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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (449409PD)	re: U.S. space policy for 21st century (page 2) (1p)	8/4/86	P1 B1
1. policy statement			
2. case file (461371)	re: appointment (2pp)	1/20/87 - 2/20/87	P6 B2 won 12/21/02
COLLECTION: WHORM: Subject File			smf
FILE FOLDER: OS Outer Space (449000-470999)			5/23/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

OSTP Updated Strawman-August 4, 1986, Version 2

U.S. SPACE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Introduction and Principles

The President's National Commission on Space (NCOS) has outlined in its report, *Pioneering the Space Frontier*, a bold civil program for the Nation's next 50 years in space. The scope and time scale of the proposed objectives clearly are too extensive for any one or even several Administrations to fully encompass. Yet, to continue to push back the frontiers of space, each generation must lay the foundations of science and technology and the infrastructure for succeeding generations. An important step toward mankind's permanent presence in space already has been initiated by the present Administration with the Space Station program. We must begin now to lay the additional foundations that could allow for mankind's continued expansion into the frontiers of space and to identify and define the programmatic options for future Presidents to decide how best to carry forward the Nation's space program. Pioneering the frontiers of space will be an ongoing process that will involve all future generations.

To maintain a vigorous society, the Nation needs visionary goals that will continue to stimulate the social and economic engine. That vision needs to be dramatic, needs to capture the imagination, needs to spark the desire of the young to achieve, needs to involve people as the physical as well as the intellectual force. That vision is presented in the recommendations of the Commission to explore, then prospect and then, if deemed desirable and practical, to establish permanent human presence on other planetary bodies of the solar system. The visionary prospect of permanently manned bases in the solar system could be an important technology driver well into the next century. It is not a question of whether humankind continues to move out into the frontiers of space, but only a question of who will do it and when it will occur. What this Nation does in space has a great influence on whether others see us as the world's leading scientific and technological power. Today, other countries, pursuing ambitious long-range plans, are scoring impressive successes in space science, space applications and space commercialization. To continue as a leader into the next century, America must move forward. To stand still is to fall behind and risk the freedom that our dynamic society and economy preserve for us.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Station, begin planning for its evolution into an orbital space port to serve as a transportation node and staging base for transport beyond low-Earth orbit, and plan for an evolution of space transportation capability to support this thrust. An important option is the establishment of outposts on the moon, preceded by a combination of visits to specific points. Prior to any decision to undertake this long term-manned exploration, a number of preliminary scientific and technological steps will be necessary.

To maintain world leadership in the next decade and into the next century, we must continue to invest in technology and space experiments in order to build the base necessary to attain the goals identified by the National Commission on Space.

Basic and applied research and technology will be required for both known and new, high-risk enabling technologies. In-space experiments and demonstrations are needed to prove the concepts and effectively gather data not possible on Earth. Parallel studies and analyses shall be performed to identify and define required systems and pacing high leverage technologies. A strong data base will thus be developed to support various potential alternative scenarios of space exploration, utilization and habitation.

Near-Term Implementation - NASA shall define a technological plan and a set of space capability demonstrations such as closed ecological systems, space-based variable-g laboratories and a Lunar Polar Survey Mission required in the near term to enable the above goals. This plan shall be submitted to the President by December 31, 1986.

Long-Range Implementation - NASA shall prepare a plan to be submitted to the President by December 31, 1986, to define the approaches by which NASA will address the full range of recommendations of the National Commission on Space.

2. Commercial Space Plans

A stated goal of the U.S. National Space Policy is to stimulate--wherever possible--private investment opportunities in support of commercial space enterprise. Commercial space enterprise is characteristically capital intensive, with long lead times and high risk. The National Commission on Space report acknowledges the unique investment opportunities for commercial space enterprise and sets forth particular recommendations for U.S. action. The National Space Strategy of 1984 established the Economic Policy Council Working Group on the Commercial Use of Space to provide a high level government focusd

for commercial space issues.

Implementation - The Economic Policy Council is directed to review the National Commission on Space recommendations related to commercial pursuits for the purpose of identifying institutional and other approaches for establishing a more conducive climate for private sector investment and involvement in future space endeavors. The Economic Policy Council shall report their findings and recommendations to the President by December 31, 1986.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 17, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ARLAN STANGELAND

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES COPY OF LETTER FROM MR. ALBERT
BOLLIE OF MIDDLE RIVER, MINNESOTA REGARDING
THE SALE OF A RARE OBJECT HE HAS KEPT FOR 20
YEARS AND BELIEVES IS FROM OUTER SPACE

		ACTION	DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD
WILLIAM BALL		ORG	87/02/17
REFERRAL NOTE:			
REFERRAL NOTE:			
REFERRAL NOTE:			
REFERRAL NOTE:			
REFERRAL NOTE:			

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240

MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *OF SIGNER         *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *CODE = A          *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED         *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *OUTGOING          *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                   *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                        *                   *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                        *                   *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

March 23, 1987

Dear Arlan:

Thank you for your letter of February 12 on behalf of Mr. Albert Bollie of Middle River, Minnesota, who would like an expert to examine an object your constituent believes came from outer space.

A member of my staff has spoken with Mr. Glenn MacPherson (Department of Mineral Services, NHB-119, Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D.C. 20560, 202-357-2260) who has offered to examine the object for Mr. Bollie. Your constituent can either call or write Mr. MacPherson to make the specific arrangements.

I hope this is of assistance to you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Arlan Stangeland
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

WLB:KRJ:JWR:jwr

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MR. GLENN MACPHERSON
DEPT OF MINERAL SERVICES
NHB-119
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
WASHINGTON DC 20560
202-357-2260

ARLAN STANGELAND
7TH DISTRICT, MINNESOTA

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE
PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

460949
OFFICES:
1526 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2165
M-F BUILDING
403 CENTER AVENUE
MOORHEAD, MN 56560
(218) 233-8631
FEDERAL BUILDING
720 MALL GERMAIN
ST. CLOUD, MN 56301
(612) 251-0740
TOLL FREE NUMBER
(IN MINNESOTA)
1-800-432-3770

February 12, 1987

WB
William Ball III
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

(Erin)
sent work to
you to answer
Ballie


Dear Mr. Ball:

Enclosed is a letter which I received recently from one of my constituents, Mr. Albert Bollie. As you can read, he would like to have a response from President Reagan to his letter. I would appreciate it if you could assist me in this manner.

Thank you in advance for your assistance. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of service to you in any way.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,



Arlan Stangeland
Member of Congress

FEB 6 1987

STAFF INIT. EDS

STAFF CODE W102A

STAFF NAME W102A

REPLY DATE 2/12

Albert Bollie
Royal Apt. # 120
Middle River, Mn. 56737

Feb. 2, -87

Arlan Stangeland
Member of Congress
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Arlan

First I wish to say thank you for your nice letter of Oct. 13, 1986 I have had surgery since and do not always feel the best, am past 87 years old and find that the Golden Age is ~~not~~ not all Roses.

A little about myself, have lived in the same TWP of Rollis since 1904 to 1982 and in the small town ^{of Catzke} since 1919 and in the same home for 59 years.

Reason for writing the above is to say you are dealing with an honest party.

Still have the about 14 ~~og~~ rare object I have kept for about 20 years and am sure it is from the outer space or another planet. It seems or has been a melted object with is full of bright things, I do not know what they are made of. Think about 50% of it are those bright things I do not know what they contain. Am sure its the only object worldwide but before you get any one to buy it am sure you will have to have an honest person look at it and fully decide that its from outer space or another planet.

Know you are busy as being a Representative is not always the best, so if you have the time why not let our President Hon. Reagen read ~~this letter~~ this letter. He will know if the Government or some one with ~~with~~ plenty money wish to buy it.

Have had my Lawyer see it and he says he has never seen another object like it.

I may not have to many days left and have no money to spend checking it but am sure you will come or get another honest person to check it. Hope to hear ~~from~~ from you.

Cordially yours

Albert Bollie
Albert Bollie

Really think the Government should buy it as it may never happen again that someone is as lucky as I was.

William Ball III
Asst to Pres for L.A.
The White House
20500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1986

461047

05

Dr. Keel,

Unless this is something you wish to do personally, suggest we refer to Gerry May for action.

____ Okay, send to G. May

____ Pls schedule brief
appt for me

Other: _____

Wilma

*after 4:00pm
staffing*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1986

→ NSC SECRETARIAT:

STAFF ACTION TO GERRY MAY


Dr. Keel requests that Gerry May staff this action. Dr. Keel will schedule meeting after Gerry May staffing.

Col May: Pls be in touch re scheduling a time on Dr. Keel's calendar.

Many thanks,

Wilma Hall

Postmarked 10 Sep 86
Raid 9-12-86



AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF
AERONAUTICS AND
ASTRONAUTICS

1010 16th STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
202/785-0293

August 25, 1986

The Honorable Alton G. Keel
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Al:

Welcome back. I hope you had a good vacation! Was that your first one?

Jerry Grey and I would like to come in to talk to you about the Institute's Workshop Paper on Space Policy. It was released to the public on August 27th--not as an Institute position, but as the product of the workshop attendees only.


Jerry will now send the paper to various AIAA committees, sections and individuals in order to come up with the final document that will be approved by the Board of Directors.

We hope you can find some time to see us before NSC business absorbs all your time.

What an exciting job you are undertaking. We wish you every possible gram of luck, and if you think the AIAA can be of any assistance to you by holding workshops on issues that will soon be before you, such as global habitability, please don't hesitate to call on us.

Pat thinks we may have to issue Volume 2 of your biography as you have accomplished so much since we last talked with you.

Best regards,



Johan Benson
Director, Washington Office

August 25, 1986

Dr. Alton G. Keel
Acting Deputy Director
National Security Council
West Wing
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF
AERONAUTICS AND
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1010 16th STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
202/785-0293



*Save if calls
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time.*

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Johan Benson
Johan Benson
Director, Washington Office

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8606658

RECEIVED 15 SEP 86 13

TO KEEL, A

FROM BENSON, JOHAN

DOCDATE 25 AUG 86

KEYWORDS: SPACE POLICY

MP

GREY, JERRY

SUBJECT: LTR TO KEEL FM AMER INSTITUTE AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS SEEKING
APPT RE SPACE POLICY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KEAL TO BENSON DUE: 22 SEP 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1986

NSC SECRETARIAT:

STAFF ACTION TO GERRY MAY

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1986

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Other: _____

Wilma

after GMM staffing

Letter to Alton Keel dated 860825 from
Johan Benson requesting appointment together with
Gerry Grey re The American Institute of Aeronautics &
Astronautics.

NSC # 8606658

461047

4900

OS 86-12

FG006-12

6658

Postmarked 18 Sep 86
Raid 9-12-86



AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF
AERONAUTICS AND
ASTRONAUTICS

1010 16th STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
202/785-0293

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Johan

Johan Benson
Director, Washington Office

86 SEP 12 P4 35

August 25, 1986

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Acting Deputy Director
National Security Council
West Wing
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

*Save if calls
sd try to sched
time.*



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202/785-0293

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Johan Benson
Director, Washington Office

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UNCLASSIFIED

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APPT RE SPACE POLICY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KEAL TO BENSON DUE: 22 SEP 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MAY

LINHARD

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 2/3 SEE 8607800 FOR FINAL ACTION

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

82

Copy sent to Anita 2-24-87

461371
05

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 17, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE FRANK E. MOSS

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF THE
ABM TREATY RATIFIED IN 1972 THAT PROHIBITED
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF ALL SPACE - BASED
COMPONENTS

ACTION

DISPOSITION

ROUTE TO:
OFFICE/AGENCY

(STAFF NAME)

ACT DATE TYPE C COMPLETED
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD

HOWARD BAKER

ORG 87/03/17

C 87/03/23

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

COMMENTS: FORMER UNITED STATES SENATOR

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:

MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1221

CS MAIL

USER CODES: (A)

(B)

(C)

*ACTION COD
*
*A-APPROPRI
*C-COMMENT/
*D-DRAFT RE
*F-FURNISH
*I-INFO COP
*R-DIRECT R
*S-FOR-SIGN
*X-INTERIM

REFE
(ROO

KEEP THIS WORKSHEET
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO
MANAGEMENT.

→ Bill -

I would
touch a c
this.

TRANSLATION:

I WOULD
TOUCH A C
THIS

Bill,

O.k per John to answer even
though the letter is old. Draft
attached -- go smooth

Thanks,

Louaine

HNB

JAN 7 1987

Los Angeles

August 26, 1987

Dear Ted:

Thank you for your letter regarding the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty. While I apologize for the delay in my response, I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my views on this matter.

President Reagan directed at the inception of the SDI program that it be conducted in full compliance with all U.S. international legal obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The SDI program was initially structured to conform to a restrictive interpretation of that Treaty, which would prohibit development and testing of ABM systems based on "other physical principles," except those in a fixed land-based mode. In 1985, the United States undertook a review of the ABM Treaty and its negotiating history in order to gain a more precise understanding of what the Treaty permits with respect to the development and testing of ABM systems. That review led the President to conclude that a broader interpretation of the Treaty -- permitting development and testing of all ABM systems involving other physical principles, regardless of basing mode -- was fully justified.

The only provision of the Treaty which deals with future technologies is Agreed Statement D, which allows "creation" (i.e., development and testing) of ABM systems based on other physical principles and provides for consultations and agreement only on deployment. The negotiating record clearly demonstrates that the United States tried, but failed, to secure Soviet agreement to a Treaty text that would have prohibited development of space-based and other mobile-based ABM systems based on future technologies. The Soviets firmly rejected that U.S. effort, arguing that restrictions could not be imposed on systems and components that were not yet created and thus not yet defined.

While some statements by White House officials during the ABM Treaty ratification process tended to support the restrictive interpretation, others were consistent with the broader interpretation. President Nixon's letter of transmittal did not address future ABM systems at all; the treatment of the subject in Secretary Rogers' official report on the Treaty is entirely consistent with the broader interpretation. The report of the Foreign Relations Committee included only a brief statement concerning future ABM systems, which repeated the thrust of

Secretary Rogers' report. The resolution of advice and consent did not in any way condition the Senate's consent to the Treaty on the restrictive interpretation.

In any case, even if some Senators believed that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to the restrictive interpretation, those beliefs could not create binding bilateral obligations under the Treaty. The best evidence of what the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to is in the Treaty text and the negotiating record. The Soviet Union refused to accept what is now called the narrow interpretation, and the United States has no greater obligation than the obligation the Soviet Union was willing to undertake.

I hope this is helpful to you in your examination of ABM Treaty issues. Please feel free to get back in touch if there is anything else I can do.

Sincerely,

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

The Honorable Frank E. Moss
Haley & Stolebarger
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

HHB/LC:ec 7HHB

cc: Lorraine Camarano - Rm. 61 - OEOB

Redone on 8/26/87 for address

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 28, 1987

Dear Ted:

Thank you for your letter regarding the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty. While I apologize for the delay in my response, I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my views on this matter.

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
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Secretary Rogers' report. The resolution of advice and consent did not in any way condition the Senate's consent to the Treaty on the restrictive interpretation.

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I hope this is helpful to you in your examination of ABM Treaty issues. Please feel free to get back in touch if there is anything else I can do.

Sincerely,



Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

The Honorable Frank E. Moss

~~1848 Wasatch Drive~~

~~Salt Lake City, UT 84108~~

Haley + Stohrger
10th fl, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

June 1, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: GRANT S. GREEN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Moss

The draft letter at Tab A, as amended, is an appropriate response to Senator Moss.

Attachment

Tab A Response to Moss

Honorable Frank E. Moss
1348 Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

Dear Ted:

White I apologize for the delay in my response, ~~It was good to hear from you, and~~
proper
Thank you for your letter regarding the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my views on this important matter.

President Reagan directed at the inception of the SDI ^{program} that if the ~~program~~ be conducted in full compliance with all U.S. international legal obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The SDI program was initially structured to conform to a restrictive interpretation of that Treaty, which ^{would} prohibits development and testing of ABM systems based on other physical principles, ["]and their substitute ~~ABM components~~, except those in a fixed land-based mode. In 1985, the United States undertook a review of the ABM Treaty and its negotiating history in order to gain a more precise understanding of what the Treaty permits with respect to the development and testing of ~~future~~ ABM systems. That review led the President to conclude that a broader interpretation of the Treaty -- permitting development and testing of all ABM systems involving other physical principles, regardless of basing mode -- was fully justified.

The only provision of the Treaty which deals with future technologies is Agreed Statement D, which allows "creation" (i.e., development and testing) of ABM systems based on other physical principles and provides for consultations and agreement only on deployment. The negotiating record clearly demonstrates that the United States tried, but failed, to secure Soviet agreement to a Treaty text that would have prohibited development of space-based

and other mobile-based ABM systems based on future technologies. The Soviets firmly rejected that U.S. effort, arguing that restrictions could not be imposed on systems and components that were not yet created and thus not yet defined.

While some statements by ^{White House} ~~Executive Branch~~ officials during the ABM Treaty ratification process tended to support the restrictive interpretation, others were consistent with the broader interpretation. President Nixon's letter of transmittal did not address future ABM systems at all; the treatment of the subject in Secretary Rogers' official report on the Treaty is entirely consistent with the broader interpretation. The report of the Foreign Relations Committee included only a brief statement concerning future ABM systems, which repeated the thrust of Secretary Rogers' report. The resolution of advice and consent did not in any way condition the Senate's consent to the Treaty on the restrictive interpretation.

In any case, even if some Senators believed that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to the restrictive interpretation, those beliefs could not create binding bilateral obligations under the Treaty. The best evidence of what the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to is in the Treaty

text and the negotiating record. The United States ^{has no} ~~cannot be~~ ^{obligation} ~~greater duty to the Soviet Union~~ than the obligation ^{to the Soviet Union} ~~to accept that limitation.~~ ^{was willing to undertake} ~~bound to the restrictive interpretation when the Soviets refused~~

The Soviet Union refused to accept what is now called the narrow interpretation, and
Sincerely,

I hope this is helpful to you in your examination of ABM Treaty issues. Please feel free to get back in touch if there is anything I can do.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 29, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN

FROM: BOB LINHART *Bob* / WILL TOBEY *Will*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Moss

At Tab I is a memo to Sally Kelley approving a response (at Tab A) to Senator Moss, who wrote to Senator Baker (at Tab B) about the ABM Treaty.

N Nicholas Rostow and Steve Steiner *Steve* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Sally Kelley
Tab A Response to Senator Moss
Tab B Incoming from Moss to Baker

THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED AND DELIVERED TO THE CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL DIVISION, WHS, ROOM 3A948, NOT LATER THAN (YYMMDD) _____

DATE (YYMMDD) 87/03/31

2810

TO: CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL DIVISION, WHS, ROOM 3A948, PENTAGON

☐ ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (COPY ATTACHED)

☐ ACTION HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED (EXPLAIN BELOW). EXPECTED DATE OF COMPLETION IS (YYMMDD) _____

☐ REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO (YYMMDD) _____ (JUSTIFY BELOW)

EXPLAIN/JUSTIFY

I: 09827 / 87

This action is to be transferred back to White House per phone conversation between Kent Stansberry (NSC) and Will Tobey (NSC)

CCD CONTROL NUMBER

W 16793

REPORTING INDIVIDUAL

SIGNATURE

Frank A. Wilson

DOD COMPONENT

SD+STAP

TELEPHONE NO.

X48600

SD FORM 391
82 APR

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE

cc: Frank Wilson
NSC - will answer

Joni
Per our
Conversation

Sally

who is Kent
Stansberry +
who is Will
Tobey - so we
can figure
this out?

Joni
L m y m
9

1987 MAR 27 AM 10:32

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MARCH 27, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 464140

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 13, 1987

TO: HOWARD BAKER

FROM: THE HONORABLE FRANK E. MOSS
1848 WASATCH DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84108

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF THE
ABM TREATY RATIFIED IN 1972 THAT PROHIBITED
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF ALL SPACE - BASED
COMPONENTS

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

W16793

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8 April 87

MEMO FOR

Joni

Kent Stansberry works in Policy.
He spoke to Will Tokey (NSC)
who accepted this case. NSC
will answer.

Rich M.

Sally —
for you —
Joni



464170

Frank E. Moss
1848 Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

March 13, 1987

Hon. Howard Baker
Chief of State
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Howard:

As a United States Senator in 1972, I joined 87 of my colleagues in voting to ratify the ABM Treaty.

It was my belief and understanding that the Treaty clearly prohibited the development and testing, as well as deployment, of all space-based and other mobile based ABM systems and components then available or any that might be developed. In his letter transmittal, President Nixon presented this interpretation as did Secretary of State Rogers in his report to the Senate on the Treaty.

With the question of interpretation of the Treaty now under Executive and Congressional consideration please note that my vote, and, I believe, the other 87 affirmative votes for ratification, were cast with this understanding of the Treaty. A new Treaty would be required to change its clear language.

Respectfully submitted,

 (Tia)

Frank E. Moss

FEM:pah

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8702810

RECEIVED 15 APR 87 12

TO BAKER, H FROM MOSS, FRANK E

DOCDATE 13 MAR 87

KEYWORDS: SDI

SPACE POLICY

MP

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: LTR TO BAKER FM MOSS RE RATIFICATION ABM TREATY

ACTION: PREPARE FOR BAKER SIGNATURE DUE: 22 APR 87 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TOBEY

LINHARD

STEINER

COCKELL

FORTIER

MAY

COMMENTS OR OTHER APPROPRIATE ACTION. RETURNED FM DOD FOR NSC

REPLY

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Green</i>	<i>X 6/1</i>	<i>For Signature</i>	<i>6/2</i>	
	<i>C 6/1</i>	<i>Green Sgd</i>		<i>Rel, wt, CNR,</i>
				<i>LES</i>
DISPATCH	<i>[Signature]</i>			

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 17, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE FRANK E. MOSS

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF THE
ABM TREATY RATIFIED IN 1972 THAT PROHIBITED
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF ALL SPACE - BASED
COMPONENTS

ACTION

DISPOSITION

ROUTE TO: ACT DATE TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME) CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD

HOWARD BAKER ✓ ORG 87/03/17 C 87/03/23 CJ

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

COMMENTS: FORMER UNITED STATES SENATOR

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1221

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

7/21

→ B(1) -

I wouldn't dare
touch a comma of
this.

Camp

TRANSLATION:

[I WOULDN'T DARE
TOUCH A COMMA OF
THIS]

Bill,

Ok per John to answer even
though the letter is old. Draft
attached -- go smooth

Thanks,

Louaine

NHB Sig.

July 28, 1987

Dear Ted:

Thank you for your letter regarding the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty. While I apologize for the delay in my response, I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my views on this matter.

President Reagan directed at the inception of the SDI program that it be conducted in full compliance with all U.S. international legal obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The SDI program was initially structured to conform to a restrictive interpretation of that Treaty, which would prohibit development and testing of ABM systems based on "other physical principles," except those in a fixed land-based mode. In 1985, the United States undertook a review of the ABM Treaty and its negotiating history in order to gain a more precise understanding of what the Treaty permits with respect to the development and testing of ABM systems. That review led the President to conclude that a broader interpretation of the Treaty -- permitting development and testing of all ABM systems involving other physical principles, regardless of basing mode -- was fully justified.

The only provision of the Treaty which deals with future technologies is Agreed Statement D, which allows "creation" (i.e., development and testing) of ABM systems based on other physical principles and provides for consultations and agreement only on deployment. The negotiating record clearly demonstrates that the United States tried, but failed, to secure Soviet agreement to a Treaty text that would have prohibited development of space-based and other mobile-based ABM systems based on future technologies. The Soviets firmly rejected that U.S. effort, arguing that restrictions could not be imposed on systems and components that were not yet created and thus not yet defined.

While some statements by White House officials during the ABM Treaty ratification process tended to support the restrictive interpretation, others were consistent with the broader interpretation. President Nixon's letter of transmittal did not address future ABM systems at all; the treatment of the subject in Secretary Rogers' official report on the Treaty is entirely consistent with the broader interpretation. The report of the Foreign Relations Committee included only a brief statement concerning future ABM systems, which repeated the thrust of

Secretary Rogers' report. The resolution of advice and consent did not in any way condition the Senate's consent to the Treaty on the restrictive interpretation.

In any case, even if some Senators believed that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to the restrictive interpretation, those beliefs could not create binding bilateral obligations under the Treaty. The best evidence of what the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to is in the Treaty text and the negotiating record. The Soviet Union refused to accept what is now called the narrow interpretation, and the United States has no greater obligation than the obligation the Soviet Union was willing to undertake.

I hope this is helpful to you in your examination of ABM Treaty issues. Please feel free to get back in touch if there is anything else I can do.

Sincerely,

Howard E. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

The Honorable Frank E. Moss
1848 Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84108

HHE/LC:ec 7HHB

cc: Lorraine Camarano - Rm. 61 - OEOB

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8 April 87

MEMO FOR

Joni

Kent Stansberry works in Policy.
He spoke to Will Tokey (NSC)
who accepted this case. NSC
will answer.

Rich M.

Sally —
for you —
Joni

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 1, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: GRANT S. GREEN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Moss

The draft letter at Tab A, as amended, is an appropriate response to Senator Moss.

Attachment

Tab A Response to Moss

Honorable Frank E. Moss
1348 Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

Dear Ted:

While I apologize for the delay in my response, I was good to hear from you, and proper

Thank you for your letter regarding the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my views on this important matter.

President Reagan directed at the inception of the SDI ^{program} that if the ~~program~~ be conducted in full compliance with all U.S. international legal obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The SDI program was initially structured to conform to a restrictive interpretation of that Treaty, which ^{would} prohibits development and testing of ABM systems based on other physical principles, ["]and their substitute ABM components, except those in a fixed land-based mode. In 1985, the United States undertook a review of the ABM Treaty and its negotiating history in order to gain a more precise understanding of what the Treaty permits with respect to the development and testing of ~~future~~ ABM systems. That review led the President to conclude that a broader interpretation of the Treaty -- permitting development and testing of all ABM systems involving other physical principles, regardless of basing mode -- was fully justified.

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and other mobile-based ABM systems based on future technologies. The Soviets firmly rejected that U.S. effort, arguing that restrictions could not be imposed on systems and components that were not yet created and thus not yet defined.

While some statements by ^{White House} ~~Executive Branch~~ officials during the ABM Treaty ratification process tended to support the restrictive interpretation, others were consistent with the broader interpretation. President Nixon's letter of transmittal did not address future ABM systems at all; the treatment of the subject in Secretary Rogers' official report on the Treaty is entirely consistent with the broader interpretation. The report of the Foreign Relations Committee included only a brief statement concerning future ABM systems, which repeated the thrust of Secretary Rogers' report. The resolution of advice and consent did not in any way condition the Senate's consent to the Treaty on the restrictive interpretation.

In any case, even if some Senators believed that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to the restrictive interpretation, those beliefs could not create binding bilateral obligations under the Treaty. The best evidence of what the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to is in the Treaty text and the negotiating record. The United States ^{has no} ~~cannot be~~ ^{greater obligation} ~~bound to the restrictive interpretation when the Soviets refused~~ ^{to accept that limitation.}

The Soviet Union refused to accept what is now called the narrow interpretation, and
Sincerely,

I hope this is helpful to you in your examination of ABM Treaty issues. Please feel free to get back in touch if there is anything else I can do.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 29, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN

FROM: BOB LINHARD/WILL TOBEY

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Moss

At Tab I is a memo to Sally Kelley approving a response (at Tab A) to Senator Moss, who wrote to Senator Baker (at Tab B) about the ABM Treaty.

Nicholas Rostow and Steve Steiner concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to Sally Kelley
Tab A	Response to Senator Moss
Tab B	Incoming from Moss to Baker

Joni —
Per our
Conversation!
Sally

Who is Kent
Stensberg +
Who is Wile
Tobey - so we
can figure
this out?



THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED AND DELIVERED TO THE CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL
DIVISION, WHS, ROOM 3A948, NOT LATER THAN (YYMMDD) _____

2810 89/03/31

TO: CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL DIVISION, WHS, ROOM 3A948, PENTAGON

- ☐ ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (COPY ATTACHED)
☐ ACTION HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED (EXPLAIN BELOW). EXPECTED DATE OF COMPLETION IS
(YYMMDD) _____
☐ REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO (YYMMDD) _____ (JUSTIFY BELOW)

EXPLAIN/JUSTIFY

I = 09827 / 87

This action is to be transferred
back to White House per phone
conversation between Kent Stansberry (NSC)
and Will Tobey (NSC)

CCD CONTROL
NUMBER

W 16793

REPORTING INDIVIDUAL

SIGNATURE

Frank Wilson

DOD COMPONENT

SD+SRCP

TELEPHONE NO.

X48620

SD FORM 391
82 APR

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE

cc: Frank Wilson
NSC - will answer

Jim -
your action -
Tobey

Sally -
for you -
Jim

1987 MAR 27 AM 10:32

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MARCH 27, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ✓

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 464140

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 13, 1987

TO: HOWARD BAKER

FROM: THE HONORABLE FRANK E. MOSS
1848 WASATCH DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84108

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF THE
ABM TREATY RATIFIED IN 1972 THAT PROHIBITED
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF ALL SPACE - BASED
COMPONENTS

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

W16793



464140

Frank E. Moss
1848 Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84143

March 13, 1987

Hon. Howard Baker
Chief of State
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Howard:

As a United States Senator in 1972, I joined 87 of my colleagues in voting to ratify the ABM Treaty.

It was my belief and understanding that the Treaty clearly prohibited the development and testing, as well as deployment, of all space-based and other mobile based ABM systems and components then available or any that might be developed. In his letter transmittal, President Nixon presented this interpretation as did Secretary of State Rogers in his report to the Senate on the Treaty.

With the question of interpretation of the Treaty now under Executive and Congressional consideration please note that my vote, and, I believe, the other 87 affirmative votes for ratification, were cast with this understanding of the Treaty. A new Treaty would be required to change its clear language.

Respectfully submitted,


Frank E. Moss

FEM:pah

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8702810

RECEIVED 15 APR 87 12

TO BAKER, H

FROM MOSS, FRANK E

DOCDATE 13 MAR 87

KEYWORDS: SDI

SPACE POLICY

MP

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: LTR TO BAKER FM MOSS RE RATIFICATION ABM TREATY

ACTION: PREPARE FOR BAKER SIGNATURE

DUE: 22 APR 87 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TOBEY

LINHARD

STEINER

COCKELL

FORTIER

MAY

COMMENTS OR OTHER APPROPRIATE ACTION. RETURNED FM DOD FOR NSC

REPLY

REF# LOG NSC/FID

(LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Green

X

6/1

For Signature

6/2

C

6/1

Green Sgd

Rel, wt, CNR,
LES

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

DS

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 23, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JAKE GARN

SUBJECT: URGES PROMPT AND DECISIVE ACTION REGARDING
OPTIONS FOR THE SPACE STATION SUBMITTED BY
OMB, NSC, THE PRESIDENT 'S SCIENCE ADVISOR
AND NASA

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
HOWARD BAKER		ORG	87/03/23		C 87/03/23
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
WILLIAM BALL		RSA	87/03/23		
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				

LUB A870416

AB

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220 _____

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *OF SIGNER         *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *CODE = A          *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *OUTGOING          *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                   *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                   *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                   *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

April 16, 1987

Dear Senator Garn:

On behalf of Howard Baker, I would like to thank you for your March 20 letter indicating your continued support for the International Space Station.

As I am sure you are aware, NASA announced on April 3 its plans to continue with the design and development of the Space Station, to establish a U.S. human presence in space by the mid 1990's. NASA will seek congressional approval to release requests for proposals to industry for a phased development of the Space Station, including estimates for an enhanced-capability Space Station Configuration.

The President's fiscal year 1988 budget request for the Space Station will remain at \$767 million, and funding projections, through fiscal year 1990, will not increase from the current budget projections for development. This funding profile is consistent with a schedule leading to permanent manned operations in space by 1996.

The Space Station is an important Administration priority for U.S. technological leadership in space, international cooperation, and national security. President Reagan is deeply committed to the Space Station and will ensure that the program is implemented in a cost-effective manner consistent with our current fiscal constraints.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Jake Garn
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

WLB:KRJ:HLB:hlb

cc: Howard Baker - FYI ✓

3123
465719
to check

E. J. (JAKE) GARN
UTAH

SD 505 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: 202-224-5444

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
BANKING, HOUSING AND
URBAN AFFAIRS
RULES AND
ADMINISTRATION

JEFF M. BINGHAM
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 20, 1987

3123
has not been sent forward in w.w.
Cathy Bergeson

The Honorable Howard Baker
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Howard:

I understand that OMB, the NSC, the President's Science Advisor and NASA have reached an agreement regarding options for the Space Station. This agreement is being forwarded to you and the President. The timing of this decision is critical.

While I don't know the details of their recommendation, I am hopeful that circumstances will permit prompt and decisive action by the White House on the Space Station. A decision is urgently needed to hold together the fragile bi-partisan support for pursuit of U.S. technological leadership in space. The President's commitment to the goal of an operational Space Station by 1994 must be emphasized now.

We have made progress in recovering from the tragic loss of Challenger and her crew. I am confident of the successful completion of those recovery efforts. We clearly need to look beyond that recovery period to the challenges and opportunities that await us. The Space Station is the most significant objective on which we can focus our efforts in space exploration.

Should the Space Station be derailed, it would encourage further attacks on the Administration's technological initiatives in SDI, the Department of Defense, and the basic sciences.

Last year, the White House took six months to make a decision to submit a budget request for the replacement of the space shuttle Challenger. The Administration recommended only \$250 million; however, Ted Stevens and I were able to push through a \$2.5 billion appropriation for this purpose. Losing the majority in the Senate will make our efforts far more difficult. But strong Presidential leadership can keep the Space Station on track. Public opinion polls consistently demonstrate that there is strong support for him to pursue such a course.

Naturally, a great deal of discussion with the Congress is necessary to make this program a success. I know you recognize the need to maintain the flexibility required to accommodate such an ongoing dialogue as the program matures.

The Honorable Howard Baker
March 20, 1987
Page 2

Thank you for your attention to this matter. As I have said before, I am willing to do whatever I can to assist you and the President in pursuing the goals of his Administration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Jake", with a large loop at the end.

Jake Garn

JG/jbf