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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90794

October 24, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 318

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS:
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. POSITION (U)

This National Security Decision Directive provides guidance on additional elements of the U.S. position at the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). The decisions below should be translated into the appropriate instructions to the U.S. NST delegation and formally incorporated into the U.S. position on the table in Geneva before the close of the current negotiating session. (S)

Suspect-Site Inspection

Based upon the extensive work of the Senior Arms Control Group, the Arms Control Support Group, and the START Interagency Group on this issue, I have decided that the basic structure of the U.S. position on suspect-site inspections (SSI) within the context of the START Treaty should be completed based upon the following two main elements. (S)

1. SSI with Right of Refusal. Each party may request suspect-site inspection to resolve a compliance concern associated with potentially illegal ballistic missile-related activity at any facility or location owned by or under contract to the government of the other party and located on its national territory. These requests may be refused; but if refused, the refusing party is required to make a good-faith effort to resolve the concern by other means. While not implying that any such inspection must be allowed, there would be an agreed limit on the number of such inspections permitted per year. (S)

2. Short-notice On-site Inspection (OSI) at a List of Agreed Facilities/Locations. Prior to treaty signature, the sides would also agree on a list of facilities or locations at which they would permit short-notice on-site inspections at the request of the other party. There would be provisions for adding facilities to the list after the treaty's entry into force. It is envisioned that this list would focus chiefly on selected facilities associated with solid rocket motor production. These short-notice on-site inspections would have their own quota per year and could not be refused. (S)

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In addition to implementing this decision promptly, I would like the following additional tasks accomplished. (U)

a. By November 1, the START Interagency Group will provide to me its recommendations on the numbers of inspections that should be associated with each of the quotas mentioned in the two elements of the decision. (S)

b. By November 15, the START Interagency Group will provide to me its recommendations on what U.S. facilities should be offered as candidates for the list mentioned in subparagraph 2 above. In addition, it should indicate what Soviet facilities we would have to have the Soviets place on the list in return to make the initial list meet U.S. interests. (S)

c. By December 1, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy and the Director of Central Intelligence will jointly provide to me their recommendations on how the U.S. should prepare to process Soviet requests for suspect-site inspections. (S)

Perimeter-Portal Monitoring

If mobile ICBMs are permitted under the START Treaty, the U.S. will require the right to conduct perimeter-portal monitoring at any facility producing solid rocket motors for any stage of a START-accountable ballistic missile if that facility produces a solid rocket motor (for any purpose) which is as large as, or larger than, the solid rocket motor for the smallest accountable stage of a treaty-limited mobile ICBM (i.e., in terms of both the diameter and the length of the motor). The U.S. will drop the phrase "at a minimum" from the formulation of our position. (S)

If mobile ICBMs remain banned under the START Treaty, the U.S. will require the right to conduct perimeter-portal monitoring:

a. at any facility producing solid rocket motors for any purpose if that facility had produced the accountable stage of a mobile ICBM; and

b. at any facility producing the accountable stage of a START-accountable ballistic missile that either has been fielded as a mobile ICBM or that has been flight tested from a mobile ICBM launcher. (S)

The U.S., at its discretion, may choose not to exercise its right at a facility or facilities which meet the conditions listed above. (S)

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The U.S. position in the START Joint Draft Treaty Text should be reviewed and adjusted as necessary to ensure that, under any circumstances, all solid rocket motor production facilities which are not subject to perimeter-portal monitoring, and all solid motor facilities where a party elects not to exercise its right to establish perimeter-portal monitoring will be subject to suspect-site inspection. This can be accomplished either by SSI with right of refusal or inclusion of the facility on an agreed list of facilities at which short-notice on-site inspection on request is guaranteed. Where used, such suspect-site inspection cannot be expected to substitute for all the functions performed by perimeter-portal monitoring systems. The intent is to use suspect-site inspection to assist in determining if potentially illegal ballistic missile production activities were being conducted at the facility. (S)

Throwweight

After review of the START Interagency Group decision paper on this issue, along with the separate views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have decided on the following approach for dealing with throwweight in START. (S)

a. For existing ballistic missiles, the values of throwweight to be attributed for START purposes shall be agreed between the parties and recorded in the throwweight protocol. Where a particular type of ballistic missile has variants with different values of throwweight, the highest value shall apply to all missiles of that type. (S)

b. For future types of ballistic missiles, the following will apply.

1. Accountable throwweight shall be the larger of:
(a) the throwweight demonstrated on any flight; or, (b) a normalized value taking into account the range at which the throwweight was demonstrated.

2. There shall be no separate definition of future types for throwweight purposes.

3. The notification required by Article X, Paragraph 5 of the START Treaty when such systems first become accountable shall include: (a) the accountable throwweight, derived as indicated above; (b) the maximum demonstrated throwweight and the range capability used in deriving the accountable throwweight.

4. There shall be a requirement for two pre-announced flight tests in the year prior to a new type of ballistic missile becoming accountable under the START Treaty; 30 days notice will be given. The purpose of such pre-announced tests will be to

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facilitate monitoring the flight tests using National Technical Means (NTM). There shall be no constraints on the design of these flight tests and no requirements to provide flight parameters of such tests except for: (a) designation of the type of ICBM or SLBM; (b) projected month and year of initial accountability of the type; (c) projected date of launch; (d) launch location; and (e) projected reentry vehicle impact area.

5. For ballistic missiles on which the final boost stage dispenses and targets multiple reentry vehicles, the maximum aggregate weight associated with that stage in the determination of throwweight will include the entire weight of the final boost stage at the time of initial ignition. (S)

c. There shall be no provisions for: (a) the use of surrogate equations such as the ideal velocity equation; (b) pre-announced demonstration flight tests for existing missiles; (c) exchange of technical data beyond that called for in the START Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); or (d) weighing of components (other than that required by other sections of the START Treaty). (S)

d. Verification of the throwweight of future types shall be by NTM, supplemented by existing START provisions for data exchange and for the broadcast of unencrypted telemetry. (S)

The START Throwweight Protocol, which has been prepared by the NSC Staff reflecting the above decisions, should be transmitted by the START Backstopping Group to the U.S. delegation in Geneva for tabling before the end of the current negotiating session. (S)

By November 1, the START Interagency Group will provide to me its recommendations on what values the U.S. should offer as the throwweight value for existing types of U.S. START-accountable ballistic missiles. In addition, it should indicate what minimum throwweight values we could accept for existing types of Soviet START-accountable ballistic missiles. (S)

Defense & Space

The following are the broad U.S. objectives associated with the issue of limitations on ABM testing in space. (S)

a. Our actions should promote robust SDI research and development. To support this objective, we should:

1. accept no limitations on ABM activities beyond those the United States accepted in 1972;
2. protect the U.S. right to conduct realistic

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feasibility tests of integrated space-based ABM systems based on other physical principles and/or space-based components of such systems capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles; and,

3. obtain evidence of Soviet acceptance of the U.S. right to test in space ABM systems and components based on other physical principles. (S)

b. We should retain the ABM Treaty until the United States is ready to make a conscious decision to move beyond it. To do this, we should conduct, within the ABM Treaty, as much ABM research, development and testing as required to determine the feasibility of effective strategic defenses. We should build sufficient confidence through such testing to support an informed deployment decision. (S)

c. We must protect critical, non-SDI programs. To ensure that we are able to do this, we should:

1. not permit the on-site inspection of spacecraft;
2. provide no launch information on space systems' functions prior to launch;
3. not designate specific orbits or regions of space as the only locations for conducting ABM tests; and,
4. avoid restrictions being placed on non-SDI space-based sensors. (S)

d. We must ensure that the United States has a comprehensive and defensible Defense and Space position. To do this, we must provide a logical approach to show that planned ABM development and testing in space would not constitute deployment. (S)

To pursue the above objectives, I have decided that the United States, in conjunction with our space-based sensor proposal, should offer the following assurance concerning the testing of space-based components and seek Soviet concurrence with the Predictability Protocol, including the additions related to this assurance. (S)

The assurance that the United States should be prepared to offer would be as follows: (U)

"In conducting research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, as acknowledged in the December 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, parties to the ABM Treaty may test space-based ABM systems in accordance

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with the Treaty. At the same time, no such system may be deployed except pursuant to the procedures specified in Article XV or Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty." (S)

"In order to demonstrate that the testing of space-based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, does not represent the deployment of such components, the United States is prepared to carry out such permitted testing only from designated ABM test satellites. Any space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory shall be designated as an ABM test satellite. Further, it is the view of the United States that the number of U.S. designated ABM test satellites in orbit simultaneously shall not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. The United States believes the number 15 falls well below that threshold." (S)

In conjunction with this U.S. assurance, the United States proposes the following addition to the Predictability Protocol currently under negotiation. (S)

"Parties shall provide to each other the following data:

1. identification of each space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is to be tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory no more than 12 hours after launch;
2. notification within 12 hours after the re-entry of an ABM test satellite from its orbit or after a change in its orbit; and
3. notification of a test using such a space object in earth orbit to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory no less than two hours prior to the conduct of any such test." (S)

With the exception of the term "ABM test satellite," all terms used in the above assurance and addition to the Predictability Protocol are drawn from the ABM Treaty, specifically Article II and Agreed Statement D. Testing and development in space of certain ABM systems and components are consistent with Agreed Statement D. (S)

An ABM test satellite is a space object in earth orbit from which

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An ABM test satellite is a space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. The U.S. Defense and Space Negotiator should inform his Soviet counterpart that the phrase "to counter a strategic ballistic missile ... in flight trajectory" in this context has the same meaning as it does under the ABM Treaty. (S)

The guidelines described in the assurance and the addition to the Predictability Protocol, based on Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty, affect only ABM systems including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars that are: (a) space-based, and (b) tested in a mode to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. (S)

In presenting the assurance and the associated additions to the Predictability Protocol, I want to ensure that our actions are clearly understood. My intent is to build upon the Joint Statement issued at the Washington Summit. I want to complement our initiative with respect to sensors and, thus, complete our negotiating position. The U.S. Defense & Space Negotiating Group, after our complete position has been presented, should pursue further discussions with the Soviets on our assurance and proposed associated additions to the Predictability Protocol with the objective of seeking a mutually acceptable resolution of this issue. The assurance and the associated additions to the Predictability Protocol do not represent any change in longstanding U.S. policy with respect to the ABM Treaty, and its proper interpretation. (S)

Finally, Administration policy on the conduct of the SDI program, worked out in conjunction with Congress, remains unchanged. We will consult fully with Congress before requesting funds for SDI tests that go beyond our current practice and fully exercise our rights under the ABM Treaty. At the same time, U.S. policy that we will not accept any treaty restrictions on the SDI program beyond those of the ABM Treaty also remains unchanged. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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