FROM KEYWORTH, J

DOCDATE 26 FEB 82

KEYWORDS: EMERGENCY PREPARED"S

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

KAY, WAYNE

SUBJECT: REQUEST PERMISSION FOR KAY TO ATTEND EMPB BD MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 05 MAR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SHOEMAKER

POINDEXTER

DEGRAFFENREID

OBE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(L /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 4/5 OBE per Shoemaker

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(WA)

(C) H.



C. F.

1261
075363 PD
FG378

EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20472

PY

March 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOARD MEMBERS

FROM: William P. Clark *WPC*
Chairman

SUBJECT: Third Board Meeting

This is to notify you that the third Board meeting is scheduled on March 31, 1982, at 5:00 p.m., rather than on March 10, 1982, as I announced at the last meeting.

The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the Working Groups' input to the national policy statement. On March 29, 1982, the Executive Secretary will distribute a draft master policy statement for your review. Board members should be prepared to discuss any problems that they may have with the proposed policy statement and the implications of that statement for their preparedness programs. See Attachment 1 for the agenda.

I emphasize again the need for all Board members to become vitally involved in the activities of the Working Groups so that the input to the national policy statement will resolve major preparedness issues. Toward that end, Attachment 2 presents five basic policy matters that should be considered by Board members and their Working Group representatives in the preparation and review of the national policy statement. *are attached.*

Attachments

No.1 Agenda
No.2 Policy matters

EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Third Meeting

March 31, 1982
5:00 - 5:50 p.m.

Indian Treaty Room 474
Old Executive Office Building

AGENDA

Introduction

Honorable William P. Clark

Discussion of
Draft Master Policy Statement

Board Members

Summation

Honorable William P. Clark

BASIC EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS ISSUES

Allocation of Responsibilities Among Various Levels of Government

Responsibilities for response to emergencies move from one level of government to another across a spectrum of emergencies. These responsibilities flow from basic constitutional provisions and are imbedded in legislation. As the administration's New Federalism program takes shape, there will be an historic shift of responsibilities to the States. As this unfolds, the emergency responsibilities of the levels of government must be re-examined and made consistent with new arrangements. The Board needs to develop a general policy on this matter.

Socio-Economic Regulations

There are many socio-economic regulations that would impede rapid and effective responses to emergencies. Many of these regulations can be waived, but many analysts contend that the waiver conditions are too stringent. On the other side are groups whose interests are served by those regulations and who could be expected to oppose any effort to set them aside, even in emergencies. A key issue for the Board is how much political capital should be invested in an effort to develop and pass legislation that would make it easier to set aside these regulations. A good deal of preparedness effort would be required for meaningful progress in this area.

Allocation of Resources

Effective responses to emergencies depend upon optimum allocations of resources among competing military and essential civilian claimants. Allocations must be balanced and be seen as equitable and consistent. The Board needs to develop a general policy on the type of mechanisms that should be put into place to assure that allocations meet these tests.

Economic Controls in Emergencies

Most of the existing plans for emergency mobilization call for the exercise of extensive controls over the economy by the Federal Government, or the States in the absence of Federal authorities. Many analysts regard these provisions as inconsistent with a public policy of maximum reliance on a free market economy. The Board needs to consider how much reliance can be placed on the market in the event of emergencies.

Mobilization Base Investment Criteria

The operational guidance provides for investments in the mobilization base in the FY 84-86 time frame. In order for this investment to be effective, agencies will need to develop coherent investment strategies. The Board needs to establish investment policies that provide criteria for evaluating possible options for mobilization base investment.

BU 3/30
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EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20472

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

075932

1140

PY FG378

Craig Fuller,

As you know, I
sit in on these
meetings for Ed.

I will be out
of town April 28-May 5.

Ed asked me to
ask you to sit in
for him Apr. 28.

Thanks,

Jim Jubin

Doc will have a folder
OK

Fourth Board Meeting of Emergency Mobilization
Preparedness Board, Apr 28 82

4/28

EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20472

April 19, 1982

*you won't be
here - do you
want anyone
to attend for
you*

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOARD MEMBERS

FROM: William P. Clark-*WPC*
Chairman

SUBJECT: Fourth Board Meeting

This is to notify you that the fourth Board meeting will be held on April 28, 1982, at 5:00 p.m. rather than on April 21, 1982, as I announced at the last meeting.

At that time you should be prepared to discuss the third draft of the national policy statement. This draft will be prepared by the Secretariat upon receipt of your comments on the second draft.

The fourth meeting will be held again in the Indian Treaty Room 474, of the Old Executive Office Building.

*Send
Fuller*

.85 155 50 110 113

REC'D. CA APR 20 1982

'82 APR 20 A10:47



EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20472

April 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Board Liaison Officers
Working Group Chairmen and Points of Contact
Non-Member Participating Agency Points of Contact

FROM: Dennis B. Green *Dennis Green*
Deputy Director for Administration
and Program Support

SUBJECT: Schedule of Board and Working Group Activities

The current Schedule of Board and Working Group (WG) Activities reported for the period April 19, 1982, through May 28, 1982, is attached for your information.

Also included are the minutes from the following meetings:

Emergency Communications WG April 7, 1982

Emergency Communications WG April 12, 1982

Attachments

EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Schedule of Board and Working Group Activities
 Reported for the Period
 April 19, 1982, through May 28, 1982

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ACTIVITY COORDINATOR (Name/Org/Phone)</u>	<u>INVITEES/ORG.</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
4/19/82	9:00 AM	HHS North Bldg. Rm. 1137	Social Services WG Meeting	Teresa Hawkes (HHS) 245-7027	Members	
4/22/82	10:00 AM	Federal Center Plaza, Rm. 622	Government Operations WG Meeting	Dennis DeWalt (FEMA) 287-0157	Members	
4/22/82	TBD	Pentagon	Scenario Development Sub-group (MMWG)	Captain McCoy (OJCS) 697-0352	Members	
4/23/82	10:00 AM	Commerce Bldg. Rm. 3876	First Meeting, Industrial Capabilites Task Force Industrial Mobilization WG	Ms. Leslie Barr (DOC) 377-4060	Members	
* 4/28/82	5:00 PM	Indian Treaty Rm. 474, Old EOB	Board Meeting	Dennis Green (EMPB) 287-0889	Board Members	SECRET Clear- ance Required. Rescheduled from 4/9/82.
4/29/82	TBD	Pentagon	Scenario Development Sub-group (MMWG)	Captain McCoy (OJCS) 697-0352	Members	
5/6/82	TBD	Pentagon	Scenario Development Sub-group (MMWG)	Captain McCoy (OJCS) 697-0352	Members	
5/11/82	10:00 AM	Federal Center Plaza, Rm. 622	Requirement Categories Committee Tasking (MMWG)	William Wadbrook (FEMA) 287-3981	Members	
5/13/82	TBD	Pentagon	Scenario Development Sub-group (MMWG)	Captain McCoy (OJCS) 697-0352	Members	
5/19/82	2:00 PM	Federal Center Plaza, Rm. 610	Civil Defense WG Task Force B	Veronica Moreland (FEMA) 287-3885	Members	

TBD - To Be Determined

* Indicates change in item since 4/9/82 issuance of this schedule.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>	ACTIVITY COORDINATOR <u>(Name/Org/Phone)</u>	<u>INVITEES/ORG.</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
* 5/24/82	2:00 PM	Federal Center Plaza, Rm. 401	Civil Defense WG Meeting	Veronica Moreland (FEMA) 287-3885	Members	Rescheduled from 5/11/82.

NOTE: Dates and room numbers are frequently changed at the last minute, so it is suggested that persons planning to attend a listed activity contact the Activity Coordinator to verify that the schedule has not been changed.

Emergency Communications Working Group (ECWG)
Minutes of April 7, 1982 Meeting

The Emergency Communications Working Group meeting was convened in the Defense Communications Agency, Director's Management Information Center (Room 4330) at 1:00 pm on April 7, 1982 by Col. Joe Wheeler, NCS-Joint Secretariat. (List of attendees is at Attachment A.)

Col. Wheeler began the meeting by proposing that the group refine the March 19 ECWG Policy Statement submission to the EMPB Secretariat based on comments received from DOE and GSA and, if time permitted, address the March 26 EMPB Secretariat draft National Policy Statement.

After considerable discussion, the representatives voted unanimously to address the March 26 Board draft National Policy Statement vice the March 19 ECWG Policy Statement submission.

A revised draft policy statement was jointly prepared by all assembled using the draft National Policy Statement as a baseline and written comments from DOE, GSA, and FEMA. (Attachment B) This draft statement will be refined at the April 12 meeting for submission to the principals on April 16.

Other issues raised during the meeting are as follows:

Col. Treadway, the EMPB Secretariat, stated that Judge Clark asked that the EMPB be referred to as the "Board." He also asked that the EMPB Secretariat be referred to as the "Board Secretariat."

Col. Treadway also requested comments from the working groups on both the preamble and the associated working group appendices of the March 26 draft National Policy Statement. The ECWG representatives agreed to defer comments on the preamble section of this draft statement until a revised version is forwarded by the Board Secretariat (promised by the Board Secretariat on April 9).

Representatives from FEMA, DOC, and GSA requested an ECWG Principals Meeting on April 12 instead of April 16 to ensure ample time for discussion of the policy statement before its due date to the Board Secretariat on April 16. Col. Wheeler indicated he would take this under advisement and check the availability of LTG Hilsman or Mr. Wunder for that date.

The USPS representative questioned whether it was appropriate for them to continue as members of the ECWG in view of "telecommunications" being substituted for "communications" in the March 26, 1982 draft National Policy Statement and the deletion of the policy initiative specifically referring to USPS concerns. Col. Wheeler stated that the ECWG Principals at the March 19 meeting had reaffirmed USPS membership in the ECWG and that he (Col. Wheeler) would again insert USPS concerns into the draft National Policy Statement.

Meeting was adjourned at 3:30 pm.

Attendees at April 7, 1982 ECWG Meeting

Chaired by Col Joe Wheeler

AGENCY

NAME

ECWG Members/Alternates/Associates

Chairman (NCS)	Col. Joseph Wheeler, USAF
(NTIA)	Mr. Donald Jansky Mr. Terrill Steichen
DOS	Mr. Charles Scott
Treasury	Mr. Gary Johnson
DoD	Mr. William Cook
DOJ	Mr. Americo Cinquegrana Mr. Richard Levine
DOC	Mr. Leon Karadbil
DOE	Mr. Robert Lewis Mr. James Brown
OMB	Mr. Gregory Henry
OJCS	CDR Jack Tozier, USN
OSTP	Col. Wayne Kay, USAF
GSA	Mr. Douglas Phelps
FEMA	LtCol. John Clark, USAF Mr. A. L. Henrichsen
USPS	Mr. Thomas Reese
FCC	Dr. Michael Marcus

ATTACHMENT A

Other Attendees

EMPB Secretariat

Col. Robert Treadway, USA

NCS-ECWG

Mr. Donald Kraft
LtCol Richard DeConti
Mr. Bert Stafford

VA

Mr. Raymond D. Holt

MITRE

Mr. M. Rifkin
Mr. Charles Duke
Mrs. Joan Sulek

Booz-Allen & Hamilton

Dr. F. L. Gunther

Emergency Mobilization PreparednessEmergency Communications

Policy. The emergency telecommunications program will ensure that the required telecommunications resources are available and adequate to respond to the Nation's needs ranging from localized disasters to war.

Program. To achieve telecommunications emergency mobilization preparedness objectives, continued reliance upon the private sector will be necessary when formulating and implementing this policy. Programs must be established that will ensure that telecommunications resources are present and remain accessible through all phases of a national emergency. Specifically these programs will:

- develop a viable emergency telecommunications operations concept;
- provide for an effective and survivable telecommunications system;
- provide a process for joint government and industry cooperation in addressing and correcting telecommunications deficiencies;
- resolve any legal and regulatory conflicts affecting the Nation's telecommunications systems; and
- provide a basis for funding emergency telecommunications enhancements.

Implementation. To meet these program criteria the Federal Government will:

- identify and prioritize disaster or wartime telecommunications needs; attention will be given to needs peculiar to the United States Postal Service (FY-82);
- initiate an evaluation of the Nation's critical telecommunications systems, identifying and prioritizing emergency telecommunications issues to be resolved (FY-82);
- establish a joint planning effort to initiate a series of government/industry conferences to identify ways of accomplishing specific emergency telecommunications objectives (FY-83);
- recommend necessary legislative changes and incentive approaches to assist government and industry in improving the survivability of the Nation's telecommunications capabilities (FY-83); and
- establish an emergency telecommunications planning process for the implementation and operation of emergency telecommunications capabilities involving both Government and the civil sector (FY-83).

Attachment B

Minutes

Emergency Communications Working

Group (ECWG) Meeting

April 12, 1982

1. ECWG Representatives met on April 12, 1982 at the NTIA offices, 1325 G Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. Col. Joseph Wheeler, USAF, of the ECWG Secretariat chaired the meeting. The attendance list is at Attachment A.
2. The agenda for the meeting is at Attachment B. Action taken on the agenda items is described below.
3. Draft Emergency Communications Policy Statement: There was discussion of the draft policy statement which had been prepared by the Board Secretariat, and then revised by the ECWG Secretariat in accordance with agreements reached during the April 7, 1982 meeting. During the discussion, NTIA introduced a new draft to replace the one developed at the previous meeting. An agreement was made to substitute suitable parts of the NTIA draft. A new draft was typed during the meeting and distributed to the attendees (Attachment C). The new draft was acceptable to the majority of the representatives. Exceptions were taken as follows:
 - a. Emergency responsibilities and functions in the non-electronic communications field (of USPS concern) were not addressed; however, the telecommunications needs of the postal service were noted.
 - b. The OJCS representative disagreed with the deletion of the requirement in the March 19 draft for consolidated planning and programmatic direction.
 - c. The FCC representative stated concern about the latent problem of not specifying that the government will pay for emergency preparedness activities.
 - d. The DOE representative did not concur in the new draft because it failed to address many of the significant policy matters in the ECWG submission of March 19. (Concerns relate to the deleted Management Section of the March 19 submission.)
4. Revised National Policy Statement on Emergency Mobilization Preparedness: This statement was not available in time for discussion at the meeting. It was provided as a handout (Attachment D), and will be discussed at the ECWG Principals meeting on April 16.

ENCLOSURE 1

(Attachment D is removed.)

5. Information Processing Issue: Col Wheeler and a representative of Booz-Allen and Hamilton gave presentations on the nature of the emergency information processing issue and the progress of the contractor's task to determine the scope of the problem. A draft fact sheet on the "Information Processing Resources Issue" was handed out (Attachment E). Col Wheeler asked the attendees to review the paper and submit comments by telephone prior to close of business Wednesday, April 14. Unless the majority of the staff representatives recommend otherwise, the issue papers will be included on the agenda for the April 16 meeting. (Subsequent telephone calls from Representatives indicated a consensus for not tabling the issue paper at the April 16 Principals meeting. Only a status report on Information Processing Task Force activities will be given.)

Attendance List
Emergency Communications Working
Group (ECWG) Meeting
April 12, 1982

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>NAME</u>
<u>ECWG Staff Representatives/Alternates/Associates</u>	
Chairman (NCS)	Col. Joseph Wheeler, USAF
NTIA	Mr. Donald Jansky Mr. Terrell Steichen Mr. Jordan Brilliant
DOS	Col. Charles Scott, USA
Treasury	Mr. Gary Johnson
DoD	Not present
DOJ	Mr. Richard L. DeHaan Mr. Richard Levine
USDA	Not present
DOC	Mr. Joseph Jasinski
DOE	Mr. Robert Lewis Mr. James Brown
OMB	Mr. Gregory Henry
NSC	Not present
OJCS	CDR Jack Tozier, USN
OSTP	Col. Wayne Kay, USAF
GSA	Mr. Douglas Phelps
FEMA	Col. John Clark, USA Mr. A. L. Henrichsen
USPS	Mr. John Dorsey
FCC	Dr. Michael Marcus Dr. Thomas Stanley

Other Attendees

Board Secretariat

Col. Raymond Stearns, USA

ECWG Secretariat

Mr. Donald Kraft
Lt.Col. Richard DeConti
Mr. Bert Stafford
Ms. Cheryl Terry
Ms. Janet Jefferson

VA (observer)

Mr. Raymond Holt

MITRE

Mr. William Hall
Mr. M. Rifkin
Dr. Charles Duke
Mr. M. Weiner
Mrs. Joan Sulek

Booz-Allen

Dr. F. L. Gunther

ECWG MEETING

12 APRIL 1982
1:00 - 3:00 PM

NTIA FORUM ROOM

AGENDA TOPICS

- Discussion Draft Emergency Communications Policy Statement
- Discussion Of Revised EMPB Policy Statement
- Briefing On Information Processing Issue
- Discussion Of Information Processing Draft Issue Paper

Emergency Communications Policy Statement

Policy. Emergency telecommunications preparedness policy requires that telecommunications resources be available and adequate to respond to the Nation's needs in emergencies ranging from localized disasters to war.

Program. To achieve telecommunications emergency mobilization preparedness objectives, continued reliance upon the private sector will be necessary when implementing this policy. Programs must be established that will ensure that telecommunications resources are present and remain accessible through all phases of a national emergency. Specifically, these programs will ensure that:

- emergency telecommunications operations concepts are viable;
- complete and updated information is available on both government and private telecommunications needs and resources.
- deficiencies in needed capabilities are remedied and funded;
- planning is conducted under adequate conceptual and policy guidance; and,
- necessary preparatory measures are effectively implemented and arrangements for a smooth transition are developed.

Implementation. To meet these program criteria, the Federal Government will:

- identify and prioritize disaster and wartime telecommunications and postal needs (FY-82);
- evaluate the Nation's critical telecommunications systems, identifying and prioritizing emergency telecommunications preparedness issues (FY-82);
- identify deficiencies between existing capabilities and anticipated needs and develop corrective approaches including funding (FY-83);
- establish a joint planning effort to initiate a series of government and industry conferences to identify ways of accomplishing specific emergency telecommunications preparedness objectives (FY-83);
- Recommend necessary legislative changes and incentive approaches to assist government and industry in mobilization planning and in improving the survivability of the Nation's telecommunications capabilities (FY-83);
- establish an emergency telecommunications planning process and provide a basis for funding the implementation and operation of emergency telecommunications capabilities involving both government and industry (FY-83); and
- develop a smooth, effective process for shifting telecommunications from a non-emergency to an emergency status (FY-83).

DRAFT FACT SHEET

INFORMATION PROCESSING RESOURCES ISSUE

Definition

Information processing resources consist of data base storage capabilities, computational capabilities, data communications connectivities, and human resources to support decision making.

Statement of the Issue

Most government, including military, and civilian organizations rely heavily on information processing resources to plan and execute their emergency management responsibilities through all phases of national emergencies. Many of these resources are automated. The extent to which our Nation relies on automated information processing resources to execute these responsibilities and the role this reliance plays in our overall national security and emergency preparedness posture is not known.

At issue is the proper mechanism, within the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board structure, to:

- . Characterize this reliance
- . Identify vulnerabilities of this reliance across the spectrum of national threats
- . Define alternatives to mitigate these vulnerabilities across the government and civilian sectors of our Nation.

Discussion

The national dependence upon automated information processing resources in all sectors of our society has kept pace with the rapid proliferation of new electronics technologies. For the past three decades, slow, inaccurate, and labor intensive manual information processing methods have systematically yielded to automated methods. As a result, decisions are being made more rapidly, processed information is becoming more accurate, and the role of the human resource in information processing is changing from a manual processing orientation to an information resource management orientation. Unquestionably, many emergency preparedness functions (e.g., transportation, logistics, physical security) require automated information processing assistance in today's environment. Sudden loss of our national automated information processing resources, coupled with the gradual deterioration of our ability to implement manual procedures to process information, could cause long term damage, possibly irreparable, to our Nation's welfare.

Alternatives

Four alternatives for addressing the above issue are:

- a. Take no action
- b. Recommend action to the responsible government agencies and departments to address this issue
- c. Form a new Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board working group to address this issue
- d. Assign action for this issue to an existing Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board working group.

Discussion of the Alternatives

The first alternative, although a no cost alternative, leads to a high degree of risk with respect to continuity of, and ensuring capabilities for, carrying out national emergency preparedness functions and responsibilities.

The second alternative ignores the civil sector, it leads to possible duplication of effort within the Federal Government, and it cannot be depended fully upon for uniform addressal of the issue.

The third alternative will satisfactorily eliminate the shortcomings of the first two alternatives. However, the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board will contract the added administrative burdens associated with an additional working group.

The fourth alternative will also satisfactorily eliminate the shortcomings of the first two alternatives, but it will add an additional workload to an existing working group in exchange for not significantly increasing the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board administrative burden.

Recommendation

By consensus of the members of the Emergency Communications Working Group, the last alternative should be pursued. Specifically, the responsibility for addressing the information processing resources issue should be formally assigned to the Emergency Communications Working Group. The natural synergy that exists between communications and information processing technologies, and their mutual dependencies, will serve to offset any increased workload for the Emergency Communications Working Group.



SENIOR ASSISTANT POSTMASTER GENERAL
Operations Group
Washington, DC 20260 -7000

November 25, 1981

Lieutenant General William J. Hilsman
Chairman, Emergency Communications
Working Group
National Communications System
Washington, D.C. 20305

Dear General Hilsman:

It is our understanding that the purpose of the Emergency Mobilization Planning Board and its various Working Groups is to improve the national mobilization posture and to enhance the nation's chances to survive a nuclear exchange.

With this purpose in mind, and since we have had no previous opportunity for submitting input to the Working Group; we believe that the Emergency Communications Working Group and its Issues Task Force, should consider all members of the "Communications Family" and the impact each member would have on assisting our nation when it is under geopolitical stress. Therefore, the main thrust of the Emergency Communications Working Group and its Issues Task Force's initial efforts should NOT be expended on the field of telecommunications alone. These efforts should, in fact, be directed toward identifying the functions of all elements of communications (i.e. telecommunications and written communications [including international, governmental, business, private mail and the printed news]) since they are vital and indispensable to: (1) national mobilization, (2) the promotion of the nation's war efforts, and (3) the post attack recovery period.

Once the vital segments of the communications community are identified, then the ECWG, and its Issues Task Force, might well direct their attention to any problems concerning equipment, systems, federal/industrial cooperation, legislative authorities, policies, etc. that need to be addressed.

In order to acquaint the Emergency Communication Working Group and its Issues Task Force with the functions of the Postal Service, we would like to present the following:

Most Federal emergency planners often overlook the fact that while the majority of Federal departments and agencies are involved primarily in regulating assigned segments of industry or in overseeing the various federally sponsored programs, the U. S. Postal Service provides a direct service to all political, business and private segments of this nation. In fact, part of our charter, as set forth in Title 39, United States Code states, "The Postal Service shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide postal services to bind the Nation together through the personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the people."

During a period of national mobilization, the Postal Service would continue its normal day-to-day operations, with the exception that we would divert some of our resources to: (1) support the Selective Service System in the notification of draft selectees, (2) support the Department of Defense in "calling-up" the reserves and in providing expanded mail service to the various mobilization training centers, and (3) support the military/industrial complex in preparing for expanded war production.


During a pre-attack declared war period the Postal Service, in addition to providing the above services, would not only register and fingerprint alien enemies for the Department of Justice but would also provide them with the completed records of such registration. Also, during this period, all mail service with those nations at war with the United States would be curtailed. Should the President and Congress decide that a censorship program would be necessary, then the U. S. Postal Service would play a major role in this program. However, before the Postal Service could participate in any censorship programs, specific legislation would have to be passed to authorize the opening and censoring of First-Class mail.

During the immediate post-attack period, when telecommunications may not be reliable or even existent, the Postal Service would be involved in registering the displaced, surviving general population through the use of "Emergency Change of Address Cards" (PS Form 809) and its "Safety Notification Cards" (PS Form 810), both of which would be placed into the mail stream with postage waived. Also, during this period, mail service would be restricted to the acceptance and delivery of First-Class domestic mail of eight ounces or less. Certain exceptions would exist, i.e. - essential mail sent by or to agencies of Federal, State and local governments, and by or to civil defense and relief agencies, money shipments by banks, shipments for disaster areas of medicines, drugs, surgical instruments, serums, surgical dressings, or hospital and sick room supplies.

As you can see from the above, the U. S. Postal Service would have a significant and vital communications role to play in any national emergency.

Should you or the Emergency Mobilization Planning Board Executive Secretariat decide to limit the Emergency Communications Working Group's study and efforts to the field of telecommunications, then we (as a telecommunications user) will continue to serve as a Working Group member, but on a limited basis.

Sincerely,


James V. Jellison
Member, Emergency Communications
Working Group)

cc: Emergency Mobilization Planning Board
Executive Secretariat

All ECWG Issues Task Force members
(through the task force chairman)



EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20472

DEC 8 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: LTG WILLIAM J. HILSMAN
CHAIRMAN, EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
WORKING GROUP

FROM: Bennett L. Lewis 
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: USPS Desire to Participate on ECWG

We are in receipt of a copy of a letter to you, from James V. Jellison, the representative of the United States Postal Service on your Working Group, concerning the vital role the Postal Service plays in the non-electronic communications system in the United States. Their statement that non-electronic communications is an important element of emergency communications is certainly true. I realize that, up to this point, you have been concentrating on telecommunications issues, but I have a suggestion that I believe would expand your horizon to encompass all emergency communications and yet not encumber your primary interest.

Some of the Working Groups, including your own, have established sub-working groups to concentrate on subordinate issues. I am suggesting that you consider establishing such a sub-working group to consider non-electronic communications and call upon the Postal Service to chair the group. This would provide you the opportunity to look at all aspects of communications, retain the ability to oversee all communications endeavors within the EMPB, and be certain that all elements of the functional area of communications are being considered.

I would be happy to discuss this with you, if you have any questions. My whole interest is to be certain that we leave no stone unturned in our quest to improve emergency mobilization preparedness as quickly as possible.

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
OFFICE OF THE MANAGER
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20305

IN REPLY REFER TO:

NCS-ECWG

1981
DEC 21 10:11

Mr. James V. Jellison
Senior Assistant Postmaster General
United States Postal Service
Washington, D.C. 20260

Dear Mr. Jellison:

I have received your proposal and General Lewis' recommended approach for expanding the scope of the ECWG to look at broader elements of communications such as non-electronic communications. I agree with your concerns and recommend we establish a task force under the ECWG to address these issues. The administrative procedures and organizational structure of the ECWG are well established and understood; an additional task force to address mobilization issues in the non-electronic communications area would be well received.

I propose that you serve as the task force chairman. Your leadership would bring the necessary expertise and knowledge to insure this group's success. If you agree, I will have the ECWG Secretariat contact you to work out a suitable set of Terms of Reference for the effort.

I appreciate your bringing this new perspective on non-electronic communications to my attention. I look forward to seeing some substantive progress in identifying and resolving emergency mobilization issues in this area.

Sincerely,


WILLIAM J. HILSMAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Chairman, ECWG

Copy To:
Mr. Bernard Wunder

ECWG Principals Meeting

April 16, 1982

1:00 - 3:00 PM

DCA Director's Management Information Center

AGENDA TOPICS

- o Briefing on Emergency Communications and National Policy Statement
- o Discussion of revised Emergency Communications Policy Statement
- o Discussion of Proposed Changes to National Policy Statement
- o Status Report from Information Processing Task Force

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EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20472

April 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Board Members
Working Group Chairmen
Liaison Officers
Points of Contact

FROM: Bennett L. Lewis
Executive Secretary

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ben Lewis", is written over the typed name "Bennett L. Lewis".

SUBJECT: Approved Minutes of Third Board Meeting

Attached are the approved minutes of the third Board meeting. Please destroy the draft minutes which were distributed earlier.

Attachment

This marking is CANCELLED when
separated from the material
bearing a protective marking.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD
Third Board Meeting
March 31, 1982
MINUTES

These minutes are unclassified.

Meeting was opened by the Chairman promptly at 5:00 p.m. The attendance list is attached. The Chairman mentioned the importance of the policy statement, the fact that it was a strawman at this time, and that it was, in many instances, quite different from the Working Group submissions. He then asked the Executive Secretary, Ben Lewis, to lead the discussion.

General Lewis made it clear that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the broad policy statement only and that the Working Groups had the next two weeks in which to prepare comments on the more specific statements. He pointed out on the chart that we were on schedule to this point and that we expected to remain on schedule. He further indicated that the Board members can assist the development of the National Policy Statement by interacting, through their liaison officers, with their agency members on the various Working Groups. He said that updated lists of their liaison officers and other Board officials were at their positions on the table.

General Lewis then called for comments on the preamble.

Mr. Giuffrida remarked that the second sentence of the first paragraph should be changed to read: "Inherent in this obligation is the requirement to have a capability to respond to a full spectrum of major peacetime and wartime emergencies."

Mr. Trent agreed, but said that the statement should have more focus on national security.

Since there were no other comments concerning the preamble, General Lewis turned to the statement of policy.

General Dalton stated that many of the suggestions were inappropriate for a national policy statement on mobilization or national defense. He cited as an example the element of policy referring to a market-based economy, because we know from World War II that severe constraints on the economy would be required. He also referenced in one of the principles the phrase concerning equitable allocation of resources, and indicated that we should not develop a plan with any criteria in mind (for equitable distribution) because the National Command Authority will decide what is equitable.

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General Dalton stated further that the first order of business should be to put into place the authority and structure that we need for mobilization for war and if we do that the principles which require primary reliance on the free market become irrelevant.

Mr. Olmer seconded General Dalton's words and indicated that extreme measures would be required.

Mr. Ikle stated he supported General Dalton and that the statement needs more emphasis on wartime emergencies because now it lends too much attention to peacetime.

Mr. Giuffrida stated that the intent of the policy statement was not to gear it solely to war. He referenced the third bullet on page 1 which clearly includes all emergencies.

Colonel Kay supported Mr. Giuffrida and emphasized the importance of establishing policy to deal with natural disasters.

General Dalton said that his intent was not to restrict the document to wartime emergencies, but wartime emergencies were certainly the extreme case and must receive the most emphasis. He added that other than wartime emergencies, being less severe, would be included.

Mr. Giuffrida made the point that mobilization was not a single event but rather a sequence of events with cumulative impact.

Mr. Trent said the language should be tailored so that the statement deals with responses to "national" emergencies.

Mr. Giuffrida said he would hope that we are putting national security as the basis in developing the national mechanism for emergency response and that once in place it could be used wherever needed.

Mr. Lovell said that it was not clear to him just what we were trying to do. Were we trying to build a system to cope with all emergencies or just the worst cases? He indicated that we must look five to ten years into the future and determine whether or not we could deal realistically with current problems. He also wondered if we were training enough people in government to face actual emergencies.

General Lewis responded that first we were trying to get the policy statement and then a plan of action developed by the agencies. He indicated that we would be focusing both on the present and the long-term. The new policy statement is intended to replace the previous Presidential Directive/NSC-57 which was never implemented by the agencies for lack of resources. The comments we are getting today will be used to revise the draft policy statement.

General Dalton reminded the Board that the Military Mobilization Working Group was working on scenarios and that if the nation develops capabilities to meet the scenarios of nuclear war we would have the capability to respond to other emergencies because the mechanisms to respond to peacetime or wartime emergencies are not all that different.

General Lewis stated that it was not necessarily true that if you prepared for the most severe case then you have covered everything lesser.

Mr. Giuffrida replied by stressing the importance of meeting national needs in a balanced way between military and civilian needs.

General Dalton said that we should not worry about specific allocation of resources but should be concerned with mechanisms to implement the decisions concerning allocation. He said the President alone would decide the allocation of resources.

Judge Clark said that he wanted to emphasize that this is a first draft policy statement. He found it healthy that there is a diversity of views and that everyone was doing their homework so that the undertaking can proceed.

Mr. Harper indicated that he could see a theme recurring through the statement which implied the application of direct controls to a continuum of emergencies. That did not make sense to him because the President's recent veto of the Petroleum Allocation Bill would suggest his reluctance to use any direct controls over the economy short of wartime emergencies. He added that the continuum of emergencies appears to cause problems. He suggested the use of categories of emergencies with concentration at the national level rather than a continuum because if broken into categories, planners would be able to draw the principles in tighter and be able to allocate resources, making maximum use of the free-enterprise system. He further suggested that concentration at the national level would result in beneficial spinoff in other emergencies.

Mr. Hodel stated that the continuum of emergencies also caused him trouble. He cited the veto of the Petroleum Allocations Bill as evidence. He further stated that we should establish the mechanism for dealing with emergencies now, but that the actual passage of emergency legislation could be accomplished much more easily during the emergency where it might be very difficult to do so prior to the emergency. In other words, it seems unnecessary preparation to focus on other than national emergencies. If we focus on the resources such as transportation, energy, and communications during national emergencies, we will be able to fill in the gaps for lesser emergencies later.

Mr. Schmults stated that he agreed with Mr. Hodel. He made the point that we should concentrate on emergencies that would overwhelm existing systems and mechanisms, rather than those with which we are presently able to cope. He made further reference to General Dalton, and he agreed with his earlier statements.

Mr. McNamar indicated that we should maintain maximum flexibility in the development of options. He thought that the statement did not give the proper impression concerning nuclear war because it did not make the point that our preparations for the contingency did not in any way lessen our desire to prevent it. He stated further that he thought reference to nuclear war should be omitted from the statement.

Mr. Wright said that he agreed. He also made the point that you must take into account, at the lowest level, the costs of each program. The costs will be addressed in the normal budget process. Domestic subsidies are an example of an extraordinary effort requiring planning. He added that this is a grey area and he didn't think we wanted to get into it.

Mr. Harper said he had an anecdote which illustrated the ability of the private sector to cope with less than national emergencies without Federal Government interference. A recent flood in a Pennsylvania community established the need for so many miles of pipe which were needed within 12 hours. A local company, with access to such pipe, was called on and responded within the required time frame. This points up the fact that it could be a waste of the taxpayers money to provide mechanisms for government intervention where the private sector infrastructure can already be relied upon. Obviously such reliance would not work in a holocaust.

Mr. Giuffrida responded that the example was an over simplification and misleading if generalized. Just because something worked in the Pennsylvania flood does not mean it always would. There is a Federal structure which is very often useful in local emergencies. Federal planning makes a difference and is appropriate. He said further that he endorsed Dalton that we should prepare for the worst case and also that McNamar's idea to rewrite the reference to nuclear war was justified. Then he said we shouldn't offer simple solutions to natural disasters; the Federal Government is helpful in assisting local communities and local officials get tested during local disasters.

General Lewis redirected discussions to the principles on page 2. He said that the programs to be implemented would be based on principles which address both civilian and military needs in an equitable and balanced manner, with reliance on free market and other voluntary arrangements as long as possible. He added that we must also pay attention to the following principles: maintain maximum Presidential and public policy flexibility such as offering multiple options for the President before going to wage and price controls; not limit preparedness measures to only one or a few scenarios; the responses should be applicable to as many scenarios as possible; direct preparedness measures should be available for dual use such as Civil Defense preparation for other than wartime disasters; measures should recognize enhanced preparedness of states and localities; most preparedness measures will be functionally interdependent among agencies and across preparedness programs, requiring interagency coordination and cooperation; and measures will emphasize a smooth transition from routine to emergency operation, taking full advantage of warnings.

Judge Clark asked if there were any comments.

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Mr. Ikle said he agreed and the principle should be omitted and should not preclude an abrupt transition.

Mr. McNamar commented on Mr. Ikle's point; and then he supported the principle that resources be allocated in an equitable manner because the appearance of equity is essential to maintaining public support.

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Mr. Giuffrida concurred.

General Lewis referred the members to page 3 and said that the more specific policy statements were extracted and aggregated from the Working Group input, that they provided broad program guidance and that they would be followed by a call for input to a plan of action which was the next step.

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General Lewis responded that was not the case.

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Mr. Giuffrida said he agreed and that such coordination was the way FEMA carries out its present mission. He added that there was no intent to dodge the talents available in the Working Groups but that it was in the FEMA mission to provide such guidance.

Mr. Olmer suggested that the introduction of this tasking might be inconsistent with the role of the Board and that we should clarify the respective roles of FEMA and the Board. The function of the Board should be included in the preamble with some specific comments as to what the Board is, to whom it reports, and its goals.

Mr. Giuffrida said that it was a good point and could be done.

General Lewis asked if he understood correctly that there was consensus that the Board would continue in operation as a permanent body.

There was some nodding of heads, but no actual response pro or con.

Mr. Hovde commented that nuclear war was mentioned twice and that it caused concern to him because he could see tomorrow's headline reading that high-level government officials plan for nuclear war.

Mr. Giuffrida stated that he had already suggested a change to the offending words.

As time was running out, General Lewis said the comments provided us enough material to revise the statement and that the Board members should continue to work with the Agency Working Groups members. He then recommended that the next meeting be held at 5:00 p.m. on April 21, 1982.

Judge Clark said the meeting would be held as recommended and that he appreciated the member's prior efforts and their comments today. He then told all present to have written comments to General Lewis the next day. The meeting was adjourned promptly.

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Third Board Meeting
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Richard G. Darman	Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Louis O. Giuffrida	Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
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R. Timothy McNamar	Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Edward C. Schmults	Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice
Darrell M. Trent	Deputy Secretary of Transportation
Joseph R. Wright	Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget
Fred C. Ikle	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Donald Paul Hodel	Under Secretary of the Interior
(Alt) Seeley Lodwick	Under Secretary of Agriculture
Lionel H. Olmer	Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade
Malcolm R. Lovell, Jr.	Under Secretary of Labor
Donald I. Hovde	Under Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
William C. Clohan	Under Secretary of Education
Lt Gen James E. Dalton	Director, Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Alt) Robert H. Miller	Director of Management Operations, Department of State
(Alt) Charles E. Allen	Director, National Intelligence Emergency Planning Staff, Office of DCI
(Alt) William A. Vaughan	Assistant Secretary for Environmental Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Department of Energy
(Alt) COL Wayne G. Kay	Military Assistant to the Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
(Alt) Dan Bourque	Deputy Executive Secretary, Health and Human Services
Bennett L. Lewis	Executive Secretary, Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE BENNETT L. LEWIS
Executive Secretary, Emergency Mobilization
Preparedness Board

SUBJECT: Third EMP Board Meetings, Mar 31

The minutes as amended and comments are approved for
distribution.

William Clark

William P. Clark

Attachment

EMPB Minutes, as amended

NSC #8202494

uw

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HORACE RUSSELL ~~for~~

SUBJECT: Minutes of Third EMP Board Meeting

Ben Lewis has provided the minutes (Tab A) of the Third Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board meeting for your approval. The most salient views presented during the meeting were as follows:

- Reference to nuclear war should be omitted from the statement.
- Language about interfacing with our allies should be included.
- Continuum of emergencies is too broad, and effort should focus on national-level emergencies.
- Providing resources should be part of the normal budgetary process.
- Should clarify the respective roles of FEMA and the Board.

On balance it was a very lively and worthwhile exchange of views that should lead to a much improved next draft. I indicated a few minor changes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Ben Lewis, approving the minutes as amended.

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to General Bennett Lewis
Tab A Minutes of EMPB

2020



EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20472

APR 7 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: WILLIAM P. CLARK
CHAIRMAN

FROM: Bennett L. Lewis
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Third Board Meeting

Attached for your approval are the minutes of the Third Board Meeting with attendance list. (Attachment 1)

Also attached are copies of those comments received from the attendees.
(Attachment 2)

If you approve, I will distribute both the minutes and the comments to all Board Members, Liaison Officers, Working Group Chairman and Points of Contact. I think it is important to provide all members with the written comments in order to expand the views expressed during the meeting.

Attachments 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT REQUIRES
A PROTECTIVE COVER AND SHALL BE
HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
FEMA INSTRUCTION 1200.3

WRITING ON THIS COVER SHEET IS PROHIBITED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Third Board Meeting Minutes

EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD
Third Board Meeting
March 31, 1982
MINUTES

These minutes are unclassified.

Meeting was opened by the Chairman promptly at 5:00 p.m. The attendance list is attached. The Chairman mentioned the importance of the policy statement, the fact that it was a strawman at this time, and that it was, in many instances, quite different from the Working Group submissions. He then turned the meeting over to the Executive Secretary, Ben Lewis, to lead the discussion.

^{asked}
General Lewis made it clear that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the broad policy statement only and that the Working Groups had the next two weeks in which to prepare comments on the more specific statements. He pointed out on the chart that we were on schedule to this point and that we expected to remain on schedule. He further indicated that the Board members can assist the development of the National Policy Statement by interacting, through their liaison officers, with their agency members on the various Working Groups. He said that updated lists of their liaison officers and other Board officials were at their positions on the table.

General Lewis then called for comments on the preamble.

Mr. Giuffrida remarked that the second sentence of the first paragraph should be changed to read: "Inherent in this obligation is the requirement to have a capability to respond to a full spectrum of major peacetime and wartime emergencies."

Mr. Trent agreed, but said that the statement should have more focus on national security.

Since there were no other comments concerning the preamble, General Lewis turned to the statement of policy.

General Dalton stated that many of the suggestions were inappropriate for a national policy statement on mobilization or national defense. He cited as an example the element of policy referring to a market-based economy, because we know from World War II that severe constraints on the economy would be required. He also referenced in one of the principles the phrase concerning equitable allocation of resources, and indicated that we should not develop a plan with any criteria in mind (for equitable distribution) because the National Command Authority will decide what is equitable.

General Dalton stated further that the first order of business should be to put into place the authority and structure that we need for mobilization for war and if we do that the principles which require primary reliance on the free market become irrelevant.

Mr. Olmer seconded General Dalton's words and indicated that extreme measures would be required.

Mr. Ikle stated he supported General Dalton and that the statement needs more emphasis on wartime emergencies because now it lends too much attention to peacetime.

Mr. Giuffrida stated that the intent of the policy statement was not to gear it solely to war. He referenced the third bullet on page 1 which clearly includes all emergencies.

Colonel Kay supported Mr. Giuffrida and emphasized the importance of establishing policy to deal with natural disasters.

General Dalton said that his intent was not to restrict the document to wartime emergencies, but wartime emergencies were certainly the extreme case and must receive the most emphasis. He added that other than wartime emergencies, being less severe, would be included.

Mr. Giuffrida made the point that mobilization was not a single event but rather a sequence of events with cumulative impact.

Mr. Trent said the language should be tailored so that the statement deals with responses to "national" emergencies.

Mr. Giuffrida said he would hope that we are putting national security as the basis in developing the national mechanism for emergency response and that once in place it could be used wherever needed.

Mr. Lovell said that it was not clear to him just what we were trying to do. Were we trying to build a system to cope with all emergencies or just the worst cases? He indicated that we must look five to ten years into the future and determine whether or not we could deal realistically with current problems. He also wondered if we were training enough people in government to face actual emergencies.

[Judge Clark asked Ben Lewis to respond.]

General Lewis responded that first we were trying to get the policy statement and then a plan of action developed by the agencies. He indicated that we would be focusing both on the present and the long-term. The new policy statement is intended to replace the previous Presidential Directive/NSC-57 which was never implemented by the agencies for lack of resources. The comments we are getting today will be used to revise the draft policy statement.

General Dalton reminded the Board that the Military Mobilization Working Group was working on scenarios and that if the nation develops capabilities to meet the scenarios of nuclear war we would have the capability to respond to other emergencies because the mechanisms to respond to peacetime or wartime emergencies are not all that different.

General Lewis stated that it was not necessarily true that if you prepared for the most severe case then you have covered everything lesser.

Mr. Giuffrida replied by stressing the importance of meeting national needs in a balanced way between military and civilian needs.

General Dalton said that we should not worry about specific allocation of resources but should be concerned with mechanisms to implement the decisions concerning allocation. He said the President alone would decide the allocation of resources.

Judge Clark said that he wanted to emphasize that this is a first draft policy statement. He found it healthy that there is a diversity of views and that everyone was doing their homework so that the undertaking can proceed.

Mr. Harper indicated that he could see a theme recurring through the statement which implied the application of direct controls to a continuum of emergencies. That did not make sense to him because the President's recent veto of the Petroleum Allocation Bill would suggest his reluctance to use any direct controls over the economy short of wartime emergencies. He added that the continuum of emergencies appears to cause problems. He suggested the use of categories of emergencies with concentration at the national level rather than a continuum because if broken into categories, planners would be able to draw the principles in tighter and be able to allocate resources, making maximum use of the free-enterprise system. He further suggested that concentration at the national level would result in beneficial spinoff in other emergencies.

Mr. Hodel stated that the continuum of emergencies also caused him trouble. He cited the veto of the Petroleum Allocations Bill as evidence. He further stated that we should establish the mechanism for dealing with emergencies now, but that the actual passage of emergency legislation could be accomplished much more easily during the emergency where it might be very difficult to do so prior to the emergency. In other words, it seems unnecessary preparation to focus on other than national emergencies. If we focus on the resources such as transportation, energy, and communications during national emergencies, we will be able to fill in the gaps for lesser emergencies later.

Mr. Schmultz stated that he agreed with Mr. Hodel. He made the point that we should concentrate on emergencies that would overwhelm existing systems and mechanisms, rather than those with which we are presently able to cope. He made further reference to General Dalton, and he agreed with his earlier statements.

Mr. McNamar indicated that we should maintain maximum flexibility in the development of options. He thought that the statement did not give the proper impression concerning nuclear war because it did not make the point that our preparations for the contingency did not in any way lessen our desire to prevent it. He stated further that he thought reference to nuclear war should be omitted from the statement.

Mr. Wright said that he agreed. He also made the point that you must take into account, at the lowest level, the costs of each program. The costs will be addressed in the normal budget process. Domestic subsidies are an example of an extraordinary effort requiring planning. He added that this is a grey area and he didn't think we wanted to get into it.

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Bennett L. Lewis	Executive Secretary, Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board

Comments from Attendees

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United States
Office of
Personnel Management

Washington, D.C. 20415

In Reply, Refer To:

Our Reference

APR 6 1982

General Bennett L. Lewis
Executive Secretary
Emergency Mobilization Preparedness
Board
500 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20472

Dear General Lewis:

At the March 31, 1982, meeting of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB), Chairman Clark requested additional comments on the proposed National Policy Statement. Our primary concerns relate to the need for better definition of the types of emergencies the Board should address and the lack of specificity regarding the degree of involvement in those various kinds of emergencies. (The definition in the Policy Statement covers emergencies ranging from earthquakes to nuclear war.)

We recommend the exclusion of lesser emergencies from Board consideration and the development of a different format or mechanism to deal with those problems. Our feeling is that the inclusion of lesser emergency categories dilutes the importance of the Board and may have a deleterious effect on generating support for its efforts.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this matter.

Sincerely,



Donald J. Devine
Director

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

Subject: National Policy Statement on Emergency
Mobilization Preparedness

Date: April 2, 1982

From: Darrell M. Trent
The Deputy Secretary
DOT Member, EMPB

Reply to
Attn. of:

To: Bennett Lewis
Executive Secretary, EMPB

In response to Chairman Clark's request for comments on the draft policy statement, I would like to reiterate my support for Fred Ikle's position on the matter of detailed technical guidance on Board policies and implementation measures. If indeed this is even an appropriate matter for inclusion in the general policy statement or an appropriate role for the Board, it should definitely be included in the purview of the working groups responsibilities. Only by utilizing this carefully conceived interdepartmental structure can we be assured of applying the time and balanced technical expertise essential to the detailed review and coordination of such guidance.

I also believe that the matter of addressing overall budget strategy merits further consideration for inclusion in the policy statement. This is particularly relevant as it pertains to those civil agencies which are operating in a declining budget environment as opposed to those agencies with predominant preparedness roles where budgets are increasing.

I am concerned about the contingency planning balance between defense mobilization and peacetime emergencies. I would only affirm my support for the primary emphasis on defense mobilization. Peacetime crises are a major national problem and should receive a high priority, but I am concerned about how broad the emphasis on peacetime contingency planning should be. It is extremely difficult to anticipate and prepare for peacetime emergencies. Contingency planning is necessary for peacetime emergencies, but the procedures and criteria in developing the approach should be carefully evaluated.

We will be pleased to elaborate on these matters if you desire additional comment.

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It's a law we
can live with.



POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 APR 1982

In Reply Refer To:
I-08440/82


MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION
PREPAREDNESS BOARD

SUBJECT: Proposed National Emergency Mobilization Policy
Statement

This responds to your request at the meeting of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) for our comments on the draft National Emergency Mobilization Policy Statement. We have reviewed this policy statement very carefully, and conclude that it should be strengthened in several areas.

First, the draft omits mention of the role of the EMPB itself in the mobilization planning process. Within the national mobilization policy, this Board will formulate guidance, coordinate planning, and resolve issues -- functions vital to the success of our national emergency preparedness effort. Second, in assigning to the Director, FEMA, the responsibility to prepare detailed technical guidance to be issued by the Board, the draft policy statement provides him a role not envisioned by either the President's memorandum establishing the Board, or existing executive authorities. Third, the draft does not emphasize sufficiently the relationship between mobilization preparedness and national defense. The policy statement should reflect the commitment of this Administration to harness the mobilization potential of the nation in support of the armed forces.

I have attached a copy of the overall broad policy portion of the draft statement, marked up to indicate some changes which would strengthen the statement in the areas highlighted above. It is our understanding that the Working Group Chairmen have been asked to provide comments on the specific policy statements within the next two weeks. We therefore will provide any comments we may have on those portions of the draft through our representatives on the working groups.


Fred C. Ikle

Attachment
a/s

PREAMBLE**DRAFT**

A fundamental obligation of government is to provide for the security of the Nation and to ensure the preservation of its people, values, and social, economic and political structures. ~~[in the face of even the most catastrophic emergencies]~~ Inherent in this obligation is the requirement to have a capability to respond to a full spectrum of emergencies. ~~[from local disasters and civil disorders through conventional and nuclear war]~~

The United States Government shall be prepared to provide ^{an} ~~[a predictable]~~ appropriate, ^{effective,} ~~and~~ ^{efficient} response to ~~[the entire spectrum of]~~ emergencies. All departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall be prepared to deal effectively with emergencies and shall program and budget sufficient funds to assure that the ^{necessary} capabilities exist.

UNITED STATES EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS POLICY

It is the policy of the United States to develop and maintain emergency mobilization preparedness programs through which governments at all levels in partnership with the private sector and the American people can respond appropriately and effectively to peacetime and wartime emergencies. These programs are to be directed initially at the correction of the most serious emergency mobilization deficiencies and are to contribute to the:

- ~~[deterrence of war and acts of terrorism, and the prevention of severe resource shortages and technological hazards]~~
 - mitigation of the adverse consequences of ^{those} emergencies ~~[that cannot be deterred or prevented]~~
 - ^{Prompt} ~~[predictable]~~ and efficient response to emergencies that ^{do} occur; and
 - prompt recovery of communities, regions, and the Nation from the effects of ~~[the full spectrum of]~~ emergencies ~~[including nuclear war]~~; and
 - preservation of basic elements of constitutional government, including separation of powers, civilian control of the military, and ^{the} ~~federalism~~; and
 - ~~[preservation of a market-based economy, free from undue governmental regulation]~~
- Maintenance and support of the armed forces, while meeting the needs of the national economy and other civil emergency preparedness requirements;
 - Deterrence of and response to acts of terrorism;
 - Prevention of severe resource shortages and technological hazards

/Comment: This break-out and sequencing will provide appropriate emphasis. The lead entry is a quotation from the President's memorandum of 17 December 1981 establishing the EMPB./

The Emergency Mobilization Preparedness programs will be based on the following principles:

- Federal agencies responsible for the management of the Nation's civilian and military resources will be prepared to utilize those resources to meet both essential civilian and military requirements across the full spectrum of peacetime and wartime emergencies. They must be prepared to allocate these resources in an equitable ~~effective~~ ^{and} ~~efficient~~ manner. ~~So as to maximize the payoffs from mobilized resources.~~
To the extent possible,
- ~~Primary~~ reliance will be placed on market mechanisms and voluntary arrangements that permit the full utilization of the inherent strengths of the American economy and society.
- Plans and procedures will be designed to retain maximum flexibility for the President and other senior officials in the application of emergency authorities and the implementation of emergency programs. ~~Measures that represent dramatic departures from established public policies will be avoided.~~ ^{Whenever possible,} However, plans will provide maximum latitude to modify established policies to meet emergency conditions.
- Preparedness measures will address the full spectrum of peacetime and wartime emergencies including ~~the unlikely emergency of~~ ^{nuclear disaster and} nuclear war. To the greatest degree possible, preparedness measures should be applicable to more than one set of emergency conditions.
- Preparedness measures will emphasize enhanced preparedness of States and localities to handle their basic responsibilities for the protection of the lives and properties of their citizens and provide for a pre-eminent Federal role only in areas where the Federal Government must assume the lead in order to protect national interests and the general population.
- Preparedness measures will reflect functional interdependencies among agency activities and across preparedness programs. This requires sustained attention to the impact of changes in one set of activities upon other activities and programs.
- Preparedness measures will ^{prepare for the} ~~emphasize a smooth~~ transition from routine to emergency operations and will be designed to make effective use of any periods of time which may be available following the receipt of political, strategic, and tactical warnings. ~~While emergencies are, by definition, discontinuous events.~~ It is imperative that the Government develop capabilities to minimize the start-up time required for emergency responses.

Consistent with these principles, agencies will:

- improve the responsiveness of all ^{facilities} ~~[significant]~~ resources and services (energy, transportation, communications, health, human, industrial production, food, social services) to demands for ~~[significant]~~ increases in output and/or re-allocations from less essential to more essential military and civilian needs;
- improve the prospects for the continuous performance of governmental functions essential to national survival and recovery;
- enhance the capabilities of the government to manage the mobilization ^{the execution of} ~~process~~ ^{programs};
- implement a civil defense program that will ^{enhance the possibility for} ~~ensure the~~ survival ~~of the bulk~~ of the population under conditions of strategic warning; and
- improve the capabilities of the United States economic and legal systems to cope with any instabilities arising from emergency conditions.

~~[In addition to the program implementation measures detailed on the attached specific policy statements, the Director of FEMA will prepare detailed technical guidance to be issued by the Board. This guidance will contain, inter alia specifics on:~~

- ~~— the types of emergency situations for which planning is to be accomplished;~~
- ~~— the major events, actions and decisions associated with each situation and the relationships among these items;~~
- ~~— the phases of emergency mobilization processes appropriate to each situation; and~~
- ~~— application of preparedness principles contained in this policy statement.]~~

Accordingly, I direct the establishment of a United States Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Program which will provide the capability to respond to all civil and military emergencies in accordance with the attached detailed programs, and other programs which might be developed subsequently.

Presidential Directive/NSC-57 is hereby rescinded.

Attachment

Consistent with this statement of national emergency mobilization policy, the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board will formulate mobilization policy and planning guidance, coordinate interdepartmental mobilization planning efforts, resolve emergency preparedness issues, and monitor and report on emergency preparedness progress. In this regard, the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board will prepare and promulgate such technical guidance as may be necessary to the achievement of national emergency preparedness objectives.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Bennett L. Lewis
EMPB Executive Secretary

FROM: Ambassador Robert H. Miller
Department of State Representative

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft EMP Policy Statement

The meeting raised a number of important questions which go to the center of the EMPB role and purpose. Some of these, the range of emergencies to be considered and the continued existence of EMPB after the planning stage, need more consideration than they had in the time allotted.

From our viewpoint the critical issue, raised by Commerce Under Secretary Olmer, is the necessity of taking account of the role, contribution and interdependence of our allies. This should be prominent in the policy statement and in the section on military mobilization.

Let me note also that the two issues raised for the Board in the submission by the Emergency Communications WG should be addressed at an early date. The reliance on information processing is as critical as communication. Because the two are so closely related, to minimize coordination problems, we think a sub-WG of the Emergency Communications WG should deal with information processing. The other issue, the shortage of technically qualified professionals is wider than an emergency matter but will compound emergency situations.



Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585

APR 1 1982

Major General Bennett L. Lewis
Executive Secretary
Emergency Mobilization Preparedness
Board
Washington, D.C. 20472

Dear General Lewis:

As requested at yesterday's EMPB meeting, enclosed are our comments on the draft National Policy Statement on Emergency Mobilization Preparedness. I hope they will be useful in preparing a revised draft of the subject document.

Sincerely,

Ronald L. Winkler
Departmental Liaison Officer

Enclosure

April 1, 1982

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE DRAFT NATIONAL POLICY
STATEMENT ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

- o The current draft statement does not recognize the existence of the National Defense Executive Reserve. These highly qualified industry executives are an essential element in dealing with emergencies. Suggest that recognition be afforded and that a policy regarding the dependence on these individuals be included in the statement.
- o Executive guidance for the implementation and coordination of the agency assignments is not specified in the current draft statement. This guidance should be provided by the National Security Council or the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board.
- o Agency heads should be charged with the responsibility for emergency mobilization preparedness. Their normal authority should not be assigned to others for emergency action. As a monitor of the agency emergency preparedness actions, the OMB should require a budget line entry for emergency preparedness for each agency.
- o Throughout the statement the words "conventional" and "nuclear" should be deleted. Let a wartime situation be the ultimate emergency with no distinction as to type.
- o Thought should be given to maintenance of distinction between "legal" and "equitable." Legal problems exist in the area of anti-trust conflict for Executive Reserves and possibly for industrial organizations working together to resolve an emergency. There is a possible need for an amendment of statutes.
- o Although this statement will reflect Federal policy, it must recognize that States have to prepared for emergencies at their own initiative since the Federal Government cannot direct State actions.
- o Coordination of emergency preparedness planning actions among Federal agencies is essential, if an effective program is to exist. The draft statement should emphasize this needed coordination.

1 2 APR 1982



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

April 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK, CHAIRMAN, EMERGENCY
MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

SUBJECT : EMPB Policy Statement

At yesterday's Board meeting, you requested that we put in writing our comments on the proposed Mobilization Preparedness Policy Statement.

We found the broad statement generally okay, as it picks up a number of themes which are consistent with the President's policies. I have two specific suggestions. They are:

1. Add to the Preamble language which recognizes the horror of nuclear war and which states explicitly our position that planning to mitigate such a war's effects will in no way lessen our efforts to avoid it.
2. Add on page 2 a "principle" that preparedness measures will be designed with due regard for preserving and enhancing public morale and will be administered so that the burden is distributed fairly.


I also notice that the draft does not address several issues raised in the memorandum you distributed to us on March 5. Specifically,

- There are no criteria for evaluating possible options for investment (depending on perspective, much of statement reads like an open-ended demand that departments invest, or a blank check that they do so)

- The Statement is silent on mechanisms for allocating resources among military and civilian claimants
- The Statement is silent on setting aside regulations which could impede mobilization.

It seems to me that the Board should focus on these issues, and consider including them in the policy statement.

Finally, it would be very useful for the Board to review the specific working group policy statements, after the working groups have reviewed them. Board review would make certain that the detailed statements are consistent with overall policy and would ensure that all Departments' views are incorporated.



R. T. McNamar

MEMORANDUM FOR: BENNETT L. LEWIS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FROM: Honorable Seeley Lodwick
Under Secretary for International Affairs
and Commodity Programs

SUBJECT: Input from Department of Agriculture

As requested by Chairman Clark, we are supplying the following comments on the overall national policy statement.

The Department of Agriculture is inclined to support the position for deleting references to nuclear war from the policy statement, we feel that we might agree to a reference to war, as long as nuclear was not included.

In the second paragraph of the preamble we would like the word predictable deleted. The statement is stronger without it. We also would replace "predictable" with "appropriate" in the third "bullet" in the policy statement.

In the sixth "bullet" we would substitute the word "restoration" for "preservation".

On the second page of the statement the last line of the first paragraph we would suggest the use of the word "benefits" in place of payoffs.

We would only use the first sentence in the third paragraph. The inclusion of the last two sentences is not necessary.

On the third page the fourth "bullet" could state "as much" in place of "the bulk" and after the word population insert "as possible".

It would appear more consistent with PD-57 if scenarios were developed jointly with the Director of FEMA and the Secretary of Defense.

It is our feeling that the policy statement should avoid areas which subject it to political attack. It should be phrased in a manner which will allow the flexibility to implement mobilization programs to address all emergencies.

We do have some questions regarding funding for the proposed activities and feel that OMB should be providing us some insight as rapidly as possible.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date 31 March 1982


To: EMPB EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Subject: Draft National Policy Statement
on Emergency Mobilization
Preparedness

Ben,

Attached for your information is a copy of our "first-cut" at the memorandum ultimately provided to the Chairman today. I believe the additional detail it contains will be beneficial to you in the next go-around.

If I can be of any assistance in this effort don't hesitate to call upon me.


JAMES E. DALTON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION
PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Subject: Draft National Policy Statement on Emergency
Mobilization Preparedness

1. We/I have reviewed the draft National Policy Statement prepared by the Secretariat. During the review, particular attention was directed to the draft's addressal of the five basic policy matters forwarded in your memorandum for board members of 5 March 1982. The following general comments are made in regard to these issues and the draft policy statement.

- Issue 1: The basic policy statement does not address the role of any level of government below federal. This could lead to the implication that the US Government will develop and maintain programs through which governments at all levels can respond. This is contradictory to the concept of turning responsibilities back to the states under the New Federalism program.

- Issue 2: In national emergencies related to national defense, it is essential that emergency authorities be readily available to the NCA with a minimum of legislative and judicial maneuvering required. The effort to make meaningful progress in this area must be made. Unfortunately, some of the principles espoused in the draft policy statement, if retained, will make the efforts much more difficult. Specifically troublesome, from a national defense viewpoint, is the stated primary reliance on market mechanisms and voluntary arrangements.

- Issue 3: In national emergencies related to national defense, the issue of balanced, equitable and consistent allocation of resources is not adequately addressed. The NCA should set priorities for allocations. Equity and consistency are not the goal; effectiveness is.

- Issue 4: The issue of a free market economy is, for all practicable purposes, irrelevant to national emergencies related to national defense. The existing Defense Production Act of 1950 and the stand-by legislation for the Defense Resources Act testify to this fact. The draft does not recognize this basic tenet.

- Issue 5: Comment on this issue is dependent on the final version of the policy statement. As written, the policy statement will make it difficult to define the precise mobilization base on which to evaluate investment options.

2. We/I consider the major deficiency in the draft to be its failure to emphasize the relationship between mobilization preparedness and national defense. In his 17 December 1981 memorandum, the President stated. inter alia, "one of the most compelling tasks still facing us is the development of a credible and effective capability to harness the mobilization potential of America in support of the armed forces, while meeting the needs of the national economy and other civil emergency preparedness requirements." -

3. In an apparent attempt to comply with the President's direction that the EMPB-prepared national policy statement and plan of action consistent with the policy both "reflect an integration of military and civilian objectives and capabilities", the draft

essentially reduces military objectives to deterrence of war. This absence of emphasis on national defense is reflected throughout the draft. Several specific comments are provided to illustrate this point.

- A "predictable" response to an emergency is described as an objective. In a military emergency, however, it may not be possible. Responses having inherent flexibility to meet uncertain conditions would be better.

- No mention is made of mobilization to support a warfighting capability.

- The draft policy emphasizes market-based economy, voluntary arrangements, and freedom from undue governmental regulations. Emergency mobilization, with its control and allocation of resources and people, requires just the opposite. History doesn't support this as a useful policy objective.

- The draft policy would have "dramatic departure from established public policies ... avoided". This would preclude such measures as implementation of a selective service, control of the civilian workforce, or crisis relocation, potentially essential elements of mobilization.

- The draft would have the Director, FEMA, prepare "detailed technical guidance to be issued by the Board". In this instance, the Board would become a conduit for the Director, FEMA which is not the intended mode of operation for the Board. Furthermore, depending on the type of emergency being addressed, detailed technical instructions might be prepared by one or the other of the departments and agencies. For military mobilization, Defense

is clearly the expert.

4. A major omission in the draft, while not specifically related to the issue of national defense, is that there is no mention of the overall role of the EMPB in formulating or overseeing emergency mobilization preparedness policies and/or programs. This should be incorporated in the next iteration.

5. It is recommended that departments and agencies of Board members be afforded the opportunity to provide working level comments and recommendations to the Executive Secretariat for appropriate revision of the draft prior to its circulation for formal coordination. The Department of Defense/Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remains committed to fully supporting this important effort.

F. IKLE
Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy

J. E. DALTON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

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02 APR 12 P12:11

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	
Bud McFarlane	2	M	
Jacque Hill	3P	✓	
Judge Clark	4	✓	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	5		D
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8202494

RECEIVED 12 APR 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM RUSSELL

DOCDATE 10 APR 82

KEYWORDS: EMPB

MINUTES

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF THIRD EMPD BOARD MTG 31 MAR

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 15 APR 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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ACTION REQUIRED

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