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4	Memorandum	01/20/1988	4		01-14-2003
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	To: For the File				
	From: Arthur Culvahouse				
	Subject: re Baker-Powell meeting with Dr. Georgi Arbatov on 1/14/88				
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1				

COLLECTION: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files

SERIES: I. Subject File

TITLE: Arbatov Meeting, Notes on - January 14, 1988

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR. 
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Baker-Powell Meeting with Dr. Georgi Arbatov
on Thursday, January 14, 1988

Dr. Georgi Arbatov visited with Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., General Colin L. Powell and Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., for approximately 30 minutes beginning at 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, January 14, 1988. Dr. Arbatov is the director of the Institute for the U.S. and Canada Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and was accompanied by Vlidimir Pechatnov, who was on the staff of the Institute and on assignment with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Culvahouse had met Arbatov in Moscow the previous week, and was asked by Baker to participate in the meeting.)

Dr. Arbatov began the meeting by noting that during the December 1987 Washington Summit there had been two visa problems involving (i) a General who was an advisor to General Secretary Gorbachev and (ii) Arbatov's "new deputy."

Dr. Arbatov commented upon the START negotiations by expressing the hope that the negotiators "do not lose the feeling of urgency." Senator Baker stated that he respectfully disagreed and had the sense that things were moving too fast. Arbatov responded that matters could move too fast and generate ill will toward the talks, but that we should not fall into the trap of the 15 years of MBFR negotiations where there was "insufficient urgency." Arbatov stated that General Secretary Gorbachev wants to proceed "resolutely and quickly" and that "time is short."

Asked about the possible times for a Moscow Summit (from a purely practical point of view), Arbatov stated that the end of May or beginning of June were good times and noted that at the end of June (June 28) there was the large Party conference which had been scheduled for the first time since the 1930s. Arbatov further volunteered there is no reason the Summit could not occur in July. When asked about early May, he stated that the weather was unstable. Arbatov volunteered that June 10 or 12 would be an interesting time

for the President since those would be the dates upon which the Soviets were celebrating their Millenium.

In response to Arbatov's questions as to what were the problems impeding the Moscow Summit, Colin Powell noted that in the area of arms control there were substantial testing issues which may or may not have solutions by May or June. With respect to a START Treaty, Colin Powell stated that a treaty was "still possible" but that we were still apart on mobile missiles and other issues and had made progress on verification regimes. With respect to defense in space, Powell reemphasized that the U.S. position was focused upon the words "as required" in the 1972 Treaty as signed. Powell emphasized that there should be no doubt that the President's position on SDI was unchanged, that the President had lost none of his enthusiasm for SDI and that his conviction remains strong. General Powell emphasized that it was important the each party understand defense in space the "same way" and that each party comprehend and agree to each other's understanding. Powell stated that "we had begun something" in the conventional and chemical areas and those beginnings should be pursued. Powell concluded that there was a meeting next month on regional conflicts and that Afghanistan was very important.

Arbatov then asked whether there was a "consensus in Washington" that it was "not in the U.S. interests for a political settlement in Afghanistan or for the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan." Arbatov stated that he understood that "fundamentalists" might prefer that the Soviet Union remain stuck in Afghanistan. Baker and Powell responded that there was a clear consensus in the U.S. Government that Soviet withdrawal with Afghanistan becoming an independent state, was in the U.S. interest. Arbatov stated again that he understood that some in the U.S. said that it was good that the U.S.S.R. was "stuck there." Powell emphasized again that we need withdrawal and that was the U.S. position. Arbatov agreed, stating that the war in Afghanistan would destabilize Pakistan, be a source for terrorist arms throughout the world and would impede U.S.-Soviet relationships.

Arbatov, in response to a question regarding whether Secretary Gorbachev was tired of summiting, stated that he, Arbatov, had seen Gorbachev twice recently, first three or four days before the New Year and then again on January 6. In the first meeting, Gorbachev stated that he was not ready to travel abroad again, but that on January 6, Gorbachev already "felt better." Arbatov noted that domestic internal matters were now the major current priority as the major foreign policy relationship with the U.S. was "being served" and that with respect to Afghanistan it had already been ascertained that "there can be movement."

Arbatov noted that with respect to Gorbachev's policy of restructuring ("perestroika"), it was clear that "resistance is there" and that the program was seen by some as demanding too much. Arbatov said it was too much to expect that people could agree that "they had become redundant" and that many people simply "don't know how to work in this new situation." Arbatov said that there were outstanding examples of success, that those were the exception as the program had only just started and there was much to learn. Arbatov noted that Gorbachev was a quick learner himself and had changed a lot in three years and that Gorbachev's "vision was much broader" although his vision was "good before."

Baker noted that he had never met Gorbachev in his many visits with Soviet delegations while in the Senate (1967-84). Arbatov stated that Gorbachev had some prominence during the Chernenko period and participated effectively in a visit to Great Britain and in a 1985 trip to Canada as head of a parliamentary delegation. Arbatov stated that Gorbachev assiduously avoided the situation of being a "crown prince." Arbatov stated that "honestly" the Soviet Union "was lucky now," but had been unlucky for quite some time with respect to its leadership. Gorbachev said that the "demands of society for change" were not recognized by the leadership in certain periods and that "history works in subtle ways." He specifically stated that the Soviets were "very unlucky" and "discouraged" during the Chernenko period and that Gorbachev had "incorporated that body of change before becoming General Secretary."

When asked about future travels by Gorbachev, including a trip to the Peoples' Republic of China, Arbatov stated that the Soviets and the Chinese repeat their proposals from time to time but that they were not nervous and not angry with the Chinese at the present time. He did not foresee a trip to South America, although there were some trips planned to "Europe," including Poland. When asked if the Chinese had responded to the Soviets' proposals, Arbatov stated that the Chinese needed all the support they could get from any country, including West Germany, Japan, the U.S., to resolve China's major problems and the Chinese were "cautious not to tip the bell." Arbatov said that there had been a great change in the bilateral U.S.S.R.-PRC relationship and that the two countries were "no longer afraid of attack by the other," that the troops had been reduced "some more" and "could be reduced much more." Arbatov stated that it was difficult to get the troops out once the military had stationed them "in the desert," constructed barracks and prepared an infrastructure. He noted that General Powell should understand that.

The meeting concluded with Arbatov reviewing his plans for meetings during his visit to the U.S., including meetings with William Colby, George Ball, Brent Scowcroft, General David Jones, and meetings at Brown University. Arbatov would then be flying to Stockholm.

cc: Howard H. Baker, Jr. ✓
Colin L. Powell